The Effects of Occupational Licensing on Employment, Skills and ...

The Effects of Occupational Licensing on Employment, Skills

and Quality: A Case Study of Two Occupations in the UK

October 2015

Dr. Amy Humphris, University of Brighton

Dr. Maria Koumenta, Queen Mary, University of London

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Executive Summary The EU commission aims to understand the impact of occupational regulation on

various labour market outcomes. This report addresses this theme by exploring

how changes in the regulation status of two occupations in the UK, namely

nursery school workers and security guards, affect the wages, employment and

skills levels of incumbents, as well as the quality of the service they deliver. In

doing so, this report expands the evidence base on occupational regulation and

contributes to evidence-based policy-making.

This report aims to:

1. Describe the institution of occupational regulation in the UK;

2. Provide an overview of the regulatory changes that nursery school

workers and security guards were subjected to;

3. Assess the impact licensing had on employment, wages, skills and quality

within the two case study occupations.

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1. Introduction Far from a blanket set of regulations which are identical in nature and

stringency, occupational regulation in the UK is a complex system containing

many different forms of regulation which vary in terms of their characteristics

and impact. The regulatory system has been moulded over time by changes in

the occupational composition, technology, educational systems, political

preferences, and institutional actors such as professional associations and

regulators. Similar processes of course take place in different market and

institutional contexts and naturally result in very diverse occupational regimes

across countries. As such, while the US labour market is dominated by licensed

occupations, the UK’s multi-faceted approach is far more complex, featuring a

variety of regulation typologies. The UK also differs hugely from many other EU

member states in that regulation is predominantly based on pre-entry

restrictions compared to for example Italy and Greece where post-entry

restrictions on the operational activities of business are commonplace. In

addition, unlike other EU member states, the UK has no record of fully de-

licensing occupations, an activity that is becoming increasingly common in

countries like Poland, Portugal and Greece. All these institutional differences

coupled with the diverse labour market contexts within which they are found

point to the value of examining the characteristics and impact of occupational

regulation at country-level.

This report focuses on the UK case and assesses the effect of increased regulation

has on three labour market outcomes, namely employment, wages and skills, and

one product market outcome, namely quality of service delivered. It investigates

these themes using two occupations whose regulation status switched from

being accredited to becoming licensed. The occupations in question are: nursery

school workers and security guards. Nursery school workers became licensed

under the Childcare Act 2006, which came into effect in March 2007. Security

guards became licensed under the Private Security Act 2001, which came into

effect in April 2003. Whilst subsequent amendments have been made to both

Acts the original date of enforcement is the focus of the analysis because this is

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the point at which the regulation status of both occupations changed. These

occupations provide an opportunity to analyse the impact of licensing because

data is readily available on the impact indicators of interest pre and post

licensing. In addition, the relative recency of the change in regulations, continuity

in the available data and the consistency of occupational coding enhance the

reliability of the results.

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2. Understanding Occupational Regulation in the UK

The UK’s occupational regulation history dates back to the Medieval Guilds.

However, the institution as we know it today only began to develop towards the

end of the 19th century. Recently, the UK has witnessed a steady growth in the

number of occupations that require a licence to practice, with twelve

occupations becoming subject to licensing for the first time since 20011, but the

preferred approach remains one of voluntarism and industry imposed training

standards. As Forth et al. (2011) show, the role of the state broadly remains one

of providing legitimacy to professional bodies and interfering only in cases

where malpractice is deemed to pose extremely high risks for the public. As far

as professions are concerned, some are content to preserve their right to self-

regulation, while others are keen to increase the barriers to entry via the

imposition of licensing requirements.

To classify occupations according to their regulation status the US literature

employs the ‘legal barriers to entry’ criterion (Brinegal and Schmitt 1992).

However, in order to provide a representative picture of the institutional

arrangements currently present in the UK, Forth et al. (2011) extend this to

include the imposition of ‘minimum skill standards’ as a separate dimension

determining the regulation status of occupations. As such, in addition to the

element of compulsion, occupational regulation is also concerned with various

forms of standard-setting mechanisms. Drawing on these dimensions, we can

distinguish between four different types of regulation: registration,

accreditation, certification and licensing.

Licensing, the focus of this report is the most restrictive form and currently the

most widespread in the UK, covering 83 of the 353 occupational groups in the

labour market2. In order to legally work in a licensed occupation, individuals

must meet a minimum degree of competency and overcome any other barriers to

entry such as additional entry exams, meet work experience requirements, and

1 Source: Forth et al. (2011), full list of switchers available in appendix. 2 Source: Author’s calculations based on the UK’s Map of Occupational Regulation (by SOC2000 Unit Group)

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pass tests relating to health, financial solvency and criminal history. The only

exception is where licensing has been newly implemented and existing workers

may qualify for automatic licenses under a ‘grandfathering’ scheme. Licensing

protects the function of an occupation, such that it is illegal for any unlicensed

individual to work as, or do any task conducted by, a licensed worker.

Licences are issued by a regulatory body which may be part of a government

department, a quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisation or a

professional body, and all will be inspected and audited by the state. There are

strict codes of conduct and formal grievance procedures available to the public

to report unsatisfactory practitioners. Subsequently licensed practitioners can

have their licence revoked if the regulatory body concludes malpractice. The

findings may also escalate to legal proceedings and custodial sentences where

necessary.

Examples of licensed occupations include: doctors, who must have a licence to

practice from the British Medical Association (BMA), security guards, who must

have a licence from the Security Industry Authority (SIA), and barristers, who

must pass the bar exams and register with a chambers. It is important to note

that licensing bodies may use the terminology of a ‘register’ but if applicants are

required to meet any minimum levels of competency in order to join a ‘register’,

licensing is the type of regulation in place.

The introduction of licensing is commonly justified on the grounds of public

protection and specifically issues around information asymmetries, quality

standardisation and quality signalling. However, regulation can also be

motivated by rent-seeking, meaning that it serves the interests of those in the

occupation or the government. Research has shown this ‘monopoly effect’ of

licensing (as it is often referred to) to have the capacity to create distortions in

the operation of the labour and product markets such as higher incomes for

practitioners (known as wage premiums), reduction in the stock of practitioners

in the market often disproportionately affecting young workers and higher

prices for consumers, often without a corresponding increase in the quality of

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products or services that consumers receive. Research, mainly (but not

exclusively) emanating from the US, largely confirms these assertions3.

In the sections that follow, we test these theories in the UK labour market

context. We begin by examining the regulatory changes in detail, before moving

on to describe the methodology. This is followed by a discussion of the results

and the implications for policy making.

3 For a detailed review see Koumenta et al. (2014) and Forth et al. (2011).

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3. Case Study Occupations

3.1 Nursery Workers In order to encourage greater female participation in the labour market and with

parts of the media being critical over the cost and quality of childcare, in 2005

the UK government decided to embark on changes to childcare provisions. Such

changes moved beyond issues surrounding its availability and cost, but also

placed quality concerns at the top of the reform agenda. As a result, in 2006 the

Childcare Act was passed and came into effect in March 2007.

Effectively, the Act represents the introduction of licensing for nursery workers.

In particular, it outlines the implementation of the Early Years register and

stipulates that all providers caring for children aged 0-5 must, by law, join the

register. Registration made the attendance of training courses that cover skills

needed to care for children, health and safety and business skills compulsory.

The qualifications that are granted through successfully completing the course

are equivalent to at least a level 3 of the UK’s National Vocational Qualifications

framework. Additionally, all staff must also attend health and safety training and

first aid training in order to receive a paediatric first aid certificate if they are to

be in sole charge of children. These courses combined with a criminal records

check were to be the only way in which an individual can become a licensed

provider (as evidenced by joining the register) and be legally allowed to work as

a childcare provider.

The training courses that childcare workers need to attend in order to become

licensed are provided nationwide by various different Ofsted-accredited trainers.

All of the courses must contain the following core units (though the title may

vary)4:

1. Develop and promote positive relationships

2. Develop and maintain a healthy, safe and secure environment for children

4 Source: City and Guilds “Children’s care, learning and development” course (2013)

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3. Promote children’s development

4. Reflect on and develop practice

5. Protect and promote children’s rights

The cost of the course varies between different providers. However City and

Guilds advise that the cost of a year-long, full-time course should be around

£1,500 before tuition top-ups, and at most £9,000 after. Care workers who

breach the guidelines imposed by the Act may result in expulsion from the

register. If this occurs the individual in question cannot legally work in early

years childcare. If extreme cases of malpractice occur, the case can be passed

over to social services and the police, and prison sentences may be applicable.

3.2 Security Guards In the late 1990s, assaults and attacks involving security workers, most notable

doormen in public places such as bars, clubs and restaurants, created public

pressure to ‘clean up’ the industry. One key incident was the attack on Paul

Steele, a 30 year old man living in Cheltenham. The attack resulted in Steele

being severely brain damaged. The perpetrator, a bouncer, had a string of

previous convictions including manslaughter. A petition led by Steele’s family

gained much public support and resulted in the matter being debated in

parliament. The resulting Private Security Act 2001 aimed to de-criminalise the

industry and prevent future incidence.

The Private Security Act 2001 came into effect in April 2003. The Act established

a regulator called the ‘Security Industry Authority’ and outlined its main aims as

follows5:

(a) to carry out the functions relating to licensing and approvals of individual practitioners; (b) to keep under review generally the provision of security industry services and other services involving the activities of security operatives;

5 Source: The Private Security Act 2001

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(c) for the purpose of protecting the public, to monitor the activities and effectiveness of persons carrying on businesses providing any such services; (d) to set or approve standards of conduct, training and levels of supervision for adoption by—

(i) those who carry on businesses providing security industry services or other services involving the activities of security operatives; and (ii) those who are employed for the purposes of such businesses;

(f) to make recommendations and proposals for the maintenance and improvement of standards in the provision of security industry services and other services involving the activities of security operatives;

According to the Act, all self-employed security guards (i.e. individuals not

employed directly by the establishment they are working in) require a licence6.

The Security Industry Authority (SIA) is responsible for setting the licences

requirement. Currently all individuals applying for a licence must attend and

pass a training course equivalent to at least an National Vocational Qualifications

Framework level 2. The courses are specific to the licence applied for. Each type

of licence requires individuals to complete two modules; one is a general module

relating to working in the private security industry while the other is specific to

the activity for example working as a CCTV operative. The general module must

cover the following five areas in its content: social, cultural and ethical issues,

health and safety; equal opportunities; environmental issues; European

awareness/legislation7.

The course generally requires at least 21 contact hours and completing an

assessment in the form of an exam. The licence application process costs

individuals £220, but this does not include the cost of attending and completing

an accredited course. In addition to the meeting the qualification requirements

applicants must be aged 18 or over and pass the criminality checks required by

the SIA. All cases are considered on an individual basis however applicants will

be automatically refused if they have: three or more convictions where sentences

6 Full list of activities covered by the SIA license can be found in the appendix 7 The only exception is the close protection licence, which does not require completion of a general module but does require completion of a specific close protection module equivalent to an NVQ level 3.

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ended in the past 7 years, two or more convictions where sentences ended in the

last 4 years or a custodial sentence where sentence restrictions ended within 7

years of the application. Once obtained all front line security workers must

display their licence at all times. Licences are valid for an average of 3 years upon

which time individuals must pay the application fee again. Although no

additional training is required for renewals, a criminality check may be repeated.

For those working in a licensable security role or supplying security staff without

an appropriate SIA licence the penalties are a fine and/or imprisonment.

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4. Methodology

The following section outlines the methodological approaches taken to identify

the impact of licensing for nursery workers and security guards on their

employment, wages, skills and quality of service delivered.

4.1 Impact of Regulation on Employment, Wages and Skills

To produce estimates of employment levels, wages and skill levels for nursery

school workers and security guards each quarter of the Labour Force Survey

(LFS) is pooled together between 2000 and 2013. The current sample covers

approximately 60,000 households annually, representing approximately 0.16%

of the population in England, Wales and Scotland, and 0.23% of the Northern

Ireland population.

The Office for National Statistics (ONS) is responsible for the design and

implementation of the survey. The LFS uses a rotational sampling method where

each respondent is included in five consecutive quarters. Each quarter in which

the respondent is included is called a ‘wave’. Each wave is exactly 13 weeks apart

so the last wave is a year after the first. In any two consecutive quarters,

approximately 80% of the respondents will be the same. The rotational design

means that there is greater accuracy in the results and an analysis of annual

changes can be conducted.

The method of respondent selection comprises two parts: first, the UK is

separated into geographical areas and second, the respondents are selected via a

stratified selection method. In each quarter there are 17,380 new respondents.

As there are up to five waves in each quarter, there will be up to 86,900 potential

respondents per quarter.

To accurately evaluate the impact of a switch in regulation status on employment

a difference-in-differences (DiD) analysis is used. The DiD method assigns a

dummy variable to the occupations that see a switch, referred to as the

treatment group. All other occupations, not subjected to a switch are referred to

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as the control group. A further dummy variable is then assigned to mark the

period before the regulation comes into force and the period after. Through

capturing the interaction between the two dummy variables one can establish

changes over time in the size of the treatment effect.

DiD is more accurate than traditional before and after comparisons because the

counterfactual outcomes are compared with an appropriate comparator group

who are like the treatment group. In this analysis the treatment and control

groups are defined in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1: Definition of treatment and control groups for analysis

Treatment Group Control Group Date of Incidence

Licensing of Nursery Workers

Nursery school workers (SOC (2000) 6121, 6122, 6123 and 6124)

All others who remain unregulated working in personal service occupations (SOC(2000) major group 6) such as housekeepers, caretakers and educational assistants.

March 2007

Licensing of Security Workers

Security workers who are employed in the security industry (SOC(2000) 9241 and SIC(2007) 80.1)

All others who remain unregulated working in elementary occupations (SOC(2000) major group 9) such as hotel porters, traffic wardens and car park attendants.

April 2003

Although both the Childcare Act 2006 and the Private Security Act 2001 have

undergone changes since their initial implementation no change has increased

the restrictiveness to the occupation to the same extent as the original Acts. As

such the focus of the investigation will be the implementation of the original Acts

which changed the regulation status of the occupations from unregulated to

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licensed in the case of security guards and from accredited to licensed for

nursery workers.

In addition to including time and comparator variables, control variables are

included in order not to over estimate the impact licensing has. These are

presented in Table 4.28.

Table 4.2: Control variables

Category Variables Demographic characteristics gender; ethnicity; disability; marital

status; number of dependent children Human capital age; qualifications Job characteristics main or second job; tenure; whether

full time or part time; whether permanent or temporary; union membership; pay set by collective bargaining

Employer characteristics industry sector; workplace size; private or public sector; region

Survey characteristics whether proxy respondent; month of interview

The model generated from the analyses will take the following form:

𝒴𝒾𝓈𝓉 = γ𝓈 + 𝜆𝓉 + 𝛿𝒟𝓈𝓉 + 𝜖𝒾𝓈𝓉 Where 𝒴𝒾𝓈𝓉 is the dependent variables for 𝒾 (wages, skills or employment) given

𝓈 and 𝓉. 𝓈 denotes the incidence of licensing and 𝓉 denoting time. γ𝓈 and 𝜆𝓉 are

the vertical intercept of 𝓈 and 𝓉 . 𝒟𝓈𝓉 denotes the dummy variable for the

treatment group and 𝛿 is the treatment effect. 𝜖𝒾𝓈𝓉 is the error term.

4.2 Impact of Regulation on Quality

4.2.1 Nursery Workers

8 Unfortunately, due to data constraints it was not possible to disaggregate the results into self-employed and employed. This is because the LFS only asks a core set of questions in each quarter.

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To ascertain the impact licensing has had on the quality of childcare within

nursery schools it was necessary to use a dataset that covered as many nursery

schools as possible from both before and after the change in regulation that

occurred in 2006. As a result, the data used is sourced from Ofsted.

Under the Conservative government, the Education (Schools) Act 1992 was

passed. The Act highlights a need for standardisation of education throughout

the country. In response to the Act, Ofsted was created to assess providers using

a national framework. Ofsted is a non-ministerial government department of Her

Majesty’s Inspector of Schools in England. Initially, Ofsted was only responsible

for inspecting primary and secondary schools. However, since 2001, Ofsted has

also been responsible for inspecting early years education and care. Before 2001,

the Daycare Standards Act 1992 and the Children’s Act 1989 placed

responsibility for monitoring upon local authorities.

Prior to 2005, Ofsted inspections took place every 6 years, unless a school

performed particularly badly in which case inspections would be conducted

more frequently. Providers were inspected for approximately one week by the

inspectors having been given two months’ notice prior to inspections. From 2005

to 2012 inspections were conducted, on average, every three years. Providers

are now inspected for between two and three days and are given two days’

notice. The increased frequency of inspections and reduced notice periods are

hoped to have increased the accuracy of the inspectors’ reports because

providers have less time to prepare for a visit.

As the licensing of nursery workers came into effect in 2006 as a result of the

Childcare Act 2006 it is necessary to observe quality levels before this date and

after in order to be able to conclude whether a difference in quality has occurred

as a result of the regulation. Therefore, the period of time where quality is

observed is from 2000 to 2011. This provides six years’ data for pre-licensing

quality and six years’ data post-licensing. In order to construct the dataset, every

Ofsted report from 2000 to 2011 relating to nursery schools was found, read and

the results recorded. This resulted in a dataset containing the results from 1,139

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Ofsted reports. Whilst every nursery school should have been captured at least

once by Ofsted, there is still a possibility that the data does not capture the whole

population. Therefore to further strengthen the validity of the results only

nurseries inspected both before and after licensing came into effect are included

(1,067 observations), making the dataset paneled.

Quality can be measured through many different variables. However, within this

study the measures of quality used are derived directly from the aims of the

Childcare Act 2006 and the core units present on the compulsory training course,

which must be attended and passed before a licence can be issued.

The five measures of quality used in the analysis are as follows:

1. The quality of the provision

2. The behaviour of the children

3. The quality of the leadership and management

4. The quality of caring

5. The learning standards

Despite the questionnaire that the inspectors need to complete evolving over

time, these key areas of quality have remained a permanent feature over the

period included in the analysis. The universal incidence of these variables in

every inspector’s report and each measure being heavily associated with the

development and ability of children to successfully transition into year 1 level

education, as supported by the results from the practitioner interviews, means

that these measures of quality should reflect the aim of the Act and the

definitions of quality from the practitioners. However, as discussed, the

questions that feature in the inspectors’ reports have varied over the period of

time in question. As such, the different measures of quality must be identified in

each version of the report9.

9 Details regarding how each dimension is defined and coded for the purposes of this report can be found in the appendix.

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Licensing came into effect as a result of the Childcare Act 2006. As such, reports

conducted before 2006 occurred pre-licensing and reports conducted in 2006 or

later, occurred post licensing. The variable created for licensing is binary: 1

signifies presence of licensing and 0 indicates an absence. As each report

contains the date of inspection this is used to generate the licensing variable.

Further, the intention is to investigate the impact licensing has had on these 5

different measures of quality. However, in order not to inflate the results, where

necessary, other factors which may have an impact on quality will be controlled

for.

To ensure key factors were included as control variables, interviews were

conducted with experienced childcare workers. In all, 15 interviews were

conducted with the aim of defining variables that should be included in the

analysis as controls. The 15 interviews conducted consisted of 9 with nursery

school leaders and 6 with head teachers of primary schools across England. The

interviews were conducted between July and August 2014. Each interview lasted

between 90 and 120 minutes. The sample was selected out of convenience.

Although this may result in some bias, location was not considered a significant

factor in forming an opinion with regard to childcare. In addition, as the

interviews are used to support the methodology and do not contribute directly

to the results, the restricted sample of interviews is not of grave concern. The

interviews were largely unstructured but one main question was posed: what

factors, beyond the quality of staff, have a significant impact on the quality of

childcare given?

When asked, eight of the respondents thought that the smaller the age range

covered, the greater the amount of attention each child would receive and as a

result the greater the development of the child would be. The smaller the size of

the nursery was also believed to have a positive association with quality,

according to nine of the respondents. The majority of respondents (12 out of 15)

highlighted the need for consistency in care for children. As such, most of the

nursery leaders (7 out of 9) stated that a change in nursery leader could have an

impact on the quality of care, either negatively because of a lack of consistency or

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positively because new ideas and approaches are introduced. A sizeable portion

(6 out of 15) also mentioned the possibility that single sex classes can affect the

behaviour and learning of children; both identified as signals of quality.

In addition to internal nursery factors such as size and leadership, respondents

also stated that factors external to the nursery school may also have an impact

on quality. Although many different factors were mentioned including the

amount of green space surrounding the nursery school, whether it was located in

an urban or rural setting, and how involved the parents were, there is one key

factor that was mentioned by all of the respondents: “affluence of the area”. All of

the respondents identified affluence as instrumental in how ‘good’ a nursery

school is. Some stated (6 out of 15) that this was linked to the financial pressure

faced by parents because it affected how much demand for care there was and

how much time was given at home to developing children academically and

emotionally. No other factors were agreed upon by a majority of respondents.

It is clear from the results of the interviews that there are some factors that are

commonly regarded by nursery leaders and head teachers as having the ability

to affect the quality of a nursery school. These are identified from the sample as,

size of the nursery, the age range of children, and if the leader has changed. The

external factor raised was the affluence of the area in which the nursery school is

located. Therefore the control variables used in the analysis are:

Year: The year the report was conducted is found through the date of inspection.

The need for inclusion of the year variable is to account for any trend, either

positive or negative, over time. As such this is a continuous variable.

Experience: This variable is found by recording how many times the nursery

school had been inspected after 2000. The rationale for the inclusion of this

variable is that the more experienced a nursery is at undergoing inspections, the

more areas for improvement they have been given, the better their quality will

become. Further, the more inspections a nursery experiences, the greater its

ability to clearly signal its qualities to an inspector.

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Change in Provision Leader: This variable is found through observing who the

provision leader was at the time of the report and who the provision leader was

the last time the nursery was inspected. This is a binary variable coded 1 for a

change in provision leader and 0 for no change. The reason for including a

variable is to account for the impact a leader has on the quality of nursery care

given by the provider.

Number on Roll: This is found on the inspection report. The number on the roll

is a discrete variable with a minimum value of 1.

Age Range: The ages covered by a provision are recorded on the inspectors’

report. The variable is generated by counting all the possible ages that could be

present in the nursery school. For example, if a nursery school covers children

between 3 and 5, the ages a child could be are 3, 4 or 5, as such the age range is 3.

This variable is continuous. The reason for including age range as a control is the

assumption that the smaller the age range of the children, the higher the quality

of care.

Affluence: This variable is sourced from an additional database called the

Community Analysis Methods and Evaluative Options (CAMEO). CAMEO uses

government reports and data including the Family Resources Survey (FRS),

British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and, the Annual Survey of Hours and

Earnings (ASHE). As such, it is used by many of the top-ranking companies in the

UK (Callcredit 2013). The overall measure comprises of all of these measures

and is postcode specific. The results are broken down into 57 categories. In turn

these categories are divided into 10 main classification groups that are further

reduced to 5 broad measures of affluence.

To analyse the data two statistical method are employed: first, a T-Test is

undertaken to observe if there was a significant increase in any of the measures

of quality since licensing came into effect. Second, a regression analysis is

conducted to take into account the various control variables raised through the

interviews. The model generated from the analysis will take the following form:

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Yquality = βihXih + βijXij + βirXir + ε

Where Xih represents characteristics of the nursery variables, Xij denotes area

characteristics, Xir is the licensing variable and ε is the error.

4.2.2 Security Workers

In order to assess the impact licensing had on the quality of security workers an

analysis of crime levels in licensed premises (bars, clubs and pubs for example)

was conducted. This will assess the ability of security workers in licensed

premises, such as bouncers, to prevent crime occurring. Whilst this will not

capture all security workers, as many work in unlicensed premises, this analysis

will provide an important insight into the ability of licensing to reduce

criminality within the occupation and harm to the public10.

In order to assess crime levels accurately a national dataset was selected. The

Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW), formally called the British Crime

Survey, asks individuals aged 16 and over about their experiences of crime over

the past year. Respondents are included only once in the survey and are

questioned face to face in their own home by trained interviewers. The CSEW

was first conducted in 1982 and ran at two year intervals until 2001. From 2001

onwards the survey has been conducted annually. The number of households

included in the survey has fluctuated over time. However, from 2001-2014 the

sample size has been between 30,000 and 47,000 annually with a high response

rate of between 73-75% in the past decade. Although data collection of managed

by an external contractor (TNS-BMRB) the CSEW is funded and managed by the

Home Office until 2012 and the Office of National Statistics (ONS) thereafter.

10 Data availability does not permit us to explore all security workers affected by licensing. We are therefore forced to undertake the analysis only in relation to those that work in licensed premises.

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Importantly, the crimes recorded by the CSEW include crimes that are not

reported to the police, as such the CSEW may provide estimates that are far

closer to the reality of crime levels in England and Wales. Whilst many of the

questions asked in the CSEW have changed over time every sample is asked if

they have been a victim of crime over the past 12 months and where this crime

occurred. As a consequence it is possible to track the amount of crime occurring

in different locations over time. The locations recorded are as follows:

. Own home or own garage (including attempted break-in)

. Immediately outside home (including shed, garden, street, in same

building)

. In or near victim's place of work (including work car park)

. In public car park

. In/around pub/bar/working men's club

. In/around nightclub/disco

. In/around football ground/ other sports ground

. In/around sports centre/sports club

. In/around other place of public entertainment (e.g. cinema, cafe,

restaurant, bingo hall, etc.)

. Travelling on transport or in or near transport facilities (e.g. at a bus

stop/station, on a bus/train, car park to station)

. In/around petrol station forecourt

. Other public or commercial locations (e.g. shop, school, street market,

hospital)

In order to capture the locations that are most likely to have security guards

present we focus on the crime occurring in or around pubs, bars and working

men’s clubs, and also in or around night clubs. As the licensing of security

workers came into effect in 2003 responses from 1996 to 2012 were pooled

together to give enough data from before licensing to control from any

independent trends.

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In addition to licensing, other control variables were included in the analysis to

prevent the impact of licensing being over estimated. Where possible the

quantity of times respondents visited licensed premises was controlled for,

under the assumption that the more times you visit a licensed premises the more

likely you are to a victim of crime. Further, the sex and age of the respondents

were included. To avoid the results being skewed by older residents the sample

was reduced to only those between 16 and 65. Lastly, to account for any time

trends, the year in which the data was collected is also controlled for.

To analyse the data two statistical method are employed: first, a T-Test is

undertaken to observe if there was a significant decrease in levels of crime in

licensed premises since licensing came into effect. Second, a regression analysis

is conducted to take into account the various control variables. The model

generated from the analysis will take the following form:

Yquality = βihXih + βirXir + ε

Where Xih represents control variables, Xir is the licensing variable and ε is the

error.

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5. Results

The following section presents the results of the DiD analysis in which we

estimate the casual impact of licensing nursery school workers and security

workers on the four outcomes of interest, namely employment, wages, skills and

quality of service delivered. Each occupation is considered in turn.

5.1 Nursery Workers The Childcare Act 2006, which came into force in March 2007, changed the

regulation status of nursery workers from accreditation to licensing. Figure 5.1

below shows the raw, unadjusted labour market outcomes for the treatment and

comparison group over the period 2001-2013. The figure contains three charts

showing (a) the percentage of all jobs in the treatment group; (b) the gross

hourly wages for the treatment and control group and (c) the percentage of

individuals qualified at NVQ Level 2 or above.

In order to ascertain that licensing had a clear and unambiguous effect, we would

expect to see a change in the differential between the treatment and the

comparator groups as we move from the pre-treatment period (i.e. before March

2007) to the post-treatment period (i.e. after March 2007). Given that such an

effect might not be easily detected from the charts if it is relatively small or if the

pattern is obscured by other factors, we also include formal tests in which any

such ‘treatment effect’ would appear as a statistically significant coefficient on

the interaction term in the DiD regression model (see Table 5.2). The table

presents three specifications for each dependent variable: (1) no control

variables; (2) restricted set of control variables and (3) full set of control

variables (as discussed in section 4.2.1).

As it can be seen from the first figure, employment levels have been fluctuating

considerably in the period before the introduction of licensing as well as after.

Around the time of the introduction, we observe a small rise between 2006 and

2007, but this falls back in 2008 to almost the levels observed in the pre-

treatment period, and then increases again before a sharp fall after 2010.

24

However, the DiD results (Table 5.2) show that the coefficient of interaction term

is negative and statistically significant thus showing that in line with

expectations, the employment of nursery workers fell as a result of licensing.

Moving on to wages, the second figure in Table 5.1 plots the average gross hourly

wages of nursery workers in the period 2001- 2013 compared to individuals in

the same SOC major group. As can be seen from the graph, nursery workers

earned less than comparable others, although the trend lines are broadly similar

to each other. According to the DiD analysis however, nursery workers

experience a three per cent wage penalty following the introduction of licensing,

although this is only statistically significant in the regression with the full

controls.

The final chart in Table 5.1 compares the qualifications above NVQ level 2 of

nursery workers to comparator occupations. The percentage of nursery workers

holding qualifications above NVQ level 2 is found to be higher than that of

comparator occupations but the lines are following a similar trend. We further

observe a spike in the period before the introduction of licensing but since it also

applies to the comparator groups we cannot conclude that this is linked to new

regulatory regime. Interestingly however, the DiD analysis indicates a nine

points differential in the percentage of nursery workers with qualifications at

NVQ level 2 or above compared to their comparators, thus suggesting that

licensing had a positive impact on qualification levels.. But as it is clear from the

graphs, such a differential begins around 2005 which might be indicative of a

substantial anticipation effect amongst workers and providers.

Figure 5.1: Percentage of nursery workers within SOC(2000) major group 6

Figure 5.2: Gross hourly wages of control and treatment group over time

Figure 5.3: Percentage of individuals qualified above NVQ level 2 in treatment and control group over time

Base: All employee and self-employed jobs within treatment and comparison groups Source: LFS 2001-2013 Date of Licensing: 2007

Table 5.2: DiD estimates for labour market outcomes (Nursery workers) Employment Wages Qualifications

1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3

Treated

Group

0.638***

(0.068)

1.066***

(0.0724)

0.753***

(0.067)

-0.328*** -0.494*** -0.052*** 0.501***

(0.023)

0.516***

(0.023)

0.508***

(0.030)

(0.095) (0.096) (0.123)

Treated

Period

1.496***

(0.0372)

1.181***

(0.051)

1.316***

(0.049)

1.426*** 0.953*** 1.134 0.577***

(0.017)

0.282***

(0.022)

0.465***

(0.023)

(0.069) (0.087) (0.0959)

Interaction -0.705***

(0.090)

-0.541***

(0.105)

-0.677***

(0.091)

-0.090 -0.064 -0.031** 0.0590

(0.031)

0.0676*

(0.031)

0.0942**

(0.036)

(0.127) (0.126) (0.148)

Base: All employee and self-employed jobs within treatment and comparison groups Source: LFS 2001-2013 Notes: t-statistics below coefficients;***=significant at 0.1% ** = significant at 1% level, * = significant at 5% level. (1) no additional control variables; (2) restricted set of control variables; (3) full set of control variables T-values given in brackets (3 d.p.)

The second part of the analysis focuses on the product market outcomes of

licensing nursery workers, and in particular indicators of quality. As discussed

previously, the quality of nursery schools is measured using five different

dimensions: behaviour of children, nursery caring behaviour, nursery leadership

and management, learning standards, and quality of provision. Tables 5.3 and

5.4 present the results.

Looking at the charts shown in Table 5.3, it is evident that all indicators of

quality were improving in the period before the introduction of licensing. This

suggests considerable anticipation effects, whereby organizational providers

make considerable efforts to improve the quality of the service they offer prior to

the introduction of the mandatory licensing requirement. Turning to the results

of the T-Tests shown in Table 5.4 we find licensing to be associated with a

positive and significant increase in the mean scores of children behaviour,

leadership and management, learning standards and quality of provision, but not

in the case of nursery caring behaviour. Therefore, we broadly find licensing to

have had a positive effect on the quality of nursery schools.

Table 5.3: Product Market Outcomes for nursery workers and comparison group 2001-2013

Figure 5.4: Mean behavior scores

Figure 5.5: Mean caring behaviour scores

Figure 5.6: Mean leadership and management scores

Figure 5.7: Mean learning standards scores

Figure 5.8: Mean quality of provision scores


29

Table 5.4: T-Test estimates for product market outcomes (Nursery workers) Behaviour of Children

1 2 3 Impact of Licensing on Behaviour

0.149*** 0.126* 0.129** (0.0325) (0.0492) (0.0493)

Nursery Caring Behaviour 1 2 3

Impact of Licensing on Caring

0.105** 0.128* 0.0220 (0.0343) (0.0516) (0.0499)

Leadership and Management 1 2 3

Impact of Licensing on Leadership and Management

0.114*** 0.134** 0.130* (0.0346) (0.0518) (0.0520)

Learning Standards 1 2 3

Impact of Licensing on Learning Standards

0.377*** 0.384*** 0.393*** (0.0373) (0.0564) (0.0564)

Quality of Provision 1 2 3

Impact of Licensing on Quality of Provision

0.165*** 0.194*** 0.194*** (0.0342) (0.0511) (0.0513)

5.2 Security Guards The Private Security Act 2001, which came into force in April 2003, switched the

regulation status of security workers from accredited to licensed. As with

nursery workers, Table 5.5 shows the raw, unadjusted labour market outcomes

for the treatment and comparison group over the period 2001-2013. The figure

contains three charts showing (a) the percentage of all jobs in the treatment

group; (b) the gross hourly wages for the treatment and control group and (c)

the percentage of individuals qualified at NVQ Level 2 or above. Table 5.6

presents the results of the DiD analyses.

The first chart in Table 5.5 relates to employment and indicates that while the

number of security guards within the elementary occupational group has

increased substantially since the Act came into force, this trend appears to have

begun before 2003, i.e. before licensing was introduced. Similarly, the results

from the DiD analysis (Table 5.6) show that while the employment levels of

security guards increased during the treatment period, this trend is consistent

with that of the rest of the elementary occupations group (i.e. similar groups in

the occupational hierarchy), once control variables are included, thus indicating

that licensing had no significant impact on the employment levels of security

guards. One explanation in line with case study evidence is that entry

requirements were not set high enough to restrict supply. Fernie (2011) for

example, discusses the ease with which the licensing qualifications can be

obtained and questions the extent to which licensing enacted any substantial

barriers to entry that could lead to any significant upskilling. Alternatively,

instead of reducing employment, licensing of security guards has changed the

composition of the workforce instead. Licensing will have deterred individuals

who are normally attracted into the occupation who have a criminal record but,

interestingly, by decriminalizing the occupation individuals who may not have

considered the occupation before may now be willing to enter because of its

improved image and reputation.

31

Turning to wages, we find that over time security guards are shown to earn more

than the comparator occupations and while the wages of both groups follow a

similar upward trend, wages have been rising more for security guards (Table

5.5). According to the regression analysis estimates, the introduction of licensing

is associated with a significant and positive effect on the wages for security

guards (Table 5.6). However, combined with the findings on employment, we

can conclude that the wage premium is not likely to be a result of supply-side

restrictions (or else rent-seeking) because we see no significant reduction in

employment. Instead, the rent premium witnessed is likely to be the result of

changes in the demand side. Changes in the demand side will occur after

licensing if the public perception of the service improves. In the case of security

guards, after licensing came into effect the public may categorise the service as

professional and are more inclined to pay for security despite the entry

standards of the license being set too low to impact upon employment levels.

In a similar vein to wages, security guards are shown to contain more individuals

with qualifications above NVQ level 2 compared to other occupations in SOC

major group 9. Interestingly, however, we do not find an increase in the number

of security guards holding such qualifications during the treatment period. These

trends are supported by the regressions results in that no positive impact of

licensing on the incidence of qualifications is found when other factors are

controlled for. This is an interesting finding and at odds with what we would

expect. One possibility is that respondents do not equate the Level 2 Award

needed to obtain the license with the NVQ qualifications framework that the

QLFS adopts. What is perhaps more difficult to explain is the drop in the

qualification levels for both treatment and comparator groups in 2005.

Table 5.5: Labour and Product Market Outcomes for security guards (2001-2013) Figure 5.10: Percentage of security workers within SOC(2000) major group 9

Figure 5.11: Gross hourly wage of treatment and control groups over time

Figure 5.12: Percentage of treatment and control group with qualifications above NVQ level 2

Figure 5.11: Share of incidences in licensed premises


33

Table 5.6: DiD estimates for labour market outcomes (Security Guards)

Base: All employee and self-employed jobs within treatment and comparison groups Source: LFS 2001-2013 Notes: t-statistics below coefficients;***=significant at 0.1% ** = significant at 1% level, * = significant at 5% level. (1) no additional control variables; (2) restricted set of control variables; (3) full set of control variables T-values given in brackets (3 d.p.)

Employment Wages Qualifications

1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3

Treated

Group

0.200*

(0.087)

0.149

(0.082)

0.0397

(0.082)

0.483** -0.275 -0.108 0.292*** 0.383*** 0.457***

(0.177) (0.174) (0.187) (0.0605) (0.0580) (0.0621)

Treated

Period

1.938***

(0.011)

1.804***

(0.012)

1.756***

(0.013)

1.126*** 0.741*** 0.797*** 0.288*** 0.123*** 0.232***

(0.0432) (0.0474) (0.0495) (0.0147) (0.0149) (0.0154)

Interaction -0.0319

(0.095)

-0.0398

(0.090)

0.0227

(0.088)

1.172*** 1.225*** 1.116*** 0.0590

(0.031)

0.0613 0.0660

(0.195) (0.190) (0.200) (0.0633) (0.0664)

We proceed with testing the impact of licensing on the quality of service security

guards offer. As discussed in the methodology section, within this analysis the

quality of security guards is being approximated by considering the incidence of

crime occurring in licensed premises such as bars, clubs and working men’s

clubs.

The final chart in Table 5.5 depicts the number of incidences of crime occurring

in licensed premises over time. As can be observed, this number appears to have

been decreasing since 1998. This suggests an existing downward trend before

licensing came into effect. We further observe a spike the period before licensing

was introduced, which perhaps can reflect the motivation for the state to

regulate the occupation. Interestingly, the results from the T-Tests shown in

Table 5.7 indicate that the incidence of licensing is associated with a significant

and negative effect on the number of crime incidences taking place in licensed

premises and this effect remains significant even once all control variables are

included in the model. This seems to be at odds with the lack of an effect on

licensing on skills discussed earlier but can be explained by the licensing scheme

requiring entrants to have a clean criminal record. The CRB check, required in

order to obtain the license, does explain why we observe a significant decrease in

criminality within licensed premises. Rather than the licensing schemes training

individuals to change their inclination towards illegal activity, licensing is

completely preventing these individuals from entering the occupation. Therefore

these results could be indicative of sorting effect that licensing has had, in that it

created an artificial barrier which excluded incompetent practitioners, but not

on the basis of skills, but on the basis of their criminal background. We can

further propose that in some occupations it is not the skill levels, as measured

through qualifications, which need to be set high enough to make an impact but

rather the human characteristics required to deliver a good service. This would

exemplify the need to consider the requirements of occupation on an individual

basis in order for licensing schemes to be effective.

35

Table 5.7: T-Test estimates for product market outcomes of licensing

Share of Incidence 1 2

Impact of Licensing on Incidences in Licensed Premises

-0.00688*** -0.00893*** (0.000412) (0.00179)

Notes: t results below coefficients; ***=significant at 0.1% ** = significant at 1% level, * = significant at 5% level. (1) t-Test results; (2) full set of control variables

36

5.3 Summary and Conclusions The theoretical framework of occupational regulation suggests that regulation,

particularly licensing, is put in place in the public interest. For both nursery

workers and security guards, licensing was state-led. Further, public perceptions

of both professions were poor resulting in considerable public support to

increase the quality of the services by restricting who could enter the

occupations. The Childcare Act 2006 and the Private Security Act 2001 came into

effect as a result of both political and public petitioning.

Theory surrounding occupational licensing makes some clear predications with

regard to the impact licensing will have in the labour market (Humphris et al.

2011). Through setting barriers to entry into occupations the supply of labour

should, in theory, be reduced. This effect is expected because licensing filters out

poor practitioners thus reducing the total amount employed. Further to impacts

on employment, licensing is expected to have a positive impact on wages and

skill levels (Pagliero 2007).The impact on wages is the result of restricting

supply but also through creating a monopoly on services provided and

increasing the demand for practitioner. Skill levels are expected to increase as a

result of barriers to entry ensuring minimum competences that usually require

entrants to attain qualifications equivalent to NVQ levels.

The impact of licensing is however heavily dependent on the entry requirements

put into place and the subsequent monopoly power of entrants into the

occupation. If standards are set to low, licensing will have little effect on

restricting entry to occupations and so no significant effect on employment

levels, wages, skills or quality will be observed. Set too high and licensing will

have a significant impact but this may result in services being unobtainable to

the public either because of inflated prices or lack of availability of practitioners.

In addition to labour market effects, in theory licensing has the potential to

increase the quality of services on offer to the public. This is because through

restricting entry to only competent practitioners that meet the skill and other

37

requirements, licensing has a sorting effect in the labour market. As before, the

extent to which licensing can achieve this depends on the stringency of the entry

requirements in that skill hurdles are high enough to screen entrants by ability

rather than merely providing a bureaucratic hurdle that most candidates can

overcome.

We use the introduction of licensing for security guards and nursery workers as

a ‘natural experiment’ and we employ a DiD approach to establish the causal

impact of licensing on labour and product market indicators of interest. Table 5.8

summarises the results of this study. The picture that emerges is that in the two

case study occupations examined, licensing is shown to have a mixed effect.

Table 5.8: Summary of the impact of licensing on employment, wages and skills

Nursery Workers Security Guards Employment Significant Negative

Effect No Effect

Wages Significant Negative Effect

Significant Positive Effect

Skills Significant Positive Effect No Effect Quality Overall Significant

Positive Effect Significant Positive Effect

Nursery workers see a significant decline in employment when compared to

other personal service occupations. This is likely to be because the entry

requirements of the licensing regime were set high enough to restrict entry to

the occupation. As a result of higher barriers to entry skill levels have also

increased as a result of licensing, so in that sense licensing has had an effect in

upskilling the workforce. This is further supported by the observed impact of

licensing on quality. In particular, we show the significant and positive effect of

the new regulatory regime has had on various indicators of quality in the

industry. On one hand, this is an encouraging finding, but if the stock of

practitioners in the labour market has declined then issues of access and service

availability might moderate its positive impact and could explain the slight down

turn in many of the indicators of quality since 2009. Moreover, the licensing

scheme restricting entry to this profession does not legally require license holder

38

to top up or refresh their training once they meet the initial entry standards. This

may mean that over time any skills learned through initial training may wane

and ultimately reduce the quality of service offered.

Turning to wages, we find that the licensing of nursery workers is associated

with a wage penalty. This is counter to predictions made by theory. One possible

explanation is that more experienced, high earners, left the occupation once

licensing came into effect. These individuals might have be nearing the end of

their working lives and did not feel they will recoup the cost of investing in

obtaining a license. Because these workers are likely to earn more once they

leave the occupation, their exit reduced the average wage in the industry and this

coincided with introduction of licensing. Alternatively, the fall in wages can be

due to some exogenous factors that our dataset does not pick up. Either way, it is

an interesting finding that deserves further scrutiny.

Security occupations, in contrast, see no significant impact on employment or

skill levels. This is likely to be the result of entry requirements not being set high

enough to restrict supply and improve the stock of skills in the industry.

However, a positive wage effect is found possibly indicative of the industry

rewarding the perceived improvements in human capital or an exogenous

demand side effect not being picked up by our models. For example, since

licensing came into effect there has been an increase in demand of security due

to national events (such as the Olympics and Commonwealth Games; the Queen’s

Jubilee) and an increase in licensed premises across the UK. Therefore, it is

possible that such an increase in the demand of subcontracted licensed security

guards to have increased wages in the sector.

The quality of security services has increased since licensing came into effect.

This is unexpected due to the lack of restriction of supply and skills. However,

the reduction in criminality may be the results of the Criminal Record

Background (CRB) checks required by the licensing scheme. A CRB check is not

reflected in skill levels as measured by NVQ levels but will restrict entry to only

those with a clean record. Further, through decriminalizing the occupation by

39

requiring clean criminal records, individuals who otherwise would have been

deterred from entering security may now enter the occupation. This would also

account for why there are no significant changes in supply. The numbers of

entrance is similar but the characteristics of entrants have changed. Since our

study is confined to the introduction of licensing in England, it would be

interesting to examine any spillover effects on employment and wages to other

regions such as Scotland and Northern Ireland in the post-treatment period.

Overall, our analysis picks up some effects that based on our theoretical

frameworks can be directly attributed to licensing. These include the negative

effect in the employment and positive effect on the skill levels of nursery

workers and the wage premium for security guards. Quality also seems to have

improved for both occupations, which is indeed a very encouraging finding.

Contrary to our predictions, we find that licensing has not affected the

employment and skill levels of security guards, possibly indicative of the

regulations not being stringent enough to have such effects. It can therefore be

concluded that there is considerable heterogeneity in the effects of licensing by

occupation and that such effects are likely to be dependent upon some key

factors: the nature and height of the entry standards as well as how extensively

they are applied. Further, such effects could be a result of the characteristics of

the licensing regime prevalent in the UK labour market contexts and in particular

the focus on regulating skills and opening up access to such education, rather

than market conduct as it is the case with various other EU member states. An

examination of additional occupations would enable us to detect some patterns

common amongst occupations and licensing regimes, but this is not always

possible due to data constraints. At this stage however, it is safe to conclude that

the effects of licensing are differential by occupation.

40

6. References

Brinegar, P. and Schmitt, K. (1992) ‘State occupational and professional licensure’, in

American Legislators’ Association. (ed.) The Book of the States, 1992–1993,

Lexington: Council of State Governments, pp. 567-580.

Fernie, S. (2011) ‘Occupational Licensing in the UK: The case of the private security

industry’, in Marsden, D. (ed.) Employment in the Lean Years: Policy and prospects

for the next decade, Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp. 101-121.

Forth, J. Bryson. A, Humphris, A. Kleiner, M. and Koumenta, M. (2011) A Review of

Occupational Regulation and Its Impact, UK Commission for Employment and Skills:

London

Koumenta, M., Humphris, A., Kleiner, M. and Pagliero, M. (2014) Occupational

Regulation in the UK and EU: Prevalence and Labour Market Impact, Department

for Business, Education and Skills, London

Humphris, A., Kleiner, M. and Koumenta, M. (2011) 'Analysing Policies Regulating

Occupations in Britain and the US', in Marsden, D., (ed.) Employment in the Lean

Years: Policy and prospects for the next decade, Oxford University Press: Oxford, pp.

87-101.

Pagliero, M. (2007) ‘The impact of potential labor supply on licensing exam difficulty

in the US market for lawyers’, Carlo Alberto Notebook, p. 53.

41

7. Appendix Table 7.1: Coding matrix of occupations

Table 7.2: Unit groups subject to becoming licensed since 2001

SOC(2000) Unit Group Title of Unit Group Year of Switch From certification to licensing 1184 Social Services Managers 2005 1185 Residential and Day Care

Managers 2005

2212 Psychologists 2009 2442 Social Workers 2005 3231 Youth and Community

Workers 2010

6121 Nursery Nurses 2008 6123 Playgroup

Leaders/Assistants 2008

From unregulated to licensing 1174 Security Managers 2003 6114 Houseparents and

Residential Wardens 2009

6115 Care Assistants and Home Carers

2005

9241 Security Guards and 2003

42

SOC(2000) Unit Group Title of Unit Group Year of Switch Regulated Occupations

9249 Elementary Security Occupations NEC

2008

Source: Forth et al. (2011) Table 7.3: Security activities needing a licence

Activity Definition Manned Guards Manned guarding activity includes any of

the following: . guarding premises against

unauthorised access or occupation, against outbreaks of disorder or against damage;

. guarding property against destruction or damage, against being stolen or against being otherwise dishonestly taken or obtained;

. guarding one or more individuals against assault or against injuries that might be suffered in consequence of the unlawful conduct of others.

All of the above includes providing a physical presence, or carrying out any form of patrol or surveillance, as to deter or otherwise discourage it from happening or to provide information, if it happens, about what has happened.

Cash and Valuables in Transit A Cash and Valuables in Transit licence is required when guarding property against destruction or damage, against being stolen or against being otherwise dishonestly taken or obtained, involving the secure transportation of property in vehicles specially manufactured or adapted so as to have secure transportation as their primary function.

Close Protection A Close Protection licence is required when guarding one or more individuals against assault or against injuries that might be suffered in consequence of the unlawful conduct of others.

Door Supervision A Door Supervisor licence is required if manned guarding activities are undertaken in relation to licensed premises*, except where the activity only involves the use of CCTV equipment or falls within the definition of cash and valuables in transit or close protection. A Door Supervisor licence is required if you are performing this activity on behalf of

43

Activity Definition yourself or your employer or your services are supplied for the purposes of or in connection with any contract to a consumer. *'in relation to licensed premises' means when those premises are open to the public, at times when alcohol is being supplied for consumption, or regulated entertainment is being provided, on the premises.

Public Space Surveillance (CCTV) A Public Space Surveillance (CCTV) licence is required when manned guarding activities are carried out through the use of closed circuit television equipment to:

. monitor the activities of a member of the public in a public or private place; or

. identify a particular person. This includes the use of CCTV in these cases to record images that are viewed on non-CCTV equipment, but excludes the use of CCTV solely to identify a trespasser or protect property.

Security Guards A Security licence is required when manned guarding activity that does not fall under the descriptions of door supervision, close protection, cash and valuables in transit, or public space surveillance (CCTV) is undertaken.

Key Holding A Key Holding licence is required when keeping custody of, or controlling access to, any key or similar device for operating (whether mechanically, electronically or otherwise) any lock. This does not apply to:

. the activities of a person who holds a key or other device for obtaining access to any premises for the purposes incidental to the provision in relation to those premises, or in relation to an individual present on those premises, or any services that do not consist of or include the carrying out of any of the manned guarding activities.

. activities carried out merely incidentally to the provision of any services in connection with a proposal for the sale of any premises or other property to which the key or similar device

44

Activity Definition gives access.

An SIA licence is required only if your services are supplied for the purposes of or in connection with any contract to a consumer.

Immobilisation, Restriction and Removal of Vehicles

SIA licensing of vehicle immobilisers applies to Northern Ireland only. You need a Vehicle Immobiliser licence if you undertake any of the following activity:

. the moving of a vehicle by any means;

. the restriction of the movement of a vehicle by any means (including the immobilisation of a vehicle by attaching a device to it);

. the release of a vehicle which has been so moved or restricted, where release is effected by returning the vehicle to the control of the person who was otherwise entitled to remove it, by removing any restriction on the movement of the vehicle by removing the device or by any other means; or

. the demanding or collection of a charge as a condition of any such release of or for the removal of the device from a vehicle.

Vehicle immobiliser activity only applies to activities carried out for the purpose of preventing or inhibiting the removal of a vehicle by a person otherwise entitled to remove it. Vehicle immobiliser activity only applies where it is proposed to impose a charge for the release of the vehicle. Vehicle immobiliser activity applies to any activities carried out in relation to a vehicle while it is elsewhere than on a road within the meaning of the Road Traffic Act 1988. The requirement to hold a licence when carrying out the immobilisation, restriction or removal activity as defined in the Act applies to anyone e.g. land occupiers, in-house employees, staff supplied for the purposes of or in connection with any contract to a consumer or volunteers.

Source: Security Industry Authority (2014)

45

Table 7.4: Definition of variables for quality of nursery workers

Dimension Year Question Measure Recoding

Quality of Provision

00/04 13 Quality and range of curriculum

Excellent

Very Good

Good

Satisfactory

Unsatisfactory

1=Unsatisfactory 2=Satisfactory

3=Good

4=Very Good

15 Provision for special needs

16 Provision for language

17 Provision for personal development

18 How well the school cares

05/06 20 How effective is the teaching and learning in meeting the full range of learners' needs?

1=Outstanding

2=Good

3= Satisfactory

4=Inadequate

1=Inadequate

2=Satisfactory 3=Good 4=Outstanding

21 How well do the curriculum and other activities meet the range of needs and interests of learners?

22 How well are learners cared for, guided and supported?

07/09 20 How effective are the teaching and learning in meeting the full range of learners' needs?

21 How well do the curriculum and other activities meet the range of needs and interests of learners?

22 How well are learners cared for, guided and supported?

10/11 9 How effectively are children in the EYFS

46


helped to learn and develop?

10 The quality of teaching

11 The extent to which curriculum meets children's needs

12 The effectiveness of care, guidance and support

Behaviour 00/04 9 Behaviour in and out of class

Excellent

Very Good

Good

Satisfactory

Unsatisfactory

1=Unsatisfactory 2=Satisfactory 3=Good

4= Excellent

05/06 13 The behaviour of learners

1=Outstanding2=Good

3= Satisfactory 4=Inadequate

1=Inadequate

2=Satisfactory 3=Good 4=Outstanding

07/09 13 The behaviour of learners

10/11 4 Children's behaviour

Leadership and Management

00/04 19 Leadership and management from the head

Excellent

Very Good

Good

Satisfactory

Unsatisfactory


4=Excellent 20 Governors fulfilling

roles

21 Value for money

22 School’s evaluation of performance

23 Strategic Use of Resources

05/06 23 How effective are leadership and management in raising achievement and supporting all learners?

1=Outstanding

2=Good

3= Satisfactory

4=Inadequate

1=Inadequate 2=Satisfactory 3=Good 4=Outstanding

47


24 How effectively leaders and managers at all levels set clear direction leading to improvement and promote high quality of care and education

25 How effectively performance is monitored, evaluated and improved to meet challenging targets

26 How well is equality of opportunity promoted and discrimination tackled so that all learners achieve as well as they can?

27 How well and efficiently are resources, are deployed to achieve value for money?

28 The extent to which governors and other supervisory boards discharge their responsibilities

29 The adequacy and suitability of staff to ensure that learners are protected

07/09 23 How effective are leadership and management in raising achievement and supporting all learners?

24 How effectively leaders and managers at all levels set clear direction leading to improvement and promote high quality

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of care and education

25 How effectively performance is monitored, evaluated and improved to meet challenging targets

26 How well is equality of opportunity promoted and discrimination tackled so that all learners achieve as well as they can?

27 How well and efficiently are resources deployed to achieve value for money?

28 The extent to which governors and other supervisory boards discharge their responsibilities

29 Do procedures for safeguarding learners meet current government requirements?

10/11 13 How effectively is provision in the EYFS led and managed?

14 The effectiveness of leadership and management in embedding ambition and driving improvement

15 The effectiveness of the governing body in challenging and supporting the school so that weaknesses are tackled decisively

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and statutory responsibilities met

16 The effectiveness of the school's engagement with parents and carers

17 The effectiveness of partnerships in promoting learning and well-being

18 How well equality of opportunity is promoted and discrimination eliminated

19 The effectiveness of safeguarding procedures

21 How effectively and efficiently are resources, including staff, deployed to achieve value for money?

Caring 00/04 18 How well the school cares

Excellent

Very Good

Good

Satisfactory

Unsatisfactory


4=Excellent

05/06 22 How well are learners cared for, guided and supported?

1=Outstanding

2=Good

3= Satisfactory

4=Inadequate

1=Inadequate 2=Satisfactory 3=Good

4=Outstanding

07/09 22 How well are learners cared for, guided and supported?

10/11 12 The effectiveness of care, guidance and support

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Learning Standards

00/04 1 Language and Literature

Excellent

Very Good

Good

Satisfactory

Unsatisfactory


4=Excellent

2 Maths

3 Personal and social development

4 Knowledge and understanding of the world

5 Physical development

6 Creative development

7 Other areas

05/06 7 How well do learners achieve?

1=Outstanding

2=Good

3=Satisfactory

4=Inadequate

1=Inadequate 2=Satisfactory 3=Good 4=Outstanding

8 Are the standards reached by learners?

07/09 7 How well do learners achieve?

8 Are the standards reached by learners?

10/11 1 How effective is the provision in meeting the needs of children in the EYFS?

2 Children's achievement and the extent to which they enjoy learning

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