1

The Effect of Liberal Ideology on Yablokos Decline

By: Nikolai Boboshko

POL354 April 7, 2011

2 The party system is a factor of a proper democratic system. Yet, not all parties contribute to democratization of the system.1 The parties must do more than compete and aggregate peoples interests, they must respect the democracy that they are a part of. Thus, for the democratic transition in Russia to occur, pro-democratic parties must succeed. One such pro-democratic party is Yabloko.2 Founded in 1993 it was expected to be able to carry the liberal vote in Russia. However, its failure to pass the 5% threshold in the 2003 Duma election led to its increased marginalization in Russian politics. Scholars provide different interpretations of why the support for Yabloko declined. They range from bad luck, being a victim of managed democracy or its own poor choices. Strangely, the role of party ideology is not considered to be a negative factor. This essay will attempt to provide a synthesis of the generally accepted problems that Yabloko faced while also factoring in the role of party ideology. The main argument of this paper is that the Soviet Legacy was not an advantage or disadvantage to liberal parties in Russia, but that liberalism is something that needed to be created. The original situation in Russia was conducive to liberalism and contributed to the creation of Yablokos ideational capital. Changes in Russian politics damaged that ideational capital and Yablokos party ideology restricted its reaction to them. When Yabloko finally adjusted, its ideology limited it to a policy that ensured its marginalization. There is a common assumption that the soviet legacy damaged liberal prospects in Russia, however polling data does not support this. For example, 78% of Russians at one time supported Human Rights.3 Thus the data suggests that liberalism can take root with parts of the population. The problem with that interpretation is that there is evidence that seems to contradict it. Even though, 78% of Russians support Human Rights, in 1999 64% supported the deportation of Chechens from Russia after the Moscow Apartment

3 Bombings.4 The middle class, a supposed liberal constituency, had strong non-liberal and nationalist opinions. A 2004 study found that 66% supported strong government while 79% supported a stronger military.5 Thus, while there are positive indicators to liberalism, the overall result is mixed. It suggests that the Russian population is not inherently hostile towards liberalism, but a large liberal vote is not guaranteed either. This mixed polling behaviour suggests that ideology is not enough to appeal to Russian voters. In the 1999 Duma election, many voters did not vote on party policy. For Yabloko voters, only 65% supported the party because they agreed with its policy.6 Had only that 65% voted for the party, it would not have passed the 5% threshold.7 This trend was evident for all parties but the CPRF.8 Thus, it is possible that liberal voters voted for non-liberal parties. The trend could have occurred because, as the 1990s was a decade of transition, voters did not have concrete views on many issues. However, polling data from 1999-2000 does not support this as it suggests most opinions were set.9 This could be an advantage for a liberal party in that it can attract non-liberal voters, but Yabloko would have to pursue an active policy to achieve that. Instead, during the lead up to the 1999 election Yabloko policy was concerned with achieving ideological purity to create ideational capital. The problem with that is that it does not appear to be the actual capital it possessed. Instead, the ideational capital Yabloko possessed can be closely tied to its leader, Grigory Yavlinsky, and is the product of the early economic transformative period of shock therapy.10 Yavlinsky was already a known political actor due to his position as the Deputy Chairman of the Committee on Management of National Economy.11 When President Boris Yeltsin implemented price liberalisation to start shock therapy, Yavlinsky was succesfully able to communicate his

4 opposition and how his liberal reform differed from the governemnt.12 By 1995 he was the third most trusted politician in Russia.13 In 1995, the Yabloko party was not able to take advantage due to its incompetent campaign.14 There were several reasons for that and some could be traced to party ideology. The party primarily focused on economics and could have lost the average voter. For example, the party pamphlet was 350 pages long and hard cover. Two-hundred of those pages covered macro-economic theory.15 Poor communication is not something specifically tied to liberalism, but in the 1995 election all the liberal parties followed the trend of lengthy and complex pamphlets.16 It could be because, as Gaidar stated, that the liberal parties were competing among each other for the same, small, liberal intellectual vote.17 Unfortunately, the 1995 Duma election was the last time the party would be able to use Yavlinskys ideational capital. In future elections, the political environment would shift away from issues of economic reform and highlight the disadvantages of the partys ideology. This shift began in the 1999 Duma election. Despite initially polling high, the party did not meet the expectations of analysts and barely passed the 5% threshold.18 During the election, the second war in Chechnya changed the atmosphere.19 The popularity of Vladimir Putins hard line stance suggests that under these conditions different ideational capital was required than Yavlinskys economic credentials.20 Furthermore, Yablokos appeared to vacillate between supporting the war and giving unworkable ultimatums.21 According to Hale this was a primary factor that contributed to the poor electoral results.22 This apparent inconsistency within Yabloko position can be traced to the party following its ideology. One of the major issues with Yablokos position on Chechnya, was

5 its change from supporting the war, to the November 7, 1999 proposal for conditional negotiations.23 The result of this was that the Russian public was unclear on what the actual policy towards the war was.24 Hale hypothesized that the party was attempting to be pragmatic and compromise with its ideology.25 However, liberal parties are not necessarily against all wars. Initially, the war was portrayed as an anti-terror operation in response to the Moscow apartment bombings.26 Such an operation, when combined with the situation in Chechnya, can be consistent with defensive aims and human rights. For example, Yavlisnky on Chechnya stated that Human rights are violated, the slave trade is flourishing, terrible crimes against humanity are being committed. This created a major threat to the security of Russian citizens, the federal power was forced to put an end to this.27 After two months the military situation in Chechnya appeared to change from an anti-terror operation to a general military invasion.28 The negotiation proposal was an attempt to redirect the war back into an ant-terrorist campaign. The actual military policy that the party advocated was one of surgical strikes against terror targets and a cordon for refugees to exit through.29 Thus, the party policy was consistent with its ideology. The shifts that occurred were due to changes in the war. If this caused a decline in party support, it was because the party was following its own ideology instead of being pragmatic. In addition, Yablokos unsuccessful policy stance was used by the other prominent liberal party, the Union of Right Forces (SPS), for its own gain at Yablokos expense. The platforms of the two parties differed to the extent of the free market in Russia, with SPS being more neo-liberal.30 A perception existed that they were competing for the same votes. In the 1999 Duma election SPS took a more active role in criticising Yabloko.31 In one of

6 the televised debates, the SPS leader stated that Yavlinsky was a traitor for not taking a more hard-line approach.32 This appeared to have worked. From September on, there is a correlation between declining Yabloko support and an increasing SPS vote.33 Thus, competition between liberal parties highlighted the problems of Yablokos Chechnya policy and further reduced its vote. The political environment towards Yabloko continued to become increasingly unfavourable. In the 2003 Duma election the party failed to pass the 5% threshold.34 The 2003 election environment was marked by increased use of administrative resources by the state to benefit pro-government United Russia party (UR). State media spent the majority of election coverage on either UR or Putin.35 Due to this, Yabloko had great difficulty in communicating its message when it might have appealed to the public.36 Furthermore, selective application of justice with the arrest of oligarch Khodorkovsky removed one of the main sources of Yablokos financing.37 This was an undoubtedly difficult environment to operate it, but the party did not pursue possible solutions. The first solution was to work within the governmental system and benefit from state administrative resources. This appeared to be a genuine possibility as Putin praised Yabloko and stated that they have been doing positive work.38 However, Putins attempts at arranging TV meetings with Yavlisnky to have some of his popularity rub off were mostly ignored.39 Yabloko could not ally too close to Putin. The economic growth under the Putin administration appeared to give the UR party issue ownership of market reform. In the 2003 election, being against socialism was a better indicator of a UR vote than a Yabloko one.40 This could have contributed to the fact that most voters who supported Yabloko did so for its strong pro-democracy stance.41 The increased importance

7 of these same voters made associating with Putin harmful. The party ran the risk of incurring what happened to SPS, where by supporting Putin, SPS lost most of its democratic vote to Yabloko.42 The second solution available to Yabloko was to merge with SPS in order to gain a united liberal vote.43 The benefits of this merger were two fold. The combined liberal vote could have been enough to put the party over the 5% threshold. 44 Yabloko would also gain access to private media. These channels, such as NTV, were no less biased than state media, but favoured SPS. On NTV SPS received the largest share of electoral coverage at 13% and it was mostly positive or neutral in tone.45 In contrast, UR was covered 6% of the time and in a neutral tone.46 Furthermore, due to UR ownership of market reform, the ideological difference on economic policy appeared to be less relevant from a voter perspective. The necessary compromise for a possible merge proved to be too difficult. In part this was because of Yablokos policy of party purity. It is unlikely that Yabloko party members would have compromised their ideas. A 2008 study found that opposition members, including present and former members of Yabloko, tend to view politics as morally absolute and are unwilling to compromise on important principles, of which economics was identified as one.47 None of these possible compromises would matter had serious fraud occurred in the 2003 election. Its presence would have meant that the administrative resources of the state were too powerful for the party to overcome. Thus, it is an important issue to consider. The main fraud claim stems from a parallel count of 2/3rds of the voting protocols conducted by the CPRF.48 It found that the result did not match the official count. Unfortunately the OSCE observer report found that it could not confirm nor deny the

8 allegations.49 By comparing OSCE reports on the 1999 and 2003 elections it may be possible to understand the nature of possible fraud. Since allegations by major parties were present in 2003, one would expect to find significantly more infractions. However, a close comparison of ballot counting shows striking similarity between the two elections. In both cases when officials did not follow the complex counting procedure, it was described as not deliberate and an attempt to speed up the process.50 In the 1999 campaign at 19% of the visited cites observers were not given a copy of the voting protocol.51 At 14% of cites the protocol results were not posted.52 In the 2003 this occurred respectively 14% and 12% of the time.53 The one major difference in 2003 was the five instances where deliberate falsification was observed.54 Thus, while there were local infractions, it does not point out to a massive top down effort against Yabloko. This can be substantiated by the fact that in 2003 higher level commissions tended to perform better than their lower counterparts.55 As most of the fraud that could have occurred is local, it might be possible for the party to recover if better electoral policy is practiced on the national level. Instead the party appeared to see fraud as the main problem. Yavlisnky did not think that the election was fair and thought the democratic transition in Russia had failed.56 By focusing on the un-democratic nature of Russia, the party moved from the economic nature of Yavlinksys ideational capital. It appeared to portray itself as the democratic opposition, but by highlighting the democratic aspect of its ideology and by choosing to actively resist the electoral system, Yabloko contributed to its own marginalization. By choosing not to compete and calling the election a farce Yavlinskys actions damaged Yablokos relevance to the voters.57 Many supported Putin because they

9 genuinely liked his policies and gave him credit for the 40% increase in living standards.58 Even those voters who felt democratic transition decreased under Putin could still have voted for him. A study on state legitimacy found that shortcomings in democratic rights are often outdone by welfare and governance gains, like [in] Russia.59 Yavlinskys decision not to run in the 2004 presidential election contributed to his declining reputation.60 Some observers speculated that Yavlinsky could not collect the two million signatures required.61 The choice to oppose the government also brought Yabloko into conflict with the government. On the possible boycott of the 2004 presidential election, Putin stated that it could provoke the breakdown of normal political life in the country and be detrimental to the economy. It is a cowardly position.62 The partys efforts to resist the system by staging mass protests, appear to have shocked the Russian government due to fear of something similar to the Ukrainian Orange revolution occurring in Russia.63 Thus, there appeared to be a clamp down on Yabloko. In 2004, the UR dominated Duma was set to pass a law that restricted the right to protest.64 During the 2007 local election in St. Petersburg, Yabloko was banned because too many of the signatures collected in support of Yabloko candidates were invalid.65 As St. Petersburg used to be a strong base for the party two things could be inferred.66 Either the ban is proof of government fraud because the party is still popular or that the party is loosing its popularity with the people. Either way, resistance against the government has brought about increased marginalization. In the 2007 election the party achieved its lowest result by gaining only 1.6% of the vote.67 The future of Yabloko as a party that focuses on the democratic aspect of its ideology, appears to be highly uncertain. From 2007 on, there have been some changes to

10 the party, like a new leader Sergein Mitrokhin.68 Yet, the party still experiences similar problems. An attempt at unity with another liberal party, Solidarity, was blocked at Yablokos 2009 congress because they were radical liberals and not social democratic.69 Proposals for change seem to be met with hostile attitude. An attempt to introduce the position of co-chairman was countered by party leaders. Mitrokhin stated that Its obvious that the reason for introducing the institutions of co-chairmen is to place among us people controlled by oligarchs.70 The threat of oligarch association is apparently used to keep dissident members in line.71 Changes in the democratic movement appear to have marginalized Yabloko with in it. The party is not a member of the National Assembly, a body of several parties that, supposedly, support democracy.72 The leaders of the Assembly have stated that they would welcome Yabloko, but not Yavlinsky because he is apparently too close to Putin and has outlived his usefulness.73 This suggests that any ideational capital Yavlinsky once had has disappeared. By not joining the National Assembly the party is out of certain democratic movements. However, by joining the organization it might loose its legitimacy as a credible party. In the National assembly there are many parties that do not follow its own liberal charter. The leader of the National Bolsheviks, Eduard Limonov, is one of the Assemblies presidents.74 The National Bolsheviks have an anti-western and anti-Semitic orientation.75 By associating with such a party, Yabloko risks having its previous legitimacy disappear and to become nothing more but another protest movement. Yabloko stance on other democratic parties leads to uncertainties over its own position. Certain actions suggest that the party is trying to distance itself from the

11 opposition and move closer to the government. In 2008, after violent clashes with the police resulted in the arrest of Yabloko members, the partys First Deputy, Sergei Ivanenko stated that Being the opposition does not mean arguing and fighting with the police. 76 On the subject of cooperation with the Putin administration, Yavlinksy stated that We must engage in dialogue with the authoritarian government in all acceptable political forms, after he had a prolonged discussion with Putin.77 His description of regime as authoritarian leads to doubts if the government is willing to view Yabloko as non threatening opposition. At the local level the party does not seem to be befitting from any administrative resources that would signal government support. The party failed to pass the 5% threshold in the 2009 local Moscow election and attributed it on fraud.78 Yabloko is an example of how ideology can restrict a partys ability to adapt to changing circumstances. The starting situation in Russia might not have been favourable, but was not particularly troublesome. Yet in the 1995, 1999 and 2003 elections Yablokos ideology prevented a more pragmatic policy. Yablokos eventual choice to resist the system backfired, because it set them against the government and the voters. The partys decision to focus on being the leader of the democratic opposition ensured its further marginalization due to competing actors. The partys future is highly uncertain and it would be surprising if they recover. Word Count: 3007

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Moser, G. Robert. Independents and Party Formation: Elite Partisanship as an Intervening Variable in Russian Politics. Comparative Poltics 31.2 (1999): 147-165. (Web. April 1, 2011. http://www.jstor.org/stable/422142), 147. 2 A detailed, but outdated description of party policy can be found at Yablokos Views. Yabloko. Web. April, 2011. http://eng.yabloko.ru/Hotissues/index_htiss.html 3 Hale, E. Henry. Yabloko and the Challenge of Building a Liberal Party in Russia. Euro-Asian Studies 56.7 (2004): 9931020. (Web. April 1, 2011. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4147494) , 995. 4 Hale, E. Henry. The Origins of United Russia and the Putin Presidency: The Role of Contingency in Part-System Development. Demokratizatsiy 12.2 (2004): 169-194. (Web. April 1, 2011 http://search0.scholarsportal.info.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/ids70/results.php? SID=456c73d98fd8f4053b480b1192ccc1fa&id=3), 179. 5 Sakwa, Richard. The 2003-2004 Russian Elections and Prospects for Democracy. (Euro-Asian Studies 57.3 (2005): 369398. Web. April 1, 2011. http://www.jstor.org/stable/30043885), 393. 6 Richard Rose, Neil Munro, Stephen White. Voting in a Floating Party System: The 1999 Duma Election. (Euro-Asian Studies 53.3 (2001): 419-443. Web. April 1, 2011. http://www.jstor.org/stable/826542), 429 7 Ibid, 424. Based on Yabloko gaining only 5.9% of the vote. 8 Rose, Munro and White. Voting in a Floating Party System, 429. 9 Hale, Henry E. Why not parties in Russia? Democracy, Federalism, and the State. (New York : Cambridge University Press, 2006. Web. April 1, 2011.), 198. 10 For information on Yavlinskys starting political capital, see Hale. Why not parties in Russia?, 58-59. 11 Hale. Why not parties in Russia?, 41. 12 Ibid, 59. 13 Hale. Why not parties in Russia?, 42. 14 For detailed analysis of Yablokos 1995 campaign, see Fish, M. Seteve. The Predicament of Russian Liberalism: Evidence from the December 1995 Parliamentary Elections. (Euro-Asian Studies 49.2 (1997): 191-220. Web. April 1, 2011. http://www.jstor.org/stable/153984) 203-208. 15 Ibid, 206. 16 Ibid, 205-206. 17 Ibid, 207. 18 Hale Yabloko., 999-1000. 19 Hale. United Russia., 177. 20 For the increase in Putins approval rating see Hale. United Russia., 180. 21 Hale. Why not parties in Russia?, 61. 22 Hale Yabloko., 1010-1013. 23 Ibid, 1012. 24 Ibid, 1013. 25 Ibid, 1010-1013. 26 Mkinen, Sirke. Russia Integrity: Russian Parties of Power and the Yabloko Association on Russo-Chechen Relations, (Euro-Asian Studies 56.8 (2004): 1157-1189. Web. April 1, 2011. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4147401), 1178. 27 Ibid, 1178. 28 Ibid, 1177-78. 29 Ibid, 1183. 30 Sakwa. The 2003-2004 Russian Elections, 375. 31 Hale. Why not parties in Russia?, 57. 32 Hale Yabloko., 1013. 33 See chart in Hale Yabloko., 1000. 34 Sakwa. The 2003-2004 Russian Elections, 372. 35 Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Russian Federation Elections to the State Duma: 7 December 2003. OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Report. (Warsaw 2004. Web. April 1, 2011.), 16. 36 Mereu, Francesca. Yabloko Still Counts on Khodorkovsky. The Moscow Times, 16 July. 2003. Web. April, 2011. http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/yabloko-still-counts-on-khodorkovsky/237155.html 37 Laverty, Nicklaus. Limited Choices: Russian Opposition Parties and the 2007 Duma Election. Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 16.4 (2008): 363-382. (Web. April 1, 2011 http://search0.scholarsportal.info.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/ids70/view_record.php? id=5&recnum=0&log=from_res&SID=456c73d98fd8f4053b480b1192ccc1fa&mark_id=search%3A5%3A10%2C0%2C2 ), 373. 38 Sakwa. The 2003-2004 Russian Elections, 375. 39 Ibid, 375. 40 Hale. Why not parties in Russia?, 106.

41 42

Ibid, 106. Ibid, 113. 43 Sakwa. The 2003-2004 Russian Elections, 374. 44 See 2007 chart in Sakwa. The 2003-2004 Russian Elections, 372. The result of combining the Yabloko and SPS vote, is 8.27% of the popular vote. 45 OSCE. 2003., 16. 46 Ibid, 16. 47 Urban, Michael. I never had a political career: Russian political actors on politics and morality. (Euro-Asian Studies 60.5 (2008): 773-790. Web. April 1, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09668130802085158), 784 & 787. 48 White, David. Victims of a Managed Democracy? Explaining the Electoral Decline of the Yabloko Party Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 15.2 (2007): 209-229. (Web. April 1. 2011.), 220., Specifically, also see footnote #67. 49 Ibid, 221. 50 For the 1999 election, see Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Russian Federation: Elections to the State Duma 19 December 1999. Final Report. (Warsaw 2000. Web. April 1, 2011.), 21. For the 2003 election, see OSCE. 2003., 21. 51 OSCE. 1999., 23. 52 Ibid, 23. 53 OSCE. 2003., 9 & 22. 54 Ibid, 22. 55 Ibid, 2. 56 Sakwa. The 2003-2004 Russian Elections, 376. 57 Sakwa. The 2003-2004 Russian Elections, 389. 58 Ibid, 386. 59 Gilley, Bruce. The Determinants of State Legitimacy: Results for 72 Countries. International Political Science Review 27.1 (2006): 47-71. (Web. April 1, 2011.http://www.jstor.org/stable/20445036), 61. 60 Hale. Why not parties in Russia?, 99. 61 Sakwa. The 2003-2004 Russian Elections, 387. 62 Ibid, 387. 63 CRS Report for Congress. Russias 2007 Legislative Election: Outcome and Implications. 2007. (Web. April 1, 2011. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22770.pdf), 3. 64 Russia set to restrict protests. BBC News, 31 March, 2004. Web. April, 2011. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3586249.stm 65 Russias party barred from polls. BBC News, 28 January, 2007. Web. April, 2011. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6308511.stm 66 Fish. The Predicament of Russian Liberalism., 202. 67 Putin party secures huge victory. BBC News, 3 December, 2007. Web. April, 2011. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7124027.stm 68 Decision-Making Bodies of the Yabloko Party. Yabloko. Web. April, 2011. http://eng.yabloko.ru/People/index_peopl.html 69 Khamrayev, Viktor. Yabloko in its Own Juice. The Current Digest of the Post - Soviet Press 61.51 (2009). Web. April 1, 2011. http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/21805075 70 Romanov, Igor. Yabloko Identifies its Enemies. The Current Digest of the Post - Soviet Press 60.13 (2008). Web. April 1, 2011. http://dlib.eastview.com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/browse/doc/20437670 71 Ibid 72 The Other Russia. The Charter of The Russian National Assembly. The Other Russia, 18 May. 2008. Web. April 1, 2011. http://www.theotherrussia.org/2008/05/18/the-charter-of-the-russian-national-assembly/ 73 Rayevsky, Leonid. Kasparov Changes Weapons. The Current Digest of the Post - Soviet Press 60.10-11 (2008). Web. April 1, 2011. http://dlib.eastview.com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/browse/doc/20437410 74 RIA Novosti. Russian opposition launches 'alternative' national assembly. Global Security, 17 May. 2008. Web April 1, 2011. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/russia/2008/russia-080517-rianovosti01.htm 75 Eke, Steven. Russian radical newspaper closed. BBC News, 26 July. 2002. Web. April 1, 2011. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2153842.stm

76 77

Romanov. Yabloko Identifies its Enemies. Ibid 78 Concern over rigged vote. BBC News, 12 October, 2009. Web. April 1, 2011. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8301844.stm

Bibliography Concern over rigged vote. BBC News, 12 October, 2009. Web. April 1, 2011. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8301844.stm Decision-Making Bodies of the Yabloko Party. Yabloko. Web. April 1, 2011. http://eng.yabloko.ru/People/index_peopl.html

Putin party secures huge victory. BBC News, 3 December, 2007. Web. April 1, 2011. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7124027.stm Russias party barred from polls. BBC News, 28 January, 2007. Web. April 1, 2011. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6308511.stm Russia set to restrict protests. BBC News, 31 March, 2004. Web 1. April, 2011. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3586249.stm Yablokos Views. Yabloko. Web. April 1, 2011. http://eng.yabloko.ru/Hotissues/index_htiss.html CRS Report for Congress. Russias 2007 Legislative Election: Outcome and Implications. 2007. Web. April 1, 2011. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22770.pdf Eke, Steven. Russian radical newspaper closed. BBC News, 26 July. 2002. Web. April 1, 2011. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2153842.stm Gilley, Bruce. The Determinants of State Legitimacy: Results for 72 Countries. International Political Science Review 27.1 (2006): 47-71. Web. April 1, 2011. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20445036

Hale, E. Henry. The Origins of United Russia and the Putin Presidency: The Role of Contingency in Part-System Development. Demokratizatsiy 12.2 (2004): 169-194. Web. April 1, 2011 http://search0.scholarsportal.info.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/ids70/results.php? SID=456c73d98fd8f4053b480b1192ccc1fa&id=3 Hale, E. Henry. Yabloko and the Challenge of Building a Liberal Party in Russia. Euro-Asian Studies 56.7 (2004): 993-1020. Web. April 1, 2011. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4147494 Hale, Henry E. Why not parties in Russia? Democracy, Federalism, and the State. New York : Cambridge University Press, 2006. Web. April 1, 2011.

Laverty, Nicklaus. Limited Choices: Russian Opposition Parties and the 2007 Duma Election. Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 16.4 (2008): 363-382. Web. April 1, 2011 http://search0.scholarsportal.info.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/ids70/view_record.php? id=5&recnum=0&log=from_res&SID=456c73d98fd8f4053b480b1192ccc1fa&mark_id=search %3A5%3A10%2C0%2C2 Mkinen, Sirke. Russia Integrity: Russian Parties of Power and the Yabloko Association on RussoChechen Relations. Euro-Asian Studies 56.8 (2004): 1157-1189. Web. April 1, 2011. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4147401 Mereu, Francesca. Yabloko Still Counts on Khodorkovsky. The Moscow Times, 16 July. 2003. Web. April, 2011. http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/yabloko-still-counts-on-khodorkovsky/237155.html Moser, G. Robert. Independents and Party Formation: Elite Partisanship as an Intervening Variable in Russian Politics. Comparative Poltics 31.2 (1999): 147-165. Web. April 1, 2011. http://www.jstor.org/stable/422142 Khamrayev, Viktor. Yabloko in its Own Juice. The Current Digest of the Post - Soviet Press 61.51 (2009). Web. April 1, 2011. http://dlib.eastview.com/browse/doc/21805075 Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Russian Federation: Elections to the State Duma 19 December 1999. Final Report. Warsaw 2000. Web. April 1, 2011. http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/russia/16293 Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. Russian Federation Elections to the State Duma: 7 December 2003. OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Report. Warsaw 2004. Web. April 1, 2011. http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/russia/21482 Rayevsky, Leonid. Kasparov Changes Weapons. The Current Digest of the Post - Soviet Press 60.1011 (2008). Web. April 1, 2011. http://dlib.eastview.com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/browse/doc/20437410 RIA Novosti. Russian opposition launches 'alternative' national assembly. Global Security, 17 May. 2008. Web. April 1, 2011. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/russia/2008/russia-080517rianovosti01.htm

Richard Rose, Neil Munro, Stephen White. Voting in a Floating Party System: The 1999 Duma Election. Euro-Asian Studies 53.3 (2001): 419-443. Web. April 1, 2011. http://www.jstor.org/stable/826542 Romanov, Igor. Yabloko Identifies its Enemies. The Current Digest of the Post - Soviet Press 60.13 (2008). Web. April 1, 2011. http://dlib.eastview.com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/browse/doc/20437670 Sakwa, Richard. The 2003-2004 Russian Elections and Prospects for Democracy. Euro-Asian Studies 57.3 (2005): 369-398. Web. April 1, 2011. http://www.jstor.org/stable/30043885 Fish, M. Steve. The Predicament of Russian Liberalism: Evidence from the December 1995 Parliamentary Elections. Euro-Asian Studies 49.2 (1997): 191-220. Web. April 1, 2011. http://www.jstor.org/stable/153984 The Other Russia. The Charter of The Russian National Assembly. The Other Russia, 18 May. 2008. Web. April 1, 2011. http://www.theotherrussia.org/2008/05/18/the-charter-of-the-russian-national-assembly/ Urban, Michael. I never had a political career: Russian political actors on politics and morality. Euro-Asian Studies 60.5 (2008): 773-790. Web. April 1, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09668130802085158 White, David. Victims of a Managed Democracy? Explaining the Electoral Decline of the Yabloko Party Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 15.2 (2007): 209-229. Web. April 1. 2011.