The Dissertation (COMPLETE)

Daniel Bassilios 11000878

The background to the outbreak of the First World War

An assessment of the developments in the European political, social and economic environment which contributed to the

onset of World War I

Daniel Bassilios – 2014

A special study submitted at Liverpool Hope University in part fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of BA Combined

Honours in Politics.

This dissertation is the original work of the candidate and has not been submitted previously as part of any qualification or course

Signed: __ ___ ____

Dated: ____ _____

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Abstract

My personal gratitude to the multitude of academics and scholars, whose work in several different

disciplines has greatly contributed to my thesis, as well as Liverpool Hope University’s history and

politics department for their support during the past three academic years.

The origins and causes of the First World War remain an area of intense scrutiny and fascination

within various academic disciplines since its outbreak one hundred years ago. Explanations and

augments comprise the basis of vast quantities of discourses, ranging from blockbuster films to

satirical sketches, and while debates continue so does the war’s impact on the contemporary world,

following on from the severe consequences it had on the world during the previous century. I have

conducted a thesis which will present an analysis and evaluation of the numerous different features

of Europe’s political, social and economic landscape which conditioned the outbreak of the First

World War. This will be examined through the use of a variety of different sources from

contemporary scholars’ books and journal articles and original publications by policy makers and

influential persons or groups. Additionally, graphical material and broad quotations will be added to

an appendix. This work will primarily be concerned with how the belligerents of Europe developed

throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and how and why these developments

created the atmosphere which favoured conflict amongst states. Three of the most influential

components in the build up to World War I will be examined; the structure of the international

political environment, the domestic social and political characteristics and both domestic economics

and the international political economy. When combined, these environmental facets present a clear

mechanism in support of the build-up of the hostility which established itself across nations and

erupted rapidly in the summer of 1914.

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Table of Contents

Introduction: 1-3

Chapter 1: The background to the international political environment between 1815-1914 :4-13

Chapter 2:The context of the internal social dynamics of states between 1815-1914 :14-24

Chapter 3: The background to the European economic environment between 1815-1914 :25-33

Conclusion: 34-35

Bibliography: 36-41

Appendix: 42-53

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Introduction

‘All the evidence goes to show that the beginning of this crisis, which has been studied so largely

with a view to discovering and distributing human responsibility, was one of those moments in

history when events passed beyond men's control. No one government was primarily responsible for

the turn of events.’1 Expressed by international historian Sir Francis Harry Hinsley, this perspective

on responsibility assigns the blame not on one man or one state but on the unrelenting sequence of

events which took five weeks to bring all the major powers into conflict. Governments were

conditioned to respond to their anxieties based largely on the structures, identities and norms they

represented domestically and operated within as part of the European community. It is the

combination of the international and domestic European civilizational background which developed

over several decades preceding 1914 which will be examined in this thesis. If the primary blame rests

not with the state leaders or the legislative governments, then the grander environment and

systemic conditions become the focus of analysis. The principal areas to be discussed in the

following chapters will be the framework of the international political system, the evolving European

social dynamics and the economic conditions and their implications on state’s foreign policies and

the international politics of the period 1815-1914, with a greater focus on conditions between 1870

and 1914.

The origins of the First World War began to take shape in the aftermath of Napoleon’s defeat in the

early nineteenth century; resolutions and conditions for the European community’s future were thus

laid out at Viennese Concert of Europe in 1815. The international political environment was not to

remain bounded by the concert’s principles throughout the century as the territorial borders

changed together with the balance of power, spawning alliances amongst the great powers and the

1 Hinsley, F. H. "International Relations in the Twentieth Century." In Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations between States, 296. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963.

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subsequent tactics and methods for decisive military strikes against each other.2 The culture of

militarism had permeated the European landscape throughout the nineteenth century and began to

ingratiate itself as a central component to the state, a concept that produced or was produced by a

strong spirit of patriotism and nationalism. These complex feelings also contributed to the rise of

separatism and stimulated the independence movements in South East Europe, not disregarding the

Bosnian-Serb Gavrilo Principe whose assassination of the Austrian heir Franz Ferdinand initiated the

outbreak of the Great War. Rising class inequalities and a yearning for greater political

enfranchisement developed into episodes of civil unrest within states, a growing support for

socialism and threats to the reigning establishment. Finally, the economic developments in Europe

had created a system of globalisation and integration which would see continuous increases in

prosperity, brought about through widespread industrialisation, relaxations in trade restrictions and

Europe’s domination over the world’s resources. Domestic inequalities which spurred much of the

internal civil unrest were exacerbated by shifts in the economic structure, which likewise affected

inequalities amongst states and developed into competitive imperial rivalry and renewal of effective

protectionist mechanisms.

This thesis will not assign blame or assert a claim on the outbreak of the First World War from any

perspective. The aim of this paper is to present an evaluation of several of the circumstances that

developed during the preceding century which created an atmosphere in 1914 where general War

amongst the states and empires of Europe was a feasible and likely occurrence. Several arguments

which assign responsibility to states and their governments persist over the years the topic has

captivated the attention of researchers,3 in addition to arguments which declare that responsibility

cannot be rested on states but on society and structure. These arguments all have their clout and

are supported by comprehensive and relevant evidence and analysis. My study will examine the

2 Stoessinger, John. "The Iron Dice: World War I." In Why Nations go to War (11th Edition), 16-17. Boston: Wadsworth-Cengage Learning, 2011.3 BBC News Magazine. "World War One: 10 interpretations of who started WW1." http://www.bbc.co.uk. February 12, 2014.

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correlating societal and structural dispositions then will conclude with an overview and an

integration of the three chapter’s analyses. While much of the content which will be assessed is

persistent in the narrative concerning the origins of the First World War, there are several facets

which will not be examined due to the impracticality of researching and analysing all components

related to this vast topic. Among these missed arguments is that concerning the conviction within

military bodies that war would produce a rapid and decisive victory as the offensive capabilities of

armies were considered far superior to defence mechanisms. The preconceived notions of warfare

gave rise to ‘the cult of the offensive’ which was indoctrinated in the preparations and war plans of

the great powers.4 As a final introductory point, political science research utilizes several approaches

in examining a series of events; because of its multi-disciplinary nature I have preceded towards an

analysis of three chapters with three different core categories but which all relate to one another in

a political fusion.

4 Evera, Stephen Van. "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War." International Security, 1984: 58-107.

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Chapter 1: The background to the international political

environment between 1815-1914.

This chapter will serve to assess how and why changes in the international system conditioned the

outbreak of World War I. The alterations in balance of power and geographic state structures

constitute the evidence of systemic level change during the course of a century; such changes are a

continuous facet of international relations and subsist as a major element in explaining the decisions

made by Europe’s states and their leaders. The century prior to the outbreak of war in 1914 had

seen the establishment of a system of international relations in Europe which originated following

the eighteenth century’s radical philosophical advocacies, the French revolution and the Napoleonic

wars. A precursor to the League of Nations was the structure constructed following the French

defeat in 1815. The blueprints for relative peace amongst the states of Europe were laid out in

Vienna. One power, Great Britain above all emerged as the dominant force with its territory intact

and its substantial naval supremacy recognised. The extent of the damage caused to the continent

during a period of continuous war reflected Britain’s superseding clout over the European mainland

and emphasised the importance of maintaining checks and balances to the power of the four victors

and the re-constituted French Kingdom. This presented a major development in international

relations; the next major pivot would not materialize until the end of the First World War. Like the

German Empire a century later, Napoleon had attempted to uniformly constitute Europe under the

dominion of post-revolutionary France. A continent described by delegates at Vienna as consisting of

‘ancient cities…, the various states from which it is composed, were principally formed from the

wrecks of the Roman Empire.’5 The nineteenth century would permanently erode the entities and

boundaries Europeans had lived within for numerous generations as the nation state took form

across the continent with the most notable transformation in territorial boundaries occurring in the

5 Pradt, M (Dominique Georges Frédéric). "The Congress of Vienna (1816)." 65-66. Philadelphia: Kessinger Publishing, 1816.

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form of German and Italian unification and the decline of Ottoman control in the Balkans.67

Imperialism would subsequently extend a state’s territory beyond the European continent; it would

connote and reflect prestige, power and a growing sense of territorial rivalry in a global environment

of zero-sum gains. The revolutionary industrialisation process within Europe’s domestic economies

extended the state’s capacity to build up its military and technological capabilities and moreover its

formidable control over its native subjects and those of dissimilar ethnicities in maritime and

continental empires. The nineteenth century therefore served as a period of radical change in

international relations, particularly as the fractured structures people lived within became redefined

into nation states and consequently restructured the balance of power between the ascending,

formalised political entities. World War I brought about the collapse of the evolutional territorial

changes, and the European map following the war displays great transformations in the wake of the

capitulation of four major dynasties who had exercised control over vast territories and

populations.8

The long term build up to the First World War and the direct altercations between the great powers

in the summer of 1914 followed many of the themes behind the realist narrative in international

politics. The anarchic, self-help and egoistic nature of politics among nations is the conclusive norm

in an environment of uneven power and de facto sovereignty. Hans Morgenthau regards stability as

being dependent on a certain degree of equilibrium in the balance of power between the prominent

states engaged in international politics.9 The inability to maintain the equilibrium contributed to

nations contesting for global hegemony, drawing the internationalist states of Europe into conflict.

The power structures evolved over the course of a century which began with a clearly defined

hegemonic power in the decades following Napoleon’s defeat. British supremacy, although relative 6 Boston College. "Europe after the Congress of Vienna, 1815." https://www2.bc.edu/. See Appendix A for European Map of 1815.7 London Geographical Institute. "London Geographical Institute_The Peoples Atlas_1920: Europe at the Outbreak-of War." http://www.hipkiss.org/. 1920. See Appendix B for the European Map of 1914.8 Ibid^. See appendix C for the European Map of 1919.9 Morgenthau, Hans J. "The Balance of Power." In Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 179-181. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1948.

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was unequalled worldwide in 1815. This degree of power for Britain conditioned the state to pioneer

advances in its own economic and military capabilities and to maintain an edge over the rest of the

world. Kenneth Waltz argues that uni-polarity is however a short lived phenomenon as challenges to

a state’s domination arises in the form of lesser powers with hegemonic potential aiming to shift the

balance in their favour. Furthermore the system is imbalanced whereby one state dominates and the

hegemonic power, although powerful is not unbounded because its power doesn’t excel that of all

others combined.10 The evolution of power dynamics in Europe’s increasingly well-structured nation

states throughout the latter half of the century established a multi-polar world in the run up to 1914;

challenges to British hegemony also emerged more prominently as imperial developments

accelerated with the colonisation of Africa and much of Asia. This system, described by realism as

the most unstable became the custom into the twentieth century. While hegemony often connotes

stability, it would become intensely challenged following the nineteenth century’s numerous

political changes. Relative stability sustained until 1914 in part owing to the strength of diplomacy in

a period fundamentally different from the characteristics of the previous centuries. Statesmen

contained various regional conflicts, the revolutions of the mid-nineteenth century and prominent

imperial rivalry, although these dangers to stability were pronounced, they became managed and

contained effectively through diplomatic efforts11. Diplomacy was the force guiding the great powers

through the period between Franz Ferdinand’s assassination and the British declaration of war, as

the German diplomat and ambassador to Britain Karl Max, Prince Lichnowsky describes in his

memoirs, ‘attempts at mediation, collaboration amongst statesmen to ensure ‘the localisation of the

conflict’.12

10 Waltz, Kenneth. In Realism and International Politics , 213-214. New York: Routledge, 2008.11 Schroeder, Paul W. "The 19th-Century International System: Changes in the Structure." World Politics, 1986: 2-4.12 Karl Max, Prince Lichnowsky. "My Mission to London, 1912-1914." London: Cassell & Co, May 1918

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The incident at Fashoda in 1898 between Britain and France demonstrates the restraining forces on

the great powers when faced with the possibility of war. Negotiations and compromise of two

traditional enemies prevailed in the form of establishing spheres of influence. Winston Churchill

describes the easing of tensions as an unforeseen occurrence; ‘This stupendous partition of half a

continent by two European Powers could scarcely be expected to excite the enthusiasm of the

rest’13. In addition to diplomatic merit, the easing of tensions between traditional enemies also

demonstrates a gesture of clemency and crucially an accurate realisation of the multi-polar

European structure. Britain’s policy of relative isolation in European affairs came to an end with the

enforcement of the Triple Entente, where a once hegemonic power consolidated an alliance with its

imperial rivals. The solidifying of the alliance between Britain, France and Russia came about at a

period of foreign policy difficulties or crises for all three states as the future of peaceful co-existence

became ever more uncertain14. British authority was critically challenged by the Boers in South

Africa; France underwent challenges to its rule in Morocco by German intervention and Russia’s

defeat to Japan in 1905 followed on by internal revolutionary movements heightened the anxiety

surrounding their overseas authority. The rivalry and tensions of the past between the three would

be allies had given way to a mutual ability to control and manage one another’s interests in attempts

to consolidate power rather than engage in any foreign programmes which could be deemed

reckless. Alliances were, in practice typically conservative and at times characterised by instability as

a result of state interests often overruling alliance agreements and misunderstandings between

state officials.15 Britain while in alliance with France and Russia had declared war upon the violation

of Belgian neutrality, while the German presence in Belgium presented a greater risk than an attack

on France through Alsace-Lorraine, the British government amongst those across the continent were

13 Churchill, Winston S. "Chapter XVII: 'The Fashoda Incident'." In The River War: An Account of the Reconquest of the Sudan, 239. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1902.14 Felix Gilbert, David Clay Large. In The End of the European Era, 1890-Present (Sixth Edition), 90-93. New York: W.W Norton and Co, 2009.15 Hinsley, Francis Harry (ed.). "Great Britain and France (1911-1914)." In British Foreign Policy Under Sir Edward Grey, by Coleraine K. A. Hamilton, 324-325. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

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also under domestic political and economic pressures which will be examined later however treaty

obligations produced the administration’s exterior justifications.

The importance of alliances in an ever changing international environment was laid out by German

chancellor Otto Von Bismarck. The new German state unified under the direction of the Prussian

statesman wished to preserve and protect its integrity from what Bismarck viewed as a hostile

environment. ‘Nobody wishes to be a minority…try to be one of three, as long as the world is

governed by the unstable equilibrium of five great powers’.16 Bismarck’s efforts to engage the newly

formed German Empire into alliances with Russia and Austria effectively guaranteed the continual

existence of the German state. The chancellor incessantly manoeuvred to secure the alliance

believing that the immobilisation of Russia will henceforth isolate France and increase the

probability for Germany to co-exist with its sovereignty secured.17 The Franco-Prussian war

redefined the power structures of continental Europe as the preeminent power France was defeated

in nine months and the German states unified as a single entity under Prussian authority. Germany

sought to consolidate its new found position amongst the Great Powers of Europe yet remained

concerned with a clear and frequently present security dilemma. While imperial and hegemonic

ambitions were a consistent recurrence throughout the German Empire’s development. The

continual existence of peace amongst the great power states was dependant on supressing

excessive and ruthless foreign policy agendas. This dilemma was also present to Bismarck in the

unstable characteristics of alliances, which often showed between the French and the British

following the Entente in the run up to war.18 While favouring an alliance with Russia, Bismarck noted

that ‘Germany would with regards to Russia be in an unequal position because of the geographic

16 Saburov, Peter Alexandrovich. In The Saburov Memoirs: Or Bismarck & Russia: Being fresh Light on the League of the Three Emerors 1881, 111. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1929.17 Bismarck, Otto Fürst von. "The Second Volume." In Bismarck, the man and the statesman; being the reflections and reminiscences of Otto, Prince von Bismarck, 251-258. New York: Harper & brothers, 189818 Lloyd George, David. In The War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, 47. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1933. See appendix D for French ambassador Paul Cambon’s remarks on Britain during tense moments in Summer 1914.

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situation and the autocratic constitution of Russia.’ 19 German foreign policy alterations following

Bismarck’s dismissal paved the way for Germany to become ever distant from Russia and greatly

entangled in the affairs of its closest ally, Austria-Hungary. The Hapsburg monarchy suffered defeat

to the Prussians in 1866 and its power eroded further by encirclement from a newly unified

Germany, a hostile Russian empire and ever increasing volatility in the Balkans. In essentials the

rivalry became unviable for Austria as the Prussian state consumed the entire German

confederation.20

The alterations in geopolitics during the second half of the nineteenth century were as pronounced

as, and ran in parallel with the changes in the structure of the balance of power. The political map’s

changes had its significance on the arrangement of alliances and the European power structures,

albeit indirectly. Germany although rapidly industrialising and exerting its influence and prestige in

the form of a colonial empire was physically encircled by France and Russia, and would not

compromise its position in the European balance of power in the same manner as Austria-Hungary.

The attention of the dual-monarchy shifted in response to its limited power in central Europe to

contest domination of the Balkans,21 as well as the response of the declining authority of the

Ottoman Empire which had controlled the region for over three centuries. Lord Salisbury

distinguished the global power structures at the turn of the century as consisting of ‘Living and dying

nations’22. The British had distinguished their nation as lively, active and healthy during this period in

the form of the acquisition of new territories and the recognition they receive from the greater

international community. The Ottoman Empire represented a power in turmoil and fragmentation as

the territory contracted in face of separatism and whose territorial decline was the primary

contributor to the alterations in the political map of South-Eastern Europe. Both Austria-Hungary 19 Bismarck, Otto Furst Von. "The Second Volume." In Bismarck, the man and the statesman; being the reflections and reminiscences of Otto, Prince von Bismarck, 247-249.20 Schroeder, Paul W. "The Lost Intermediaries: The Impact of 1870 on the European System." The International History Review, 1984: 12,1721 Demeter, Gabor. "Count Andrassy and the Attitude of Austria-Hungary during the Great Eastern Crisis 1875-1879." http://www.academia.edu/. 201422 Daily Mail and Empire. "The Living and Dying Nations." The Mail and Empire, May 21, 1898: 5

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and Russia; the states seeking to enhance their influence in the region had seen their power checked

through military defeat in Crimea and Central Europe and were attempting to resuscitate their

authority by succeeding the Ottoman Empire as the preeminent power in the Balkans. The condition

of a state, whether living or dying is most indicative based on the changes in the political map. War

constitutes the primary cause of these changes, especially in the context being examined,

furthermore in conjunction, the international system renders a state powerful or impotent based on

the outcome that conflicts produce. Acquisition of territory became a primary German war aim as

stated by Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg in September 1914, calling for the annexation of various

portions of the neighbouring states and German colonial expansion in Africa, superseding the

domination of the continent by the French and the British.23

The European alliance systems hinged on the continuation of Franco-German enmity and the

competing interests of Russia and Austria-Hungary. Loose alignments and former rivalries of a

reconcilable disposition had become rigid platforms for mutual support by 1914 owing to this

persistence of the status quo. War plans and strategies became an important fabrication in the

entire context of World War I and the great power’s plans depended significantly on their alliances

as well as their geographic positions and their territorial ambitions. Franco-British co-operation

cemented plans for military co-operation on land and at sea and the former also set out plans with

Russia for military co-operation against Germany.24 France’s preoccupation with Alsace-Lorraine

served as its primary motive for its plan XVII and its historical grievances with Germany centred on

the restoration of French territory. Where the French policy was directed towards attack, its Russian

partner initially upheld a policy of defence along a front opposing Germany, Austria-Hungary and

potentially the Ottoman Empire, Russia’s concurrent adversary. The Military convention of 1892

exemplified both the defensive nature of the initial alliance as well as the explicit antagonism felt

23 Bethmann-Hollweg, Theobald von. September program of Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg. Berlin, September 9, 191424 Stevenson, David. "The First World War and International Politics." 22. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1988

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between the opposing coalitions of European powers.25 However the Russian’s were gradually

coerced by France as well as by its obligations to the Slavic population of the Balkans to take a more

offensive approach and attack East Prussia and Galicia. The efficiency and speed of Russian

mobilization would become a major instigator of war, as the French and the German’s co-ordinated

their armies in parallel with the Russians.26 The alliance of France and Russia represents an evolving

and progressive relationship between the two states, with growing inclinations for strong military

cooperation followed in accordance with the continuation and exacerbation of the hostile political

environment. Furthermore, their share of world power and their integral state structures hinged on

military success. Fresh in Russian memory was the military defeat to Japan which adversely affected

its power status and the integrity of the Russian autarky.

This section will now exclusively examine the German war plans devised following Bismarck’s death

and the inability to renew the adhesion with Russia that the Prussian statesman had aimed to

achieve. Alfred Von Schlieffen strategically enveloped the inflexible plan for a quick victory in a short

war that would bear his name27, coming into fruition as German generals had begun to accept a two

front war as the inevitable predicament of the German Reich. While all major powers had devised

war plans, Schlieffen’s successor von Moltke conducted a decree in 1912 along with Wilhelm II and

the naval cabinet that war, sooner rather than later would be most favourable to Germany, that the

continuing Balkan crisis should be met with Austro-Hungarian force and that upon becoming

belligerent, France and Russia should be made to appear offensively hostile to justify the two front

German attack.28 An eighteen month window of opportunity to strike at the surrounding hostile

camps of France and Russia became the fixated position of the German state as the geographic

situation and the balance of power rendered Germany capable only of manoeuvring at a specific

25 World War I Document Archive. "World War I: The Franco-Russian Alliance Military Convention." http://www.gwpda.org/. February 5, 1996.26 Turner, L. C. F. "The Russian Mobilization in 1914." Journal of Contemporary History, 1968: 65-6927 Keegan, John. In The First World War, 30-32. London: Hutchinson, 199828 Müller, Georg Alexander von. "Admiral Von Muller and the Approach to War." The Historical Journal; Vol 4, 1969: 661

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time and in a specific manner. The theory was shared by high ranking commanders such as Erich

Ludendorff, ‘in our unfavourable military-political position, in the centre of Europe, surrounded by

enemies, we had to reckon with foes greatly superior in numbers and prepare ourselves

accordingly…Russia pressed for war and continually increased her army… in France the thought of

revenge had revived with renewed vigour.’29 The unified Germany had meticulously prepared for

war and weighed up the costs and benefits of its plans for several years prior to the summer of 1914.

Across Europe the reluctance by all powers to disengage during the initial mobilization represent the

extensive vigilance that had been built up over several decades.

The structure of states, power and the international system supported the initiatives that would lead

to war after a period of a century whereby the arrangement of the states and entities within the

system had been restructured considerably since the deliberations of Vienna. Though states such as

Britain saw little change in their international agenda for much of the nineteenth century, the

continental boundaries were reshaped and the balance of power altered significantly. In periods

with an absence of interstate conflict, the spread of imperial development provided additional

vigour in the reshaping of the balance of power and alliances. Pronounced rivalry between

conflicting states and empires both withstood and invigorated or gave way to formidable alliances in

the effort to consolidate peace and fend off more potent challenges. The persistence of diplomacy,

while gathering clout during the nineteenth century was employed by various states in summer 1914

only to fail in bringing about demobilization, aggravated by constructed mutual mistrust and

incompatible interests.30 Finally, states would begin to demonstrate cohesion in their foreign policy

and their military tactics in the run up to hostilities. The dilemma surrounding security and power,

frequently the theme of international relations theories concerned the great powers of Europe

radically juxtaposing with a period where they experienced relative peace and growing prosperity.

29 Ludendorff, Erich. In Ludendorff's own story, August 1914-November 1918 , 28-29. New York: Harper, 191930 Steinmeier, Frank-Walter. "1914 – the failure of and need for diplomacy." http://www.london.diplo.de/. January 28, 2014

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Bismarck recognized that the stability on the surface was marred by intransigence and insecurity,

likening Europe as a powder keg and complacent statesmen continually ‘smoking in an arsenal’31.

The continent’s place at the heart of international politics and its position as the bedrock of the

global balance of power would diminish and fail to recover throughout the twentieth century as a

consequence of the First World War.

31 Glenny, Misha. In The Balkans 1804–1999: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers , 243. London: Granta Books, 1999

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Chapter 2: The context of the internal social dynamics of states

between 1815-1914.

Domestic level development and elements of continuity within individual states will be examined

and assessed in this chapter as fundamental components in the origins and causes of the First World

War. The focus will centre on nationalism, state culture, identity and norms and the means in which

these characteristics developed in numerous societies, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe. In

discord with the rigid systemic structures, the themes being discussed have strong social dimensions

and thus are more arbitrary and fluid in nature, therefore difficult to accurately categorise and

theorise. The social constructivist elements to these themes are most pronounced, as described by

Benedict Anderson; ‘states are an imagined and limited political community in terms of size and

sovereignty.’32 The development of similar characteristics amongst societies can aid the construction

of a state or inversely the formalised state can in turn construct the society for its citizens. Political

principles enhance the state’s legitimacy and state builders act as archetypal figures which reinforces

the nationalist sentiments. Citizens become bounded by the state’s values and culture and also by

the state institutions and its established ability to enforce law and order33. Amongst these recurring

distinctions is also the construction of territorial boundaries based around an opposition to

differences amongst people’s identities and norms, chiefly languages, religions and ethnicities. The

European map’s evolution over the course of the century illustrates significant alterations in the

social dynamics of the European people, and the war itself produced a patchwork of smaller nations

arising from dynastic collapses in Central and Eastern Europe.34 Britain and France while

experiencing negligible territorial change experienced a certain degree of transformation within

their domestic level characteristics although not as prominent as the alterations in other parts of the

continent. France’s national identity arose out of its revolution, in spite of defeat and monarchic

32 Anderson, Benedict. In Imagined Communities, 5-7. London: Verso, 1991.33 Geller, Ernest. In Nations and Nationalism, 1-7. New York: Cornell University Press, 198334 See appendices A and B

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restoration, the principles of revolutionary France remained a potent mechanism for social change

which would alter European social identity of the following century.

Serbia’s initial strike against the Austro-Hungarian throne would eventually transcend into the First

World War. The apparent motive of Gavrilo Principe was to destabilise the Habsburg Monarchy’s

control of the Slavic people through violent intimidation, causing rebellion amongst groups aiming to

form an all Slavic state, Yugoslavia. Principe operated within a pan-Slavic group, the Black Hand as a

student with resolute grievances towards the Hapsburg monarchy. Principe’s organisation endorsed

their motives under the maxim ‘unification or death’ and purposefully gave the ‘priority to the

revolutionary struggle rather than to rely on cultural striving.’35 The oath taken by Principe and all

members demanded that they’ll only act in accordance with the Black Hand’s principles or face the

brutal death penalty,36 thus Principe’s motives mirrored that of the Black Hand, as he exclaimed at

his trial. ‘The main motive which guided me in my deed was: the avenging of the Serbian people. ... I

am a nationalist. I aimed to free the Yugoslavs, for I am a Yugoslav.’37 The defiant nationalist passions

of Principe’s testimony suggested Serbia grievance with its oppressive neighbour, however this

testament came in contrast to the Serbian response to the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum of July 1914.

Uncharacteristic of the defiant nationalist sentiments that drove Principe and the Black Hand to

Sarajevo, the Serbian government accepted demands which would signify the state’s impotence in

the wake of pressure from its apparent oppressor. For example ‘The [Austro-Hungarian] government

expected to be invited to cooperate in the investigation of the crime, and it was ready, in order to

prove its complete correctness, to proceed against all persons in regard to whom it would receive

information’.38 The state’s rejection of one clause would lead to the Austro-Hungarian invasion

which Serbia was adamantly trying to oppose. The nationalist faction operating within the Serb state 35 Pozzi, Henri. "War is Coming Again." In Black Hand Over Europe, 268-273. London: The Francis Mott Co, 1935.36 Ibid^. See appendix E for the Black Hand’s oath of allegiance. 37 Princip, Gavrilo (translation and editing by W.A. Dolph Owings, Elizabeth Pribic and Nikola Pribic). The Sarajevo trial. Chapel Hill: Documentary Publications, October 191438 Royal Serbian Government. "The Serbian Response to the Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum - World War I Document Archives." http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/. July 25, 1914.

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ultimately carried the symbol of their state in their endeavours and permitted the state to bear

responsibility for their actions in spite of the government willingly accepting to Austria-Hungary that

a gross injustice had been done and would wish to co-operate on several matters to defuse pre-

existing tensions. Serbia was positioned as a country with a collection of different voices; the newly

independent state contained elements of disunity, whereas nationalism collates the people of the

state under similar principles and guidelines, in particular those concerning territorial expansion and

the incorporation of corresponding racial and ethnic groups. Nikola Pašić’s government conceded to

much of Austria-Hungary’s pressure, yet the statesman was aware that nationalist tendencies run

deep within the Serb population, ‘the Serbs strive for the unification of all Serb tribes on the basis of

tradition, memory and the historical past of the Serb race’.39

A succession of small and intermediate scale wars throughout the nineteenth century frequently

resulted in territorial changes. The Serbian state emerged in the Balkan environment amidst several

competing national claims from ethnic minorities once ruled by the Ottoman Empire and

increasingly the target of the Austro-Hungarian Empire’s expansion. The Bosnian annexation of 1908

brought the dual-monarchy’s domain to the Serbian border. Nationalist expansion had occurred

widely throughout the century and the continent as Greece, Belgium, Italy and Germany fought for

and achieved independence, national unity and territorial integrity.40 The Balkan Wars of 1912-1913

redefined borders and rendered the Serb state the most potent challenger to Austria-Hungary, while

at the same time the region was marred by instability owing to the resurfacing of ethnic tensions

and relative economic underdevelopment. Political groups typically exploited centuries old

nationalist attitudes; contradicting attitudes which formed a uniform alliance in the face of Ottoman

control, however also lead to in-fighting in an ethnically diverse region comprising of states

experiencing autonomy for the first time in centuries41. The insecurity of the region was apparent to

39 Pašić, Nikola. In Sloga Srbo-Hrvata, 54. Belgrade : Vreme Knjige, 1995.40 Ferguson, Niall. In The Pity of War, 144. London: Penguin Books, 199841 Pavlowitch, Stevan K. "Europe and the Balkans in a historical perspective, 1804-1945." Journal of Southern Europe & the Balkans, 2000: 143-144

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the great powers who mediated in the resolutions of the Balkan Wars. The Russians and Austro-

Hungarians upheld the most influence in the region with clear opposing views, the Austrian naval

officer Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf calling for ‘the total suppression of the Serbian nest of

revolutionaries’.42 Russia’s traditional kinship with the ethnic Slavs was invigorated by threats from

the Austro-Hungarians, a relationship with strong historical and cultural bonds brought about

Russia’s involvement in its fifth Balkan conflict in a century.43 Nationalism’s clashing principles, it

being of a constructive and destructive nature lead to the Balkan states formalizing into sovereign

entities following the fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire’s European provinces; however the

diversity of the region and the fragility of the ascending governments and political systems fuelled

subsequent internal strife.

Louis P. Bénézet, an American academic conceived of a European map in 1918 defined by ethnic and

racial boundaries, juxtaposed with the map of the previous century which contained ill-defined

borders constructed not by nature but artificially through wars and threatening international

relations resulting in the annexation of territories.4445 The ethnic divides of Europe were most potent

in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, comprising of several races ruled over by only the Hapsburg

Monarchy and the Hungarian Magyars. As well as the Serbian discontent with the empire’s ruling

classes, the multi-ethnic realm was subject to significant internal hostilities among the most

dissatisfied populations. Following the Austro-Hungarian compromise of 1867, Friedrich Ferdinand

Count von Beust regarded the empire’s fragility would be the product of the impending unification

of the German states into a confederation and then a single realm, but more significantly the

yearning for independence from several racial groups within the empire’s dominion. Von Beust

42 Beaver, Jan G. In Collision Course: Count Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, Serbia and the Politics of Preventive War, 99. London: Lulu, 200943 Jelavich, Barbara. In Russia's Balkan Entanglements (1806-1914), 260-265. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 199144 Benezet, L. P. "XXVI: Europe as it Should be." In The World War and What Was Behind It (The Story of the Map of Europe). Chicago: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1918.45 Ibid^. See Appendix F for Benezet’s map with regions separated based on ethnic bourdaries

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advocated the system of absolute monarchical rule to maintaining order and stability as the

revolutions of 1848 remained in recent memory of statesmen as well as independence activists.46

Emperor Franz Joseph symbolised this stability and continuity during his sixty eight year reign, yet his

power diminished during this elongated period of rule. Initially the empire’s mandate prevailed in

spite of calls for greater autonomy from the minority groups and the increasing knowledge and

awareness of their disadvantaged position in society. Political concessions at the turn of the

twentieth century aimed at resolving dissidence, paradoxically provided ammunition for the

discontented masses to explicitly influence the government at the same time Franz Josef’s influence

and personality were diminishing.47 As Von Beust had predicted, the recession from absolute rule

and the declining influence of the aging emperor put the Austro-Hungarian Empire on a path

towards its downfall. Nationalism and ethnic diasporas destabilising the dual monarchy had

profound effects on the decision to declare war owing to the possibility of accelerated

fragmentation of the empire.

Austria-Hungary’s ethnic tensions gathered momentum in parallel with the growing weakness of its

monarchy and political system. The approach of absolute autarchy and suppression of nationalist

sentiments was a major facet in the neighbouring Russian Empire, whose solidarity with the similar

Slavic races in Serbia would provide the alleged impetus for mobilization in July 1914.48 An element

of continuity in Russia’s history; the spread of Russian culture, traditions and values became

indoctrinated across Northern Asia and Eastern Europe throughout the nineteenth century. The

relationship the Russians adopted with Eastern Europeans was somewhat ambiguous and

characterised by the assimilation of certain non-Russian groups alongside violent reprisals towards

others. Predominantly, a race’s fate was subject to their cohesion with Russia’s language, religion

46 Beust, Friedrich Ferdinand von. In Memoirs of (Volume I), 20-25. London: Remington and Co., 1887.47 Ebeling, Richard M. In Political Economy, Public Policy and Monetary Economics: Ludwig Von Mises and the Austrian Tradition, 59. New York: Routledge, 201048 Florinsky, Michael. "The Russian Mobilization of 1914." Political Science Quarterly, 1927: 214-215.

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and their compliance with the Russian mandates.49 Massacres towards dissidents such as the Poles

and the anti-Jewish pogroms encouraged by religious antipathy maintained the Tsar’s and the

Russian ruling classes’ statute. A state attuned to the values of the past and the maintenance of

traditions of the preceding generations also contained separatist elements spurred on primarily by

economic hardship and counteracted the Romanov’s increasing sense of nationalism. The

phenomenon of patriotic rejection was felt marginally amongst various social groups, predominantly

the existing dissidents, those accustomed to persistent and extreme poverty and groups coerced

into adopting an alien identity by the Russian state. Following the revolutions of 1905, the Tsar

proclaimed that ‘Only the state which preserves the heritage of the past is strong and firm, we

ourselves have sinned against this and God is perhaps punishing us’.50 The pan-European nationalist

attitudes in Russian society underpinned the royal family and its affiliates however there began to

emerge a clear distinction between the will of the sovereign and that of the populous.

Where Russia aimed to preserve its dynastic heritage, through coercion and vehement

discouragement of diversity, the Italian unification and nationalisation programme demonstrated

that the means employed for the construction of national identity, loyalty and recognition in the

nineteenth century were focussed on the governments and their longer term agendas for merging

the local identities into that of the nation-state. State provisions in the form of education and

compulsory military service combined with the ongoing migration and agglomeration of populations

into urban environments ensured a growing sense of patriotism in several states. For example, fewer

than 10% of the population spoke the Italian language at the time of unification; state provided

education would see regional dialects became subdued in future generations owing to their

adaptation of a uniform language.51 Following the unification of Italy, the champion of unification

49 Kappeler, Andreas. "The Ambiguities of Russification." Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History (Volume 5, Number 2), 2004: 291-29750 Steinberg, Mark D. In The Fall of the Romanovs: Political Dreams and Personal Struggles in a Time of Revolution, 11. New Haven: Yale University Press, 199551 Guerini, Federica. "Language policy and ideology in Italy." International Journal of the Sociology of Language, 2011: 109

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Massimo D'Azeglio proclaimed ‘Italy has been made, but we have yet to make the Italians’(s'è fatta

l'italia, ma non si fanno gl’Italia).52 The nationalist unifiers attempted to construct a more robust

autonomous unitary Italian polity while subsequently the government would attempt to personify

their attitudes into the will of the country’s population. For older generations, the transfer into

manufacturing and particularly into a densely populated urban landscape ensured the abandonment

of the localised customs and traditions of the villages and a greater consolidation of the national

identity the governments hoped would filter down and affect the masses as well as the nobles,

monarchs and ruling classes. This would prove critical in an environment with growing democratic

propensities as people who associate with their governments develop a greater loyalty to it and the

state it represents. Amongst the vast and diverse social change advocated by the revolutions of 1848

were movements dedicated to the expanse of democracy entwined with growing national identities

in loosely aligned states as well amongst people under foreign governments.5354

The previous paragraph denotes the nationalist mechanisms as a vehicle for dissolving absolutism

and creating an impetus for populations to envision themselves within a system upholding greater

democratic and liberal ideals; however the following sections will explore nationalism and

particularly militarism as factors which lead states to thrive on conflict. Through a combination of

fact and mythology, governments and state builders indoctrinate the shared historical foundations

of the state. The theme of war, victorious battles and tragic defeats recurs frequently in the

concurrent character of Europe’s great powers. Conflict with France created the Second German

Reich in January 1871, with the Prussian aristocracy as its fundamental component in governance

and the military. Bismarck’s adhesion to military power is evident in his memoirs ‘our strength

cannot proceed from a press and parliamentary, but only from the policy of a great military power.’55

52 D'Azeglio, Massimo. In My Memoirs, 5. Florence: Firenze, G. Barbèra, 189153 Hobsbawm, E.J. "Nationalism." In The Age of Revolution: Europe from 1789-1848, 132-145. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 196254 Deutsche Bundestag. "The Constitution of March 27, 1849." http://www.bundestag.de/. September 2008. See Appendix G for the Philipp Veit painting ‘Germania’. 55 Bismarck, Otto, Fürst von. "The Second Volume." In Bismarck, the man and the statesman; being the reflections and reminiscences of Otto, Prince von Bismarck, 4.

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The Clausewitzian discourse adopted by the Prussians and then the Germans regards war as being

the continuation of politics by other means.56 The army was a means of pursing a frequently

expansionist foreign policy, but also as a means of social mobility in a structure characterised by

hierarchy, historical traditions and disciplinarians. Strength and unity of the German populace

depended on the subjugation of both its perceived and authentic enemies which surround it.

Maintenance of a disciplinary stance was due in part to the conscripts developing loyalty and

devotion to their state, and the perception of German supremacy was emitted across the

continent.57 France, while embittered by the defeat of 1871 was anxious to form its alliances with

Britain, the historical enemy and Russia, the empire built on absolutism in the face of German

military potency. The antipathy of both states forged a nationalist personification of the territorial

borders, France equating the loss of Alsace-Lorraine as though the right arm of France had been

amputated and dramatizing the goal of reconquering the lost province in the national mind set.58 The

German anthem ‘Die Wacht am Rhein’ glorified the Rhineland and emphasised the commitment the

army made in its defence in the wake of the growing animosity towards the French.59

Through personification of a state’s features such as important territories, passions arise and the

impetus for conflict exacerbates. The epitome of nationalism’s human face during the late

nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was the sovereign and in the majority of states, a monarch.

Monarchs also represented the militaristic fervour that intertwined with nationalism. Portraits and

photographs were frequently taken of the monarch in full military uniform and decorations,60 and

their upbringing revolved around the culture and norms of the military apparatus, being the

56 Clausewitz, Carl Von. In On War, 75-89. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 198957 Fischer, Fritz. In From Kaiserreich to Third Reich: Elements of Continuity in German History, 3-4,39-40. London: Routledge, 198658 Tuchman, Barbara. In The Guns of August, 30. New York: Macmillan, 1962. See Appendix H for Victor Hugo’s quote regarding France’s passionate aim at the recapture of Alsace-Lorraine. 59 Wilhelm, Carl. "Library of Congress. Music Division." http://memory.loc.gov/. 1870. http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/h?ammem/mussm:@field(NUMBER+@band(sm1870+01744)) (accessed March 27, 2014)60 See appendix I for photos of the monarchs of Britain, Russia, Germany and Austria in full military uniforms and decorations.

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descendants of powerful, distinguished dynasty’s who accrued their position through victories in

war. Upon his ascent to the throne, Wilhelm II distinguished his personal loyalty to the army and

pronounced his dedicated affection towards the military publically.61 As with monarchs, the military

stands out as a representation of a state’s legitimacy and endurance. The continental powers

continuously maintained large armies owing to powerful historical leaders employing military force

to establish their sovereign enterprise and lay the foundations of the state, which leaders such as

Frederick II of Prussia and Peter I of Russia achieved in the 18 th Century, eventually both leaders

would come to bear the epithet ‘the great’, as recognition for their distinctions in the expanse of the

territory they inherited. The continuation of the militaristic doctrine as well as the conditions of the

alliance systems and the balance of power prompted careful planning, precision and revision of war

plans. Furthermore the various local conflicts and skirmishes of the early twentieth century arose

reasserted the military stance of the great powers; fearful and anxious of their rivals and often

bringing to light misperception of their capacity as well as that of neighbouring powers.62

In the ever increasing tensions, amidst the decision makers constantly preparing for war with

scrupulous determination, pride and allegiance to the military came to affect significant portions of

the middle and upper classes, those in particular who benefitted significantly from the increases in

wealth and prosperity. In societies becoming increasingly divided by wealth and class, domestic

political interest groups brought internal challenges to the establishment. A meeting of the

International Socialist Bureau occurred in Brussels in July 1914, the delegates from around the world

degreed by a unanimous vote that pan-socialist movements must ‘not only continue but strengthen

their demonstrations against war in favour of peace’.63 The movement had gathered momentum for

several decades in industrialised nations amidst growing disparity in wealth, with the disadvantaged 61 California Digital Newspaper Collection. "Daily Alta California, Volume 42, Number 14169, 17 June 1888." http://cdnc.ucr.edu/. See appendix J for Emperor Wilhelm II’s inaugural address to soldiers and sailors of the German Reich 62 Stevenson, David. "Militarization and Diplomacy in Europe before 1914." International Security, 1997: 125-161.63 National Library of New Zealand. "International Socialist Bureau: Maoriland Worker, Volume 5, Issue 192, 7 October 1914, Page 3." http://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/. October 7, 1914.

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wielding a growing awareness and resentment of the established economic and societal order.

Across Europe, groups of dissidents were gathering the political clout needed for reforms and the

socialist community made up significant portions of national assemblies in the limited democracies.

The German election of 1912 highlights the growth in social democrat approval where they emerged

as the largest party in the Reichstag.64 With only limited participation by citizens in governments, the

political authority remained with the monarchs, the ruling class males and military personnel who

exercised greater autonomy than the majority of the population, however the economic and

industrial capabilities of a state were markedly dependant on many lower class citizens whose

growing solidarity amongst workers of all nations was in conflict with traditional nationalist

attitudes. The strong impetus for structural change had been firmly established and leaders

recognised that large scale war would significantly affect the course of this impetus, Russian interior

minister Pyotr Durnovo, believing the Russo-Japanese war had firmly entrenched the motivation for

social revolution, cautiously warned the Tsar that defeat would make this revolution an

inevitability.65 Socialist ideology, whilst pronounced in the majority of states was more destabilising

to some establishments over others; similarly there were differences in the manner in which

governments managed the developments and this correlated somewhat with their regime structure

and the extent and nature of the socialist programme. The fierce suppression of socialism by the

Russian autocracy would inadvertently contribute to the revolution which produced the monarchy’s

downfall.

The preceding chapter has explored several social aspects of the background to the First World War.

The characteristics of nationalism appear prominently in the majority of European states during the

nineteenth century and profoundly influenced the verdicts and judgements of state leaders as well

64 Administration of the German Bundestag. "Elections in the Empire: 1871-1918." http://www.bundestag.de/. November 1, 200565 Durnovo, Pyotr. "Durnovo's Memorandum; February 1914." In Documents Of Russian History: 1914 1917, by Frank Alfred Golder, 3-23. London: The Century Co., 1927. See Appendix K for a paragraph of Durnovo’s memorandum illustrating the social impacts of war with Germany.

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as guided individuals and groups to stand in support of their state and sovereignty, or engage in

conflict and hostility against the opposing claimant of their land and its inhabitants. The opposition

to dissimilarities gripped the leaders of states likewise who engaged in conflict with neighbouring

states or regions selected as part of an empire’s expansion in order to advance their nation’s claim

over territory, subjugating ethnologically different communities. Through education, military service

and the urban expansion in industrialised nations, individuals became indoctrinated with the ideals

and norms of the state, amongst which were longstanding militaristic traditions, personified in the

form of monarchy (excluding France post 1870) and maintained through substantial technological

and economic developments. Nationalism and militarism became potently challenged at the

beginning of the twentieth century in the form of the growing influence of socialism and increased

democratic participation, this in spite of enfranchisement being limited to approximately 25% of the

populations. 66 This limited suffrage demonstrates the misrepresented majority in European society

and the frequently recurring theme of the will of the sovereign and other decision makers being in

opposition to that of the populace. Combined, these elements unleashed firm bitterness and

resentment cohabiting alongside pride and affluence and this dichotomy conditioned an

environment of unstable and fervent personalities which traversed the social, economic and political

spectrum. The First World War illuminated the poignancy of the social facets which had been

developing for the preceding century.

Chapter 3: The background to the European economic

environment of the period 1815-1914.

66 Goldstein, Robert J. In Political repression in 19th century Europe, 4-5. London: Routledge, 1983

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The economic analysis of the years following the First World War strongly indicates that the war was

a major pivot between two fundamentally different economic systems. John Maynard Keynes

established the primary critique of the Versailles conference proceedings and directives of 1919. The

member of the British treasury observed the treaty to be an instrument for global economic

disintegration and renewed poverty throughout Europe; as with unjust settlements before it had

threatened to ‘throw back human progress for centuries’.67 The forthcoming plight of the European

populations into the following decades was also recognized by Herbert Hoover, stressing that the

population of Europe was destined to starve without the re-emergence of its globally connected

markets for the imports of food combined with ‘demoralised productivity’ of the European labour

force.68 This chapter will explore the economic environment which preceded World War I however

it’s important to briefly mention that the war’s implications had more elongated, detrimental effects

on the state of global and domestic economics than on social dynamics and the international

political system. Economic strength and weakness moulds the tensions concerning the balance of

power and national and ethnic integrity, all of which persisted into the following decades and upon

which had developed new resentments. From an economic standpoint, the level of international

trade integration would not recover to pre-World War I levels until the 1970s, furthermore capital

and financial market integration as a percentage of world output has yet to reach the level of

integration of the early twentieth century, likewise migration figures as a percentage of world

population.69 While the reliability of economic statistics is limited and Eurocentric, its expediency is

enforced by the growth of bureaucracy, record keeping and the European domination over much of

the world’s land, labour, capital and enterprise.

67 Keynes, John Maynard. In The Economic Consequences of the Peace, 226-230. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 192068 Hoover, Herbert. "The Economic Situation in Europe." In The World's Work, Volume 39, 98-102. New York: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1919.69 Joseph Grieco, John Ikenberry. In State Power and World Markets: The International Political Economy, 15-16. New York: W.W Norton & Co, 2003

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The following sections will examine the changing economic environment of European states and

their colonial empires, the challenges they confronted and the benefits they procured both within

their borders and in the international environment, their policy and capacity for military and naval

expansion, and the competitiveness and co-operation undertaken in an era of increasing

globalisation. The latter is a phenomenon which underpins the contemporary economic climate,

which had initially accelerated during the nineteenth century, fuelled by industrialisation,

technological innovations such as railroads and telegraph networks as well as pioneering changes in

consistent economic foundations and principles such as the adaptation of the gold standard by

several states. Integration however comes about through willingness for states to engage in trade

and commerce. At the heart of Britain’s economic policy was the growing avocation of trade

liberalisation, the faith in which was pronounced in British politics owing to the resulting peace and

stability it could bring to the world.70 Subsequently, free trading rights would be imposed on its

colonies and its spheres of influence and would become a custom and factor of global economic

integration. The one-sided nature of imperialism, a system dependant on one political entity

extending its control over another therefore results with states benefitting disproportionally from

the economic relationship and liberalized trade was frequently enforced through intimidation and

violent reprisals by colonial powers against weaker states.71 European states of similar economic

capacities initially engaged in numerous trade agreements during the 1860’s following the model of

the Cobden–Chevalier agreement between Britain and France. The impetus for equal, bilateral

trading regimes constructed loose alliances between trading partners which had political alliance

potential in the future, although third party state’s exclusion lead to trade restrictions between

states disengaged from the two-party contract.72 These initial drives towards free trade and

70 Cobden, Richard. "Vol. 1 (Free Trade and Finance) [1870]." In Speeches on Questions of Public Policy., by John Bright & J.E. Thorold Rogers, 188. London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1870. See appendix L for an extract from a Cobden speech in justification of the free trade principles (1846)71 Pottinger, Henry. "Treaty of Nanjing (Nanking), 1842." http://china.usc.edu/. June 26, 1843. http://china.usc.edu/ShowArticle.aspx?articleID=403&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1 (accessed March 31, 2014).72 Lampe, Markus. "Explaining nineteenth-century bilateralism: economic and political determinants of the Cobden–Chevalier network." Economic History Review, 2010: 1-2.

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integration proved that amidst a veil of co-operation and growing prosperity was a notable

acceleration towards inequality amongst states both globally and within the European realm as the

zero-sum proponents materializes, irrespective of the intentions to construct an assured economic

alliance.

Beginning in the 1870s, the economic growth and integration of the industrialised world became

firmly conditioned by a decade of rapid and substantial change in the geographical and political

landscape. Italian and German unification, the preservation of the United States as a single polity

and the restoration of the chrysanthemum throne in Japan had constructed more formidable nation

states but also more formidable economic institutions. The unity and agglomeration of peoples

within a more inelastic environment leads to a greater maximisation of productivity, centralised

governments exercise greater control over fiscal and monetary policy and improved stability of the

economic apparatus. Conversely, well-assembled integration mechanisms gradually provide the

impetus for political unification as had the German ‘zollverein,’ which expanded the economic clout

of the German states and established the connectivity which would aid economic growth following

unification.73 Between states, alliances of a political nature can become entwined with the

communal economic conditions as the Franco-Russian bond markets demonstrate. The evolution

during the late nineteenth century of sizable and well-structured financial markets permitted the

growth of capital market integration. The economically inept Russian market became France’s most

significant overseas recipient of capital and financial investments during the three decades

preceding World War I, with mutually beneficial principles these loans and bonds correlated with

improving political relations and the alliance of 1892, subsequently Russian investment in

infrastructural projects increased providing long term material benefits. 74 Nevertheless, the growing

unpredictable nature of the Russian elites worried financiers in summer of 1914 as the political crisis

73 Lalor, John J. "Zollverein." Cyclopædia of Political Science, Political Economy, and the Political History of the United States, 1881: 1102-110574 Ukhov, Andrey. "Financial Innovation and Russian Government Debt Before 1918." Yale International Centre for Finance, 2003: 19-21

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threatened to destroy the commercial interests of both states, leading to influential investors

lobbying the ruling political classes.75 The example of France and Russia’s economic accords

reinforces the alliance structures as the growing risk of financial breakdown restricts state’s ability to

act unscrupulously towards each other, furthermore the leverage of the economic elite underlines

international political economy, the distinctive and often close relationship between politics and

economics emerging as the influence of economic constraints being placed on policymakers.

The principles underpinning Britain’s relationship with its continental neighbours, while frequently

following the ethos of relative isolation from European entanglements, Britain further attempted to

separate its economic agenda from its political philosophy as will be explored in the following

example. Along with the bilateral trade agreements of 1860, in spite of apparent French aggression

towards Germany in 1870, the British continued their export trade with France among which was the

frequent dispatch of war materials. The British secretary of state for foreign affairs concluded that

‘there is no necessity to hamper the trade with neutral countries by preventing the exportation of

contraband of war to the belligerents.’76 With France being its primary continental partner, the

disruption of trade would have had notable setback on Britain’s economy and potentially damaged

the incentives for the triple entente. The majority of overall trade at the time of the Franco-Prussian

war was however with Britain’s colonial empire, which it directly administered politically. The British

Raj having been under the de facto control of the East India Company was formally incorporated into

the Empire and the British political domain following the Government of India act. Greater political

supervision ran in conjunction with a fivefold increase in overall trade volume in less than a decade

and a half.77 The expansion of colonial trade did not however develop in proportion to the vast

growth of the British Empire at the turn of the century, the trading relationship eventually shifting to

75 Ferguson, Niall. In The House of Rothschild: Volume 2: The World's Banker: 1849-1999, 431-436. London: Penguin Books, 199976 Granville George Leveson Gower, 2nd Earl Granville. "Memorandum communicated by Count Bernstorff to Earl Granville." London: British Foreign Office, September 1, 187077 Myers, A.B. Diagram showing the Shipping, Exports, Imports and combined Import and Export Trade. Colombo: Colonial Office (UK), July 28, 1880.

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one of import dependence and demand-led growth. Britain’s economic prestige and hegemonic

status was in decline paralleling with the rising industrial growth of the German empire and the

United States, with the latter becoming Britain’s primary trading partner amongst the great powers,

supported by a reconciliation of feelings and interests and subsequently become a fundamental

lifeline following the declaration of war in 1914.7879 Having exercised a form of economic hegemony

during the nineteenth century based on maritime imperial expansion and the policy of indifference

towards the European political economy, multi-polarity and the power structures were allowed to

alter progressively. Discussed in chapter one, this atmosphere enhances the attractiveness of war

based on the perception of clear and present relative gains which could be accrued from states of

similar economic and military capacity. The military capabilities and the economic means to military

power will hence be examined in the following paragraph.

Germany’s ascent towards becoming a potent challenge to British supremacy was strongly

dependant on its industrial strength, as well as its commercial standing as part of a cohesive network

of trading nations. Wilhelm II was direct in his Daily Telegraph interview, ‘Germany is a young and

growing empire. She has a worldwide commerce which is rapidly expanding…Germany must have a

powerful fleet to protect that commerce and her manifold interests in even the most distant seas’.80

The naval expansion was at the forefront of Anglo-German relations and a destabilising omen in a

fragile relationship, combined with the changing fortunes of both states. Britain’s import

dependency had position the German expansion as a means for Germany to become a viable

successor to Britain’s once supreme navy. The naval prominence of the period was amongst several

mechanism of projecting national prestige, but moreover they proved to be economically viable as it

enabled imperial expansions, combined with the defensive and protectionist undertakings the navy

78 United States Library of Congress. "A union in the interest of humanity - civilization - freedom and peace for all time." http://www.loc.gov/. 1898. See appendix M for a US poster in recognition and celebration of the shared interests of the United States and Great Britain.79 United Department of Commerce. Imports and Exports by Grand Divisions and Countries. Washington D.C: Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, October 27, 191580 Daily Telegraph. "The Daily Telegraph Affair." http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/. October 28, 1908

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provided. Economic protectionist measures were increasing in the form of tariffs and charges on

commercial activity, while avocations for free trade were apparent in the previous decades, the

British attitude shifted in the 1890’s as they attempted to restructure their policies in discord with

the mechanisms they had strongly supported previously.81 The British commercial attitude was

perceived by Germany as a defensive measure against growing German strength, diplomatic papers

state ‘now that the superiority of German industry is recognized, [the British] will soon make efforts

to destroy it.’82 The escalating tensions allowed for war materials to become a strong economic

factor, the supply of which becoming a necessity in both Britain and Germany as the rivalry entered

a cyclical phase of constant arms build-up. An example from 1906 saw a tariff proposed by the

Swedish government on iron ore exports. This was bitterly and somewhat disingenuously resented

by Britain and more so by Germany as an affront to the established commercial relations with

Britain’s foreign office frequently affirming the growing German demand in parallel with dwindling

imports into Britain.83For fear of losing out and being ill prepared in relation to the competition, the

arms build-up continued and relied on the domestic economic capacity of the great powers and an

open commercial environment to ensure a greater probability of survival. These needs mirrored the

tense environment that states perceived was omnipresent.

The strongly competitive economic approach was also reflected in the imperial ambitions of the

great powers. In mentioning ‘great powers’, colonies presented a means of power acquisition and

vast economic benefits through an exploitative trade relationship. Economic growth and population

increases became greatly facilitated by a state’s ability to expand and consolidate its territorial gains.

81 Copeland, Dale C. "Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations." International Security, 1996: 5–4182 trans. E.T.S. Dugsdale. "Volume. II." In German Diplomatic Documents, 1871-1914, 486-487. New York: Harper and Brothers, 193083 Foreign Office. "Sweden: Files 688-5154." Export duty on iron ore. London: W B Peat and Co, 1906

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The Berlin conference of 1884-1885 allowed for the partition of Africa to be a triumph of diplomacy

over aggression, with agreements reached on spheres of influence, trading and navigational

regulations and a respect for the international law recognised by the signatory powers.84 As with the

Concert of Europe seventy years earlier, the principles and successes of the agreements in Berlin did

not transcend into a stable long term colonisation process. The continuation of territorial expansion

was fuelled significantly by the growing need for raw materials in heavily industrialised nations and

securing markets for which a growing quantity of goods could be traded. Maritime imperial

expansion stood as the foreign policy objective of Britain, France and Germany, with continental

expansion being the intentions in Russia and Austria-Hungary. Furthermore, un-colonised regions

were frequently categorized and identified by the powers of Europe as spheres of influence and

consequently coerced into co-operation with European powers. The vast Chinese markets of the

Qing dynasty served as the model for indirect imperial dealings.85 The resources of the Middle East

were strongly sought after by several powers, with Germany challenging the predominantly British

stronghold on Persia and Mesopotamia. Diplomatic efforts between powers predominated for

several years alongside the pressuring influence of loans and political patronage. The crumpling

Ottoman Empire increasingly became the subject of German interests with heavy German outflows

of capital and proposals for infrastructural projects such as the Berlin-Baghdad railway.86 Resource

scarcity and economic regression would first strike Germany over its rivals owing to its industrial

clout juxtaposing with its territorial inferiority as the Germans were to remain a minor imperial

power into the twentieth century. Rivalling ambitions disruptive to the status quo in the Middle East

and elsewhere were frequently checked through the tried and tested diplomatic manoeuvrings.

Nevertheless clashes in contested territories were equally pervasive in examples such as the

Moroccan crisis, the Spanish-American war and the Russo-Japanese war. The First World War

84 The Berlin Conference (1884-1885). "The Berlin Conference General Act (1885)." http://21548675.nhd.weebly.com/. February 26, 1885.85 Caswell, Thomas. "Global History: Imperialism (China)." http://www.regentsprep.org/. 2003. See appendix N for a map denoting the various spheres of European influence in China. 86 Fischer, Fritz. In War of illusions: German Policies from 1911-1914, 298-308. London: Chatto & Windus, 1975

31


therefore seemed assured as the impending struggle for economic supremacy following on from the

increasing propensity for conflict. An emergent argument for the increasing probability of war came

from the emergent Marxist theorisations and philosophers, such as Karl Kautsky, who argues that

capitalist modus operandi having become firmly indoctrinated into the European mind-set ultimately

culminating in desperate attempts at the total control of various factors of production. The reason

being ‘The growth of industry in the capitalist states today is so fast that a sufficient expansion of the

market can no longer be achieved by the methods that had been employed up to the 1870’s.’87

The economic structure increasingly the subject of Marxist interpretation arises owing to the

dominating clout that economic conditions have on facilitating instability, both international and

domestic and spawned largely by the fertility of inequality amongst classes as well as that amongst

states. Troubled governments by 1914 had become exceptionally concerned with their states

economic future and transfigured from diplomacy to war.88 A transfiguration which would destabilise

global economics during the twentieth century, Keynes would write that ‘an extraordinary episode in

the economic progress of man…came to an end in August 1914.’89 Although this chapter has

identified the system preceding the war as a constituent part of the formula which ultimately

conditioned its onset, within the realm of relative peace of the preceding decades, the Clausewitzian

philosophy emerges again owing to the frequent continuation of diplomacy during periods of

skirmishes and hostilities between great powers as well as mediation by neutral states. The

economic risks entailed allowed for numerous attempts by states to compromise and retreat in the

face of danger, risks that had grown out of ever increasing integration and co-operation amongst the

states at the centre of world power. The liberal attitudes advocated during the nineteenth century

were frequently confronted with protectionist policies, which embroiled with the colonial trade,

87 Kautsky, Karl. "Ultra-Imperialism." Die Neue Zeit (The New Times) , 1914: 41-4688 Gordon, Michael R. "Domestic Conflict and the Origins of the First World War: The British and the German Cases." The Journal of Modern History, 1974 : 200-205.89 Keynes, John Maynard. In The economic consequences of the peace, 10-11. New York: Harcourt, Bruce & Howe, 1920.

32


imperial expansion and the profoundly nationalist state of mind ensured that the environment

would be fundamentally based on relative gains and losses. Alliances would be somewhat firmed up

amongst states with bilateral economic relations and meagre rivalry, with states weighing up the

relative costs and benefits of alliances. For instance, Britain favouring France and Russia over

Germany despite the historic rivalry and was more capable of reconciling and compromising with the

French in Sudan and the Russians in Asia; the feeling was equally mutual in all three states.90

Germany’s adhesion to economic and naval supremacy revealing the paralleling anxieties of the

early twentieth century as territorial and resource gains reached their climax with the continent

divided politically as well as economically.

Conclusion

All the themes and activities in European society that have been discussed correspond to the notion

of continental wide instability and insecurity, a century of transformations following on from the

calamity of the French Revolutionary wars. In the same convention, historian Fritz Stern writes of the

90 Taylor, A.J.P. In The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1918, 412-451. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971

33


First World War as, ‘the first calamity of the 20th century, the calamity from which all other

calamities sprang.’91 The war’s impact produced the pivot in the economic and international political

narrative in Europe, and was the culmination of the pressure compiled on nations for decades, which

ultimately had followed a dangerous and risky narrative. The balance of power being at a position

where an oligopoly of states share an almost equal proportion of the world’s economic and military

capacity, combined with their imperial motives in a zero-sum environment stirred up the

competitive drive which characterised the laissez-faire philosophy and the nationalism doctrine

which flourishes in the competitive and hostile climate between states. The policy makers and

influential conformists upheld a distinctively different ethos to the masses of disenfranchised

people, who sought radical changes through utilising nationalist or socialist sentiments for

destabilising the rigid structures around them. These evolutions lead governments and statesmen

towards anxiety and distress, paralleling with the unsettling situation around them as their state’s

power, prestige and social structure seemed to be in jeopardy. Furthermore the culture of militarism

and its comprehensive apparatus represented a belief that war and direct confrontation was the

most potent means of drastically reversing their fortunes. Only combined did these characteristics of

the European environment make the phenomenon of the First World War conceivable. The context

that saturated the world in 1914 lead numerous of the great power’s government personnel and

subsequently political commentators to decree that the war was inevitable and grew out of the

multitude of the inhospitable characteristics.92

Competing arguments regarding environmental conditions and responsibility will vehemently

disagree with some of the issues raised and discussed in this paper. The lack of uniformity in

providing answers and definitive claims on a topic which has perplexed academics for a century

ensures that the legitimacy of this analysis is extensive and contemporary. Its primary drawbacks are

91 Clark, Christopher. "Introduction." In The Sleepwalkers - How Europe Went to War in 1914 , xix. London: Penguin Books, 2012.92 Ferguson, Niall. "Introduction." In The Pity of War, xxxvii-xxxix. London: Penguin Books, 1998.

34


associated with the depth of analysis, which isn’t as multidimensional as it could be in a longer and

more robust piece and the same is true for the solitary approach adopted. This acknowledges that

there is little consideration for the outbreak of the First World War being conditioned by the

deliberate actions of individual policy makers or the singular domestic characteristics of a state

which acted irrationally and out of sync with its neighbours. In addition there is no direct

acknowledgement for one theme or subject being the most potent destabilising factor as they’re

intertwined and often contradictory when wielded by different individuals and groups. The most

prominent of which is nationalism, a structure which can order and spellbind people into the upmost

loyalty to their state and government, yet can also be a mechanism for the internal breakup of the

national authority, followed by the state’s territory. Conflicts of ideas also affect the viewpoints on

economic policy, whether states opt for trade liberalisation or protectionism, and political

representation; the extent of democratic participation or the traditional conviction for the rights of

monarchy and aristocracy.

The effects of the First World War and the subjects it sought to address have been infused across the

European mosaic of nations. Illuminating the factors in the society and structure of Europe which

lead to the destruction of what superficially seemed to be a continent in the midst of relative peace

and prosperity experienced by a century of progress has been the primary aim of this thesis.

Although additionally, a clear understanding that the complexity, the breadth and the broadness of

the topic have only given the reader an illustration which represents only a fraction of the plentiful

discourses that shroud information publications.

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The Dissertation (COMPLETE)

Documents

Transcript of The Dissertation (COMPLETE)