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The Emissions Gap Report 2013A UNEP Synthesis Report
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Published by the United Naons Environment Programme (UNEP), November 2013
Copyright UNEP 2013
ISBN: 978-92-807-3353-2DEW/1742/NA
This publicaon may be reproduced in whole or in part and in any form for educaonal or non-prot services without specialpermission from the copyright holder, provided acknowledgement of the source is made. UNEP would appreciate receivinga copy of any publicaon that uses this publicaon as a source.
No use of this publicaon may be made for resale or any other commercial purpose whatsoever without prior permission inwring from the United Naons Environment Programme. Applicaons for such permission, with a statement of the purposeand extent of the reproducon, should be addressed to the Director, DCPI, UNEP, P. O. Box 30552, Nairobi 00100, Kenya.
Disclaimers
Menon of a commercial company or product in this document does not imply endorsement by UNEP or the authors. Theuse of informaon from this document for publicity or adversing is not permied. Trademark names and symbols are usedin an editorial fashion with no intenon on infringement of trademark or copyright laws.
We regret any errors or omissions that may have been unwingly made.
Images and illustraons as specied.
Citaon
This document may be cited as:UNEP 2013. The Emissions Gap Report 2013. United Naons Environment Programme (UNEP), Nairobi
A digital copy of this report along with supporng appendices are available at hp://www.unep.org/emissionsgapreport2013/
This project is part of the Internaonal Climate Iniave. TheFederal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservaonand Nuclear Safely supports this iniave on the basis of a
decision adopted by the German Bundestag.
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report is printed on paper from sustainable
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Supported by:
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The Emissions Gap Report 2013A UNEP Synthesis Report
November 2013
UNEP
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The Emissions Gap Report 2013 Acknowledgementsv
Chapter 4Lead authors: Henry Neufeldt (World Agroforestry Centre -
ICRAF, Kenya).
Contribung authors: Tapan K. Adhya (KIIT University,
India), Jeanne Y. Coulibaly (AfricaRice, Benin), Gabrielle
Kissinger (Lexeme Consulng, Canada), Genxing Pan (Nanjing
Agricultural University, China).
Reviewers:Anee Engelund Friis (Danish Agriculture and Food
Council, Denmark), Bert Metz (European Climate Foundaon,
Netherlands), William Moomaw (Tus University, USA), Klaus
Mschen (Federal Environment Agency, Germany), Chrisne
Negra (EcoAgriculture Partners, USA), Anne Olho (UNEP Ris
Centre, Denmark), Kaa Simeonova (UNFCCC Secretariat,
Germany), Youba Sokona (South Centre, Switzerland).
Chapter 5Lead authors: Niklas Hhne (Ecofys, Germany), Jennifer
Morgan (World Resources Instute, USA).
Contribung authors: Yemi Katerere (Independent
Consultant, Zimbabwe), Lutz Weischer (World Resources
Instute, Germany), Durwood Zaelke (Instute for
Governance and Sustainable Development, USA).
Reviewers: Michel den Elzen (PBL Netherlands Environmental
Assessment Agency, Netherlands), Johannes Gtschow
(Potsdam Instute for Climate Impact Research, Germany),
Ariane Labat (European Commission, Belgium), Kelly Levin
(World Resources Instute, USA), Bert Metz (European
Climate Foundaon, Netherlands), Daniel Puig (UNEP Ris
Centre, Denmark), Christopher Taylor (Department of Energy
and Climate Change, United Kingdom).
Chapter 6Lead authors: Niklas Hhne (Ecofys, Germany), Anne Olho(UNEP Ris Centre, Denmark).
Contribung authors: Kornelis Blok (Ecofys, Netherlands),
Taryn Fransen (World Resources Instute, USA).
Reviewers: Joshua Busby (University of Texas at Ausn, USA),
Annie Dufey (Fundacin Chile, Chile), Asger Garnak (Ministry
of Climate, Energy and Buildings, Denmark), Bert Metz
(European Climate Foundaon, Netherlands), Klaus Mschen
(Federal Environment Agency, Germany), Daniel Puig (UNEP
Ris Centre, Denmark), Kaa Simeonova (UNFCCC Secretariat,
Germany), Youba Sokona (South Centre, Switzerland), Kiran
Sura (PricewaterhouseCoopers, United Kingdom), EliotWhington (University of Cambridge, United Kingdom).
Other Input: Annie Dufey (Fundacin Chile, Chile), Yemi
Katerere (Independent Consultant, Zimbabwe).
Thanks also to:Keith Alverson (UNEP, Kenya), Stuart Crane (UNEP, Kenya),
David Crossley (Regulatory Assistance Project, Australia),
Davide DAmbrosio (Internaonal Energy Agency, France),
Shyamasree Dasgupta (Jadavpur University, India), Jusne
Garre (Internaonal Energy Agency, France), Antonia
Gawel (Independent Consultant, Bhutan), Michael Grubb
(University of Cambridge, United Kingdom), James ArthurHaselip (UNEP Ris Centre, Denmark), Michael Mendelsohn
(Naonal Renewable Energy Laboratory, USA), Pedro Filipe
Paralta Carqueija (UNEP Ris Centre, Denmark), Daniel
Perczyk (Instuto Torcuato Di Tella, Argenna), Lynn Price
(Lawrence Berkeley Naonal Laboratory, USA), Wilson
Rickerson (Meister Consultants Group, USA), Joyashree Roy
(Jadavpur University, India), Misato Sato (London School of
Economics, United Kingdom), Janet Sawin (Sunna Research,
USA), Andrew Sco (Overseas Development Instute, United
Kingdom), Jacob Krog Sbygaard (Ministry of Climate, Energy
and Buildings, Denmark), Geng Yong (Naonal Academy ofSciences, China), Changhua Wu (The Climate Group, China).
Editorial Team:Joseph Alcamo (UNEP, Kenya), Daniel Puig (UNEP Ris Centre,
Denmark), Anne Olho (UNEP Ris Centre, Denmark),
Volodymyr Demkine (UNEP, Kenya), Bert Metz (European
Climate Foundaon, Netherlands).
Project Coordinaon:Daniel Puig (UNEP Ris Centre, Denmark), Anne Olho (UNEP
Ris Centre, Denmark), Tasia Spangsberg Christensen (UNEP
Ris Centre, Denmark), Volodymyr Demkine (UNEP, Kenya),
John Christensen (UNEP Ris Centre, Denmark), Mee
Annelie Rasmussen (UNEP Ris Centre, Denmark), Seraphine
Haeussling (UNEP, France).
Secretariat and Media Support:Harsha Dave (UNEP, Kenya), Pia Riis Kofoed-Hansen (UNEP
Ris Centre, Denmark), Sunday A. Leonard (UNEP, Kenya),
Mee Annelie Rasmussen (UNEP Ris Centre, Denmark),
Shereen Zorba (UNEP, Kenya), Neeya Patel (UNEP, Kenya),
Kelvin Memia (UNEP, Kenya).
Gap Model CalculaonsJrgen Fenhann (UNEP Ris Centre, Denmark), Jacob Ipsen
Hansen (UNEP Ris Centre, Denmark).
Climate Model CalculaonsJoeri Rogelj (ETH Zurich, Switzerland).
EditorBart Ullstein
Design and LayoutAudrey Ringler (UNEP)
Layout and PrinngUNON, Publishing Services Secon, ISO 14001:2004 cered
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The Emissions Gap Report 2013 Contentsvi
Contents
Glossary ........................................................................................................................................................................ vii
Acronyms ....................................................................................................................................................................... ix
Foreword ......................................................................................................................................................................... x
Execuve Summary ........................................................................................................................................................ xi
Introducon ....................................................................................................................................................................1
Chapter 2: Emissions trends as a result of pledges and their implementaon ..................................................................3
2.1 Introducon .............................................................................................................................................................3
2.2 Current global emissions .........................................................................................................................................3
2.3 Projected global emissions under business-as-usual scenarios ...............................................................................4
2.4 Projected global emissions under pledge assumpons ..........................................................................................5
2.5 Naonal progress: do policies match pledges? .......................................................................................................9
2.6 Summary ...............................................................................................................................................................12
Chapter 3 The emissions gap and its implicaons .......................................................................................................13
3.1 Introducon ...........................................................................................................................................................13
3.2 Which scenarios are analyzed? ..............................................................................................................................13
3.3 Emissions in line with least-cost 2 C pathways .....................................................................................................14
3.4. Emissions in line with least-cost 1.5 C pathways ..................................................................................................17
3.5 Later-acon scenarios in the literature ..................................................................................................................17
3.6 The emissions gap: trade-os and implicaons of todays policy choices .............................................................19
Chapter 4: Bridging the gap I: Policies for reducing emissions from agriculture ..............................................................23
4.1 Introducon ...........................................................................................................................................................23
4.2 Conversion of llage to no-llage pracces ...........................................................................................................24
4.3 Improved nutrient and water management in rice systems ..................................................................................26
4.4 Agroforestry ...........................................................................................................................................................27
4.5 Lessons learned ..................................................................................................................................................... 28
Chapter 5: Bridging the gap II: Internaonal cooperave iniaves
5.1 Introducon ...........................................................................................................................................................29
5.2 Current internaonal cooperave iniaves .........................................................................................................29
5.3 Promising areas for internaonal cooperave iniaves to close the gap ............................................................30
5.4 How to make internaonal cooperave iniaves eecve in closing the gap?...................................................31
5.5 Links with the United Naons Framework Convenon on Climate Change ..........................................................32
5.6 Conclusions ............................................................................................................................................................32
Chapter 6: Bridging the gap III: Overview of opons ......................................................................................................33
6.1 Introducon ...........................................................................................................................................................33
6.2 Emission reducon potenals in 2020 and 2030: can the gap be bridged? ..........................................................33
6.3 Opons to narrow and potenally bridge the emissions gap in 2020 ...................................................................346.4 Conclusions ............................................................................................................................................................36
References ....................................................................................................................................................................37
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The Emissions Gap Report 2013 Glossaryviii
Emission pathway The trajectory of annual global
greenhouse gas emissions over me.
Greenhouse gases covered by the Kyoto Protocol These
include the six main greenhouse gases, as listed in
Annex A of the Kyoto Protocol: carbon dioxide (CO2); methane
(CH4); nitrous oxide (N
2O); hydrouorocarbons (HFCs);
peruorocarbons (PFCs); and sulphur hexauoride (SF6).
Integrated assessment modelsModels that seek to combineknowledge from mulple disciplines in the form of equaons
and/or algorithms in order to explore complex environmental
problems. As such, they describe the full chain of climate
change, including relevant links and feedbacks between
socio-economic and biophysical processes.
Internaonal cooperave iniaves Iniaves outside
of the United Naons Framework Convenon on Climate
Change aimed at reducing emissions of greenhouse gases
by promong acons that are less greenhouse gas intensive,
compared to prevailing alternaves.
Kyoto Protocol The internaonal environmental treaty
intended to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. It builds
upon the United Naons Framework Convenon on
Climate Change.
Later-acon scenariosClimate change migaon scenarios
in which emission levels in the near term, typically up to
2020 or 2030, are higher than those in the corresponding
least-cost scenarios.
Least-cost scenarios Climate change migaon scenarios
assuming that emission reducons start immediately aer
the model base year, typically 2010, and are distributed
opmally over me, such that aggregate costs of reaching
the climate target are minimized.
Lenient rulesPledge cases with maximum Annex I land use,
land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) credits and surplus
emissions units, and maximum impact of double counng.
Likely chance A likelihood greater than 66 percent. Used
in this report to convey the probabilies of meeng
temperature limits.
Medium chanceA likelihood of 5066 percent. Used in this
report to convey the probabilies of meeng temperature
limits.
Montreal Protocol The Montreal Protocol on Substances
that Deplete the Ozone Layer is an internaonal treaty that
was designed to reduce the producon and consumpon
of ozone-depleng substances in order to reduce their
abundance in the atmosphere, and thereby protect the
Earths ozone layer.
Non-Annex I countries A group of developing countries
that have signed and raed the United Naons Framework
Convenon on Climate Change. They do not have binding
emission reducon targets.
No-llage agriculture Farming pracce characterized by
the eliminaon of soil ploughing by seeding a crop directly
under the mulch layer from the previous crop. It relies on
permanent soil cover by organic amendments, and the
diversicaon of crop species grown in sequences and/or
associaon. This approach avoids emissions caused by soil
disturbances related to ploughing, and from burning fossil
fuels to run farm machinery for ploughing.
Pledge For the purpose of this report, pledges include
Annex I targets and non-Annex I acons, as included in
Appendix I and Appendix II of the Copenhagen Accord, and
subsequently revised and updated in some instances.
Radiave forcing Change in the net, downward minus
upward, irradiance, expressed in was per square meter
(W/m2), at the tropopause due to a change in an external
driver of climate change, such as, for example, a change
in the concentraon of carbon dioxide or the output of
the Sun. For the purposes of this report, radiave forcing
is further dened as the change relave to the year 1750
and, unless otherwise noted, refers to a global and annualaverage value.
Scenario A descripon of how the future may unfold based
on if-then proposions. Scenarios typically include an inial
socio-economic situaon and a descripon of the key driving
forces and future changes in emissions, temperature or
other climate change-related variables.
Strict rules Pledge cases in which the impact of land use,
land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) credits and surplus
emissions units are set to zero.
Top-down model A model that applies macroeconomictheory, econometric and opmisaon techniques to
aggregate economic variables. Using historical data on
consumpon, prices, incomes, and factor costs, top-down
models assess nal demand for goods and services, and
supply from main sectors, such as energy, transportaon,
agriculture and industry.
Transient climate responseMeasure of the temperature rise
that occurs at the me of a doubling of CO2concentraon in
the atmosphere.
Transient climate response to cumulave carbon emissions
Measure of temperature rise per unit of cumulavecarbon emissions.
Uncondional pledgesPledges made by countries without
condions aached.
20th80th percenle range Results that fall within the
2080 percent range of the frequency distribuon of results
in this assessment.
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The Emissions Gap Report 2013 Acronymsix
Acronyms
AAU Assigned Amount Unit
ADP Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Plaorm
AR4 Fourth Assessment Report of theIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
AR5 Fih Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
AWD Alternate Weng and Drying
BaU Business-as-Usual
BC black carbon
BioCCS Bio-energy combined with Carbon Capture and
Storage
BP Brish Petroleum
BRT Bus Rapid Transit
CCAC Climate and Clean Air Coalion to Reduce Short-
lived Climate Pollutants
CCS Carbon Capture and Storage
CDIAC Carbon Dioxide Informaon Analysis Center
CDM Clean Development Mechanism
CEM Clean Energy Ministerial
CER Cered Emission Reducon
CFC chlorouorocarbon
CO2e Carbon Dioxide Equivalent
COP Conference of the Pares to the United Naons
Framework Convenon on Climate Change
CP1 First Commitment Period of the Kyoto Protocol
CP2 Second Commitment Period of the Kyoto
Protocol
EDGAR Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric
Research
EIA Energy Informaon Administraon
ERU Emission Reducon Unit
EU-ETS EU Emissions Trading System
GDP Gross Domesc Product
GEA Global Energy Assessment
GHG greenhouse gas
Gt gigatonne
GWP Global Warming PotenalHCFC hydrochlorouorocarbon
HFC hydrouorocarbon
IAM Integrated Assessment Model
ICAO Internaonal Civil Aviaon Organizaon
ICI Internaonal Cooperave Iniave
IEA Internaonal Energy Agency
IMO Internaonal Marime Organizaon
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
LULUCF Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry
NAMA Naonally Appropriate Migaon Acon
NGO Non-Governmental Organizaon
OC organic carbon
ODS ozone depleng substances
PAM policies and measures
PPP Purchasing Power Parity
PV photovoltaic
RD&D research, development and demonstraon
REDD+ Reduced Emissions from Deforestaon and
Forest Degradaon
RPS Renewable Porolio Standards
SO2 sulphur dioxide
SOC soil organic carbon
TCR transient climate response
TCRE transient climate response to cumulave carbon
emissions
UDP urea deep placement
UNEP United Naons Environment Programme
UNFCCC United Naons Framework Convenon on
Climate Change
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The Emissions Gap Report 2013 Forewordx
Achim Steiner
UN Under-Secretary-General,UNEP Execuve Director
The latest assessment by Working Group I of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, released
earlier this year, concluded that climate change remainsone of the greatest challenges facing society. Warming
of the climate system is unequivocal, human-inuenced,
and many unprecedented changes have been observed
throughout the climate system since 1950. These changes
threaten life on Earth as we know it. Connued emissions of
greenhouse gases will cause further warming and changes
in all components of the climate system. Liming climate
change will require substanal and sustained reducons
of greenhouse gas emissions. But how much reducon
is needed?
Further to the Copenhagen Accord of 2009 and the Cancn
agreements in 2010, internaonal eorts under the UnitedNaons Framework Convenon on Climate Change are
focused on keeping the average rise in global temperature
to below 2 C, compared to pre-industrial levels. Current
commitments and pledges by developed and developing
naons can take the world part of the way towards achieving
this 2 C target, but this assessment shows that the there is
sll a signicant gap between polical ambion and praccal
reality. In short, addional emission reducons are needed.
With this fourth assessment of the gap between ambions
and needs, the United Naons Environment Programme
seeks to inform governments and the wider public on how
far the response to climate change has progressed over the
past year, and thus whether the world is on track to meet
the 2 C target. In addion to reviewing naonal pledges
and acons, this years assessment, for the rst me, also
reviews internaonal cooperave iniaves which, while
potenally overlapping, serve to complement naonal
pledges and acons.
From a technical standpoint, meeng the 2 C target
remains possible: it will take a combinaon of full
implementaon of current naonal pledges and acons, a
scaling up of the most eecve internaonal cooperave
iniaves, and addional migaon eorts at the country
level. All these eorts will require strengthened policies
aimed at curbing greenhouse gas emissions. Crucially, they
also require the promoon of development pathways that
can concomitantly reduce emissions.
As in the previous assessment, this years report provides
updated analyses of a number of tried and tested sector-
specic policy opons to achieve this goal. Specically,we show that acons taken in the agricultural sector can
lower emissions and boost the overall sustainability of
food producon. Replicang these successful policies, and
scaling them up, would provide one opon for countries
to go beyond their current pledges and help close the
emissions gap.
The challenge we face is neither a technical nor policy
one it is polical: the current pace of acon is simply
insucient. The technologies to reduce emission levels to
a level consistent with the 2 C target are available and we
know which policies we can use to deploy them. However,
the polical will to do so remains weak. This lack of policalwill has a price: we will have to undertake steeper and
more costly acons to potenally bridge the emissions gap
by 2020.
This report is a call for polical acon. I hope that,
by providing high quality evidence and analysis, it will
achieve its goal of supporng internaonal climate
change negoaons.
Foreword
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The Emissions Gap Report 2013 Execuve summaryxi
Execuve summary
The emissions gap in 2020 is the dierence between
emission levels in 2020 consistent with meeng climate
targets, and levels expected in that year if country pledgesand commitments are met. As it becomes less and less
likely that the emissions gap will be closed by 2020, the
world will have to rely on more dicult, costlier and
riskier means aer 2020 of keeping the global average
temperature increase below 2C. If the emissions gap is
not closed, or signicantly narrowed, by 2020, the door to
many opons liming the temperature increase to 1.5 C at
the end of this century will be closed.
Arcle 2 of the United Naons Framework Convenon
on Climate Change (Climate Convenon) declares that
its ulmate objecve is to [stabilize] greenhouse gas
concentraons in the atmosphere at a level that wouldprevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the
climate system. The pares to the Climate Convenon have
translated this objecve into an important, concrete target
for liming the increase in global average temperature to
2 C, compared to its pre-industrial levels. With the aim
of meeng this target, many of the pares have made
emission reducon pledges, while others have commied to
reducons under the recent extension of the Kyoto Protocol.
Since 2010, the United Naons Environment Programme
has facilitated an annual independent analysis of those
pledges and commitments, to assess whether they are
consistent with a least-cost approach to keep global average
warming below 2 C 1. This report conrms and strengthens
the conclusions of the three previous analyses that current
pledges and commitments fall short of that goal. It further
says that, as emissions of greenhouse gases connue to
rise rather than decline, it becomes less and less likely that
emissions will be low enough by 2020 to be on a least-cost
pathway towards meeng the 2 C target2.
As a result, aer 2020, the world will have to rely on more
dicult, costlier and riskier means of meeng the target
the further from the least-cost level in 2020, the higher
these costs and the greater the risks will be. If the gap is not
closed or signicantly narrowed by 2020, the door to manyopons to limit temperature increase to 1.5 C at the end of
this century will be closed, further increasing the need to
rely on accelerated energy-eciency increases and biomass
with carbon capture and storage for reaching the target.
1. What are current global emissions?Current global greenhouse gas emission levels are
considerably higher than the levels in 2020 that are in
line with meeng the 1.5 C or 2 C targets, and are sll
increasing. In 2010, in absolute levels, developing countries
accounted for about 60 percent of global greenhouse gas
emissions.The most recent esmates of global greenhouse gas
emissions are for 2010 and amount to 50.1 gigatonnes of
carbon dioxide equivalent (GtCO2e) per year (range: 45.6
54.6 GtCO2e per year). This is already 14 percent higher than
the median esmate of the emission level in 2020 with a
likely chance of achieving the least cost pathway towards
meeng the 2 C target (44 GtCO2e per year)3. With regards
to emissions in 2010, the modelling groups report a median
value of 48.8 GtCO2e, which is within the uncertainty range
cited above. For consistency with emission scenarios, the
gure of 48.8 GtCO2e per year is used in the calculaon of
the pledge case scenarios.
Relave contribuons to global emissions from developing
and developed countries changed lile from 1990 to 1999.
However, the balance changed signicantly between 2000
and 2010 the developed country share decreased from
51.8 percent to 40.9 percent, whereas developing country
emissions increased from 48.2 percent to 59.1 percent.
Today developing and developed countries are responsible
for roughly equal shares of cumulave greenhouse gas
emissions for the period 1850-2010.
____________________1 For this report, a least-cost approach means that emissions are reduced by the
cheapest means available.2For this report, a least-cost pathway or a least-cost emissions pathway or least-cost emission scenarios mean the same thing the temporal pathway of globalemissions that meets a climate target and that also takes advantage of the lowest-cost opons available for reducing emissions.
____________________3See footnote 2.
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The Emissions Gap Report 2013 Execuve summaryxii
2. What emission levels are ancipatedfor 2020?
Global greenhouse gas emissions in 2020 are esmated
at 59 GtCO2e per year under a business-as-usual scenario.
If implemented fully, pledges and commitments would
reduce this by 37 GtCO2e per year. It is only possible
to conrm that a few pares are on track to meet theirpledges and commitments by 2020.
Global greenhouse gas emissions in 2020 are esmated at
59 GtCO2e per year (range: 5660 GtCO
2e per year) under
a business-as-usual scenario that is, a scenario that only
considers exisng migaon eorts. This is about 1 GtCO2e
higher than the esmate in the 2012 emissions gap report.
There have been no signicant changes in the pledges and
commitments made by pares to the Climate Convenon
since the 2012 assessment. However, both rules of
accounng for land-use change and forestry, and rules for
the use of surplus allowances from the Kyoto Protocols rst
commitment period have been ghtened.Implemenng the pledges would reduce emissions by
37 GtCO2e, compared to business-as-usual emission levels.
A review of available evidence from 13 of the pares to the
Climate Convenon that have made pledges or commitments
indicates that ve Australia, China, the European Union,
India and the Russian Federaon appear to be on track to
meet their pledges. Four pares Canada, Japan, Mexico
and the U.S. may require further acon and/or purchased
osets to meet their pledges, according to government and
independent esmates of projected naonal emissions
in 2020. A h party the Republic of Korea may also
require further acon but this could not be veried based
on government esmates. However, new acons now
being taken by all ve of these pares many enable them
to meet their pledges, although the impact of these acons
have not been analyzed here. Not enough informaon is
available concerning Brazil, Indonesia and South Africa. It
is worth nong that being on track to implement pledges
does not equate to being on track to meet the 1.5 C or 2 C
temperature targets.
3. What is the latest esmate of theemissions gap in 2020?Even if pledges are fully implemented, the emissions gap
in 2020 will be 812 GtCO2e per year, assuming least-cost
emission pathways. Limited available informaon indicates
that the emissions gap in 2020 to meet a 1.5 C target in
2020 is a further 25 GtCO2e per year wider.
Least-cost emission pathways consistent with a likely
chance of keeping global mean temperature increases below
2 C compared to pre-industrial levels have a median level
of 44 GtCO2e in 2020 (range: 3847 GtCO
2e)4. Assuming
full implementaon of the pledges, the emissions gap thus
amounts to between 812 GtCO2
e per year in 2020 (Table 1).
Governments have agreed to more stringent internaonal
accounng rules for land-use change and surplus allowances
for the pares to the Kyoto Protocol. However, it is highly
uncertain whether the condions currently aached to the
high end of country pledges will be met. Therefore, it is more
probable than not that the gap in 2020 will be at the high
end of the 812 GtCO2e range.
Liming increases in global average temperature further to
1.5 C compared to pre-industrial levels requires emissions in
2020 to be even lower, if a least-cost path towards achieving
this objecve is followed. Based on a limited number of new
studies, least-cost emission pathways consistent with the
1.5 C target have emission levels in 2020 of 3744 GtCO2e
per year, declining rapidly thereaer.
Note:
Following the 2012 conference of the pares to the Climate Convenon in Doha, a group of countries has adopted reducon commitments for the
second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol
Source: United Naons Framework Convenon on Climate Change
____________________4See footnote 2.
Quanfied commitments for the secondcommitment period under the Kyoto Protocoland pledges under the Cancn Agreements
Pledges formulated in terms of economy-wide emissionreducons under the Cancn Agreements
Submied migaonacons under theCancn Agreements
Countries withno pledges
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The Emissions Gap Report 2013 Execuve summaryxiii
4. What emission levels in 2025, 2030 and2050 are consistent with the 2 C target?
Least-cost emission pathways consistent with a likely
chance of meeng a 2 C target have global emissions
in 2050 that are 41 and 55 percent, respecvely, below
emission levels in 1990 and 2010.
Given the decision at the 17 thConference of the Pares to
the Climate Convenon in 2011 to complete negoaons on
a new binding agreement by 2015 for the period aer 2020,it has become increasingly important to esmate global
emission levels in 2025 and thereaer that are likely to
meet the 2 C target. In the scenarios assessed in this report,
global emission levels in 2025 and 2030 consistent with the
2 C target amount to approximately 40 GtCO2e (range:
3545 GtCO2e) and 35 GtCO
2e (range: 3242 GtCO
2e),
respecvely. In these scenarios, global emissions in 2050
amount to 22 GtCO2e (range: 1825 GtCO
2e). These levels
are all based on the assumpon that the 2020 least-cost
level of 44 GtCO2e per year will be achieved.
5. What are the implicaons of least-costemission pathways that meet the 1.5 Cand 2 C targets in 2020?
The longer that decisive migaon eorts are postponed,
the higher the dependence on negave emissions in the
second half of the 21stcentury to keep the global average
temperature increase below 2C. The technologies required
for achieving negave emissions may have signicant
negave environmental impacts.
Scenarios consistent with the 1.5 C and 2 C targets
share several characteriscs: higher-than-current emission
reducon rates throughout the century; improvements
in energy eciency and the introducon of zero- and
low-carbon technologies at faster rates than have been
experienced historically over extended periods; greenhouse
gas emissions peaking around 2020; net negave carbon
dioxide emissions from the energy and industrial sectors
in the second half of the century5and an accelerated shi
toward electricaon6.
The technologies required for achieving negave emissions
in the energy and industrial sectors have not yet been
deployed on a large scale and their use may have signicant
impacts, notably on biodiversity and water supply. Because
of this, some scenarios explore the emission reducons
required to meet temperature targets without relying on
negave emissions. These scenarios require maximumemissions in 2020 of 40 GtCO
2e (range: 3644 GtCO
2e), as
compared to a median of 44 GtCO2e for the complete set of
least-cost scenarios.
6. What are the implicaons of later aconscenarios that sll meet the 1.5 C and2 C targets?
Based on a much larger number of studies than in
2012, this update concludes that so-called later-acon
scenarios have several implicaons compared to least-
cost scenarios, including: (i) much higher rates of global
emission reducons in the medium term; (ii) greater lock-in
of carbon-intensive infrastructure; (iii) greater dependence
on certain technologies in the medium-term; (iv) greater
costs of migaon in the medium- and long-term, and
greater risks of economic disrupon; and (v) greater risks
of failing to meet the 2 C target. For these reasons later-
acon scenarios may not be feasible in pracce and, as aresult, temperature targets could be missed.
The esmates of the emissions gap in this and previous
reports are based on least-cost scenarios, which characterize
trends in global emissions up to 2100 under the assumpon
that climate targets will be met by the cheapest combinaon
of policies, measures and technologies. But several new
studies using a dierent type of scenario are now available
later-acon scenarios, which assume that a least-cost
trajectory is not followed immediately, but rather forwards
from a specic future date. Like least-cost scenarios, later-
acon scenarios chart pathways that are consistent with
the 2 C target. Contrary to least-cost scenarios, later-acon
scenarios assume higher global emissions in the near term,
which are compensated by deeper reducons later, typically,
aer 2020 or 2030.
For least-cost scenarios, emission reducon rates for
20302050 consistent with a 2 C target are 24.5 percent
per year. Historically, such reducons have been achieved in
a small number of individual countries, but not globally. For
later-acon scenarios, the corresponding emission reducon
rates would have to be substanally higher, for example,
68.5 percent if emission reducons remain modest unl
2030. These emission reducon rates are without historic
precedent over extended periods of me. Furthermore,
and because of the delay between policy implementaonand actual emission reducons, achieving such high rates
of change would require migaon policies to be adopted
several years before the reducons begin.
Apart from assuming higher global emissions in the
near term, later-acon scenarios also have fewer opons
for reducing emissions when concerted acon nally
begins aer 2020 or 2030. This is because of carbon lock-
in the connued construcon of high-emission fossil-fuel
infrastructure unconstrained by climate policies. Because
technological infrastructure can have life-mes of up to
several decades, later-acon scenarios eecvely lock-in in
these high-emission alternaves for a long period of me.By denion, later-acon scenarios are more expensive
than least-cost scenarios. The actual cost penalty of later
acon depends on the future availability of technologies
when comprehensive migaon acons nally begin, as
well as on the magnitude of emission reducons up to
that point. Finally, although later-acon scenarios might
reach the same temperature targets as their least-cost
counterparts, later-acon scenarios pose greater risks of
climate impacts for four reasons. First, delaying acon allows
more greenhouse gases to build-up in the atmosphere in the
near term, thereby increasing the risk that later emission
reducons will be unable to compensate for this build up.Second, the risk of overshoong climate targets for both
atmospheric concentraons of greenhouse gases and global
temperature increase is higher with later-acon scenarios.
____________________5For most scenarios.6 Net negave carbon dioxide emissions from the energy and industrial sectorsrefers to the potenal to acvely remove more carbon dioxide from theatmosphere than is emied within a given period of me. Negave emissions canbe achieved through, among other means, bioenergy in combinaon with carboncapture and storage.
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The Emissions Gap Report 2013 Execuve summaryxiv
The emissions gap
40
45
55
60
Case
1
Case
2
Case
3
Case
4
50
Time (years)
AnnualGloba
lTotalGreenhouseGasEmissions(GtCOe
)
2010 2020
Median esmate of level
consistent with 2 C:
44 GtCOe (range 41 47)
Shaded area shows likely range (66%)
to limit global temperature increase
to below 2 C during the 21 century
2 C range
Remaining
gap to stay
within 2 C
limit
Business as usual
59 GtCOe (range 56 60)
Case1
12GtCO
e
Case2
11GtCO
e
Case3
10GtCO
e
Case4
8GtCO
e
20402000 2020 2060 2080 2100
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1.5 C range
Peak before 2020
Rapid decline aerwards
2 C range
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The Emissions Gap Report 2013 Execuve summaryxv
Median esmate of level
consistent with 2 C:
44 GtCOe (range 41 47)
Shaded area shows likely range (66%)
to limit global temperature increase
to below 2 C during 21 century
17GtCOe(1420)
Power sector
(2.2 3.9 GtCOe)
Transport**
(1.7 2.5 GtCOe)
Buildings
(1.4 2.9 GtCOe)
Forestry(1.3 4.2 GtCOe)
Agriculture
(1.1 4.3 GtCOe)
Waste
(about 0.8 GtCOe)
*based on results from Bridging the Emissions Gap Report 2011
**including shipping and aviaon
Industry
(1.5 4.6 GtCOe)
How to bridge the gap: results from sectoral policy analysis*
40
45
55
60
50
Time (years)
AnnualGlobalTotalGreenhouseGasEmissions(GtCOe
)
2010 2020
2 C range
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The Emissions Gap Report 2013 Execuve summaryxvi
Third, the near-term rate of temperature increase is higher,
which implies greater near-term climate impacts. Lastly,
when acon is delayed, opons to achieve stringent levels of
climate protecon are increasingly lost.
7. Can the gap be bridged by 2020?The technical potenal for reducing emissions to levels in
2020 is sll esmated at about 17 3 GtCO2e. This is enough
to close the gap between business-as-usual emissionlevels and levels that meet the 2 C target, but me is
running out.
Sector-level studies of emission reducons reveal that,
at marginal costs below US $50100 per tonne of carbon
dioxide equivalent, emissions in 2020 could be reduced
by 17 3 GtCO2e, compared to business-as-usual levels in
that same year. While this potenal would, in principle, be
enough to reach the least-cost target of 44 GtCO2e in 2020,
there is lile me le.
There are many opportunies to narrow the emissions
gap in 2020 as noted in following paragraphs, ranging from
applying more stringent accounng pracces for emission
reducon pledges, to increasing the scope of pledges. To
bridge the emissions gap by 2020, all opons should be
brought into play.
8. What are the opons to bridge theemissions gap?
The applicaon of strict accounng rules for naonal
migaon acon could narrow the gap by 12 GtCO2e. In
addion, moving from uncondional to condional pledges
could narrow the gap by 23 GtCO2e, and increasing the
scope of current pledges could further narrow the gap by
1.8 GtCO2e. These three steps can bring us halfway to
bridging the gap. The remaining gap can be bridged
through further naonal and internaonal acon, including
internaonal cooperave iniaves. Much of this acon
will help full naonal interests outside of climate policy.
Minimizing the use of lenient land-use credits and of
surplus emission reducons, and avoiding double counng
of osets could narrow the gap by about 12 GtCO2e.
Implemenng the more ambious condional pledges
(rather than the uncondional pledges) could narrow the
gap by 23 GtCO2e. A range of acons aimed at increasing
the scope of current pledges could narrow the gap by an
addional 1.8 GtCO2e. (These include covering all emissions
in naonal pledges, having all countries pledge emissionreducons, and reducing emissions from internaonal
transport). Adding together the more stringent accounng
pracces, the more ambious pledges, and the increased
scope of current pledges, reduces the gap around 6 GtCO2e
or by about a half.
The remaining gap can be bridged through further naonal
and internaonal acon, including internaonal cooperave
iniaves (see next point). Also important is the fact that
many acons to reduce emissions can help meet other
naonal and local development objecves such as reducing
air polluon or trac congeson, or saving household
energy costs.
9. How can internaonal cooperaveiniaves contribute to narrowingthe gap?
There is an increasing number of internaonal cooperave
iniaves, through which groups of countries and/or other
enes cooperate to promote technologies and policies
that have climate benets, even though climate change
migaon may not be the primary goal of the iniave.
These eorts have the potenal to help bridge the gap byseveral GtCO2e in 2020.
Internaonal cooperave iniaves take the form of either
global dialogues (to exchange informaon and understand
naonal priories), formal mul-lateral processes
(addressing issues that are relevant to the reducon of
GHG emissions), or implementaon iniaves (oen
structured around technical dialogue fora or sector-specic
implementaon projects). Some make a direct contribuon
to climate change migaon, by eecvely helping countries
reduce emissions, while others contribute to this goal
indirectly, for example through consensus building eorts or
the sharing of good pracces among members.
The most important areas for internaonal cooperave
iniaves appear to be:
- Energy eciency (up to 2 GtCO2e by 2020): covered by
a substanal number of iniaves.
- Fossil fuel subsidy reform (0.42 GtCO2e by 2020): the
number of iniaves and clear commitments in this
area is limited.
- Methane and other short-lived climate pollutants
(0.61.1 GtCO2e by 2020); this area is covered by one
overarching and several specic iniaves. (Reducons
here may occur as a side eect of other climate
migaon.)
-Renewable energy (13 GtCO2e by 2020): severaliniaves have been started in this area.
Based on limited evidence, the following provisions
could arguably enhance the eecveness of Internaonal
Cooperave Iniaves: (i) a clearly dened vision and
mandate with clearly arculated goals; (ii) the right mix of
parcipants appropriate for that mandate, going beyond
tradional climate negoators; (iii) stronger parcipaon
from developing country actors; (iv) sucient funding and
an instuonal structure that supports implementaon and
follow-up, but maintains exibility; and (v) and incenves for
parcipants.
10. How can naonal agricultural policiespromote development while substanallyreducing emissions?
Agriculture now contributes about 11 percent to global
greenhouse gas emissions. The esmated emission
reducon potenal for the sector ranges from 1.1 GtCO2e
to 4.3 GtCO2e in 2020. Emission reducons achieved by
these iniaves may partly overlap with naonal pledges,
but in some cases may also be addional to these.
Not many countries have specied acon in the
agriculture sector as part of implemenng their pledges. Yet,
esmates of emission reducon potenals for the sectorare high, ranging from 1.1 GtCO
2e to 4.3 GtCO
2e a wide
range, reecng uncertaines in the esmate. In this years
update we describe policies that have proved to be eecve
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The Emissions Gap Report 2013 Execuve summaryxvii
Table 1 Emissions reducons with respect to business-as-usual and emissions gap in 2020, by pledge case
Case Pledge type Rule type Median emission levelsand range (GtCO
2e per year)
Reducons with respect tobusiness-as-usual in 2020
(GtCO2e per year)
Emissions gap in 2020(GtCO
2e per year)
Case 1 Uncondional Lenient 56 (5456) 3 12
Case 2 Uncondional Strict 55 (5355) 4 11
Case 3 Condional Lenient 54 (5254) 5 10
Case 4 Condional Strict 52 (5052) 7 8
Note:In this report, an uncondional pledge is one made without condions aached. A condional pledge might depend on the ability of a
naonal legislature to enact necessary laws, or may depend on acon from other countries, or on the provision of nance or technical support.
Strict rules means that allowances from land use, land-use change and forestry accounng and surplus emission credits will not be counted as
part of a countrys meeng their emissions reducon pledges. Under lenient rules, these elements can be counted.
in reducing emissions and increasing carbon uptake in the
agricultural sector.
In addion to contribung to climate change migaon,
these measures enhance the sectors environmental
sustainability and, depending on the measure and situaon,
may provide other benets such as higher yields, lower
ferlizer costs or extra prots from wood supply. Three
examples are:- Usage of no-llage pracces: no-llage refers to the
eliminaon of ploughing by direct seeding under the
mulch layer of the previous seasons crop. This reduces
greenhouse gas emissions from soil disturbance and
from fossil-fuel use of farm machinery.
- Improved nutrient and water management in rice
producon: this includes innovave cropping pracces
such as alternate weng and drying and urea deep
placement that reduce methane and nitrous oxide
emissions.
- Agroforestry: this consists of dierent management
pracces that all deliberately include woody perennials
on farms and the landscape, and which increasethe uptake and storage of carbon dioxide from the
atmosphere in biomass and soils.
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Introducon
Chapter 1
In December of 2009, 114 pares to the United Naons
Framework Convenon on Climate Change (the Climate
Convenon) agreed to the Copenhagen Accord1. Among the
important provisions of the accord was the call to pares to
submit voluntary emission reducon pledges for the year
2020. To date, 42 developed countries have responded
to this call and submied economy-wide greenhouse gas
emission reducon pledges, 16 developing countries have
submied mul-sector expected emission reducons, and
in addion 39 other developing countries have submied
pledges related to sectoral goals2. Another important
provision was the seng of a target to keep the increase
in global average temperature below 2C relave to pre-
industrial levels. In the wake of these two provisions, some
very crical quesons arose:- Are the pledges for 2020 enough to keep the world on
track to meet the 2 C target?
- Will there be a gap between where we need to be in
2020 versus where we expect to be?
UNEP, together with the scienc community, took on
these quesons in a report published just ahead of the
Climate Convenon meeng in Cancn in late 2010 (UNEP,
2010). This emissions gap report synthesized the latest
scienc knowledge about the possible gap between the
global emissions levels in 2020 consistent with the 2 C
target versus the expected levels if countries full their
emission reducon pledges. Many pares to the ClimateConvenon found this analysis useful as a reference point
for establishing the level of ambion that countries needed
to pursue in controlling their greenhouse gas emissions. As
a result they asked UNEP to produce annual follow-ups, with
updates of the gap and advice on how to close it.
Besides updang the esmates of the emissions gap, the
2011 report also looked at feasible ways of bridging the gap
from two perspecves (UNEP, 2011). The rst was from the
top-down viewpoint of integrated models, which showed
that feasible transformaons in the energy system and other
sectors would lower global emissions enough to meet the
2 C target. The second was a boom-up perspecve, which
examined the emissions reducon potenal in each of the
main emissions-producing sectors of the economy. These
boom-up esmates showed that enough total potenal
exists to bridge the emissions gap in 2020.
The 2012 report presented an update of the gap but
also good examples of best-pracce policy instruments
for reducing emissions. Among these were acons such
as implemenng appliance standards and vehicle fuel-
eciency guidelines, which are working successfully in many
parts of the world and are ready for applicaon elsewhere to
help reduce emissions.
The current report reviews the latest esmates of the
emissions gap in 2020 and provides plenful addional
informaon relevant to the climate negoaons. Included
are the latest esmates of:- the current level of global greenhouse gas emissions
based on authoritave sources;
- naonal emission levels, both current (2010) and
projected (2020), consistent with current pledges and
other commitments;
- global emission levels consistent with the 2 C target in
2020, 2030 and 2050;
- progress being made in dierent parts of the world to
achieve substanal emission reducons.
New to this fourth report is an assessment of the extent to
which countries are on track to meet their naonal pledges.
Also new is a descripon of the many cooperave climateiniaves being undertaken internaonally among many
dierent actors public, private, and from civil society.
Special aenon is given to analysing new scenarios
that assume later acon for migaon, compared to those
used earlier to compute the emissions gap. The report also
describes new ndings from scienc literature about the
impacts of later acon to reduce global emissions.
This year the report reviews best pracces in reducing
emissions in an oen-overlooked emissions-producing
sector agriculture. Innovave ideas are described for
transforming agriculture into a more sustainable, low-
emissions form.As in previous years, this report has been prepared by a
wide range of sciensts from around the world. This year____________________1 Since then, the number of pares agreeing to the Accord has risen to 141 (seehps://unfccc.int/meengs/copenhagen_dec_2009/items/5262.php).2With the 28 member states of the European Union counted as one party.
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70 sciensts from 44 scienc groups in 17 countries have
contributed to the assessment.
The informaon contained in the report provides
invaluable inputs to the current debate on global climate
policy and the acons needed to meet internaonal climate
targets. Meeng these targets is instrumental for liming
the adverse impacts of climate change and associated
adaptaon gaps as illustrated in Box 1.1. UNEP hopes that
this fourth update will help catalyse acon in the forthcoming
climate negoaons.
Box 1.1 From emissions gap to adaptaon gap
This reports denion of the emissions gap is based on the internaonally agreed limit to the increase in globalaverage temperature of 2 C (or possibly 1.5C). Chapter 3 summarizes the latest scienc ndings regardingboth least-cost and later-acon scenarios for meeng that 1.5 or 2 C target. The chapter concludes that,with later-acon scenarios, the cost and risk of not meeng the target increases signicantly, compared toleast-cost scenarios.
The 2 C target has become associated with what the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) termeddangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system, even though the IPCC has thus far neveraached a specic temperature threshold to the concept. Nevertheless, the IPCC has characterised dangerousanthropogenic interference through ve reasons for concern, namely risk to unique and threatened systems,risk of extreme weather events, disparies of impacts and vulnerabilies, aggregate damage and risks of large-scale disconnuies.
These reasons for concern would thus gain parcular relevance in the event that the world followed a later-aconscenario emissions trajectory that in the end failed to meet the 1.5 or 2 C target. Today, when the choice betweenleast-cost and later-acon scenarios is sll available to us, later-acon scenarios highlight a growing adaptaonproblem which, by analogy with the emissions gap, could be termed an adaptaon gap.
The adaptaon gap is more of a challenge to assess than the emissions gap. Whereas carbon dioxide and itsequivalents provide a common metric for quanfying the emissions gap, we lack a comparable metric forquanfying the adaptaon gap and assessing the impacts of eorts to close it. While the emissions gap indicatesthe quanty of greenhouse gas emissions that need to be abated, the adaptaon gap could measure vulnerabilieswhich need to be reduced but are not accounted for in any funded programme for reducing adaptaon risks.Alternavely, it could esmate the gap between the level of funding needed for adaptaon and the level of fundingactually commied to the task. Developing countries needs for adaptaon are believed to cost in the range ofUS $100 billion per year (UNFCCC, 2007; World Bank, 2010). By comparison the funds made available by the majormullateral funding mechanisms that generate and disperse adaptaon nance add up to a total of around US$3.9 billion to date. From a funding perspecve therefore, the adaptaon gap is signicant3.
The concept of the adaptaon gap is in line with the IPCCs Working Group IIs use of the term adaptaon decit,which is used to describe the decit between the current state of a country or management system and a statethat would minimize the adverse impacts of current climate condions.
Framing the adaptaon gap in a way useful for policy making also requires a beer understanding of how thecosts of adaptaon vary with dierent temperature projecons. Data on the costs of adaptaon under business-as-usual, and best- and worst-case emission scenarios could help policy makers beer understand the relaonshipbetween adaptaon to, and migaon of climate change. Adaptaon cost esmates also put the true costs ofclimate change, as opposed to only looking at the costs of migang it, into a broader and clearer perspecve.
There is also a knowledge gap between what we know and what we need to know to successfully adapt to climate
change. It is true that we already have enough knowledge to act on adaptaon, but not enough to act well. Forexample, we lack informaon about how much exisng and planned policies can reduce peoples vulnerability.Evaluang the eecveness of various intervenons would arguably be a very eecve way of measuring progresstowards adaptaon.
____________________3 The US $3.9 billion gure is a rough esmate based on informaon from thefollowing major mullateral funding mechanisms for adaptaon: an equivalent ofUS $399 million has been commied by the EUs Global Climate Change Alliancefrom 2008 to 2013 (GCCA, 2013). (It should be noted that part of these fundshave supported clean energy, Reducing Emissions from Deforestaon and ForestDegradaon (REDD) and Disaster Risk Reducon programme); cumulave pledgesto the Least Developed Countries Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund
amounted to a total of US $863 million from their incepon to May 2013, (GEF,2013); US $2.3 billion has been pledged to the Strategic Climate Fund Trust fund asof December 31, 2012 (World Bank, 2013); and the Adaptaon Fund had receivedresources amounng to US $324 billion as of 30 November, 2012 (AdaptaonFund, 2012).
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The Emissions Gap Report 2013 Emissions trends, pledges and their implementaon 3
Emission trends, pledges and theirimplementaon
Chapter 2
2.1 IntroduconThis chapter presents an update, based on the scienc
literature, of the following crical topics:
- current (2010 global) emissions of greenhouse gases;
- projected emissions (to 2020) of greenhouse gases
under a business-as-usual (BaU) scenario;
- projecons (to 2020) of greenhouse gas emissions
under four dierent sets of assumpons regarding
implementaon of naonal pledges to reduce
emissions;- the extent to which pares are posioned to implement
their pledges, in light of their current policy porolios
and plausible assumpons regarding macroeconomic
trends and osets.
The esmated emission level in 2020 under a business-as-
usual scenario is 1 gigatonne of carbon dioxide equivalent
(GtCO2e) higher compared to last years emissions gap
report1. While the emission levels in 2020 for the strict-rules
cases are higher by roughly 1 GtCO2e (uncondional) and
are comparable to last years emission level (condional),
the emission levels associated with the two lenient-rules
cases are lower by roughly 1 GtCO2e, as compared to lastyears esmates. These changes are mainly due to decisions
on surpluses made by countries during the Doha climate
negoaons and downward revisions to the assumpons
on double counng of osets. They illustrate that increasing
stringency through the climate negoaons can help
reduce emission levels in 2020 under lenient-rules cases.
However, they do not reect an increase in ambion or
acon, but represent a move towards stricter accounng
rules. To illustrate, in last years emissions gap report,
emission levels associated with the strict-rules cases were
3 GtCO2e lower than those of the lenient-rules cases, whereas
this year they are lower by around 1 GtCO2e (uncondional)
and 2 GtCO2e (condional).
While previous reports assumed full pledge
implementaon, this year we also explore the extent
to which 13 pares, accounng for 72 percent of global
greenhouse gas emissions, are already on track to implementtheir pledges, and where further policy implementaon or
osets are likely to be required.
2.2 Current global emissionsLast years report esmated total global greenhouse
gas emissions in 2010 at 50.1 GtCO2e, with a 95 percent
uncertainty range of 45.654.6 GtCO2e2. This boom-up
esmate from the EDGAR database (JRC/PBL, 2012) has
not been updated since and is considered a comprehensive
assessment of global greenhouse gas emissions in 20103.
Figure 2.1 shows emission levels by major economic grouping
for the period 19702010, using this database4. These
may dier from data derived from the Naonal Inventory
Reports, which are the latest esmate of emissions for most
developed countries. The latest global esmates of energy-
related carbon dioxide emissions show a connued increase
for the years 2011 and 2012, although at a lower pace than
the average since the beginning of the 21stcentury (Olivier
et al., 2013)5.
Lead authors: Michel den Elzen (PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, Netherlands), Taryn Fransen (World ResourcesInstute, USA), Hans-Holger Rogner (Internaonal Instute for Applied Systems Analysis, Austria)
Contribung authors: Johannes Gtschow (Potsdam Instute for Climate Impact Research, Germany), Giacomo Grassi (EuropeanCommissions Joint Research Centre, Italy), Niklas Hhne (Ecofys, Germany), Kelly Levin (World Resources Instute, USA), Elizabeth
Sawin (Climate Interacve, USA), Mark Roelfsema (PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, Netherlands), Christopher Taylor(Department of Energy and Climate Change, United Kingdom), Zhao Xiusheng (Tshingua University, China)
____________________1 Unless otherwise stated, all emissions in this report are expressed in GtCO
2e.
This is the sum of six of the greenhouse gases covered by the Kyoto Protocol (thatis CO
2, CH
4, N
2O, HFCs, PFCs and SF
6), weighted by their global warming potenal
(GWP) (UNFCCC, 2002). Not included are ozone depleng substances (ODS), blackcarbon (BC), and organic carbon (OC). While nitrogen triuoride (NF
3) has recently
been added to the Kyoto Protocol, it has not been included in this analysis. Unlessotherwise stated, data include emissions from land use, land-use change andforestry (LULUCF).
____________________2This esmate included all six Kyoto gases and also takes into account emissionsfrom land use, land-use change and forestry.3 Another comprehensive assessment of global GHG emissions is WRIs CAITdatabase that esmated total global GHG emissions in 2010 at 47.2 GtCO
2e.
4 The reader is referred to last years report (UNEP 2012a) for a breakdownby gas.5The reader is referred to Appendix 2A for further details.
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The Emissions Gap Report 2013 Emissions trends, pledges and their implementaon4
Figure 2.1: Trend in global greenhouse gas emissions 19702010 by major economic groupingNote: The data ploed has been calculated using global warming potenal values as used for UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol reporng.The graph shows emissions of 50.1 GtCO
2e in 2010, as derived from boom-up emission inventories.
Source: EDGAR 4.2 FT2010 (JRC/PBL, 2012. Percentages refer to shares in global emissions in 2010.
While the last decade of the 20th century saw lile
change in the relave regional contribuons to annual
global greenhouse gas emissions, this changed drascally
during the rst decade of the 21st century. Between 2000
and 2010, the developed country share decreased from
51.8 percent to 40.9 percent, whereas developing countryemissions increased from 48.2 percent to 59.1 percent (JRC/
PBL, 2012). Referring to Figure 2.1, between 2000 and 2010
the share of global emissions of the non-OECD G20 countries
(i.e. Argenna, China, Brazil, India, Indonesia, the Russian
Federaon, Saudi Arabia and South Africa) increased by
8.7 percent, while the share of all OECD countries and other
industrialized countries declined by 9.0 percent, and the
share of the remaining developing countries changed lile.
Today developing and developed countries are responsible
for roughly equal shares of cumulave greenhouse gas
emissions for the period 1850-2010 (den Elzen et al., 2013b).
Greenhouse gas emission esmates are uncertain due todierences in denions and in the accounng of naonal
emissions. To produce a stascally signicant assessment
of the uncertainty associated with those emission esmates,
a large number of independent but consistent datasets is
required, which at present is not the case (Appendix 2.A).
It is nonetheless clear that energy-related carbon dioxide
emissions have the lowest uncertainty (UNEP, 2012a),
while land use and land-use change emissions of dierent
greenhouse gases have the highest.
2.3 Projected global emissions under
business-as-usual scenariosBusiness-as-usual scenarios of future developments aregenerally based on an extrapolaon of current economic,
social and technological trends. They usually reect policies
that have taken eect as of a recent cut-o date, for example,
20108. However, in some cases they may include policies
that, while approved, will only enter into force at a future
date (DEA/OECD/URC, 2013).
Business-as-usual scenarios of greenhouse gases are
benchmarks against which the eecveness of migaonpolicies and measures can be tested. They are also used in
this report to assess the extent to which pares pledges can
meet the 2o C or 1.5o C targets.
Business-as-usual emissions for 2020 were derived
from esmates by 12 modelling groups that analyzed the
reducon proposals of pares, as described in Secon 2.4 9.
Most of the modelling groups followed the same approach
with regards to the types of policies included in the BaU
scenario they did not include new policies with a potenal
eect on greenhouse gas emissions beyond those in eect
at the cut-o date10. Some of the modelling groups used the
BaU scenarios that the pares provided.Based on the analysis by these 12 modelling groups,
global greenhouse gas emissions for 2020 are esmated
at 59 GtCO2e (range 5660 GtCO
2e) in 2020 under BaU
assumpons, which is about 1 GtCO2e higher than the gure
in the 2012 emissions gap report11. Two key factors explain
____________________8BaU scenarios typically vary with regard to which policies they take into accountfor a variety of reasons, including: the cut-o year for their inclusion; whetherpolicies have to be planned, adopted, and/or implemented if they are to beincluded; methodologies for quanfying the eect of included policies; and thedeterminaon of whether a policy will have a signicant eect that warrants
inclusion.9See Table B.1 in Appendix 2.B for a lisng of the modelling groups.10The cut-o date for exclusion of policies varies among the modelling groups.11 Unless stated otherwise, all ranges in the report are expressed as 20 th80th
percenles.
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
GtC
Oe
Bunkers Least developed countries Other developing countries
OECD Lan America OECD Europe OECD North America
Non-OECD G20 members Other industrialized countries OECD Pacific
60
2.2%
4.7%
16.3%
42.5%
2.1%5.2%
1.5%
11.0%
14.5%
50
40
30
20
10
0
Years
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The Emissions Gap Report 2013 Emissions trends, pledges and their implementaon 5
this increase: using the BaU numbers from Chinas second
naonal communicaon to UNFCCC (Government of China,
2012), and moving the base year from 2005 to 2010 in more
model studies12.
To test the robustness of the 59 GtCO2e BaU esmate, we
compare our esmates with those of several internaonal
modelling groups, including six that are parcipang in the
studies discussed in Secon 2.4 (Kriegler et al., 2013)13.
The BaU scenarios with which we compared our esmates(24 scenarios, developed by 12 dierent models) give
a median of 58 GtCO2e, with a range of 5560 GtCO
2e. In
spite of the dierent lower bound, this median, 58 GtCO2e,
is consistent with that obtained by the modelling groups
contribung to this report.
2.4 Projected global emissions under pledgeassumpons
Under the 2010 Cancn Agreements of the Climate
Convenon, 42 developed-country pares have submied
quaned economy-wide emission reducon proposals for
2020. Since November 2012, when the last emissions gap
report was released, only New Zealand has signicantly
changed its pledge14. Some countries, notably Mexico, have
changed underlying assumpons that eecvely change
their pledge15.
At the latest Conference of the Pares (COP) to the Climate
Convenon, held in in Doha in late 2012, pares agreed on
a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. This
period will run from 2013 to 2020 and provides for quaned
emission reducon targets for the following Annex I pares:
Australia, Belarus, the European Union and its member
states, Kazakhstan, Monaco, Norway, Switzerland andUkraine. No binding emission reducon targets were set for
any other Climate Convenon pares, neither Annex-I nor
non-Annex I.
To date 55 developing country pares and the African
group have submied naonally appropriate migaon
acons (NAMAs) to Climate Convenon (UNFCCC, 2013). Of
these, 16 have been framed in terms of mul-sector expected
greenhouse gas emission reducons16. The remaining 39 are
expressed as sectoral goals or, in fewer instances, specic
migaon projects. In this assessment only the former 16
are considered17. Together, the 42 developed country pares
with reducon targets and the 16 developing country pares
accounted for about 75 percent of global emissions in 2010.
____________________12This resulted in higher emission levels, as economic acvity and thus emissionlevels was higher in the period 20052010, compared to the previous base year.13The esmates in this report do not include new policies aecng greenhousegas emissions aer the cut-o year.14 In August 2013, New Zealand announced a single 5 percent reducon target
with respect to its 1990 emission levels, replacing its inial 1020 percent target.15The Mexican government recently updated the countrys BaU scenario for 2020.This updated scenario leads to 960 MtCO
2e emissions, which is above the previous
BaU esmate, and also aects the 2020 emissions resulng from the pledge(see Box 2.1).
____________________16 China and India have expressed their migaon goals in terms of emissionreducons per unit of GDP; Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa and theRepublic of Korea, in terms of deviaons below their respecve BaU emissionscenarios; Angua and Barbuda, Marshall Islands and Republic of Moldova, interms of absolute greenhouse gas emission reducons; and Costa Rica and theMaldives, in terms of a carbon neutrality goal. The reader is referred to Appendix2.C for addional details on these goals.17Quanfying the emission reducons resulng from these 39 acons is dicult.For this reason, this assessment assumes no reducons below BaU emissionscenarios for these countries. This might be a conservave assumpon.18 For example, in November 2012, as a part of the countrys second naonalcommunicaon to the Climate Convenon, the Chinese government releasednaonal BaU and migaon scenarios for the rst me (Government of China,2012). The BaU scenario excludes all climate-related policies implemented
since 2005, which leads to energy-related carbon dioxide emissions of14.4 GtCO
2in 2020. The migaon scenario reects both domesc policies and the
countrys internaonal emission-intensity target and results in emissions levels of4.5 GtCO
2below BaU levels. Similarly, the Mexican government recently updated
the countrys BaU scenario for 2020.
Box 2.1 Current and projected emission levels for 13 UNFCCC pares with a pledge
Figure 2.2 shows past (1990, 2005 and 2010) as expected and future (2020) emission levels for 13 ClimateConvenon pares that have submied quantave emission reducon pledges. Four dierent projeconsto 2020 are presented: the naonal BaU scenario, the median BaU value from several internaonal modellingstudies, and the emission levels resulng from implementaon of two emission reducon pledge cases (see thenext secon for a descripon of the dierent pledge cases).
Annex I pares have dened their commitments in terms of emission reducons in 2020 relave to historical
emission levels, typically emission levels in 1990. Conversely, non-Annex I pares have dened them in terms ofemission reducons in 2020 relave to hypothecal future emission levels, typically against BaU levels in 2020, orin terms of greenhouse gas emission intensity. In this second case, the uncertainty about actual emission levels in2020 is carried over into the esmate of the emission reducons commitment.
Most naonal BaU scenarios from non-Annex I pares are relavely high compared to the range in the correspondingscenario by 12 modelling studies. The reasons for this are numerous, including dierences in denions, notablyas to which policies are considered in the baseline, as well in the nature of the assumpons made (DEA/OECD/URC, 2013). Crucially, some developing countries are increasingly clarifying those assumpons and the methodsused to calculate the baseline18.
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The Emissions Gap Report 2013 Emissions trends, pledges and their implementaon6
Box 2.1 Current and projected emission levels for 13 UNFCCC pares with a pledge (connued)
Figure 2.2. Greenhouse gas emissions, including land-use change, for 1990, 2005, 2010 and for 2020 under a naonal BaU(if available), median of the BaU assumed by modelling groups, uncondional pledge and condional pledge for UNFCCC paresincluded in the G20 with a pledge, taking the European Union as a group.Note: For developed countries, emissions exclude emissions from land-use change.Note: European Union data include all current European Union member countries except Croaa, which joined the EuropeanUnion on 1 July, 2013.Source: EDGAR (JRC/PBL, 2012)19
____________________19 Naonal BaUs were obtained from the following sources. For developedcountries, we use the best representaon of a with-policies BaU scenario, i.e.:Australia (Department of Climate Change and Energy Eciency, 2012); Canada(Environment Canada, 2012); European Union (European Environment Agency,2012); Japan: not available; Russia (Government of the Russian Federaon, 2010);USA (EIA, 2012; Bianco etal., 2013). For developing countries without-policies BaUscenarios (den Elzen et al., 2013a), i.e.: Brazil (Brazilian Government, 2010); China(Government of China, 2012), supplemented with the average esmate non-energy CO
2emission projecon from den Elzen et al., 2013a and esmates from
Climate Acon Tracker; India (Planning Commission, 2011); Indonesia (Ministry ofEnvironment, 2010), Mexico (NCCS, 2013); South Africa (South Africa. Departmentof Environmental Aairs, 2011); Korea, Republic of (Republic of Korea, 2011). Notethat the naonal BaUs for South Africa and India were reported as a range. For thegures, the mid-point has been used.
Some pledges are uncondional, whereas others havebeen made condional on the ability of a naonal legislature
to enact necessary laws, the acon of other countries, or the
provision of nancial or technical support. We refer to these
pledges as, respecvely, uncondional and condional.
Some countries have submied one of each type, whereas
others have submied only a condional or only an
uncondional pledge. This creates a range of possible
collecve impacts from the pledges, bounded on the low
end if only uncondional pledges are implemented, and
on the high end if all condional pledges are implemented.
Emission levels in 2020 resulng from implementaon of
the pledges also depend on the rules used to account forboth land use and land-use change credits and debits, and
surplus emission units. These concepts are introduced in
the following secons, followed by a quancaon of the
emission reducons resulng from dierent combinaons ofpledge cases.
2.4.1 Use of land use, land-use change andforestry credits and debits
Under the Kyoto Protocol, Annex I pares may receive
credits or debits from land use, land-use change and forestry
(LULUCF) acvies dependent on a set of complex accounng
rules that contribute to the achievement of their individual
emission reducon targets. During the seventeenth
Conference of the Pares to the Climate Convenon, held
in Durban in late 2011, new LULUCF accounng rules for
countries parcipang in the second commitment period(CP2) of the Kyoto Protocol were agreed (UNFCCC, 2012a).
The potenal contribuon of LULUCF accounng under
these new rules appears to be relavely modest for Annex
I pares that joined the rst commitment period of the
Kyoto Protocol (Grassi et al., 2012): a dierence of up to
about 2 percent of 1990 emissions between strict and
lenient accounng, equal to about 0.3 GtCO2e per year. If
the USA, which did not join the rst commitment period of
the Kyoto Protocol, followed these rules, the number would
increase to 0.45 GtCO2e per year20. While these esmates
____________________20 For the USA, the esmated potenal contribuon from LULUCF credits is
about 0.15 GtCO2e per year. This is calculated as follows: for forest management,assuming 2005 as reference year and given the available projecons for 2020(United States Department of State, 2010), the credit is esmated at about0.07 GtCO
2e per year; an addional credit of about 0.08 GtCO
2e per year is
esmated from aorestaon/reforestaon and deforestaon (EPA, 2005).
1990 2010 naonal BaU 2020 BaU 2020 2020-uncondional 2020-conditonal2005
8000
6000
4000
2000
0
10000
12000
14000
16000
18000
Emissions(MtCOe)
Australia
B
razil
Canada
C
hina
E
U27
India
Indonesia
Japan
Mexico
Russia
SouthA
frica
Korea,
Republicof
USA
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____________________21For example, in the case of Russia, if the appropriate accounng of the potenalof the forestry sector (UNFCCC, 2012c) is interpreted as not applying the cap onforest management credits agreed in Durban, LULUCF credits in Russia alone mayreach 0.3 GtCO
2e per year, instead of the 0.1 GtCO
2e per year assumed in this
assessment.22This would apply if all surplus credits were purchased by pares with pledgesthat do require emission reducons, displacing migaon acon in buying pares.23 The European Union stated in Doha that their legislaon does not allow theuse of carried over surplus units (UNFCCC, 2012b). However, it is unclear if thisstatement is fully binding. Purchase of units was not excluded by the European
Union, but is highly unlikely to happen, as the European Union holds the largestshare of surplus units.24 In their respecve pledges, the governments of Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarusproposed target emission levels above that 2008-2010 emissions average. Furtherdetails are available in Chen et al. (2013) and Kollmuss (2013).
____________________25Calculaons assume as a starng point the inial assigned amounts of the rstcommitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. The uncertainty ranges come from the
future decisions of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. If these countries stay in thesecond commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol and lower their commitments totheir 2008-2010 emission levels, they can make use of surplus emissions.26 At least in theory, emission reducons could also be shared, with a certainpercentage aributed to the buyer and the seller retaining the remainder.
are generally consistent with the informaon contained in
UNFCCC (2012c), they may underesmate emissions from
those countries that may adopt dierent accounng rules
from those of the Kyoto Protocol, for example, Canada,
Japan, New Zealand and Russia21.
2.4.2 Surplus emissions unitsEsmates of emission levels in 2020 can also be inuenced
by the potenal use of surplus emission units. These surplusunits could arise either when pares actual emissions are
below their emission targets for the rst commitment period
of the Kyoto Protocol, or when their emissions in 2020 are
below their target for that year, when this does not require
signicant emission reducons. Note that surplus emission
units refers to surpluses arising from dierent types of
allowances assigned amount units, emission reducon
units and cered emission reducons all introduced in
the next paragraphs.
The 2012 emissions gap report esmated the maximum
emission reducon in 2020 due to surplus credits at
1.8 GtCO2
e22. However, as a result of the rules for using
such surplus allowances agreed to in Doha, these esmates
need to be revised (UNFCCC, 2012b; Kollmuss, 2013). The
pares agreed that allowances, referred to as assigned
amount units (AAUs), not used in the rst commitment
period can be carried over to the next period. However,
recent decisions on surplus emission units signicantly
limit the use of such surplus allowances and prevent the
build-up of new ones. Only pares parcipang in the
second commitment period can sell their surplus assigned
amount units. This will exclude Russia, which is the largest
holder of surplus assigned amount units, but which will
not parcipate in the second commitment period. Buyer
countries can only purchase surplus assigned amount unitsup to a quanty of 2 percent of their own inial assigned
amount for the rst commitment period. In addion,
Australia, Japan, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Norway and
Switzerland have said that they will not purchase units from
others, while the European Union has declared that they
will not use any surplus emissions units (UNFCCC, 2012b)23.
Finally, new surplus allowances are prevented by the fact
that allowances that exceed the pares average emission
levels in the period 20082010 will be cancelled. This rule
aects Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine24.
These decisions reduce the impact of surplus emissions
in 2020. Based on Chen et al.(2013) and Gtschow (2013),the impact of Kyoto surpluses on 2020 pledges is esmated
to be about 0.05 GtCO2e (range 0.050.15 GtCO