The Evolving Role of the Adriatic Space in the Mediterranean: Challenges and Opportunities

8/13/2019 The Evolving Role of the Adriatic Space in the Mediterranean: Challenges and Opportunities

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MEDITERRANEAN PAPER SERIES 2013

THE EVOLVING ROLE OF THE ADRIATIC

SPACE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIESEmilio Cocco
http://www.iai.it/index_en.asphttp://www.gmfus.org/


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About Istituto Affari Internazionali

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Cover photo: Te harbor o rieste, Italy. Emilio Cocco
http://www.gmfus.org/http://www.iai.it/index_en.asphttp://www.iai.it/index_en.asphttp://www.gmfus.org/


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T E R A S M

C O

M P S

D

Emilio Cocco1

1 Emilio Cocco is a senior lecturer of sociology of the territory and the environment at the University of Teramo, Italy.

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .iv

Historical Background. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

The Adriatic Space: Actors and Shared Issues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Cooperation in the Adriatic Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Territorial Disputes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

The Adriatic Sea in the Mediterranean Space. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11


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T E R A S M III

E S

Located at the crossroads of the BalkanPeninsula, Central Europe, and theMediterranean, the Adriatic has historically

been characterized by partitioning of the basin intoseparate spaces of national sovereignty and regionalintegration. These centrifugal and centripetal forcesare still at work today and the future of the regionwill depend on two different geopolitical dynamics:further European integration and EU efforts tostabilize the Mediterranean region. Without asimultaneous orientation toward Europe and therest of the Mediterranean, the Adriatic Sea will not

be able to perform its inter-locking role and willrun the risk of progressive marginalization. Adriaticstakeholders should therefore move toward a

vision that sets the space on a path toward strongerEU integration anda strengthening of the EUsMediterranean dimension.


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T G M F U SIV

Relations between the Adriatic andMediterranean spaces are not as strongand self-evident as one would expect,

given their geographic interdependence. Indeedthese spaces are fragmented and this is alsoreflected in research on the area. While studieson Southeastern and Central Europe tend toconcentrate on their continental rather thanAdriatic or wider Mediterranean dimensions,despite their importance for the economic, cultural,and political development of southeastern Europe,1Mediterranean studies tend to underestimate

the maritime dimension of the Western Balkans.Adriatic questions are treated apart from widerMediterranean politics. The loose connectionbetween the Adriatic and the Mediterranean Basinsreflects a lack of shared geopolitical approachesof Adriatic countries toward the Mediterranean,hindered by two centuries of nation-state buildingprocesses that fractured an area that was oncebuilt upon a Mediterranean connectivity2intosovereign spaces of land-oriented continental

1 Emilio Cocco, The Adriatic Space of Identity, NarodnaUmjetnost. Croatian Journal of Ethnology and Folklore Research,Vol. 43, No. 1, June 2006, pp. 7-14, http://hrcak.srce.hr/index.php?show=clanak&id_clanak_jezik=36540.

2 Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell, The Corrupting Sea: AStudy of Mediterranean History, Oxford, Blackwell, 2000.

states.3

Nonetheless, this state of affairs may notbe permanent, especially since the inclusion ofthe Western Balkans in the European project,were there to be a push for a new Mediterraneaninitiative.

The purpose of this paper is to assess how theAdriatic space is developing and examine whatrole it could play in the wider Mediterranean. Itbegins with an overview of actors, players, andnetworks against a specific historical and socialbackground that still has an influence on presentday dynamics before analyzing ongoing practices ofregional cooperation in the Adriatic region vis--visinternational disputes and disagreements. Finally,it sets these dynamics into the wider frameworksof the European and Mediterranean contexts andassesses the relevance of the Adriatic space for theMediterranean focusing on limits and opportunitiesin the Adriatic sub-region.

3 Pamela Ballinger, Lines in the Water, Peoples on the Map.Maritime Museums and the Representation of CulturalBoundaries in the Upper Adriatic, Narodna Umjetnost.Croatian Journal of Ethnology and Folklore Research, Vol.

43, No. 1, June 2006, pp. 15-39, http://hrcak.srce.hr/index.php?show=clanak&id_clanak_jezik=36542;Pamela Ballinger,La frantumazione dello spazio adriatico, in Emilio Cocco andEverardo Minardi (eds.), Immaginare lAdriatico, Milano, FrancoAngeli, 2007, pp. 27-43; Reinhard Johler, A Local Construc-tion -- or: What Have the Alps to do with a Global Readingof the Mediterranean?, Narodna Umjetnost. Croatian Journalof Ethnology and Folklore Research, Vol. 36, No. 1, June 1999,pp. 87-101, http://hrcak.srce.hr/index.php?show=clanak&id_clanak_jezik=53503

F
http://hrcak.srce.hr/index.php?show=clanak&id_clanak_jezik=36540http://hrcak.srce.hr/index.php?show=clanak&id_clanak_jezik=36540http://hrcak.srce.hr/index.php?show=clanak&id_clanak_jezik=36542http://hrcak.srce.hr/index.php?show=clanak&id_clanak_jezik=36542http://hrcak.srce.hr/index.php?show=clanak&id_clanak_jezik=53503http://hrcak.srce.hr/index.php?show=clanak&id_clanak_jezik=53503http://hrcak.srce.hr/index.php?show=clanak&id_clanak_jezik=53503http://hrcak.srce.hr/index.php?show=clanak&id_clanak_jezik=53503http://hrcak.srce.hr/index.php?show=clanak&id_clanak_jezik=36542http://hrcak.srce.hr/index.php?show=clanak&id_clanak_jezik=36542http://hrcak.srce.hr/index.php?show=clanak&id_clanak_jezik=36540http://hrcak.srce.hr/index.php?show=clanak&id_clanak_jezik=36540


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T E R A S M 1

In his seminal book on the Mediterranean,Fernand Braudel suggests that at the beginningof the modern era, the Adriatic was perhaps

the most coherent and unified of all regions in theMediterranean Sea, although he was speaking ofgeographic rather than political unity.4No politicalactor has ever succeeded in politically integratinga region characterized by such physical proximitybetween two coastlines and, at the same time, suchlinguistic, political, and cultural diversity.

The contemporary history of the Adriatic Basin hasbeen characterized by two simultaneous processesof progressive partition and fragmentation intoseparate spaces of national sovereignty, on onehand, and regional integration, reunification, andmulti-national regional cooperation, on the other.The first process started in Napoleonic times (theend of the maritime Republic of Venice), grewin the 19thcentury, and reached its peak withthe post-World War I collapse of the empires inthe area. The 20thcenturys stage was set by thefragmentation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire,which led to a prolonged political struggle between

Italy, Yugoslavia, and Albania for the definitionof their Adriatic borders and the limits of theirstate sovereignty, even though this process wassomewhat frozen in the post-World War II periodby the Iron Curtain.5Interestingly, the secondprocess merged with the first one as the fight forseparate national spaces and the narratives ofmulti-national regional integration sometimes

4 Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the MediterraneanWorld in the Age of Philip II, Vol. I. , New York, Harper & Row,1972.

5 The post-World War II redefinition of the borders betweenItaly and Yugoslavia was a complicated and tense process wherelocal, national, and global interests played a role. The Memo-randum of Understanding signed in London in 1954 by thetwo parties outlined the solution that eventually became fullyeffective after the Treaty of Osimo (1975). Nonetheless, after theMemorandum, relations between Italy and Yugoslavia progres-sively normalized and quite soon the Italo-Yugoslav borderbecame an extremely open one, probably the most open borderof the so-called Iron Curtain. Flows and exchanges of people andgoods revealed an eagerness to cooperate in different fields.

intertwined ambiguously. This was especiallytrue when national questions regarding the areasoverlapped with the political ideologies of fascismand communism throughout the 20thcentury.6Thisambivalent nature of the Adriatic geopolitical spaceis still one of its long-term features.

The violent collapse of federative Yugoslavia inthe 1990s and the parallel process of Europeanenlargement opened a new round of the two-fold process of nation-building and regionalintegration that was so characteristic of the region.The development of the EU from an economiccommunity into a more integrated supranationalpolitical body merged with the Yugoslav wars,ethnic cleansing, the displacement of people, andthe restructuring of public and private property.The European integration path soon becamethe polar star for all post-Yugoslav states,as it enabled them to pursue the dual goals ofnational sovereignty and regional cooperation(plus democratization and economic prosperity).Thus, the Adriatic space was increasingly seenas a chance for countries that were eager to leave

all Balkan and Yugoslav affiliations behind themand associate themselves with a more Westernand European space (i.e. the Western Balkans orEastern Adriatic). Nonetheless, this process is byno means consolidated. Historical antagonismsand conflicting memories are still able to turn theAdriatic Basin into a virtual battlefield wherethese nation- versus region-oriented processes caneasily clash.

6 Pamela Ballinger, History in Exile: Memory and Identity at theBorders of the Balkans, Princeton, Princeton University Press,2003; Marina Cattaruzza (ed.), Nazionalismi di frontiera. Identitcontrapposte sullAdriatico nord-orientale, 1850-1950, Soveria

Mannelli, Rubbettino, 2003; Rolf Wrsdrfer, Krisenherd Adria1915-1955: Konstruktion und Artikulation des Nationalen imitalienisch-jugoslawischen Grenzraum, Paderborn, FerdinandSchningh, 2004.

1H B


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T G M F U S2

Today the Adriatic regional space is shared bysix states, of which three are EU members(Italy, Slovenia, and Croatia) and three have

signed Stabilization and Association Agreementswith the EU (Albania, Montenegro, and Bosnia andHerzegovina). Commercial exchanges and tradebetween the two shores of the Adriatic are quitedeveloped and Italy is one of the most importanttrade partners for all the countries of the easternAdriatic (the largest for Croatia, Slovenia, andAlbania). A traditional competitor of Italy in theregion is Germany, joined more recently by Russia

and China, which are increasing their investmentsin the fields of infrastructure and energy.7This isnot surprising since the Adriatic Sea is a strategicenergy corridor to Central Europe. Coastal citiesand their ports function as commercial, industrial,and tourist hubs for the region.8

Other stakeholders in the region include majorfinancial and banking groups such as UnicreditBank, which is active in all countries of the EasternAdriatic and maintains a leading position in thesector. Other Italian banks like Intesa San Paolo and

Banco Popolare are present in the Eastern Adriaticcountries, showing a good degree of financialinterconnection between Italy, former Yugoslavcountries, and Albania. The Catholic Church isthe most important religious actor and the Vaticanhas been playing a role in the management ofchallenging issues such as the process of returningreal estate and redefining property rights bothin Croatia and Slovenia. Pilgrimage routes (i.e.Medjugorje) represent a steady factor enhancing

7 Stefan Ralchev, Energy in the Western Balkans: A Strategic

Overview, Sofia, Institute for Regional and InternationalStudies, August 2012, http://www.iris-bg.org/files/Energy_in_the_Western_Balkans_Overview_%20Aug12.pdf; Lavdrim Lita,I nostri Balcani, Roma, Fondazione Magna Carta, http://www.magna-carta.it/content/nostri-balcani.

8 Daniele Del Bianco (ed.), Protecting the Adriatic Seaways,Critical Infrastructures Protection Project Report, Gorizia,ISIG, 2008, http://provaisig.altervista.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Final-Report.pdf.

religious tourism and supporting an inter-Adriaticmovement of people year round. Transnationalcrime networks are also active in the region.Human trafficking was a main issue in the 1990s,but the region is still dangerously exposed tothe impact of illicit activities such as smuggling,drug trafficking, and illegal migration-relatedbusinesses.9The risk of migration waves towardEurope from the Eastern Adriatic countries hasproved to be relatively low so far. However, theEastern Adriatic could work as a transit area forAsian and African illegal migration flows directed

toward the EU, as well as for other types of illicitexchanges and movements of goods. In this contextthe stabilization and stronger integration of theBalkans is crucial for the security of the wholeAdriatic Basin.

Finally, the fragile ecology10of the Adriatic Sea alsomakes stronger integration in the area a necessity.The locked-in nature of the Adriatic Basintogether with comparatively high tourism andenergy traffic make it highly vulnerable to marinepollution. Tourism traffic is very high from May to

September, although it drops significantly during9 Matteo Albertini, The Adriatic Connection: Mafia Links fromItaly to the Western Balkans, in Balkananalysis , June 1, 2011,http://www.balkanalysis.com/serbia/2011/06/01/ ; FrancescoStrazzari and Fabrizio Coticchia, The Phantom Menace:Transnational Organised Crime, in Paul Stubbs and ChristopheSolioz (eds.), Toward Open Regionalism in South East Europe ,Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2012, pp. 147-174.

10 Considering the physical features of the Adriatic Basin, whichis a semi-land locked sea, the intensity of maritime traffic is asensible cause of ecological risks. The Adriatic Sea mean breadthis about 160 kilometers (85 nautical miles, 100 miles), althoughthe Strait of Otranto, which connects with the Ionian Sea, is only45-55 nautical miles wide (85-100 kilometers). Moreover, theAdriatic is a quite shallow sea, especially in its northern part.Between Venice and the Croatian peninsula of Istria, the depthrarely exceeds 46 meters (25 fathoms), whereas in the southernpart of the sea, between Bari, Italy, and Dubrovnik, Croatia, itreaches around 900 meters (500 fathoms). The maximum depthis 1,460 meters (800 fathoms), and the mean depth is 240 metersSee Daniele Del Bianco (ed.), Protecting the Adriatic Seaways,cit., pp. 29-30. See also the REMPEC (Regional Marine PollutionEmergency Response Centre for the Mediterranean Sea) data-base for a list of the major accidents took place in the AdriaticSea since 1977, http://www.rempec.org .

2T A S:A S I
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T E R A S M 3

the rest of the year. In the case of oil and containers(and their tractors), the practice of carryinglorries by ferry increased consistently during the1990s when the Yugoslav wars produced harderborder control with long waiting periods, bad roadconnections, and safety concerns. Trucks comingfrom Turkey and the Black Sea region started tobypass the Balkans on their way to Europe by beingshipped to northern Adriatic harbors and thencontinuing their trip toward Central and NorthernEurope. A particularly intense activity throughoutthe year is maritime oil transport,11with ships

coming from several Mediterranean ports andheading mostly for Italian harbors. Consequently,the Adriatic Sea, with its annual oil transport of 70million tons is extremely endangered by pollutionfrom the estimated 15,000 metric tons of residuesdeliberately discharged every year.12

Balancing local and regional environmentalprotection with the global interests of internationalshipping and industrial development is becomingthestrategic challenge for the Adriatic Basin.13From this perspective, the planned pan-European

11 Beside oil, liquified natural gas represents the other importantsource of energy supplied through the Adriatic Basin. In thisregard a quite advanced off-shore terminal named AdriaticLNG terminal was built nine miles off Veneto (Rovigo) in theNorthern Adriatic. The terminal is a gravity based regassifica-tion structure lying right on the seabed and has been operatingsince 2009. Another more contested LNG terminal should beplaced in the Gulf of Trieste but the project is facing severalobjections and resistances both in Italy and Slovenia. See http://www.adriaticlng.it and http://www.edison.it/en/company/gas-infrastructures/adriatic-lng-terminal.shtml.

12

Ugo Bilardo and Giuseppe Mureddu, Traffico petroliero esostenibilit ambientale, Roma, Unione Petrolifera, 2004; MiraMorovi and Andrei Ivanov, Oil Spill Monitoring in the Croa-tian Adriatic Waters: Needs and Possibilities, Acta Adriatica,Vol. 52, No. 1, June 2011, pp. 45-56, http://jadran.izor.hr/acta/eng/v52_1_5.htm.

13 Davor Vidas, The Adriatic Sea Today: Unsolved Issues andChallenges,Mepielan E-bulletin, December 22, 2010, http://www.mepielan-ebulletin.gr/default.aspx?pid=18&ArticleId=51.

transport corridors 5 and 8,14

as well as the so-called Adriatic Corridor, all cross the Adriaticsea region and could turn it into a Highway ofthe Sea. Such large-scale projects require plansfor integrated transport systems and logistics ina regional framework. Moreover, they necessitate

joint regulations for major sea ports. A three-fold approach that combines sea-land intermodallogistics, critical infrastructure protection, andenergy policies should inspire strategies ofsustainable territorial development of the Adriaticmaritime region from a transnational perspective.

Such strategies are critical when economics,logistics, and environmental concerns are discussedand harmonized in multi-level decision-makingprocesses. They concern issues such as plans forthe construction of liquified natural gas terminalsand pipelines,15off-shore oil and gas plants, policiesenhancing renewable energies, management offisheries, and joint initiatives to tackle the risksof pollution of the sea and maritime man-madeaccidents (i.e. oil spills).

14 Corridors number 5 and 8 are two of the ten pan-Europeancorridors that should connect Central and Eastern Europe.These corridors are not part of the Trans-European TransportNetwork (TEN-T) although they serve a similar function.Corridor number 8 will connect the Adriatic and the Black Seafrom Durres, Albania, to Varna, Bulgaria. Corridor number 5,

originally planned between Lisbon and Kyiv, has been reducedfor financial reasons to a Mediterranean Corridor that wouldexclude Portugal and Ukraine. Maps and descriptions availableat: http://magnetbahnforum.de/index.php?Maps-Trans-Euro-pean-Networks.

15 Umberto Profazio, Trans Adriatic Pipeline: EconomicAdvantages over the Competitors but Equal Political Risks,PECOB Business Reports, March 2011, http://www.pecob.eu/flex/cm/pages/ServeBLOB.php/L/EN/IDPagina/2996.
http://www.adriaticlng.it/http://www.adriaticlng.it/http://www.edison.it/en/company/gas-infrastructures/adriatic-lng-terminal.shtmlhttp://www.edison.it/en/company/gas-infrastructures/adriatic-lng-terminal.shtmlhttp://jadran.izor.hr/acta/eng/v52_1_5.htmhttp://jadran.izor.hr/acta/eng/v52_1_5.htmhttp://www.mepielan-ebulletin.gr/default.aspx?pid=18&ArticleId=51http://www.mepielan-ebulletin.gr/default.aspx?pid=18&ArticleId=51http://magnetbahnforum.de/index.php?Maps-Trans-European-Networkshttp://magnetbahnforum.de/index.php?Maps-Trans-European-Networkshttp://www.pecob.eu/flex/cm/pages/ServeBLOB.php/L/EN/IDPagina/2996http://www.pecob.eu/flex/cm/pages/ServeBLOB.php/L/EN/IDPagina/2996http://www.pecob.eu/flex/cm/pages/ServeBLOB.php/L/EN/IDPagina/2996http://www.pecob.eu/flex/cm/pages/ServeBLOB.php/L/EN/IDPagina/2996http://magnetbahnforum.de/index.php?Maps-Trans-European-Networkshttp://magnetbahnforum.de/index.php?Maps-Trans-European-Networkshttp://www.mepielan-ebulletin.gr/default.aspx?pid=18&ArticleId=51http://www.mepielan-ebulletin.gr/default.aspx?pid=18&ArticleId=51http://jadran.izor.hr/acta/eng/v52_1_5.htmhttp://jadran.izor.hr/acta/eng/v52_1_5.htmhttp://www.edison.it/en/company/gas-infrastructures/adriatic-lng-terminal.shtmlhttp://www.edison.it/en/company/gas-infrastructures/adriatic-lng-terminal.shtmlhttp://www.adriaticlng.it/http://www.adriaticlng.it/


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T G M F U S4

The Adriatic Basin has a strategicgeopolitical location at the crossroads ofthe Balkan Peninsula, Central Europe,

and the Mediterranean. As a result, its politicalcommunities are included in a number ofoverlapping multilateral initiatives driven by civilsociety, states, and supranational organizations.Particularly since the 1990s, bottom-up dynamicshave played a central role in the Adriatic Basin.16As the collapse of federal Yugoslavia generatedsocial emergencies and humanitarian risks inthe Balkans, European civil society organizations

promptly reacted by investing conspicuouslyin the area, anticipating but also following theroadmaps put forward by states and internationalorganizations. On the state level, EU memberswith historical ties to southeastern Europe, suchas Italy and Austria, were especially active. Theyput forward their own governmental strategies toestablish new regional frameworks of internationalcooperation, thus contributing to the emergenceof an open regionalism.17Similarly, the EU andother prominent international organizations, suchas NATO and the OSCE, projected themselves in

the area after the 1995 Dayton agreement with theintent of paving a clear Euro-Atlantic and pro-Western path for all the new post-Yugoslav entities.

Since the first decade of the 21stcentury, thesepatterns of transnational cooperation havebecome more established and institutionalized aspioneering initiatives rooted in civil society andthe local political bodies of cities or regions havecoupled with renewed neighborhood policies at

16 Battistina Cugusi, Macro-regional dynamics in the Mediter-ranean area(s): The Case of the Adriatic-Ionian Macro-region,EUborderegions Working Papers, No. 6, January 2013, http://www.euborderregions.eu/dissemination/policy.

17 Christophe Solioz and Paul Stubbs, Emergent regionalco-operation in South-East Europe: toward open regionalism?,Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1-2,March-June 2009, pp. 1-16.

both the national (i.e. Italian law 84/2001)18

and EUlevel (i.e. Interreg or partnership agreements). Asa result, the Adriatic is progressively becoming anarea of intense multi-level cooperation. To clarifythese dynamics, the most relevant cooperationinitiatives, their main features and stakeholders areoutlined below.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)has played a crucial role in the Euro-Atlanticintegration of the Adriatic area since its military

intervention in former Yugoslavia. Within a fewyears after having deployed its first peacekeepingmission to Bosnia and Herzegovina in December1995, NATO mobilized to intervene in the Kosovocontroversy to prevent a humanitarian crisis,deploying the NATO-led Kosovo Force in 1999.In 2001, NATO, along with the European Union,helped the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedoniabring its internal conflict to an end and laterdeployed a task force to collect weapons frominsurgents and supported the implementation of apeace agreement. Today, besides Italy, three eastern

Adriatic countries are part of NATO: Albania(2009), Croatia (2009), and Slovenia (2004).Moreover, three more partners in the WesternBalkans aspire to membership. Montenegro joinedthe Membership Action Plan (MAP) in 2009;Bosnia and Herzegovina was invited to the MAPin 2010; and the former Yugoslav Republic ofMacedonia is likely to be invited to start accessiontalks soon, once a solution to the issue over thecountrys name is reached.19

European Union

The European Union (EU) is certainly the mostinfluential supranational actor in the area. One

18 Act regulating the Italian participation to the stabilization,reconstruction, and development of the Balkan countries, http://www.normattiva.it/uri-res/N2Ls?urn:nir:stato:legge:2001;84.

19 See http://www.nato.int.

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T E R A S M 5

of its focuses has been promotion of Adriaticcross-border cooperation at the regional levelthrough the Interreg program, which is financedunder the European Regional Development Fund.20Moreover, the 2007-2013 Adriatic cross-bordercooperation program Instrument for Pre-AccessionAssistance (IPA) seeks to stimulate furtherregional cooperation in the framework of theforthcoming integration of the entire Adriatic areain the European Union. Besides integration andassociation processes, all post-Yugoslav countriesplus Albania have been involved in some forms

of European-sponsored regional cooperation. EUactions have also triggered regional initiatives. TheEU-sponsored Stability Pact for South-EasternEurope led to the creation of the Italian-sponsoredAdriaticIonian Initiative (AII). Indeed, the EUemerges as the first and most important frame ofreference for all initiatives outlined here althoughthis was only recently institutionalized when theEuropean Commission, namely the EnvironmentDirectorate General (DG) and the Maritime Affairsand Fisheries DG, produced a Macro-Regionalstrategy for the Adriatic Basin in June 2011,

following a statement by the European Council inMay 2011. To understand the role of this strategyand before examining it in detail, the relevantinitiatives are now briefly reviewed.

A regional forum with an important Adriaticconnotation is the Central European Initiative(CEI), based in Trieste since 1996. CEI is anintergovernmental forum promoting political,economic, cultural, and scientific cooperationamong member states, which include all Adriaticstates plus most Central and East European ones

(with the exclusion of Germany and the Balticstates, but including Ukraine and Belarus).21The Central European Initiative sprang fromthe Quadragonale, established in Budapest on

20 See http://www.adriaticipacbc.org.

21 See http://www.ceinet.org .

November 11, 1989, by Italy, Austria, Hungary, andthe Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Thatinitiative was aimed at overcoming the existingdivision in blocs by re-establishing cooperationlinks among countries of different politicalorientations and economic structures. At thefirst summit in Venice in 1990, Czechoslovakiawas admitted and the Initiative was renamedPentagonale. In 1991, with the admission ofPoland, it became the Hexagonale. Even thoughthe initiative was relatively low-key, it fosterednetworks between universities, economic actors,

and local political bodies.

Similar in its intent, but with a clearer and sharperAdriatic focus is theAdriatic-Ionian Initiative(AII),which represents the most important inter-statemultilateral Adriatic forum since its establishmentas part of the European Unions Stability Pact forSouth Eastern Europe, involving all southeasternEuropean countries aspiring to join the Union.22AII was set up in Ancona (Italy) on May 19-20,2000, by the heads of states and governments ofItaly, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia,

Greece, and Slovenia. At the end of the conference,the foreign ministers of participating countriessigned the Ancona Declaration, which statesthat strengthening regional cooperation helps topromote political and economic stability, thuscreating a solid base for the process of Europeanintegration.23The Initiative was later extended tothe federative union of Serbia and Montenegro,and, after the referendum in Montenegro, to bothstates. Following the EU approach to supportingmultilateral sub-regional cooperation and given thesuccessful example of the EU Strategy for the Baltic

Sea, the AII started to push for a macro-region forthe Adriatic-Ionian basin in early 2010.

22 See http://www.aii-ps.org .

23 See Introductory notes, comma 2 of the Ancona Declaration,May 19-20, 2000, http://www.aii-ps.org/index.php/about-the-aii/guidelines-and-rules-of-procedures/item/4-the-ancona-declaration.
http://www.adriaticipacbc.org/http://www.ceinet.org/http://www.aii-ps.org/http://www.aii-ps.org/index.php/about-the-aii/guidelines-and-rules-of-procedures/item/4-the-ancona-declarationhttp://www.aii-ps.org/index.php/about-the-aii/guidelines-and-rules-of-procedures/item/4-the-ancona-declarationhttp://www.aii-ps.org/index.php/about-the-aii/guidelines-and-rules-of-procedures/item/4-the-ancona-declarationhttp://www.aii-ps.org/index.php/about-the-aii/guidelines-and-rules-of-procedures/item/4-the-ancona-declarationhttp://www.aii-ps.org/index.php/about-the-aii/guidelines-and-rules-of-procedures/item/4-the-ancona-declarationhttp://www.aii-ps.org/index.php/about-the-aii/guidelines-and-rules-of-procedures/item/4-the-ancona-declarationhttp://www.aii-ps.org/http://www.ceinet.org/http://www.adriaticipacbc.org/


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Another relevant transnational player in regionalcooperation is theAdriatic-Ionian Euro-Region,founded on June 30, 2006, in Pula, Croatia. Itrepresents a model of cooperation that includestransnational and inter-regional cooperationbetween regions along the Adriatic coast.24Itsgoal is to set a joint stage for local authoritiesto solve common issues of the Adriatic area.It consists of 26 members: regional and localgovernments from Italy, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosniaand Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Albania. Atthe level of municipalities, the leading network

is the Forum of the Cities of the Adriatic andIonian Basin, as established at the initiative ofthe Municipality of Ancona and ANCI (ItalianNational Association of the Municipalities) withthe approval of the Charter of Ancona in Ancona,on April 20, 1999. It brings together the coastalcities of the seven countries of the AdriaticIonian basin (Italy, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia andHerzegovina, Montenegro, Albania, and Greece)25and aims to build and develop the economic,social, environmental, and cultural heritage of theAdriatic and Ionian coastal cities and to collaborate

on European integration and enlargement. Closelyrelated to the Forum of the Cities is the Forumof the Adriatic Chambers of Commerce, which isa transnational non-profit association with legalpersonality set up in 2001. Among the academiccooperation initiatives, Uniadrion, established tocreate a permanent connection among universitiesand research centers in the Adriatic-Ionian region,links several academic institutions from all theformer Yugoslav countries as well as Albania,Greece, and Italy. Originally hosted by theUniversity of Bologna, it is now based in Ancona at

the Polytechnic University of the Marche Region,and promotes cooperation mainly through didactic

24 Diego Vecchiato, The Adriatic Euroregion, Strategic Institu-tion Building, in Pace diritti umani - Peace Human Rights, Vol.7, No. 3, 2010, pp. 53-61, http://unipd-centrodirittiumani.it/public/docs/PDU3_2010_A053.pdf.

25 See http://www.faic.eu.

activities, such as training courses, masters, andresearch projects.26Finally and even though thesea is obviously the central feature of the Adriaticregion, a maritime cooperative dimensionamong Adriatic countries has only appeared veryrecently.27In December 2012, the EU Commissionlaunched jointly with the Croatian governmenta Marine strategy for Adriatic and Ionian Seas,which is probably the first coherent and systematicattempt to implement a sea-based strategy in theregion.

Eventually, all these actions and networksconverged in December 2012 in the EUCommissions plan to develop a Macro-RegionalStrategy for the Adriatic-Ionian Region by theend of 2014. The macro-region is not a new bodyor organization but represents an innovativemode of territorial cooperation among differentregions and nations with the goal of balanced andsustainable development. Accordingly, the macro-region is not a geographical region with predefinedboundaries, but a functional area, composed ofnational, regional, and local bodies coming together

to tackle shared challenges. It is not a furtherinstitutional level within the European Union (likestates, regions, municipalities, etc.) but rather anetwork, an operating mode, or, more precisely,a joint initiative involving several European,national, regional and stakeholders, policies, andfunding programs. It involves Albania, Bosnia andHerzegovina, Croatia, Greece, Italy, Montenegro,Serbia, and Slovenia.

To conclude this section, cooperation in theAdriatic Basin has grown in the last 20 yearsmainly as a reaction to emergency situations and tocounter the disrupting regional effects as well asa feared domino effect of the Yugoslav collapse.Some important results have been achieved, such as

26 See http://www.forumaic.org .

27 See http://www.uniadrion.net.
http://unipd-centrodirittiumani.it/public/docs/PDU3_2010_A053.pdfhttp://unipd-centrodirittiumani.it/public/docs/PDU3_2010_A053.pdfhttp://www.faic.eu/http://www.forumaic.org/http://www.uniadrion.net/http://www.uniadrion.net/http://www.forumaic.org/http://www.faic.eu/http://unipd-centrodirittiumani.it/public/docs/PDU3_2010_A053.pdfhttp://unipd-centrodirittiumani.it/public/docs/PDU3_2010_A053.pdf


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T E R A S M 7

the end to armed hostilities and a clearer vision ofa European future for all post-Yugoslav countries.Nonetheless, the process of regional reintegrationis still relatively slow. One of the strategic obstaclesto the development of efficient Adriatic regionalcooperation has been the substantial diversityin administrative practices and organizationalpatterns at the local and regional levels. In the caseof Italy, the regional authorities engaged in Adriaticcooperation often act without clear guidancefrom the national government and as a result, the

overall impact of their actions responds to localviews and reflects a weakness in deliberation andpost-evaluation actions. Thus, the harmonizationof rules and practices at local and regional levelsshould go hand-in-hand with a definition ofpriorities to achieve deeper integration in EU andNATO structures. Finally, the impact of nationalismand centralizing trends has been a hindrance,especially in the eastern Adriatic. Governmentsin the area are not always ready to cooperate asunsolved national rivalries continue to smolder.


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The disintegration of Yugoslavia led to aproliferation of Adriatic littoral states andthus an increase in the number of potential

maritime and land boundaries and related disputes.A number of critical issues have been resolved (forexample, the Croatia-Yugoslavia [later Montenegro]boundary on the Prevlaka Peninsula and the Bayof Kotor), but some are still unsettled, such as theBay of Piran dispute between Croatia and Sloveniaor the question of Bosnias access to the sea.28Regional cooperation initiatives have been onlypartly successful in tackling these issues. While

the Adriatic space did become peaceful after theend of the Kosovo crisis, buttressed as it was byseveral bottom-up initiatives and multilateralcooperation frameworks, national governmentsand even some states did not always take thekind of actions that enable effective transnationalintegration. Accordingly, in spite of declarations ofgoodwill and wishful proclamations, some nationalconfrontations still persist.

The main dispute is in the Gulf of Piran andis related to the delimitation of the maritime

boundary between Slovenia and Croatia, namely tothe Slovenian claim of a corridor to internationalwaters. The dispute also involves the issue ofdelimitation of land boundaries, ethnic loyalties,and unsettled real estate claims.29A third frontwas opened by Croatias unilateral decision inOctober 2003 to establish a maritime EconomicExclusive Zone (EEZ) beyond 12 nautical miles on

28 Gerald H. Blake and Duko Topalovi, The Maritime Bound-aries of the Adriatic Sea,Maritime Briefings, Vol. 1, No. 8, 1996,https://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/publications/view/?id=231.

29 Matej Avbelj and Jernej Letnar erni, The Conundrum ofthe Piran Bay: Slovenia v. Croatia - The Case of Maritime Delim-itation, The University of Pennsylvania Journal of InternationalLaw & Policy, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2007, pp. 1-19, https://www.law.upenn.edu/journals/jil/jilp/articles/5-1_Cernic_Jernej_Letnar.pdf; Damir Josipovi and Vera Krinik-Buki, Slovensko-hrvakiobmejni prostor : etnine vzporednice med popisi prebivalstva

po letu 1991 [Slovenian-Croatian Border Area: Ethnic Paral-lels Between the Censuses of Population after 1991], Ljubljana,Institute for Ethnic Studies, 2010.

the basis of the Law of the Sea. Slovenia and Italyalmost immediately took rather critical positionsand, playing upon their status as EU memberstates, managed to bring the issue before theEuropean Commission. This move had a strongpolitical impact on Croatia, still an EU applicantcountry at the time. After the EEZ problem wasplaced in the context of progress in Croatias EUaccession process, the Croatian government wasforced to withdraw in 2008, but the economic andenvironmental status of that part of the Adriaticremains undefined.30Nonetheless, some progress

has been observed since Croatias recent accessionto the EU, as the role of the EEZs in the Adriaticand the Mediterranean is now being discussed asa possible instrument of ecological protection andeconomic development.

Another dispute concerns Croatia and Bosniaand Herzegovina with regard to Bosnias shortcoastline (Neum enclave) and its access to the opensea. In this case, Bosnias interest in having a fullyfunctioning maritime outpost clashes with Croatiaslogistical need to connect the county of Dubrovnik

with the rest of the country. The Croatian projectto build a bridge across the channel in front ofNeum has been fiercely opposed by the Bosniangovernment, which wants to keep its corridor tointernational waters open. Nonetheless, the twocountries have tried to keep the dispute undercontrol without openly turning it into a matter ofinternational confrontation for nationalist partiesto thrive upon, as in the Piran case.31

30

Davor Vidas, The Adriatic Sea Today: Unsolved Issues andChallenges, cit.

31 The latter led to repeated mobilization of the Croatian andSlovenian public opinions, until the point of suggesting aninternational arbitrage to settle the issue, whereas the Neumcase proved to be a less sensitive topic insofar. Adelina Marini,Croatia and Bosnia from Now refrain from Opening PandorasBox, Euinside, September 7, 2012, http://www.euinside.eu/en/news/croatia-and-bosnia-do-not-want-to-open-pandoras-box.

4T D
https://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/publications/view/?id=231https://www.law.upenn.edu/journals/jil/jilp/articles/5-1_Cernic_Jernej_Letnar.pdfhttps://www.law.upenn.edu/journals/jil/jilp/articles/5-1_Cernic_Jernej_Letnar.pdfhttps://www.law.upenn.edu/journals/jil/jilp/articles/5-1_Cernic_Jernej_Letnar.pdfhttp://www.euinside.eu/en/news/croatia-and-bosnia-do-not-want-to-open-pandoras-boxhttp://www.euinside.eu/en/news/croatia-and-bosnia-do-not-want-to-open-pandoras-boxhttp://www.euinside.eu/en/news/croatia-and-bosnia-do-not-want-to-open-pandoras-boxhttp://www.euinside.eu/en/news/croatia-and-bosnia-do-not-want-to-open-pandoras-boxhttps://www.law.upenn.edu/journals/jil/jilp/articles/5-1_Cernic_Jernej_Letnar.pdfhttps://www.law.upenn.edu/journals/jil/jilp/articles/5-1_Cernic_Jernej_Letnar.pdfhttps://www.law.upenn.edu/journals/jil/jilp/articles/5-1_Cernic_Jernej_Letnar.pdfhttps://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/publications/view/?id=231


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Eventually, the persistence of these disputes has tobe understood in the context of nation-building inthe wake of relatively recent state collapses (FederalYugoslavia, and in some respects also Albania)and the consequent geopolitical fragmentation.The political stability of the Adriatic region isstill haunted by territorial sensitivities, notablyregarding the modification of internationalfrontiers and the loss of territories. In fact, althoughthe risk of serious escalation of the conflictsbetween Adriatic countries is quite low, micro

conflicts do function as tests of sovereignty forthe new states and as challenges to the Europeanproject.32Local politicians seeking support can stirup the nationalist sentiments of public opinion bystressing security concerns.

32 Bernard Lory, Contentieux micro-territoriaux dans lesBalkans, XIXe-XXIe sicles, Balkanologie , Vol. 6, No. 1-2,December 2002, pp. 9-14, http://balkanologie.revues.org/1612.
http://balkanologie.revues.org/1612http://balkanologie.revues.org/1612


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T E R A S M 11

horizons and clear political goals since the verybeginning of the UfM in 2008, but also of anasymmetry in political investments. In otherwords, on one hand, the UfM presents an attractiveopportunity for the eastern Adriatic countries36andfor some other smaller European Mediterraneanstates to pursue European integration further andtake on political responsibility and gain prestigewithin the EU.37On the other hand, however, thecountries of Northern Africa and the Middle Eastare not equally interested in developing furthercooperation initiatives.38Since political integration

in the EU is not in the cards, they are morecomfortable with maintaining bilateral relationswith the EU than in investing politically in theproliferation of rather ambivalent multilateral andmulti-scaled cooperation initiatives. Therefore, awhole new and attractive multilateral approachby the EU, which takes account of the starktransformation the Southern Mediterraneanis experiencing, is needed and would also playa key strategic role for the Adriatic. Without adouble orientation toward Europe and the restof the Mediterranean, the Adriatic Sea will not

be able to perform its interlocking role and will36 Slovenia, for example, tried to carve out a role for itself inMediterranean politics, notably through the MediterraneanUniversity based in Slovenia, which was one of the few productsof UfM-Eastern Adriatic engagement.

37 Dimitar Bechev, Distant Neighbours: The MediterraneanPolicies of the Countries in South East Europe, in Schfer, Isabeland Jean-Robert Henry (eds.),Mediterranean Policies from

Above and Below, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2009, pp. 171-185.

38 Roberto Aliboni, The State of Play of the Union for the Medi-terranean in the Euro-Med Context, Documenti IAI, No. 1017,September 2010, http://www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/IAI1017.pdf.

run the risk of progressive marginalization. Theroadmap of European integration in southeasternEurope did not follow a Mediterranean path butwas strongly oriented toward centralnorthernEurope and the western (Atlantic) side. Adriaticstakeholders could open a new perspective for theEU by moving toward a vision that sets the Adriaticspace on a path toward stronger EU integrationand a strengthening of the EUs Mediterraneandimension.

Italy, specifically, could play a crucial role in thisrespect. The Adriatic space could not only provideItaly with a gateway for connecting with the largercontinental European regions, such as the Danubeand the Baltic regions but, as one of the drivingforces of the EUs Mediterranean policy, Italy couldalso actively seek to open the Adriatic space towardthe Mediterranean and include it in a new pushfor a Mediterranean initiative. The latter shouldbe reshaped as a genuinely European effort, andnot be restricted to a Spanish, French or Italian-led local endeavor. Otherwise, the risk is not onlythat of turning the Adriatic Macro Region into an

isolated, exclusive pool a low-profile, intimatereproduction of the Mediterranean Sea in whichto accumulate hypertrophic networking initiativesand perform empty diplomatic exercises butalso that of progressively losing touch with theMediterranean region at a time when the EU isalready increasingly inward- and continental-looking and in danger of losing its stakes in itsSouth Mediterranean neighborhood undergoingfundamental change.
http://www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/IAI1017.pdfhttp://www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/IAI1017.pdf


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The Evolving Role of the Adriatic Space in the Mediterranean: Challenges and Opportunities

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