THE DRUG CRISIS IN THE AMERICAS

Gabriela Moreno

Center for International Studies University of St. Thomas

Houston, Texas 77006

Since the early 1980s, the United States has participated in the war against the illicit drug trade in the Americas, through funding and policymaking. The drug crisis has become a major issue that has deteriorated Latin American socioeconomic and political sectors, and as a result has become a threat to the United States and U.S. relations with Latin American countries. Because drug addiction has skyrocketed in the United States, the US government has had a greater incentive to interrupt the drug market and become more proactive in the War on Drugs. However, there is a growing concern in regards to the counternarcotics policies implemented in the Latin American drug war. This paper argues that a successful strategy requires a dramatic revision of existing policies and approaches to the War on Drugs. Authors such as Russell Crandall and Brian Loveman argue that even with the billions of dollars spent on U.S. efforts towards the War on Drugs, the War has not abated, and has only created collateral damage in the Latin American countries. Other authors such as Cindy Fazey and Moises Naim argue that the drug trade has transcended borders and has grown along with globalization; therefore, the proper solutions would have to be internationally-based. This paper will first discuss the relationship between the United States and Latin America and how this relationship influences the policies regarding the drug industry, followed by a historical overview to examine the origin and the major causes of the Latin American drug trade along with the countermeasures implemented over time. An analysis will follow in regards to the effects of the drug industry in the core countries of Colombia and the United States, and the strategic development of policymaking regarding this issue and its results on the War on Drugs.

The rise in globalization since the 1990’s has created an increasingly integrated global

economy, with products and ideas transcending borders more easily. Great technological

innovations have provided the context for countries to become more interdependent through

international trade. The rise in technology has revolutionized international trade—transforming

the way countries trade with each other in faster and closer networks. The increase of

interdependence has lessened national regulations and protectionism around the globe, creating

an increasingly open global market with an easy flow of ideas and products. This global

interdependence is an achievement that provides great profit and development; but, along with

the flow of products such as American jeans, music, movies and food, there seems to have been a

great flow of illicit products such as cocaine, heroin and opium.

In the Western Hemisphere, interrelations between countries such as the United States,

Colombia, and Mexico have changed dramatically since the launch of the region’s War on

Drugs. The United States has campaigned heavily for the growth of free trade and the lowering

of borders in the region; however, this move for greater free trade has also provided the context

for the illicit drug market to grow and prosper. The growing demand by U.S. consumers and the

ease along the U.S.-Mexico border have created a large illicit drug market in the region that has

deteriorated the socioeconomic and political sectors of the major drug producing countries. The

consumption of illicit drugs transported from Colombia and Mexico has gradually increased over

the years. Countermeasures implemented by the three most affected countries—U.S., Mexico,

and Colombia—have not tamed the production and distribution of drugs. What has happened is

that drug trafficking organizations (DTO’s) have easily adapted to governmental

countermeasures. Decentralization has given DTO’s the flexibility to shift production and

distribution to previously unaffected areas. This balloon effect is a major regional concern that

could carry on to other countries such as Peru, Bolivia, and the rest of the Western Hemisphere.

The interrelationship between the U.S. and Colombia is characteristic of a dominant-

subordinate relationship and therefore, U.S. national interests and concerns are at a higher

priority than Colombia’s in the decision making of the Drug War. Since the 1980's, when

Colombia's drug crisis was at its peak, the United States became more proactive in the War on

Drugs by funding U.S. aid for anti-drug trafficking solutions. The U.S. provided Colombia with

training and military tools such as helicopters and firearms to combat drug traffickers and the

guerrillas that assist them. U.S. funding, training and intelligence have provided Colombia with

the ability to raid and confiscate a great supply of cocaine from traffickers, and to launch demand

reduction programs, such as rehabilitation and drug prevention education.

The increase in drug consumption in the United States and the growth in production in

Mexico has raised the question among researchers and scholars of whether the current policies

that are being implemented are really helping. Are we really winning this battle? It seems that

the growth in consumption and the apparent balloon effect has proven that the policies being

proposed by the United States and Colombia are ineffective. Apparently, the United States has

focused its policies on hard power—meaning that its policies are mainly military-based. Both

U.S. and Colombian efforts have been to combat the production and distribution of cocaine, and

have relatively ignored that there is an increase in demand for it. Over the years, the price on

cocaine has declined—signaling a surplus in production. For this reason, there has been growing

concern over the policies implemented on this region’s Drug Crisis. Concerns have spurred over

the need to focus on social issues and rebuilding Colombia’s infrastructure to successfully defeat

the Drug Crisis. By providing a healthier social and economic infrastructure, the level of poverty

would decline—lessening the public’s incentive to fall prey to the black market. What is certain

is the need for mutual cooperation between Colombia and the U.S., and the need for a revisal of

U.S. policies.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE DRUG TRADE

In the late 1800’s, demand for narcotics such as cocaine, marijuana, and heroin led to

high levels of drug importation. U.S. companies profited by providing narcotics in their

products—such as Coca-Cola and their use of cocaine—and offering the necessary tools for their

use. However, “by 1895, around three percent of the population [in the United States] was

[already] addicted to morphine” (Recio 2002, 23). These results led to a concern over the level

of addiction in the United States, and led to various interest groups to lobby for their regulation.

Not only was drug addiction a concern for the public, but drug regulation was also lobbied due to

the drug consumption by minorities. A majority of people lobbying for drug regulations were

campaigning as a result of their racial prejudices—not only towards the consumers but towards

the foreign producers as well. The rising link between drug consumption and minorities led to a

growing number of groups campaigning against products imported from countries such as China.

For instance, in the 1870’s, Western states in the U.S. led a massive campaign against the use of

opium and the Chinese. These campaigns began a surge of new laws and regulations against the

use of opium.

By the 1900’s, the prejudice groups and those groups mainly concerned with regulation

of alcohol and drug consumption, joined forces. The growth of these campaigns created

government and corporate pressures. Various states in the U.S.—particularly those of the

West—were raising new restrictions in order to lessen the use of drugs. The excessive lobbying

of groups led a change in perspective in the public over the moral grounds in restricting drug use.

The Pharmacist Association played a major part in the new regulations: now prescriptions were

needed in order to attain any drug and the use of narcotics on the medication was to be indicated

on the labels for safety. However, interest groups continued to lobby for stricter regulations on

the national level.

The Harrison Narcotics Tax Act

The continued pressure on the U.S. government led to the Harrison Narcotics Tax Act of 1914

which placed regulations on drug production and distribution within the United States. The Act

incorporated a sales tax to the sale of narcotics, reaffirmed the need for medical prescriptions,

and imposed the mandatory request for such transactions to be reported to the Federal

Government. Gradually the Treasury Department—which was in charge of the Act—used its

own methods in enforcing this Act. These efforts involved the imprisonment of a vast number of

physicians prescribing medication with narcotics to their patients. “By 1921 the Narcotics

Division employed 170 agents and had already sent 1,583 doctors and pharmacists to prison”

(Recio 2002, 26). This aggression against physicians led to a gradual change in the Harrison

Act—transforming it into a prohibitionist law against the use of narcotics. Those who

manufactured, distributed or consumed any narcotic were imprisoned. In contrast to

governmental belief, these strict regulations on consumption and criminalization of addicts and

consumers led to a growth in consumer demand—which paved the way for the black market.

A Shift in Focus

In the early 1920’s, an interest group within the Treasury Department began a shift in perspective

to combat drug use. It is then that the American government created the notion that in order to

reduce U.S. drug consumption, production had to be lessened not only in the U.S., but in other

producing countries as well. This was revolutionary to previous attempts on the matter, because

the Department aimed at putting pressure on other countries that produced and distributed

narcotics—such as Mexico. A conveniently close neighbor, Mexico was already producing and

distributing drugs and alcohol to the United States. The new prohibition laws gave Mexico-

based producers an advantage—one that provided many profits due to the increasing demand for

narcotics. Evidently, the U.S. perceived this as a threat to national interests, and encouraged the

surveillance of Mexican drug and alcohol production and distribution. Accordingly, the U.S.

government began to exert pressure on Mexico over its opium imports. The United States

believed that if producing countries also prohibited narcotics, drug prices—even in the black

market—would be excessively high that consumers would be unable to pay. However, this was

not the case. Although technically the U.S. and Mexico were working closely to regulate drug

consumption, the United States remained skeptical and maintained surveillance on Mexican

imports.

As mentioned above, prohibition of drug consumption in the United States, paved the

way for the growth of black markets along the U.S.-Mexico border. Due to high demand, these

markets were worth millions of dollars, and the smuggling of drugs expanded with the flow of

human migration along the border. U.S. pressures on the Mexican government led to a growing

number of restrictions in Mexico in regards to drug production and distribution. As a result,

production expanded along various states in order to evade the new regulatory laws. Parallel to

U.S. efforts years before, the Mexican government implemented stricter laws on the national

level—even incorporating them along medical lines. In mid 1920’s, the government required the

transactions related to narcotics in drug stores, to be recorded. Non-tariff barriers such as the

mandatory requests of “special” permits began to be implemented for the imports of marijuana,

opium, morphine and cocaine. Because of the new Mexican regulations on opium imports,

several countries in Mexico began to produce opium domestically. Various areas in the

Northwestern part of Mexico had appropriate land for opium planting. However, Mexican

efforts to enforce the law led to the imprisonment of any individual suspected of distributing

drugs. Drug trafficking became more prevalent as the government grew more strict on its

regulation. However, the growth in drug planting also depicted discrepancies in state and federal

regulations in regards to drug production. In order for drug traffickers to successfully plant

drugs and to attain the necessary derivatives, a state’s mayor or governor had to practice a certain

amount of leniency. Yet, “even though Mexico already had experience in planting and sending

such drugs to the United States, the country was not self-sufficient in production…the drug

entered Mexico illegally quite frequently” (Recio 2002, 40). Many of the drugs imported to

Mexico were from Asia and Europe—depicting not only a Western drug problem, but an

international one.

The illicit drug trade in Mexico expanded, and soon, corruption penetrated security

agencies, such as Mexico’s Customs agencies. The growing influence of the industry

preoccupied Mexican interests groups. Several interest groups joined forces in order to combat

drug trafficking in the country. Domestic and U.S. pressures created an anti-narcotics campaign

in Mexico that placed great pressure on the government and its policies. However, these policies

only exacerbated the problem by making the black markets stronger and more profitable. Social

instability and a weak economic infrastructure only created an incentive for people to enter the

black market in order to survive in the country’s weak conditions. “The narcotics industry not

only [created] jobs, but also [offered] an escape from abject poverty to many and veritable

fortunes and even quasi-elite social status to a few” (Lee III 1985-1986, 148). However, much

of the U.S. policies were misguided and were directed only at combating the supply of drugs in

source countries, while neglecting the increasing domestic demand for narcotics. Many of the

policies imposed on Latin America were biased and institutionalized. Bruce Michael Bagley, an

associate professor at the Institute of Inter-American Studies of the University of Miami, stated

that:

While publicly trumpeting its hardline antidrug stance, the Reagan Administration…indulged in counterproductive rhetorical denunciations and scapegoating of Colombia and other Andean countries and systematically underfunded U.S. assistance programs for the region (1989-90, 163).

Market Reform. By the middle of the 1970’s—in an increasingly globalized world—Latin

American countries strove to keep up with their industrialized counterparts in order to compete

in the global market. At the time, these economies had very weak foundations with

socioeconomic inequality. The lack of jobs and education in countries such as Colombia,

Bolivia and Peru made it difficult for these countries to participate in the growing free market

economy. Beginning in the 1980’s, the United States’ policies towards Latin America focused

on market reform and the elimination of the illicit drug market. These policies played a major

role regarding the course of the drug market. In order to remedy the stagnant Latin economies,

the United States provided foreign aid, and supported “loans through multilateral funding

agencies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), trade concessions, and diplomatic

favour” (Andreas 1995, 75). However, the strict and uniform policies requested by the IMF and

supported by the U.S. only created greater inequality in the countries.

The purpose of these neoliberal programs was to stimulate the domestic economy—to

boost profits and create jobs—and to push the domestic industries to compete in the global

market. However, in order to repay the loans given by the IMF and to fund the domestic

programs promised, Latin American countries embraced the profits and the jobs gained by the

illicit drug market. In the 1980’s, Latin America was highly in debt, and in order to repay the

loans given and to appease international pressures, countries such as Peru and Bolivia had to

conform to the strict guidelines given by the IMF for market reform. To respond to the

guidelines, Latin countries stabilized their currency, reduced their tariff and non-tariff barriers,

and privatized formerly state-owned industries. With these neoliberal policies, Latin countries

were able to participate in the global market more easily. However, these policies were uniform

and did not apply to each country’s individual needs, which resulted in social and political

instability. In order to comply with the IMF’s and the U.S.’ demands and regulations, these

countries exported their greatest commodity—cocaine. These Latin American governments had

a priority—which was to appease international pressures over debt, and to appease domestic

concerns over employment. These priorities diverted “attention and resources from drug

control” (Lee III 1985-1986, 144).

Consequently, the major export and greatest supplier of foreign currency was the coca

supply. Coca exports boomed and helped countries such as Bolivia to prosper economically.

For instance, in 1987 “coca exports generated $1.5 billion, which represented about 29% of

GDP” (Andreas 1995, 79). This economic flow generated a great flow of income and provided a

higher level of employment for the country. With these policies, countries like Bolivia and Peru

were able to appease both international and domestic pressures. With the introduction of the

global market to these countries, drug trafficking and narcotics production increased. The

increasing demand for cocaine in the United States generated a great flow of profit to the black

drug market, and therefore the industry gradually became more powerful and innovative. Profit

allowed drug traffickers to attain the necessary weapons and technology to become more

powerful and influential in their countries. Soon enough, the countries of Bolivia, Peru,

Colombia, Mexico and Peru became the major producing and distributing sources of illegal

narcotics in the Western Hemisphere. The bulk of these drugs were exported to the United

States—which even then had the greatest demand for narcotics in the Hemisphere. In 1983, then

Assistant Secretary of State Dominick DiCarlo “valued Peru’s trade in 1982 at $850 million,

Bolivia’s at more than $1 billion, and Colombia’s at $2 billion” (Lee III 1985-1986, 146).

Production of narcotics was specialized among these countries: Mexico produced marijuana and

heroin, and Peru and Bolivia were the sources of the coca leaf. But Colombia was the main

source of the drug market. Colombian traffickers not only produced and distributed their large

production of refined cocaine from Colombia, but they extended their business to other Latin

American countries as well. Colombian drug traffickers were very influential and powerful to

organize and finance their production in other countries.

This economic prowess only made these countries dependent on the narcotics industry—

and consequently, on the drug traffickers. Gradually, drug traffickers became involved in social

and political development. For instance, “Colombian and Bolivian drug traffickers...sponsored

public works programs, such as apartment complexes, schools, hospitals and urban renewal

projects, and…donated large sums to charity” (Lee III 1985-1986, 150). However, as the

country grew more dependent on narcodollars, drug traffickers became political influential

through blackmail, coercion and intimidation. Any form of uncooperative policies against drug

trafficking and their activities, would lead to violence and even assassinations of public officials.

Even when political officials would muster the courage to publicly condemn and combat

trafficking activities, the reality was that these countries were too dependent on this one industry.

These governments faced domestic pressures such as unemployment and poverty, and the

benefits of the drug industry were too abundant to ignore. Crop eradication efforts only raised

public discontent over the loss of employment. Farmers and distributors did not earn equivalent

profits by investing their time producing other licit crops. Not only did this raise unemployment,

but the income lost on anti-trafficking measures and in the market, created a slump for these

countries. As a result, Latin American governments would make efforts—however minor—in

order to appease international pressures. Domestic pressures and lack of institutional support

resulted in meager efforts by these countries, in destroying a few drug laboratories and uprooting

“a few coca bushes or marijuana plants” (Lee III 1985-1986, 152) while leaving the drug

industry to run as usual. These efforts were only executed to sell the image that Latin America

was on top of the drug problem, while intentionally letting the illicit drug market to flourish.

Globalization

Shown above is a clear depiction of how decisions made by one country, heavily affect

others—especially adjacent countries. By the 1970’s, an increasingly interdependent economy

led to the decrease of tariff and non-tariff barriers and the lowering of borders. The growth in

interdependence led to a growth in international trade and a global market that initiated

technological innovations to create a swifter form of communications among traders and

governments. The rise of the internet also opened doors to the growth of illicit trade around the

globe. However, in the Western Hemisphere the United States found itself with a greater

security issue with the opening of its southern border and the convenience of the internet for drug

traffickers. The rise in information technology created a decentralized black market which made

drug trafficking more difficult to track. Production and distribution were done more swiftly,

without consumers or distributors having to do business personally. Because of this

decentralization of the market and its transcendence over international borders, researchers have

come to find that with the rise of globalization in the 1990’s, it is not states that can properly deal

with the illicit market—but transnational organizations. Just as in the early 1900’s, the United

States has made the initiative to battle the supply of drugs in Latin America—with an emphasis

in Colombia. However, its efficacy has faltered and a growth of drug production and violence in

Mexico has led analysts to believe that the solution for this crisis should be handled at the

international level.

In a highly globalized economy, it is a complex issue for the United States and Colombia

to properly deal with the drug crisis in the region. For the sake of domestic and foreign interests,

it is necessary to maintain an open economy with a swift trade flow along the borders. However,

it is incredibly difficult to monitor the borderlines as violence and migration has increased along

the U.S.-Mexico border.

The Illicit Drug Market

The great demand in the United States for narcotics and the great supply of drugs in Latin

America, led to a surge of drug exports into the United States. This convenience made Mexico

the principle transit of illegal narcotics. Like previously mentioned, Mexico was a source

country of heroin, marijuana and methamphetamine yet its production was not enough to sustain

a strong illegal market. Profits were mainly attained by Mexican cartels transporting Latin

America’s drugs into the United States through the U.S.-Mexico border. Latin countries have

had other transit routes such as the Caribbean Basin countries and other islands in the Atlantic

and Caribbean Sea. However, the border between the U.S. and Mexico, which is nearly 2,000

miles gives Mexico the comparative advantage as the major transit country. According to a

Congressional report by Colleen Cook, “90% of cocaine entering the United States transits

Mexico” (Cook 2007, 4). Colombian traffickers still have the comparative advantage in the

industry because of their large level of supply and expertise on the trade; however the Mexican

drug trafficking organizations (DTO’s) have played a major role in the War on Drugs since the

[demise] of the Colombian Medellin and Cali cartels. Latin American narcotics reach Mexico

either by land, sea or air routes and reach the United States mostly by land through the U.S.-

Mexico border. On October 30, 2008 a record breaking 23.5 ton shipment of cocaine was seized

in Manzanillo that was concealed in shipping containers. As the United States has become

increasingly involved in the War on Drugs in the Western Hemisphere, U.S. policies have

emphasized the need to control narcotics production and distribution—as a result, Mexico’s role

as a major transit of narcotics has become a security issue for America’s policies. “Mexico is

our next door neighbor and a significant economic partner in the North America Free Trade

Agreement. Chaos in that country would inevitably impact Americans” (Carpenter 2005, 6).

Consequently, Mexican cartels have become more influential than Colombians in the West’s

drug industry.

Because of the heavy flow of migration in the U.S.-Mexico border and the lack of an

equal amount of law enforcement agents, Mexican traffickers are able to transport drugs and

their profits along the border. “Mexican drug traffickers increasingly smuggle money back into

Mexico in cars and trucks” (Cook 2007, 6) and commercial trucks “with hidden compartments,

or concealed within legitimate cargo” (Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement

Affairs 2008; hereafter INL) and occasionally use human trafficking for narcotics transports. A

current issue is the rise in kidnapping of U.S. citizens for their use in transporting drugs.

Because customs officials might be less suspicious of U.S. citizens, Mexican traffickers kidnap

innocent Americans to use them as mules for drug transport. Other forms of transit have been

through the use of public officials. Through the course of the years, there has been greater police

corruption. For instance, “[the] PGR reported in late 2005 that nearly 1,500 of AFI’s 7,000

agents were under investigation for suspected criminal activity” (Cook 2007, 9). The AFI is

Mexico’s Federal Investigative Agency—the equivalent of the U.S Federal Bureau of

Investigation, designed to use modern and scientific modes of criminal investigation; and the fact

that a major part of its agents are charged of corruption shows how drug trafficking has

penetrated Mexico’s political and social sectors, like in Colombia.

Domestic Effects of the Trade

The effects of drug trafficking in producing countries varies incredibly—from providing

a great flow of foreign income into the country, to increasing violence and corruption in society.

These drug related profits are beneficial in facilitating a country’s competitiveness in the global

market, yet negative effects include the rise in violence and corruption in the country, along with

social degradation and loss of confidence within the country. Mexico and Colombia are of major

concern to the United States: Colombia has been the linchpin of the narcotics trade and it has

affected the Latin countries around it—including Mexico. Now there is a growing concern that

Mexico is following in Colombia’s footsteps with the peak in drug related violence and

corruption.

Socioeconomic and Political Degradation in Mexico. Drug trafficking in Colombia and

Mexico has been the cause of much corruption in these countries. The public has had a loss of

confidence over political and law enforcement officials. Loss of trust and insecurity in these

countries has led to an instability and degradation of the social sectors. The violence in these

countries continues, and in recent months the U.S. media has focused on the chaotic violence

taking place in Mexico. This is a security issue of high importance to the U.S. because the chaos

“is spilling over the border” (Carpenter 2005, 1) and affecting U.S. border towns and its citizens.

Every day, the media reveals new drug-related deaths along the border, and what seems to be of

great concern is that many of the casualties are those of police officers and other public officials.

This chaos in the border is mainly due to the cartels’ turf wars in the region “for control of the

access corridors to the lucrative U.S. market” (Carpenter 2005, 2). The DTO’s have created

Areas of Influence where they operate and exert their greatest influence. For instance, the

Tijuana cartel created its Area of Influence near the Baja California region; the Areas of the

Federation consist of the West, South and the Yucatan Peninsula; and the Juarez and Gulf Cartel

are stationed in the North and Northwestern part of Mexico. Aside from financing, producing

and distributing narcotics, their activities consist of arms trafficking, auto theft and kidnapping.

The cartels have enforcer gangs in these territories to control drug trafficking routes and defend

the cartel’s terrain. However, violence and deaths occur when public officials get involved to

interrupt these activities. Other issues are when these enforcer gangs become socially disruptive

in towns for the sake of influence. In order to exert their influence, these enforcer gangs

terrorize the streets of towns in their Areas. This disrupts the social peace in Mexican society

and the trust the public has on the government’s authority.

Just like in Colombia during the 1980’s, the Mexican government’s authority has been

put into question because of the influence that these DTO’s have on Mexico’s policies. Political

officials, journalists and other public officials involved in anti-drug trafficking activities are

threatened and assassinated. Consequently, DTO’s spread fear in the country to the point that

many public positions are left vacant because candidates fear too much for their lives to fight in

the War on Drugs. There are a few, like today’s Mexican President Felipe Calderon, who stand

up against drug trafficking and condemn its activities publicly, despite personal threats.

However, the persistence of violence and social degradation in the country has the majority of

the public concerned with the President’s policies and effectiveness, although his efforts are

positively acknowledged by the United States and the international community.

During the Fox Administration the concept of public security was put as first priority.

Before that, “[according] to the Fox Administration, the confusion of national security with

regime security had as a consequence the lack of attention to the “real threats”: the increase of

organized crime, corruption, environmental degradation, among others” (Chabat 2006, 17).

Today, there is the public concern over Mexico’s policies in regards to the War on Drugs due to

the perception that they are an extension of American interests. This concern has risen from the

militarization of Mexico in recent years. The United States has provided Mexico military aid to

combat the drug supply and its distribution. However, the clashes between the military and the

DTO’s only create further dangers and disrupt the peace. “Daily deaths [occur] both from

confrontations between the army and the drug traffickers, and battles between drug cartels

seeking to re-establish control over territory and leadership” (Carlsen 2007, 3). U.S. intervention

of Mexico’s crisis only bolsters U.S. influence and emphasizes its dominance in the region.

Therefore, the nation’s dependence on drug trafficking profits and U.S. aid only makes the

government seem overly dependent and less authoritative and to protect the country. The lack of

trust in the government only creates a weaker sense of security—which creates vulnerability

among the public regarding the benefits of being in the drug trafficking industry.

The continued corruption charges against important public officials well known for their

anti-drug trafficking efforts, is also a major concern in the public sphere. By the end of the year

2000, “there were more than 3,000 law-enforcement officers suspended for corruption” (Chabat

2006, 15). Also, the arrest of public officials such as Ricardo Gutierrez Vargas, Mexico’s liaison

with Interpol and director of the AFI—charged with leaking classified information to Mexico’s

drug trafficking organizations—depicts the penetration of drug trafficking in Mexico’s social

sectors. Even some major corporations with anti-drug trafficking missions “were accused of

participating in drug trafficking, extortion and kidnapping” (Chabat 2006, 5). The Bush

Administration has perceived Mexico’s drug crisis as a major security concern to the United

States, due to the increase in violence and drug related killings near the border, and committed

over $400 million for Mexico’s anti-drug trafficking efforts.

The increase in abductions and killings of innocents has resulted in Mexico launching an

anti-kidnapping squad made of 300 officers. There has been a loss of confidence in the

government’s capacity to fight violence and corruption. Abduction and killing of children and

the suspicion of police involvement has made the public angry and resentful of drug trafficking.

Socioeconomic and Political Degradation in Colombia. Like Mexico has done today, the

benefits of drug trafficking in Colombia—in the 1980’s—were highly welcomed yet these

benefits had a short term effect. The drug industry created long-term consequences that would

negatively affect Colombian society. The illegal drug market negatively affected Colombia by

making it dependent on that single industry, with no regard to the country’s weak economic

infrastructure.

The drug industry [had] acted as a catalyst that accelerated a process of “delegitimation of the regime” that [had] contributed to the country’s stagnation (Thoumi 1995). This process produced a sharp decline in trust that increased transaction costs, contributed to increased violence and impunity that…induced “clean” capital flight and larger security costs, promoted expectations of very fast wealth accumulation that produced highly speculative investments and increases in bankruptcies, embezzlements, and so forth (Thoumi 2002, 110-11).

Because drug trafficking has permeated Colombian society for over 90 years, the issues

of Colombia differ in some way from Mexico’s problems. By the 1980’s-1990’s, the Medellin

and Cali cartels had corrupted the political and economic spheres of Colombian society; and had

created enough violence to make Colombia a regional concern. The demise of these two

infamous cartels did not have a long term positive effect: political and socioeconomic

instability, human rights abuses, militarization of society and violence, are issues still affecting

Colombian society today.

The rise of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC)—a terrorist

guerrilla group—and its influence on the political and social spheres, created further violence in

Colombia despite the demise of the infamous Colombian cartels. Since his first term in office,

President Alvaro Uribe has implemented relatively successful anti-drug trafficking campaigns

that have lessened violence and attacks on the country’s infrastructure and have put pressure on

the FARC. During his first term, the level of kidnappings decreased substantially: “[an] annual

average of 2,843 in 1996-2002 to 1,061 in 2002-2006, a drop of 63 percent” (Bustamante and

Chaskel 2008, 78). Same thing with assassinations: threats on political figures “attributed to

guerilla groups fell by 11 percent” (Bustamante and Chaskel 2008, 78). These successes by

President Uribe have granted him greater domestic support and have provided Colombian

citizens with a greater degree of security. However, researchers have found that the FARC may

be adapting to the government’s military strategies. Most of the government’s successes were

during Uribe’s first presidential term, and there are concerns whether the Administration will

have the same level of success during his second term. A current issue remains the negotiations

for the release of roughly 500 prisoners in the hands of the FARC.

A social concern in the country is the great number of people being displaced from their

homes as a result of “[repeated] threats and acts of aggression by guerrillas, paramilitaries, and

their associates in the narcotics industry” (Bustamante and Chaskel 2008, 79). More than 3

million people have been displaced over the past 20 years because of the dangers by the FARC

and its associates, and many have had to move to slums and shantytowns. Many of the crimes

still prevalent in society are the extrajudicial killings performed by some members of Colombia’s

armed forces. According to Bustamante and Chaskel, these crimes consist of members killing

innocent people and then dressing them up as the enemy combatants to justify the murders. The

murder of these victims are not put to justice, that “[less] than 1 percent of reported instances of

extrajudicial killings lead to criminal convictions” (Bustamante and Chaskel 2008, 79).

Although Uribe’s policies have lessened violence and chaos in the country, Colombia remains a

very dangerous country with a high degree of impunity and low security for minorities. Security

measures remain a luxury in Colombia and only the elite can afford it.

According to the State Department in 2002, members of the armed forces and the

guerillas worked together—making deals for profit at the expense of civilians. Because of U.S.

pressures, military personnel were suspended by Colombia because of human rights abuses and

their collaboration with guerrillas. However, major human rights organizations and groups have

disputed that Colombian efforts are not in compliance with U.S. regulations. These groups have

“named several high-ranking officials who have avoided suspension and prosecution despite

facing serious allegations” (Vaicius and Isacson 2003, 14).

The weak economic infrastructure in Colombia has left poverty and the economic

inequality prevalent in Colombian society. “A number of projects have been funded, either by

the United States directly or through multilateral agencies…that aim at providing alternative

commercial crops for farmers growing coca” (Reuter and Kleiman 1986, 308). Anti-drug

trafficking efforts such as crop eradication are also a cause of poverty today. Colombian

peasants have attempted to survive economically by producing crops for the market, yet the most

profitable crops to be produced are illicit crops—more specifically, coca. For this reason, there

are many farmers producing illicit crops for the sake of survival. Consequently, crop eradication

efforts also cause loss of jobs for farmers in the illicit crop production business.

Within Colombia, the drug trade has complicated the preexisting social conflict between the traditional landowners and the landless. The success of the drug trade [has] allowed narcotraffickers to buy land…joining the ranks of the traditional landowners, but with different interests and goals (Holmes et al. 2006, 167).

Coca production is a large source of employment in Colombia and crop eradication

affects the farmers in these areas. The United States and multinational organizations have

designed alternative programs in order to offer farm families an alternative form employment

through compensation and guidance for licit crop production. However the alternative

development money continues to be delayed by U.S. bureaucracy. The long processes and

inefficiencies in attaining this money only increase unemployment and poverty in the country.

“Farmers can…earn far higher returns from illicit plants than from the alternatives. For that

reason, even when they enter crop-substitution programs, peasants often continue to grow drug

plants in other areas” (CATO, 570). Consequently, the Colombian government uses crop

surveillance via satellite to make sure these farmers do not revert back to illicit crop production.

Crop eradication is also a problem for rural society because of the effects that aerial

spraying has on the soil and the groundwater. Aerial spraying is effective in destroying illicit

crops and cutting production in those areas, but it also contaminates the soil and groundwater

enough to generate disease in the surrounding areas.

Colombian DTO’s have penetrated the political and judicial system through intimidation

and bribery—consequently, reducing credibility and trust by the people. “Colombia is in the

midst of an institutional crisis characterized by extremely low levels of social capital and trust”

(Thoumi 2002, 112). The lack of social commitment to the drug crisis only exacerbates the

problem and gives leeway to further corruption in the political system. This lack of motivation

to deal with the drug crisis is a result of the income generated by the illicit drug market.

Colombia’s economic infrastructure is too weak to sustain itself without the benefits generated

by the narcotics trade.

Regional Effects of the Trade. The Western Hemisphere’s Drug Crisis is an issue that

not only affects producing and consumer countries, but the whole Hemisphere as a whole.

Spillovers even traverse to overseas markets, yet because this paper is focused on the Western

Hemisphere only certain effects will be discussed. In order to combat the West’s War on Drugs,

research groups and organizations have invested heavily on research and development. Treaties

and Regional Agreements have been recognized by the region’s countries; however their level of

implementation is doubtful. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and the

Organization of American States (OAS) have provided research and recommendations over the

drug crisis in order to assess drug control in the region. This provides regional pressures on

producing countries that fail to comply with drug control measures. Regional mechanisms are

applied in order to help Latin America with its drug crisis and the effects it has on the rest of the

region. Despite U.S. and Latin American efforts in regards to military training, crop eradication,

destruction of laboratory sites and interdiction, the illicit drug market continues to grow and has

expand regionally. What we have found is a balloon effect throughout the hemisphere that has

policymakers wondering what their next initiative will cause.

Since the 1980’s, when Colombia’s drug crisis was at its peak, the United States became

more proactive in the War on Drugs. Since then, the U.S. has continued to fund Colombia’s

various mechanisms and equipment for the fight against drugs. As the dominant power in the

region and seeing how this problem is a hemispheric threat, the U.S. has found it necessary to aid

in the crisis by supplying Colombia with foreign aid, military equipment and training and

policies. During the time period of 2004 to 2006, Latin countries received more than $500

million in investment for alternative development programs. Evidently, this issue does not only

involve the United States and Colombia: these investments have been funded through

international cooperation as well. Nevertheless, the United States has been proactive in funding

Colombian efforts—with more than $35 billion invested since 1981. However, the problem lies

when these large funds are invested in policies that have not proven effective in the past years.

This becomes a domestic issue because it affects the pockets of U.S. taxpayers. Fruitless results

will only create a negative public rating in regards to the War on Drugs and the politicians

supporting it.

As Mexico has become more proactive in the drug trade, there has been a continuing

spillover of drug related violence into the United States. Not only is violence prevalent in the

U.S.-Mexico border, but crimes related to money laundering are also a result of this proximity.

This problem is highly related to the balloon effect of the industry: illicit drug production and

distribution has expanded from Latin America to Mexico, and now its social effects are being felt

in the United States. Despite the numerous strategies that the U.S. and Colombia have come up

with, it seems that DTO’s are always a step ahead—and this seems to be a result of their massive

economic resources. The massive profits of this industry allow traffickers to adjust to

counternarcotics measures easily, and their decentralization gives them flexibility. The most

salient consequence has been the rise of drug production in Mexico. In the 1980’s, when the

United States was implementing its hardline policies in Colombia against its infamous cartels,

many drug lords shifted their business to Mexico—where they resumed their trade. Today,

Mexico’s drug related violence and corruption is a major threat to United States national

security.

Another social concern over this industry is the link of drug trafficking with terrorism.

Research has found a link between drug seizures with those of ammunition and firearms. For

instance in 2006, 79,056 firearms and 1,860,066 of ammunition were seized in illicit trafficking

cases. The number of ammunition seized in drug trafficking offenses has exceeded those of

firearms and explosives. This quantitative connection has led researchers and policymakers to

conclude that drug related profits fund terrorist activities. This greater threat requires funding for

border controls—not only border interdiction but stricter forms of identification measures.

Recently, the United States has funded for greater identification measures by creating an

electronic passport. This is an achievement because it makes imitation more difficult than

previous U.S. passports. And in the summer of 2009, United States citizens will be required to

have a passport for any form of travel.

The increase in drug addiction in the United States is a national concern. Over the years,

demand for narcotics has increased, which has led the U.S. to fund for drug preventive and

rehabilitation programs around the country.

Other regional concerns consist of the negative effects that the illicit drug market may

have on the global market. The economic successes of most of the Latin American countries are

a result of drug related profits. This illicit industry has only exacerbated Latin countries’ weak

infrastructures by having society ignore core economic issues. Despite the great profits gained

from the illicit market, these economies continue to have great levels of inequality and low

education. Poverty, inequality and illiteracy are not characteristics that can boost society into

modernization. It is a problem that Latin American countries continue to ignore these problems.

Dependence on the illicit drug market and its profits has only created rentier economies—with a

dependence on an illicit industry. It is imperative that these economies improve domestic

education and focus on improving the other sectors to prepare them for market competition.

Otherwise, the regional market will consist mainly of unstable, rentier economies—generating

instability in the market as a whole.

Interrelations

The growth of the drug market in the Americas has affected the interrelations between the

United States and the drug producing countries. What is evident is that the United States has

more at stake in dealing with drug trafficking in Mexico than in Colombia, due to the close trade

relations the U.S. has with Mexico. In the 1980’s, the U.S. and Colombia had a strained

relationship. The United States’ time and effort put on the War on Drugs was not as dedicative

as it is now with Mexico, and its recommendations on Latin America were more stringent and

demanding. During the Samper Administration (1994-98), “the U.S. government considered

Colombian president Ernesto Samper an enemy in the drug war. U.S. antidrug policy…targeted

not just illicit crop cultivation, traffickers, and money laundering but also the democratically

elected president himself” (Crandall 2001, 95). The aggressive proposals implemented on

Colombia and the concessions applied due to noncompliance, easily depicted the dominant-

subordinate relationship between the two countries. Since then, the United States continues to

fund Colombia’s anti-drug trafficking efforts. However, critics continue to scrutinize American

efforts on Colombia’s crisis—claiming that the time and funds invested on the War are not

satisfactory to Colombia’s needs. According to researcher Kenneth Sharpe, “the United States

has not been willing to commit the resources that would really be necessary…a source country

like Colombia would need $2-$3 billion annually to establish effective control over drug-

producing areas” (Sharpe 1988, 78). Up to this day, the United States does not fund $2-$3

billion annually to Colombia. “In the summer of 2000, the U.S. government approved a $1.3

billion supplemental assistance package for Colombia” (Crandall 2001, 95) mainly consisting of

counternarcotics aid. As for strategy, analysts and governmental organizations are concerned of

the unilateral approach the U.S. has on the War on Drugs. U.S. foreign policy on the War on

Drugs has consisted of a supply-based strategy that has been fruitless up to this day. U.S.

demand for cocaine continues to increase in the United States, and DTO’s are constantly

adapting to government countermeasures that drug production has not subsided.

Today’s emphasis on the drug-related violence in Mexico has brought to light the more

intricate U.S.-Mexico relationship in the Drug War. Despite the continued violence and chaos in

the U.S-Mexico border, and the government’s inability to control corruption in the country, the

United States has not implemented the sanctions it once placed on Colombia. “Unlike its

treatment of Colombia…Washington has consistently granted Mexico full certification despite

evidence of narcocorruption throughout the Mexican government” (CATO, 574). The U.S.-

Mexican administrations continue to hold close talks in regards to security and counternarcotics

measures, and even though their interrelations are frail, they do not reflect the stringent U.S.-

Colombian relations. Even by the end of its term, the Bush Administration viewed U.S.-

Mexican relations as important due to the NAFTA relations, yet it still perceived the drug related

violence in the U.S-Mexico border as a threat to U.S. national security. Therefore, then

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice took a visit to Mexico to hold talks with her Mexico

counterpart about further security measures to be considered.

Today, U.S-Colombian relations are not as stringent as in the last decade, yet today’s

concerns over the Mexican drug crisis depict U.S. favoritism with Mexico. U.S. policies and

recommendations toward Mexico seem to contrast to the hardline pressures the U.S. had placed

in Colombia. Mexico’s proximity to the United States, a shared border, and crucial trade related

ties are reasons for the difference in strategy toward Mexico. It is in the country’s greater

interests to be more strategic and supportive of Mexico due to the close and crucial trade

relations between the two countries. However, future relations between the two countries are

still stringent because of the Mexican government’s criticism of U.S. policies in controlling

domestic demand; and the U.S. arms trade that has supplied DTO’s in Latin America.

Domestic and International Collaboration—Policies

U.S. Foreign Policy for Colombia. With the end of the Cold War, the main concern for the

United States was to keep communism from taking over the Western Hemisphere. To take

charge of Western relations, the U.S. focused on linking what researcher Russell Crandall called

“intermestic” issues—which were concerns that combined domestic and international pressures.

Immigration and the drug war fell under the category of intermestic concerns. However, the

degree of competition within U.S. agencies on these issues only made policymaking more

difficult and inefficient. According to Russell Crandall, two issues affecting U.S. policy during

the early 1990’s was the bureaucratic form of decision making, and realist-centered policies.

The competitiveness and disagreements between the U.S. agencies only created a highly

bureaucratic foreign policy process, “devoid of any type of overarching strategic policy”

(Crandall 2001, 98), with a realist perspective—finding a consensus only on national security.

U.S. foreign policy for the War on Drugs has varied with the changing of administrations.

However, the first few decades of U.S. involvement in the War on Drugs were characterized with

unilateral and hardline policies toward Latin American countries. The relationship between the

U.S. and Latin America was one of dominant-subordinate states. As a result, most of the U.S.

policy proposals in the Drug War were biased in favor of U.S. national interests. The

asymmetric relationship between the U.S. and Colombia—Colombia being the major producer

country in the West—did not give the latter country much leeway on the implementation of

policies. The subordinate state had to consider U.S. interests in its policies and lack of

compliance resulted in coercive action by the dominant state.

During the 1970’s-80’s, United States foreign policy was extremely unilateral and

hardline. The administration viewed the drug problem as the main concern of the decade. On

June 17, 1971, U.S. President Richard Nixon declared the global illicit drug trade as the number

one concern in global politics. However, U.S. President George Bush (1988-1992) declared the

War on Drugs in the Western Hemisphere in a 1988 campaign speech, where he emphasized the

need to combat the drug problem from the source. This new concept on the War on Drugs was

initiated with the belief that the proper solution to deal with the drug problem was to focus on the

supply side of the issue. In his campaign speech, Bush stated, “The cheapest way to eradicate

narcotics is to destroy them at their source…we need to wipe out crops wherever they are grown

and take out labs wherever they exist” (quoted in Crandall 2001, 100). This speech on the

strategic point of the War on Drugs disregarded the domestic demand for narcotics and the need

to deal with the problem domestically.

In 1989, the Bush Administration became increasingly involved in the War on Drugs as a

result of the assassination of presidential candidate, Luis Carlos Galan—a Colombian

presidential candidate whom the United States felt would gear Colombia into modernization and

to close U.S.-Colombian relations. The assassination of Galan resulted in the United States

sending Colombia approximately $65 million in counternarcotics aid—more than was expected

for that year—and the creation of the Andean Initiative, which was a program designed to

combat “drug cultivation and drug trafficking in the Andes” (Crandall 2001, 101). The

administration’s inability to reduce drug cultivation and trafficking in the Andes did not halt U.S.

efforts in the War on Drugs. This initiative was only the beginning of the long battle in the War

against drugs.

During the Clinton Administration (1993-2001), U.S. policy on the War on Drugs was

highly interventionist. Although the U.S. perceived the drug problem as a great threat, the funds

for the War on Drugs were reduced. The ineffective policies conducted during the Bush

Administration only made newly elected President Clinton reduce the funds for Andean foreign

aid; “[therefore] the planned fiscal year 1993 $387 billion in antidrug aid for the Andean

countries was slashed to $174 billion” (Crandall 2001, 101). During the Clinton presidency,

U.S.-Colombian relations grew stringent as suspicions of corruption were ignited. Information

leaks led the U.S. to doubt the Colombian administration’s dedication to the War on Drugs. As a

result of these suspicions, President Clinton adapted to a hardline character and used coercive

pressures on Colombia and its Samper Administration for compliance. The United States

ultimately had the upper hand—as the dominant state—and had the ability to coerce Colombia

into complying with U.S. requests. The context of U.S. suspicion gave the U.S. an advantage to

exert its influence in Colombia, enough to have U.S. public officials—such as agents from the

Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)—serving in Colombia under U.S. protection. U.S. pressures

and intelligence by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the DEA helped the Samper

Administration in launching anti drug operations against the infamous Medellin and Cali cartels.

Washington’s hardline pressures on Bogotá were mainly interventionist and lacked

strategy. The U.S. efforts disregarded the implementation of proper solutions for the War on

Drugs while it pressured Samper to escalate anti-drug trafficking policies. In 1996 and 1997, the

U.S. decertified Colombia under the pretext that the Samper administration was highly

corrupted. Decertification of Colombia suspended U.S. foreign aid and trade benefits with the

country. However, this only created collateral damage in Colombia. Isolationism of Colombia

led to social and economic problems due to Colombia’s dependence on the U.S. market. Higher

levels of poverty and inequality only strengthened Colombia’s drug traffickers, and “concern

was growing that the two earlier decertification decisions had been counterproductive and

actually were harming U.S. counternarcotics efforts” (Crandall 2001, 110). Decertification

isolated Colombia from U.S. relations and its market, and also took away U.S. anti-drug funds—

which only had negative results for the drug war. U.S. national interest led the U.S. to reverse

the decertification and continue U.S. assistance on the War on Drugs.

In 1998, Colombia’s newly elected president, Andres Pastrana, first suggested the

implementation of a Plan Colombia. In response to this idea, U.S Congress passed a bill based

on this concept, yet “it focused more narrowly on crop fumigation and drug interdiction” than on

drug preventive programs and rehabilitation—which were major issues of the drug crisis. The

bill was based on combating the production and distribution of narcotics, not on fighting the

guerrilla groups or drug traffickers funding the trade. However, after the September 11 attacks

on the United States, the U.S. and Colombia shifted their focus toward the battle against

terrorists—which led to a shift in focus on the mission of Plan Colombia as well. “Since then,

military aid to Colombia has been openly used in battles against the FARC, the National

Liberation Army (ELN), and the AUC, each of which is on the State Department’s list of foreign

terrorist organizations” (Bustamante and Chaskel 2008, 78). The efforts through Plan Colombia

were both combating drug production and terrorist groups. However, Plan Colombia has failed

to succeed in its effort to reduce drug production in Latin America: “it has failed to stop the US-

bound flow of illicit drugs produced in the Andean Region” (Bustamante and Chaskel 2008, 78),

and the price of cocaine has decreased dramatically since 1999.

In regards to Plan Colombia’s effort in reducing drug production in the region, coca cultivation in Colombia decreased considerably from 2000 to 2005, from 163,300 hectares (ha) to 105,400 ha… Nevertheless, it is important to note that coca cultivation has increased since 2003 and hat new coca plants have sprung up in areas previously not cultivated (Neumann 2006, 429).

U.S. crop eradication efforts have only created a balloon effect in the country, where DTO’s

have adapted to the measures, and shifted their operations elsewhere. These eradication efforts

have not succeeded in reducing the incentive for illicit crop production in the country. In fact, in

2003, “the overall amount of coca grown in Colombia [was] somewhere near 150,00 hectares, or

three times as much as it was when the United States began large-scale spraying” (Vaicius and

Isacson 2003, 14). Since Plan Colombia’s inception, the United States has transferred over $4.3

billion on the War on Drugs; however,

Three-quarters of that money has gone to the military, [and] the results are well known: Colombia remains the primary source of cocaine on the U.S. market, the price has gone down, and the purity has risen. Despite massive fumigations, the surface area planted in coca has not been reduced” (Carlsen 2007, 2).

Poverty in the country provides traffickers the context for peasant vulnerability. Millions

of farm families become integrated in the illicit crop production business in order to survive in

Colombia’s economy. Therefore, crop eradication has other effects not thought of by the U.S.

Congress—ecological and humanitarian costs. The chemicals used—mainly the concentration of

glyphosate—for aerial spraying and fumigation of illicit crops are known to be harmful.

In a word, glyphosate leads to soil erosion, deforestation, air and food contamination, water pollution and illness among animals, young children and the elderly (diarrhea, weight loss, cancer and skin diseases) (Neumann 2006, 430).

Not only is fumigation health and environmentally hazardous, but it also results in displacement

of millions of farm families. Conflict in the fumigation areas and the loss of employment forces

families to move from their homes in search of alternative forms of employment and safety. In

2002, U.S. foreign aid law “sought to limit fumigation’s collateral effects” (Vaicius and Isacson

2003, 11) because of the pressures by Colombian citizens and humanitarian organizations.

However, the conditions that the law put on the State Department were vague enough for

interpretation. Aerial spraying has continued in Colombia.

Nevertheless, U.S. Congress requested the State Department to fund for alternative

development programs, in order to compensate farm families for the destruction of their crops.

These programs were designed to offer farmers alternate forms of employment and economic

compensations for displacement.

As a result of the new challenges of the 21st Century, Plan Colombia was extended by the

Colombian government, to focus on the growing terrorism challenge. This extension is known

as Plan Patriota, “and the overall majority of US aid…is aimed at the purpose of counternarcotics

and antiterrorism” (Neumann 2006, 431). The majority of U.S. counternarcotics aid is now

allocated to the military and law enforcement sectors—leaving the smaller portion of aid for

demand reduction programs, rehabilitation and social development. Although the Drug War is

becoming a lesser priority with the rise of the War on Terror, “the size and purpose of the U.S.

military aid are expanding rapidly” (Vaicius and Isacson 2003, 2) in Colombia. The new Bush

Administration has opted “for steady military-aid increases within the framework of a blanket

‘counter-terror’ approach” (Vaicius and Isacson 2003, 22). Throughout the years of the Drug

War, the United States has transferred high class military equipment to Colombia.

Since 1999, U.S. aid has included eighty-four helicopters; the creation of new brigades in Colombia’s army and navy; grants of cargo and attack aircraft, patrol boats, communications and intelligence-gathering equipment, uniforms, and small arms; and the training of over 15,000 Colombian military and police. Hundreds of U.S troops and private contract personnel work on Colombian soil as trainers, intelligence-gatherers, spray pilots and mechanics (Vaicius and Isacson 2003, 4).

It is evident that U.S. policy for Colombia is focused on military and law enforcement assistance,

while it lacks strategic policies on civil development and close intergovernmental cooperation.

The drug problem is prevalent in these societies because of deep rooted societal issues that can

not be fixed with the billions of dollars invested on military equipment and irrational supply-

based operations. The drug trafficking organizations continue to have a large market in the U.S.

willing to invest in cocaine; and also have a large market of employees willing to risk their lives

for the economic benefits the industry provides. Interdictions and aerial spraying only create

collateral damage and increase violence: “they have not affected the country’s illicit export

performance” (CATO, 571).

U.S. Foreign Policy on Mexico. As for U.S. policy initiatives in Mexico, the United States has

shown more interactive and a closer bilateral cooperation with Mexico on its drug crisis. Mexico

remains fully certified by the U.S. and U.S. government officials remain cooperative in terms of

intelligence and support. U.S. counternarcotics aid for Mexico is at a smaller scale than U.S aid

for Colombia, yet it has been consistent in offering “aviation support; operational support for

Mexico’s drug interdiction and eradication programs; and professionalization and training of

Mexican law enforcement personnel” (Congressional Research Service 2007; hereafter CRS). In

2006, as the violence increased in Mexico, the United States allocated US$450.9 million to

strengthen drug control capabilities in the country. “Current U.S. counternarcotics policy toward

Mexico focuses on the interdiction and eradication of drug shipments” (CRS, 2007) primarily

near the U.S-Mexico border. Despite these efforts, the United States does not fund alternative

development programs in Mexico.

In regards to U.S training, the United States government has provided training for the

Mexican law enforcement agencies (LEA’s) to bolster surveillance and laboratory capabilities,

for the improvement of methamphetamine seizures. Additionally, the U.S. has also provided

specialization training for information technology engineers, polygraph operators, and the

Mexican Navy. In 2007, the U.S. law enforcement personnel shared “shared sensitive tactical

information with their Mexican counterparts in real time, resulting in greater numbers of

successful interdiction operations” (INL, 2008) such as the seizure of over 2.7 MT of cocaine.

However, much of the recent clashes between the army and drug trafficking

organizations, has led the media to focus on the negative effects militarization has had on

Mexican society and safety. In Mexico, “the army is on the front line of the counter-narcotics

campaign” and this level of militarization “has led to human rights violations as well as

increased violent confrontations with drug traffickers” (Carlsen 2007, 4). The rise in police

corruption has made the army more credible and trustworthy than Mexico’s law enforcement.

The public has lost confidence on Mexico’s police force as drug related deaths and kidnappings

pervade the enforcement agency. As a result, crimes have been asked to be reported to the army

instead for fear of retaliation. Despite close training with Mexican LEA’s and Customs, the

United States has tightened security in the U.S.-Mexico border. Because of the high corruption

levels in Mexico, and the loss of confidence in Mexican LEA’s, the United States has increased

the number of agents for border security.

On June 2008, the Bush Administration allocated $400 million to Mexico in

counternarcotics aid—less than what was allocated in 2006. This package consisted of

helicopters, technical support and drug-sniffing dogs. A smaller portion of U.S. foreign aid to

Mexico is allocated to drug prevention programs and rehabilitation. Currently, about 35% of

U.S aid goes to prevention programs, treatment and research. In response to this aid, the

Mexican government has been able to fund for reforms in schools—including testing of students

for drug detection. Rehabilitation clinics abound, yet they do not provide security and privacy

features available in the United States.

The closer trade relations the United States has with Mexico keeps the U.S. from

decertifying its counterpart, yet the counternarcotics assistance that the U.S. has offered is not a

complete progress—in regards to policy—from what was offered to Colombia. Much of the

U.S. aid for Mexico, is based on militarization and is biased toward combating drug supply in

Mexico, rather than promoting civil assistance and reform. Demand reduction initiatives are less

aggressive: the efforts primarily consist of conducting surveys in particularly sensitive states to

for drug use analysis. Militarization of Mexico, interdiction and eradication has only increased

violence in the country—increasing drug related killings in 2008 by 50% --and civil conditions

have not necessary improved for local citizens. Drug addiction, violence, corruption, and

poverty continue to plague Mexican society despite the billions of dollars invested by the United

States.

U.S. Domestic Policy. As was previously mentioned, the drug crisis in the Western Hemisphere

was a security issue perceived in the Post-Cold War era that led to a series of prohibition laws in

the U.S. The White House initiated policies that prioritized supply reduction and foreign policy

directed to source countries in Latin America. In the 1970’s, the Nixon Administration not only

introduced the War on Drugs, but it also expanded its domestic policies on the issue. President

Nixon took the initiative of executing a counternarcotics offensive and also created a series of

anti-drug agencies to deal with the issue domestically. This initiative led to the creation of the

agencies such as the Drug Enforcement Agency which criminalized illicit drug use. Nixon

emphasized the need for treatment of illicit drug use, and the need to control the domestic

distribution of such drugs. During the early years of the Drug War, the U.S. government felt it

necessary to emphasize national security from foreign threats by strengthening border controls,

that in 1969, it closed the U.S.-Mexico border in order to scrutinize all vehicles through

inspection.

Since the 1980’s, “the federal government has also devoted considerable resources to

hardening the southern U.S. land and sea borders…targeting drug trafficking and unauthorized

immigration” (Andreas 2003, 87). Before the September 11 attacks, U.S. agencies such as the

U.S. Customs Service and the U.S. Coast Guard were primarily focused with drug control and

interdiction. However, after September 11, the missions for these agencies were shifted to deal

with terrorism. By 2002, the U.S. government (USG) set up a new cabinet-level department: the

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) under which it reorganized multiple “border

enforcement-related departments and agencies including the Coast Guard, Customs Service, and

the INS” (Andreas 2003, 92). This reorganization was designed to improve interagency relations

and information dissemination, and in effect, have a quicker response against security threats.

This has been difficult due to the interagency lack of trust and competitiveness. Nevertheless,

the mission for border control has increased the law enforcement budget for the expansion of

tracking and security mechanisms beyond the points of entry.

New and more invasive laws; the development of more sophisticated surveillance and information technologies; stricter visa regimes and more technologically advanced and forgery-resistant travel documents; enhanced cooperation with source and transit countries and a greater extension of tracking and control mechanisms…[the] growing use of military and intelligence hardware, personnel, and expertise for policing tasks (Andreas 2003, 79).

These are domestic measures that the United States has implemented in order to provide further

border control and domestic security. Unfortunately, human resources for securing the border are

bleak in comparison with the high levels of migration flow. There are simply not enough human

resources to fully secure the U.S.-Mexico border from drug transports.

Another domestic concern is the growing influence of Mexican DTO’s in the U.S.

Because of the convenience of a shared border and the high migration flows, Mexican DTO’s

launder their profits in the United States. Money laundering crimes are committed throughout

the country, yet they are more prevalent in states closer to the Mexico border. U.S. law

enforcement agencies organize long-term investigations in order to track down money

launderers. These efforts are an achievement to these agencies; however, they only help disrupt

the drug market in a marginal way. Overall, the costs of these operations outweigh the gains,

and the availability of drugs is not affected.

Demand reduction programs are also a concern for the U.S. government, but the budget

allocated to these efforts is relatively small in comparison with law enforcement campaigns.

Gradually, the government has improved rehabilitation and education campaigns—creating a

better environment for the patients in need. Privacy and educational development is provided for

addicts, as an incentive for rehabilitation. These efforts allow drug addicts to be more

comfortable in coming forward, without fear of information leaks or any form of maltreatment.

Drug preventive programs such as the Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE) program are

also offered in elementary and middle schools for preventive education. These programs give

children information on social, personal and health consequences when dealing with narcotics,

and promote self-esteem and drug awareness. These school preventive programs “have made it

possible for a greater number of teachers and other school officials to receive training in life

skills, reduction of risk factors, and promotion of protective factors” (OAS 2008, 12).

Colombia’s Domestic Policy. As is well known, Colombia has come a long way since the

beginning of its drug crisis. For many decades, Colombia conducted policies based on U.S.

national interests that have had long term consequences on society. However, in recent years,

Colombia has implemented a growing number of drug prevention and supply reduction programs

more in alignment with the country’s individual needs.

Colombia currently has the National Narcotics Council (established in 1973), which is

funded by different sources, including the United States. In 2006, the United States allocated

approximately US$ 11,326,000 to this department. The Council is a state institution “that

advises the National Government in the matter of drafting, coordinating, and following up on

anti-drug policies” (OAS 2006, 4). It compiles and coordinates drug related statistics for

analysis, as well as it decides where demand reduction programs, development programs and

supply reduction activities will take place.

In 2007, Colombia established the National Development Plan (PND)—under the

auspices of the National Narcotics Department—which consists of guidelines for fighting the

illicit drug problem on areas such as, diagnosis, legal and institutional updating; reduction of

drug use; alternative development; coordination of information on counter drug plans, and so

forth. Unfortunately, there is no formal budget for this plan: funds are allocated through

different sources, such as public institutions in the country, the State, and international sources.

The PND is a way of coordinating efforts that are consistent with democratic security in the

country.

In reference to demand reduction programs, Colombia has conducted surveys on students

(every four years), forensic medicine registers of deceased persons (to analyze cause of death);

on patients in emergency rooms; drug transactions; and has conducted surveillance in prisons.

These surveys are conducted for research and development purposes and are crucial to

understanding the development of this crisis. With this information gathered, “Colombia

distributes information on prevention, treatment, and rehabilitation programs. Its budget for

disseminating information…is composed of different allocations from various State institutions”

(OAS 2006, 6). Just as with other development programs, these efforts do not have a formal

budget. Nevertheless, Colombia has established various drug prevention programs to

disseminate information to various key populations. For instance, the Drug Abuse Resistance

Education (DARE) program focuses primarily on young students and on entrepreneurs that are

exposed to foreign trade. DARE teaches these populations about self-esteem and drug

awareness, and psychological and prevention strategies; as well as psychosocial campaigns

against drug use and trafficking. Other programs include, the Colombia Future Program, which

focuses on community leaders, and provides lectures on the social effects of drug use (i.e. sexual

violence, homicides). Other programs include, the Penitentiary System Program, Prevention of

Drug Addiction among School Students (FNE), and Drugs in the Workplace Prevention

Program.

As for drug treatment efforts, Colombia has established nationwide standards on drug

treatment. However, there is a lack of transparency on the information of drug treatment

patients: “The Ministry of Health is the institution in charge of keeping a national registry of

treatment services and centers and, at the same time, granting the respective accreditation.

However [Colombia] does not indicate whether a patient drug consumption registry exists”

(OAS 2006, 9). The availability of a patient registry is needed in order to assess drug addiction

in the country, as well as the effectiveness of drug treatment centers by other actors other than

Colombia’s Health Ministry.

Supply reduction continues to be a major concern in Colombia. According to the OAS,

there is an increase in the use of pharmaceuticals and their derivatives for illicit drug purposes.

As a result, Colombia has conducted surveillance on physicians for the control of these chemical

substances. These operations have resulted in seizures of such substances. Other operations

have been over the control of money laundering, drug and arms trafficking in the country. In

order to enhance law enforcement strategies, the government funds special training of LEA’s

“responsible for drug trafficking control in the country’s various provinces” (OAS 2006, 25) to

enhance intelligence dissemination and strategies for supply interdiction. However, interdiction

is only one strategy against drug supply. The Colombian also allocates a large amount of funds

for crop eradication.

Colombia “has a formal crop eradication program, which includes aerial spraying and

manual eradication (forced)” (OAS 2006, 14). In order to keep farmers from switching back to

illicit crop production, Colombia “has a system for the detection and quantification of illicit crop

areas” (OAS 2006, 14). By 2006, 214,135.95 areas were sprayed—meaning that this fertile land

has been contaminated by hazardous chemicals—introducing ecological and agricultural issues.

Not only is this environmentally hazardous, but this large amount of land has been wasted and is

now unavailable for future agricultural use. The U.S. funds allocated for eradication

campaigns—approximately US$ 129,349,166—that instead, should be invested on providing

further education and security for the masses.

Crop eradication campaigns have forced the Colombian government to provide

compensation for farmers that have lost their source of income. Colombia reported to the OAS,

that alternative development programs include training of basic education (literacy) to young

people and adults; including brief conferences regarding the development of micro-businesses on

arts and crafts. Education Projects have also been established; and the government has provided

computers to schools has promoted licit crop production of other crops such as vanilla, special

coffees, palm oil, etc. However, literacy campaigns for younger children; stronger and free

educational programs for children are not provided. In order to assess the impact of alternative

development programs, the government has two mechanisms: 1.) The Monitoring System—

which consists of periodical verification of drug zones and confirmation “that these areas are free

of illicit crops” (OAS 2006, 16) 2.) and the Follow-up and Evaluation System—which “consists

of gathering information periodically, in order to learn about the trends and changes over time”

(OAS 2006, 16) necessary for the strategic development of these programs.

Mexico’s Domestic Policy. Mexico’s policies in regards to its drug crisis are very controversial.

Current media has shed light on the increase in militarization of Mexican society, and the human

rights violations it has led to. Despite its concentration on military enforcement, the Mexican

government has also implemented social policies similar to those of Colombia; however,

information on their standards and quality is still lacking. Nevertheless, information gathered on

drug related policies reveals that Mexico is highly concerned with the spread of drug addiction in

the younger populations. Aside from the programs promoted by the U.S., Mexico launched its

own National Drug Control Program (PNCD) in 2001—created by the Office of the Attorney

General of the Republic (PGR), which is Mexico’s executive branch.

The PNCD (2001-2006) was designed to provide for actions for the following:

[For] the areas of demand reduction, supply reduction, development programs related to the prevention or reduction of illicit crop cultivation, drug production and trafficking, control measures, money laundering, program evaluation, addressing drug-related crimes, and international cooperation (OAS Mexico 2006, 3).

PNCD budget was allocated through various government agencies and through international

cooperation. Mexican federal agencies had specific budgets dedicated particularly to this

program. Policies proposed by the PNCD were conducted solely by the PGR who currently

coordinates these policies through the National Center for Planning, Analysis, and Information in

Combating Crime (CENAPI). Only the federal authorities have the power to implement anti-

drug policy actions—unlike other countries where community leaders are allotted some form of

sovereignty for conducting necessary actions on issues.

Mexico currently has a National Information System, by which Mexico gathers statistical

data on drug related information through various agencies. Compilation of data is primarily

divided between three major agencies that gather data in regard to health, demand reduction, and

supply reduction issues. The statistics gathered for the health department are focused on anti-

drug addiction issues; for the demand reduction department, the data gathered is to assess drug

addiction and mental health; and supply reduction statistics emphasize interdiction and

eradication.

Mexico reports that the lack of financial resources, the heterogeneous nature…to capture data, and the lack of coordination among agencies…are the major impediments the country encounters in compiling, organizing, analyzing, and utilizing statistics and [information] on drugs (OAS Mexico 2006, 5).

Decentralization of information compilation to different agencies is ineffective especially when

there is interagency competition and distrust. This structure in policy is not appropriate when

dealing with a country like Mexico, because of its corruption levels. Trust and close cooperation

between agencies is necessary for proper information dissemination—otherwise, any sort of

fragmentation can impede these agencies from responding to threats on time. In order to

improve interagency cooperation, the Mexican government has provided an array of

communication systems that allow LEA’s to share “intelligence data at the national and

interagency level, and with other countries.” These efforts are conducted “to increase

cooperation…on the subject of exchanging strategic, tactical, and operation information, so as to

combat illicit drug trafficking occurring within the region” (OAS Mexico 2006, 27).

For the purpose of demand reduction, the Mexican government has also funded for

demand reduction programs in the country. Mexico has a national strategy, prepared by the

National Council against Addictions (CONADIC), which focuses on preventive education in

schools. The target audiences for this program are young boys and girls, and adolescents. In

2007, mandatory drug testing in schools was launched. Another drug prevention program—

launched in 2001—is the Comprehensive Program on Preventing Crime and Drug Dependence;

however, information on its role and quality is not reported. According to the OAS, Mexico

reports that its prevention programs are implemented nationwide for key populations that appear

to be the most vulnerable—from preschoolers to University students; women; indigenous groups

and prisoners. Like in Colombia, Mexico also provides drug prevention programs for the

workplace.

Drug treatment efforts in Mexico are conducted in various ways, including research and

development. The Federal Commission for Protection against Health Risks (COFEPRIS) is a

federal unit “guidelines and standards of care for drug abuse treatment at the national, state, and

local levels” (OAS Mexico 2006, 10). Surveys are also conducted every five years for the

general population, while every year the government conducts surveys on key populations;

however, “[the] information on drug use prevalence and incidence…[is] not provided” (OAS

Mexico 2006, 13). Mexico’s Ministry of Health coordinates meetings designed to encourage

drug abuse treatment in and outside treatment centers. Through various mechanisms, Mexico

assesses the quality of standards of drug abuse treatment centers and personnel; the CONADIC

accredits the centers that meet the proper standards and requisites. Also, in order to provide fair

treatment nationwide, “Mexico emphasizes that the Youth Integration Center’s (CU’s)

comprehensive treatment and rehabilitation program serves both males and females…regardless

of their legal problems” (OAS Mexico 2006, 11).

Supply reduction efforts include the training of law enforcement officials, bilateral

cooperation with the United States on intelligence; and police investigations to control money

laundering, and the flow of drug and arms trafficking in the region. In order to control the level

of drug supply available, “Mexico has a system for detecting and quantifying the area of illicit

crops of poppy and marijuana.” Yields of illicit crops have been estimated by a “mathematical

model proposed by the United Nations” (OAS Mexico 2006, 15). Methods for crop surveillance

seem to be antiquated, and the Mexican government claims that this is a result of insufficient

funds for supply reduction operations. Other methods include aerial spraying and manual

eradication (forced) of illicit crops. This also creates the necessity of implementing development

programs for local citizens displaced by the eradication. Compensation efforts cover 75% of the

areas with illicit crops. In order to improve economic opportunities or living conditions,

Mexican agencies provide the affected citizens alternative options for employment. However,

the impact of these programs “is evaluated in Mexico through an internal mechanism” (OAS

Mexico 2006, 17); therefore, proper assessment on the quality of these programs is limited.

International Collaboration. The War on Drugs is not solely based in the Western

Hemisphere. This drug crisis is a global concern affecting every country in the world. Drug

trafficking is as global as other issues such as human trafficking and terrorism. The fact that this

is a global concern has ignited international organizations to provide research and development

(R&D), and global awareness. The drug crisis has also led to the creation of regional

organizations and mechanisms, which provide R&D and recommendations for regional progress

on the War on Drugs. These organizations are effective in providing global and regional

awareness due to their credibility on research and development.

The United Nations (UN) is one organization that exerts its influence worldwide on drug

control awareness through its Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). In regards to the War on

Drugs in the Western Hemisphere, the UNODC has conducted research on the policies and

methodologies implemented. The research conducted is a way to improve global information

dissemination on the drug crisis. In this manner, countries around the world can be aware of the

strategies that are implemented by the U.S. and Colombia to combat the War on Drugs. The

failure or the success of these policies serve as global informational tools. The research of the

UN is primarily informative with the provision of statistical data, survey results and

methodologies. Recommendation of policies is not provided.

The Organization of American States (OAS) is a regional organization for the Western

Hemisphere. The research conducted by the OAS is very informative, with the provision of

quantitative and qualitative data. The OAS provides evaluative reports on imperative issues such

as the War on Drugs. These reports on drug control, evaluate the ability of individual countries

to control the drug issue in their respective jurisdiction. The OAS also provides hemispheric

reports on drug control that analyze regional cooperation and development on this issue. OAS

research is not only informative, but it also acknowledges progress and provides regional and

individual recommendations for the development of policies and methodologies.

The Interamerican Association for Environmental Defense (AIDA) is an interamerican

interest group that also conducts research on the policies of the War on Drugs in the Western

Hemisphere. However, AIDA differs from the previous organizations in that it is

environmentally focused. Its bias on environmental concerns makes AIDA’s recommendations

and criticism unilateral. The Association gathers specific data on environmental issues, such as

crop eradication, and evaluates their quality; then it offers recommendations and plausible

solutions.

In regards to law enforcement, Interpol provides international collaboration to the War on

Drugs by disseminating information concerning criminal activity and global threats. Interpol

shares this information globally, creating a global tracking network of criminality. This

information is imperative for national security, especially with transnational issues such as the

War on Drugs.

The information gathered by regional and institutional organizations, and the

collaborative network that international cooperation provides—creates a global network that is

necessary to combat global issues such as the War on Drugs. The 21st Century has seen the rise

of transnational criminalities that make global networks imperative.

CONCLUSION

The Drug Crisis in the America’s continues to be a major concern for the major producer

and consumer countries in the region. However, it has proven disastrous for Latin American

countries such as Colombia and Mexico. The collateral damage that this crisis has caused has

extended Latin America’s drug problem into a regional security issue. This crisis has

transcended borders and has negatively affected surrounding countries. Efforts to tame the

region’s drug crisis have been inconsistent and counterproductive. The lack of mutual

cooperative efforts in the region and the influence of U.S. interests in counternarcotics policy

have resulted in further deterioration of socioeconomic and political spheres of drug producing

countries. With the rise of the 21st Century, Latin American countries have implemented policies

consistent with their own needs; however, the long term effects of the past decades will be

difficult to fix if countries continue to criminalize the drug industry and disregard the social and

economic origins of the drug crisis.

It is pertinent that the most influential country in the War on Drugs—the United States—

apply well-rounded policies promoting socioeconomic and political reform. These policies

would have to be relative to each country’s individual needs and would have to be fair to all

sectors of society. Militarization and supply-based policies have proven to be ineffective

because of the lack of understanding of the social problems feeding the drug crisis. To overcome

further shortcomings, it is pertinent to obtain equal cooperation; transparency of information

dissemination; policy reform; and long term commitment to fighting the War on Drugs.

Otherwise, the drug crisis will expand further, and will continue to deteriorate the socioeconomic

and political spheres of the rest of the Western Hemisphere.

REFERENCES

Andreas, Peter. 1995. “Free Market Reform and Drug Market Prohibition: US policies at cross purposes in Latin America” Third World Quarterly 16 (1) 75-87. Andreas, Peter. 2003. “Redrawing the Line: Borders and Security in the Twenty-First Century” International Security 28 (2): 78-111. Aslund, Anders. 2006. “The Dark Side of Globalization” Journal of Democracy 17 (3): 167-170. Asociacion Interamericana para la Defensa del Ambiente. 2006. Estrategias de Desarrollo Alternativo en Colombia: La Necesidad de Acciones mas alla de las Fumigaciones A Cultivos Ilicitos. http://www.aida-americas.org/templates/aida/uploads/docs/AIDA- INFORME_DESARROLLO_ALTERNATIVO_06-08.pdf (accessed November 17, 2008). Atkins, G. Pope. 2004. “Assessing Inter-American Relations” Latin American Research Review 39(1): 205-222. Bagley, Bruce Michael. 1989-1990. “Dateline Drug Wars: Colombia: The Wrong Strategy” Foreign Policy 77: 154-171. Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. 2008. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Canada, Mexico, and Central America. http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2008/vol1/html/100777.htm Bustamante, Michael, and Sebastian Chakel. 2008. “Colombia’s Precarious Progress” Current History: A Journal of Contemporary World Affairs 107 (706): 77--. CATO Institute. CATO Handbook for Congress: Policy Recommendations for the 108th

Congress. The International War on Drugs. Washington, D.C. CATO Institute. http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb108/hb108-56.pdf Centro de Investigacion y Docencia Economicas. 2004. Mexico y el Mundo : Opinion Publica Y Politica Exterior en Mexico. http://www.cide.edu/investigador/documentos/guadalupe.gonzalez/Reporte_Mexico_200

4.pdf (accessed December 3, 2008). Chabat, Jorge. 2006. Mexico: The Security Challenge http://www.justiceinmexico.org/events/pdf/Mexico_Security_Challenge_Jorge_Chabat.

pdf (accessed November 14, 2008).

Cook, Colleen W. Congressional Research Service. 2007. Mexico’s Drug Cartels. CRS Report for Congress. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34215.pdf (accessed August 14, 2008).

Crandall, Russell. 2006. “Drugs and Democracy in Latin America: The Impact of U.S. Policy” Latin American Politics & Society 48 (1): 192-195.

Crandall, Russell. 2001. “Explicit Narcotization: US Policy toward Colombia during the Samper Administration” Latin American Politics and Society 43 (3): 95-120. Fajnzylber, Pablo, Daniel Lederman and Norman Loayza. 2000. “Crime and Victimization: An Economic Perspective” Economia 1 (1): 219-278.

Fazey, Cindy. 2007. “International Policy on Illicit Drug Trafficking: The Formal and Informal Mechanisms” Journal of Drug Issues 37 (4): 755-779. Holmes, Jennifer S., Sheila Amin Gutierrez de Pineres, and Kevin M. Curtin. 2006. “Drugs, Violence, and Development in Colombia: A Department-Level Analysis” Latin American Politics and Society 48 (3): 157-184. International Narcotics Control Board. 2008. Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2007. New York. United Nations. Jones, Marlyn J. 2002. “Policy Paradox: Implications of U.S. Drug Control Policy for Jamaica” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 582: 117-133.

Lee III, Rensselaer W. 1985-1986. “The Latin American Drug Connection” Foreign Policy 61 (Winter): 142-159. Loveman, Brian. 2004. “Bad Neighbor Policy: Washington’s Futile War on Drugs in Latin America” Latin American Politics & Society 46 (1): 165-171. Naim, Moises. 2006. Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers, and Copycats are Hijacking the Global Economy. New York: First Anchor Books. Neumann, Vanessa. 2006. “The Incoherence of US Counternarcotics Policy in Colombia: Exploring the Breaches in the Policy Cycle” European Journal of Development Research 18 (3): 412-434.

Recio, Gabriela. 2002. “Drugs and Alcohol: US Prohibition and the Origins of the Drug Trade in Mexico, 1910-1930” Journal of Latin American Studies 34 (1): 21-42. Reuter, Peter et al. 1986. “Risks and Prices: An Economic Analysis of Drug Enforcement”

Crime and Justice 7: 289-340.

Sharpe, Kenneth E. 1988. “The Drug War: Going After Supply: A Commentary” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 30 (2-3): 77-85.

Shifter, Michael. 2007. “Latin America’s Drug Problem” Current History: A Journal of Contemporary World Affairs 106 (697): 58--. Thoumi, Francisco E. 2002. “Illegal Drugs in Colombia: From Illegal Economic Boom to Social Crisis” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 582: 102-116. Organization of American States. Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism. Colombia. Evaluation Of Progress in Drug Control 2005-2006. http://www.cicad.oas.org/MEM/ENG/Reports/Fourth%20Round%20Full/Colombia%2 0-%20Fourth%20Round%20-%20ENG.pdf (accessed November 27, 2008). Organization of American States. Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism. 2008. Hemispheric Report: Evaluation of Progress in Drug Control 2005-2006 http://www.cicad.oas.org/MEM/ENG/Reports/Fourth%20Round%20Full/Hemispheric

%20-%204th%20Round%20-%20ENG.pdf (accessed November 27, 2008). Organization of American States. Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism. Mexico: Evaulation of Progress in Drug Control 2005-2006. http://www.cicad.oas.org/MEM/ENG/Reports/Fourth%20Round%20Full/Mexico%20-

%20Fourth%20Round%20-%20ENG.pdf (accessed November 27, 2008). United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 2007. Colombia Coca Cultivation Survey. United Nations. http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/icmp/colombia_2006_en_web.pdf (accessed November 22, 2008). United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 2003. Colombia coca survey for 2002—preliminary Report. United Nations. http://74.125.95.132/search?q=cache:bsiABu3zzQ0J:www.unodc.org/pdf/colombia/repo rt_2003-03- 01_1.pdf+national+narcotics+department+in+colombia+%2B+DNE&hl=en&ct=clnk& cd=3&gl=us (accessed November 22, 2008). United States Department of State. 2007. The Merida Initiative: United States—Mexico—Central America Security Cooperation. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/oct/93800.htm Vaicius, Ingrid, Isacson, Adam. The Center for International Policy’s. 2003. The‘War on Drugs’ Meets the ‘War on Terror’. International Policy Report.