The Drama at Fukushima By Dr. Richard Lahey
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Transcript of The Drama at Fukushima By Dr. Richard Lahey
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8/7/2019 The Drama at Fukushima By Dr. Richard Lahey
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THE DRAMA AT FUKUSHIMA
The nuclear reactor emergency occurring at the Fukushima power plants in Japan has captured the
attention of the world, but there has been a lot of confusing and contradictory information presented by
the media and other sources. Unfortunately, this may have caused significant fear and anxiety on the
part of the public both here and abroad. The purpose of this white paper is to try to explain whatappears to have occurred at the Fukushima plants to date and what will be the most likely outcome in
terms of the health and safety of the Japanese public and the world.
As can be seen in my Vita (www.rpi.edu/~laheyr/laheyvita.html), prior to going to Rensselaer
Polytechnic Institute (RPI) in 1975 as Chairman of the Department of Nuclear Engineering & Science, I
(Richard T. Lahey, Jr.) was responsible for the boiling water nuclear reactor (BWR) safety-related R&D of
the General Electric Company (GE), the designer of the BWRs at Fukushima . My responsibilities
included core thermal-hydraulic phenomena, emergency core cooling system performance and
performance of the various pressure-suppression containment designs. The particular Fukushima power
plants under consideration are BWR/3 or 4 type nuclear reactors (the first ones having both internal jet
pumps and steam separators) with Mark I pressure-suppression containments (see the attached figure
at the end for details, however please note that Japanese built Mark-I containment systems are
somewhat larger than the GE system which is shown, and Fukushima Daiichi unit-6 has a Mark-II type
containment design). As a consequence of this experience I am very familiar with these types of reactor
systems and how they may respond during accident conditions.
While it has been very difficult to get reliable and self-consistent information on the ongoing nuclear
emergency, I have attempted to make some sense of what is currently known. Since the conditions
associated with the various reactors at Fukushima are different, and even for a particular plant they can
change daily, unless a specific plant is cited, I have chosen to give a generic explanation of what has
occurred. Anyway, we know that a very strong (i.e., 9.0 on the Richter scale) earthquake occurred off
the coast of north eastern Japan and it caused the nuclear reactors which were operating at Fukushima
to SCRAM ( i.e., the control rods were automatically inserted rapidly, thus terminating the fission
process ), which is what these plants were designed to do. Soon after this event, the reactors were put
into a standard shut down cooling mode using the plants closed-loop residual heat removal (RHR)
systems which keep the core covered with water and remove the decay heat generated by the
radioactive decay of the radioactive fission fragments in the nuclear fuel (e.g., subsequent to a SCRAM
the power level of the core drops from full power operation to an initial decay heat power level of about
5% to 3% of full power, and then this power level slowly decays with time after that). This continued for
about an hour until a large tsunami (estimated be 14m high) arrived which knocked out any offsite
electrical power and disabled the plants emergency diesel generators ( which had been brought on right
after the earthquake struck). It should be noted that, in accordance with rules established by the
Japanese regulatory authorities, these plants were designed to take the large loads associated with an
earthquake ( I.e., 8.2 on the Richter scale) and an associated tsunami ( assumed to 5.7 m high), but
obviously not one which had the height/strength of the massive tsunami which actually hit these plants.
Anyway, an alternate battery- powered RHR type system was apparently enabled after the tsunami hit
but this mode of cooling was terminated about eight hours later when the batteries presumably became
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depleted. Subsequently it appears that the water level in the reactor cores began to drop and once the
upper part of the fuel was no longer submerged it began to heatup due to decay heat. When the
zircalloy cladding surrounding the fuel rod pellets gets hot enough and exothermic zirc/steam oxidation
reaction occurs ( Zr + 2H2O = ZrO2 + 2H2 ) which generates a lot of hydrogen gas, and this gas and the
steam generated due to boiling of the residual water in the core, builds up the pressure in the reactor
pressure vessel ( RPV). The pressure in the RPV was subsequently reduced, presumably by discharging
these gases into the water pool of the torodial shaped wet well of the Mark-I ( e.g., Unit-1)pressure
suppression containment ( see the lower part of the attached figure for details ). Hydrogen , being a
non-condensable gas , does not remain in the pressure suppression pool but collects in the upper wet
well and dry well regions of the Mark-I containment ( which was initially inerted with nitrogen gas)
causing it to become pressurized (see attached figure of this containment arrangement).
In order to prevent an over-pressurization of the containment structure, these gases were apparently
vented by the reactor operators into the reactor building near the spent fuel pool ( see the upper
portion of the attached figure). When hydrogen gas is vented, a combustible mixture may form. As a
consequence, a hydrogen explosion occurred which blew out the upper blow-out panels of the reactorbuilding (these types of chemical explosions have now happened at several of the plants in various
regions apparently including within the containments). Also during drywell venting some radioactive
gases (including radioactive Iodine 131 and Cesium 137) were released to the atmosphere but it
was found to be a relatively small amount and, to date, this and subsequent ventings have caused no
significant off-site health-related issues , even though some contamination of food stuff and drinking
water has been reported.
Next, in order to reflood the cores to keep the fuel cool the Japanese authorities decided to take an
unprecedented emergency response and injected sea water into the cores (later sea water was
apparently injection into the containment systems to fill region below the RPV ( for the Mark-Icontainments up to the height of the main vent pipes to the pressure suppression pool , about m).
This should promote cooling of any corium which may be release from the RPV, prevent failure of the
steel containment liner , scrub any radioactive aerosols form during concrete ablation by the corium,
and help reduce the potential for a hydrogen explosion within the containment. Nevertheless, the novel
feed-and-bleed method being used for core cooling appears to have been helpful, but it requires that
the steam formed due to boiling in the core be periodically vented and replaced with cold salt water.
Nevertheless, as long as the operators are able to remain onsite, this mode of long-term core cooling
can presumably continue and hopefully keep at least some of the damaged cores from achieving an
uncoolable geometry until either operation of the closed circuit RHR system is restored , the decay heat
level is reduced sufficiently, or the flow passages in the cores/RHR systems become plugged with salt (which, even though the melting temperature of salt is well below that of the core structures and
components, could compromise effective core cooling ). Anyway, as long as there is no breach in both
the plants containment and RPV there should be no significant radiation releases from the cores of
these stricken reactors to the environment ; only the amounts released during the periodic venting of
the RPVs/containments. This is something important that the media has so far failed to realize . Thus,
even if, as may have occurred, one or more of the containments has been penetrated due to hydrogen
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explosions, etc. , the RPV of these plants will contain the radioactive core rubble as long as the RPVs
remain intact. If not, a molten core can melt through the lower head of the RPV and drop down into the
dry well region of the containment, which, as noted previously, are filled with liquid to help freeze these
materials in place and to scrub the radioactive releases due to concrete ablation by the corium melt. In
particular, one way or the other, as long as the cores are kept submerged with water there should not
be gross dispersal of the core debris, and thus there will not be radioactive releases of the type that
occurred at Chernobyl (a Russian nuclear reactor which had no containment structure at all), in which
there was a massive amount of core melting which resulted in the vaporization and release directly to
the environment of previously solid fuel materials. Once released to the relatively cool atmosphere
these highly radioactive vapors formed an extremely dangerous aerosol fog that spread across and
contaminated a lot of Eastern Europe. As I said previously, this type of release will not occur at
Fukushima , indeed only gross contamination of the nuclear park should occur , and even this will be
greatly mitigated as long as the RPVs/containments are intact , long core cooling is properly maintained
and the lower part of the dry wells of the intact containments remains filled with water.
However, there are other important safety concerns that must be addressed. In particular, on3/14/2011 there was apparently a fire in the spent fuel pool (i.e., large open pools which resemble
swimming pools) of Fukushima Daiichi Unit 4, a reactor which was shut down for refueling prior to the
earthquake. This fire apparently was put out by the Japanese but it resulted in a relatively large release
of radioactivity to the local environment (i.e., 40 REM/hr onsite readings). Also, since these spent fuel
pools are not located within containment buildings, rather above the containment in the reactor
buildings, this radiation readily escapes to the environment. The most likely cause of this fire is that the
earthquake and/or subsequent related events caused the pool cooling and/or the normal water level to
be lost in the spent fuel pool thereby uncovering the previously submerged spent fuel. If this fuel still
has enough decay heat in it (since unit-4 was being refueled its core had been put into the pool last
November and is thus still quite radioactive) the zircalloy clad fuel rods can heat up sufficiently to causethe zircalloy to undergo a violent exothermic chemical reaction (with the steam and/or air which is
present) in which the heat of combustion can exceed the decay heat, creating a run-away oxidation
reaction; it will literally burn. Unfortunately, a propagating Zirc fire may liberate and disperse many of
the fission products stored in the spent fuel (which are often much larger than those in the cores),
thereby causing the observed spike in the onsite radiation level. It should be noted that the Japanese
use mixed oxide type fuel ( i.e., Plutonium as well as Uranium is used for fuel ), however it appears that
no fuel of this type is currently in the spent fuel pools at Fukushima ( i.e., just in the core of Unit-3).
Anyway, once the spent fuel pool fire is extinguished, the fix is to keep the spent fuel pool properly
cooled and full of water, which can be done in several ways , including with a fire hose. Unfortunately it
appears that this may not have been done after the initial fire was extinguished (perhaps because it was
felt that the fire may have been an oil fire instead). In any event a new fuel pool fire was reported
(3/16/11) and it has apparently been difficult to fight this fire because of the associated high radiation
levels and possibly the high upward velocity of the hydrogen/steam produced in the pool fire retarding
the flow of water into the pool. Also, there are six other spent fuel pools onsite that need to be
inspected and monitored to make sure that they are filled with water and adequately cooled.
Nevertheless, I would expect that the Japanese will eventually manage to quench this fire and hopefully
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will finally understand what caused it and how to prevent future fires. If so, this should not be a
significant source of radiation releases in the future. If not, significant radiation could be released to the
environment.
In my opinion, the expected end-state of this accident scenario should be one that is somewhat similar
to the accident at TMI: the affected power plants have highly damaged cores and the plants areessentially destroyed ( e.g., if by nothing else , by salt water injection into the RPV). However, the bulk
of the incore radioactivity should be contained within the plant boundaries ( even if corium is released
to the flooded containments). Moreover, I would expect that the spent fuel pools will be filled with
water, cooled and put into a stable state. However, it is important that those in charge of managing
this accident in Japan clearly understand what is going on and take the proper steps to mitigate things.
In this regard, the release of more accurate and timely information would allow them to get helpful
input from the scientific community, and to reduce the level of fear and anxiety that currently exists in
the public at large. In the future SWAT teams of nuclear reactor safety experts should be organized
within each country that have nuclear power plants to give the authorities timely advice during
emergencies and a similar international group should be organized and coordinated by the IAEA.
There have been some innovative and even heroic actions on the part of the utility (TEPCO) that owns
and operates the Fukushima reactors. They are to be congratulated on their continuing efforts to
contain this potentially serious nuclear accident and it is hoped that the government authorities in Japan
will let them continue to do their job. In addition, even though some workers and soldiers have been
injured by the earthquake/tsunami and subsequent hydrogen explosions, etc. (including one that
unfortunately died as a result of injuries sustained by the earthquake), and some onsite workers have
apparently had excess radiation exposure, to date, there has been no physical harm done to the general
public due to the nuclear emergency at Fukushima, but many have been badly frightened by the way
this nuclear emergency has been report to them by the media . Anyway, this is in stark contrast to themassive destruction and loss of thousands of lives attributed to the earthquake and tsunami. My
prayers go out to the Japanese people and I hope that my input will be helpful in mitigating the possible
consequences of the unfolding drama at Fukushima and in preventing future emergencies of this type
around the world.
Dr. Richard T. Lahey, Jr. NAE March 16, 2011 (Revised 4/28/11)
The Edward E. Hood Professor Emeritus of Engineering
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute / Troy, NY USA
Domicile : St. Augustine, Florida / (904) 814-8071
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