The Eritrean-Ethiopian BorderConflict: Part 2-Explanations

ADDIS ABABA, Ethiopia November 1998

"Ifind it difficult to give a satisfactory answer to the question why rela-tions with Eritrea have soured and how they reached the present Stage. AsI havefound no answer that can satisfy me, I have no answer to give youwhich I believe will satisfy you."

--Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi speaking to journalists

"It is difficult to even guess what could be behind this sudden turn ofevents. However, when it is all over we will stand in judgment beforeour own people."

uEritrean President Isaias Afwerki as quoted in Eritrea Profile

By Marc Michaelson

When fightingbroke out along the Ethiopian-Eritreanborder in May, nearlyeveryone was shocked. No one expected a war between these close friendsand neighbors. The people, and even the presidents, of the two countries ex-pressed disbelief.

The two liberation movements, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front(EPLF) and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), had cooperated closelyduring "the struggle" to overthrow Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam’s socialistDerg government in 1991. Once they exchanged their battle fatigues for civil-ian clothes, assuming dominant roles within their respective governments, col-laboration increased. Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki and Ethiopian PrimeMinister Meles Zenawi were personally very close, speaking regularly on thephone to discuss issues, coordinate policy and offer each other friendly advice.The two:governments worked together to ensure a smooth referendum on in-dependence and transition to self-rule in Eritrea, ey negotiated partnershipagreements in currency, trade and certain spheres of foreign policy. Togetherthey revitalized the sub-regional Inter-Governmental Authority on Develop-ment (IGAD), based in Djibouti, to promote trade and stability in the sub-region.

All of these efforts were reaping tangible benefits for both countries. Ag-gressive economic development programs were steadily reversing decades ofdisastrous feudal and then communist stagnation. War-ravaged infrastructures

roads, electricity, telecommunications were being rebuilt and modern-

This is the second of a two part series on the Eritrean-Ethiopian border conflict. PartI described the conflict events and peace initiatives from both Ethiopian and Eritreanperspectives. Part 2 explores the background and causes of the conflict.

Meles Zenawi as quoted in "The Eye on Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa," Vol. VIII,1998, p.18.

ized. The two countries were pursuing different strate-gies for economic development and nation-building, butbothwere persistent, strong-willed and principled in theircommitments to rehabilitate their war-battered nations.

How, then, could all of this be lost overnight? Howcould such dear friends turn into vitriolic enemies nearlyinstantaneously? How could the "African Renaissance"praised by President Clinton this past spring unravel atthe seams so quickly, so naturally?

Understanding the Eritrean-Ethiopianborder conflictis not easy the conflict in many ways defies logic. Aplethora of conspiracy theories, diabolical intrigues andmaniacal schemes have emerged as answers to this sim-plest of questions: Why? Herein, I will attempt to wadethrough the rumors, propaganda and hoopla to providesome explanation and insights into this war that no oneseems to understand.

HISTORICAL FACTORS

Don’tAsk "why., Ask "Why Not?"

The puzzlement expressed since the outbreak of hos-tilities in May is, in many regards, entirely unfounded.When put in proper historical perspective, it is not thereturn to war that is strange or noteworthy, but ratherthe peculiar absence of war during the past seven years.Instead of asking how war could possibly have brokenout between these two peace-loving, development-ori-ented neighbors, a more propos question may be ’howdid they avoid war until now?’.

Ethiopia has known relatively few periods of totalpeace and harmony throughout the past two thousand

or so years. War, conquest and political violence has beenendemic in this part of the world. As Harold Marcus notesin A History of Ethiopia, "The five hundred years beforethe Christian era witnessed warfare that increased inscale..." (p. 5) Later, in the 4th Century, King Ezana of theAxumite empire led his army into Sudan to secure cara-van trade routes. In the 6th Century, King Caleb led histroops to Yemenwhere they fought the Jewish leader DhuNwas, whose persecution of the Christian populationwasdisrupting trade relations. In the 8th century, Axumlooked southward, and established itself, militarily ofcourse, in the area that is now Welo province. The Agewsubjects of that region fought back, and as Marcus ob-serves, from 900-1000 there was "continual warfare andskirmishing against the isolated government fortresses."3

This is merely a brief sampling; the accounts of perpetualwarfare continue from the Zagwe dynasty to theSolomonic Dynasty and into the modern era.

Expanding and contracting empires, wars of acces-sion, skirmishes between rival feudal lords, religious con-quests all have been an integral part of societal andpolitical life in what are today Ethiopia and Eritrea. Allof this is not meant to portray the Abyssinian people as aslew of gun-toting violent zealots, but rather to show thatthose who expected a long reign of peace and tranquil-lity to descend upon Ethiopia and Eritrea beginning in1991 were probably unduly optimistic.

The Barrel of the Gun: Political Power Gained, Po-litical Power Exercised

The current governments in Ethiopia and Eritrea areled by former guerrilla movements. Eritrea’s EPLF hasbeen renamed the PFDJ (People’s Front for Democracyand Justice) and reorganized into a political party. In

Ethiopia, a coalition of rebel groups led bythe TPLF formed the EPRDF (EthiopianPeople’s Revolutionary Democratic Front) in1988. This multi-ethnic coalition, now a col-lection of civilian political parties, formed atransitional government in 1991, and contin-ues to rule Ethiopia today.

Violent political transition is not new toEthiopia, nor to Africa as a whole. Guerrillamovements and military coups d’dtat are acommon feature on the continent, During the1990’s, Zaire (now Congo), Sierra Leone,Guinea Bissau, Nigeria, and a host of othercountries have hosted violent powerchanges. In the Horn of Africa, there havebeen intractable civil wars in Somalia andSudan, and periodic civil strife in Kenya andUganda. Ethiopia’s recent history is also in-dicative. Emperor Haile Selassie was over-

Ethiopian troops deployed near the disputed border with Eritrea thrown by a collection of disgruntled seg-

Harold Marcus, A History:ofEthiopia, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994, p. 11.

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ments of the population in 1974, and even-tually the Derg, a hard-line, left-wing factionof the military, assumed power. Then, in1991, the TPLF and EPLF ousted the Derg. Apattern begins to emerge.

This pattern of accessionby violent over-throw validates violence as a political tool.When groups, even benevolent, progressiveand principled movements like the EPLF andTPLF, attain political power throughthe bar-rel of the gun, a precedent is set. Militaryoperations are perceived as legitimate, per-haps even the most effective, means toachieve political ends. In times of stress, pres-sure, threat or confrontation, these groupswill often resort to military force to achievepolitical objectives and maintain or protectpower.

The Ethiopian-Eritrean border war cannot be adequately explained by such simple reasoning;however, the history of the EPLF and TPLF provides thecontext or backdrop in which this conflict has occurred.The current dispute is not the first time these two gov-ernments have used military force. Eritrea has had mili-tary confrontations with Yemen over ownership of theHanish Islands in the Red Sea, with Djibouti over a bor-der dispute, and has assisted the rebels in neighboringSudan. Ethiopia, for its part, has been somewhat less ag-gressive, although it has also shown some propensity to-ward using the military as a political tool. Ethiopia hasaided the Sudanese rebels, and has had several militaryskirmishes with AMttihad, a Somali rebel group.

TheyNeverLiked Us, andThey Like Us Even LessNow

Some observers point to historical animositybetweenthe populations of Eritrea and Tigray. Tensions betweenthe two peoples began prior to the Italian conquest ofEritrea in the 19th century. A series of Tigrayan warlordsand leaders, from Ras Mikhael Seul in the 1760’s toYohannes IV in the 1870’s, incorporated Eritrea into theirpolitical dominions. The Eritreans, who at that time did

Two members of local Eritrean militia pose infront of the Mereb River

not yet have a distinctive identity separate from Ethio-pia, first became alienated and distrustful of their south-ern neighbors in Tigray during this period.

The relationship changed significantly when Italycolonized what is now Eritrea. AS Italy built its colonialstructures and spurred the local economy with invest-ments in industry and infrastructures, Eritrea began tomodernize and its people started to form their own dis-tinctive identity. ManyTigrayans came to Eritrea in searchof work, and most were given the most menial jobsthose the Eritreans themselves didn’t want. The Tigrayansbegan to resent the Eritreans, who looked down uponthem as third-class citizens.

The self-confidence of Eritreans, particularly as theyproclaim their Italian-inspired sophistication and civil-ity, and their prowess on the battlefront, can easily beinterpreted as arrogance and condescension. ThroughoutTigray, onecansensethedeep angertowardEritmans for theirboastfulness portraying themselves as advanced andcivilized. This ill-feeling is quite pervasive and childish

the repetitious whining resembles kids in a schoolyard,

41 believe political organizations (and leaders) that attain power through violent means are more likely, while they are inpower, to use violence as a tool to achieve political ends than are political organizations that attained power non-violently (e.g.democratically), Further quantitative research is needed to test this supposition.

"Background Notes on the Ethio-Eritrean War," anonymous unpublished manuscript distributed by GTZ.

There was a brief period, 1889-1896, when Italy controlled both Eritrea and Tigray. Hoping to assume control of all ofEthiopia, the Italians planned further pushes south, but were defeated by Emperor Menelik II and his armies in the famousBattle of Adua in 1896. Following that defeat, the Italians withdrew back to the Mereb River, and ultimately agreed on a borderdemarcation with Ethiopia in a series of treaties in 1900, 1902, 1908. These treaties are currently cited by the Eritreans asevidence of clear colonial-demarcated borders. Had the Italians been successful in holding Tigray, modem-day Ethiopia wouldlikely have included both Eritrea and Tigray, and the tensions between the two populations would have dissipated.

The Italians treated their Eritrean subjects as inferiors, segregating neighborhoods and many facilities. But if the Eritreanswere second class citizens, they treated Tigrayans as third class citizens, in an effort to salvage their own dignity. The firstTigrayans who came to work in Eritrea came from an area called Agame. Eritreans began to refer to all Tigrayans disdainfullyas Agame. The term has become loaded with negativit35 implying they are a stupid and an inferior class of people.

Institute of Current World Affairs 3

dispute, but additionally a feud betweentwo peoples carrying the baggage of his-torical rivalry.

TERRITORIAL FACTORS

Shifting, Poorly Defined Borders

The central problem from which thiscrisis emanates is that of continuouslyshifting, ambiguous borders. There havebeen a number of historical opportuni-ties, all foregone, to clearly delineate anddemarcate the border between Ethiopiaand Eritrea. Had the border been defini-tively agreed upon and well-marked onthe ground, this conflict would not havehappened.

Asmara’s Italian-style skyline, a source ofpridefor many Eritreans

bickering over whose dad can beat up the others. TheTigrayans are incensed, and would seem better servedby just ignoring Eritrean arrogance. Instead, they appearto have developed an inferiority complex, which they ofcourse vigorously deny.

Ironically, it is often extremely difficult to definitivelydistinguish Ethiopians from Eritreans, particularly in theborder areas. Tigrayans and Eritreans are ethnically, lin-guistically and culturally very similar. The two peopleshave lived close together and intermarried for centuries,making "pure" ethnic composition relatively unusual.The populations have been inextricably mixed. EvenEthiopia’s Prime Minister Meles and Eritrea’s PresidentIsaias each have one Ethiopian parent and one Eritreanparent.

The Tigrayan-Eritrean historical feud is an unlikelydirect cause of the current conflict. Still, although the ten-sions are trite (and due to ethnic integration, in some waysunfounded), they are prominent. The all-encompassinganimosity that has rapidly enveloped the people of Tigrayis largely related to these feelings. The current conflict isbeing viewed as an opportunity to "teach them a lesson"or "show them who is boss." As such, there is a person-alized element to the conflict; it is not strictly a political

Following the Ethiopian’s defeat ofthe Italians in Adua in 1896, and Italy’ssuccessive retreat to the Mereb River, atrio of agreements between Italy, Britain

and Ethiopia were concluded in 1900, 1902, and 1908.These agreements clearly described where the bordershould be placed. The reality on the ground remainedless clear, and never entirely reflected these treaties. Ethio-pia continued to administer sections of land designatedfor Italian rule. In other areas, particularly in the inhos-pitable eastern Denakil Desert region, no demarcationwas ever conducted.

In 1951, as British rule1 was replaced by a loose-confederation arrangement, the border issue was againleft unresolved. Then, when Emperor Haile Selassie’sgovernment forcibly annexed Eritrea a decade later, theborder became irrelevant as Eritrea officially was underEthiopian control. The boundary between Tigray andEritrea was a regional boundary, not a national one, andtherefore of little consequence.

During the liberation struggle, the border once againbecame contentious. TPLF and EPLF rebel groups foughtover some of the areas that are currently the object ofdispute. Specifically, the Badime area was contested. Withtheir primary focus on the quest for independence,the Eritreans (especially the EPLF) chose not to fo-cus attention or resources on competition for terri-tories. These problems could be resolved later, after

Eritrea is composed of nine different ethnic groups. Here am referring to the dominant majori.ty Tigrinya group. The onlysignificant difference betWeen the Tigrinya of Eritrea and the Tigrayans of Ethiopia was a result of Eritrea’s 50 years ofcolonization by the Italians and then the British.

A detailed historiography of te boundary would be useful, but lies beyond the scope of this piece. In this section, provide abrief sketch of the border issuelto illustrate the gaps between agreements, maps and realities on the ground. For those inter-ested in a more in depth lok a the history of the border areas, see Jean-Louis Peninou, "The Ethiopian-Eritrean BorderConflict," in IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin, Vol. 6, No. 2, Summer 1998.

Following the defeat and expulsion of Italian forces, the British administered Eritrea from 1941-1951.

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defeating the Derg and attaining self-rule. As such, the TPLF assumed andmaintained control of Badime, and con-tinued to administer the areas until May6th.

Even after the TPLF-EPLF joint vic-tory in 1991, the border question wasskirted. The internationally accepted bor-der, reflected on both Ethiopian and Eri-trean maps, does not reflect the realityon the ground, nor has it ever. Largechunks of land that lie within the con-fines ofwhat, according to colonial agree-ments, should have been Eritrea, havealways been administered by Ethiopia.

When Eritrea officially gained inde-pendence in 1993, the last opportunity toresolve the border issue was missed. Atthat time, the maps and administrativereality on the ground should have beenreconciled, one way or the other. Yet,since the issue was inherently thorny, both the EPLF andTPLF decided to concentrate on the more pressing needsof rehabilitation and reconstruction. Relations betweenthe two countries were cordial, cooperation close.

Now, due to the trigger events of May 6th, and in-creasing tensions between the two nations in the preced-ing months, the border issue has come to a head.

The Organization for African Unity (OAU) and theUnited Nations both recognize colonial borders as im-mutable. However, the fundamental question remainswhich colonial border? Is it the border spelled out incolonial treaties between the Italians and Ethiopians atthe turn ofthe century, or is it the ftmctionalborder, the actualterritories the Italians and Ethiopians actually administered?This question lies at the crux of the border dispute.

The Mereb River,fullfrom heavy rains in August, marks a non-contestedsection of the Ethiopian Eritrean border.

tionable. A tense military standoff ended in May 1996with a French-brokered agreement to cease fighting andhand the dispute to an international arbitration panel.Both sides presented their evidence, and after long de-liberations, in October 1998 the International Court ofJustice in the Hague rendered its decision. The major is-lands would be placed under Yemeni rule, while a fewlesser clusters would be administered by Eritrea. Bothsides have accepted the decision, and have rapidly begunto normalize diplomatic and trade relations. However,what is most important from the Ethiopian perspectiveis that Eritrea used military might to forcibly assume con-trol of the Hanish at the outset. This, they assert, is in-dicative of Eritrean aggressive attitude, and itsgovernment’s tendency to fight first and talk later.

Eritrean Expansionism: Pushing the Territorial En-velope in all Directions

Ethiopia accuses the Eritrean government of attempt-ing to expand its territorial boundaries in all directions.As a small country, Eritrea needs as much land as pos-sible to be an economically viable entity. To these ends,over the past several years, Eritrea has initiated territo-rial disputes with nearly every one of its neighbors. Ac-cording to the Ethiopians, the Eritrean invasion ofEthiopian lands in May was just the latest expression ofEritrean expansionist ambition.

The most noteworthy incident took place in Decem-ber 1995 when Eritrean forces occupied Greater Hanish,the largest of the group of Hanish Islands in the Red Sea.These small but strategic islands were claimed by bothYemen and Eritrea, but their actual ownership was ques-

Another border confrontation took place withDjibouti in 1996. This conflict never escalated, sinceFrench military forces (stationed in Djibouti) flew fighterplanes over Eritrea in a show of force meant to send aclear message: you mess with Djibouti, you mess withFrance. Eritrea backed down. Again, the point from theEthiopian perspective is that Eritrea shows little respectfor international law, or established principles for resolv-ing disputes; rather, it takes these situations into its ownhands and resorts to what it knows best the military.

Following the Ethiopian line of argument, the Eri-trean occupation of Badime, Zalanbessa, and Alga-Aliteina represent the latest in a series of aggressiveactions by the Eritrean government against its neighbors.The case appears quite solid on the surface. The Eritreangovernment has shown little restraint in the use of force.Its frequent use of the military is provocative, danger-ous, and destabilizing. Likewise, the mandatory sixmonths of military training for Eritrean youth at Sawa

Institute of Current World Affairs 5

military camp signals the continued promotion and in-stitutionalization of a military culture.

This militaristic culture notwithstanding, the currentborder dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea cannot beproperly explained as outright Eritrean aggression. Suchan explanation ignores the ongoing skirmishes and in-cursions at points along the border by both sides overthe past several years, including alleged Ethiopianterritorial encroachments in the Badime area and the in-vasion of Bada in July 1997. Eritrea initially exercised con-siderable restraint in its responses to these events, andrepeatedly sought to resolve the simmering disputesthrough diplomatic channels. The Ethiopian argumentalso fails to acknowledge the provocative 1997 Tigraymap (which swallows sections of Eritrea) and the psy-chological threat it posed to Eritrea. In Eritrea, the currentconflict is perceived as defensive, protecting the interna-tionally-recognized borders it believes, with some validreasoning that Ethiopia is violating. Thus, while Eritreahas been quick to pull the trigger, this is not inherentlyindicative of expansionist designs.

Tigrayan Expansionism: The Questfor "Greater Tigray"

Mirroring the Ethiopian accusation of expansionismis a similar but opposite explanation from the Eritreancamp. The Eritreans perceive the gradual but persistentEthiopian nudging of the border deeper and deeper intoEritrean territory as a reflection of the historical quest toestablish a "Greater Tigray." The general argument stemsfrom the TPLF’s 1985 manifesto, which explicitly equatesthe TPLF struggle with the quest for Tigrayan indepen-

dence. Eritrea claims there are indications that Tigray’snationalist ambitions are presently coming to the fore, inpreparation for Tigrayan secession from Ethiopia.

The evidence provided is all circumstantial, but doespoint to some interesting developments in the manage-ment of internal territorial boundaries within Ethiopia’ssystem of ethnic federalism. For example, in 1997 inter-nal provincial boundaries were re-drawn, allocating toTigray State pieces of Welo and Gondar Provinces, whileceding an eastern portion of Tigray to the Afar regionalstate. These changes were apparently undertaken to placeTigrinya-speaking peoples under the administration ofTigray, and shift the Afar population into Afar regionalstate. The re-drawing of these boundaries gave TigrayRegion a common border with Sudan.

Corollary evidence is the new 1997 map of Tigray,produced by the Tigray Regional Government with Ger-man financial assistance. This map, Eritrea claims, swal,

lows large chunks of Eritrean territo13 particularly withinthe now hotly disputed Badime and Alga-Aliteina areas.The map reflects the areas actually administeredby Tigrayon the ground (prior to May 6th), but in so doing, contra-dicts the actual legal boundary between Ethiopia andEritrea. When comparing the new map with the old (andstill current) national map of Ethiopia, the border areaslook quite different. Among other changes, the straightline marking the western edge of the Yirga triangle hasbeen replaced by a lumpy double hump. The Eritreanalarm at this map seems quite well founded. Eritrea per-ceives the unilateral shifting of the border on this map asevidence of Tigray’s intent to expand its territory at the

expense of Eritrea.

Finally, the Eritreans point to theconstitutional mechanism allowingregional states, under certain condi-tions, to secede from Ethiopia and es-tablish themselves as independentstates. This dangerous legal provi-sion, the Eritreans contend, was putin to the constitution by Tigrayan na-tionalists to enable them to separatefrom Ethiopia when the timing be-came ripe. Eritrea’s condemnation ofthis provision is quite strange, sinceEritrea itself seceded from Ethiopiain 1993.

Tents provide temporary shelterfrom shelling behind hills. This area, south ofZalanbessa, has been controlled by Eritrea since July.

6 MM-5

Despite the evidence cited, thecontention that the TPLF is intent on es-tablishing an independent "GreaterTigray" is far-fetched. Theremaywellbehard-line nationalists who still cling tothis dream, but the mainstreamTigrayan leadership, the leaders ofEthiopia as a whole, do not harborsuch aspirations. Pointing to the 1985

TPLFmanifesto is similarly ludicrous. Muchhas changedin both countries and in both political movements sincethen. At the time both the EPLF and TPLF were militantlysocialist/communist in their economic orientation. Both

1997 Ethiopian Map of Tigray Province

Eritrea’s international border

Tigray Administrative ZoneITITI Eritrean territory claimed by Ethiopia

SUDAN

ERITREA

,.. Asmara 0Gash-Setii\ DecamhareArea

"" Afiteina Area

Addis Ababa I-,--, .-,",.

Afar

have since espoused free market systems and are mak-ing slow but deliberate efforts to liberalize their econo-mies. Likewise, now that the TPLF dominates the coali-tion governing Ethiopia- much to the benefit of

infrastructural investment, rehabilitationanddevelopmentinthe Tigray regionit would be foolish for Tigray to pur-sue separation.

SAUDIARABI

DMAN

ECONOMIC FACTORS

The economies of Ethiopia andEritrea have been integrally connectedsince long before Eritrea’s indepen-dence in 1993. Ethiopia has alwaysused the ports of Assab and Massawaas primary points for the import andexport of goods. Eritrea is a net foodimporter, and has always purchased teff(the staple grain used for making tra-ditional injera) from Ethiopia. Ethiopiabought its salt from Eritrea; Eritreabought its coffee from Ethiopia.

After 1993, this trade and economiccooperation continued and prospered.As part of the agreement surroundingEritrea’s independence, Ethiopia wasgranted free, long-term use of the portof Assab. Eritrea continued to utilizeEthiopia’s currency, the birr. The twocountries negotiated agreements forEthiopia’s continued use of the oil re-finery at Assab, ..and for duty-free tradeof basic commodities like coffee, sugarand staple grains.

However, in the months leading upto the outbreak of fighting in May,economic relations soured. The agree-ments no longer seemed mutuallybeneficial, and on a number of levels,economic tensions multiplied.

ANew Currency and Trade Woes

Burii

DJI

Djibout7

SIALIA

With the introduction of Eritrea’scurrency, the nakfa, in October 1997,trade relations, particularly in the bor-der areas, began to deteriorate. Despitethe two governments’ efforts to ensurea smooth transition, trade levels and ef-ficiencies were adversely effected.Eritrea wanted to maintain a one-to-one exchange rate between the nakfaand the birr, a provision that was un-derstandably unacceptable to Ethiopia.Since Ethiopia had no control overEritrea’s monetarypolicy, it couldnotsub-

Institute of Current World Affairs 7

ject itself to a fixed exchange rate. After the intro-duction of the nakfa, Eritrea wanted the con-tinued benefit of unrestricted trade with Ethio-pia. Ethiopia, for its part, insisted that all trade,except small transactions of less than 2000 birr/nakfa (about $275) at the border, be paid for inhard currency Letters of Credit. This provision, ex-tremely bureaucratic and cumbersome in practice,slowed and reduced trade considerably. To protectits economy, Ethiopia also restricted some catego-ries of goods (particularly exportable items) fromfree trade at the border.

Economic tensions grew and with them politi-cal tensions, especially in the fragile border areas.Most border towns were mixed in composition-Eritreans and Ethiopians lived side by side. Theborder was porous people moved freely and fre-quently between the two countries. Both curren-cies thus became acceptable modes of exchange, acommon occurrence in border towns around theworld. However, according to some Eritrean residents inEthiopian border towns, Tigrayan local officials were in-furiated by the appearance of the nakfa, and sometimesconfiscated it, or beat and jailed local citizens for pos-sessing the new currency. These allegations at firstsounded somewhat unlikely, but similar stories were re-peated bynumerous people, from different villages, whohad fled after the outbreak of hostilities. Such vignettes,while impressionistic, are indicative of the negative re-actions sparked by the new Eritrean currency, especiallyin the outlying areas.

Coffee Follies

Ethiopia has now accused Eritrean businessmen ofviolating the concessionary trade agreement by aggres-sivelybuying Ethiopian coffee and then exporting it. Theyclaim this has enabled Eritrea to become the 13th largestcoffee exporter in Africa, despite the minor fact thatEritrea doesn’t even grow coffee.

The trade agreements apparently permitted Eritre-ans to buy Ethiopian commodities duty-free in local cur-rency (i.e. at the same price as Ethiopians), but with thestipulation that it be used solely for local consumptionand not re-export. This complaint surfaced after thewar began, and is suspect in some regards. First, ex-port-grade coffee is tightly controlled by the Ethio-pian government, and is sold only by auction, in hardcurrency, to registered exporters. Any coffee pur-chased by Eritreans in local currency would not havebeen labeled export grade, and any re-exportwould there-fore have been to the benefit of both the Ethiopians whosold it at local market rates, iand the Eritreans who wereable to re-sell it abroad.

Such trade violations, once proven, can easily be ad-dressed through other channels. They are unrelated to8 MM-5

Eritrea’s new currency, the nakfa, has been asource ofeconomic tension

the current dispute and are a distraction from the morerelevant and pressing border issues at the heart of thisconflict.

Schemes to Unlock the Landlock

In line with its accusations of Tigrayan expansion-ism and quest for independence, Eritrea asserts that Ethio-pia sparked the border war to take the port city of Assaband thereby gain an important outlet to the Red Sea. Theycite Ethiopia’s June offensive at Burie (on the road toAssab), an area that was never disputed by either coun-try. They also point to a speech made by an Ethiopiandeputy foreign minister in WashingtonDC to former Dergofficials in June, in which he allegedly pledged: "we willgive you back Assab in a few days."

While many Ethiopians remain bitter that the seces-sion of Eritrea has landlocked the c0untr3 the Ethiopiangovernment has reiterated its respect for Eritrean sover-eignty and says it has no intention of re-taking Assab.Prior to the war, Assab was being utilized freely by Ethio-pia, and the vast majority of employees in the port area,numbering in the tens of thousands, were Ethiopiannationals. The scheme appears both farfetched and tin-

workable. Should Ethiopia attempt to occupy Assaban unlikely prospect- Eritrea would certainly launch acounter-offensive, and continue fighting until it regainedcontrol of its valuable port.

Some observers have tried to explain the outbreak ofthis war in economic terms. The Ethiopian governmentitself has implied that economic imperatives may havesparked the conflict. They claim the Eritrean economywas faltering and that President Isaias, in an effort to dis-tract his increasingly disgruntled subjects, triggered aborder war. While it is true that prices of some staples(e.g. teff) and imported products (e.g. fuel) had risen with

the nakfa’s introduction, these conditions do not appearsufficient cause for launching a mutually destructive bor-der war. And, while the nakfa and deteriorating trade re-lations mayhave raised tensions and ripened the climatefor conflict, they were certainly not the primary cause ofthe current border war.

INTERNATIONAL CONSPIRACIES

A host of creative conspiracy theories have surfacedto explain the current conflict. The general inexplicabil-ity of this misguided war has fed those with grandschemes who believe someone out there is always out toget them.

Egyptian Protection ofthe Nile

Among the highest priority infrastructural develop-ments undertakenby the Ethiopian governmenthas beenhydroelectric power. To satisfy the electricity demandsof other regions, especially Tigray, the government hasbegun to harness energy from tributaries feeding the NileRiver. Already a major hydroelectric station near BahirDar (in Gojjam Region) is operational, and in mid-1998began supplying electricity to major towns and villagesthroughout Tigray. A number of potential sites for sec-ondary hydroelectric power stations have also been iden-tified and the government is seeking partners to assist intheir development.

The Nile is one of the most critical natural resourcesin the region, and ten countries rely upon it for drinkingwater, irrigation and power.11 The two main downrivercountries, Sudan and Egypt, are most vulnerable, andtheir fragile, arid landscapes present, perhaps, the great-est need for river resources. All of the countries in theNile River Basin meet periodically and discuss river,re-lated issues to promote equitable sharing of this valu-able resource. Still, the Nile has been an ongoing sourceof strain, and Egyptian-Ethiopian relations have in re-cent years cooled considerably as Ethiopia’s capacity anddesire to aggressively develop Nile resources has dra-matically increased.

With this background, the latest conspiracy theoryto float around Addis Ababa places Egypt behind theborder crisis. Hoping to protect its Nile lifeline, unreli-able sources say, Egypt has supported Eritrean aggres-sion, in the hope that a prolonged war will devastateEthiopia’s capacity to develop Nile resources. While themotive is clear, no supporting evidence for this hokeyscheme has been offered. Nor has there been any allu-sion to what benefits will accrue to Eritrea, which wouldalso presumably be severely devastated by the conflict.

This Egyptian conspiracy scheme appears blatantlybogus. However, Ethiopia has been somewhat brazen inproclaiming its right to unilaterally decide on Nile utili-zation within its territorial boundaries. The Nile itself isa flashpoint resource, and its management will need tobe carefully monitored and discussed in coming years.Otherwise, there is a real risk of direct conflictbetween Ethio-pia andEgypt (as well as the other riparian countries).

"They’re Trying to Overthrow Our Government"

From both camps there have emerged explanationsof the conflict based on the opposing government’s de-sire to overthrow them. Ethiopia points to Eritrea’s rela-tions with the OLF (Oromo Liberation Front) and ALF(Afar Liberation Front), accusing the Eritreans of support-ing these movements to destabilize and topple the Ethio-pian government. The Eritrean goal, they assert, is theinstallation of a puppet regime in Addis Ababa, therebyguaranteeing an exploitative relationship and enablingEritrea to milk the lifeblood of the Ethiopian economy,and manipulate it politically.

Strangely enough, the Eritreans accuse the Ethiopiangovernment of similar designs. Due to economic tensions,and still lamenting the loss of their own outlet to the RedSea, Ethiopia wants to oust Isaias’ stubborn inner circleand replace them with a friendlier government. Ethiopiais displeased with some of the developments in Eritrea,and therefore wants to place it on a different track.

Neither of these conspiracy theories is particularlyconvincing. The Ethiopian and Eritrean governmentswere still quite friendly until the outbreak of violence inMay. The recent accusations from both camps, based onthe new hostility and distrust, reflect prevailing politicalwinds and propaganda more than concrete efforts at in-citing overthrow of the (now) enemy government.

Sudanese Self-Defense

While this scenario hasn’t garnered much attention,Sudan would be the most eager local instigator of a dam-aging, distracting war between Ethiopia and Eritrea.Ethiopia and Eritrea (along with Uganda) have been the"front-line states" assisted by the U.S. to destabilize andoverthrow the government of Sudan. Both countries haveaided the south-Sudanese rebels with training and sup-plies, and most of the rebel groups have set up their head-quarters in Asmara, Eritrea’s capital. A major war be-tween Ethiopia and Eritrea would render them incapableof intervening in Sudan, thereby fortifying the Sudanesegovernment’s military position. How exactly Sudan couldtrigger such a conflict between its neighbors is a major

11 The Blue Nile, originating in the Ethiopian highlands, and its tributaries, account for 86% of the Nile River water. The WhiteNile begins in Burundi, flows through the Equatorial Lakes, and provides 14% of the Nile waters. These two rivers converge atKhartoum before continuing to flow northward through Egypt and into the Mediterranean. (Ashok Swain, "Ethiopia, theSudan and Egypt: The Nile River Dispute," in The Eye on Ethiopia and the Horn ofAfrica, Vol. IX, No. 50, June/July 1998, p. 28.)

Institute of Current World Affairs 9

question mark. However, thus far, the biggest beneficiaryof the border dispute has been Sudan.

In a strange twist, there seems to have been a gen-eral rapprochement between Sudan and Ethiopia overthe past several months. Rumors of private meetings be-tween Ethiopian and Sudanese diplomats have been con-firmed. In mid-October, Ethiopian Airlines announcedthe resumption of flights to Khartoum. Warmakes strangebedfellows, and while Ethiopia publicly denies the re-alignment, it will be interesting to see how these shiftsultimately play out and impact sub-regional affairs.

Conclusions

It is exceedingly difficult to isolate one causative fac-tor, one historic event, one opportunity missed, or oneconspiratorial force as the linchpin of the currentEthiopian-Eritrean border conflict. This war was a mis-take. Neither government intended to launch or becomeembroiled in a resource-sapping full-scale war. The eventsof May 6th, the details of which remain shrouded inmystery, provided an unwitting trigger. With the Eri-trean occupation or re-taking of Badime (dependingon your perspective), events began to spiral out ofcontrol. Before either side knew what hit them, theywere engaged in a series of border battles, wooingthe international community for support, and rallyingtheir peoples to protect national pride and territorialintegrity.

By the same token, this conflict certainly did notemerge randomly from a vacuum. Increasing tensionsover border skirmishes and deteriorating economic rela-tions ripened the atmosphere for war. Trust and coop-eration were declining; suspicion was on the rise.

There were opportunities, particularly at the time ofEritrean independence in 1993, when the border disputecould have been resolved once and for all. However, theissue was bound to be thorny, and neither side relishedthe prospect of dampening the jubilant mood and golden

spirit of cooperation with sultry and depressing topicslike untangling a messy borderline. At the same histori-cal juncture, the citizenship of Eritreans should have beenclarified. Those of Eritrean descent who had long livedin Ethiopia should havebeen given a choice to assumeEritrean citizenship and live within Ethiopia as a foreignnational, or to apply for/maintain Ethiopian citizenship.The quirky dual citizenship that emerged, with manyholding Ethiopian passports and Eritrean identificationcards, led to the disturbing deportation of tens of thou-sands of Ethiopian nationals of Eritrean descent. Again,it is easy to see why this citizenship issue was tabled dur-ing happier times; no one thought it would ever be nec-essary to choose one or the other. No one ever thoughtthings would ever get so bad so quickly between the twofriendly nations.

Fading out the background noise, the current war isultimately about borders. The Ethiopian governmentmaintains that the core issue is invasion, and they havegarnered considerable support from the internationalcommunity for this point of view. However, contradict-ing that assertion is Ethiopia’s unwillingness to specifyprecisely where it has been invaded. This all leads backaround, in a never-ending circle of points and counter-points, to the basic question of the border where wasit, and where should it have been? Ultimately that is theroot of the issue. Should the parties find a way to clearlyresolve and demarcate their commonboundary, the pros-pect ofwar will rapidly fade. That is the heart of the chal-lenge defusing the crisis, avoiding a disastrous war,and slowly rebuilding peace.

Some serious and lasting damage has already beendone. Even if a political settlement is achieved, and tradeand diplomatic relations restored, considerable ill-feel-ing will continue to linger. "How can we trust them afterwhat they’ve done?" "Look how they treated out citizens dur-ing the war abusing, raping, torturing, expelling." Thesefeelings of mistrust, anger, and pain will take longer toheal. The political solution, as difficult and remote as itcurrently appears, will be the easy part.

10 MM-5

A History of Ethiopia 52Addis Ababa 13, 1.4Addis Pharmaceutical Factory 4.4Adi-Murug (Bada) 4.2Adigrat 3.2, 44Adua 5.4Afar 42, 5.6"African Renaissance" 45, 4.8, 52Afwerki, Isaias 34, 41, 45, 51, 54, 58Agew 52Al-lttihad 5.3ALF (Afar Liberation Front) 59Alga-Aliteina 43, 5.5, 56Aliteina 4.1,4.3Ambesete Geleba 4.3Arap Moi, Daniel 48Ark of the Covenant 16Asmara 32, 59Asmara airport 4.4Assab 4.4, 57, 58Aweke, Aster 15Axumite empire 5.2Ayder Primary School 44

Bada. See also Adi-MurugBadime 3 4, 3.7, 4.1, 4 2, 4.3, 4 8, 5 4, 55, 56, 510Bagoweini 36Bahir Dar (Gojjam Region) 59Barentu 35battle casualties 43birr 5.7Bole airport 11, 1.3border conflict 33, 41, 51, 52Britain 54Burie 34, 43, 58Burkina Faso 48

Clinton, Bill 4.5, 48coffee 5.8coffee ceremony 17colonial rule 42conspiracy theories 59culture 17currency 58

D

Debre Zeyit 14Decamhare 32Dembe Jefecke village 3.7Denakil Desert 54deportation 32, 45Derg government 35, 44Dhu Nwas 52Djibouti 44, 48, 51, 53, 55doro wot (stew) 17

E

EC (European Community) 47economy 57, 58Egypt 59Ephrem, Sebhat 43EPLF (Eritrean People’s Liberation Front)

34, 45, 51, 52, 53, 54, 57EPRDF (Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic

Front) 52Erde Mattios 43Eritrea 31, 41Eritrea Profile 38Eritrean Defense Force 42ERREC (Eritrean Relief and Refugee Commission) 36Ethiopia 54Ethiopian Airlines 4.5, 510Ethiopian Orthodox Church 14Ethiopian Telecommunications Authority ,45ethnic groups 3.5

Amhara, Oromo 35

F

Fatzi 32Fessehai, Habteab 37Follina 37

G

Gash-Barka Region 35Ghebray, Tekeste 4.8Ghebretnsae, Woldemichael 36Gondar Province 56Gouled Aptidon, Hassan 48Greater Hanish 55"Greater Tigray" 56Guinea Bissau 5.2

H

Habtekere, Gebrenguse 36Hanish Islands 5.3, 55Heret village 37hydroelectric power 59

ICRC (Intemational Committee of the Red Cross) 46IGAD (Inter-Governmental Authority on Development)

34, 4.7, 5.1injera (flat bread made from fermented batter) 1.3, 57intermarriage 54Italian colonization 5.3Italy 5.4

J

Janmeda 16, 3.1

K

Kenya 5.2Khartoum 510khat 18King Caleb 52King Ezana 52kitfo (ground beef with spiced butter) 18Kombolcha 31

L

Lake, Anthony 48lakes 14

Bishoftu 14Legesse, Asmarom 38

M

Marcus, Harold 52Mariam, Mengistu Haile 3.4, 44, 51Massawa 57media 3.3Mehare, Zait 37Mekelle 3.1, 44Menelik 16Mereb River 37, 54Mubarak, Hosni 48Mulki 37Museveni, Yoweri 4.8

N

nakfa 57Nigeria 52Nile River 5.9

O

OAU (Organization for African Unity) 34, 47, 4.8, 55OLF (Oromo Liberation Front) 59

P

Paul Kagame 47Petros, Col Bezabieh 4.4PFDJ (People’s Front for Democracy and Justice) 52pickpockets 17

police 1.7

Q

Qaddafi, Muammar 34, 48

R

Ras Mikhael Seul 5.3Red Sea 4.8, 5.8religion 14Resolution 1177 48Rice, Susan 4.7Robinson, Mary 45Rwanda 4.7

S

Sawa national military training camp 4.6, 5.5Selassie, Haile 5.2, 54Setit 43Shambuco 3.6Sheba 1.6Sierra Leone 52Sifreye Genet 3.7Solomon 16Solomonic Dynasty 52Somalia 52Sudan 52, 59

T

tabot (holy slab) 16tala (barley beer) 1.8teff 5.7tej (honey wine) 8Tesfaye-Mikael, Worku 36the Derg 3.4, 53, 55tibs (sauteed meat) 1.4Tigray Province 32, 42, 44, 5.3Tigrayan nationalism 56Tigrinya 3.8Timket, the Ethiopian Orthodox Church’s celebration 16TPLF (Tigray People’s Liberation Front)

3.4, 5.1, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57tradition 18transportation 14

U

U.S -Rwanda Peace Plan 4.7Uganda 52, 59UN Cartographic Office 47UN Commissioner on Human Rights See Robinson,

MaryUNICEF 3.7United Nations 47, 55United Nations OCHA (Office for the Coordination of

Humanitarian Assistance) 36United Nations Security Council 4.8USAID OFDA (Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance) 36

W

Welo Province 5.2, 56White Horse Whiskey 18

Y

Yemen 5.3Yirga triangle 56Yohannes IV 53

Z

Zagwe dynasty 5.2Zaire (now Congo) 52Zalanbessa 3.2, 3.4, 4.2, 4.3, 5.5Zenawi, Meles 3.4, 42, 4.5, 51, 54Zimbabwe 48

Institute of Current World Affairs 11

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