The Dutch Connection - The Australian War Memorial The Dutch... · The Dutch Connection Background...

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VOLUNTARY GUIDES BACKGROUNDER Number 87 Issue # 1 March 2006 The Dutch Connection Background notes for Guides accompanying Dutch Nationals on their journey through the Memorial See also www.awm.gov.au PJH

Transcript of The Dutch Connection - The Australian War Memorial The Dutch... · The Dutch Connection Background...

VOLUNTARY GUIDES BACKGROUNDER Number 87 Issue # 1 March 2006

The Dutch Connection

Background notes for Guides accompanying Dutch Nationals on their journey through the

Memorial

See also www.awm.gov.au

PJH

ISSUE # 2(June 2010)

ISSUE #1 (March 2006)

BACKGROUNDER # 87

The Dutch Connection

Contents

• Section 1 World War I

• Section 2 Aircraft Hall

• Section 3 ANZAC Hall

• Section 4 World War II

• Section 5 Korea

ISSUE # 2(June 2010)

ISSUE #1 (March 2006)

BACKGROUNDER # 87

The Dutch Connection

Section 1

World War I

• Netherlands in WW1.The answerbank.com.uk

• The Netherlands in World War 1,1914-1918. World History at KMLA Feb 2006

• Defending An Unstable Peace.Rob Ruggenberg. The Heritage of the Great War

www.greatwar .nl

By Ed: Locating a definitive article on the Netherlands in WW1 is not easy. The foregoing

articles demonstrate a certain consistency however their intergrity cannot be guaranteed.

ISSUE # 2(June 2010)

1 ISSUE #1 (March 2006)

The Netherlands in WWI {www. The answerbank.com.uk}

The Netherlands, which was an important neutral country, obtained and maintained its neutrality during WW1 only by Queen Wilhelmina skilfully and carefully using to full advantage her family ties to Germany’s Emperor Wilhelm II, Russian Tsar Nicholas II, and George V. A significant portion of the Netherlands population was pro-German as a result of perceived British brutality in the Boer War when the Netherlands strongly sympathized with the Afrikaners (1899-1902). There still was a strong anti-British feeling in the country at the outset of WW1. The Netherlands initially opened its doors for Belgian refugees when the Germans occupied that country in 1914 and left the doors open to later care for almost one million Belgian and British army and civilian refugees, of whom 300,000 were in the country the full four years of the war. The Netherlands also sent food and clothes to the remaining Belgians as far as the Germans would allow it. Immediately after the war the Netherlands took in hundreds of starving Austrian children and some of them stayed in the country and later married Dutch citizens. The German Kaiser was granted asylum in the Netherlands in 1918 and lived in a castle at Doorn whilst his compatriots had to endure extremely hard times after Germany had lost the war. Kaiser Wilhelm II died in 1941. Several countries remained neutral in WW1, amongst them America for much of the War until in 1917 the Germans declared unrestricted submarine warfare.

The Netherlands in World War I, 1914-1918

{ World History at KMLA website .Feb 2006} During World War I, the Netherlands stayed neutral; it mobilized it's forces (ARMED NEUTRALITY). The various political parties rallied behind the Dutch government in it's course of neutrality; partisan politics was postposed til after the war. The British blockade and German u-boat-warfare reserved a narrow corridor straight north from the peninsula of Holland for Dutch commercial shipping; ships on their way to and from the Dutch East Indies now had to sail all around the British island. Food became scarce; coupons had been introduced (bread coupons in 1915). A considerable number of refugees, mostly Belgians, fled to the Netherlands - the number peaked at over 1 million early in the war; c.100,000 stayed throughout the war. In addition, Belgian troops were interned in camps in the southern Netherlands. Lodging the refugees came to the Netherlands' government at a cost of 37 million Guilders. The refugee camps were closed down in 1919. In 1916 severe floods devastated parts of the Dutch countryside; parts of Amsterdam itself were inundated. The prevent similar disasters in the future, water engineer CORNELIS LELY had developed the ZUIDERZEE PROJECT back in the 1880es; the Act of Closing and Drainage of the Zuiderzee according to Lely's plan was passed in 1918; the dam closing the Zuiderzee and turning it from a saltwater bay into a sweetwater lake was finished in 1929. In 1917 the constitution was amended, universal manhood suffrage introduced. On November 10th 1918, German Emperor Wilhelm II. abdicated, to live in the Netherlands in exile (at Doorn, where he died in 1941).

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Defending An Unstable Peace By Rob Ruggenberg

{THE HERITAGE OF THE GREAT WAR www.greatwar.nl }

Only ten countries managed to stay neutral during World War I :Argentina, Chile, Denmark, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Venezuela, Sweden and Switzerland.

Only these countries were neutral during the Great War 1914-1918. The rest of the world conducted war with each other.

Following the adage that he who wants peace prepares for war, the small Dutch army exercised continuously. In the East Holland bordered to Germany and in the south to German-occupied Belgium. The heavy gunfire in Flanders was heard in Holland every day. The Belgian battlefields were no more than 40 km's away (about 26 miles).

When the war broke out more than one million Belgian refugees fled to Holland. Thousands of soldiers, from both sides, followed them. They crossed the border because the enemy had them encircled, like it happened to 2,000 British marines at Antwerp.

All foreign soldiers arriving in The Netherlands were disarmed and interned in camps where they were to stay during rest of the war. The picture on the left (click on it to see it larger) shows the disarmament of German infantry-troops who had fled across the Dutch border. The German soldiers called this place the graveyard, because of the bayonets that were put into the ground.

The Dutch government had mobilized 500.000 man to reinforce the regular army. They guarded the borders and filled their days with exercising and polishing...

There were many incidents in which war-countries were involved. England for instance, bombed - by accident - the Dutch port of Zierikzee.

And German U-boats torpedoed and sank many Dutch ships - even one that transported German prisoners-of-war from England to the Netherlands.

In spring 1915 the Germans erected an dreadful electric fence between occupied Belgium and the Netherlands. The 2,000 Volts wire ran almost 200 Km (125 Miles) long through villages, orchards, meadows, woodland, over brooks - even over the river Meuse. The height of the construction was over 3 meters. How many people the fence killed is unknown. Estimates vary from 2,000 to 3,000.

The word neutral comes from ne uter (=none of both), but in the Netherlands making a choice was a near thing: commander-in-chief General C.J. Snijders had a strong liking for the 'invincible' Germany.

Because of his attitude the government several times tried to get rid of the general, but Queen Wilhelmina kept on backing her CIC. The queen was fond of the army and often visited the troops and observed exercises.

To maintain neutrality the Netherlands laid mines in coastal waters, to prevent hostile landings.

Three times (in 1916, 1917 and 1918) Germany considered occupying the Netherlands. In that case the allied countries without doubt would have invaded the country from the seaside.

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Germany eventually refrained from invading Holland, also because of the foodsupplies that continuously flowed from this country. This trade made some merchants in Holland very rich. They were called OW'ers, meaning 'oorlogswinst-makers': war-profiteers. Until this very day OW'er is considered a harsh term of abuse in Holland.

In the Netherlands there are some cemeteries where victims of the Great War are buried. Many were sailors who fell at sea. Others are civilians or navy-personnel who died at the beaches where countless mines washed ashore.

Maintaining neutrality caused discord among the inhabitants of the Netherlands. The population was divided, as were the politicians.

Many people still bore a grudge to England because of the Boer War, fifteen years earlier, when thousands of Boers (Dutch descendants) in South-Africa had been killed by British soldiers.

There was also a lot of discontent among the soldiers. Only at the end of the war they were brought into real action. They had to strike down hunger revolts in some of the larger cities...

Almost every prayer in that time begged for peace. It took four long years and 37,000,000 casualties before these humble prayers came true.

ISSUE # 2(June 2010)

ISSUE #1 (March 2006)

BACKGROUNDER # 87

The Dutch Connection

Section 2

Aircraft Hall

• The Dutch Air Forces in the Pacific. John Douglas Pacific Wreck

Database:www.pacificwrecks.com

• Netherlands East Indies Air Force in Australia during WW2. Australia @ War

website

• Lieutenant “Gus” Winckel. AWM Australia Under Attack Online Exhibition

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THE DUTCH AIR FORCES IN THE PACIFIC

WARDutch Air Forces in the Pacific War

by John Douglas

The Dutch Air Forces were one of the minor players on the Allied side in the Pacific War.

Their involvement came from the current country of Indonesia, which at the time of World

War II, was administered by the Netherlands, and known as the Netherlands East Indies

(NEI). The administration of N.E.I had two colonial air forces, the Royal Netherlands Naval

Air Service (M.L.D) or more often the R.N.N; and the air service of the Royal Netherlands

Indies Army (The ML.KNIL). The Royal Netherlands Indies Airline had a Fleet of transports

as well. On 7 th December the composition of these forces was:

MLD

33 Dornier flying boats 35 Catalina flying boats 6 Fokker T-IV float planes

KNIL

83 Glen Martin B10 bombers 71 Brewster Buffalo F2A Fighters 17 Curtis Wright W21

Fighters 13 Curtis 75A Fighters 40 Various recon and trainers

KNILM

4 Douglas DC2 Transports 18 Lodestar Transports Other planes were on order but not

delivered at this date.

Note: - the number of planes varies, according to the reference chosen.

These planes were disposed throughout a number of locations in the N.E.I.. The first loss to

Japanese aggression occurred at Pearl Harbour, when a RNN Catalina was destroyed. 3 Glen

Martin Bomber Squadrons and a Buffalo Squadron were posted to the defense of Singapore.

Additional Glen Martin Bombers and the Dornlers were deployed to the defense of British

Borneo. After a series of battles the survivors of the Dutch Air Forces escaped to Australia.

The battle for the defense of the NEI saw Dutch Air Forces lose nearly 300 planes. The planes

that fled to Australia at the fall of the Netherlands East Indies were:

M.L.D

6 Dornier Flying boats 9 Catalina Flying boats

ML-KNIL

1 Glen Martin B10

KNILM

3 Douglas DC2 11 Lockheed Lodestar

The 11 Lockheed Lodestars were sold to the US Government, for use as local transport. The

sole Glen Martin Bomber was also sold to the US Air Force, and was used operationally by

them until August 1944, when it was scrapped. The RAAF acquired 5 of the Dornier flying

boats (the other was retained by the MLD/RNN for their use within Australia).

1 Catalina was purchased by the RAAF, as were 28 Ryan STM Trainers and 18 Vought

Kingfisher reconnaissance seaplanes, 31 Bostons and 17 Buffalos, all of which had been

ordered by the Dutch government for the defense of NEI, and which were diverted to

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Australia on the fall of the N.E.I.

These were 5 Mitchell B25s also intended for the ML-KNIL that were shipped to Australia at

this time. Including other B25s there were a total of 54 Mitchells ordered by the NEI

Government. The USAAF took over 49 of these planes, leaving only 5 for the NEI - ML

KNIL. These remaining 5 B25s were ultimately transferred to the USAAF as well. The

aircrew that arrived in Australia on the fall of the N.E.I were allocated to 3 different locations

and activities.

The RNN/MLD Air Force Crews were sent to Colombo where they formed the Dutch No.

321 Squadron. One RNN air crew was retained in Australia to fly the sole Dornier and later

on, two Catalinas that were taken into the fleet of transports use by the N.E.I. Government-in-

exile.

The ML-KNIL air crew were sent initially to Amberley, and then on to Canberra, when they

helped form a B25 Squadron, 18 (NEI) Squadron, flying under RAAF Operational Control.

Ultimately the Dutch were not able to provide enough ground crew or extra gunners to fully

staff this Squadron, so the RAAF made up the numbers needed.

18 (NEI) Squadron in effect was a mixture of Australian and Dutch personnel, with a Dutch

Commander and an Australian liaison officer commanding the Australian Squadron members.

As much as possible Dutch identity was retained (the NEI. Members used Dutch salutes etc).

The initial B25s were all reallocated to the USAAF and 18 Bostons were supplied in their

place. A month later these Bostons were replaced with 18 Mitchells, which took the Squadron

some re-equipping to bring them up to a satisfactory standard. 18 (NEI) Squadron transferred

to the Northern Territory Australia, in December 1942, operating out of Bachelor A/S for

most of the war.

They were in action by February 1943 making raids on Japanese installations in the occupied.

Netherlands East Indies and in Timor as well.

The KLM air crews was send to the US for further training in Military a/c.

In September 1943 new more heavily armed and better equipped B25s were allocated to 18

(N.E.I) Squadron, replacing their warn out aircraft.

Another group of new B25s were issued in March 1944 to 18 (NEI) Squadron to replace the

B25s then in use.

In February 1945 18 (N.E.I) Squadron was reassigned to Jaquinot Bay airbase, immediately to

the south of Rabaul in New Britain; which had just been captured by Australian ground

forces. The Squadron ground parties had just arrived at Jaquinot Bay, when the squadron was

reassigned to Balikipapan. They arrived there in July 1945.

The Dormer (X - 24) was used not only for activities within Australia, but also for occasional

supply runs up into Dutch New Guinea (Tanoh Merah and Wissel Lakes) as were the two

Catalinas, Y-86 and Y-87.

A further B25 Squadron (119(NEI) Squadron) was formed in September 1943 but quickly

dissolved when manpower shortages become apparent in December the same year. These

planes were transferred to the RAAF.

A third NEI Squadron (No. 120) was formed in Canberra in December 1943, flying P40s. It

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also had the same mixture of Australian and Dutch aircrew and ground staff as 18 (NEI)

Squadron. In May 1944 this Squadron began operations in Merauke, Dutch New Guinea.

Some of these P40s were posted to the North Coast of DNG, operating out of Noemfoer.

In March and April 1945 18 (NEI) Squadron begin its transfer to Jaquinot Bay, New Britain.

In May the transfer was cancelled and the Squadron posted back to the Northern Territory of

Australia.

One 120 (NEI) Squadron Wirraway was lost near Kikori in PNG and several P40s were lost

over the North Coast of DNG. 120 (NEI) Squadron arrived at Jaquinot Bay in May 1945; and

was promptly transferred to back in DNG. The RNN Dornier was transferred to the RAAF in

October 1944.

Immediately prior to the end of the war, a 4 th (19 NEI) Squadron was formed in Canberra.

This was a Transport squadron, using Lodestars, Dakotas and surplus B25s plus the two RNN

Catalinas.

These aircraft had all been on strength for some time and the Squadron establishment was a

formality. 18 (NEI) Squadron finally reached Balikipapan on 14th August 1945.

In June 1945 120 (NEI) Squadron commenced operations out of Biak in DNG. 6 of their P40s

were lost over Manokwari in a one week period in early August 1945. By the end of the war

120 (NEI) Squadron had lost 14 pilots and 11 aircraft. 18 (NEI) Squadron lost 112 aircrew

and 21 B25s. Several support A/C were lost as well, including a Dakota which was found 44

years later near Mossman in New South Wales

What remains of the WWII Dutch Air Force in the Pacific today?

Of the pre war fleet, a number of the Ryan trainers have survived and can be seen at air shows

in Australia. Several are flying today, and others are under restoration.

The Buffalos have all vanished, except as future rebuilt projects, including one rebuild

currently underway at the Military Aviation Museum RNIAF, at Soesterberg in, the

Netherlands. The Dorniers are all gone, but a few B25s remain. Some of the earlier B-25s

when decommissioned by the 18 th (NEI) Squadron, had a further life with American and

Australia air forces, and may still remain in other markings as wrecks. There is a King fisher

being rebuilt at Wangeratta Australia that was probably one of these purchase by the RAAF

for the NEI order. Charles Darby located one KNIL A-20, as a hulk, at Tadji airfield in the

early 1970s. The Indonesian Armed Forces Museum in Jakarta has a B-25 on display from

this era, whilst in Holland, a group of enthusiasts (Duke of Brabant Air Force) flies a B-25

marked in the colours of 18 (NEI) Squadron.

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NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES AIR FORCE IN AUSTRALIA

DURING WW2 {Extracted from Peter Dunn's AUSTRALIA @ WAR 23.01.06}

The Japanese occupied the Netherlands East Indies (NEI) in early 1942. A number of Dutch

airmen escaped to Australia after surviving the fierce fight with the Japanese. They mostly

ended up at either Archerfield airfield in Brisbane or Melbourne. These airmen were formed

into a number of operational groups under RAAF control. All of their stores and equipment

were supplied by the United States of America.

The Netherlands East Indies Air Force (NEI-AF) had two combat squadrons and some

Transport sections in Australia during World War 2.

18 (NEI) SQUADRON The first NEI-AF Squadron was 18 (NEI) Squadron, which was

formed as an RAAF Squadron at Fairbairn airfield in Canberra on 4 April 1942 under the

command of Lieutenant Colonel B.J. Fiedeldij. The Squadron was formed from the two

groups of Dutch airmen at Archerfield and Melbourne. They flew B-25 Mitchells. The

Squadron's Dutch personnel (and a few Javanese) were complemented by a number RAAF

personnel covering both aircrew and ground crew occupations.

18 (NEI) Squadron was scheduled to take delivery of eighteen B-25 Mitchell bombers when it

was first formed, but these aircraft were re-assigned to the USAAF for combat duties in New

Guinea. They eventually received five B-25 Mitchell in April 1942.

The original five B-25's were replaced by ten Douglas Bostons (a mixture of DB-7N's and A-

20A's). Their early days in Canberra consisted of training and anti-submarine patrols. On 5

June 1942, during one of these anti-submarine patrols, the Squadron encountered a Japanese

submarine off Sydney, which they reportedly sank. This later proved to be not the case.

On 6 July 1942, 18 Squadron was officially disbanded as an RAAF Squadron and became

part of the Netherlands East Indies Air Force, but still under RAAF command.

The Bostons were then replaced between 23 August 1942 and 18 September 1942 with

eighteen new B-25 Mitchells.

18 (NEI) Squadron was relocated to MacDonald airfield in the Northern Territory on 5

December 1942. MacDonald airfield required a lot of work. 18 (NEI) Squadron personnel

built dispersal areas and taxiways between these areas and the short airfield. The granite

gravel airfield would wash out badly in heavy rain and often required repairs. By mid January

943, the Squadron achieved operational status at MacDonald airfield.

Their first operational flight was a reconnaissance patrol on 18 January 1943 to the Tanimbar

Islands looking for reported enemy shipping. They flew their first operational attack on 19

January 1943 to Toeal in the Kai Islands and the next day they shot down two "Zeros" over

Fuiloro and a "Dave" (Nakajima E8N1 floatplane) at Dobo during a raid on Timor.

On 31 January 1943, while returning from a dawn raid on Dili, two Mitchells from 18 (NEI)

Squadron made forced landings due to a shortage of fuel. There were no casualties.

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On 18 February 1943, during a raid on Dili, Timor, six Mitchells of 18 (NEI) Squadron were

intercepted by two Zeros. B-25 Mitchell Serial No. N5-144 was shot down by the Japanese

and fell into the sea. One Zero was destroyed. The crew of the downed Mitchell were spotted

in their rescue dinghy by the other Mitchells as they departed the area, low on fuel. Three

Hudson later dropped supplies to the downed crew, who were subsequently rescued by

HMAS Vendetta. It was then discovered that the pilot and bombardier had been shot dead and

the co-pilot wounded by the strafing Zero. While in their rescue dinghy they had been

attacked by a large shark which attempted to bite the back of the wounded co-pilot. They also

had to ward off a large sea bird which attacked them in their dinghy.

18 (NEI) Squadron Mitchells suffered a number of forced landings short of their base at

MacDonald airfield. Their long bombing missions, often meant they returned very low on

fuel.

Later in February 1943, 18 (NEI) Squadron shot down another "Zero", claimed one probable

and damaged three others.

Between the 13 April 1943 and 8 May 1943, 18 (NEI) Squadron relocated from MacDonald

airfield further north to the better equipped Batchelor airfield. They then flew from Batchelor

until the end of the war.

In April 1943, 18 (NEI) Squadron, along with Beaufighters of 31 Squadron RAAF, and

Liberators of the 319th Bomb Squadron, flew almost daily raids on enemy bases and

shipping. On 18 April 1943, 13 Hudsons of 2 Squadron RAAF, and 9 Mitchells of 18 (NEI)

Squadron made a night raid on Penfui. 18 (NEI) Squadron were the first to attack. They met

heavy AA fire.

On 2 May 1943, 18 (NEI) Squadron bombed Penfui by the light of flares. On 6 May 1943,

they bombed Dili in Timor.

18 (NEI) Squadron's first mission out of Batchelor was on 11 May 1943. This was a

reconnaissance of Somniloquy-Tanimbar Island and Laha-Ambon, plus operations over

Penfoei, Koepang Harbour and Dili.

18 (NEI) Squadron carried out many mast-height attacks on Japanese shipping which proved

to be very dangerous. On some occasions bombs exploded before they fully left the aircraft

due to faulty delayed-action fuses.

On 11 June 1943, Lieutenant Colonel J.J. Zomer started as their new Commanding Officer.

In September 1943, new heavily armed and better equipped B-25's arrived complete with

newly trained crews. These crews had been trained at a joint Dutch Army-Navy flying school

that had been established at Jackson, Mississippi, in the States.

The Squadron acquired itself a Squadron badge which depicted a Dutch farmer's wife

sweeping out dust with a large broom. It was affectionately known as the "Dutch Cleanser".

This was in recognition of their success against the Japanese. From 17 November 1943 until 4

January 1944, 18 (NEI) Squadron was responsible for the destruction of six Japanese ships

totalling 25,545 tons, plus numerous other small enemy vessels.

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In December 1943, 18 (NEI) Squadron and 31 Squadron RAAF combined forces to attack

Japanese shipping. On 15 December 1943, eight Beaufighters from 31 Squadron attacked

Manatuto where they sank two barges and damaged six schooners. They then attacked a

convoy. They sunk a 500 tonne ship. That afternoon, five Mitchells from 18 (NEI) Squadron

attacked the same convoy. They sank the "Wakatsu Maru" of 5,123 tonnes. The Beaufighters

continued the attack on the convoy the next day.

On 8 March 1944, a number of RAAF Squadrons were ordered to carry out prearranged

emergency movements to counter a suspected Japanese naval attack on Freemantle in

Western Australia. As part of this exercise 18 (NEI) Squadron and 31 Squadron RAAF were

moved to Learmonth airfield in the Potshot area (Exmouth Gulf area) on 10 March 1944. 18

(NEI) Squadron moved to Potshot in sixteen B-25 Mitchells and eight C-47 Dakotas.

120 (NEI) Squadron was also moved from Canberra to Potshot. The suspected attack never

eventuated and on 20 March 1944 all squadrons were ordered back to their normal bases. 18

(NEI) Squadron left Potshot for Batchelor on 23 March 1944. They resumed operations from

Batchelor on 30 March 1944 when eight B-25 Mitchells bombed Penfoei. It was around this

time that they received a new batch of B-25 Mitchells fitted with tail guns.

In April 1944, Koepang, Dili, Penfui and Lautem became daily targets for 2 Squadron's

Beauforts and 18 (NEI) Squadron's Mitchells.

Lieutenant Colonel E.J.G. teRoller became the new Commanding Officer of 18 (NEI)

Squadron in April 1944.

On 19 April 1944, eight Beaufighters and fifteen Beauforts of 1 Squadron RAAF and twelve

Mitchells of 18 (NEI) Squadron struck Su Barracks and the town area.

During May 1944, various targets on Timor were constantly attacked by Nos. 1 and 31

Squadrons RAAF and 18 (NEI) Squadron. On 18 May 1944, Mitchell Serial No. N5-177, of

18 (NEI) Squadron was shot down by AA fire while it was strafing Saumlaki village. On 23

May 1944, another Mitchell, Serial No. N5-162 was lost due to AA fire during a raid on

Timor.

On 23 June 1944, the Commanding Officer, Lt. Col. teRoller was killed, when the Mitchell

that he was co-piloting, was hit by anti-aircraft fire and exploded when it fell into the sea

during a shipping raid near Tioor Island. Three Japanese vessels were destroyed or damaged

during this raid.

On 1 July 1944, Lieutenant Colonel D.L. Asjes became the new Commanding Officer of 18

(NEI) Squadron.

In July 1944, 18 (NEI) Squadron combined with Nos. 2 and 31 Squadrons RAAF, to attack

enemy barge movements between Timor Babar, Sermata and Leti Islands. On 29 July 1944,

nine Mitchells from 2 Squadron RAAF and nine Mitchells from 18 (NEI) Squadron attacked

Penfui at sunset.

It was around this time that the Squadron flew 14 hour daylight missions over internment

camps on Java dropping leaflets.

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On 7 October 1944, Lieutenant Colonel M. Van Haselen became the new Commanding

Officer.

In October 1944, 2 Squadron RAAF and 18 (NEI) Squadron, between them, sank or damaged

54 vessels. On 6 November 1944, the two Squadrons attacked Waimgapu, Sumba Island, and

sank the Japanese Navy's "Special Submarine Chaser" No. 118. Later in November 1944, they

sank two small merchant vessels off the coast of Timor.

On 6 April 1945, eleven Mitchells of 18 (NEI) Squadron and ten B-24's of 21 Squadron

RAAF attacked a Japanese convoy, escorted by the light cruiser Isuzu, in the Flores Sea. They

were evacuating Japanese troops from Timor. Two B-24's were shot down by Japanese

aircraft protecting the convoy. 18 (NEI) Squadron's Mitchells scored two direct hits on the

Isuzu. The badly damaged Isuzu was easy prey the next day, when it was sunk by submarines

Char and Gabilan.

On 25 February 1945, 18 (NEI) Squadron had commenced its planned relocation to Jacquinot

Bay in New Britain. Supplies had already been sent by ship but the move was abandoned

when the Squadron was taken off operations. The Dutch had wanted to go to the East Indies

and had pleaded with MacArthur for a change in plans. He relented and the Squadron was

redirected to Morotai in the Halmaheras. Another late change, saw the Squadron relocating

from Batchelor to Balikpapan on 15 July 1945. They arrived in Balikpapan on 17 July 1945.

Their main activities in Balikpapan was leaflet and food and supply drops to prison camps in

Borneo, the Celebes and Java.

In July 1945, the Mitchells of 2 Squadron RAAF and 18 (NEI) Squadron, which were part of

79 Wing, joined the First TAF.

On 8 September 1945, the Mitchells of 2 Squadron RAA and 18 (NEI) Squadron flew air

cover for the surrender by the Japanese commanders on HMAS Burdekin.

On 21 September 1945, 18 (NEI) Squadron provided air cover for the 7th Australian Division

as they landed on Makassar.

The RAAF components of 18 (NEI) Squadron were withdrawn on 25 November 1945 and

operational control of the Squadron was passed back to the Dutch on 15 January 1946.

The veterans' organisation, "18 Squadron NEI-RAAF Forces Association" was dissolved in

1999. It published an excellent Newsletter with all sorts of information. Its final issue was

No.63 dated October 1999.

120 (NEI) SQUADRON 120 (NEI) Squadron was formed in Canberra on 10 December

1943. They were equipped with P-40N Kittyhawks.

On 8 March 1944, a number of RAAF Squadrons were ordered to carry out prearranged

emergency movements to counter a suspected Japanese naval attack on Freemantle. As part of

this exercise 120 (NEI) Squadron was moved from Canberra to Potshot. Amongst the many

other movements, 18 (NEI) Squadron and 31 Squadron RAAF were also moved to Potshot

(Learmonth).

5

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The Squadron relocated to Potshot (Learmonth) in Western Australia on 9 March 1944 They

flew through Adelaide and Ceduna, and across the Nullabor Plains via Kalgoorlie, and then

Potshot (Exmouth Gulf). The suspected attack never eventuated and on 20 March 1944 all

squadrons were ordered back to their normal bases. On 23 March 1944 they left Potshot

headed back to Canberra. Two Kittyhawks became lost and crashed near Mildura (see below)

On 10 April 1944, most of the groundcrew was shipped to Merauke in New Guinea by sea,

and on 10 and 11 April 1944, the Kittyhawks left for Merauke in two flights. Maintenance of

these P-40´s was carried out by 86 Squadron RAAF until their own ground personnel and

material had arrived. They stayed in New Guinea until June-July 1945 by which time they

were stationed at Biak.

In about June/July 1945, all units on Morotai came under a new command known as No. 11

Group, which consisted of the Spitfires of 79, 452 and 457 Squadrons and the Kittyhawks of

120 (NEI) Squadron.

120 (NEI) Squadron flew no other operations over Australia, except for rotations of crew and

aircraft. In one of these rotations, a C-47 was was lost near Mossman (see below) killing 7

pilots from 120 (NEI) Squadron. The C-47 left Merauke on 6 September 1944.

Stewart Wilson's book "The Spitfire, Mustang, & Kittyhawk, In Australian Service" shows

twenty P-40N-20 Kittyhawks were transferred to the Far East Air Force in July 1944:-

A29-637, A29-640, A29-643, A29-672, A29-673, A29-674, A29-678, A29-682, A29-685,

A29-686, A29-687, A29-689, A29-692, A29-693, A29-694, A29-695, A29-696, A29-697,

A29-699, A29-703.

Another book by Geoff Pentland "The P-40 Kittyhawk in Service", shows that 67 Kittyhawks

were delivered to No. 120 (NEI) Squadron. This "Dutch" Squadron served under RAAF

operational command.

TRANSPORT SQUADRONS There were no formal Dutch Transport Squadrons until

September 1944. There were initially two transport sections:-

NEI-Transport Section, Brisbane (NEI-TSB) NEI-TSB was equipped with three Lockheed

Lodestars and five B-25 Mitchell´s. They were based at Archerfield.

NEI-Transport Section, Melbourne (NEI-TSM) NEI-TSM was equipped with a number of

de-armed B-25 Mitchell´s and nine Lockheed Lodestars

Both of these Transport Sections were used to ferry men and material to 120 (NEI) Squadron

in Merauke (later Biak) and 18 (NEI) Squadron at Batchelor.

In November 1944, both the above Transport Sections were combined into No. 1 NEI-

Transport Squadron. The aircraft pool was expanded with four C-47´s and five Lockheed 12a

light transports.

On 15 August 1945, the unofficial transports used by the Netherlands East Indies KLM

(KNILM) was renamed 19 (NEI) Transport Squadron and officially taken on the strength of

the RAAF. It had 13 Dakota´s.

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SOME BUFFALOS THAT CAME TO AUSTRALIA Seventeen Buffalos were transferred

to the RAAF in 1942. They had earlier been part of the Netherlands East Indies Air Force.

With the fall of Singapore twenty Model 439D's and one 339D were sent to Australia in

March 1942. They initially were transferred to the USAAC. They still had their Dutch serial

numbers and their original US "NX" test numbers. Once they arrived in Australia, most of

them were allocated temporary numbers.

Seventeen of these aircraft were transferred to the RAAF and became A51-1 through to A51-

17. The first six were sent in crates to Essendon where they were assembled at the Ansett

Airways hangar. Cameras were installed and the aircraft were allocated to the newly formed

PRU at Laverton in June 1942. The rest of the Buffalos were moved to the PRU at Darwin

where they became operational in August 1942.

REFERENCE BOOKS

Alford, Bob (1992), "Darwin's air war 1942-1945: an illustrated history", Aviation Historical

Society of the Northern Territory & Coleman's Printing, Darwin, NT.

Barnes, Norman (2000), "The RAAF and the flying squadrons", Allen & Unwin, St Leonards,

NSW.

Eather, Steve (1995), "Flying squadrons of the Australian Defence Force", Aerospace

Publications, Weston Creek, ACT.

Hurst, Doug , "The Fourth Ally - The Dutch forces in Australia in WWII"

Odgers, George (1957), "Air war against Japan 1943-45", Australia in the War of 1939-1945,

Series 3 (Air), Australian War Memorial, Canberra.

Parnell, N.M. & Lynch, C.A., "Australian Air Force since 1911"

Pentland, Geoffrey (1974), "The P-40 Kittyhawk in service", Kookaburra Technical

Publications, Melbourne.

Powell, Alan (1988), "The shadow's edge: Australia's northern war", Melbourne University

Press, Carlton, Victoria.

RAAF Historical (1995), "Fighter units", Units of the RAAF, vol. 2, AGPS, Canberra. [120

NEI Sqn)

RAAF Historical (1995), "Bomber units", Units of the RAAF, vol. 3, AGPS, Canberra. [18

NEI Sqn]

Wallace, Gordon (1983), "Are you there Don R?", The Author, Surrey Hills, Victoria. [later

reprinted under the title "Up in Darwin with the Dutch"]

Wallace, Gordon (1986), "Those air force days", The Author, Surrey Hills, Victoria.

Wilson, Stewart (1988), " The Spitfire, Mustang and Kittyhawk in Australian service",

Aerospace Publications, n.p. [?Weston Creek, ACT].

Wilson, Stewart (1992), "Boston, Mitchell & Liberator in Australian service", Aerospace

Publications, Weston Creek, ACT.

02/06/2006 06:11 AMLieutenant “Gus” Winckel

Page 1 of 1http://www.awm.gov.au/underattack/end/winckel.asp

Australia under attack

Lieutenant “Gus” Winckel

After losing the Netherlands East Indies (NEI), Dutch colonial forces were also based in Australia. FirstLieutenant W. F. A. “Gus” Winckel served with the NEI Air Force. He was flying refugees to Australiawhen he was caught on the airfield in Broome during the air raid in March 1942. Taking up a machine-gun,he damaged a raider so badly that it crashed into the sea killing the pilot, Osamu Kudo. Winckel wasawarded the Dutch Gold Cross.

After his fight at Broome, Winckel was promoted and served with No. 18 (NEI) Squadron on coastal patrolsoff eastern Australia. After the war he returned to the NEI to find that his girlfriend, who he feared had diedas a prisoner of the Japanese, was still alive. They married shortly after.

Lientenant "Gus" WinckelP04304.001

Dutch aircraft at Fairbairn, ACTP01818.003

ISSUE #1 (March 2006)

BACKGROUNDER # 87

The Dutch Connection

Section 3

ANZAC Hall

Striking by Night

• THE WEEK HOLLAND WELCOMED THE ‘BOMBS’ .Dianne Rutherford. WARTIME #16

Sydney Under Attack

The K IX Club. James Ritchie Grant. From Sea Breezes Vol. 70 1996

Operation Manna

{AWM WEBSITE JAN 2006}

Operation Manna was mounted between 29 April and 8 May 1945 to drop food to starving civilians in

Western Holland, which was still in enemy hands. 33 Bomber Command squadrons were involved and

dropped over 6,685 tons of food onto drop zones at Leiden, The Hague, Rotterdam and Gouda. The

operation came to an end when the German surrender on 8 May made it possible for food to be

transported into these areas by road.

See also the “Manna” medallion in the WW2 - Year of Victory Gallery

ISSUE # 2(June 2010)

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The K IX Club

The vicissitudes of a Dutch submarine in Royal Australian Navy service.

By James Ritchie Grant. From Sea Breezes Vol. 70 1996.

Despite an appreciation of the value of submarines gained through the operation of submarines

during and after World War I the Royal Australian Navy was obliged, as an economy measure, to

transfer its two "O" class boats, the HMAS Oxley and the Otway to the Royal Navy on April 10,

1931.

HMAS Oxley 1928 (Photo: © Collection John Eade).

The Royal Australian Navy thus entered World War II without the ability to either wage submarine

warfare or to give realistic training in the art of hunting down and destroying enemy submarines.

The lack of proper training facilities was not of vital importance during the first two years of the

war, but when Japan entered the war and submarine activity along the Australian coasts rose to a

serious level the Royal Navy had no submarine, however obsolete, to offer as a training vessel.

Paradoxically it was the loss of the Netherlands East Indies which appeared to produce an answer to

the problem. In March 1942 three K (Koloniën) class submarines of the Royal Netherlands Navy

arrived in Fremantle, Western Australia, to join other Dutch Navy survivors from the Netherlands

East Indies fighting. These three vessels, K VIII, K IX and K XII, which been built by K.M. de

Schelde, Vlissingen, Holland, in 1922/23 and were not only old but had seen 'hard' service during

the three-month defence of the Netherlands East Indies. The K VIII was assessed as beyond

economic repair and after such components as might be useful to the other two boats were removed,

this vessel was scrapped at Fremantle. With hindsight considerable time and effort would have been

saved if the K IX had been scrapped at this time. However the other two submarines were offered to

the Royal Australian Navy on April 15, 1942, K XII for operational service and K IX a tr aining aid

in the antisubmarine warfare school.

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K VIII, K IX and K X. The complete K VIII class in Vlissingen

This offer was accepted at the end of April. The K XII came under the control of the United States

Navy at Fremantle and the K9, the form in which it was referred to in Australian correspondence,

arrived in Sydney Harbour in the middle of May 1942 for servicing and transfer to the school some

time in August. Following an inspection, the hull was found to require engineering work and the

machinery, including the engines and battery, were in a poor state.

For a short time thereafter it was thought that the Netherlands Government would decommission

the vessel in order to utilize the crew more effectively. However it was agreed that the K9 would be

allocated to the anti-submarine school and work went ahead with readying the vessel for

commissioning by the RAN. In March 1943 the majority of the Dutch and Indonesian crew were

transferred to other Dutch Navy vessels.

As the RAN had no personnel with up-to-date experience in the operation of submarines, assistance

was sought from the Royal Navy, who agreed to second three officers, Lt. F.M. Piggott RNR, Lt. H.

Langer RNR and Sub-Lt. P. Fickling RN and 10 ratings, including CPO Gus Fisher, an Australian

who had taken the opportunity to volunteer and thus return home. Additional volunteers were called

for from the RAN to make up the crew.

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K IX Officers: Sub Lt. P. Fickling RN, Lt. H. Lauger RNR, Lt. F.M. Piggot RNR (Captain) (Photo:

© Collection John Eade).

Piggott was horrified when he first saw the boat, he had been advised that it was an old Dutch boat,

but he had never seen one that old! or with so many defects. Work on the vessel commenced with

the crew assisting the dockyard workers to get it ready.

While most of the problems had been caused by age and hard service additional ones had been

caused when a torpedo fired by a Japanese miniature submarine sank HMAS Kuttabul in Sydney

Harbour on May 3, 1942. The forward part of the superstructure of the K9, which had been tied up

alongside the other ship, was crushed when the Kuttabul sank and struck the submarine. The other

major damage had been inflicted on the main battery which had to be replaced by the one removed

from the K VIII when it was scrapped.

It was inevitable that the boat came to be called "Canine", reputedly due to its resemblance to a

pregnant bitch when propped up in the dry-dock.

Unfortunately as work proceeded an increasing number of faults came to light and progress was so

slow that Piggott was threatened with a court martial if the submarine was not immediately made

ready for sea. The officer did apologize the following day having no doubt reflected on the extent of

the problems with the boat and on how little influence a "pommie" officer would have on

Australian dockyard workers.

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K9 in the dry-dock at Cockatoo Island (Photo: © Collection John Eade)

Despite all the problems the boat was commissioned into the RAN on June 22, 1943, and was

expected to take up its duties in the middle of July. However yet more defects were detected and its

introduction to service slipped back to September and then to November. Following an

unsuccessful first attempt to dive additional ballast was added and the boat was officially handed

over to HMAS Rushcutter.

Although now officially operational the vessel still had one major problem, that of battery

reliability. It was not possible to fully charge the battery and poor ventilation of the battery

compartment was causing problems for the crew. This was again reported on December 15, 1943,

when it was reported that the battery had originally been installed in another submarine in 1932, had

last been serviced in 1939, and was of an obsolete pattern now abandoned by the Royal Navy. The

solution to the problem was to run the ventilator fans at a higher speed but this produced a chemical

reaction which threatened to damage the ventilator ducting and cause a whole new batch of

difficulties.

The whole problem of operating the K9 was solved at

0832 hours on January 22, 1944, when the battery

exploded, fortunately without injuring anyone. A

Board of Enquiry was convened on February 11,

1944, and it found the "the extraordinary low

efficiency of the battery's ventilating arrangements"

was responsible for the accident and that no blame

could be attached to either the dockyard staff or

ship's officers who had followed all laid down

instructions.

Engine room crew of K9. photo includes (peaked

caps) CERA Williams, Gorman, Green and Tindale

(Photo: © Collection John Eade).

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ISSUE #1 (March 2006)

Evidence had been presented at the enquiry that the boat had been in use for only a total of 31 days

since its commissioning.

It was a poor end to all the effort that had been put into making the Vessel serviceable and the RAN

decided to cut their losses and decommissioning of the submarine was approved on February 24,

1944.

The crew of the K9 was paid off on March 31, 1944, and the boat was converted to an oil lighter. It

was lost after breaking its tow on June 8, 1945, and being washed ashore on Fiona Beach, N.S.W. It

was subsequently sold for scrap to Messrs Humphrey & Batt of Sydney.

An attempt was made to obtain the K XII which was being used by the US Navy in Fremantle, but

this move was opposed by the USN on the grounds that the "K XII was a liability to the war effort."

Other attempts to obtain a training submarine from either Britain or the United States were equally

unsuccessful and it was not until April 18, 1967, that the RAN commissioned another submarine.

ISSUE # 2(June 2010)

ISSUE #1 (March 2006)

BACKGROUNDER # 87

The Dutch Connection

Section 4

World War II

• The Netherlands in World War II.Wikipedia 06.02.2006

• The Dutch Connection-Our Fourth Ally. Doug Hurst. Battle for Australia

website{Review by Mark C. Jones}

• Battle of the Java Sea. Wikipedia website

• Dutch and NEI soldiers and HMAS ARMIDALE .Extract from AWM 2002

History Conference Remembering 1942 HMAS ARMIDALE 1942 .Ian Hodges

• V1-Flying Bombs.AWM website

• Australian-Dutch Defence Co-operation 1940-41.Herman Bussemarkert. AWM

Journal # 29 November 1996

ISSUE # 2(June 2010)

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ISSUE #1( March 2006)

The Netherlands in World War II From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia 06.02.2006

Prelude to the War

In World War I the Netherlands succeeded in remaining neutral, although the sympathies were

clearly more on the German side than on the British. Relations with Germany had traditionally

been better and the memory of the Boer War was fresh. After the end of the war the Kaiser

Wilhelm II asked and was given asylum, much to the anger of both Britain and France. A

further consequence of the neutrality was that the country had no involvement in the Treaty of Versailles. In fact, the Dutch economy suffered from the financial consequences of the

reparation that Germany was made to pay. There was a large influx of children from Germany,

Austria and even Hungary who came to stay with Dutch fosterparents as conditions in the

hinterland worsened.

During the period between the first and second World Wars the Netherlands, like other

countries, suffered from the effects of the Great Depression after the Stock Market Crash of

1929.

Prime minister Hendrikus Colijn pursued the policy of a strong guilder. This led to a strong

currency, avoiding a possible hyperinflation such as had struck Germany in the early twenties,

but also causing much poverty by unemployment according to some economists: the Great

Depression was typified by deflation. The Vereniging Nederlands Fabrikaat (Dutch Product

Association) tried to reverse the economic downfall with a campaign Koopt Nederlandsche

waar, dan helpen wij elkaar (Buy Dutch goods, so we help each other).

The poverty caused by the Great Depression helped the rise of some Nazism in the Netherlands.

Anton Mussert founded the Nazist Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging (National Socialist Movement or NSB). It got almost no votes (about eight percent maximum), but was during the

occupation made the only allowed political party in the Netherlands.

Under the influence of the economic depression and the Broken Guns movement, the budget of

the Ministry of War (today Ministry of Defence) wasn't allowed to increase much.

The outbreak of the war

The two sides of a WWII 'Ausweis' or 'Persoonsbewijs' (identification)

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At the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, the Netherlands declared itself neutral once

again as in World War I. In order to flank the French defences on the Maginot Line and to pre-

empt a possible British invasion, on May 10, 1940 Germany invaded the Netherlands, starting

the Battle of the Netherlands, and Belgium. Given the historically good relations with its much

larger neighbour, the invasion came as big surprise to most Dutch, but the army had been

warned by Hans Oster, a German officer.

The poorly equipped Dutch army was quickly defeated by the Germans. At the Afsluitdijk, the Grebbeberg and Dordrecht the Dutch Army offered strong resistance. A German airborne

landing at The Hague, intended to capture the Dutch royal family and the government, failed.

The royal family and government escaped to Britain to continue the fight (although some saw

this as an act of cowardice).

On May 14 the Germans demanded the surrender of the port of Rotterdam, threatening to bomb

the city. Soon after the ultimatum it surrendered. However, bombers that had already been sent

were not called back and the city was thus still heavily bombed, resulting in approximately 800

deaths and 78,000 homeless. This was supposedly caused by a communications difficulty. After this bombardment the Dutch army surrendered, but the battle continued in Zeeland for a few

days, until the bombardment of Middelburg forced Zeeland to surrender as well.

People were hoping to be liberated quickly by the French and British, but after the evacuation

from Dunkirk, where the Allies's armies barely escaped being surrounded, France surrendered.

The new regime in Vichy began collaborating with the Germans. The government of Prime

Minister Dirk Jan de Geer was invited to return as well. He wanted to accept this invitation but

Queen Wilhelmina did not approve it.

The Dutch navy, merchant navy and the oil reserves of Dutch East Indies were of great

importance to the British. After Germany forced Vichy France to hand over Indochina to Japan,

Queen Wilhelmina was afraid the same thing would happen to the East Indies. She herself

dismissed her Prime Minister and assigned another (Pieter Gerbrandy), who did want to

continue fighting.

Gleichschaltung

The German policy in the Netherlands was called Gleichschaltung. Gleichschaltung means

'making equal' in english. This policy had two aims. One was that an end should be made to

pillarization and the differences between the working class and the bourgoisie. Another aim was

that the Dutch nation was to be dissolved and become part of a Germanic or Aryan nation of lords, Herrenvolk. The German occupation authorities tried to change the society step by step,

so the Dutch population would not be antigonized.

This policy was a complete failure mainly due to the loss of the war and because of the

economic recession. The national-socialist ideology was alien to the approach of different

Dutch ideologies. Humanism was an important element in all of the main Dutch ideologies.

German atrocities led to public resentment against the German occupation regime. Before 1943,

the German position was so strong, that many Dutch citizens started to cooperate with the

Germans, while the majority of the Dutch population was indifferent or remained silent. Dutch nationalism was very vivid which became apparent in 1943, when the Germans started to lose

the war. The Germans lost nearly the complete control over the Dutch society, which formed

one front against the Germans and Dutch people associated with the Germans.

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German officials were divided on the matter if the Dutch were conquered foreigners or Aryan

bloodbrothers. Most Germans regarded themselves as German nationalists, but the most

important German officials, including the SS, Arthur Seyss-Inquart and Adolf Hitler regarded

the Dutch as part of the Aryan Herrenvolk. Nevertheless, nearly no Dutch people fought on the

German side, but the allies could count on warm sympathies of the Dutch population, which

was expressed by the railwaystrike of 1944 during Operation Market Garden. Seyss-Inquart was

so angry, that he stopped the transfer of food from the eastern Netherlands to the major cities in

the west, thereby contributing to the hongerwinter. The German regime became extreme hard in 1944/1945 against the Dutch 'traitors.' Suspects of terrorism were shot on the side, while

hundreds of bystanders were forced to watch on point blank for instance.

Persecution of Jews

Shortly after the invasion the Persecution of Jews began. The Germans established a

government with the Austrian Arthur Seyss-Inquart as leader. They also established a "Jewish

Board". Mainly this was a way of organising the identification and deportation of Jews more

efficiently. A substantial number of people from the diamond business organised this 'Board'

and the Jews were told they were safe, as long as they all came to register themselves. Only a few disagreed, mainly because it 'would jeopardise the Jewish community'. The Dutch

people did not offer much resistance at that time either and a possible Allied victory seemed far

away. When the Germans had gathered enough information they broke all promises and started

deporting the Jews. In 1942 a transit camp was built near Westerbork by converting an existing

internment camp for immigrants; at Vught and Amersfoort German concentration camps were

built as well. At the end of the war only 30,000 of the 140,000 Dutch Jews survived. Two of the

victims were Anne Frank, and Etty Hillesum who became famous years later because of the

diary they produced in the years up to their executions.

The Dutch people reacted with a strike (the February Strike) as a protest against the

deportations. Although the strike did not accomplish much, it was a major setback for Seyss-

Inquart because he had planned to both deport the Jews and to win the Dutch for the Nazi cause.

From then on the Nazis treated the Dutch more strictly.

Part of the reason that it was so easy for the Germans to round up the Jews was that the Dutch

had registered their population in too much detail, including information about their religion. To

this day, this is used as an argument in the Netherlands that such detailed registration is a bad

idea.

There has been some criticism of Dutch Railways (NS) for helping the deportations by not

going on strike. But there was little knowledge of what exactly was going to happen to the Jews

and the trains were essential in other terrains. As an example of how much they were needed

the later 'Hungerwinter' (see below) can be given. Another organisation later accused of

assisting the deportation is the Dutch police: most Jews were in fact apprehended by them and

not by actual Germans.

Oppression and resistance

An Arbeitseinsatz was imposed on the Netherlands, which obliged every man between 18 and 45 to work in the German factories, which were bombed regularly by the western Allies. Those

who refused to work in German factories were forced to go underground. As food and many

other goods were taken out of the Netherlands, rationing (with ration cards) became a way of

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controlling the population. Any Dutch that violated German laws, such as hiding or hiding

another, automatically lost their food. Hiding Jews was even more dangerous as it was

punishable by death - one third of the people who hid Jews did not survive the war.

The Atlantic Wall, a gigantic coastal defence line built by the Germans along the entire

European coast from South France to Denmark and Norway stretched into the Netherlands too.

Some towns, like Scheveningen, were evacuated because of this. In the Hague 3200 houses

were demolished and 2594 were dismantled. 20,000 houses were cleared, and 65,000 people

were forced to move. The Arbeitseinsatz also included forcing Dutch people to work on these projects, but a passive form of resistance took place here by working slowly or doing such a bad

job that it had to be done again.

Due to the censorship, the radio and newspapers were only allowed to deliver the news

approved by the Germans. Obviously this only reported the positive results of the German war

effort. These news messages were not able to hide the unfavourable completely; after all, the

German 'victories' in Russia kept coming closer to Germany. Listening to Radio Oranje (Radio

Orange), Dutch-speaking broadcasts from London, was prohibited.

These measures of oppression stimulated the resistance movement. Illegal newspapers with the

news from Radio Oranje were spread. Some people stole to obtain ration cards, to feed people

in hiding.

In February 1943, the Amsterdam-based resistance cell CS-6 assassinated Luitenant-Generaal

Hendrik A. Seyffardt, the figurehead of the SS-Freiwilligen-Legion Niederlande and a major

Dutch collaborator with ties to the NSB.

Acts of resistance were met with increasing German brutality. After an assault on a German officer near Putten the entire male population of the town was deported to a concentration camp

without trial.

Members of the underground resistance in the Netherlands included Hannie Schaft.

In order for the resistance to do its work it was sometimes necessary to act as if they were

collaborating with the Germans. After the war this led to problems if they couldn't prove they

had been in the resistance - which was difficult because it was the nature of the job to keep it a

secret.

Some even decided to keep their underground activities a secret after the war because they

didn't want to brag about what they had done. Such was the case in Valkenburg. This led to a

problem for historians, who couldn't find any information on any resistance there, so they

claimed there wasn't any. See Valkenburg resistance, also as an example of how such resistance

worked.

Dutch volunteers in the German armed forces

Not all Dutch offered active or passive resistance against the German occupation. Some Dutch

chose to serve with the German armed forces. A great number of Dutch men were forced to

work in the German war industry, these men were often seen as traitors after the war even though they hadn't had any options during the war.

The NSB, a fascist party, collaborated actively with the German occupants. In 1941, when

Germany still seemed certain to win the war, about three percent of the adult male population

was member of the NSB. There were also Dutch who voluntarily enlisted in the German army

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and the Waffen SS to take part in the so-called Crusade against Bolshevism or against

communism in general.

Between 25,000 and 30,000 Dutch served in the Heer and the Waffen-SS, the most notable

formations being the 4.SS-Freiwilligen-Panzergrenadier-Brigade Nederland and the Landstorm

Nederland. Apart from brief combat during Operation Market Garden, these units saw action

exclusively on the Eastern Front against the Soviet Union.

The Nederland brigade distinguished itself on the Eastern Front during the Battle of Narva

(1944), with several troopers receiving the Knight's Cross, Germany's highest award for

bravery.

The last year

After the Allied landing in Normandy in June 1944, the western Allies rapidly advanced in the

direction of the Dutch border. Tuesday September 5 is known as Dolle dinsdag (Mad Tuesday)

- the Dutch began celebrating, believing they were close to liberation. In September the Allies

tried to capture the bridges over the main rivers (Operation Market Garden) but they failed in

Arnhem. The northern part of the country above the Rhine river delta had to wait until 1945 to

be liberated.

However a part of the south of the Netherlands was not liberated either - the Germans still

occupied Walcheren. From here they controlled the approaches to the port of Antwerp. And the

Allies needed a large supply port as the ports in Normandy were too limited and far away. On

October 24 the Canadian 2nd Division took the Kreekkrakdam after some fierce fighting. The

next day they were able to liberate the town of Rilland Bath. The Scottish 52nd Lowland

Division landed on the south coast of Zuid-Beveland. On October 30 Zuid-Beveland was

completely liberated.

To capture the approaches to the port of Antwerp, the British and Canadians also needed

Walcheren. But the strong German defense made a landing very difficult. Therefore the dikes of

Walcheren at Westkapelle were bombed. Walcheren was flooded. In spite of warning the

people with pamphlets, 180 inhabitants of Westkappelle died. The dikes at Vlissingen and

Veere were bombed too.

The Dutch government did not want to use the old water line in 1940. It was still possible to

create an island out of Holland by destroying dykes and flooding the polders, but this island

contained the main cities. There were too many people to keep alive. However, Hitler ordered Festung Holland to be held at any price. The winter of 1944-1945 was very severe, and this

lead to hunger journeys and people who starved to death (about 30,000), exhaustion, cold or

disease. This winter is known as the Hongerwinter (Hungerwinter). The food situation was

aggravated by a general railway strike ordered by the Dutch government in exile in expectation

of a general German collapse near the end of 1944.

On the island of Texel 800 Georgians, part of the German army, rebelled on April 5, 1945.

Their rebellion was crushed by the German army after two weeks of battle. 565 Georgians, 120

inhabitants of Texel and 800 Germans died. The 228 surviving Georgians were forcibly repatriated after the war.

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After the capture of the Rhine bridge at Remagen, Canadian forces entered the Netherlands

from the east, liberating the eastern and northern provinces. The western provinces, where the

situation was worst, however, had to wait until the surrender of German forces in the

Netherlands was negotiated on the eve of May 5, 1945 (three days before the general

capitulation of Germany), in hotel De Wereld (The World) in Wageningen. Previously the

Swedish Red Cross had been allowed to provide relief efforts, the most memorable ones

employing Allied bombers dropping food over the German-occupied territories in Operation

Manna.

After liberation, Dutch citizens began taking the law into their own hands as in other liberated

countries such as France. Collaborators and moffenmeiden(Hun's girls) were abused and

humiliated in public, usually by having their heads shaven and painted orange.

Dutch East Indies and the war against Japan

On January 10, 1942 the Japanese invaded the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia). Dutch navy

ships in the Dutch East Indies joined the ABDA fleet (American-British-Dutch-Australian fleet)

commanded by Dutch admiral Karel Doorman. On February 27 and 28 1942, Admiral Doorman

was ordered to take the offensive against the Japanese. The ABDA fleet encountered the

Japanese at the Battle of the Java Sea, Doorman then gave the order to attack. However the ABDA fleet was destroyed in the ensuing battle. The words in which Doorman is alleged to

have given the order to attack were "Ik val aan, volg mij!" (I attack, follow me!), although he

never literally said that (in reality the order was "All ships follow me").

After Japanese troops had landed on Java, the Dutch surrendered on March 1 1942. Dutch

soldiers were imprisoned in labour camps. Later all Dutch were captured and sent to camps,

some were deported to Japan or set to work on the Thai-Burma Railway.

Dutch submarines escaped and resumed the fight on with the Allies. As a part of the Allied forces they were on the hunt for Japanese oil transports to Japan and troop and weapon

transports from Japan headed for the other battlefields (including New Guinea).

Several Dutch army and navy pilots also escaped, and with Dutch aircraft purchased from the

United States formed Royal Australian Air Force No. 18 Squadron (B-25 Mitchells) and No.

120 Squadron (P-40 Kittyhawks). These squadrons helped defend Australia from the Japanese

and participated in the eventual liberation of the Netherlands East Indies. [1]

Gradually, control of the Netherlands East Indies was wrested away from the Japanese. The largest Allied invasion took place in July 1945 with Australian landings on the island of

Borneo, ostensibly to seize the strategic oilfields from the now cut-off Japanese forces.

However, the Japanese had already begun independence negotiations with Indonesian

nationalists such as Sukarno - and Indonesian forces had themselves taken over control of a

sizeable portion of Sumatra and Java. The Japanese surrender on August 15 1945 precipitated

outright conflict between British, Dutch, Australian and American forces on one side and

Indonesian forces on the other.

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After the war

After the war some people who were thought to have collaborated with the Germans were

murdered or punished without trial. Others were sentenced by the Ministry of Justice. Some

proved to have been arrested unjustly, and were cleared of charges, sometimes after having

been in custody for a long period of time.

There were plans to annexate a sizeable portion of Germany, either without or with German

population — which in the latter case would have to be 'dutchified' — doubling the Netherlands in surface. This plan was dropped after an allied refusal. But a plan that was executed to some

extent was Black Tulip, the deportation of all holders of German passports in the Netherlands.

In the end several thousand Germans were deported.

The bank credits of killed Jewish Dutch are still subjects of trials more than half a century later.

The end of the war also meant the final loss of the Netherlands East Indies from Dutch control.

Following the surrender of the Japanese in the Netherlands East Indies, Indonesian nationalists

fought a four year Indonesian war of independence against Dutch and British Commonwealth

forces, eventually leading to the Dutch recognition of the independence of Indonesia. Many Dutch and Indonesians emigrated or returned to the Netherlands at this time, resulting in a

lasting Indonesian influence in Dutch culture and cuisine.

World War II has left many trails on the Dutch society. On May 4 the Dutch commemorate the

people who died during the war. Among the living there are many who still have emotional

problems due to the war, the first generation as well as the second. In the year 2000 the

government still granted 24,000 people a yearly payment (among them are victims from later

wars too, for example the war in Korea).

ISSUE # 2(June 2010)

1 ISSUE #1(March 2006)

The Dutch Connection - Our Fourth Ally

by Doug Hurst { Reproduced with Permission}

Such was the scale of the Battle for Australia that many smaller contributions have been absorbed into the broad sweep of greater events, or simply lost in the mists of time. So it is with the Dutch. They too fought from Australia against the Japanese during the dark days of 1942-43 and continued the fight until the Pacific War was over, but their contribution is largely forgotten today.

Most came from Indonesia (then the Netherlands East Indies) following the Japanese invasion in early 1942, but men from occupied Holland and elsewhere also contributed. Although numbering just a few thousand, these Dutch forces fought above their weight in some vital areas.

The cruiser Tromp,one of four Australian-based Dutch warships that operated with Allied navies in the

Pacific and Indian Oceans in WW II

DUTCH MERCHANT SHIPS CARRIED AUSTRALIAN TROOPS AND SUPPLIES

The most important Dutch contribution was ships, especially merchant ships. The geography of the war made merchant ships a critical factor for both sides. The Japanese had to re-supply forces spread over a vast area, much of it thousands of kilometres from Japan and other supply sources. Some Allied supply lines were even longer - much of their military hardware came from the USA - and the Allies were using an island continent as a base from which to fight a war in islands and countries spread throughout a vast ocean. To win, the Allies needed many ships of all kinds, including the humblest of merchantmen.

2 ISSUE #1(March 2006)

Even today, aircraft could carry only the tip of the iceberg of military needs to a Pacific war. This was even more so sixty years ago with the tiny transport aircraft of the times. Merchant ships carried virtually everything. Passenger liners were pressed into service as troop ships; their speed and capacity becoming a key part of the Allied capability. Some liners become hospital ships. The Oranje, a Royal Netherlands Line ship, is one of the best remembered, carrying 32,461 sick and wounded Allied patients on over 40 voyages and operating from a number of Australian ports.

This Royal Netherlands Line ship operated from Australia as a hospital ship during the Battle for

Australia.

Indeed, almost everything that went to and from the Pacific War went by ship. In 1942, that most critical year, 19 of the 27 merchant ships that sailed to and from Australia were Dutch. Most were from KPM, the East Indies shipping line that had grown to more than 150 ships by the late 1930s. KPM had lost 79 ships during the Japanese invasion, and was now continuing operations from safer allied ports throughout the world.

Initially concentrated in Sydney where the company already had a base, KPM ships operated from most east coast ports, carrying some 100,000 Allied troops and over a million tons of cargo to the Pacific War during 1942-43. They remained a vital part of the Allied war effort until the end of the war.

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DUTCH MILITARY SUPPORT IN THE BATTLE FOR AUSTRALIA

Dutch warships and flying boats fought in the Battle for Australia

For protection, merchant ships were formed up into convoys whenever possible and escorted by warships. In Australia's case, convoy escort included everything from protecting oil tankers crossing the Indian Ocean, to looking after troop ships headed into the Pacific, and much in between. Warships were also needed for general sea control over large areas and offensive operations against land targets. As a result, the allies needed warships in large numbers to fight and support the Pacific War.

The Dutch contributed a cruiser, three destroyers, a minesweeper and varying numbers of submarines. The first to arrive - in late February 1942 - was the light cruiser RNN Tromp, then one of ten Royal Netherlands Navy (RNN) warships in Indonesia, along with 15 submarines, 13 motor torpedo boats, some mine warfare craft, and 64 flying boats.

Tromp was sent to Australia for battle-damage repairs just before most of the RNN surface fleet and eight submarines were destroyed in the Battle of the Java Sea and its aftermath. A minesweeper, disguised as an island during the day, escaped to Fremantle - as did three submarines, all much in need of repairs. One submarine was scrapped. The other two were repaired and operated from the big Allied submarine base at Fremantle, mostly on covert support of clandestine operations in occupied Indonesian territory.

This Dutch-owned and manned B-25 Mitchell bomber from RAAF No. 18 Squadron is operating from a

Northern Territory base.

The flying boats fared better. Many had joined an air-shuttle flying key personnel out of Indonesia to Australia via Broome. Fifteen flying boats were in Roebuck Bay near Broome on 3 March 1942 when Japanese Zeros from Timor attacked. All the flying boats and some other Allied aircraft were destroyed, and a hundred or more people killed. The remaining RNN flying boats mostly made it to Australia, some going on to RAAF service, and others relocating to Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) to fly Indian Ocean sorties to help protect oil convoys and Allied shipping in general.

As a result, Tromp was the only RNN surface warship from Indonesia able to relocate to Australia. This good fortune held for the entire war, during which she survived many battles and become known to her crew as "the lucky ship". Perhaps her most remarkable survival was during an attack on Sabang Island, just north of Sumatra, on 25 July 1944. Tromp entered the harbour with orders to destroy port installations and oil tanks. The battle was fierce, with Tromp taking three hits from enemy shells.

4 ISSUE #1(March 2006)

Remarkably, none exploded and the crew wrapped two of the still hot shells in blankets and dumped them overboard. Her prolonged survival against such odds seems to have got under the skin of the Japanese who claimed (via Tokyo Rose) to have rid themselves of her a number of times, but never did.

Following repairs, in mid-1942 she was sent to Fremantle for Indian Ocean convoy duties, adding further to Dutch warship numbers sailing with Allied fleets. Most were RNN ships from the Netherlands that had escaped to England ahead of the German invasion. Three such ships, the destroyers Jacob van

Heemskerk, Van Galen and Tjerk Hiddes, joined Tromp soon after her arrival in Fremantle. Like Tromp, they served throughout the war on escort duties and offensive operations against the Japanese.

Dutch air support in the Battle for Australia

Also, military aircraft bought and paid for, but still in the pipe-line when the Japanese invaded, began arriving in Australia during the first half of 1942. Along with the aircraft flown in from Indonesia by Dutch aircrew relocated to fight on, this gave the Dutch more than 120 aircraft in Australia. Support personnel were too few in number, however, for the Dutch to quickly form effective squadrons. They reluctantly transferred most of their aircraft to their US and Australian allies soon after arriving - a frustration for the Dutch, but a most welcome boost to Allied airpower at a critical time.

The biggest purchase was 162 B-25 Mitchell bombers, the first of which began arriving in Australia during the first months of 1942. Early arrivals were commandeered by the Americans for immediate duty in New Guinea, but by mid-year the Dutch were establishing a B-25 bomber squadron in Canberra. An RAAF squadron, No. 18, it was commanded by Dutch officers, but part manned by the RAAF who also exercised operational control. Orders were printed in Dutch and English, and such was the mix of personnel that at one parade the CO addressed the squadron in English, Dutch and Bahasa (Indonesian).

Despite some language difficulties, the squadron was very effective. For most of the war it operated from the Northern Territory, mainly from Batchelor airfield just south of Darwin, attacking Japanese ground targets around the Timor Sea and specialising in anti-shipping operations, often in conjunction with other RAAF squadrons. In mid-1945, the squadron transferred to Balikpapan in eastern Borneo and was there at war's end.

A Kittyhawk fighter squadron, No 120, was also formed in Canberra the next year (1943) along with a unit to provide training for and support to northern operations. Like No. 18 Squadron, both were RAAF units commanded by Dutch officers, flew Dutch-owned aircraft under RAAF operational control and were part manned by RAAF personnel. The Kittyhawks were stationed in Merauke, on the south side of Dutch New Guinea (West New Guinea) for most of the war. They often operated with RAAF squadrons in the area and moved north to Biak in mid-1945.

Two transport flights were formed in Melbourne and Brisbane respectively, flying mostly C-47 Dakotas, Lockheed Lodestars and some converted B-25s to support the Dutch operational squadrons and the Allies in general. The two flights were merged late in the war to become No. 19 Squadron, again with RAAF support.

The Dutch Army in Australia

The Dutch Army in Australia numbered just a few hundred for most of the war, and concentrated on specialist areas such as intelligence and interpreter services to the Allied forces operating in reclaimed

5 ISSUE #1(March 2006)

Dutch territory. The intelligence work often involved operating within occupied territory or supporting those who did, and casualties in both roles were high. Like their colleagues in the air and at sea they also took the fight to the enemy.

A Memorial in Canberra honours the Dutch who fought in the Battle for Australia

A memorial to the Dutch is located in Blamey Square, in the Defence Complex in Canberra, a site it shares with the much better known American memorial with its eagle atop a soaring column. This siting symbolises the fact that the Americans and the Dutch were the only non-Commonwealth countries that fought from Australia in the Pacific War. Hopefully, the siting will also ensure that the contribution of the Dutch to the Battle for Australia is better known in the future than it is today.

THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE IN AUSTRALIA

The Dutch Government also fled the German invasion, relocating to England to form a government-in-exile. Small in number, they reluctantly gave up much control of the East Indies to the colonial government. With the Japanese invasion, the colonial government also had to flee, mostly to Australia, where they had already prepared the ground by pre-positioning key personnel and considerable wealth. Eventually, a government-in exile was also formed in Australia, operating mainly from Wacol near Brisbane. The two governments-in-exile used funds transferred before the respective invasions and tapped into Dutch wealth in Allied and neutral countries to fund their war efforts. As a result, Dutch forces in Australia largely paid their own way.

A more detailed account of the Dutch forces in Australia is available in the book "The Fourth Ally". Written by retired RAAF Group Captain, Doug Hurst, it may be obtained from the author at 43 Percy Crescent CHAPMAN ACT 2611 for $30, which includes postage and packing to any Australian address. For details regarding commercial orders, multiple order discounts and overseas orders, contact the author on phone/fax: 02 6288 6195, or email: [email protected]

The Fourth Ally tells of the Dutch forces who fought from Australia against the Japanese during WW II. Driven by the Japanese from Indonesia (then the Netherlands East Indies), they relocated ships, aircraft and personnel to Australia. They joined with United States, British and Australian forces as the fourth ally, providing the bulk of allied merchant shipping in the Pacific War, operating a fleet of warships and submarines, flying bomber, fighter and transport aircraft, and running specialist army units supporting allied forces.

6 ISSUE #1(March 2006)

THE FOURTH ALLY

Reviewed March 2002 by Mark C. Jones, Manchester, USA.

Rating: Good.

Doug Hurst tells the story of the Dutch contribution to the war in the Pacific theatre. Using the stories of former Dutch servicemen, Hurst weaves together the story of the Netherlands armed forces from the pre-war years of 1938-39 through the immediate post-war period of 1945-1948. The author attempts to cover the entire range of the Dutch contribution to the Allied cause but the emphasis is mostly on aviation and naval units. Dutch land forces were virtually non-existent in Australia because so few soldiers had been evacuated from the Netherlands East Indies (N.E.I.). While units of the Royal Netherlands Navy are mentioned throughout the story, the Dutch squadrons within the Royal Australian Air Force are clearly the focus of Hurst’s story. (The author is a former RAAF officer). Also included in the story are the sailors of the Dutch shipping company KPM (Koninklijke Paketvaart-Maatschappij) who with other Allied merchant mariners played a crucial role in the Allied victory.

The Fourth Ally is not an exhaustive study of the role of Dutch forces in the Pacific theatre during World War II. The author acknowledges this, stating that he was attempting to make known the story of Dutch Australians, not to write an official campaign history. This he does capably, interspersing anecdotes and pictures from Dutch servicemen with an explanation of the larger campaigns of the war. The selection of which personal stories to include seems to be determined by who the author had met among the former Dutch servicemen. Instead of tracking down one or more servicemen from each Dutch ship or squadron and then combining their stories, the author seems to have based his book on the stories of those former servicemen he knows in Australia. This process produced a somewhat representative story but certainly not a comprehensive treatment of the experiences of Dutch service personnel. Among the approximately twenty men who shared their wartime experiences with Hurst are marines from the light cruiser Tromp, an officer from the submarine K-15, numerous pilots and aircrew from the air service of the Netherlands East Indies Army, and several men who fought in the army or marines in the post-war struggle against the Indonesian nationalists.

There are two topics that come out in Hurst’s treatment of the topic that have not appeared to my knowledge in other English-language sources that address the Dutch armed forces during World War II. The first is the difference of attitude and experience of personnel who were from the N.E.I. as opposed to the Netherlands proper. Hurst indicates (p. 54) that men from the N.E.I. had a different view on colonial social structures than European Dutch. N.E.I. Dutch were also more likely to recognize that Dutch control over the islands was likely to change as a result of the war. The second is the issue of ethnicity in the Dutch armed forces (pp. 74-76). The units that escaped to Australia included Dutchmen from both Europe and the NEI, men of mixed European and Indonesian origin, and native Indonesians. Many of the Indonesian men wished to return to the islands, seeing the war as lost, and some Australian and American officials initially objected to these ethnically diverse units out of racial prejudice. The inclusion of these two issues is noteworthy and will appeal to any reader with an interest in military sociology.

One topic covered by the book that seemed to fall outside the declared scope of the book is the post-war struggle by the Dutch to reassume control over the islands. While some of the Dutch aviation units needed to regain control over the N.E.I. were based in Australia and needed Australian logistical support, the majority of the Dutch armed forces were in the islands and under British strategic direction. The

7 ISSUE #1(March 2006)

experiences of Dutch men who served in the army or marines are certainly interesting but they appear to fall outside of the time frame of the story (World War II) and the location of the story (Australia). The book would be more effective if it dispensed with the post-war chapters and instead more thoroughly covered the wartime experiences of Dutch personnel resident in Australia.

The strengths of this book are several. First, the subject is one that has yet to be covered adequately in English so this book is a useful addition to the literature. Second, the use of personal stories and pictures gives the book a flavour that is lacking in conventional military history writing. Third, the book is well illustrated with 71 black and white photographs plus six maps and four other illustrations. Fourth, the story is easy to follow and smoothly expressed, again something not always found in books on military topics.

The book also has several weaknesses. First, the book overemphasizes the role of the aviation units incorporated within the RAAF (such as 18 Squadron) and neglects some of the naval units, specifically the surface ships and submarines based at Fremantle. Second, with just a few exceptions, the author does not indicate the source of arguments about the direction of the war or statistics on forces involved. Third, the bibliography lacks many published sources that a reader can use to check the author’s account or read further on the subject. Those published sources that are included often lack a complete citation. Fourth, some minor errors relating to naval forces slipped through the editing process such as claiming that the light cruiser Tromp could steam at 40 knots (p. 16), referring to the ships of the U.S. Navy’s 58th Destroyer Division as torpedo boats (p. 29), referring to the anti-aircraft cruiser Heemskerck as a destroyer (p. 68), and giving the name of the Royal Navy’s Eastern Fleet commander, Admiral Sir James Somerville, as Summerville (p. 122).

In summary, The Fourth Ally is an interesting, highly readable account of an aspect of World War II that has not been told before. It tells the story through the experiences of Dutch veterans who now live in Australia. Readers who seek a study comparable to the two volume series on the RAN during World War II by G. Hermon Gill (1968, reprinted 1985 by William Collins, Sydney) will need to wait for such a book to be written in English. For readers whose interest in naval history is more general, this book will be a pleasant read. Since the book is not distributed by a commercial publisher, potential readers will need to contact the author to obtain a copy. The address from the copyright declaration is: 43 Percy Crescent, Chapman, ACT 2611. (see footnote1).

Reviewed March 2002 by Mark C. Jones. Mark C. Jones, Manchester, Connecticut, USA.

First published in the January-March 2002 issue of the Australian magazine "The Navy". Published on this site with the kind permission of the editor, Mr. Mark Schweikert.

ISSUE # 2(June 2010)

10/27/2005 06:20 AMBattle of the Java Sea - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

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Battle of the Java Sea

Japanese cruiser Haguro (pictured) sank HNLMS De

Ruyter, killing Admiral Karel Doorman

Conflict: World War II, Pacific War

Date: February 27, 1942 - March 1, 1942

Place: Java Sea

Outcome: Decisive Japanese victory

Combatants

United States

Netherlands

United Kingdom

Australia

Japan

Commanders

Karel Doorman Takeo Takagi

Strength

5 cruisers

12 destroyers

4 cruisers

14 destroyers

transports

Casualties

5 cruisers sunk

5 destroyers sunk

2,300 sailors killed

2 ships damaged

4 loaded troop transports sunk

Pacific Campaign 1941-42

Pearl Harbor – Thailand – Malaya – Hong Kong –

Philippines – Force Z – Wake Island – Bataan –

Corregidor – Borneo – Rabaul – Balikpapan – Ambon –

Singapore – Makassar Strait – Palembang – Darwin –

Badung Strait – Timor – Java Sea – Java –

Indian Ocean – Doolittle Raid – Coral Sea – Midway

Battle of the Java Sea

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.

The Battle of the Java Sea was a major naval battle of the

Pacific campaign of World War II. Allied ships suffered a

disastrous defeat at the hand of the Imperial Japanese Navy, in

action over several days in February-March 1942. The action

included the smaller, but also significant Battle of Sunda Strait.

It was the largest surface engagement since the Battle of Jutland

in World War I.

Contents

1 Background

2 The main action

3 Battle of Sunda Strait

4 Consequences

Background

The Japanese invasion of the Netherlands East Indies progressed

at a rapid pace as they advanced from their Palau Islands colony

and captured bases in Sarawak and the southern Philippines.

They seized bases in eastern Borneo and in northern Celebes

while troop convoys, screened by destroyers and cruisers with air

support provided by swarms of fighters operating from captured

bases, steamed southward through the Makassar Strait and into

the Molucca Sea. To oppose these invading forces was a small

force, consisting mostly of American and Dutch warships, many

of them of World War I vintage, under the command of Admiral

Thomas C. Hart.

On January 23, 1942 a force of four American destroyers

attacked a Japanese invasion convoy in Makassar Strait as it

approached Balikpapan in Borneo. On February 13, the

remaining Dutch and American ships, under the command of

Dutch Admiral Karel Doorman, fought the Battle of Palembang,

an unsuccessful attempt to prevent the Japanese from capturing

the major oil port in eastern Sumatra. On February 19, the

Japanese First Air Fleet, under Admiral Chuichi Nagumo,

attacked and wrecked the port at Darwin in northern Australia

which rendered it useless as a supply and naval base to support

operations in the East Indies.

Shortly before the Battle of Java Sea commenced, the odds

were not good for the ABDA forces. The Allies were disunited (ships came from four separate navies) and

demoralized by constant air attacks and the impending fear of doom. In addition, there was no coordination between

Allied navies and air forces. Yet Admiral Doorman vowed to engage the Japanese at all costs.

10/27/2005 06:20 AMBattle of the Java Sea - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

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The main action

The Japanese amphibious forces now gathered to strike at Java, and on February 27 1942, the main American-British-

Dutch-Australian Command (ABDACOM) naval force, under Doorman, sailed northeast from Surabaya to intercept a

convoy approaching from the Makassar Strait. The ABDA force consisted of two heavy cruisers (HMS Exeter, USS

Houston) and three light cruisers (HNLMS De Ruyter (Doorman's flagship), HNLMS Java, HMAS Perth), and nine

destroyers (HMS Electra, HMS Encounter, HMS Jupiter, HNLMS Kortenaer, HNLMS Witte de With, USS Alden,

USS John D. Edwards, USS John D. Ford, USS Pope and USS Paul Jones.

The Japanese convoy was escorted by two heavy (Nachi, Haguro ) and two light cruisers (Naka, Jintsu) and fourteen

destroyers (Yudachi, Samidare, Murasame, Harusame, Minegumo, Asagumo, Yukikaze, Tokitsukaze, Amatsukaze,

Hatsukaze, Yamakaze, Kawakaze, Sazanami, and Ushio) under the command of Rear Admiral Shoji Nishimura. The

Japanese heavy cruisers were much more powerful, armed with ten 8-in (203 mm) guns each and superb torpedoes.

The Allied heavy cruisers were armed only with six guns each. The ABDA force engaged the Japanese in the Java

Sea, and battle raged intermittently from mid-afternoon to midnight as the Allies tried to attack the troop transports,

but were repulsed by superior firepower and supporting aircraft. The Dutch cruisers and a number of destroyers were

sunk, mostly by long lance torpedoes. Doorman went down with De Ruyter. Exeter was heavily damaged and limped

back to Sunda Strait with an escort of two destroyers. The four American destroyers were detached to refuel.

Battle of Sunda Strait

Only the cruisers HMAS Perth and USS Houston remained, the latter having sustained damage to its aft turret. The

two ships arrived at Tanjung Priok on February 28 where they received orders to sail through Sunda Strait to

Tjilatjap. By chance, on the night of March 1, 1942, they encountered a Japanese amphibious landing force including

aircraft carriers, battleships, three cruisers and ten destroyers, near Batavia. The two Allied cruisers managed to sink

four loaded troop transports before being overwhelmed and sunk.

Consequences

A further two American destroyers were sunk as they attempted to escape to Australia. The main ABDA naval force

had been almost totally destroyed: 10 ships and approximately 2,173 sailors had been lost. The Battle of the Java Sea

ended significant Allied naval operations in south east Asia during 1942, and Japanese land forces invaded Java on

February 28. They quickly overran the island. The remnants of the ABDA land forces surrendered on March 9.

Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Java_Sea"

Categories: Naval battles | Naval battles of World War II | World War II operations and battles of the Pacific

Campaign

This page was last modified 11:57, 16 September 2005.All text is available under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License (see Copyrights fordetails).

1

ISSUE #1(March 2006)

Dutch and NEI soldiers

and

HMAS ARMIDALE {Extract from2002 History Conference - Remembering 1942 HMAS Armidale 1942 Ian Hodges}

………..When Armidale and Castlemaine left Darwin shortly after midnight on 29 November 1942,

Armidale was crowded with its own crew of 83, 3 AIF Bren gunners, and the (two)Dutch (officers)

and (61) NEI soldiers. The slower Kuru had left Darwin the previous night. Early the next morning

the corvettes were seen by Japanese airmen. Once they'd been spotted, Castlemaine's captain, and

the operation's senior officer, Lieutenant Commander P. J. Sullivan radioed Darwin requesting that

the operation be postponed. There was nowhere other than Timor that they could be going and there

were at least ten hours of daylight between them and their destination. Japanese aircraft based on

Timor would have ample opportunity to try and sink the two ships.

………..The first attack came at around 1.00 pm. Armidale managed to avoid the Japanese bombs

and she survived. But at around three the crew confronted a much more menacing situation. This

time 13 Japanese planes circled beyond the range of Armidale's guns. Richards sent out a last

desperate plea for air support and the crew braced themselves. The planes circled for about 20

minutes, and then they split up into groups and attacked from four directions at once. Armidale's

gunners were overwhelmed, and this time the Japanese attacked with torpedoes rather than bombs.

The first one hit just near the mess deck, killing more than half of the NEI troops and

wounding many of the rest. Already, the Armidale was taking on water. ….

Armidale sank within three minutes of the first torpedo hitting, but for the next twenty minutes the

planes flew back and forth over the scene, machine-gunning the men in the water. Some men

sought safety by diving, others, held afloat by their life jackets, just had to hope. ….

When they were able to take stock, it turned out that, of the 149 men aboard, 102 had survived the

sinking: 73 of the Armidale's crew, the three AIF Bren gunners, two Dutch army officers, and 24

NEI soldiers. …….. The good swimmers gathered this flotsam and it was lashed together to make a

raft, held afloat by some drums and a couple of orapiza floats. They also had a Carley float and the

motor boat that Lamshed had seen. Later that afternoon, someone noticed a ripple on the ocean

surface and a few men swum over to investigate. They found Armidale's damaged whaler, floating

about a metre under water. They tied it to floats and lashed it to the raft for men to stand in….

On the raft the men continued to fend off the sharks and sea snakes that had plagued them since the

sinking. The NEI soldiers, unable to speak English and unused to the ocean, were reluctant to

give up their places in the Carley float and take their turn on the raft. Their officers were

armed; so were some of the soldiers and things began to look ugly. The Australians, unarmed

on the raft, decided to give up the Carley float, and so the two groups drifted apart.

……….Back in Darwin they were reunited with Richards and the survivors from the motor boat.

The raft had been spotted by the same Catalina that found the whaler, but the sea was too rough for

a landing and all that remains of that encounter is a grainy photo showing the men on the raft

waving. There were extensive air and sea searches, but the raft and Carley float were never

seen again. Palmer, who his men called a wonderful officer and decent man, always wondered

whether he had made the right decision and after the war he went back to Timor to see if any of the

men on the raft had been in Japanese prison camps. But there was no trace…….

V-1 Flying Bombs

{AWM WEBSITE JAN 2006}

LONDON, ENGLAND. C. 1945-05-08. GERMAN FEISLER FI 103 V1 FLYING BOMB ON DISPLAY IN TRAFALGAR SQUARE ON

VE (VICTORY IN EUROPE) DAY. (PHOTOGRAPHER AND DONOR R. HINES)

The V-1 was a small pilotless aircraft, fitted with an 850 kilogramme high explosive warhead

and powered by a petrol-fuelled pulse jet engine. It was the first of Germany's "vengence

weapons" or vergeltungwaffen, from which the "V" designation was derived, although its

correct designation was the FZG-76. Development work on the FZG-76 began at

Peenemünde in June 1942 and the first successful flight took place on 24 December 1942.

Mass production began on 1 March 1944 and about 35,000 were eventually produced. The

FZG-76 was launched from an inclined ramp and it was originally intended to be fired from

hardened fixed launch sites. These sites, however, were hard to conceal and as a result were

heavily attacked by Allied aircraft. Most operational launches of the FZG-76 were thus

conducted from portable launch ramps that were concealed amongst buildings and vegetation.

The first occurred on 13 June 1944 and was targeted on London. Up until 29 March 1945,

9,521 FZG-76s were launched against targets in the United Kingdom, of which only 6,725

made it as far as the British coast and 4,621 were subsequently destroyed by anti-aircraft fire

or fighter aircraft, leaving to 2,104 to crash down somewhere, not always on their intended

target. The main launch sites were located in the Pas de Calais in France, but once these were

overrun by Allied forces in September 1944, FZG-76s were launched from Heinkel III

bombers up until January 1945. The last phase of the flying bomb offensive on Britain was

conducted between 3 and 29 March 1945 with a long range variant of the FZG-76,

launched from sites in Holland. Six and a half thousand FZG-76s were also launched

against Dutch and Belgian towns, predominantly Antwerp; 4,096 of which reached their

targets.

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AUSTRALIAN –DUTCH DEFENCE COOPERATION 1940-1941

Herman Bussemakert University of Amsterdam The Netherlands

{ AWM Journal # 29 November 1996}

1. Introduction

{1} Despite the growing menace of Japanese military expansion during the 1930s, the

Commonwealth of Australia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, with an extensive colony in

the Far East, had come to neither formal nor informal agreement on a common defence policy.

For the Australian Government, it was of vital interest that the Netherlands East Indies should

not fall into Japanese hands, but they hoped to prevent such a fate by adhering to Imperial

Defence, that is, to the British promise that the Royal Navy would defend Australia and British

interests in the Far East. That policy was seen to be the best guarantee that there would be no

Japanese incursions into the Dutch territories in south-east Asia.

{2} On the other hand, the Dutch Government maintained a strict policy of neutrality in the hope

that, as in the First World War, Holland itself would be spared invasion. The small size of The

Netherlands and its limited industrial base, however, precluded a credible defence of the colony,

which was an archipelago of more than 13,000 islands covering a surface equal to that of Europe

from Scotland to the Caucasus and from the North Cape to Sicily. The Dutch Government,

however, reasoned that none of the three Powers (Japan, Great Britain and the USA) interested

in any possible invasion of the Netherlands East Indies (NEI) would ever allow either of the

others to do so. Consequently, these powers would adhere to the status quo. Should the Japanese

strike, it was implicitly assumed that Britain would certainly intervene and that the USA might

[1].

{3} Both the war in Western Europe, resulting in the occupation of The Netherlands in May

1940, and the constitutional impossibility of the US Government’s adopting a strong foreign

policy aimed at restricting the totalitarian régimes in East and West, transformed everything.

This article deals with the change in attitude at government level both in Australia and within the

Dutch government in exile, resulting in defence agreements being drawn up whereby Australia

not only took over the defence of the eastern part of the NEI but also developed a strong system

of defence co-operation against Japan in the latter part of 1941. For the Dutch, this meant not

only total reversal of its diplomatic tradition of neutrality that had existed for 125 years but also

radical abandonment of that neutrality. The principal reasons for these changes were the loss of

the mother country and the growing realisation by both the Dutch and Australian governments

that they had common interests. The article makes use of sources in Dutch archives, not easily

accessible to Australian researchers without the help of translators.

2. Early Australian-Dutch relationships

{4} Although they had previously discovered the western and southern parts of Australia, Dutch

interest in Australia was almost non-existent until the 1850s and the goldrush in Victoria. That

event created trading opportunities, resulting in the appointment of commercial agents and

consuls in Melbourne and Sydney [2]. Despite the strong anti-British sentiment in The

Netherlands due to the Boer War, the East Indies Government convinced the Dutch Government

to send a warship to attend the festivities celebrating Federation in 1901. The armoured cruiser

HNMS Noord-Brabant of the East Indies fleet arrived at Melbourne on May 1, 1901 to take part

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in the International Fleet Review, gaining much acclaim by the Australian press and other

authorities [3]. Trade relationships thereafter remained excellent, and even increased in

importance. This is illustrated by the fact that the Australian Government appointed a Trade

Commissioner to the British consulate in Batavia in 1916 even before the appointment of such

commissioners in Paris (1917) and New York (1918) [4].

{5} Although East Indian imports and exports declined overall in the early 1930s, trade with

Australia increased. Many products, such as flour, dairy produce, coal and horses for the Royal

Netherlands East Indian Army (KNIL [5]) were imported from Australia. Sugar, kapok, rice,

crude oil and oil products were exported to Australia. The Dutch entry in the London to

Melbourne air race of 1934 resulted in much positive publicity, and a regular air service between

Batavia and Sydney via Darwin was established in 1938.

{6} The Australian Goodwill Mission to the Far East under J.G. Latham started their tour to Asia

with a ten-day visit to Java, where the mission was extensively entertained by both military and

civil colonial officials, from 1 to 11 April 1934 [6]. In his secret report on the Mission, Latham

recommended closer co-operation between the Australian and Dutch navies. At the very least he

proposed that a number of Australian naval officers should familiarise themselves with the

Dutch language [7]. Apparently, the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) took this recommendation to

heart, for a number of naval officers consequently mastered the Dutch language.

{7} The increasing threat of Japan, and especially the interest of the Japanese in gaining a

concession for oil exploration in Portuguese Timor, caused considerable consternation both in

The Hague and in Canberra. During the Disarmament Conference in Brussels in November

1937, the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, A.C.D. de Graeff, talked at length with the

Australian High Commissioner in London, S.M. Bruce. The matter of defence, however, was not

discussed. Following that meeting, the Australian Government sent Vice-Consul Edward

Lambert from Batavia to Dili to talk with the Portuguese authorities. He reported that no

concession as yet had been granted to the Japanese, but he also concluded that Portuguese

authorities harboured strong anti-Dutch feelings because of the misuse the Dutch had made of

the monopoly of their inter-insular shipping line, the Royal Packetboat Company [8].

{8} In these circumstances, the Australian government considered it wise to sound out the Dutch

concerning closer political co-operation between the two governments. R.G. Menzies suggested

in a letter to the Prime Minister, J.A. Lyons, on 23 December 1937, that the Governor-General,

Lord Gowrie, should pay a goodwill visit to Batavia on his way to London in April 1938. Lyons

accordingly requested that an official invitation from the Dutch to Lord Gowrie be secured

through official diplomatic channels [9].

{9} This request caused real consternation within the Dutch Government. Very upset indeed was

the Dutch Governor-General in the East Indies, A.W.L. Tjarda Van Starkenborgh Stachouwer,

because of the precedent it would have given to other, less welcome, visitors, like the Governor-

General of Japanese Taiwan, or - worse still - the new President of the Philippines, Manuel

Quezon. A visit by the latter could have been seen as a most unwelcome encouragement to

Indonesian nationalists. The Governor-General therefore said that no official invitation should be

sent, but the following face-saving procedure was put forward: the Dutch Government, learning

of the planned holiday visit by the Australian Governor-General to the NEI on his way to

Britain, would invite him to visit the Dutch Governor-General in Batavia. This plan of action

was accepted by the Australians. From the correspondence between the Dutch Governor-General

and the Cabinet in The Hague it is, however, abundantly clear that the Dutch were not at all

happy about the Australian initiative [10].

{10} Nevertheless, the visit itself was a complete success. Lord and Lady Gowrie arrived at Bali

on April 2, 1938. They were escorted by Lt. Col. F. Milius of the KNIL and Dr. K.F.J.

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Verboeket of the Cabinet of the Governor-General. On April 5, 1938 they were entertained by

the KNIL at their headquarters in Bandoeng for an entire day. The next day they witnessed an air

show by the KNIL Air Force, which displayed their newly acquired Glenn Martin bombers. On 7

April they paid a formal state visit to the Governor-General in Batavia, and a day later visited

him informally at his palace at Buitenzorg, south of Batavia. Lord and Lady Gowrie left for

Singapore on April 9.

{11} Considering the program of the visit and the Australian Governor-General's military

background, it is inconceivable that military matters were not discussed between them. The

official reports by both Australian and Dutch participants, however, make no mention of defence

[11], a silence most likely explained by the strong neutral attitude of the Dutch government at

the time. The articles which appeared in the Sydney Morning Herald on 6 and 7 April regarding

Anglo-Dutch defence co-operation thus caused acute embarrassment. The Dutch Consul-

General, T. Elink Schuurman, formally requested some kind of official statement by the

Australian government that no defence issues had been discussed [12]. Lyons obliged, and made

a statement in the House of Representatives on 27 April 1938, in which he referred to Lord

Gowrie's visit and emphasized that, contrary to press speculation, the visit had "had no political

or military significance whatsoever" [13]. It may easily be deduced, however, that informal

discussions on defence matters had definitely taken place because a letter sent by the Colonial

Office in London to the Foreign Office stated that if the Committee on Imperial Defence

objected to proposals for closer collaboration with the Dutch, Lord Gowrie should be informed

without delay [14].

{12} Another indication that defence cooperation had indeed been discussed informally may be

found in the report on a meeting between Lord Gowrie and the Dutch Minister in London on 11

May 1938. Lord Gowrie talked freely about Australian re-armament plans and about the defence

of Singapore, which he had inspected after his visit to Java [15].

3. Tentative Australian-Dutch defence discussions before May 1940

{13} The genesis of military co-operation between the Dominions and the Netherlands

originated not in Australia, but in New Zealand. The Dutch Consul in Wellington, M.F.

Vigeveno, reported on March 23, 1939 on the frank discussions he had had with Commodore

Horan, the Chief of Staff of the Royal New-Zealand Navy (RNZN). Horan strongly emphasized

the need for Dutch co-operation in the defence of the Pacific and therefore stressed the

importance of Dutch naval representation at the ensuing Pacific Defence Conference, which was

planned to take place in Wellington from 14 to 16 April 1939 [16].

{14} On account of their neutrality the Dutch did not participate in that conference. Those

nations present at the Conference (Britain, Australia and New Zealand) concluded unanimously

that The Netherlands government should be approached [17]. It was decided that the Australian

Naval Chief of Staff, Admiral Sir Ragnar Colvin, should contact the Dutch Consul-General in

Sydney about the possibility of a visit to the NEI to discuss mutual naval matters [18]. The

request was politely yet firmly turned down by the NEI authorities.

{15} After the outbreak of the war in Europe, Australian anxiety about a change in the status quo

of the East Indies increased, as it was feared that Holland might soon be occupied by Germany.

On 10 November 1939 the Australian Government inquired in London whether the British

Government had any contingency policy should that occur [19]. The British view was that, if

Germany attacked The Netherlands, the Dutch would resist, and that in the East Indies the Dutch

would actively co-operate with the British in catching German ships leaving East Indian ports.

This expectation was based on a report by the British Commander-in-Chief, China Station, Vice-

Admiral Sir Percy Noble, who had visited Batavia harbour on board his flagship, HMS KENT,

in April 1939. There he had met the Dutch Naval and Military Commanders-in-Chief, who had

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given him confidential information on Dutch policy on Japanese aggression. His report [20], a

copy of which was sent to the Australian Naval Board, stated unequivocally that "the use or

occupation of any part of the Netherlands East Indian Territory by the Japanese will at once be

countered by bombing, and the Dutch will immediately declare war themselves in the event of

Japanese aggression". Before this report was issued, there was uncertainty in British and

Australian defence circles about the willingness of the Dutch to defend themselves in the face of

a Japanese attack. The report even mentioned an informal Dutch proposal to the effect that the

British Fleet and Air Arm would operate in the Singapore-Sumatra-Borneo theatre, with Dutch

forces operating east of it based on Surabaya and Ambon. The report, for which no equivalent

has yet been found in Dutch archives, is the first documentary evidence of informal discussions

at the highest military level between Dutch and British commanders. It contains highly secret

information, for example, about the existence of concealed Dutch airfields in the jungle of

Borneo.

{16} In October 1939 secret talks were held between the trade representative of the Dutch

Consulate-General, Mr. J. van Horst Pellekaan, and the Australian Controller-General of

Munitions Supply, N.K.S. Brodribb, on the possibility of obtaining defence supplies for the

Netherlands East Indies. Brodribb then went to London with R.G. Casey, Minister for Supply

and Development. At the same time the Australian Counsellor at the British Embassy in

Washington was approached by the Dutch Minister, Dr A. Loudon, asking whether a meeting

between Australian and Dutch officials would be feasible in order to discuss the possible supply

of war materials to the NEI from Australia [21]. Concurrently, the Dutch Consul-General in

Sydney enquired whether Casey and Brodribb could talk with Dutch army officials on their

return to Australia from London [22]. This was indeed arranged, both men speaking to Dutch

army officers on the day of their arrival by Qantas flying boat at Surabaya on December 14,

1939. The subject of the secret talks was the supply of ammunition to the Dutch [23]. From all

these secret talks it is clear that, although the formal Dutch policy of neutrality was strictly

sustained, the likelihood of German occupation of The Netherlands was considered highly

probable, an event which would cut off their source of ammunition supplies. The NEI

Government wanted a safe supply of weapons and ammunition, but was not yet interested in any

closer defence co-operation.

{17} The secret meeting at Surabaya resulted in a formal request from the Dutch to the

Australian Government to explore the possibility of Australia supplying munitions to the NEI.

Bruce informed Prime Minister Menzies about this matter on January 25, 1940 [24]. He stressed

that the Dutch Government was interested in long range policy rather than fulfilling immediate

supply needs. Menzies answered positively, stressing that Commonwealth officers were aware of

the Dutch needs (as outlined at Surabaya), but that the Dutch Consul in Sydney had agreed that

the Australians needed more time in order to examine their capacity to fulfil them [25]. It can be

inferred that the discussions at Surabaya had already been very detailed with respect to the Dutch

requirements. It can also be concluded that the KNIL had not until then really been in a hurry to

improve their armaments position. Holland was still a free country, and when the Australians

asked for more time, the Dutch did not object. As far as we know, no further contact, either

formal or informal, was made between Dutch and Australian armed forces representatives until

October 1940.

4. The period of secret talks, June-December 1940

{18} This laissez-faire attitude gave way when Dutch policy makers realised the full

consequence of the loss of the motherland in May 1940. In June 1940 the Dutch trade

commissioner in Sydney, van Holst Pellekaan, contacted the Secretary of the Australian

Department of Foreign Affairs, Colonel Hodgson. The Dutch wanted to send a military mission

to discuss the delivery of Australian arms and munitions. As no formal reply was received, the

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Consul-General, Elink Schuurman, urged by his Government, sent a second request in stronger

terms on August 26, 1940 [26]. On August 15 the Dutch Minister in London also approached

Bruce on the same issue [27]. On 16 September the Australian Government decided that a small

KNIL-Commission would be allowed to visit Australia. At the specific request of the Dutch, the

visit was to be as low-key as possible, and the Commission was to be referred to in public as an

Industrial Research Commission [28].

{19} The Commission consisted of three KNIL Officers: Colonel P.H.T van der Steen (Artillery

Commander, Coast Artillery Surabaya), Air Force Major Dr. G. Otten, and Artillery Captain

F.B. Kroese. They arrived on October 23, 1940 as civilians on a regular KNILM flight. With the

exception of Van der Steen, who stayed for about a week, the members of the Commission were

taken on a very extensive tour of the complete Australian Defence establishment, leaving the

country early in December 1940 [29]. The Commission visited 65 factories producing weapons

and munitions, and a number of military installations and testing grounds. The members of the

commission were very appreciative of the openness and high degree of co-operation displayed

by Australian officials at all levels. In their official report, however, they expressed amazement

at the lack of urgency shown by the Australian workers, who, they wrote, even organized strikes

while their country was at war.

{20} The semi-official Dutch history of The Netherlands in the Second World War makes no

mention of the attempts by the KNIL to secure weapons and munitions from Australia. Only one

passing remark has been found about some Australian assistance to Dutch weapon factories in

Java, which is also off the cuff [30]. This is all the more surprising because the list of Dutch

requirements was quite extensive. They were divided into two categories, one immediate, and

the other prospective (three to six months). The immediate requirements were for 5 million

rounds of .303 inch small arms ammunition, and 500,000 pieces of links to feed these bullets

into machine-guns. Furthermore, 500 trench mortars, over 3 million mortar grenades, and 380

tons of TNT were needed. The equipment ordered consisted of anti-tank guns and ammunition,

tanks, searchlights, armour piercing shell and aircraft bombs. The commission stated that the

total long range requirement for small arms ammunition was about 100 million rounds per

annum and therefore that it was necessary to establish a new small-arms munitions factory in

Java. Both plant and equipment were to be obtained from Australia [31]. The commission’s

report implied that there was a debate within the Dutch defence establishment on exchanging the

existing .265 inch rifle barrel for the (British) .303 inch type of rifle and machine-gun. Should

this exchange become definite, an additional 100,000 rifle barrels and 5,000 machine-gun barrels

would be needed.

{21} The Australians responded to the Dutch requests on 25 November 1940. It was agreed to

supply the 5 million rounds of small arms ammunition asked for, but because of the tight supply

situation it was impossible to fulfil the other immediate Dutch requirements. It was, however,

agreed to give the Dutch the specifications of the fuse of the Australian 3-inch mortar grenades

and of the 250-pound aircraft bomb, and full specifications of the characteristics of TNT

manufactured in Australia. As their part of the agreement, the Commission had handed to the

Australians full information on the (Swedish) anti-aircraft fire control instruments being used by

the KNIL, and drawings and specifications of the air bombs used in the NEI [32].

{22} It can therefore be concluded that, although official Dutch policy in the NEI was still

neutral, by the end of 1940 a number of secret and informal contacts at higher political and

defence levels in both administrations had been established. This virtually drew the Australians

into the defence of the NEI against the likely common enemy, Japan. And as long as the

Australian involvement was kept secret, it was welcomed by the Dutch. The next step would be

the formalisation of the contacts which had been established. Although the original Dutch

request regarding munitions and weapons supplies was only partly met by the Australian

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Government, both parties had worked together in remarkable unity and at great speed to produce

in a mutually satisfactory conclusion. The Dutch military command then even decided to equip

all KNIL/ML Air Force personnel with .303 inch rifles, as almost all the planes in service also

had .303 inch Vickers and Colt/Browning machine-guns. This would also mean that if the

KNIL/ML Air Force ever had to carry out duties in conjunction with the RAF and RAAF, no

supply difficulties would arise from the use of different types of weaponry [33].

{23} On 1 October 1940 the Australian Minister in Washington reported that the British

Ambassador, Lord Lothian, had been approached by the US Secretary of State, Cordell Hull. He

had asked for immediate private staff meetings to be held between the USA, Britain, Australia

and The Netherlands to discuss technical problems should these countries be involved in united

defence action, although Hull stipulated that these talks were to be technical, and would have

nothing to do with political policy [34]. It was the start of a chain of events which lead

eventually to staff talks between all four powers, two of which were officially neutral.

{24} In a military appraisal in early August 1940, the British Chiefs of Staff had already

expressed their view that "One aim of our policy should be ultimately to secure full military co-

operation with the Dutch"[35]. It is therefore not surprising that both the Australian and British

Governments welcomed the American initiative and made immediate plans for these talks. After

some haggling about the place (both London and Washington were suggested), agreement was

reached for the talks to take place in Singapore, and the British Government approached the

Dutch about being present [36]. The Dutch Government, however, supported Governor-General

Tjarda's opinion that even secret staff talks formed a breach of Dutch neutrality, and could

represent a pretext for the Japanese to intervene if they got to hear of them. Due to their excellent

intelligence, this would only have been a matter of time. The fact that the Americans did not

show up worsened matters. Roosevelt faced an election challenge on November 5, 1940 and did

not want to do anything which might endanger his re-election. Their involvement in staff talks

was postponed for the time being [37]. Accordingly, on 22 October 1940 the Defence

Conference at Singapore was attended only by Britain, Australia and New Zealand. The report of

the conference, however, had two appendices which listed points for discussion with Dutch and

American authorities as soon as that became politically possible [38]. The report also revealed

such an alarming weakness in the defences of Singapore that the Australian Cabinet decided that

Menzies should travel to London to discuss this and other matters directly with Churchill and the

Chiefs of Staff [39].

{25} With Roosevelt safely re-elected, new invitations went out for staff talks in Singapore. The

Americans attended as observers, and the Dutch Government in exile had put pressure on Tjarda

to comply with any agreements made. On 26-28 November 1940 these talks between all four

powers took place. The British Government had spelt out the objectives of these talks and had

sent copies to the other governments involved [40].

{26} The results of this conference were considerable. It was agreed that liaison officers would

be appointed with utmost urgency. Commander G.B. Salm was appointed Dutch naval liaison

officer with the Australians. The Australian Government appointed Commander V.E. Kennedy

RAN as liaison officer in Batavia. The Dutch also agreed to provide fuel, spares and ammunition

for the RAF and the RAAF at their military airfields in Sumatra, Borneo and the Eastern NEI

The Dutch indicated that they lacked adequate stocks of small-arms ammunition and asked for

assistance in replenishing them.

{27} About a month later, on 29 December 1940, Elink Schuurman had a long and frank talk

with Menzies, who strongly expressed his misgivings about the Dutch policy of being allied with

Britain in Europe, while remaining shy of co-operation with Britain and Australia in the Far

East. He strongly urged that secret staff talks be held directly between Australia and the NEI, and

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emphasized Australia’s vital interest in their integrity. For reasons of British foreign policy, not

wanting to give the Dutch a unilateral guarantee without the backing of the US, it was

impossible for Australia to give the Dutch a similar guarantee; but the former would, out of self-

interest, do their best to provide weapons and munitions to the NEI [41].

5. Staff talks, January-May 1941

{28} On 12 January 1941 the Australian Minister for the Army, P.C. Spender, visited the Dutch

Governor-General at Batavia and obtained his agreement to hold staff talks between the

Australians and the Dutch directly. The Australian Government reacted very quickly. On 22

January 1941 Menzies accepted the Dutch invitation dated January 18 to send a military

delegation to Batavia. This delegation consisted of Wing Cdr W.L. Hely and Squadron Leader

H.W. Berry of the RAAF, Cdr V.E. Kennedy of the RAN, and R.H. Doyle, Controller of

Production, Munitions Department. On 11 and 12 February 1941 they met officers from both the

Dutch Royal Navy (KM) and the KNIL in Batavia to discuss a number of issues concerning

defence co-operation. Kennedy reported to the Australian Naval Board on February 14,

describing the meetings as open and pleasant. Agreements were reached on informing each other

of the positions of ships bound for or leaving the Dutch East Indies and the Australia Station. To

his amazement, Kennedy found out that the Commander-in-Chief of the British China Station,

Vice-Admiral Geoffrey Layton, was already reporting the position of Australian warships to the

NEI authorities [42]. This showed that far more informal but effective Anglo-Dutch naval co-

operation at operational level had been taking place than had been approved by the respective

governments. A very good personal friendship between Layton and his Dutch counterpart, Vice-

Admiral C.E.L. Helfrich, helped considerably. The Dutch also gave them information about the

positions of minefields, and advised the Australians that they would re-route all their shipping to

and from the US West Coast through the Torres Straits to minimise Japanese interference. It was

also agreed that Tjilatjap harbour on the south coast of Java would be expanded to handle more

freight.

{29} It was intended that the Dutch Army Chief of Staff, Major-General H. ter Poorten, would

attend the meeting between the British Commander-in-Chief, Malaya Command, Sir Robert

Brooke-Popham, and the Australian War Cabinet scheduled for February 10-17. At the last

moment, however, this visit was cancelled by the Governor-General himself because of

threatening Japanese moves, to the considerable embarrassment of Schuurman, because some of

the Australian generals and politicians had interpreted it as a signal of appeasement by the Dutch

towards the Japanese [43]. But Brooke-Popham did have the opportunity to talk to the Governor-

General and afterwards to Ter Poorten as well during a short stop in Batavia on his way to

Melbourne. Ter Poorten attended the second Four-Power Staff Conference at Singapore at the

end of the month in person. He also visited Australian Army headquarters at Melbourne between

15 and 28 March 1941. The result of these extended talks was that an agreement was reached,

not only to detach six officers from the tank corps at the Australian Tank Corps School at

Seymour, but also to extend an invitation to the commander of the Australian Coast Artillery to

visit the coastal defences of Surabaya. This invitation was accepted and the visit subsequently

took place [44].

{30} The fact that the Qantas airline service from Sydney to London used the Batavia airport for

refuelling made it possible for Australian officials to have more frequent contact with their

Dutch counterparts on their way to and from London than would otherwise have been the case.

These facilities meant that it was easy to arrange a meeting on January 28, 1941 between

Menzies and the Dutch Governor-General. Tjarda's report sent to the Minister of Colonies on

that meeting stated that Menzies was willing to go to war against Japan should Dutch territory be

taken. It also mentioned the willingness of the Australian Government to discuss the possibility

of garrisoning an Australian Army Division on Java [45]. Based on the information he got from

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Tjarda, Menzies started his first meeting at the Foreign Office in London on 26 February 1941

by asking "whether we regarded the Netherlands East Indies as vital" (meaning that the invasion

of that territory would be a casus belli) [46]. The Foreign Office left the question unanswered for

the time being. The Naval Staff were less diplomatic, for during talks between Menzies and the

Vice Chief of Naval Staff on 8 March 1941, Vice-Admiral T.S.V. Phillips stated that "we should

not go to war with Japan over their occupation of any part of the Netherlands East Indies; this

would only add to the number of our enemies, and if Germany could first be defeated we could

turn to Japan later and deal with her" [47]. It was a straight answer, but not the one Menzies was

expecting.

{31} After their meeting with Dutch senior officers, the Australian military delegation went

straight from Batavia to the second Four-Power Staff Conference at Singapore, which took place

on 22 February 1941. The Dutch were present in force, as were the Americans, who again

attended as "observers". At that conference, it was agreed that Australia would take over the

defence of Ambon and Timor if war broke out in the Pacific. Australian forces at Ambon were to

be under Dutch control at the outset. The Allied Forces in Dutch Timor, however, would come

under Australian control on the arrival of their army units. The Australians would contribute to

the defence of the Ambon-Timor-Darwin triangle with two Hudson Bomber squadrons and two

army brigades. This was later reduced to a force of about 1,200 men each for Ambon and Timor.

The RAAF units were not to be stationed permanently at Ambon and Koepang, but advance

parties were to prepare the bases for their transfer. The Australian War Cabinet agreed with the

recommendations issued after the Singapore Conference, but in collaboration with the Dutch

authorities it was also decided that radio equipment, vehicle transport, bombs and ammunition,

aviation fuel and general stores should be sent to Ambon and Koepang in advance. The

equipment and stores would bear Dutch markings and would be charged to the KNIL [48].

{32} The Australian Government was less happy about the failure of the conference to draw up a

co-ordinated naval defence plan for the Far East and it therefore urged that a third conference be

held to formulate such a plan [49]. During the parallel US - British Staff Talks held in

Washington from January to March 1941, the British secured the American commitment to

attend the next Singapore conference as official participants. In that capacity they had already

attended the Anglo-Dutch-Australian-American Combined Services Communications

Conference which had taken place on 27 February 1941. At that conference the four parties

disclosed to each other the frequencies and station calls of ships and shore installations and air

bases. The Dutch representatives disclosed the existence and call signals of the top-secret

Samarinda-II and Singkawang-II airfields in Dutch Borneo, and codes and ciphers were

standardised and exchanged. The importance of this conference has been overlooked in most

official military histories of the countries concerned.

{33} The third Four-Power Singapore Staff Conference took place on 21-27 April 1941, with the

Americans now as full participants. It was an important conference which laid the foundation for

the later ABDA-Allied Integrated Command, the first of its kind during the Second World War.

During this conference the Dutch-Australian agreements with regard to the eastern part of the

NEI were upheld against the wishes of the British delegates, who wanted to focus specifically on

the defence of Singapore and its surroundings [50]. It was here that, for the first time, the

Australians used the expression "Malay Barrier" to describe the importance of the NEI for the

defence of Australia.

{34} The importance of this third and last Singapore Staff Conference was the feeling of all

parties that, despite the political expediency of delaying declaration of a guarantee towards the

NEI, the prospective allies were all in the same boat. The Dutch were officially still neutral, at

least in south-east Asia, but at the operational level the frequency of contact had increased

considerably since the last conference. It was the feeling of no longer being isolated that gave the

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Dutch the courage to join the American embargo against Japan a few months later, even though,

politically, they had no obligation to do so and, militarily, it meant that a Japanese attack on the

NEI oilfields would only be a matter of time.

6. The unofficial alliance, May-December 1941

{35} Based on the agreements of the second and third Four-Power Singapore Staff Conferences,

the Australian Army produced a detailed plan on May 6, 1941 for the reinforcement of Timor

and Ambon [51]. Two battalions of the 23rd Infantry Brigade AIF were to be employed.

Meanwhile, 360 tons of military equipment were already on board two KPM freighters on the

way to Ambon and Koepang. Six Dutch military planes arrived in Darwin on 17 May and went

back to Koepang with a reconnaissance party on board, consisting of the Commander of the 23rd

Brigade AIF, Brigadier E.F. Lind, and the battalion commanders of the two battalions in

question, the Lt-Cols L.N. Roach and G.D. Youl [52]. As well, maintenance parties consisting of

one officer and seven men were despatched to each of both areas to take charge of the military

equipment. The results of the reconnaissance were the recommendations to have both the

battalions and the maintenance parties strengthened and to set up a direct link with Dutch

military headquarters in Bandoeng [53]. For military and political reasons, however, the

Australian Government did not implement these recommendations.

{36} The Australian Government did, however, carry out the recommendation to reinforce the

Australian maintenance parties. They neglected to contact the Dutch Government directly on this

issue, however, but made do by sending a request to the British Government [54]. The Foreign

Office knew that the Dutch would angle for a guarantee on the integrity of the NEI, a guarantee

which the British were unwilling to give. It took almost a month before the negative reply was

given on August 7. The Dutch position thus remained as stated by the Commanding Officer

KNIL, Lt-Gen. Berenschot, in a cablegram to liaison-officer Salm, dated May 8, 1941: that no

Australian maintenance parties were to be allowed above the two seven-man teams, and that

Dutch maintenance personnel would be supplied, "who will be instructed by so called factory

personnel in civilian clothes" (that is, the seven-man teams already mentioned).

{37} In the period July-September 1941 the Australians shipped a number of motorcycles, a few

lorries and ten Bren-carriers to each of the two sites at Koepang and Ambon. Ammunition,

explosives, and two 6-inch coastal guns to be assembled protect its Koepang harbour were also

sent [55]. As their equipment would already have been in place at the outbreak of the war, the

two battalions would only have needed to carry their personal equipment with them at the time

of transport to Koepang and Ambon. The Dutch government meanwhile offered assistance in the

servicing of the 6-inch gun battery at Koepang before the arrival of the Australian crew, and this

offer was accepted by the Australians. Two KNIL non-commissioned officers and 18 artillery

men arrived at Koepang on 6 August 1941 for this purpose [56].

{38} It was only after repeated urgings by the Australians that the British Government (in early

October) finally contacted the Dutch Government in exile about the issue of larger advance

parties in uniform. This was to ensure discipline, which could not be maintained among soldiers

wearing civvies. The new Australian Prime Minister, John Curtin, tired of British foot-dragging,

instructed Bruce to contact the Dutch Government in exile immediately on this matter. On 23

October 1941 he met the Dutch Minister to talk the subject over [57]. The Dutch government

agreed to the Australian request concerning maintenance parties of 100 Army personnel and 52

Air Force personnel being based on Ambon, and 100 Army and 19 Air Force personnel being

sent to Koepang in uniform. Nevertheless, the Dutch rejected the proposal to establish more

troops at those sites before the outbreak of war because they feared "undesirable incidents with

the population", especially at Ambon [58]. Their real fear, though, was loss of face in the eyes of

the local population because of the obvious Dutch inability to defend their colony.

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{39} This incapacity became especially clear in the dispute between Dutch and Australian

authorities on the issue of the command structure on Ambon. At the Singapore conferences it

had been agreed that the local Dutch commander, a lieutenant-colonel, would also command the

Australian troops. After his reconnaissance trip, however, Brigadier Lind recommended that his

headquarters should be at Ambon. A lieutenant-colonel could not be superior to a brigadier. The

Dutch feared loss of respect by the very loyal local population if they realised that an Australian

was in command at Ambon [59]. The Australian Chief of Staff therefore suggested that the

brigadier should not to be sent to Ambon, and that the possibility of combined HQ at Ambon be

negotiated with the Dutch authorities.

{40} Notwithstanding these problems, by October 1941 a solid foundation had been laid for

close Dutch-Australian defence co-operation. The Australian liaison officers in Batavia and

Bandoeng did not hide their presence any longer, and they were allowed to wear their uniforms.

Warships and aeroplanes called at each other's harbours and airfields. It was a far cry from the

situation which had existed just one and a half years before.

{41} On 5 December 1941, three days before Pearl Harbour, the NEI Government asked the

Australian Government to send aircraft to Ambon and Timor [60]. The War Cabinet approved,

and at dawn on 7 December, 1941 two flights of Hudson bombers from the 13th RAAF squadron

flew to Laha Field in Ambon, and one flight of No 2 squadron flew to Koepang. That day,

Brigadier Lind received orders at Darwin to move the 21st Battalion ("Gull Force") to Ambon,

and the 40th Battalion ("Sparrow Force") to Timor. The troops were quickly shipped to their

destinations, where their heavy equipment was waiting for them. As was planned, Australia took

over the defence of a large part of the eastern part of the NEI at the moment that hostilities

started. It was a momentous and unprecedented occasion, and it crowned the development of

closer relationships between Australia and the Dutch East Indies in mutual defence.

7. Summary and conclusions

{42} During the last few years of peace, there was a growing realisation in both the NEI and

Australia that both countries had common interests. For Australia, the integrity of the NEI was a

vital security need, as the island chain was a barrier between the Australian heartland and Japan.

For the Dutch, Australia represented a much-needed industrial hinterland. This need became

even more pressing after the loss of contact with the mother country following the German

occupation. But, as has been observed, there were powerful obstacles to the emergence of an

open alliance between the two countries. Australia was snared within the doctrine of Imperial

Defence, and for the British under the leadership of Winston Churchill, the Far East had low

priority. A guarantee to the NEI was out of the question.

{43} Among the Dutch there was a 130-year-old legacy of neutrality and aloofness, combined

with lingering suspicions about British design on "the richest colony of the world". In the first

few months after the catastrophe in Western Europe, there was still doubt as to whether Britain

would be able to stand up to the expected German onslaught. This called for a prudent policy by

the Dutch Government in exile, even when it was hosted by the British and based in London. As

this government was in disarray during its first few months in London, the Dutch Governor-

General in Batavia had wide freedom of action to determine local policy. That resulted in strict

neutrality and aloofness, even with respect to the British ally in the Far East. All this was to the

amazement and growing irritation of the Australian Government, which used its trump card - the

overriding need of the Dutch colonial army to re-arm - most skilfully. This resulted in promising

links even before the German occupation of Holland. The success of the military mission to

Australia at the end of 1940, coupled with both the British victory in the Battle of Britain and

increasing Japanese aggression, resulted in a complete change of Dutch policy at the end of

1940. Secret staff talks between British, Australian and Dutch officers then became possible

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[61]. Following Australian pressure put on the Dutch Governor-General during Menzies' visit,

the way was clear for Dutch participation in the second and third Singapore Conferences. As late

as October 1941, however, the Dutch authorities were still unwilling to allow Australian forces

to enter their assigned areas of operations in the Moluccas and Timor.

{44} There were many factors which prevented early and effective co-operation between the

Dutch and Australian Governments. First, although they disagreed with the British because of

the vital interest they had in their own defence, the Australians adhered strictly to the British

policy of not giving any guarantee for the territorial integrity of the NEI. This resulted in a

serious loss of time. Secondly, the Dutch adhered to their traditional policy of aloofness as

upheld by the Governor-General. This resulted in a year’s delay in the establishment of closer

defence co-operation. Thirdly, Australia failed to achieve all-out industrial mobilisation before

Pearl Harbour, as is evident from the production loss due to labour strikes. Consequently, the

Dutch became dependent on one supplier of weapons only: the USA, which also had other

interests to consider with respect to their prospective allies. The fourth factor was the weakness

and vacillation of the Dutch Government in exile during their first year in London. This gave the

Governor-General the opportunity to determine his own foreign policy, leading to much doubt in

Australian, British and American political and military circles about the willingness of the Dutch

to defend themselves should the Japanese attack. There was always the possibility that the Dutch

administration in the East Indies would adopt the "French Model" of Indo-China if the Japanese

put more pressure on them. Consequently, there was great reluctance by the US Government to

export weapons to the NEI, especially in 1940 and early 1941. Dutch political and military

aloofness as executed by the Governor-General therefore proved self-defeating [62]. It must be

said, however, that Menzies did not share these doubts; early on he instructed his government to

assist the Dutch to obtain modern weapons wherever possible.

{45} Of all prospective Dutch allies, Australia took the most positive stand and assisted them

most in the two difficult years following the German occupation of Holland. It was in Australia's

own interest to maintain the Malay Barrier as a protective shield, but the Australian Government

faced formidable problems with the British Government in trying to justify this difference in

attitude. The Dutch, however, appreciated the Australian position. In May 1941, the then Chief-

of-Staff of the KNIL noted that co-operation with the Australian counterpart was excellent,

remarking that Ambon and Timor had seen more Australians in the previous few weeks than in

the hundred years before [63]! This appreciation of the positive Australian attitude towards the

NEI can also be found in a cablegram, sent by the Governor General to the Dutch Colonial

Minister on 14 April 1941 [64]. It was therefore no coincidence that after the Japanese invasion

the Netherlands East Indies Government in exile established itself in Australia with the remnants

of their armed forces, in the vain hope that the colony would be recaptured from there. That

attempt was described in depth by Jack Ford [65] in his monumental study of Australian-Dutch

relationships during the Second World War, and falls beyond the scope of this article.

Notes: SEE AWM WEBSITE FOR LIST OF REFERENCES

About the author

Herman Bussemaker is currently working on a thesis on defence cooperation between western

powers in the Far East at the University of Amsterdam and the Royal Netherlands Naval

Academy.

ISSUE # 2(June 2010)

ISSUE #1 (March 2006)

BACKGROUNDER # 87

The Dutch Connection

Section 5

Korea

• Dutch Participation in the Korean War.www.koreanwar.com (06.02.2006)

• The Netherlands in Korea: the NDVN. World History at KMLA {06.02.2006}

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DUTCH PARTICIPATION IN

THE KOREAN WAR

{www.koreanwar.com-06.02.2006}

Arriving from fighting in Malaysia and commonly known as the "Netherlands Battalion," the

advance party of the Dutch contingent arrived in Korea on 24 October 1950, but the remainder of

the unit’s men did not arrive until early December 1950.

I. THE WAR

Duration of the Conflict: June 25th 1950— July 27th 1953 at 22OO hours. Participants : United

Nations Military Forces versus North Korea and the People's Republic of China with political and

material support of the Soviet Union. Cause : Unprovoked attack by North-Korean military forces

on the Republic Of Korea (South Korea)

United Nations Forces: Army(A), Navy(N) and/or Air force(AF)

0. Australia (A,N,AF)

0. Belgium (A)

0. Canada (A,N,AF)

0. Colombia (A,N)

0. Ethiopia (A)

0. France (A,N)

0. Greece (A)

0. Luxembourg (A)

0. Netherlands(A,N)

0. New Zealand (A,N)

0. Philippines (A)

0. Thailand (A,N)

0. Turkey (A)

0. United States of America (A,N,AF)

0. United Kingdom (A,N,AF)

0. Union of South Africa (AF)

Medical Support: Denmark, India, Italy, Norway, Sweden, UK, USA.

II. ROYAL NETHERLANDS NAVY

During the conflict the following naval forces were employed:

0. Hr.Ms. destroyer " Evertsen" 07-07-1950 / 18-04- 1951

0. Hr.Ms. destroyer "Van Galen" till 21-01-1952

0. Hr.Ms. destroyer "Piet Heim" till 18-01-1953

0. Hr.Ms. Frigate " Johan Maurits van Nassau) till 05—11—1953

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0. Hr.Ms. Frigate "Dubois " till 10-09—1954

0. Hr.Ms. Frigate "van Zijll " till 24—01—1955

The first four vessels were awarded the Presidential Unit Citation of the Republic of Korea as part

of the US 7th Fleet.

Hr.Ms "Evertsen" and "Van Galen" were awarded the Presidential Unit Citation of the Republic of

Korea for a second time as part of "Task Force 95 ".

A total of 1360 men of the navy served in the Korean waters.

Two of them died when serving.

Activities of the Dutch naval forces:

0. escorting aircraft carriers

0. anti-infiltration patrols

0. destroying enemy costal guns, transport and bunkers

0. supporting ground troops with artillery fire

Hr.Ms. "Piet Heim" became a member of the "Train-Busters Club" after destroying an enemy train.

1950 Chinnamp’o, Inchon 1951 Wonsan, Inchon, Sak-to, Chingpo Sangjin, Chongsin and

Hungnam 1952 Sak-do, Cho-do, Sangjin, Wonsan Taechong, P’yong-Do 1953 Sak-to, Taejong and

P’yong Do

III. THE NETHERLANDS DETACHMENT UNITED NATIONS (NDVN)

The NDVN was established on October 15th 1950 by Royal Degree number 27, dated 27-09—

1950.

Out of a total number of 16.225 volunteers only 3.418 men were accepted and sent to Korea.

Because 516 men volunteered twice and 38 men three times a total of 3.972 men served in Korea.

2.980 of those participated in the actual war, as the units that arrived after the armistice (July 27th

1953) did not participate in any fighting.

The 3.972 men mentioned before formed 26 detachments, who left for Korea on different dates.

The 1st Detachment (636 men) left the Netherlands on October 26th; the 26th (and last)

Detachment (143 men) left on July 1954. The last units returned to the Netherlands at the end of

1954.

Casualties

116 men; 115 are buried at the Tanggok UN War cemetery near Pusan (Korea) 1 man could not be

recovered after being KIA

Missing in Action 3

POW 1 (died in prison camp.)

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One seriously wounded man died right after arriving in the Netherlands, one had died in an accident

in Korea and one died on the way back and was buried in Singapore.

381 men were wounded in action, 26 during training, 5 and 56 men in accidents.

A total of 91 men are permanently disabled.

The NDVN was always considerably below official battalion strength and therefore the 8th Army

allotted a number of Korean soldiers of the Korean Augmentation to US Army (KATUSA)to the

NDVN. Of this group 20 men were KIA.

In memory of these Korean soldiers a remembrance plaque in both the Korean and the Dutch

language is attached on the Korean War Memorial in the "Oranje barrack at Schaarsbergen near

Arnhem, The Netherlands.

Twenty members of the other Korean support units CTC/KSC, assigned to the NDVN, were also

KIA.

The total losses of the NDVN and assigned units amounts to 163 men. By this the NDVN suffered

the heaviest loses of any battalion in the Dutch Army ever.

Assignments

After arriving in Korea the NDVN was assigned to the 38th U.S. Infantry Regiment "Rock of the

Maine". This was one of the regiments of the 2nd (Indianhead) US Infantry Division.

Combat activities

The most important combat activities of the NDVN were :

0. 1951 Hoengseong, Wonju, Hill 325, Hwachon reservoir, Inje, Taeusan, Mundung-ni, Iron

Triangle

0. 1952 Silver Star Hill, Star Hill, Sagimak, Chungmoksil. Koje-do, Old Baldy, Arsenal, Iron

Triangle(2nd time)

0. 1953 Samichon valley, Nudea, Iron Triangle(3rd time), Chunmoksil, Hill 340.

Decorations

The NDVN was awarded Presidential Unit Citations 4 times:

1. To the 1st Detachment NDVN the Distinguished Unit Citation of the President of the United

States stating " Hoengseong— Wonju" for the period 12 / 15th Feb. 1951

2. To the 1st and the 2nd Detachment NDVN, as part of the 2nd Div, a similar award, stating

"Soyang gang" for the period 16/22 May 1951

3. To the 1st up to and including the 16th Detachment NDVN, the Presidential Unit Citation of the

President of the Republic of Korea, stating " November 1950 /April 8 1953.

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4. To the 1st up to and including the 19th Detachment NDVN, as part of the 2nd US Infantry

Division , a similar award, for the period Nov 22nd 1950 - October 26th 1953.

All Dutch military personnel that served in Korea was awarded:

1. by the Dutch government: the Cross for Justice and Freedom with clasp "Korea"

2. by the United Nations : U.N. Service Medal with clasp "Korea"

3 by the Korean government the " Korean War Medal" (Army personnel only).

KATUSA troops, as mentioned before, also were awarded the Cross for Justice and Freedom.

For gallantry in battle the following decorations have been awarded to members of the N.D.V.N.

Military Order of William : 3 (of which 2 posthumous) Bronze Lion : 5 Bronze Cross : 19 Cross of

Merit 4 American awards : 120 Korean Awards : 43

IV THE TRADITION

A. Van Heutsz Regiment

The tradition of the NDVN, the first unit of a new regiment, formed the 1st June 1950 and named

the " Van Heutsz" Regiment, is kept alive by that Regiment. Van Heutsz was the most famous

general in the Dutch East Indies at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century) The

regiment is billeted in the Oranje barracks at Schaarsbergen near Arnhem.

Colors of the Regiment carry the words: Korea 1950-1954

Since the new formed regiment did not have her colors in 1950 yet, a Dutch flag was used in Korea

as the "battle- flag " of the NDVN. This flag now has an official status and is shown on every

parade etc of the regiment. American and Korean battle streamers, representing the Unit Citations,

are attached to this flag.

The "battle- flag" has its own color guard, armed with the M-1 Garand rifle (as used in Korea by the

NDVN ) The Color Guard wears the U.S. 2nd

Infantry Division "Indianhead" patch on its right

sleeve.

On the barrack grounds Is also situated the official monument for the Dutch soldiers and the

KATUSA soldiers killed in action during the Korean War