People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria

Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research

Larbi Ben M’hidi University-Oum El Bouaghi

Faculty of Letters and Languages

Department of English

The Economic and Political Interplay in the American-

Algerian Relations in the 1960’s and 1970’s

–An American Perspective-

A Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the

Degree of Master of Arts in Anglo-American Studies

By: FARHI Abderraouf Supervisor: FILALI. B

Board of Examiners

Examiner: BOUDJELIT. A

2015-2016

Abstract

The most significant period that the American-Algerian relations had witnessed was during

the 1960s and the 1970s. The research examines the political events that influenced the

bilateral diplomatic ties and their relationship to the unaffected economic relations. The

Research employs a large score of data in order to investigate the economic and political

interplay in the American-Algerian relations. A number of methods are used, including the

descriptive approach devoted to conduct a historical survey about the course of event, and

the analytical approach that pursues data and gives analysis. The results show that despite

the fact of the rupture in the diplomatic relations, the economic ones were preserved, due

to a pragmatic policy adopted progressively by Algeria.

Résumé

La période entre 1962 et 1978 est considérée l’une des phases les plus importantes dans les

relations algéro-américaines. Cette étude aborde la recherche et la détection des

événements politiques qui ont affecté les relations bilatérales entre les deux pays et ses

impacts sur les échanges économiques. La recherche est basée sur une vaste base de

données pour mettre en évidence les interactions politiques et économiques entre l'Algérie

et les Etats-Unis d'Amérique. Deux approches ont été utilisées dans cette étude, la méthode

descriptive pour donner un aperçu historique sur les événements politiques entre les deux

pays et la méthode analytique afin de poursuivre les données économiques pour la

conclusion des analyses. Les résultats ont montré que malgré de l'absence des relations

diplomatiques, les relations économiques ont été préservés, dans un cadre d'une politique

pragmatique adoptée progressivement par l'Algérie.

ملخص

من أهم المراحل التي مرت بها العلاقات الأمريكية الجزائرية. 2691و 2691تعتبر الحقبة الممتدة بين

تتطرق هذه الدراسة إلى البحث والكشف عن الأحداث السياسية التي أثرت على العلاقات الثنائية بين

يانات واسعة من أجل البلدين ومدى انعكاسها على المبادلات الاقتصادية. يرتكز البحث على قاعدة ب

تسليط الضوء على التفاعلات السياسية والاقتصادية بين الجزائر والولايات المتحدة الأمريكية. وظف

البحث منهجين، المنهج الوصفي من أجل إعطاء لمحة تاريخية عن الأحداث السياسية بين البلدين،

ليلات. أظهرت النتائج أنه على الرغم من ومنهج تحليلي من أجل متابعة البيانات الاقتصادية وتقديم التح

غياب العلاقات الدبلوماسية، تم الحفاظ على العلاقات الاقتصادية، في إطار سياسة براغماتية اعتمدتها

الجزائر تدريجيا.

i

Dedications

This dissertation is dedicated to my parents for their endless love support, and

encouragement. To my Bothers Aziz and Akram, My beloved sister Ines. To

my friends AbdelDjalil Larouk, Rafiq Saadi, Mouhamed Zellache, Newfel

Baaloul, Walid Hassani, Alaa Bouzid, and Ramy Badis. To my classmates,

Akrem Triki, Samir Derbal, Abdelaziz Mouassa, Doudou, Werda Messouss,

Hadjer BenBouzid, Marwa kherraz, Rania, and Afaf Arfi. Finally, to all my

teammates and coach in ASSOB basketball Team.

I would like also to express my sincere gratitude to all my English teachers,

Mr Bouri, Ms. Ghennam, Mr Mazouz, Ms. Heddad and Mr. Boulemaiz.

Thank You All

ii

Acknowledgments:

Well, I thank Allah blessing firstly and my parents secondly, and I

would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor Mr.

Billel Filali for devoting his precious time in the process of making

this dissertation. I appreciate his support, patience, motivation and

immense knowledge.

I would also like to extend my appreciation to the committee

member: Ms. Boudjelit for her advice.

THANK YOU ALL.

iii

Table of Contents

Abstract

Dedication……………………………………………………………………………….......i

Acknowledgments………………………………………………………………...………...ii

Table Of Contents ……………….……………………...…………….…………….……..iii

General Introduction…………………………………..…………………………….…......01

Chapter I (1962 – 1967): The early establishment of the American-Algerian Relations….05

1. First Interaction and the formalities of the American-Algerian Relations…..….....06

2. Algeria’s military coup, and The reactions of the international community………09

3. The 1967 Arab-Israeli Crisis and The beginning of the deterioration……………..14

Chapter II (1967 – 1974): Diplomacy Vs. Economy in American-Algerian Relations: A

Hard Equation………………………………………….…………………………………..24

1. Diplomatic Rupture and economic partnership……………………………………25

2. The Karim Belkacem Trial and its Impact on the American-Algeria Relations…..29

3. Algerian-American economic interplay: Statistics and scrutiny…………………..33

Chapter III (1974 – 1978): The Western Sahara Question & its Impact on the American-Algerian

Relations.……………………………………………………………………………………....…...40

1. Algerian-Moroccan Relations: Historical Background………………...………….41

2. The Resumption of American-Algerian Diplomatic Relations……………………46

3. “Green March vs. Invasion” and its Impact on the U.S-Algerian Relations…...….49

General Conclusion……………………………………….…..……………………...……61

Works Cited…………………………..…………………………………….…….…..……65

1

Introduction

Algeria’s own revolutionary tendencies and its commitment to the principle of self-

determination, in addition to its unconditional support for the liberation movements have

historically influenced its foreign policy. Committed to promote worldwide revolution

against imperialism, Algeria has been a prominent outspoken leader both in the North

African region and in the Third World. However, the ideological tendencies of the post-

independence years were abandoned progressively for the sake of more realistic economic

and strategic reasons. Indeed, starting from the late 1960’s and early 1970’s, economic

factors played a significant role in reshaping the course of Algeria’s foreign policy, which

was significant in the case of Algerian-American relations. After a period of more or less

amicable relations, which was tainted in the beginning by Ben Bella’s visit to Cuba

following his visit to Washington, Algeria broke its diplomatic relations with the United

States at the outset of the Arab-Israeli war of 1967. This conflict was the point that marked

the deterioration of the American-Algerian relations.

Despite the absence of diplomatic relations between the two countries, however, the

economic partnership grew steadily. The conflict with the French petroleum companies

and the launching of the El-Paso-SONATRACH partnership laid the first stone for more

growing economic dealings with the United States. This improvement in economic

relations paved the way for both countries to move in steady steps towards restoring the

disconnected diplomatic relations. However, a number of external and internal political

disagreements, such us the Vietnam War and the Middle East conflict of 1967, in addition

to Belkacem Trial, delayed the resumption of diplomatic relations until September 1974,

which marked a new phase of mutual economic and political understandings between the

two countries. Subsequently, the progress achieved between Algiers and Washington was

2

immediately threatened with the emergence of a new conflict. The eruption of the Western

Sahara clash, which brought Morocco, a strategic ally to the United States in the North

African region, and Algeria, a rising economic partner that the United states needed to

befriend, into struggle following Spain’s withdrawal from Western Sahara.

This study of Algeria’s foreign policy toward the United States was motivated by

many reasons. The research aims to achieve a better understanding of Algeria’s post

independence history, foreign policy formulation and shifts, and relations not only with the

United States, but also with France, the Soviet Union, Morocco, Spain, and the Arab and

Third World countries as researching relations with the United States of America requires

dealing with different players in the international scene at that time. The requirements has

made it inevitable to deal with international relations while investigating American-

Algerian relations.

Primary research material used for this research consists of American government

publications relating to the foreign relations of the United States (U.S.) which cover the

period under investigation, particularly those released by the U.S. Department of State

recently. The series of The Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) are outstanding

in the matter. Although part of the declassified material was done on a selective basis,

probably because of American security concerns, it, nonetheless, remains a valuable source

of information about the period under study. The documents published by the U.S

Department of State and the National Archives and Records Administration include

telegrams, airgrams, memorandums, National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) and

correspondences. Some were declassified in June 2007 and released September 6, 2007,

which covers United States’ general policy towards the region, while others were

declassified recently in 2014, which documents the American relations with North Africa

from 1973 to 1976. What is relevant to this research is Volume E-5 of the FRUS series.

3

The documents in chapter two of this volume cover the United States foreign policy toward

Algeria. However, The Volume E-9 of the FRUS series covers in his first chapter the

efforts to re-establish diplomatic relations with Algeria. Additionally, it documents

Secretary of State Kissinger’s interactions with Spain, Morocco, and Algeria in order to

diminish growing tensions following Spain’s declaration that it would transfer sovereignty

of Western Sahara. Further historical documents were used to cover the crisis of June 1967

that erupted in the Middle East. These documents are of utmost importance that so far have

not been fully investigated by scholars. This research was conducted depending mainly on

American released documents due to the lack of documented material from the Algerian

side. However, the researcher devoted a respected effort to stay objective. The second

source of the primary material used here derives from a collection of memoirs and

autobiographies of the historical players that were involved in those events. In citation, this

research work has been pursued in The Modern Language Association (MLA) Format.

This research work includes three chapters. The first chapter highlights an early

controversial phase in the American-Algerian relations. This phase was characterized by a

short amity that was projected through the visit of Algeria’s President Ahmed Ben Bella to

the United States on October 15, 1962 and his ‘historical meeting’ with the American

President John F. Kennedy. This first phase of niceties ended immediately with Ben

Bella’s visit to Havana the next day. The assassination of Kennedy in November 1963 in

addition to the removal of Ben Bella from power in June 1965 paved the way to the second

phase that was characterized by tensions over the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 featured

America’s side taking with Israel which finally, precipitated diplomatic rupture between

the two countries.

The second chapter deals with the ambivalent U.S-Algerian relations and the

reorientation of Algeria’s foreign policy. It highlights the incompatible Algerian-American

4

ideologies and foreign policies with particular emphasis on the improving of economic

relations. The Belkacem Trial that stressed the American-Algerian bilateral relations at a

time when economies were at best. It also analyses the shift in Algeria’s foreign policy

from what has been termed as ‘radicalism’ to more pragmatic attitudes toward the United

States, which was illustrated finally by economic statistics and analysis.

The last chapter analyses the American foreign policy conducted in the Maghreb

bloc. It gives a historical background on the Algerian-Moroccan relation, which was

characterized by tensions starting from the Algerian-Moroccan border dispute in 1963 and

offers a historical survey on the Western Sahara region. It focuses on the American pro-

Moroccan stance concerning the Western Sahara conflict, which once more overshadowed

relations with Algeria. Ultimately, the Algerian-Moroccan tensions of 1976 confirmed the

ideological split in Algiers and Washington’s foreign policies despite the rapidly growing

economic dealings. Relations during the 1970’s truly show the nature of Algeria’s

pragmatic policy toward America and the reasons behind the ambivalent attitudes in

Algerian-American relations.

5

Chapter One (1962 – 1967): The Early Establishment of the American-

Algerian Relations

The year 1962 marked the most crucial event in Algeria’s history. A cease-fire was

proclaimed in March 19. The war with France had officially come to an end and the

establishment of an independent Algerian state took place. The Algerian people voted

overwhelmingly for independence. Accordingly, November 1962, The White House issued

a declaration by President Kennedy recognizing national independence for the Algerian

people (Editorial Note. Doc. 67, p. 97). Concurrently, based on Socialist ideologies, the

Tripoli program explicitly revealed the economic policy that has been adopted by the

Algerian government. Algeria as a newly independent government was faced with serious

economic difficulties including the political divisions among the several Algerian power

groups. However, In Foreign affairs, if compared to its small population, and regardless to

its newness as a nation, Algeria progressively played a major role in the international

scene. At the same time, it tried to commit to a course of nonalignment, yet its attitude

towards The United States was a subject matter to different political factors that will be

discussed amply. These political factors raised questions about the nature of the American-

Algerian early relations and the possibility of whether Algeria could serve as a reliable

economic partner of the United States.

1. First Interaction and the Formalities of the American-Algerian

Relations

The diplomatic relations between the United States and Algeria were established

progressively. Though Americans were zealous to launch major development projects in

Algeria, they were encountered by many obstacles. Firstly, they had to wait until the new

6

Algerian government settles down. Secondly, according to the Evian accords, France is

supposed to be Algeria’s main customer and the major source of essential assistance.

Therefore, any attempt without a French green light would be considered as an offence to

DeGaulle. The American government was caught between this French position and the

certainty that the Soviets will get involved as well (Aid Planning for Algeria. Doc. 66, p.

95).

The Tripoli meeting in July 1962 showed that all the parties of the political scene in

Algeria tried to consolidate their positioning. Supported by Boumedienne, Ben Bella tried

to consolidate his position, by affirming his own principles that were based mainly on

Socialism, pan-Arabism, and with reference to Islam. Whereas the Provisional

Government of the Republic of Algeria (PGRA) headed by Ben Khedda, was resisting Ben

Bella’s attempt to take over the power. As a result, Ben Bella resigned from his position in

the PGRA as a vice president. Thus, the Tripoli meeting devoted a huge split in powers

with no sign of unity confirmation. Due to Ben Bella’s withdrawal from the PGRA, the

United States chose not to recognize any kind of Algerian Government with full diplomatic

relations until the conflict between the various sides is resolved (Editorial Note. Doc. 67, p.

97).

On July 6, William J. Porter, the first United States Ambassador to Algeria,

reported from Algiers on Dahlab's declaration that the PGRA and the Provisional

Executive had agreed to grant the PGRA the responsibility of conducting foreign affairs

while the Provisional Executive is responsible for administrating the country. Porter said:

"if Dahlab's statement remained uncontested by the Provisional Executive, the United

States should recognize him as Foreign Minister” (Editorial Note. Doc. 67, p. 97). The

Department, however, questioned whether it is “juridically or practicably feasible” to

separate such action from recognition of PGRA under Ben Khedda, and noted that

7

statements to the press should emphasize the provisional nature of the PGRA pending the

choice of a permanent government by the Algerian people” (Editorial Note. Doc. 67, p.

97).

On July 9, Robert Komer, an agent in the U.S. National Security Council Staff,

wrote to National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy that he had told the U.S. Department

of State that the White House would want to clear any accreditation of Porter to the PGRA,

which would strengthen the hand of the Ben Khedda faction. He added that he had

previously agreed with State that this was “highly desirable though a calculated risk” but

that the Embassy in Paris had strongly objected so the matter was being reappraised

(Editorial Note. Doc. 67, p. 97).

On July 13, Secretary of State Dean Rusk informed the Assistant Secretary of State

for African Affairs G. Mennen Williams, who was in Bonn, that the PGRA and the

Provisional Executive had both notified the American. Government that Dahlab was

responsible for foreign affairs in Algeria and that an official in Dahlab's ministry had

informed Porter that the PGRA was satisfied to have American representation continue at

the Consulate General level until after the elections on August 12. He added that the split

between Ben Bella and the PGRA under Ben Khedda continued (Editorial Note. Doc. 67,

p. 97).

The National Assembly of Algeria, which was elected on September 26, designated

Ben Bella as Prime Minister of Algeria on September 26. On September 29, the Assembly

approved his list of cabinet officers and the United States formally recognized the “newly

established Government of the Republic of Algeria” (Department of State Bulletin,

October 15, 1962, p. 560). The embassy in Algiers was established on September 29 with

Porter as Charge d'Affaires in the interim. On October 4, the President formally invited the

8

new Prime Minister Ben Bella to visit the White House during his visit to the United States

for the admission of Algeria to the United Nations ((Editorial Note. Doc. 67, p. 102-104).

On October 8, 1962, Algeria was recognized and voted into the United Nations as

the 109th member. Few days later, and particularly on October 15, The Algerian Prime

Minister, Ben Bella, flew to Washington D.C where he was warmly hosted by the

American President John F. Kennedy. The visit represented the first diplomatic and

political interaction between the two countries. However, on the next day, October 16, Ben

Bella boarded a Cuban plane and flew to Havana where Castro was waiting for him

asserting that both, Algeria and Cuba, share common revolutionary tendencies. A multi

interpretable trip that was in deep contrast with Ben Bella’s prior visit to the United States.

Americans were irritated and Kennedy himself was perplexed due to a move that seemed

to be either a hopeless naïveté or a calculated insult. For Cubans, Ben Bella’s visit was “a

noble gesture” in Fidel’s Words (Gleijeses 33).

It is highly important to point out the fact that Cuba offered full support to the

Algerian independence movement, therefor; this movement by Ben Bella may be

interpreted also as a gratitude for Cuba. Due to Ben Bella’s Cuban stance, it is relevant to

say that The United States and Algeria started on the wrong foot. Subsequently, both

countries were unable to agree on some types of aid which should be granted to Algeria in

the course of specific programs that the United States is presenting to newly independent

nations.

2. Algeria’s Military Coup, and the Reactions of the International

Community.

In April 1963, Ben Bella became the Secretary-General of the National Liberation

Front (FLN), the Political tool of the revolution and the sole political party in post-

independent Algeria. On September 13, 1962, Ahmed Ben Bella was elected as president

9

for a five-year term. He formed a government that included his closest supporters, Rabah

Bitat as vice president, Houari Boumedienne as minister of defense, and Muhammad

Khemisti as a Foreign Minister (Williamson, 291).

According to a U.S. NIE conducted by all members of the U.S. Intelligence Board

on November 7. the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) along with other intelligent

organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force

that participated in the preparation of this estimate entitled “The Short Term Outlook in

Algeria” stated that:

Ben Bella has seized control, and for the moment at least has the support of

the largest and best disciplined military force in the country. He is trying,

during the present respite in political activities, to consolidate his political

position, to improve his popular image, to impose his authority over the

Armed Forces, and to revive the economy. (STOA. doc. 74, p. 109)

However, Economically, Algeria’s picture was not bright. 250.000 peasants are

away from their lands. About 4.5 million Algerians are without resources. Over half the

population had a per capita income of $55 per year. The departure of Europeans caused the

loss of the tax revenue due to this emigration and caused a shortage of trained personnel.

As a result, 85% of the new construction was halted and the pace of industry and

agriculture was slowed down. Fields remained untilled. Almost a complete dislocation of

economic life had developed in the post-independence period (Encarta, 2009).

Unemployment remained one for the nightmares of the regime. The U.S. NIE stated that:

Little has yet been accomplished in economic revival, and the chances are

poor that much will be accomplished in the next few months. Thus, the

population in the cities, now dependent upon foreign charity, may become

increasingly frustrated, and living standards in the rural areas, already barely

10

sufficient to sustain life, may be further driven down. (STOA. doc. 74, p.

109)

In addition to the economic factor, regional, ethnic and ideological opposition to

Ben Bella’s government continued to grow in 1963. One by one, the leading figures of the

government alienated from Ben Bella ,which resulted in a major revolt occurred in the

Kabylia area. The local military commander Mohand Ou El Hadj joined Hocine Ait-

Ahmed to form a Front of Socialist Forces (FFS) announcing their hostility and opposition

to the government. Ben Bella moved a strong military force towards Kabylia.

Nevertheless, neither side wanted to bring on the disaster of a new war. In November, Ben

Bella began negotiations with the Kabyles for a coalition government. However, such a

government would unlikely prove to be stable or long lasting. Ben Bella dealt more

severely with the political rivals in 1964. His distrust of opponents increased. As a result,

administrative assistants and government officials were arrested and sent to camps in the

Sahara while others were trailed and executed (Encarta, 2009).

Hostility continued to grow against Ben Bella’s economic and political policies,

which was speculated by The U.S. NIE:

While Ben Bella's immediate prospects for holding power are fairly good,

we believe that within a year he will be confronted with severe political

challenges. The intractable nature of Algeria's economic problems, the

somewhat chaotic conditions which will persist, and latent hostility to his

rule in important sectors of the society, all will tend to undermine Ben

Bella's position. Any one of a number of oppositionist leaders might seek to

exploit the dissatisfactions of the jobless, and there is always danger of

unrest in the countryside. (STOA. doc. 74, p. 109)

11

Ben Bella’s position deteriorated when he made it clear that he was impressed with

the communist model which was evident in his clothing as well as in his speeches. This

fact was noted in the U.S NIE, it was stated that Ben Bella, who calls himself both an

"Arab Socialist" and a Marxist, appears to be much closer to Nasser in policy and doctrine.

This judgment was based upon his words and actions on both national and international

matters; yet, it is hard to assert to what extent Ben Bella’s philosophic leanings could

extend towards the communist bloc. However, he may indeed prove to be far more radical

than he now appears to be” (STOA. doc. 74, p. 109).

The fact that Ben Bella had communist tendencies progressively became

unaccepted by the army and its leader Boumedienne. Furthermore, this latter was not

satisfied with Ben Bella’s behaviors of taking political decisions without consulting him

starting from the selection of the National Assembly delegates in 1962 down to the

preparation to the first conference of the FLN Party in 1964 (Jaouadi, An Insurgent

rebuilds a county). Eventually, Ben Bella’s biggest threat comes from the increasing power

of the Army under the command of Col. Boumedienne. The U.S. National Intelligent

Estimate stated that:

Ben Bella must also somehow establish his authority over the radical

Defense Minister, Colonel Boumedienne, and a showdown between the two

seems likely to occur sooner or later. If Boumedienne became tired of

political infighting, if there were growing insecurity in the cities and

subversion in the countryside, or if there were irresolution and confusion in

the government, Boumedienne might simply step in and establish a military

dictatorship. (doc. 74, p. 109)

Every time Ben Bella sacked a government official, he personally took over his

responsibility. This power monopoly started to become unaccepted by Boumedienne. At a

12

certain period, Ben Bella functioned as a president, commander in chief of the armed

forces, minister of foreign affairs, and minister of youth at the same time whereby mostly

all the Ministries were under his control. When Boumedienne came back from a business

trip to Moscow where he signed a contract of military hardware buyout. He received

reports from the army that Ben Bella intended to remove him from his office. Therefore, he

decided to make a radical move (Jaouadi, An Insurgent rebuilds a county).

On June 19, 1965 Ben Bella was deposed and arrested by the army in a swift

bloodless military coup d’état led by the Minister of Defense Boumedienne. In view of

Algeria’s economic dilemma and Ben Bella’s dictatorial tendencies, his termination of

most of the traditional leaders, and his failure to make the FLN a representative party piled

up to leave Ben Bella without an organized support when the army turned against him.

Therefore, many administrates and politicians did not oppose the coup. A 26 member

Council of the Revolution headed by Boumedienne assumed full power. Representative of

the Revolutionary Council condemned the abuse of personal power associated with Ben

Bella, and the economic deteriorations his government had caused. The Council aimed to

put an end to internal divisions, recognize the FLN and create a pragmatic brand of

socialist Algerian society based on a solid economy. In international relations, a policy of

non-alignment was to be pursued (Jaouadi, An Insurgent rebuilds a county).

Shortly after the coup, the new established government rushed to announce its

commitment of adhering its international obligations, maintaining friendly relations with

France, and seeking African, Arab, and Magreb unity. It also sought the favor of the

Communist countries and promised to continue to support the liberation movements.

However, it soon found itself severely criticized by the European Communist press and by

13

some regimes that had close relations with Ben Bella such as The Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics (USSR), which had been heavily committed to Ben Bella initially, the USSR

appeared to be preserved and anxious.

Supposing that Boumedienne, unlike Ben Bella, was not a pan-Arabist figure, the

Egyptian regime led by Nasser was unresponsive to the events that occurred in Algeria.

Furthermore, The Egyptian authorities sent a delegate to Algeria to make sure that Ben

Bella would not be executed, this attempt was interpreted by the Algerian government as

an interference in the domestic affairs. Communist China on the other hand, recognized the

new regime immediately (Jaouadi, An Insurgent rebuilds a county).

Boumedienne’s first aim was to restore relations with the Communist camp. He

successfully did in March 1965 when an official delegation attended the Communist

Party’s 23rd congress. Relations with the Soviet Union improved progressively. The deputy

chairman of the soviet state planning organization headed a team in Algeria to help draft

the country’s first development plan. There were about 3000 Soviet experts, teachers,

doctors and technicians working in Algeria. The United States did not express a clear

political position which implicitly indicated that the United States did not oppose the coup.

(Jaouadi, An Insurgent rebuilds a county).

3. The 1967 Arab-Israeli Conflict and the American-Algerian Relation.

Washington, May 23, 1967, 2:45 a.m., according to an American intelligence

extracted from a telegram sent by Secretary of State Dean Rusk to the U.S. embassy in the

Soviet Union. The Egyptian Leader Gamal Abdel Nasser initiated a bold move when he

ordered the increment of the Egyptian military strength in the area from normal level of

30,000 to 50,000. Additionally, Nasser moved his naval units south into Red Sea toward

entrance to Gulf of Aqaba and closed it after he requested the United Nation Emergency

Forces (UNEF) to withdraw from the borders between Israel and Egypt. Moreover, the

14

Egyptian coast artillery unit has been sent to take over positions being given up by the

UNEFs at the mouth of the Gulf, where the shipping channel lies within easy artillery

range. Nasser has announced the Gulf would be closed to Israeli flagships, adding that if

"Israelis want war, we welcome it" (Doc. 38, p. 67).

These occurrences seems to be adequate to bring about a declaration of war by

Israel. The American first official reaction to the closing of the Strait of Tiran was

conveyed through a telegram from the U.S. Department of State to the Embassy in the

United Arab Republic (UAR) and notably for Cairo in May 22, 1967 in which Secretary of

State Dean Rusk stated that:

We would also take this opportunity to reaffirm our continued adherence to

principle of free access to Gulf of Aqaba for ships of all nations. The right

of free and innocent passage of these waters is a vital interest of the

international community. We are convinced that any interference whatever

with these international rights could have the gravest international

consequences. (For Cairo. Doc. 35. P. 60)

While investigating the reasons behind the Egyptian army mobilization, some

briefing notes sent for the Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms stated that On

April 7, 1967, The Israelis overpowered the Syrians Air Forces in a battle. As a result, The

Egyptians were embarrassed because they did not help the Syrians; hence, they made this

step of marching into Sinai, to show good faith, and in hopes of deterring the Israelis (The

Middle East. doc. 45, p. 75).

Unsurprisingly, the American full support to the Government of Israel during the

crisis was palpable in almost every telegram that was sent to the UAR. It was stated in a

telegram sent by the U.S. Department of State to the UAR embassy in May 22, 1967 the

15

following: “Three aspects of situation cause us particular concern. First is continuing

terrorism being carried out against Israel with Syrian approval, and at least in some cases,

from Syrian territory” (doc. 35, p. 60).

Whereas The Soviet view to the issue was of a different angle. The USSR blamed

Israel for its attitude in region which generated these hostilities expressing its bias to the

Arab States. This view was expressed explicitly in a telegram from the embassy in the

Soviet Union to the U.S. Department of State in May 23, 1967. The following was stated in

the telegram: “The Soviet Union had reached the conclusion that the reason for the current

tension was the policy of Israel, and certain circles or groups in Israel which had

determined this policy” (doc. 41, p. 68). Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei

Gromyko added that:

All statements that Israel was allegedly threatened and that other countries,

and particularly Syria, were following policies to the detriment of Israel,

were groundless. From the first days of its existence, Israel had followed an

unfriendly policy toward the Arab states. Circles in Israel claimed that there

was subversive activity against Israel and that they would counter this by

their own actions. Such charges were groundless, and the Soviets did not

believe them. (doc. 41, p. 68)

The escalation in events continued to take place from both sides, a fierce war is

knocking on doors of both sides. For this reason, the CIA prepared a memorandum under

the subject of “Overall Arab and Israeli Military Capabilities” in which it evaluated the

military potentials of both sides. Although the Arab states outnumbered Israel, and this

latter had to fight on so many fronts, the CIA report gave preference to Israeli forces. The

CIA asserted that:

16

The judgment of the intelligence community is that Israeli ground forces

"can maintain internal security, defend successfully against simultaneous

Arab attacks on all fronts, launch limited attacks simultaneously on all

fronts, or hold on any three fronts while mounting successfully a major

offensive on the fourth." In the air, the judgment is less clear: the Israelis

"probably could defeat the Egyptian air force if Israel's air facilities were not

damaged beyond repair. (OAIMC. doc. 44, p. 73)

Moreover, the report added that Israeli is expected to go for a short-term war,

conducted by ground forces with air cover. If this assumption fail, Israel might deeply be

in trouble. If Israel wants to defeat the Arab forces, it would have to use 280,000 men,

117,000 deployed in the vicinity of the Israeli borders. However, the total strength of the

Arab armies is nearly 500,000, vs. the same 280,000 on the Israeli side (OAIMC. doc. 44,

p. 73).

In view of the Egyptian lurking forces in the borders. The Israelis, as stated by the

Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms at a White House meeting on May 23,

1967, are convinced that they are facing a new situation, with UAR forces beefed up and

the UNEF safety mechanism withdrawn. They have carried out at least 40 to 50 percent

mobilization as a protective measure, and are re-assessing their security requirements.

Moreover, an emergency meeting of the national security panel was called (The Middle

East. doc. 45, p. 75).

The Israelis, feel that they must now patrol by land and air into Sinai, and there is a

hint of fatalism in the Arab moves which is clearly expressed in Nasser's announcement

about the Gulf of Aqaba. Under the circumstances, war can now come from accident,

incident, or miscalculation (The Middle East. doc. 45, p. 75).

17

According to a Telegram from the Embassy in Israel to the U.S. Department of

State, the attack by Egypt and Syria appeared to be imminent. Reinforcements in the

Egyptian military forces kept increasing, the intensity was getting higher, and everything

indicates that a war is looming. The telegram stated that:

Information on which this conclusion was based is that Egypt has held

establishment of second army group in Sinai to reinforce divisions already

there and has ordered armored brigade from Yemen to join such group. It

has increased tanks in Sinai to total of 800. It has reversed naval forces

proceeding to Aqaba and ordered them returned to Mediterranean. It has

sent cabinet minister to Moscow to coordinate operations between Egyptian

and Soviet Governments. Syria is to receive Iraqi troops by airlift and has

increased offensive posture its forces already on frontier. Jordanians have

announced willingness to accept Iraqi and Saudi Arabian troops. All this

indicates that Egyptians and Syrians are no longer concerned with Aqaba

but prepared to launch a full scale attack against Israeli existence. (doc. 63,

p. 108)

Following the last telegram received by Secretary of State Dean Rusk from the U.S.

embassy in Israel stating that the outburst of the war is imminent. The Central Intelligence

Agency prepared a memorandum in May 26, entitled “Military Capabilities Of Israeli And

The Arab States” in which it estimated the course of the war in case it erupted, stated that:

Israel could almost certainly attain air superiority over the Sinai Peninsula in

24 hours after taking the initiative or in two or three days if the UAR struck

first. In the latter case, Israel might lose up to half of its air force. We

18

estimate that armored striking forces could breach the UAR's double

defense line in the Sinai within several days. Regrouping and resupplying

would be required before the Israelis could initiate further attacks aimed at

driving to the Suez Canal. Israel could contain any attacks by Syria or

Jordan during this period. (MCIAS. doc. 76, p. 138)

Hostilities began early on June 5th 1967, it was hard at first to sort out who initiated

the fighting. Each side was publicly accusing the other of aggression. Later on, it appeared

to be that Israel took the initiative and conducted a systematic, purposeful and effective

attack - as estimated by the CIA - on Arab airfields (Editorial Note. Doc. 152, p. 295).

Information on the outbreak of the war and which side took the initiative has been

excerpted in a “Presidential Daily Brief” that was transformed to President Lyndon B.

Johnson on June 5, 1967. The Daily Brief stated that:

Israeli planes raided airfields in Cairo and other areas beginning at about

8:00 AM local time, Cairo has just been informed that at least five of its

airfields in Sinai and the Canal area have suddenly become "unserviceable."

Israel's war plans had put high priority on quick action against the Egyptian

Air Force because of the threat to its own more vulnerable airfields and vital

centers. As a result, Israel has gained an early and perhaps overwhelming

victory in the air, but the progress of the war on the ground was still unclear.

Eventually, Egyptians was withdrawing most, if not all, of their forces from

the Sinai (Arab States-Israel. Doc. 151, p. 294).

The United Arab Republic (UAR) ambassador Mostafa Kamel warned the United

States government that Israel was doing its utmost to bring United States in on its side. He

urged The United States not to become a third party because All Arabs would be watching

19

the United States action, directly and indirectly, open or behind the scenes. In this regard.

Kamel stated that other "friendly powers" would also be watching” (Doc. 171, p. 321).

Although the United States government claimed in its official and public statements

that it will maintain a neutral position in its foreign policy regarding the crisis in the

Middle East. However, offstage, The U.S. government was supporting Israel. The

American stance regarding the eruption of the war and its infinite support to Israel was

demonstrated when Walt Rostow, the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs to

U.S. President Johnson stated that:

However, at the time, I should say that, war having been initiated against

our advice, there was a certain relief that things were going well for the

Israelis. In part, because it was an intelligence judgment very carefully

canvassed in the previous weeks that the Israelis would win briskly. The

sense was that they would win pretty briskly even if the Egyptians had

started the war. Also behind that satisfaction was not merely a question of

our intelligence being right, but it did look as though we would not be put in

a position of having to make a choice of engaging ourselves or seeing Israel

thrown into the sea or defeated. That would have been a most painful

moment and, of course, with the Soviet presence in the Middle East, a

moment of great general danger” (WRR. doc. 149, p.290)

On, June 8, 1967, Israel appeared to be in a favorable position if compared to the

Arab States. According to a Presidential Daily Brief, on the Sinai Peninsula, the Israelis

have apparently accomplished most of their military objectives. The Israelis approached

the Suez Canal so rapidly that they probably cut off the major portion of the retreating

Egyptians (Arab States-Israel. doc. 202, p. 358).

20

In a Memorandum from the Board of National Estimates to the Director of Central

Intelligence Agency entitled “Implications in the Moslem World of Forcing the Strait of

Tiran” Sent to the President on June 1 with an attached memorandum estimated that

The main target of attack against the United States in the Arab world would inevitably be

the oil industry. Unquestionably, all American oil operations in the Middle East would be

subject to harassments. In all Arab countries, sabotage incidents would likely to take place

against American oil facilities. Strikes of oil workers with accompanying rioting are likely

to tie up oil production and might threaten loss of American workers (IMWFST. doc. 126,

p. 228).

Respectively, as a response to the American stance and support to Israel, the Arab

oil-producing countries, meeting in Baghdad, warned that they will conduct an oil embargo

on any country which supports Israel in the fighting. Baghdad radio said: “This morning,

the pumping of Iraqi oil has been stopped "because of American and British attitudes"(doc.

151, p. 294)

Subsequently, Arab countries initiated an Oil Embargo against all countries that

support Israel in its war against the Arab states in one way or another. In June 6, Nathaniel

Davis of the U.S. National Security Council Staff sent a report to the president's Special

Assistant Walt Rostow entitled “The Situation in New York” with an Editorial Note where

he stated:

Iraq, Kuwait, and Algeria announced the suspension of oil deliveries to the

United States and United Kingdom on June 6. A Conference of Oil

Ministers from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Algeria, the UAR, Syria,

Lebanon, and representatives from Bahrain, Qatar, and Abu Dhabi declared

in a June 5 communiqué that Arab oil should be denied to countries

committing aggression or participating in aggression against any Arab state,

21

including any armed attack by any country in support of Israel, and that the

direct or indirect involvement of any country in armed aggression against

the Arab states would make the assets of its companies and nationals inside

the territories of the Arab countries subject to the laws of war. (doc. 180, p.

331)

The Internal challenges could not prevent Algeria from being a major participant in

the Arab issues. Under Boumedienne’s rule, Algeria maintained a major role in the

international scene. Consequently, when the Arab-Israeli crisis erupted in May 1967, the

Algerian government declared its unconditional support for the Palestinian cause and its

stance remained uncompromisingly militant regarding the crisis. During the course of the

war, Algeria maintained a firm and a hardline policy against Israel, and Boumedienne flew

to Moscow personally to seek support, both diplomatic and military, for the Arab cause.

On May 29, Algerian troops were reported being en route for service in Sinai (Jaouadi, An

Insurgent rebuilds a county).

The U.S. Special Assistant Walt W. Rostow noted in a telegram sent to the U.S.

embassy in Israel in June 16, that” the Algerian Government was taking a hard line in the

present situation. In the same report, he stated that:

June 6—Algeria loaded a ship bound for Cairo with tanks. June 8—a ship

loaded with 70 tanks, 37 artillery pieces and other military equipment was

supposed to leave the Soviet Union for the UAR. June 9—GOI

(Government of Israel) believed that UAR had only 50 planes left.

However, on that day, 27 MIG-17’s and 2 or 3 MIG-21s arrived in UAR

from Algeria. (doc. 266, p. 438)

Considerably, Algeria declared its public rejection to the cease-fire, Boumedienne

in his official speeches expressed Algeria’s total rejection to the defeat or any solution that

22

derives out of the defeat, and refuses the endorsement of any compromise settlement with

the Israelis. This statement was not just a personal view that Boumedienne endorsed.

Algerians, through the course of the war, have developed strong feelings for the Arab-

Israeli dispute, sentiments that could not be ignored by the Algerian government (NIE:

AIR. doc. 62-71, p. 1). A memorandum prepared by the CIA in June 12, entitled “Nasir’s

Situation and Position Among the Arab Leaders” illustrated the Algerian stance and

Boumedienne’s attitude regarding the Arab-Israeli crisis:

Of the revolutionary states, Algeria is disgusted at the humiliating collapse

of the UAR Army. Boumedienne had been reported as “out of his mind”

with rage at Nasir; the Algerian premier has not, to our knowledge,

answered Nasir’s plea for him to call an Arab summit conference. The

Algerians are suspicious of Nasir’s abilities and probably are unwilling to

help restore Nasir’s prestige among the Arabs. Boumedienne’s current trip

to Moscow may indicate an intention to upstage Nasir. (NSPAAL. doc. 274,

p. 454).

This attitude extended to reach movements against those who tend to be allies with

Israel, particularly The United States. Following the embargo on all trades with the United

States, The Algerian government was the first among the Arab states to withdraw its

ambassador in Washington D.C. and severe its diplomatic relations with the United States

these moves had short and long term affects the American Algerian relations.

The Arab-Israeli crisis of 1967 was the starting point that deteriorated the

American-Algerian relations, although a number of issues will be forcing the decline of the

American- Algerian relations in the future. This deterioration can be noticed in the way

that Algeria disfavor The American foreign policy, the nationalization of American firms

in Algeria during and following the Arab-Israeli crisis, and the different ideological view

23

of both countries. Consequently, the United States rank Algeria among the radical states.

However, the economic side boomed during the same period and was not affected by the

diplomatic rupture. Though France was Algeria’s primary trade partner, The United States

progressively paved its way into the Algerian market. As America contributed in providing

Algeria with economic advice, technical expertise and industrial equipment’s, especially in

oil industry and gas liquefaction.

24

Chapter II (1967 – 1974): Diplomacy Vs. Economy in American-Algerian

Relations: A Hard Equation.

As a matter of fact, economy and politics cannot be viewed differently since the

link between the two is clearly observable; therefore, they are forcibly interrelated

especially if one take into consideration the fact that a government’s success or failure is

usually measured by its economic performance. Theoretically, economy should remain

non-political, because a typical economist should give preference to reason and common

sense rather than emotion and preconception; and neglect any political adherence or

adversary for the sake of unbiased investments in order to improve the economic

performance of the country.

A number of political issues took place between Algeria and the United States that

were more than enough to stimulate political disputes. Starting from Ben Bella’s visit to

Cuba in 1962 following his visit to Washington D.C., which was considered as an insult to

the American government, down to the Arab-Israeli crisis of June 1967 and

Boumedienne’s tone and attitude, which remained artlessly and clearly militant. This trend

and the serious complications in relations between both countries led to rigorous actions

took by the Algerian government against Israel’s supporters, significantly the United

States. Algeria was the first Arab state to severe its diplomatic relations with the United

States entailing the recall of diplomatic representatives due to the United States stance and

support for Israel during the crisis.

The diplomatic rupture occurred between Algeria and the United States was

supposed to bring about a complete cut in relations, taking in consideration that Algeria

was seen as a radical state due to its international attitudes that regularly came in contrast

with those of the United States. Surprisingly, the post Arab-Israeli crisis of 1967

25

unexpectedly witnessed a boom in the economic transactions between Algeria and the

United States at the expense of Algeria’s first economic partner and colonizer, France.

1. Diplomatic Rupture and Economic Partnership.

After the Arab-Israeli crisis of 1967, Algeria’s internal political stability has

improved. As a result, The Algerian government under Boumedienne concentrated on

adopting a new policy that was mainly based on granting priority to internal matters.

Although it remained vocal on some international issues and active in supporting liberation

movements. The Algerian zeal for these groups has declined in recent years. It maintained

its stance as an anti-imperialist state and objected the United States’ actions in Vietnam

and the Middle East. Nevertheless, this fact did not prevent Algeria to seek advice and

expertise from U.S. business corporations. Algeria's revolutionary government seems to be

more pragmatic in practice by gradually becoming concerned more with domestic

economic and industrial development. One measure of this pragmatism is the continuing

economic boom in business with the U. S. despite the absence of official diplomatic

relations (Encarta, 2009).

Algeria’s new orientation was adequate, the Algerian government was willing to

step in and compete for international markets especially the energetic ones. The

nationalization of state firms took place, and the Algerian government started partially to

manage its nationalized business firms. Since 1967, work on investment projects was

greatly enhanced, thereafter, economically; Algeria was improving by spending the lion’s

share of foreign exchange earnings to promote economic development.

The NIE of March 12, 1970 no. 60-70, analyzed the Algerian economic status and

development, stated that:

Projects already under way or completed will permit the production and

export of sufficient petroleum and natural gas to finance the 1970-1973

26

development plan without resort to heavy foreign borrowing. Petroleum

production, now at the rate of about 900,000 barrels per day, is likely to

increase at an average rate of 5 to 10 percent annually. Output of exportable

natural gas is scheduled to rise from 15 billion cubic meters (bcm) annually

to 5 billion during the same period… By 1973, Algeria's annual foreign

exchange earnings will include about $800-$900 million from oil and about

$100 million from natural gas. (The Outlook for North Africa. p.5)

The NIE continued to describe the economic performance in prominent words stating that

the 1970-1973 development plan will emphasize capital-intensive industry in order to

create new employment opportunities and better living conditions (The Outlook for North

Africa. p.6).

France has been the key western influence in Algeria, but this is not to say that

relations between France and Algeria were consistently smooth. During the year 1969, the

French role continued to decline. There were serious and unsettled disagreements between

Algeria and France over different issues mainly the ones related to the energetic policies

announced by Boumedienne. Following the interruption of negotiations concerning the

Franco-Algerian oil agreements, Boumedienne proceeded with the nationalization of oil

and gas pipelines and deposits in order to reduce the immense French investments to a

convenient size. This fact caused frictions between the two countries, because the French

government considered the step as inimical. As a result, France decided to suspend its

purchases of the Algerian oil. During the same year, Algerian immigration into France was

all but cut off (Jaouadi, An insurgent rebuilds a state).

Moreover, the presence of France in North Africa and specifically in Algeria is

significant in the most important fields. Therefore, the United States is committed not to

disturb the French considerable involvement in the area, which would not always be in the

27

United States favor particularly in trade and petroleum issues. Hence, in order to support

its specific interests, the United States must as well take a stand and design policies in the

area. Despite the fact that official relations were still severed, the United States had

important commercial interests in Algeria. the Middle East and Vietnam remain major

points of disagreement. However, a gradual amelioration of American-American

commercial relations is likely to be (Aid Planning for Algeria. Doc. 66).

The decline in relations between France and Algeria has forced this latter to search

for new markets. Taking into consideration that the Algerian government developed good

even strong relations with the Soviets, it might go for the USSR as an alternative.

However, the USSR does not appear to be a prominent market especially for the Algerian

energetic products since the Algerian and the Soviet economy have the same nature. In

other words, the Soviets are not in need of the Algerian Gas and Oil. This fact was

highlighted by a document prepared by the American Office of National Estimate (ONE)

in August 19, 1969 in which it was stated that:

One which would entail a deterioration of its (Algeria) relations with

France, bring on a change in its dealings with the oil companies so severe as

to have international repercussions, and ultimately enhance its ties with the

Soviet Union. We do not estimate this to be the probable sequence of

events; we do regard it as a serious possibility worthy of careful attention.

(Algeria: Troubles Ahead?. NIE no. 15)

The improvement of the Algerian relations with the United States disturbed the

authorities in Paris. In connection with U.S. assistant secretary Newsom in April 6th, 1971,

French Ambassador in the United States Lucet indicated that he would appreciate rundown

on American-Algerian relations, particularly with respect to the U.S importation of liquid

natural gas from Algeria. Newsom ensured that the United States government respects the

28

French role in Algeria and has no intention creating, any difficulties for France in its

relations with Algeria (doc. 24).

The acrimonious intensity between Algeria and France following the severe moves

took by the Algerian government against the French oil companies pushed the Algerian

government to go after an adequate alternative markets for its petroleum product, which

provided the United States with a good reason to seize the opportunity and step in as a

prominent economic partner to Algeria. This fact granted the American firms there a

favored position. However, Disputes related to the Arab-Israeli Crisis of 1967 floated in

the early 1969 disturbing the tireless efforts to go along with the process of developing the

economic relations and restoring the diplomatic ones.

2. The Karim Belkacem Trial and its Impact on the American-

Algeria Relations.

According to a documentary entitled: ”an Insurgent rebuilds a county” displayed by

Al Jazeera Documentary channel in 2014, it was stated that Boumedienne’s attitudes

towards the war of 1967 rang the alarm bells in Israel. Following the 1967 and due to

Boumedienne’s militant attitude and insistence on a military solution concerning the

Palestinian cause asserting that the only acceptable course of action there is for the

Palestinians to emulate Algeria's independence struggle. Israel observed opposition groups

that attempted to overthrow Boumedienne from power. This fact was deduced by the

Israeli writer Michael M. Laskier relying on documents he got from the Israeli archives

(Jaouadi, an Insurgent rebuilds a county).

The state telegram of December 21st 1967 indicated that Belkacem Karim, the

leader of the Democratic Movement for Algerian Renewal (MDRA) The opposition

movement in Algeria, asked for Israeli assistance. As a result, the MOSSAD authorized

Arieh Levin who works for the Israeli embassy in Paris to hold a series of back channel

29

meetings with the MDRA through the help of Edmond Kwort, a French Jew who in the

past maintained special links with French intelligence and was close to the MDRA

(Jaouadi, an Insurgent rebuilds a county).

Contextually, Kwort wanted to introduce to the Israelis someone named ‘Mourad’

(full name not disclosed), who served during the revolutionary period under Belkacem

Karim in the GPRA and now sought to destabilize the Algerian regime. ‘Mourad’ was

interested in obtaining weapons and explosives from Israel.

Now, the question whether the planned meetings with Belkacem Karim, “Mourad,” and

others or not is uncertain. The Israelis seemed to be suspicious about the capacity of the

opposition and whether it could challenge Boumedienne's successful control over the

Algerian armed force. Rather what is certain is that they kept connections with the

opposition in Algeria in order to evaluate the amount of support they had inside (Jaouadi,

an Insurgent rebuilds a county).

During the trial of Karim Belkacem in March 24th, 1969 there were no indications

and proofs from the Algerian authorities that Israel had a relation with the opposition in

Algeria. However, depending on accurate information, the Algerian authorities seemed

sure that the CIA did. According to a secret telegram from the American Embassy in

Algiers to the U.S. foreign Ministry in April 14th, 1969, it was stated that the Algerian

authorities were certain that contacts were made between the opposition and the CIA,

especially that these contacts were supported by time and place details (The Krim

Belkacem Trial, doc. 14).

These accusations of United States’ involvement in Algerian internal affairs came

during a time when there has been a gradual progress in American-Algerian relations. This

was demonstrated when the U.S. President Eisenhower died in March 28. President

Boumedienne sent a message of condolences to President Nixon, as the first official

30

communication between the government of Algeria and the United States at this level since

the break of diplomatic relations in June 1967 (The Krim Belkacem Trial, doc. 14).

The court upheld in Oran On April 7 passed sentence on some 60 persons accused

of conspiracy against the security of Algeria. The most prominent Algerian on trial was

Belkacem Karim, historic figure of the Algerian revolution, principal negotiator of the

Evian agreements with France, and head of the opposition MDRA since October 1967. The

Court sentenced Karim, Tamsaout Belkacem, and Amirat Slimane to death, the former two

in absentia (The Krim Belkacem Trial, doc. 14).

Akli Belahssen, one of Karim's top lieutenants who claimed that he was in charge

of external and press affairs for the MDRA testified that: “After contacts at the American

Embassy in Paris, American services agreed to provide funds for Belkacem Karim's

opposition movement.” He added that:” Michel Leroy, a Karim agent, was received by a

high State Department official in Washington.” He even went further by saying that:

American services provided bombs and explosives of a kind "only at CIA

disposition", suggested the training of commando teams to destroy Algerian

military airports, and approved a new "draft constitution" and list of

personalities to form a new government. (The Krim Belkacem Trial, doc.

14)

The Americans denied all the charges attributed to them. The U.S. government

interpreted these accusations as an attempt by the Algerian government to mislead the

public opinion. According to diplomatic sources, the United States viewed the act of

publishing Belahssen’s testimony that condemns the United States authorities as an act that

was supposed to give credit to some Algerians whom were suspicious concerning the

United States. real intentions in Algeria. In addition, The Belkacem trail served as a

31

suitable purpose to warn the Algerian public of the harsh punishment that would befall

anyone involved in suspicious opposition activities (The Krim Belkacem Trial, doc. 14).

In spite of the Oran Trial and its impact in the American-Algerian relations. The

United States involvement in its internal affairs in a way or another, but not sure to what

extent, the U.S. government tends to believe that the Algerians are still interested in the

improvement at the level of the bilateral relations especially the economic one. This

interpretation came as a response from Layachi Yaker, an Algerian Foreign Ministry

Official to Lewis Hoffacker, a U.S. Foreign Service officer who expressed his country’s

concerns and displeasure regarding the allegations against the U.S. government. Yaker

made three points in reply to the U.S. officials:

Firstly, the government of Algeria had no doubt about the authenticity of the

contacts by the opposition group with CIA and other Americans, since they

were supported by details of time, place etc. Secondly, these contacts took

place during the Johnson administration, a period of special difficulty in

American-Algerian relations. Thirdly and finally, The Government of

Algeria nevertheless looked forward with much hope to the absence of such

contacts during the present American administration.

On another occasion, Yaker put forth an exceptional statement that the government

of Algeria will do all that it can to enhance the mutual relations and looks forward to a

positive progress concerning the Middle East and the Vietnamese crises (The Krim

Belkacem Trial, doc. 14).

Since the United States and particularly the CIA was involved and accused of

interfering in the Algerian internal affairs, conspiring against the State national security,

and supporting Belkacem’s opposition organization. It was expected that the relations

between the two countries would deteriorate even more to include the economic

32

partnership at a time when there has been a steady improvement in the economic bilateral

relations. The American-Algerian relations passed through many collisions, the Belkacem

trail was a controversial issue that disturbed the relatively good conditions surrounding the

two-sided efforts to become important partners. Such a clash would at best result in a sharp

decline in the American-Algerian relations. However, both sides favored to consider this

issue as a misstep and proved their determination to move forward in improving their

relations.

3. Algerian-American Economic Interplay: Statistics and

Analysis.

It was certain that President Boumedienne would make a major change in the

Algerian foreign policy when he addressed his diplomats in October 21st, 1969 at a

conference of the Algerian chiefs of mission, asserting that Algeria will give preference to

internal over external affairs. The speech emphasized on the concentration on internal

goals and getting Algeria's economic and financial situation on the right path. This new

attitude started to become notable in the Algerian foreign policy but had never been

officially integrated (President Boumediene's Reorientation, doc. 18).

Economically, the American-Algerian relations experienced a boom in the late 70s.

The Algerian government sought the American equipment and technicians in order to

develop the petroleum sector and other related industries. SONATRACH, the Algerian

government-owned Oil and Gas Company, decided to sell its products directly to the

foreign countries in order to enhance its petroleum revenues. Sophisticated American

equipment was imported, many commercial enterprises were undertaken jointly with an

Algerian state corporation holding 51% of the shares and an American firm holding 49%

have come into operation including an elaborate computer center, advanced oil exploration

33

projects and heavy industry factories. The value of these projects accumulated is not

negligible (Algeria's International Relations. NIE no. 62-71).

In 1969, Algeria imported about $80 million in goods and services from the United

States oil Companies produced about 10 percent of Algeria's oil whose assets in the

country is worth $100 million. However, the most significant event this year was the

agreement between the El Paso Natural Gas Company and SONATRACH to construct

pipelines and gas liquidation facilities all worth $1.2 billion. This Project is supposed to

provide large quantities of Algerian natural gas to the American market that could reach 10

billion cubic meters per year and could be extended an additional 5 billion cubic meters per

year. Taking into consideration that only those of the United States., the USSR and

possibly Iran exceed Algeria’s natural gas reserves. The Algerian government saw the El

Paso project as a good initiative and a solid platform in what could become a very large

profitable enterprise that would allow the local government to receive about $120 million

per year in export incomes (Algeria's International Relations. NIE no. 62-71).

The Algerian part of the agreement includes that SONATRACH builds a large

liquefaction plant and a pipeline to the Hassi R’mel gas field. The United States Export-

Import Bank provided a $285 million loan to the Algerian government to realize its portion

of the project. Whereas the El Paso would order the built of 6 to 9 liquid natural gas (LNG)

tankers and the construction of facilities on the east coast of the United States in order to

reconvert the LNG into gas (Algeria's International Relations. NIE no. 62-71).

In the process of requesting finance for Algeria’s share of the El Paso project,

Foreign Minister of Algeria Abdelaziz Bouteflika hosted for the first time an American

diplomatic representative in Algiers since 1967 break. During the course of the meeting,

Bouteflika made it clear to Chief of the Interests Section William L. Eagleton that while

not prepared for full diplomatic relations, the Algerian government hoped to extend

34

economic ties with the United States. It is important to mention that meetings with the

American officials during this period were marked by an American displeasure concerning

the nationalization of small American firms in Algeria with no a compensation. However,

Algeria had succeeded in convincing the American authorities that such a step would have

involved them in heavy compensation for French nationalized properties (Meeting with

Algerian ForMin. Doc. 19).

The United States progressively made inroads into the Algerian markets. The El

Paso agreement, if approved, could not go in production until 1975-1976 at best. After

which both sides will start to benefit from the project. During this period, the American

main aim was to be a much larger trading partner with Algeria. The El Paso agreement had

many implications. While The United States government sees the El Paso Project as a

pretext to reestablish the severed diplomatic relations with Algeria and simultaneously an

opportunity to reshape Algeria’s international attitude. Yet, the Algerian authorities saw

the El Paso contract as a pure business project that might improve the bilateral relations but

would not grant the American much political power over the Algerians (Algeria’s

International Relations. NIE no. 62-71).

The American-Algerian economic partnership indicated that relations were

improving .This fact was reflected through a meeting in October 10, 1969 between the

Algerian Foreign Minister Bouteflika and the U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger. During the

discussion, U.S. Secretary stated that the American-Algerian relations had improved since

1967 break. Bouteflika responded that it is incorrect to call what happened as a break but

rather it would be more appropriate to call it a “Slow-Down”. In fact, the Algerian Foreign

Minister indicated that the American-Algerian relations had never been better than during

the “Slow-Down” (NARA, doc. 46).

35

Obviously, the economic cooperation was the most important factor the United

States managed to use in its efforts to restore diplomatic relations with Algeria. The U.S.

secretary of State Official stated that efforts of economic cooperation are strongly tied with

political conditions. As a result, Bouteflika, although convinced that full diplomatic

restoration of relations is still unlikely to be, stated that perhaps it would be suitable for

him to consider designating someone in his department to be in direct contact with the U.S

Chargé in Algiers and vice versa in Washington (NARA, doc. 46).

In a similar context that brought together state officials of both countries, a

conversation took place in the General Assembly of the United Nations between

ambassador Mohammed Yazid, head of the Algerian delegation, Richard C. Pedersen, a

U.S. Department of State Counselor, and Charles W. Bray, an acting Director of North

African Affairs. This conversation came as an extension to the discussion initiated between

the U.S. Secretary official and Algerian Foreign Minister Bouteflika in October 10. Yazid

emphasized on some concrete steps that might be taken to improve relations, he noted a

number of financial and other steps were still required in connection with the El Paso

agreement and other pending matters. Yazid stated that:

Investment guarantees would be useful in persuading financial interests to

put up the capital Algeria would require as a result of the El Paso-

SONATRACH agreement. Perhaps the guarantees would also make it easier

for the U.S Export-Import Bank to finance the sale of Boeings to Air

Algerie. (U.S.-Algerian Relations. Doc. 17)

Mr. Pedersen said that we would consult this and comeback to you shortly,

nonetheless, he pointed out that the fulfillment of such a request would contradict with our

laws in the absence of diplomatic relations. (U.S.-Algerian Relations. Doc. 17)

36

By 1970, Algeria became an important world oil supplier. Its income from the oil

trade reached $650 million in hard currency. 10 to 15% of oil earnings are being invested

in discovering more oil fields, and for the construction of more pipelines. A number of

import alternative activities, such as textiles have been built. Major industrial projects are

in construction, a steel mill and three petrochemical complexes are designed not to provide

the government with new export earnings. The lion’s share of the income has been allotted

to the agricultural sector, Government efforts in the economic areas have led the Algerian

economy to grow at a statistical rate of 5-6 percent a year (Algeria's International

Relations. Doc. 27).

By 1973, Algeria expects to increase its crude oil production by 50 percent. The

Algerian government nationalized five oil companies that occupied 10% of the total

production and raised the price of crude oil from $2.08 to $ 2.85 a barrel. In 1971,

important agreements were made with the American companies whereby Gas liquefaction

plants are to be built at Arzew and Skikda and the United States will increase its annual

purchase of Algerian natural gas. In the early 1972, Algeria concluded a 25-year deal with

an American company for the sale of up to $260 million annually of petroleum products.

Consequently, the economy grew at rate of 18% and continued to boom in 1973 (Algeria's

International Relations. Doc. 27).

Although many factors indicated that good American-Algerian relations would

never see the light anytime soon. Yet, Algeria preserved a pragmatic economic relationship

with the United-States. Reasons behind this ambivalent policy are hard to be spotted.

Firstly, one of the Algerian governmental principal aims is to sustain full control on all

elements of the economy, including those in which the Soviets and the French are

involved. Hence, The Algerian government was seeking alternatives in economic

partnership in order to get rid of great dependence on its major partners, namely France

37

and the USSR. Boumedienne seems to be cautious of heavy dependence on them and

interested in adding other options to his economic partnerships. In doing so, Boumedienne

has moved to improve relations with the United States. Secondly, The Algerian

government was using the American insistence on restoring diplomatic relations to

establish strong business relations and preserve an advanced economic position so that

when the diplomatic relations were to be finally restored they would be based on

something tangible and concrete.

Finally, since the Arab-Israeli crisis of 1967, many Arab states broke their

diplomatic relations with the United States. Yet, no one has restored them. It is unlikely

that Algeria, as an anti-imperialist state with revolutionary principles would put itself in the

position of the first Arab state to restore diplomatic relations with the United States

Boumedienne reorientation to a more pragmatic and realistic way was finally

substantial in his speech of August 1975, when he gradually altered some of his

perspectives about the Middle East which, at a certain period of time, were purely militant.

In the presence of a socialist international delegation headed by Austrian Chancellor Bruno

Kreisky, Boumedienne said:

Palestinians and Israelis are competing for the same piece of land. Some call

it ‘Israel’ (after their forefather Israel), others call it ‘Palestine’ also

referring to ancient history. But let us leave history at the side. Let us ask

the question: have Israelis the right to live on this piece of land? And we can

answer positively. But likewise have the Palestinians.” Boumedienne’s

moderation also applied to the broader Arab-Israeli conflict: “We do not

think it possible to find a solution without guaranteeing the minimum rights

of those directly concerned….Whatever solution the contending parties—

38

Israel and the Palestinians, but also Egypt and Syria—accept, Algeria would

also accept and without any reservation”(Laskier, Israel and the Maghreb)

He concluded that the solution to the Palestinian issue should center around one of

three options. Coexistence between Israelis and Palestinians within borders of one territory

in which the population balance would be kept. Implementation of UN resolutions in the

spirit of the 1947 Partition Plan or the “lame solution”, grouping the Palestinians in the

Gaza Strip and on the West Bank of Jordan (Laskier, Israel and the Maghreb).

This shift in Boumedienne’s tendency. In addition to his speech that publicly

introduced a new Algerian foreign policy which was based on giving preference to internal

over external matters. Moreover, the preserving of economic relations with the United

States despite the fact of many political disputes proves that economic improvement and

industrial development were favored at the expense of political disagreement. The year

1968 brought about a new phase in Algerian-American relations. Despite the number of

issues that continued to hinder the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between the two

countries, relations improved. For the sake of reciprocal conveniences, issues such as

American imperialism, nationalization of private American firms in Algeria, and differing

ideological outlooks, were either ignored or downplayed.

39

Chapter III (1974 – 1978): The Western Sahara Question & its Impact on

the American-Algerian Relations.

Unquestionably, the Maghreb is considered to be a political and geostrategic area

since it opens the for the African continent. The end of the Algerian war represented the

appropriate occasion for the American involvement in the whole area. Throughout history,

western countries and mainly France and Spain were the dominant powers in the whole

bloc. However, the United States reinforced its ties where they needed to be reinforced and

rebuilt them where they have been damaged. The U.S. government had friendly relations

with Morocco and Tunisia with full diplomatic exchange and cooperation. Concerning

Algeria, the absence of diplomatic ties could not prevent the American-Algerian economic

relation to improve. The American foreign policy in the region aims at preventing the

newly independent nations of the Maghreb from adopting the alternative solution of

turning towards the USSR. Yet, a number of disputes continued to trouble the stability of

the region. Mainly between Algeria and Morocco. These disputes between these countries

and the continuous support of U.S. government to Morocco resulted in another hardship in

the American-Algerian relations.

1. Algerian-Moroccan Relation: Historical Background

When Algeria got its independence in 1962, border disputes erupted in the North

African region when Morocco and Tunisia claimed major parts of Algeria since

international borders in this region had never been defined. Unlike Tunisia, Morocco

decided to take its claims further afield. When the Algerian-Moroccan negotiations failed

to offer significant solutions, Morocco decided to initiate a military movement through

raiding Algeria in a brief war of October 1963, and occupied parts of Bechar and Tindouf

provinces, at a time when Algeria was still reeling from the enormous damage caused by

the war of independence. Nevertheless, the Algerian army managed to block the Moroccan

40

forces from moving any farther. The aim of this assault was as follows: “(1) seizure of

limited number of advanced points in preparation for border negotiations, (2) obtaining

control of Tindouf and its mineral deposits and possibly (3) positioning for greater

pressures on Mauritania” (North African Region. doc. 7, p. 11).

With the eruption of the Algerian-Moroccan dispute, the United States and France

official stance was to stay on good terms with both countries; therefore, they decided not to

get involved. However, the failure of Algerian-Moroccan negotiations and the chance that

the border conflict might evolve to a regional war disturbed the United States. This fact

was clearly expressed by the Americans since any possible war between the countries

might possibly attract the Soviets. Consequently, the American interests would be

endangered. The American government expressed its concerns that limited border conflict

might evolve to a regional war in which other powers might become involved.

Subsequently, the American interests in area might be jeopardized. Furthermore, the

Americans claimed their unwillingness to become a part of this struggle. However, they

seemed prepared to exert diplomatic efforts in order to bring about an immediate early

cease-fire (North African Region. doc. 9, p. 13).

This attitude adopted by the United States towards the conflict was a pragmatic one.

The U.S. government was unwilling to lose one of the disputed sides by leaning towards

the other. In spite of the friendly relations Morocco had with the United States regarding

military cooperation. The United States decided to stay neutral. Robert W. Komer of the

National Security Council Staff in his report to the President's Special Assistant for

National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy was more than sure that more arms aid the

United States would offer to Morocco the more Algeria would seek the same thing

elsewhere, inevitably the USSR. Komer had more than this to offer as a pretext for the U.S.

position. The internal matters are of great importance, Komer believes that Ben Bella is

41

more likely to remain in office if compared to King Hassan. Ben Bella seems to have done

a good job so far of out-maneuvering his opposition. Whereas Hassan seems to has less life

expectancy than Ben Bella. In other words, The United States is cautious about the fact

that it may end up backing the losing side (Foreign Relation of the U.S. doc. 27).

However, both sides of the conflict seemed unwilling to take the conflict any

further and certainly wanted to avoid the extension of the war. The Algerian authorities

sought the assistance of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in order to bring about a

cease-fire, while the Moroccan government did not mind the interference of the United

Nations Secretary General or the OAU to get negotiations started again with the

government of Algeria. Finally, both countries, Morocco and Algeria accepted the

mediation of Haile Selassie, Emperor of Ethiopia and the Chairperson of the OAU, and

other African and Arab states, in order to issue a cease-fire, resume negotiations, and

prevent both countries from seeking outside help. Consequently, King Hassan and

President Ben Bella agreed to meet with Selassie at the Bamako Conference (North

African Region. doc. 9, p. 13).

All African states at the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Conference in Addis

Ababa strongly recommended that the borders inherited from colonial powers should not

be changed and should be accepted and that no borders should be changed by force.

Analyzing the outcomes of the conference, the U.S. Documents highlighted the resulting

decision were :

(1) a cease-fire commencing November 2; (2) withdrawal of combatants

from a Saharan demilitarized zone to be established by a quadri-partite

commission composed of Morocco, Algeria, Mali, and Ethiopia; (3)

establishment of Malian and Ethiopian observers inside this zone; and (4) an

42

arbitral commission to be formed as a result of an OAU foreign minister's

meeting. (The Moroccan-Algerian Cease-Fire. Doc. 26)

Later on, border agreements were signed in 1972 by President Boumedienne and

King Hassen.

The “Sand War” as it was known, was the very first disagreement that brought the

two newly independent countries into a continuous conflict. In spite of the fact that

relations have improved at certain phases due to common interests and economic

cooperation, however, political relations would continue to be tensive throughout much of

the 1960s and the 1970s due to territorial disagreements. Besides, the outbreak of the Sand

War was a stimulus for both sides to go after a significant arms build-up, therefore;

increasing tensions.

The Western Sahara was another issue that troubled Algerian-Moroccan relations

up till this day. In order to understand the reasons behind the critical situation that over-

shadowed the region for a long period, a purposive historical overview would be

outstanding in the matter. This historical overview would be based on researches prepared

under the supervision of the National Intelligence Officer for the Middle East. It was

principally drafted by CIA in coordination with the U.S. Bureau of Intelligence and

Research in September 6, 1974 (Spanish Sahara: Pawn of the Northwest Africa. Doc. 87).

It was mentioned that current day borders of Western Sahara came as a result of a

series of Franco-Spanish agreements between 1900 and 1912. These agreements did not

consider questions of historical or ethnic unity. In 1958, Spain Officially declared its

predominance over the territory as a Spanish province. Three years later the province was

given limited representation in the Spanish parliament. Political power in the province is

concentrated in the hands of the Spanish governor general. Upon independence in 1956,

Morocco laid claim to all of Spain’s holdings in northwestern Africa. Morocco bases its

43

claim to the Western Sahara on pre-colonial history. When Moroccan rulers exercised

variable degrees of control over many parts of the Western Sahara. From the 10th through

the 17th centuries, Moroccans looked southward, penetrating Spanish Sahara, Mauritania,

southwestern Algeria, and for a short time Mali. At one time or another, the nomadic

peoples in the area accepted the religious supremacy of the Sultan. The successive waves

of Moroccan penetration, however, alternated with periods when Morocco’s interest turned

northward to Spain. During these times, politico-religious rulers from present day

Mauritania extended their control into Morocco, which had several dynasties of

Mauritanian origin. (Spanish Sahara. Doc. 87).

Morocco has argued that the territory it recuperated from the European colonization

in 1956 represents only part of the Sultan’s historical holdings. It was not until 1970 that

Rabat recognized the Islamic Republic of Mauritania; ten years after it became

independent. In addition to Morocco’s claim to part of Algeria which resulted in a brief

border war in 1963. Both parties signed an agreement in 1972 demarcating their common

boundary, but Rabat has not yet ratified it. In addition to the historical facts that Morocco

used to legitimize its territorial expansionist ambitions in the region, the economic factor is

of utmost importance as well. Morocco was the third largest producer and the largest

exporter of phosphate rock in the world. Obviously, the Sahara is important, primarily

because of its large deposits of high-grade phosphate rock discovered in 1963 in Bunkraa,

some 60 miles from the coast near Morocco. Reserves, estimated at 1.4 to 1.7 billion tons

of minerals, are sufficient to put Spanish Sahara among the world’s leading producers and

exporters for many years (Spanish Sahara. Doc. 87).

A Spanish state mining company, Fos Bunkraa, is developing the deposits and

expected to ship as much as two million tons in 1974. By 1978, production may reach 6

million tons annually, an output worth around $389 million at current prices. FosBuCraa

44

has invested at least $200 million to provide facilities for mining, processing, and

transportation. Total investment in the mining complex, including funds from several non-

Spanish sources, may run as high as $480 million. Expanding Spanish Saharan phosphate

production should find ready buyers abroad. The increasing demand for fertilizers has

strengthened the world phosphate market. With assured markets in Spain and low

operating and transport costs, Saharan phosphates are in a strong competitive position.

Mineral assets increased the value of the territory (Spanish Sahara. Doc. 87).

2. The Resumption of American-Algerian Diplomatic Relations

Regarding The American-Algerian relations, the early 1970s was marked by

intensive political meetings from both sides in order to reestablish diplomatic relations.

The most significant event in 1974 was Boumedienne’s Official visit to the special General

Assembly of the United Nations; He took the occasion to visit then-president Nixon in

Washington. Subsequently, In April 30, Boumedienne expressed his desire to resume

diplomatic relations with the United States during a conversation he had with U.S.

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. April 30, Kissinger reported that:

Our talks also accelerated the momentum toward resumption of diplomatic

relations…Boumedienne said he wants to resume formal diplomatic

relations with us after the Syrian-Israeli disengagement has been achieved

and before the Geneva Conference convenes. He sees this as a matter of

only weeks. (Algeria, 1973–1976. Doc. 1)

The resumption of American-Algerian diplomatic relations was a subject matter to

many internal and external factors. The Algerian government continued to raise the

question of seeking American influence on the Export-Import Bank in order to finance the

Algerian projects every time the Algerian and the United States encountered each other.

The circumstances in the Middle East, and the outcome of the Syrian-Israeli

45

disengagement negotiations were crucial for the Algerian authorities. Algeria worked in

coordination with the Syrian government in order to decide what would be the most

appropriate time to resume political relations with the United States. Kissinger confirmed

this fact when he instructed William L. Eagleton not to raise the issue of renewal of

diplomatic relations with the Algerians in a letter issued in May 21. Kissinger confirmed

that Boumedienne and President Asad would coordinate the question of renewing relations

with the United States very closely between them. He asserted that the result of the

negotiation would certainly depend mainly on outcome of current disengagement

negotiations, which are not yet certain. Meanwhile, Kissinger stated that the United States

should not be pressing Algerians (Algeria, 1973–1976. Doc. 2).

Knowing that Algeria and Syria are working in coordination to declare the

resumption of their diplomatic relations with the United States. The Americans used all

possible means to convince the Algerian government to re-set the diplomatic ties with

Algeria. In doing so, Kissinger gave instructions to Eagleton in June 8, to inform President

Boumedienne that Syria has agreed to resume its diplomatic relations with the United

States during President Nixon’s visit to Syria. Kissinger also asserted that the American

government is ready to meet the Algerian government half way and reaffirmed the United

States desire to resume diplomatic (Algeria, 1973–1976. Doc. 3).

In response, Boumedienne met with U.S. chief interests in Algeria Eagleton in his

farewell call and expressed Algeria’s reaction. The Algerian President asserted Algeria’s

general satisfaction regarding economic relations. However, he pointed out to the major

differences that had divided the two countries concerning international matters, mainly the

Middle East and Vietnam. He added that the United States is powerful enough to conduct

its international policy in the Third World without having to use threats, excessive force or

military operations. Regarding the resumption of diplomatic relations, Boumedienne’s

46

answer was vague and unclear. Although he appeared to be convinced that nothing

prevents the reestablishment of diplomatic relations with the United States but he did not

bind himself to a specific date stating that:” resumption of diplomatic relations would

occur soon” (Algeria, 1973–1976. Doc. 4).

It is also important to mention that Boumedienne informed the U.S authorities on

June 29, that there would be no need to send a replacement for Mr. Eagleton since

Ambassadors would be exchanged soon. However, By July 15, the U.S government

expressed its reluctance to pass a long period without a U.S senior representative in

Algeria due to the importance attached to the American-Algerian relations. Therefore,

Kissinger considered nominating an American representative of ambassadorial rank as

chief of the U.S. interests section in Algeria, and possibly, he could be named as American

ambassador in Algiers as soon as diplomatic relations were to be restored (Algeria, 1973–

1976. Doc. 5).

The United States persistence to resume diplomatic relations with Algeria

continued. American officials of all ranks kept assuring there is no further obstacles that

prevent both countries from restoring relations. On July 19, when former U.S Secretary

Rogers had been in Rabat, Moroccans had called the Algerian ambassador in Morocco

Noureddine Dellici to meet with him privately. When Dellici stated that the Middle East

and Vietnam are the two major issues that stood between the American-Algerian relations.

Rogers replied that Vietnam is going to end soon. While the Middle East conflict is

complicated and no one could make firm prediction to the sequence of events. Dellici

agreed and reported the progress that has been reached on Vietnam and the Middle East

would result in the normalization of relations (Algeria, 1973–1976. Doc. 5).

Kissinger’s three visits to Algeria resulted in the resumption of diplomatic relations,

which paved the way for better understanding between the two countries. Both officials

47

agreed to set the date of November 12, 1974 for the joint announcement of resumption

(doc.7). Although American-Algerian relations were troubled by many difficulties,

common interests, good economic partnership, in addition to the American determination

to reestablish good diplomatic relations with Algeria combined to contribute in the

resumption of the diplomatic relations. However, further disagreement were to occur in the

near future.

3. “Green March vs. Invasion” and its Impact on the U.S-Algerian

Relations.

The Western Sahara is a major source of problems in the Maghreb since it is

deemed to be one of the last remnants of the western colonialism in Africa. Its strategic

location alongside the Atlantic coast of northwest Africa as well as the discovery of natural

resources, mainly phosphates, has made the territory even more interesting and desired.

Historically, the Western Sahara is a Spanish province when General Franco announced

that Spanish Sahara would be permitted self-governance as a necessary preparation for

self-determination. Morocco had early ambitions of its own to take over the whole area.

This fact was conveyed during a conversation between Ahmed Benhima, Foreign Minister

of Morocco and Henry Kissinger, assistant to the U.S President. Benhima expressed his

displeasure concerning Spain’s willingness of granting the Western Sahara its

independence wondering about the reasons behind granting its independence since it is

inhabited only by 45,000 people, two-thirds were uneducated and simultaneously controls

many strategic sea routes. Benhima added: “I don’t want you to think that Morocco wants

it for itself. We asked Spain what its intentions were. They were not clear” (US-Moroccan

bilateral relations. Doc. 64).

The Western Sahara was one aspect among the larger problems of overall relations

with Morocco and Maghreb stability. The visions of an irredentist Morocco, which in the

48

past laid claims to parts of Algeria, and memories of the 1963 border war have not faded

away. As a result, Algerians viewed Morocco as a potential enemy with a political system

and ideology that differs radically from Algeria’s. During this critical situation, The

Moroccan-Algerian tensions were increasing more and more. Morocco's ambition to seize

the Western Sahara was asserted by its yearning to purchase U.S. military equipment as a

precaution. King Hassen knew in advance that Boumedienne would create troubles

because he anticipated that his ambition would eventually result in an inevitable escalation

of tension in the region. In return, King Hassen Offered U.S. Air Force and Navy bases in

Morocco. In a memorandum of conversation between the U.S. Deputy Secretary of

Defense Honorable William P. Clements, Jr. accompanied by his assistants and King

Hassan’s Special Emissary composed of Colonel Ahmed Dlimi, Moroccan Intelligence

Chief, and Abdelhadi Boutaleb, ambassador to the United States and other Moroccan

military assistants. The reason was to discuss the problems created by the long lead-time

for the equipment requested for the Moroccan Armed Forces. Colonel Dlimi confirmed

that Morocco has problems with Spain over the Sahara, and Algeria is not supporting the

Moroccan position, and apparently more interested in its own aims for the Sahara.

Consequently, Morocco is concerned that Algeria may take some initiatives. Therefore

wants to be ready (Meeting with King Hassan’s Special Emissary. Doc. 69)

Spain’s official declaration of its withdrawal from the Western Sahara jeopardized

the stability of the region, and elevated even the possibility of the eruption of an armed

conflict. Preserving good relations with the United States throughout history, King Hassen

had offered U.S. Air Force and navy military bases in Morocco. In exchange of delivery of

U.S. military equipment. Furthermore, Morocco served as a strategic ally to the United

States in the region for the sake of gaining U.S. support concerning international matters,

most importantly the question of the Western Sahara. Algeria asserted to the Moroccan

49

authorities that it has no interests in the Western Sahara. During his 5 hours conversation

with King Hassen, the Algerian Foreign Minister Bouteflika emphasized that “if Spain

leaves the Sahara, not one Algerian soldier will cross the frontier.” He argued that never

again would Algeria enter into a 1963-type of situation between the two countries. Yet, this

statement did not indicate that Algeria would be satisfied if Morocco or any other country

takes over the territory (Meeting With His Majesty. Doc. 70)

From the very beginning, President Boumedienne has done nothing to oppose King

Hassan’s efforts to have the Saharan issue settled in his favor. Boumedienne’s

preoccupation with matters such as OPEC oil policies, the Middle East question, the

Palestinian issue, and various domestic issues may be the reason behind his “silence”.

However, avoiding making any public announcements or getting Algeria involved in the

issue does not mean that Algiers will accept the Moroccan efforts of annexing the Sahara.

According to a report that was prepared by the CIA, it was stated that:

U.S. Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) believes Algeria’s recent

public silence on the Sahara question may well reflect an unwillingness to

provoke Morocco on an issue in which it has no overriding interest.

Moreover, INR finds no evidence to indicate that Algeria has yet mounted a

serious diplomatic campaign to thwart Moroccan ambitions in Spanish

Sahara. On balance, INR considers that Algeria is not presently

contemplating hostilities with Morocco over this issue—notwithstanding

some indications of Moroccan apprehensions to the contrary. (SPANISH

SAHARA. Doc. 87)

During his meeting with Mr. Clements, King Hassen presented arguments that

Algeria’s disagreement with Morocco would not be in its favor. He emphasized to Mr.

Clements that Algeria had always declared that it has no claim on the Sahara. Therefore,

50

there would be no motive for Algeria to take any action. He further stated that if Algeria

chooses the option war with Morocco, the Arab world would have to choose between the

two countries. King Hassan was convinced the majority would choose Morocco and this if

happens would break the unity of the Arab world. Algeria would never want that

responsibility (Spanish Sahara. Doc. 90).

King Hassen seemed to be willing to use military force to back up his claim over

the Western Sahara. Morocco mobilized its armed forces to southern Morocco and put

them on alert. More, Rabat took many precautionary measures on its way to achieve its

expansionist ambitions. In a Memorandum prepared by the U.S. National Security Council

Staff to the U.S. President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Brent

Scowcroft in October 20, 1975. Scowcroft was informed of the delivery of 28 M48A3

tanks to Morocco. However, Moroccans requested U.S. aid in moving the tanks to Oujda in

the northeast of the country near the Algerian borders. Suddenly, Moroccans changed their

desired destination of the tanks to Ksah el-Souk, 200 km southeast of Casablanca. In this

location, the tanks would not be available for use in Western Sahara to prevent any

possible Algerian incursion into Morocco. The U.S. authorities felt that if they approved

the Moroccan request they would be portrayed as giving aid and encouragement to

Moroccan plans to take the Western Sahara by force. Therefore, they intended to refuse the

Moroccan request (Moroccan Tanks. Doc. 71).

During some period, Morocco and the United States started a military

modernization program through upgrading Morocco’s military capabilities regardless to

the unsettled Sahara dispute. U.S. government intended to delay Moroccan military

buyouts in order to avoid intensifying the situation in the region through giving the

impression that the United States promotes an escalation of pace by providing military

supplies to Morocco. However, the U.S. government was concerned that the delay in

51

delivering military equipment to Morocco might lead King Hassan to doubt U.S. support

and this would eventually push Morocco to seek military equipment from another source;

the USSR. Therefore, the U.S. government took some reconsiderations (Military Sales to

Morocco and Mauritania. Doc. 74).

From Morocco was a strategic ally in the region whereas Algeria was not since it

was backed militarily by the Soviets. Hence, the United States decided to meet some of the

Moroccan needs. However, the U.S. government was aware of Boumedienne’s reaction.

There is a chance that Algeria would see the United States actions as a provocation. As a

result, American-Algerian relations would certainly suffer, and Boumedienne might feel

the need to respond by emphasizing on supporting the Polisario directly. It was stated in a

recommendation delivered to Kissinger that Algeria undoubtedly would be irritated by any

U.S. arms deliveries or sales to Morocco. However, U.S. officials believed that the United

States should follow a careful policy of providing enough support for Morocco to assure

King Hassen that the United States intend to proceed with its long-term program. Morocco

sought military assistance from The Iranians and the Jordanians as well, which would be

an accelerated delivery as an alternative since the United States delivery would take so

long provided that the United States would help in the transportation of the equipment and

replacement of transferred items as well (Military Sales to Morocco and Mauritania. Doc.

74).

The United States was also deeply concerned that its military training facilities and

bases in Morocco might urge Algeria to offer similar facilities to the Soviets. Embassy in

Algiers reports that the Algerian leaders are deeply concerned by the American role as a

major arms supplier to Morocco and have warned repeatedly that this would adversely

affect our long-term economic and political interests in there (Closure of Kenitra Complex.

Doc. 86).

52

In addition to its military efforts, Morocco subsequently started a diplomatic

campaign to force Spain to give up its plans for granting the Western Sahara the right of

self-governing. In late July and early August 1974, Moroccan emissaries visited various

Arab and African capitals as well as Asian and East European countries to seek

international support for Rabat’s position. Although the Arab and African states will back a

demand that Spain will promote, they were not inclined to support Morocco’s territorial

ambitions, especially in view of Mauritania’s rival claim to the area and Algeria’s

insistence on a role. In brief, Morocco had few options in-hand, if Spain withdrew its

troops from the Western Sahara, Hassan might be tempted to push across the borders. If a

referendum took place and the result was against the Moroccan interests, Hassan might

move to annex the territory using military force, hoping that Algeria would not react

militarily (SPANISH SAHARA. Doc. 87).

Algeria had considerable diplomatic influence abilities. Politically, Algeria is

capable of frustrating Moroccan diplomatic campaign to lobby Third World support and

bring it on its side concerning the Western Sahara issue. If Algeria was pushed to take a

stand, it could use its considerable influence in the Arab League, the Nonaligned

Movement, the OAU, and the UN to mount a campaign in support of self-determination for

the Western Sahara. Especially if one takes into account that the next UN General

Assembly was presided Algerian Foreign Minister Bouteflika being its head. He was in an

ideal position to promote Algeria’s desire for a self-determination vote to solve the

Saharan dispute (SPANISH SAHARA. Doc. 87).

Morocco seems to refuse any arrangement that result in the independence of the

Western Sahara. It fears that an independent Western Sahara would certainly be dominated

by Algeria because of its important political role in the Arab and Third World scenes. The

Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) fears that if King Hassan failed to achieve a

53

political solution and choses the military option and both forces engage in hostilities, the

outcome would be unpredictable (SPANISH SAHARA. Doc. 87).

In October 14, 1974, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and Assistant to the

U.S. President for National Security Affairs met President Houari Boumedienne in Algiers.

This meeting was the first encounter between American-Algerian officials that discussed

the Western Sahara issue. Kissinger and Boumedienne discussed Algeria’s position on the

Western Sahara. Kissinger’s answer concerning his view of the Sahara problem was

sarcastic. During the conversation, he stated that:” I cannot get excited about 40,000 people

who probably do not know they are living in Spanish Sahara. I hope you do not think I am

too cynical” (Next Steps in the Middle East Negotiation. Doc. 89).

Few days later, Kissinger was in Rabat where he had a meeting with King Hassan.

During the conversation, King Hassan stated that he seeks the ICJ (International Court of

Justice) decision. For some reason he seemed more than sure that the decision of the ICJ

would rule in Morocco’s favor. He argued that Morocco would accept the ICJ regardless to

their outcomes. However, he seemed to be anxious about the outcome of Spain’s

withdrawal from the Western Sahara, he expressed his concerns that Spain might turn

down the ICJ solution and run directly for a Referendum. He even threatened that if Spain

grant full independence to the Western Sahara at 10 o’clock he shall move in his forces for

invasion at 11 o’clock. Hassan claimed that if the Western Sahara gets its independence,

the territory would be full of Russians and Morocco would be eventually surrounded by the

Atlantic and on the Mediterranean and it would be surrounded by Algeria, Algeria and

Algeria on the three other sides. Kissinger seemed to prefer the ICJ solution (Private

Meeting. Doc. 90).

The intention in the region is growing. According to an Intelligence Alert

Memorandum in October 3, 1975 to Kissinger, King Hassan has decided to invade the

54

Western Sahara within the next three weeks. With the Spanish military still in the Sahara, a

serious conflict could develop. There is also a possibility that Algeria would get involved

in the conflict. Consequently, the situation could evolve to a regional war. However, the

United States gave instructions that U.S. equipment are not to be used against U.S. allies,

namely, Spain (Moroccan Invasion of Spanish Sahara. Doc. 93).

The United States had to intervene to cool things down; Kissinger met with

Moroccan ambassador Washington, Abdelhadi Boutaleb in October 17, 1975. Moroccan

ambassador delivered King Hassan’s assurances to the United States that Morocco did not

intend to make Spain engaged militarily in the Sahara. However, Boutaleb firmly stated

that:

We do not want war with Spain, but if Spain is handing the Sahara over to

dissident Moroccan elements and to outsiders, we think that we are within

our rights to ask the United States, our friend, to help Morocco, its friend,

and to be actively sympathetic to Morocco’s cause. It is no longer a question

of choosing between Morocco and Spain, but of choosing between Morocco

and outside elements that wish to usurp what is rightfully Morocco’s.

(Secretary’s Meeting with Moroccan Amb. Doc. 96)

In light of the ICJ advisory opinion and reports of UN Commission calling for

some determination of the wishes of the Saharan population by granting them their right in

self-determination. Hassan announced a civilian march on the Western Sahara. Kissinger

immediately sent a letter to the Moroccan leader expressing their concerns over the

developments in the Sahara. Asking him to explore all available opportunities for a

diplomatic settlement, which will avoid military or political conformation (Spanish Sahara.

Doc. 97).

55

The Green March announced by Morocco rung the alarm bells in Algiers. The U.S.

ambassador Richard B. Parker received urgent summons on October 30, to go to the

Presidency. Parker noted that Boumedienne was in grim mood and came right to to the

point Boumedienne stated that:” Algeria had followed a policy of restraint and moderation

but time had come to decide whether or not that policy had been wise”. He emphasized

that the United States must take steps to prevent Hassan from proceeding with his March.

In spite of the fact that U.S. officials specified several times that the United States was

maintaining a position of neutrality, Boumedienne seemed to be sure that no one in the

region would believe that Hassan was going into the Sahara without the American

blessing. At this point of the conversation, Parker attempted to interrupt; however,

Boumedienne waved him aside and continued, saying that:” Green March threatened not

only the stability of the Maghreb but for the Arab World as a whole”. More, Boumedienne

assured that if the United States was seriously interested in stability, they should take

action at this point. Parker responded that the United States deals with Hassan are limited.

King had indicated that he was on road from which it would be impossible to turn back.

Boumedienne said angrily:” Then let him continue” and immediately terminated the

meeting (Spanish Sahara. Doc. 100).

On the next day, Boumedienne re-summoned Parker in order to reiterate his

position that responsibility for the future development for the Sahara problem lays within

the United Nations and the United States hands. Parker reported that Boumedienne was in

a more relaxed and friendly mood than he was last night. However, his position was still

the same. During the meeting Boumedienne stated that:” Problems such as Vietnam might

have caused considerable irritation but had not affected the basis of our relations. Parker

noted that the implication is that the problem of the Sahara would (Spanish Sahara. Doc.

102).

56

The Green March announced by the Moroccan King was not as green as it was

claimed to be. The Government of Spain received information which it considered as

accurate that amongst “the Green Marchers” there was 25.000 members of the Royal

Moroccan Army who had their weapons concealed. The Government off Spain was

convinced that once across the Saharan borders; these “Trojan Horse” of soldiers would

take up their arms and start a military invasion. As a result, the Spanish foreign minister

Pedro Cortina expressed his concerns to Kissinger that soldiers would accompany

marchers and attempt a military invasion, therefore, a military confrontation between

Madrid and Rabat would likely to happen (Spanish Sahara. Doc. 103).

UN Secretary General of the United Nations developed a formula that contained

three principle elements: (a) an announcement by Spain that it would withdraw from the

Spanish Sahara by 1st February, 1976. (b) a Moroccan announcement of abandoning the

march; and (c) the establishment of a temporary UN administration whose task is

supervising the withdrawal and work out ways to consult the people of Spanish Sahara

(Spanish Sahara. Doc. 99).

At this point, it became clear that the United States did not act enough to prevent

the Green March and King Hassan demonstrated little or no willingness at all to compel to

the UN proposal. As a result, the Algerian tone continued to escalate. Boumedienne

demanded the UN Security Council to expel Moroccans from the Spanish Sahara. If not,

Algerians will take military actions in case nothing is done. During his meeting with U.S.

Officials in November 6. Boumedienne told the U.S. ambassadors that:” Nothing you can

say to me will convince me that the United States cannot stop this affaire immediately. All

the U.S. government have to do is to send a message to Hassan saying stop and he will

stop”. Boumedienne was unwilling to listen to any explanations the United States may

give about their inability to control Hassan (Spanish Sahara. Doc. 107).

57

In an intelligent alert memorandum delivered to Kissinger with an assessment of

the likelihood of a Moroccan invasion to the Sahara as well as likely Algerian Backlash to

the invasion, it was stated that :

A military confrontation with either Spain or Algeria is likely to have

serious consequences for King Hassan. A military defeat would unleash

strong political currents inside Morocco that would create domestic

instability for some time to come and would probably lead to his overthrow.

No matter what the outcome, all three countries are likely to blame the

United States for not having used sufficient diplomatic pressure to avert the

crisis. (Likelihood of Hostilities. Doc. 109)

Morocco and Mauritania have made steady progress to consolidate their

administrative hold on the area. On its side, Algeria did not show any willingness to make

the comprises needed for a settlement of Morocco in the Western Sahara, and sought to

keep the issue of self-determination alive in international forums. Algeria insisted on

Saharan Self-determination trough UN-supervised popular consultation. On April 14, and

in its attempt to establish formal sovereignty over the Western Sahara, Rabat and

Nouakchott announced that they had agreed to split the disputed territory. Morocco

acquired the Northern two-thirds of the Sahara, containing the capital of El Aaiun and the

rich phosphate deposits at BuCraa, Mauritania got the southern third, including rich marine

sources, the unexploited iron ore at Agracha, and the port of Dakhla, whose harbor has an

excellent potential (THE WESTERN SAHARA ISSUE. Doc. 116).

Despite majority policy differences on international political issues, the United

States cooperation with Algeria has been increasing in the economic field. The primary

U.S. interests in its relations with Algeria is to insure continued access to Algeria’s natural

resources through long-range cooperation agreements. Algeria has the fourth largest

58

proven reserves of natural gas in the world and produces about one million barrels per day

of low sulfur crude oil. The Boumedienne government is firmly committed to rapid

industrialization financed by the sale of oil and gas. It sees the United States as a major

market for these products and as a source of capital and technology. .Before Algiers broke

relations with the United States in June 1967; the United States had provided $180 million

in economic assistance. The United States direct investment is small but Algeria offers an

expanding market for the United States goods and services. The total American community

is approximately 700 (SPANISH SAHARA. Doc. 87).

The United States has no important interests in the Sahara. It has sought to remain

on good terms with Algeria, despite the fact that it gave more importance to the protection

of the interests of its allies in the region, namely Morocco. This attitude might have

troubled the American-Algerian Relations and created problems with other Third World

countries for which the option of self-determination is of a great importance. Yet,

regardless to the political deteriorations that were caused by the emergence of the Western

Sahara issue, increasing United States demands for energy and growing needs for capital

and technical assistance that were essential for Algeria’s economic development lessened

tensions between the two countries.

59

General Conclusion

This research studied the American-Algerian relations from an American point of

view with specific emphasis on the documents released periodically by the U.S.

Department of State. In its attempt to illustrate American attitudes toward Algeria’s foreign

policy, this research work analyzed the American approach through the consecutive

administrations of Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and Ford. Moreover, it attempted

to investigate the reasons behind the continuity of economic transactions in spite of the

absence of the diplomatic relations. Furthermore, the study endeavored to unveil the

contradictory Algerian and American positions concerning critical issues in their bilateral

relations. This was made possible by the recent declassifications and releases of the United

States Department of State documents relating to the period under consideration.

In analyzing the subject, this work attempted to answer two main questions: What

was the nature of Algerian foreign policy towards the United States? And what are the

reasons behind the ambivalent foreign policy embraced by the Algerian and American

governments? Dealing with relations between the two countries, the researcher included

issues that were elaborated through different perspectives, mainly, the American-Algerian

ideological divergences caused by the Arab-Israeli conflicts of 1967, the Algerian reaction

towards the American attempt to influence its national security exposed in Karim

Belkacem Trial, and the American position in the Algerian-Moroccan Western Sahara

dispute.

The first misunderstanding between Algeria and the United States occurred during

the first contact between the two heads of states. When Ben Bella visited Havana after his

visit to Washington in October 1962. The Americans saw that such a move by the Algerian

Head of State could only be interpreted as a supportive stance to Cuba. What happened

during that visit influenced Algerian-American relations for the coming two decades.

60

Many divergences appeared in Algeria’s foreign policy toward the United States .

While Algeria’s foreign policy was supportive of worldwide liberation movements, the

American one backed colonial empires and the governments that were loyal to the United

States. At this point, Algerian-American relations were greatly influenced by the collision

of the revolutionary-oriented foreign policy of Algeria and the imperialistic foreign policy

of the United States.

This dissertation came to the conclusion that Algeria’s revolutionary heritage

influenced its foreign policy. In an Arab context, Algerian-American divergences over

foreign policy issues peaked at the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1967. Algeria

considered that the American support for Israel represented a menace to the Arab World.

Therefore, together with other Arab countries, it broke up diplomatic relations with the

United States.

Research also revealed additional problems that contributed in enlarging the rift

between both countries. The Oran trial of Karim Belkacem, which revealed the

involvement of the CIA in Algerian matters, was significant. Research, however, showed

that the ideological and political differences could not hinder the growth of trade and

economic dealings between the two countries. Surprisingly, Algerian-American relations

had never been better than during the diplomatic break from 1967 to 1974. Algeria’s

reoriented foreign policy in the late 1960s placed first priority on domestic concerns such

as the industrial development programs and; consequently, it sought to maximize incomes

from the gas and oil industry and exports in order to financially support them. Its new

pragmatic attitudes enabled it to make a distinction between America as its second

economic partner and America as the leader of international imperialism. In this way,

research proved that what was considered by many academics as an ‘inconsistency’,

61

‘ambivalence’ and ‘contradiction’ and even ‘hypocrisy’ in Algeria’s foreign policy toward

the United States was mere Algerian pragmatism and realpolitik.

The Bouteflika-Rogers meeting allowed both sides to express points of view

concerning critical matters in their bilateral relations. The meeting marked the desire of

both countries to resume diplomatic relations. The subsequent Yazid-Pederson and Bray

meeting was fruitful; both sides agreed on the necessity of the resumption of diplomatic

ties. Finally, Boumedienne, after he declined resuming relations at a first meeting with

Richard Newsom, agreed that Algeria would resume diplomatic ties at a more appropriate

time. Kissinger’s three visits to Algeria resulted in the resumption of diplomatic relations

in November 1974 which paved the way for better understanding between the two

countries.

One of the essential conclusions of this research is that even if unfriendly attitudes

stained political relations between Algeria and the United States, economic relations were

mutually well-preserved. During the 1970’s, several commercial contracts were ratified.

Algeria’s foreign policy was viewed in terms of pragmatism as a result of its ability in

separating political affairs from economic interests.

During the border dispute of 1963, the double-sided play was also a feature of

American foreign policy as this research revealed. The United States supported Morocco

over Algeria during the dispute. Research concluded to the fact that America’s biased

attitudes in dealing with the border dispute. Subsequently, this research also showed that

throughout the 1970’s, Algeria’s role at the international arena increased. Its influence in

Third World politics grew remarkably. Algeria’s diplomatic presence was of great

importance; this presence enabled Algeria to express its principles at the OAU and UNO

meetings, as Bouteflika was the head of the UNGA, which coincided with the emergence

of the Western Sahara’s issue. The United States’ blatant bias in favor of Morocco

62

represented a threat for Algeria. For the latter, the issue was a regional problem, i.e.: an

Algerian-Moroccan business that the United States had nothing to do with. In other words,

Algeria considered any American side taking as a meddling in its own affairs. However,

strategic concerns drove the American administrations to support Morocco not only

through providing it with arms but also in international debates regardless of their growing

economic relations with Algeria.

Definitely, researchers in Algeria-United States relations pointed to ambivalent

attitudes in their bilateral relations. Research of the FRUS documents, however, concluded

differently. Those gave priority attention to Algeria’s economic growth, concentrated on its

pragmatic policy, and did not indicate any inconsistencies in those relations. Besides, they

stressed the American need for bettering economic relations with Algeria and disclosed

that its gas provided a solution to the energy gap Americans were projecting in the future.

Finally, the researcher estimates that the real Algerian-American rapprochement occurred

during the second half of the 1960’s and had develop.

63

Works Cited

I. Primary Sources

1.Official Published Documents

US. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-1968. Africa. Vol.

XXIV. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1999.

______________________. Foreign Relations of the United States 1964–1968. Arab

Israeli Dispute, 1967–68. Vol. XX. Washington: United States Government Printing

Office, 2001. Print

______________________. Bureau of Intelligence and Research. New Directions in the

Maghreb. By Thomas L. Hughes. Washington: United States Government Printing

Office, 2007. Print.

______________________. Foreign Relation of the United States. Memorandum for the

President: Study of Trends in North Africa. By Henry A. Kissinger. Washington: United

States Government Printing Office, 2007. Print.

______________________. Foreign Relations of the United States, Documents on North

Africa 1969-1972. Volume E-5, Part 2, Washington: United States Government

Printing Office, 2007. Print.

______________________. Foreign Relations of the United States. Arab-Israeli Crisis

and War, 1967. Vol. XIX. Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2004.

Print

______________________. National Archives. Action Memorandum: US African Policy.

Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2006. Print.

______________________. Office of the Historian. Algeria's International Relations. Vol.

E-5. Part 2. Washington: Foreign Relations, Spt 6, 2007. Print.

64

______________________. Foreign Relation of the United States. Documents on North

Africa, 1973–1976. Ed. Burton, Myra F. Vol. E–9. Part 1, Washington: United

States Government Printing Office, 2014. Print.

2. Autobiographies, Memoirs, and Diaries

Nixon, Richard. The Memoirs of Richard Nixon. London: Arrow, 1979. Print.

II. Secondary Sources

1. Books

White, Theodore H. Breach of Faith: The Fall of Richard Nixon. New York: Atheneum,

1975. Print.

Williamson, Joan. The Middle East and North Africa. London: Europa Publications, 1999.

Print.

2. Films

An Insurgent rebuilds a county. Fathi Jaouadi. Horizons for Media Production, 2014. Al

Jazeera Documentary. Film.

3. Articles

Gleijeses, Piero. "Cuba's First Venture in Africa: Algeria, 1961-1965." Journal of Latin

American Studies28.1 (1996): 159-95. Web. 23 April. 2016.

Mots-Clés/Keys-Words

- The United States of American

- Algeria

- France

- Morocco

- The Western Sahara

- The American-Algerian foreign

relations/ The bilateral diplomatic

ties.

- The economic relations

- The diplomatic rupture

- Foreign policy

- The ambivalent foreign policy

- The Economic Strategies

- Revolutionary tendencies

- Self-determination

- The liberation movements

- Imperialism

- The North African region/ the

Maghreb bloc

- The Third World

- Post- independence

- Tainted

- The Arab-Israeli war

- The deterioration

- Economic partnership

- The El-Paso-SONATRACH

contact

- Political disagreements

- The Belkacem Trial

- The resumption of diplomatic

relations

- The Western Sahara conflict

- The international scene

- The Foreign Relations of the

United States (FRUS)

- The National Intelligence

Estimates (NIE)

- Ahmed Ben Bella

- Houari Boumedienne

- Henry Kissinger.

- Abdelaziz Bouteflika

- King Hassan II

- John F. Kennedy

- pragmatic policy

- pragmatism

- realpolitik

- the Organization of African Unity

(OAU)

- the United Nations Organization

(UNO)

- the United Nations General

Assembly (UNGA)