The Euro Crisis: a View from the North€¦ · 22.5.2013 Seppo Honkapohja 10 80 90 100 110 120 130...
Transcript of The Euro Crisis: a View from the North€¦ · 22.5.2013 Seppo Honkapohja 10 80 90 100 110 120 130...
SUOMEN PANKKI | FINLANDS BANK | BANK OF FINLAND
The Euro Crisis: a View from the North
Seppo HonkapohjaBank of Finland
1Seppo Honkapohja22.5.2013
Views expressed are my own and do not necessarily reflectthose of the Bank of Finland.
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Outline
♦ Build-up of the crisis
♦ Some design faults
♦ Adjustment and policies in the crisis
♦ The austerity debate: comments
♦ Going forward
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1. Build-up of the crisis
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Fig. 1: Disappearance of interest ratedifferentials (before 2008)
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0
4
8
12
16
20
24
28
32
0
4
8
12
16
20
1995 2000 2005 2010
Ireland Italy Portugal Spain Greece (right scale)
%
10 years government bond interest rate differential to Germany.Source: Bloomberg.24297@Korkoerot(m)_SH_0513
Interest rate differentials
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Figure 2A: Public deficits
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-35
-30
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain Euro area
% of GDP
Source: European Comission.24297@Alijäämät_SH_0513
Public deficits: GIIPS
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Figure 2B: Public debt
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0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain Euro area
% of GDP
Source: European Comission.24297@Velat_SH_0513
Public debt: GIIPS
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Figure 3: Current account and public debtdynamics, GIIPS countries
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Spain
Ireland
ItalyGreece
Portugal
‐35
‐30
‐25
‐20
‐15
‐10
‐5
0
5
10
‐20 ‐10 0 10 20
Public deficit
Current account
Imbalances: GIIPS 2002‐2012
Spain
Ireland
Italy
Greece
Portugal
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Figure 4: Current account and public debtdynamics, high-rated countries
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Finland
AustriaBelgium
Netherlands
France
Germany
‐10
‐5
0
5
10
‐10 ‐5 0 5 10
Public deficit
Current Account
Imbalances: High‐rated countries 2002‐2012
Finland
Austria
Belgium
Netherlands
France
Germany
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Figure 6: Unit labor costs for selected high-rated countries
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95
100
105
110
115
120
125
130
135
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Belgium Finland France Germany Netherlands
2000 = 100
Source: European Comission.25200@ULC_SH_0513
Unit labor costs: high-rated countries
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Figure 7: Unit labor costs for GIIPS countries
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80
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain
2000 = 100
Source: European Comission.25200@ULC_GIIPS_SH_0513
Unit labor costs: GIIPS
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2. Some design faults
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♦ Currency union is no shield from BOP crises - on the contrary!– BOP crisis took the form of a run on weak sovereigns .– ”Original sin”: sovereign debts in currency outside control by the
country.
♦ SGP problems:− No monitoring of external imbalances.− Lax implementation of SGP.
♦ Downgrading of the no bail-out clause.
♦ Insufficient completion of the EU single financial marketprogramme.
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3. Adjustment and policies in the crisis
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♦ Only hard choices remain once the crisis has erupted.– Necessary to adjust GDP downward.
♦ Making policy choices about downward adjustment arecomplex in the euro system.
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Fig. 8: GDP declining, except for Ireland
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60
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain
2005 = 100
Source: European Comission.26750@Chart8
GDP: GIIPS
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Fig. 9: Current accounts in still deficit, exceptIreland
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-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain
% of GDP
Source: European Commission.26813@Chart4(en)
Current account: GIIPS
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Fig. 10: Primary balances improving
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-30
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain
% of GDP
Source: European Commission.26037@Perusjäämät_SH_0513
Primary deficit to GDP: GIIPS
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Fig. 11: Rising unemployment
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0
5
10
15
20
25
30
2005 2007 2009 2011 2013
Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain
%
Source: Eurostat.26295@Työt_GIIPS_SH_0513
Unemployment: GIIPS
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4. The austerity debate: comments
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SUOMEN PANKKI | FINLANDS BANK | BANK OF FINLAND 2022.5.2013 Seppo Honkapohja
Constant 0.97* (0.54)
Forecast of fiscal stance ‐0.28 (0.39)
Fitted value of change in sovereign bond yields ‐0.56** (0.21)
R2 0.67
Growth forecast error = α + β forecast of fiscal stance + γ fitted value of change in sov. yields + ε
Change in sov. bond yields = γ0 + γ1 sov. rating + γ2 sov. CDS spread + γ3 headline fiscal deficit + ε
Table1:GDPgrowthforecasterrorsandforecastoffiscalstance,estimation with instrument variables
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♦ Alternatives to present policies:(1) Slower speed in adjustment:
Finance for countries in EU-IMF programmes?Other countries: risk of increasing rates with major slow-down or reversal in adjustment.
(2) More expansionary FP in high-rated countries:Limited impact?Public finances of Northern countries are not that strong. Political willingness in Northern countries?
(3) Defaulting on existing debt (and possibly exit from euro). Quick balancing of public deficit and CA => additional austerity, capital controls, possibly fragile new currency.
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5. Going forward
♦ Two principal parts in the policy response.
(1) Crisis management. – Policies in the crisis countries. – Provision of bridge finance by IMF and EU (ESM). – Accommodative monetary policy by ECB.
(2) Improvements in economic and fiscal institutions and governance.
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♦ Banking union: SSM, bank resolution, deposit insurance.
♦ Improved governance for more resilient EU/euro area.− European Semester, Six-pack, Two-pack, Fiscal compact…
♦ Implementation of the new rules is crucial.
♦ ”Legacy” problem: what to do with the existing highlevels of private and public debts? (see figure)
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Figure 12: Greek and Irish public debt ration1970-2011
20.12.2010
0
40
80
120
160
200
240
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Ireland Greece Euro area
% of GDP
Sources: Eurostat ja European Commission. Forecast autumn 2011.23162@EA J-velka(pitkä)
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♦ Numerous proposals (Euro bonds, EMF, Specialfund,…)
− Involve complicated and possibly drastic redistributions of liabilities among countries.
− Moral hazard problems in many of them.
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