The Dilemmas of an Academic Liberal Historian in Lloyd George's Government: H.A.L. Fisher at the...

The Dilemmas of an Academic Liberal Historian in Lloyd George’s Government: H.A.L. Fisher at the Board of Education, 1916-1922

DENNIS DEAN University of London Institute of Education

A. L. Fisher is now largely known for his somewhat gloomy History of Modern Europe, published in the: 1930s. Histo- H a rians of education also remember him as the architect of

educational reforms in 1918. While not seen as a major landmark in the same way as those of W.E. Forster, Arthur Balfour or R.A. Butler, these reforms completed the process of raising the school-leaving age to fourteen and proposed to introduce for the first time compulsory continuation schools for all those who left school at that age. In a perceptive essay on coalition Liberalism, written in 1971, Kenneth Morgan suggested Fisher’s importance in the government. He was lccated near the centre of decision-making and was seen by Lloyd George as an asset to his administration. ‘To Lloyd George, Fisher was a figure: of real stature in the post-war government, his sole link with the Liberal intelligentsia amidst the professional politicians who largely filled ithe ministerial ranks.’I There have been other, less kindly, assessments of Fisher’s importance to the prime minister. Leonard Woolf, a relative by marriage, chose to portray him as a dupe skilfully exploited by a master tactician. ‘He gave us a vision of the Prime Minister and the President of the Board of Education sitting in the Cabinet Room at Downing Street and receiving an unending stream of secret, momentous messages from every quarter of the earth, if not the remotest galaxies of the outer universe.” Lloyd George had appointed him to office ‘with his unerring instinct for political window dre~sing’.~ To increasingly bitter oppo- nents of Lloyd George’s coalition Fisher was regarded as an unworldly

* Kenneth Morgan, ‘Lloyd George’s Stage Army’, Lloyd George: Twelve h a y s , ed. A. J. P. Taylor (1971). p. 231.

Leonard Woolf, Downhill All the Wuy 1919-1939 (1%7), p. 35. Ibid., p. 35.

@ The Historid M a t i o n 1994. Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowky Road, Oxford OX4 1 JF, UK md 238 Main St. Cambridge, MA 02142, USA.

58 FISHER AT THE BOARD OF EDUCATION

figure, flattered by the attention he had received, and adding credibility to a shoddy and deceitful government. Accounts of Fisher’s tenure as Warden of New College in the 1930s, such as those of Harold Nicolson, which described him as a man constantly reminding his listeners that he had been in government and regaling them with tales of Lloyd George’s handling of colleagues, have perhaps served to enhance the unflattering image drawn by W00lf.~

Contrasting portraits thus exist of a distinguished historian and scholar who embarked on a brief, but far from uneventful, parliamentary career. Fisher himself felt the need to put the record straight about his reasons for joining the government and his role within it. His own account, entitled An Unfinished Autobiography, appeared in 1940, the year of his death in a road accident. In it Fisher hinted that academic life, on its own, never entirely satisfied him: ‘Yet if I may judge from my experience there is always a haunting feeling that learning and scholarship and the literary life can bring content only if linked with some practical form of active service to the comrn~nity.’~ He had chosen to concentrate on teaching history rather than philosophy at Oxford because he thought it a subject less detached from the world. Oxford, in his undergraduate period, was very much influenced by T. H. Green, a figure acknowledged by Fisher as exercising great power over him. More important than his political philosophy, notable as it was in shaping late Victorian academic liberalism, was Green’s frequent injunction that academics must get themselves involved .in the everyday world of work and community.

Shortly after the end of the Second World War, David Ogg’s brief biography, Herbert Fisher 1865-1940, appeared, published largely as a commemorative tribute. Ogg chose to dwell on Fisher’s character, his ability as a scholar and his influence as a teacher, portraying his subject as a somewhat austere late Victorian who moved into the twentieth century without escaping from the mould of the nineteenth. Later sections of the book on Fisher as a politician revealed some of his interest in foreign affairs and his involvement in the often tortuous policy-making that surrounded the Lloyd George government, but little was added to Fisher’s own earlier account. Educational historians have provided additional depth studies of Fisher’s work at the Board of

Harold Nicolson, Diaries andLettem 1930-1939 (1%). p. 155. He recorded a meeting on 1 1 October 1933 in which Fisher spent much time talking about Curzon, whom he described as ‘a savant and an historian, not a man of action’. In Consensus and Disunity: The Lloyd George Coalition Government (1972), p. 2, Kenneth Morgan writes: ’when Fisher used to expound in the New College common rooms on the good old days under Lloyd George, younger dons like Lionel Robbins averted their gaze or stopped their ears, until the urbanity and sanity of the Warden duly returned.’ This work is indispensable for an understanding of the workings of the coalition government and its many crises.

H. A. L. Fisher, An Unfinished Autobiography (1940) [hereafter Fisher, Unfinished Autobiography], p. 86.

0 The Historical Asstxiation 1994

DENNIS DEAN 59

Education.6 The most important of these has been Geoffrey Sherington’s English Education, Social Change and War 191 1-20, published in 1981. It is a valuable re-evaluation which stresses Fisher’s caution, his concern to work within accepted practices anti his very close rapport with senior officials. In all that he did for education, including the legislation of 1918, he emerges as a consolidationist and preservationist, and in no sense as a radical. Sherington describes him as ‘a reformer who had no wish to remould society or even rebuild the educational system’.’ Above all, he was determined to act quickly on educational legislation, not only because he thought that action .was necessary, but, equally important, to protect the fabric of education from zealous pressure groups.

Fisher’s appointment to the Board of Education, if judgeld as a move to strengthen Lloyd George’s own position in government, must be deemed a striking success. The Fortnightly Review congratulated him on securing such an acquisition, ’that was another characteristic stroke of the P.M.’s genius for who but he would have dared to look outside the ranks of his political followers for a Minister of Education’.* In similiar vein, the educational world rejoiced in securing such a distinguished figure. ‘Dr Fisher has not been appointed on political grounds. It may be hoped that he will be able to devote himself unreservedly to the work of education.* The repeated emphasis of all these congratulatory articles was that his was a truly non-political appointment. Fisher’s was indeed one of many appointments that Lloyd George was to make from outside the normal political world. All of these appointees were to carry out specific tasks and most of the others were businessmen who weire recruited to new ministries. What they all had in common was that they owed their elevation to office entirely to Lloyd George. A parliamentary seat had to be found speedily for Fisher to enable him to present a major piece of educational legislation which formed an essential ingredient of the premier’s promises of rapid legislation to deal with post-*war problems.

Although he had been in contact with Lloyd George in 1916 there is no evidence that Fisher either lobbied for this appointment or considered that he had the appropriate experience for it. Credit for the sug- gestion belongs among a wider network of advisers surrounding the new premier, notably Thomas Jones, at the beginning of a long Whitehall career, and Christopher Addison, his adviser from the Liberal benches. Addison had been Henderson’s parliamentary secretary a.t the Board of

L. Andrews, TheEducation Act, 1918 (1976); D. W. Dean, ‘H. A. L. fisher, Reconstruc- tion and the Development of the 191 8 Education Act’, British Journal of Educational Studies, xviii (1970). 259-76; D. H. Akenson, ‘Patterns of English Educational Change: The Fisher and the Butler Acts’, History of Education, v (1971), 143-56.

Geoffrey Sherington, English Education. Social Change and War 1911-20 (Manchester, 1981) [hereafter Sherington, English Education], p. 83.

Fortnightly Review, 1 Jan. 1917. Times Educational Supplement, 14 Dec. 1916.

0 The Historical Association 1994


Education and was acquainted with the problems of this department. The most recent biographer of Thomas Jones, E. L. Ellis, has indicated that other non-political names were considered. There was much to commend Michael Sadler, who had wide experience of working-class audiences in university extension. Later he had established a research body with himself as Director of Office of Special Inquiries which pro- duced a range of studies on educational systems around the world. He had worked ceaselessly on educational matters and investigations and had finally been appointed as Vice-chancellor of Leeds University. His educational experience was much more extensive than that of his Oxford near-contemporary, Fisher. Indeed, he could not but express dis- appointment at being passed over, commenting on the appointment, ‘I cannot pretend not to feel it very much. Fisher will be a strength to the Government but mainly on subjects other than in education.’1° Lloyd George feared that Sadler might have proved to be a difficult colleague. Another figure who came under consideration was Henry Hadow, another Oxford contemporary of Fisher, recently appointed as Vice- Chancellor of Durham University. Jones dismissed him as lacking a democratic touch. While canvassing heavily for Fisher’s appointment, Jones was not unaware of possible defects, such as excessive caution. ‘Some are afraid that Fisher will be too timid. Anyway you can keep him right on all the main issues.’”

On the question of Fisher’s suitability Jones and Addison were influenced by a number of factors. The coalition had to present itself as being more than a reshuffle of familiar political faces. Lack of progress in the war had created a crisis in which the nation’s morale was at stake. What was required, almost instantly, was decisive action on both military and home fronts. This had to include the relaunching of the much-heralded reconstruction programme. Education was increasingly regarded by a wide variety of opinion to be central to this planning. It was vital that the right appointment was made to ensure rapid legislation. The post ought not to be filled by a regular politican who would be seen as part of the bargaining of coalition-making. This element had played its part in Henderson’s unhappy appointment to the post in 1915. He had been called in as a representative of Labour and the trade unions and had consequently spent most of his time in government dealing with industrial relations. Addison had been a recipient of some of his disquiet at his difficulties. ‘Henderson told us quite freely that he felt like a fish out of water at the Board of Education and indeed his time was spent

lo Michael Sadleir, Michael Ernest Sadler (1949) [hereafter Sadleir, Sad/er], p. 276. Sadler had been anticipating his own appointment for some time. In a letter to his father he had insisted, ‘If they want me, I can tackle it’ (Sadleir, Sadler, p. 275).

T. J. to Sir Henry Jones, 10 Dec. 1916, in Thomas Jones: Whiteha// Diary, ed. K. Middlemas (3 vols., 1%9) [hereafter Middlemas, Thomas Jones], i (1916-25), 14.


DENNIS DEAN 61

at the Ministry of Munitions’.’’ As complaints mounted about lack of direction in education he pleaded to be replaced. He acknowledged rising criticisms in a letter to Asquith. ‘It is said by Lord Haldane, by speakers in the House of Commons and by the public that the Board of Education is without a Head, and I am obliged to recognise that in so far as the criticism means that more than half my time arid energy are necessarily spent on duties outside my Department it is wholly true.’13

Addison and Jones were looking for more than just an educational enthusiast. They were well aware, from past struggles, of the pitfalls in education, particularly to any government struggling to maintain the unity of the nation. This ruled out educational zealots who might upset powerful and well-established interests. Fisher was a religious sceptic, but one who had lived under the shadow of the established church long enough to appreciate its power. He was unlikely to tamper with existing settlements. That he had little real knowledge of most of the educational system was not necessarily a defect if he listened to the riglit advice. His move from Oxford to a new environment in Sheffield, where he became Vice-Chancellor of the university, was considered to have shown his adaptability. In particular he had quickly established good relations with the working class and the trade unions and promotedl adult education, a cause very dear to Thomas Jones. Thus he would have two priceless assets which might enable him to be successful. First of all his social class, upbringing and education should enable him to work closely with senior officials at the Board who shared his background. This might facilitate speedy legislation. At the same time he was seen as a new minister who wanted to promote enthusiasm among an increasingly war-weary working class. In his opening months in office Jones and Addison watched their protdgd’s progress closely. Alfred Zmmern con- fided hopefully to Jones, ‘He is taking big views and evidently gets on well with the Board.’14

Political calculations were also never far from their minds. Both Jones and Addison were progressive in outlook and were concerned at the paucity of Liberal resources on which the new prime nninister could rely. Not only were the great figures of Liberalism such as Asquith and Grey in the shadows, but they took with them many of the new generation, such as John Simon and Walter Runciman. Lloyd George was therefore surrounded by Conservative ministers who were likely to undermine his Liberalism. If Fisher could be pressed into office he could be presented as a non-political appointment, but one who was known

Christopher Addison, Politics from Within (2 vols., 1924), i. 265; K. 0. Morgan and J. Morgan, Portrait of a Progrtwive: The Political Career of Christopher, Viscount Addison

” A. Henderson to H. H. Asquith, 16 July 1916, in A. Hamilton, Arthur Henderson (1938). p. 106. On Henderson’s unhappy tenure at the Board of Education see C. Wrigley, Arthur Henderson (Gower, 1990). Dr Wrigley writes: ‘Henderson was well aware when he took the post that he would have limited time to devote to education’ @. 101). l4 A. Zimmern to T. J., 17 Jan. 1917, Middlemas. Thomas Jones, i. 20.

1980).

0 The Historical Assodation 1994


to be a Liberal sympathizer on contentious issues like free trade or the speedy introduction of home rule for Ireland. Fisher would add a liberal leaven to the new coalition. The secretariat which came to surround the Prime Minister in Downing Street was largely Liberal and progressive in outlook and clearly supported the move.

Lloyd George’s main concern in the early days of office was to strengthen his own personal position. His Welsh Dissenting background and his father’s career as a schoolmaster gave him an interest in education, particularly in his early years as a politician. He had drawn attention to the privileges given to the established church in Wales and, after 1902, he had rallied Welsh Dissent in its struggles against the full operation of the Balfour legislation. The issue was never large enough totally to absorb such an ambitious politician but he never entirely lost his early concern about educational matters. He used this to persuade Fisher that resources and time would be made available for educational legislation. He also was aware that Fisher possessed useful political assets. Widespread concern had been expressed about the way in which Asquith had been forced out. Many in academic, intellectual and professional life had found the whole episode distasteful, engineered by press intrigues and secret conspiracies. The beneficiaries, the members of the new coalition government, appeared to them to be tainted from the beginning. Fisher’s appointment threw them into confusion. Here was a man, associated with academic and intellectual life as well as the Court and services, being appointed by a prime minister who was deeply distrusted in all these quarters. A letter received by the new minister summed up this confusion. ‘It is an odd sensation to feel oneself dislik- ing the new government as a whole, and yet feel more delight over one appointment in it than any appointment I have known.’15 The appointment did something to maintain Lloyd George’s somewhat tattered Liberal reputation and gave him some access to an influential opinion- forming world in which he had many enemies.

This academic, intellectual world was one that Lloyd George watched with a mixture of fascination and unease. Unlike Balfour, Asquith or Bryce, he had never belonged to it. Fisher revealed some of the new prime minister’s own uncertainties as they discussed his appointment to the post. The comparison which Lloyd George made between his background and that of Asquith indicated his insecurity: ‘The Prime Minister replied that although he was not a highly cultivated man like Mr Asquith, he believed that being a son of an elementary schoolmaster

Bodleian Library, Fisher Papers [hereafter Fisher Papers], Box 3, R. Lennard to Fisher, 11 Dec. 1916. A. J. P. Taylor, in English History 1914-1945 (1965). described the change of government as ‘a revolution British style’ (p. 73). He identified the way in which the premier attempted to incorporate various interest groups into the government to establish his control. Fisher’s group, the intellectual aristocracy, presented him with the most difficulties in this respect. The change of government in 1916 has been widely debated. The most recent study is B. B. Gilbert, David Lloyd George: The Organizer of Victory 1912-16 (1992). especially ch. 10, pp. 385-419. For a very useful Lloyd George bibliography see Chris Wrigley, ‘David Lloyd George 1863-1945’. The Historion, xxvi (1990). 10-12. 0 The Historical A d a t i o n 1994

DENNIS DEAN 63

he cared more for popular education.’16 Increasingly, over many years, he came to appreciate Fisher’s companionship. C. P. Scott, the powerful Liberal newspaper proprietor, described the growing strength of this attachment by 1919. ‘He spoke in very warm terms of him, “another M~rley”.’~’ The choice of this term was not without significance. Lloyd George craved for an understanding figure of intellectual merit to whom he could open out. He was clearly flattered that Fisher sought his opinions on world affairs. Frances Stevenson recorded later meetings in which the two men discussed and reflected on great events of the time. They became close neighbours in the 1930s and when dining together Fisher often interrogated his former leader closely. Stevenson recorded one such encounter at the height of the Ethiopian crisis in 1935: ‘Fisher asked D what he would do if he were in power now.”* Lloyd George not only revelled in this attention but, in turn, rushed to defend Fisher’s scholarship. ‘D said he thought Fisher an admirable writer ;and historian “better than Tre~elyan”.”~ He had even hoped that Fisher might eventually write his official life.2o

Lloyd George had a variety of reasons for drawing Fisher into government. What were Fisher’s reasons for accepting? In his own account he chose to dwell on the unexpectedness of the offer. This seemed clearly to be the case, but Fisher was also anxious to make it plain that he had played no part in Asquith’s downfall. ‘I had not been fcdlowing very closely the course of politics but held Asquith in great regard and was sorry to hear of the fall of the Ministry.’21 There was, in the early days, a sense of guilt which he could not easily dispel. He wrote to Gilbert Murray, a close friend, expressing misgivings about accepting office. ‘In one sense the step is difficult to excuse and forgive. All my sympathies are with Asquith and Grey.’zz In his early months in office he continued to stress that his only concern was to steer through important educational legislation. Yet this impression, on reflection, was misleading. Fisher was hardly a stranger to politics and politicians. On a range of Commissions on which he had served he had been able to observe them at close quarters. His marriage into a strongly parliamentary family had brought him even nearer to that life. In his years at Oxford he had come into contact with a number of eager young politicians, such as Phillip

l6 Fisher, Unfinished Autobiography, p. 91. C. P. Scott, 30 Nov.-1 Dec. 1919, in C. P. Scott, The Political Diaries of C. P. Scott

1911-1928 (1970) bereafter Scott, Diaries], p. 379. Lloyd George: A Diary by Frances Stevenson, ed. A. J. P.. Taylor (1967). p. 314.

l9 Ibid., p. 258. Thomas Jones, Diary with Letters 1931-50 (1954), p. 470. In Thomas Jones. David Lloyd

George (1951), it is revealed that Lloyd George consulted Fisher when he was writing his war memoirs in the 1930s. He told Fisher: ‘I am not writing history as a historian but as a solicitor in possession of the documents’ (p. 185). For scattered evidence of Fisher’s continued involvement with Lloyd George after 1922 the best account is John Campbell, LIoyd George: The Goat in the Wilderness 1922-1931 (1977). *’ Fisher, Unfinished Autobiography, p. 91. 22 Fisher Papers, Box 7, Fisher to Gilbert Murray, 9 Dec. 1916. 0 The Historid Association 1994


Kerr and Lionel Curtis. As a result of these contacts, in 1907 he had made an extensive tour throughout South Africa, meeting up with the so-called Milner Kindergarten (a group of young administrators recruited by Milner to advise him on future policy in South Africa), and became involved in the activities of the Round Table Movement. He had campaigned for the Liberal cause and was well known in Liberal circles. Finally, he was seen as an expert on European affairs at a time when it was becoming evident that great changes were likely to emerge as older empires came under intense pressure. Fisher had been present at conferences held by Lloyd George, in a troubled 1916, to enable the minister to understand more fully the distribution of nationalities in eastern Europe and to discuss redistribution of territory in that region.

There was little doubt, however, that Fisher took up his post in an uneasy frame of mind. He felt deeply the exclusion from office of many senior Liberal figures and the equivocal responses from his close friends. Gilbert Murray sent congratulations but felt compelled to add, ‘It does pain me as Bryce said to me yesterday that there had been a very base intrigue and that you are consenting to share the results of it.’23 Any word from former ministers that they did not hold him to blame eased his conscience. He wrote to his wife, ‘Some nice letters from Lord Crewe and Edward Grey. I am much relieved at this.” He was to continue to honour Asquith and was eager to see him return to the centre of public life. In 1919 he was delighted to be able to offer him the prestigious chairmanship of the Royal Commission on Oxford and Cambridge. ‘It is a great thing to ask of you but were you able to act, the satisfaction would be general and profound, both in the Universities themselves and in every quarter of the country where the interests of higher learning are held in value.’25

Fisher pursued a range of strategies to satisfy his conflicting concerns. Up to the end of the war he continued to insist that his function in the new government was solely to steer major legislation on education through parliament. This proved more difficult than he had anticipated. Powerful groups attacked sections of the intended Bill, forcing Fisher into difficult negotiations inside and outside parliament; and he needed strong support from cabinet colleagues, including the prime minister. All of this activity drew him closer to the centre of political life. In addition, he found it important to appeal to other constituencies to counter influential business and industrial opposition, and embarked on an extensive speaking tour of the main cities to build up support for his proposals. It thus often fell to Fisher to become the main proponent of domestic reconstruction and one of Lloyd George’s key ministers in maintaining morale throughout the nation. On occasions he almost

23 Fisher Papers, Box 3, Fisher to Gilbert Murray, 16 Dec. 1916. Fisher Papers, Box 5, Fisher to Lettice Fisher, 14 Dec. 1916. ’’ Public Record Office [henceforth PRO] ED 24/1694, Royal Commission on Oxford and

Cambridge Universities correspondence, Fisher to H. Asquith, 26 Aug. 1919.


DENNIS DEAN 65

found himself adopting populist tones. In November 1917 he con- fronted the Bradford Textile Society, a well-known centre of hostility to much of his legislation. He asked for sacrifices as a repayment to those who had suffered most severely in war. ‘One of the tragedies of the War lies in the fact that young men and women are called upon to lay down their lives in support of a policy which has been formed by older men and I ask you whether the time has not come for some measure of reparation.’% By 1918 he was one of Lloyd George’s more prominent ministers.

At the same time, almost to reassure some of his academic colleagues, he took on the role of a Liberal conscience in a government that contained, in their eyes, dangerous illiberal forces represented by Carson and Milner. This, in itself, presented difficulties for a minister who claimed that he wanted only to immerse himself in departmental business. For his part, Lloyd George never prevented Fisher playing this role. In his years as premier he constantly maintained a balancing act between the conflicting forces in his government. At times he wanted to retain his own Liberal credentials. Fisher’s continuing presence was therefore useful in reassuring Liberal opinion in the country. He informed C. P. Scott that Fisher ‘was influential in the Cabinet and a thorough Liberal - evidentially his chief support on the Liberal side’.27

How could Fisher prove his constancy to his Liberal commitments in this government? One way was to take up concerns known to be troubl- ing sensitive consciences. The treatment given to numbers of people who had refused compulsory military service aroused their stro:ng protests. Margaret Hobhouse drew Fisher’s attention to their plight. ‘I believe you are friendly to the release of these men and hope you will be able to help US.'^ He had already made representations to the prime minister poin- ting out that local Labour opinion in Sheffield was deeply disturbed about the harsh treatment of conscientious objectors.29 This was not an issue on which Fisher himself was totally at ease, as was demonstrated in the approach made by him to an unsympathetic Lloyd George for their speedy release at the end of the war, on the grounds that continued detention would give them the attributes of martyrs. He had too many service connections himself to fight too strenuously for people whom he suspected of holding extreme religious or political views. Other ministers knew that he was being approached for assistance on this matter by pressure groups. Cabinet colleagues almost welcomed his interventions, seeing them as a possible safety-valve to offset potential trouble. Milner had wanted an inquiry and used Fisher’s influence with

26 Fisher, Educational Reform Speeches (Oxford, 1918), p. 121. On the rhetoric which surrounded the post-war reconstruction debate see Paul Barton Johnson, Lund .Fit For Heroes: The Planning of British Reconstruction 19161919 (New York, 1%). 27 Scott, Diaries. 30 Nov.-1 Dcc. 1919, p. 379.

PRO ED 24/1694. miscellaneous correspondence. M. Hobhouse to Fisher, 2 Nov. 1917. 29 House of Lords Record Office, Lloyd George Papers [hereafter Lloyd Cieorge Papers], F16/7/2, Fisher to Lloyd George, 18 Oct. 1917.

0 The Historical Amciation 1994


the premier to press his own case, placing a letter from Fisher before Lloyd George. ‘I thought you might like to see the opinion of one whose judgement I am sure you will agree is worth considering in a matter of this kind.’30

On other Liberal issues Fisher pursued a stronger line. This was particularly so in the case of speedy implementation of home rule for Ireland. While in some matters, even those related to free trade, Fisher was prepared, for the sake of coalition unity, to compromise on inessen- tial details, any attempt by Tory ministers to water down this commitment met with his strong opposition. On this, as on so many other issues, Fisher was essentially a preservationist. A generous Home Rule Bill, postponed in any case because of war, was more likely to enable links between Britain and Ireland to be retained than was a measure dragged from a reluctant British government. Moreover, the home rule leadership had behaved honourably in war-time: in the latter stages of the war Fisher identified them as constitutionalists struggling to hold back rising revolutionary forces in Ireland. Home rule legislation was necessary since ‘it will preserve to the Constitutional Party a remnant of prestige among their people and possibly abridge the influence of Sinn

He was one of the few ministers who had visited Ireland in 1918. His diary recorded the extent of disaffection and the growing influence of Sinn F e i r ~ . ~ ~ On his return he warned the Prime Minister of the worsening situation, the strength of anti-conscription feeling and the lack of interest in the progress of the war.33

In responding to the strife-torn post-war situation in Ireland Fisher held clear to a number of principles. These were strongly pressed in all the cabinet committees in which he was called to serve as a representative of the Liberal line. First of all he campaigned for the widest possible settlement even if it caused conflict within the coalition. When placed in charge of the drafting of legislation after the war he conducted a long battle to ensure that the new home rule government would be given the widest possible financial autonomy. In this he clashed with Lloyd George, who expressed grave reservations that control of customs and excise was to be transferred to a future Dublin government. In his survey of possible options Fisher had gone for the boldest course, arguing that ‘it is more likely to win initial support in Ireland for the Bill and ultimately to promote the principal object of the Bill i.e. the reconciliation of the English and the Irish races’.34 Along with Addison and Montagu he continually pressed for stringent discipline to be exerted over military forces, even although he firmly believed that the retention of law and order had to be assigned the highest priority. World opinion, and more specifically that of the United States, needed constantly to be

30 Lloyd George Papers, F38/2/7 Lord Milner to Lloyd George, 1 June 1917. 3* Lloyd George Papers, F/6/7/29, Fisher to Lloyd George, 15 April 1918. 32 Fisher Papers, Box 9, diary of a tour of Ireland. March 1918. 33 Lloyd George Papers, F6/7/29, Fisher to Lloyd George, 1 1 Oct. 1918. 3( PRO CAB 24/97 CP 556. memorandum by Fisher, 31 Jan. 1920.


DENNIS DEAN 67

considered. Even after the settlement was finally achieved in 1922 Fisher feared that there were elements in Britain who would use religious bigotry to hold back reconciliation. Harsh words were exchanged in cabinet with Austen Chamberlain on sectarian riots in Belfast: ‘The Lord Privy Seal asked why Mr Fisher put Ulster in the Dock. Fisher replied: Prejudice however would be excited by the fact that outrages had been more intense in Belfast than el~ewhere.’~~ He warned Lloyd George that sinister influences remained at work. ‘So long as the Belfast slaughtering continues anarchy will reign in the South. This is just what Henry Wilson wants. He wants anarchy, civil war, re~onquest.’~~ Throughout the difficult Irish situation faced almost continuously by the coalition, Fisher held to the principle that people could not be held down against their will. He suspected that there were always malign influences within the Irish administration which made a settlement more difficult to obtain.

Fisher suffered from two major problems in getting his case across. Lloyd George was often exasperated by the troubles in 1rela.nd and less willing to follow a conciliatory line. Ultimately, a combination of weari- ness in Britain, affecting even Conservatives, and constant American pressure forced him to a settlement, but Lloyd George’s frequent lack of understanding drove his education minister to the point of resignation. The disagreement on fiscal autonomy had been serisous and he complained to his wife about Lloyd George, who ‘wouldn’t have Customs and Excise at any price and has been determined to stand by the finance of the Bill. I am deeply chagrined - the last chance of making the Bill a real settlement gone and I have been seriously Iconsidering whether I ought to resign.’37 His other problem was that the proposals, which he put forward as generous, satisfied few in post-war Ireland. Fisher was aware of a history of past grievances and broken pledges which he expected the government to put right by a generous home rule settlement. That the Irish had moved beyond this and that a new leadership was determined to assert independence and separate identity was beyond his full comprehension. He regarded Sinn Fein as dolminated by extremists who would try to destroy all his reasonable attemlpts at what he saw as a fair settlement. His hope, after 1918, had been that, after a degree of necessary coercion heavily tempered with generous acts of conciliation, ‘in time moderate opinion and business interests would assert themselves and men would be elected who would consent to form a Parliament’.38 This position was increasingly untenable. It is also clear

35 PRO CAB 23/3/30 (22). cabinet minutes, 1 June 1922.

37 Fisher Papers, Box 6. Fisher to Lettice Fisher, 13 Oct. 1920. For a comprehensive treatment of the later stages of the coalition government’s difficulties with its Irish policy see Sheila Lawler, Britain undlreland 1914-23 (Dublin, 1983). She comments on ]Lloyd George’s attitude to continual Irish pressure, ‘His views on Ireland, when he chose to have them, amounted to bored and resentful repulsion’ (p. 41). 38 Scott, Diaries, 16-17 March 1920, p. 382.

Lloyd George Papers, F/6/7/87, Fisher to Lloyd George. 30 May 1922.



that Ireland strained Fisher’s growing loyalty to Lloyd George and was a factor leading him to eventual disenchantment with a coalition dominated by a Conservative majority.

Fisher’s views on Indian reforms after 1917, another Liberal cause, bore striking similarities to his approach to Ireland. First of all, growing distrust and suspicion needed to be quickly forestalled by generous British concessions. He had eagerly supported Edwin Montagu’s appointment to the India Office as a guarantee that reforms leading to more self-government would be carried through. The appointment of Lord Sinha, an Indian notable, as an under-secretary at the India Office was described by him ‘as a fine stroke of imagination which will make a profound impression on the political mind of India’.39 An additional task given to Fisher in 1919 was to steer the Government of India Act through parliament during Montagu’s frequent absences because of illness. His arguments were once again couched in preservationist terms. He informed a critical House of Commons that ‘it promises to add to the course of good and enlightened government all those moderate forces of India’s public opinion which might be delayed by procrastina- tion’.40 In 1920 rumours abounded that he was involved in attempts to strengthen the hand of reform in India. Montagu hoped to succeed the cautious Lord Chelmsford as Viceroy, leaving Fisher to take over the India Office. This plan foundered on distrust in coalition circles of Montagu’s ability to hold down the Viceroyalty. Fisher continued to urge his fellow ministers to do d l that they could to secure the loyalty of the Indian population. On the Near East settlement, while stressing his own concern at past Turkish misgovernment, he indicated Indian misgivings, warning that ‘Indian students with whom he came into contact were very apprehensive indeed of the effect in India of the expulsion of Turkey from C~nstantinople’.~’ He continually urged British officials in India to be very careful in their conduct towards Indians. He had little sympathy for the attitudes of Sir Michael O’Dwyer or General Dyer in their response to disturbances. This, however, was the limit of his Liberal horizons. He still believed that it was Britain’s duty to spread the beneficial aspects of Western civilization to India. This made the time- scale of British rule in India a long one and the process of political education, contained in the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, of pro- longed duration. Fisher, in later years, was to grow even more doubtful as to whether India would ever be transformed into a parliamentary

39 House of Common Debates, vol. 116, col. 2360. H. A. L. Fisher, 5 June 1919. 4o Lloyd George Papers, F/67/31, Fisher to Lloyd George, 11 Dec. 1918. 41 PRO CAB 23/35, Committee on the Straits. 10 Feb. 1919. For an appraisal of Edwin Montagu and his often difficult relationship with Lloyd George see Naomi B. Levine, Politics. Religion und Love (New York, 1991). Fisher is portrayed as constantly trying to reassure an often depressed and disillusioned minister. On one occasion he warned Montagu: ‘It is very wrong of you, is it not, to be governing India from your sick bed’ (p. 543).


D E M W DEAN 69

democracy.42 This put him at a distance from the growing Congress movement and its new leadership. Again, in Indian affairs, Fisher met some of the difficulties with Lloyd George that he had encountered on Ireland. Perhaps to counteract Conservative charges that IMontagu and Fisher exercised too much influence, the prime minister often intervened in a contrary fashion. His defence of the often criticized, over-cautious Indian Civil Service reached such extravagant heights that even the Viceroy, Lord Reading, felt compelled to send a warning: ‘The lesson surely is that it is dangerous to speak in a position of great authority without the most careful p repa ra t i~n .~~

Increasingly, as he moved to the centre of the political stage, Fisher found himself involved in debates about the future of the Liberal Party. Initially he had hoped that divisions between Lloyd George and Asquith would be speedily healed. He believed that the two men had qualities which complemented each other and added to the strength of Liberalism. The former was clearly the man for the moment, the figure needed to bring the war to a successful conclusion; the latter had been a remarkable peace-time leader whose abilities would be in demand again as the war ended. It was Fisher’s hope that the two leaders would be quickly reconciled. When this seemed less likely to hqppen he tried to keep the peace by arguing that the two groups had separate functions which were of equal importance for Liberalism’s survival. Within the government, Liberal ministers like himself must continue to defend the party’s principles against the Conservative majority. They must ensure that a post-war government did not slide into reaction. The function of Asquith and his supporters was to keep those Liberal principles constantly before the public eye and even to jog Liberal ministers to remember their loyalties. Liberalism’s fate, he maintained, depended on the two sections understanding their separate purposes. Asquith’s followers needed to recognize that the continued presence: of the coalition Liberals in a war-time government and into the immediate post-war period was essential for the lasting reputation of the whole of Liberalism. A carefully worked out speech explained his position. ‘Mr Fisher said that for the moment Liberalism was not a force strong enough to govern the country. The country must be governed by a coalition of parties.M He went on to describe the twin functions which could give them a unifying thread: ‘It was the business of :Liberalism to

42 See the gloomy letter to the Viceroy, Lord Irwin: India Office Library, Halifax MSS, EUR C 152 [27], 30 Jan. 1929. The rising power of Indian nationalism during the period of the coalition is described in Judith M. Brown. Gandhi’s Rise to Power: Indian Politics 1915-1922 (Cambridge, 1972). 43 India Office Library, Reading MSS, EUR E 236. vol. IV, L,ord Reading to Lord Peel, 21 Sept. 1922. 44 Fisher’s speech to the Cambridge University Liberal Club, The Times, IS March 1920. On the coalition Liberals as a group see Don M. Gregier, Chiefs without Indians (Washington DC. 1982).

0 The Historical Assofiation 1994


see that there was as much Liberalism in the government as possible. Within the Government it was the business of Liberals to fortify the Liberal element in Government policy, and Liberals outside should see that the function was perf~rmed’.~~ The two groups rarely saw their roles in this complementary way. Increasingly, Asquith’s followers distanced themselves from their former associates. They saw Lloyd George as the root cause of their isolation from political life, and the coalition not as an agency to ensure Liberalism’s survival in a difficult period but as the most powerful cause of its decline.

Steps taken by Lloyd George in the latter stages of the war fanned this distrust. His actions during the 1918 election, particularly the granting of the coupon to coalition candidates alone, were regarded by the Asquithians as contributing significantly to their humiliating defeat. Fisher had been unhappy at the dangers of this approach. He clearly disliked the campaign and much of the election atmosphere, commenting bitterly to his wife on one of his main speaking engagements in Manchester, ‘Altogether it was a very disagreeable meeting.* He feared the consequences of an overwhelming coalition victory on the political life of the nation. Although he focused on the possible destruc- tion of Labour as a parliamentary force, his fears could have equally applied to Asquith’s supporters. ‘I quite agree that it is a tremendous mistake to have official coalition candidates. The Labour Party will be mowed under and instead of being strong in Parliament will be outside of it - a great mi~take’.~’ Despite these misgivings, however, Fisher decided not only to stay in politics, but to play a key role in the 1918 election campaign by writing the coalition Liberal manifesto. His reasons need to be explored.

First of all it was important, in the difficult aftermath of the war, to keep Lloyd George in power. The likely alternative seemed to be a Con- servative government, dominated by reactionary backbenchers, or (more distantly) a lurch to the left into class-ridden politics. Either option was abhorred by Fisher. What was needed was a period of recuperation for the shattered forces of Liberalism, which was suffering from acute difficulties created by the circumstances of total war. He was confident that Liberal sentiment remained strong in the country and would eventually revive. He transmitted this hope to Gilbert Murray: ‘Every month which puts us far from the meanness of the war is but to strengthen the humane forces in thought and feeling.- A key issue in post-war Britain was how to sustain these forces. Fisher, to secure a

45 Fisher Papers, Box 5. Fisher to Lettice Fisher, 4 Dec. 1918. Ibid., 22 Nov. 1918. Montagu reported on some of Fisher’s uneasiness during this period:

‘Fisher told me this afternoon that having got his two Bills through, such was the perplexity about his future that he thought he could not go on’: D. Waley, Edwin Montugu (1964), p. 190. 47 Fisher Papers, Box 5, Fisher to Lettice Fisher, 22 Nov. 1922.

Fisher Papers, Box 7, Fisher to Gilbert Murray, 18 April 1922.


DENINIS DEAN 71

future for Liberalism, become more embroiled in the politics of the coalition government.

This meant numerous interventions. On the domestic front he struggled to ensure that as much of his educational legislation as possible was implemented. It was to prove an increasingly difficult task as the Treasury began to question the costs of schemes which had been proposed in the heat of war. Increasingly, in this area, Fisher found himself forced into a defensive, salvaging operation,” which was, in the long run, to weaken his resolve to stay in the coalition. He protested to Lloyd George about the cuts directed at education which were prloposed by the Commission of National Expenditure in the early months of 1922. ‘It seems to me quite clear now that the rank and file of the Tory Party will not be content until they have tried the experiment of a pure Tory Administration. They want to get rid of your liberal rnini~ters.’~~ Lloyd George’s ability to restrain the Conservative backbenchers was being undermined. This was the moment for Liberal ministers to leave the coalition.

While he was arguing for the necessity of a Liberal piresence in the coalition government, Fisher staunchly refused to be lured into any move to create new political alignments and fusions. From 1919 onwards proposals to create a Centre Party, held together by anti- socialism, were very much on the agenda. Fisher opposed ithe possibility of amalgamation and the omission of the term Liberal from a description of Lloyd George’s followers. It would, he feared, end. any prospect of reconciliation with Asquith. In this respect, his resolution was firmer than that of either Addison or Churchill, both of whom toyed with new political combinations. This firmness was recognized b:y elements in coalition Liberalism who were uneasy with these proposals. When rumours spread that Fisher was to be appointed arnbassador to Washington, Herbert Lewis pleaded for his retention in government, not only for the future of education but for the maintenance of a Liberal voice in government. ‘May I add with respect to the Liberal Ministers on the Front Bench that the withdrawal of Fisher’s personality would grievously weaken that of the Ministry.’51 Fisher’s estimate of Lloyd George’s own indispensability at this time seldom wavered. There were

49 The most useful account is in Sherington, English Education, pp. 163-7. Lloyd George Papers, F/16/7/84, Fisher to Lloyd George, 20 March 1922. His growing

disillusion about coalition politics was confirmed in a letter to C. P. Scott (Scott, Diaries, p. 433, Fisher to Scott, 12 Nov. 1922): ‘As for me I have long regarded the dissolution of the Coalition as inevitable. Indeed I advised Lloyd George last February tcb take his Liberal followers out of the Government in which it was clear that their continued presence was giving offence to the majority of the Government’s supporters in the H of C.’ According to M. Kinnear in The Fall of Lloyd George (1972), p. 105, ‘Fisher believed that the Conser- vatives wanted him out.’ s1 Lloyd George Papers, F32/1/16 Herbert Lewis to Lloyd George, 21 March 1919. For evidence of Fisher’s opposition to the formation of a new party see The Riddell Diaries 1908-23: A Selection, ed. J. McEwen (1986), p. 305, where a meeting of Liberal ministers on 15 February 1920 to discuss proposals is recorded: ‘Fisher and Shortt were strongly against anything being done at present.’



occasions, as in the negotiations for the renewal of the coalition in 1918, when Lloyd George’s position appeared at its strongest, on which Fisher feared that his leader might be forced to concede too much to the superior political strength of the Conservatives. In these circumstances, he believed, it was the responsibility of other Liberal ministers ’to stiffen him on the Liberal side’.52 It took him a very long time, in spite of war- nings, to see that Lloyd George was very vulnerable. Edwin Montagu, an ally, grew more convinced that the difficulties in political life could be attributed to Lloyd George’s determination to hold on to power at whatever cost to the Liberal cause. He had agonized to the distant Reading: ‘Politics are in an awful state. We are governed by a Prime Minister who has confidence only in Chamberlain, F.E. and Horne, and carries with him Winston because of the necessity for doing Even as the coalition drew to an end Fisher wrote to Lloyd George optimistically about the future. ‘My strong view is that your reputation in the country and the world would grow by reorganization, and that in a few months time you would come back stronger than ever.’% He retained his confidence in Lloyd George even as his leader moved into the political wilderness.

There were reasons much deeper than personal loyalty for Fisher’s growing belief in Lloyd George’s capacity to lead the nation through its difficulties. These were connected with his reactions to the war. He was always struggling to define his views and they tended to vary from moment to moment. There was much that he found repugnant in war. It represented an assault on principles at the heart of his Liberal creed: a breakdown in rationality, a massive setback to ordered progress, a disregard for proper international behaviour. He had witnessed with distaste, as had his friends G.M. Trevelyan and Gilbert Murray, the excessive jingoism displayed in the early stages of the Boer War. As the opening shots of 1914 were fired he feared for a return of this. ‘I notice some of the insolent levity which marked the opening stages of the war.’55 A great deal would depend on the spirit in which war was undertaken. There was much, in the first year, that lifted Fisher’s spirits. It seemed as if the nation was rediscovering its unity. He described the process in a pamphlet:

It seems as if everybody was being steadily drawn in by some great force of suction and the war service which is also the peace service of the nation. Girls are banding together to work in the fields. Young women of good family are learning to nurse or to milk cows or to take the place of men

52 Fisher Papers, Box 5, Fisher to Lettice Fisher, 18 Nov. 1918. s3 India Office Library, Reading MSS EUR E 238, vol. 1 , E. S. Montagu to Lord Reading. 30Nov. 1921.

5s Fisher Papers, Box 7, Fisher to Gilbert Murray, 7 Aug. 1914. Lloyd George Papers, F16/7/84, Fisher to Lloyd George, 20 March 1922.


DENNIS DEAN 73

clerks called away on active service. Schoolboys in Eton jackets make tools for the munition works. Professors and lecturers inspect shells.s6

He hoped not only that this spirit could be maintained but that the sense of collaboration could be continued on the return of peace. Links between the learned and the masses, rediscovered in the crisis of war, might be utilized for the rebuilding of the nation. Thus he hoped that a nucleus of university-trained staff, with their fresh knowledge of people gained in war-time experiences, might transform hostile attitudes to compulsory continuation schooling. They would become missionaries for this new cause in the most hostile rural areas. ‘A little band of discer- ning men and women who know what was possible and what was impossible in normal districts might bring the agriculturists to look upon the developments with less disfavo~r.’~’ There was no doubt that he firmly agreed with Gilbert Murray’s view ‘that Liberal feeling in England should keep in touch with the war - not let patriotism gel: identified with Toryism or Militarism for the sake of the settlement aifterward’.’’ At Sheffield, Fisher’s efforts to involve his university in the: war were soon being commented on with favour. His support for the university volunteer movement was total. Staff at the university were encouraged to put their skills at the disposal of the military and lalboratories were turned over to projects that would assist the war, His wife energetically recruited women staff and students for her knitting circles. Fisher wrote tracts and pamphlets explaining Britain’s involvement in the struggle.

By the end of 1915 some of his initial elation was diminishing. There was evidence not only of muddle, but of disarray, in political circles. He became alarmed at the military stalemate and the dangers which seemed to be growing. There was a sense in which he was beginning to lose hope and he revealed his own fears. ‘The war drags on: the P.M. who I met the other day told me that it could not last owing to the exhaustion of all parties but I confess that I do not follow his reasoning . . .y59 In the depressing atmosphere of 1916 his views were seen to be important enough for Lloyd George to invite him to conferences tlo discuss future peace settlements. Fisher believed that the longer the WELT continued the less likely were prospects of a reasonable peace. If some kind of settlement on Alsace-Lorraine was to be reached, he argued, What was necessary to secure these terms was peace as soon as Fisher was beginning to feel the need for a new show of energy, a display of confidence which would dispel some of his fears about the direction of the War and express his concern for Liberal values. He desired a peace

H. A. L. Fisher, The British Shore In the War (1918), p. 23. s7 H. A. L. Fisher, The Place of the University in the Life of The Nution (1918). p. 13. 58 Bodleian Library, Gilbert Murray Papers 1 1 (special correspondence), 133, Murray to Fisher, 10 Aug. 1914. 59 India Office Library, Meston Papers, EUR F 135, Fisher to Sir James Meston, 6 Dec. 1915. 6o Fisher Papers, Box 24, conversation with Lloyd George. 27 Aug. 1’916.



which would secure proper conditions for recovery. Lloyd George increasingly seemed able to understand this.

Whatever misgivings Fisher possessed about Asquith’s resignation were gradually cast aside. Alternatives to Lloyd George seemed unat- tractive. War might well push the country into the arms of reactionary Toryism. It also created sinister populist figures. For Fisher the popularity of Horatio Bottomley exemplified the dangers which the nation faced. Here was a figure established by the murky aspects of war fever; his presence in public life brought out deep anxieties in Fisher. ‘Bottomley sprawls hideous and huge on the Opposition bench below the gangway. He is extraordinarily like Bradlaugh the personification of vulgar power. He is clearly destined to be the greatest anti-Government force in the House.*’ Lloyd George was necessary to diminish the influence of these demagogues. He had the skills, the understanding of people, and a counter-populism that could blunt the appeal of Bottomley’s demagoguery.

From the beginning of the war Fisher’s attention did not stray far from a future peace settlement. As the duration of that war lengthened, his concern grew that it would be more difficult to secure a peace that would last. He viewed the total breakdown of some of the older empires in Eastern Europe with some misgivings. He thought that in mixed religious and ethnic areas the result would certainly lead to a series of ‘Ulster’ conflicts. The intervention of Woodrow Wilson, with his determination to impose patterns of self-determination, did not reassure Fisher. Like many academic British Liberals he had grave reservations about American inexperience in the complex world of international relations. He was also deeply concerned that if a harsh peace settlement were imposed on Germany it would sow the seeds of future conflict. Thus he warned Lloyd George, ‘My object in writing to you is to urge that an irredentist Prussia will constitute a greater danger for the future peace of the world than an irredentist Poland.*2 He was greatly troubled by the combination of Wilson’s heady idealism and France’s determination to ensure that the peace treaty would not only be harsh but implemented to the last letter. By 1922 he believed that French attitudes presented dangers to Europe’s stability and posed a threat to Britain if the latter were to try to exert diplomatic pressure. ‘Yes France is now very formidable, far more formidable to us should she quarrel, which Heaven forbid, than ever before in history for she is building aircraft like mad.“3

Fisher on occasion voiced his concern over the way in which the peace settlement created future dangers. Hankey and Jones urged Lloyd George to summon Fisher to Paris to help in the negotiations. When the treaty was signed he made it clear that it did not rouse much enthusiasm

Fisher Papers, Box 5, Fisher to Lettice Fisher, 12 Feb. 1919. Lloyd George Papers, F16/7/37. Fisher to Lloyd George. 17 March 1919. Fisher Papers, Box 7, Fisher to Murray, 18 April 1922.


DENNIS DEAN 75

in him and he put much of the blame for this on Wilson. ‘I can’t profess to be happy about the Treaty. The Polish settlement is to my mind the most unsatisfactory but ever since Wilson went in for the restoration of the ancient Kingdom of Poland we were placed in a position of almost inextricable difficulty here.- He believed that Lloyd George had conducted the negotiations from the British side with some distinction, given the problems created by the other victorious powers. ‘When the full story comes to be written, we shall have no reason to be ashamed of the part our delegation had played.*5 For the time being the treaty had to be accepted until a more favourable moment should appear to renegotiate some of the harsher aspects. The essentiarl point was to ensure that its defects did not harm a return to peaceful conditions. How could this be done?

One radical school of thought suggested new approaches. The Union of Democratic Control favoured a just peace, the limitation of burdens on defeated nations and an acceptance that imperial nations must accept some of the principles which they sought to impose on the defeated nations. Fisher at some points did not appear to be too remote from some of their views. He warned his cabinet colleagues,

The British Empire will emerge with tremendous accession of power and territory. It may take a mandate for Palestine as well. Meanwhile we pressed the doctrine of self-determinination. The German and Austrian Treaties were based on it. Should we not greatly strengthen our moral prestige all over the world if we show that the handling of our possessions is based on it also.66

He parted company very sharply with those radical critics, however, on the kind of pressure that was suggested by them as necessary to reshape international relations. Nowhere was there such evidence of the marked gulf between an older Liberal academic figure like himself and these new forces, shaped by opposition to pre-war foreign policy. War had made him less optimistic and more fearful of mass irrational pressures. Radical critics denounced secret diplomacy, hidden deals and concealed clauses in treaties. Their remedy for these evils was open diplomacy, conducted in the glare of full publicity. This was reinforced by their belief that the people had a right to participate in the decisions that affected the way in which nations conducted their foreign policy. They were convinced that if this had been done in the past, many mistakes would have been avoided. Fisher repudiated this:

The argument appears to assume that a debate conducted in public is more likely to end in a peaceful issue than are the conversations of trained diplomats behind closed doors; that the great mass of the people is more likely to take the conciliatory and understanding view of the political

6( Ibid., 11 June 1919. 65 Ibid. For the background of the negotiations I am much indebted to A. Lentin, Guilt at Versailles: Lloyd George and the Pre-hhtory of Appeasement (1984). 66 PRO CAB 24/87 G.T. 6443, Fisher memorandum, undated 1919.



personages cloaked in negotiations and that the fear of continuous public commentary will generally act as a restraint upon the adoption of blood

Fisher had been shaken by the pressures placed on politicians to imple- ment a hard peace. In his opinion they had made the task of the British delegation of securing a reasonable settlement more difficult.

Fisher’s involvement in foreign policy matters did not diminish once the Versailles settlement had been reached. He became the chief delegate of the British government at the League of Nations. Enthusiasts for the League, such as Robert Cecil, saw him as one of the few reliable allies within the government for this new institution. He complained bitterly to Fisher about the indifference displayed by other ministers. ‘It is very perverse of some of your colleagues to regard the League of Nations as a kind of outside organization for which they are not in any respect responsible.- There were significant differences, however, between the two men’s approaches. For Cecil the League was the harbinger of a new world order, the international reconciler as well as the future policeman of nations. Fisher’s hopes for the League were much more limited. He accepted its policing role, but only in disputes between smaller nations. In addition, he hoped that it might play a part in the eventual revision of some of the harsher terms of Versailles. This was the limit of his own vision of the new institution. It would not replace conventional diplomacy.

Indeed, what bound Fisher increasingly to Lloyd George in the immediate post-war period was his belief that the they shared the same instincts about the direction of foreign policy. He could disagree with some of the prime minister’s assessments: he was worried about the excessively pro-Greek stance adopted by Lloyd George in the Near East and suggested compromises which would leave ‘an international commission to control the Straits and to exercise effective control over Con- stantinople with the Sultan in nominal control*.@ Nevertheless he believed that Lloyd George shared his view that the best way to secure a lasting peace was to promote a return to prosperity through the restoration of trade, to ease tensions in Europe where possible and to revive noinal channels of diplomacy.

All of this came together in Fisher’s contributions to the debates within the government about intervention in Russia in order to undermine the Bolshevik regime. There was little doubt that he abhorred these revolutionaries, who had destroyed what he considered to be a promis- ing parliamentary government in 1917. He disliked their ideology and their efforts to undermine western constitutional governments. For him there was always the fear that elements in Britain, in particular the

and violent causes. All of these assumptions were highly questionable. K

67 H. A. L. Fisher, The Commonweal (1923). p. 260.

9 June 1921. 69 See PRO CAB 23/35, meeting of the Committee on the Straits, 10 Feb. 1919.

British Library Additional Manuscripts 51095, Cecil Papers, Lord Robert Cecil to Fisher,


DENNIS DEAN 77

working class and disaffected intellectual groups - including some teachers - might be drawn into these conspiracies. The answer to this threat was a return to prosperity and judicious concessions to ensure support. There was some evidence that his commitment to reformed pay and pension arrangements for teachers was part of a strategy to diminish the possibility of communist influence in this area. Within the cabinet he spoke strongly against talk of a western crusade to destroy Lenin’s regime. Two considerations came to the forefront in his thinking. Public opinion, particularly among the working class, rejected an intervention which was likely to result in high financial outlay on the m:ilitary. ‘Work- ing men do not understand why we are fighting in Russiir at all, unless it be as they are informed by the ILP to assist in the restoration of autocracy.’70 The danger was that if western nations mounted an all- out offensive they would fall into the trap of Soviet propaganda, which would be likely to win over working-class opinion to their cause. ‘Pro- bably only a small minority of working men in the country sympathize with the Bolshevik regime but a very large number consider that the institution of the Russian government is an affair of the Russians themselves and that Russia should be left to stew in her own In addition to these fears, Fisher retained much of the classic Whig attitude to revolutions in other nations. He urged a wary response and advised non- involvement in internal matters. He was doubtful of the intentions of some of those who favoured intervention, notably the Fkench and the Poles, both of whom he suspected of harbouring their own plans for self-aggrandizement. He distrusted many of the White Rhssian leaders and urged Lloyd George to try to curb some of their ;ictivities.” He hoped that non-intervention, together with the resumption of trade and a growing normality of diplomatic relations, would provide a much more effective answer to the communist threat. The restoration of normal relations was more likely to soften the harshness of communist rule and push the leadership on to a more moderate course. [n government he constantly raised questions, insisted that other ministers define their intentions and ultimately bolstered up Lloyd George’s own strong instincts to avoid a costly anti-Bolshevik crusade.

70 PRO CAB 24/71 G.T. 6443. Fisher’s memorandum OD future military policy in Russia, 5 Dec. 1918. On the often tortuous debates concerning attempts to reach some kind of economic accord with the Soviet Union see Richard Ullman, AnglccSoviet Relations, 1917-1921 (3 vols.. Princeton, 1961-72). At the end of the closing volume, Anglo-Soviet Accord (1972), p. 461, Ullman assesses support for Lloyd George’s position on Russian policy: ‘Among the Liberals in the Coalition Government perhaps only €4. A. L. Fisher was in unequivocal agreement and Fisher’s donnish background and position as President of the Board of Education did not give him much weight on such an issue.’ In a very recent appraisal, British and American Commercial Relations with Soviet Russia, 1918-1924 (Chapel Hill, 1992). Christine White argues that ‘Lloyd George had never been convinced of the value of intervention in Russia and had repeatedly expressed his doublts over the efficacy of continuing aid to the failing counterrevolutionary armies’ @. 110). 71 PRO CAB 24/71 G.T. 6443, Fisher’s memorandum on future military policy in Russia, 5 Dec. 1918. 72 Sce Lloyd George Papers, F16/7/56, Fisher to Lloyd George, 26 May 1920.

0 The Historical Assodation 1994


Fisher was clearly worried about the uncertainties of the political situation while he was a minister in Lloyd George’s government. This anxiety went far beyond the future of Liberalism, dogged by divisions and clashes of personality. He was intensely concerned with the mood of the working class and preoccupied with the intentions of the emerging Labour Party. Frustration soon became apparent on both sides. Some of the Labour-inclined intelligentsia such as R.H. Tawney had welcomed his presence in the coalition, together with Addison and Montagu, as evidence of the continuation of a steady advance towards progressive collectivist policies. However, by 191 8 they increasingly saw him as lukewarm to fundamental change. Fisher for his part had expected more reliable support from Labour, both in parliament and in the country, for his educational legislation. His views were fiied by a number of reference points. First of all there was the hope and desire that the working class could be moved by more than their narrow sec- tional interests or cruder forces of self-interest or nationalism. Gladstone’s leadership had demonstrated that the working class could be made to look beyond their immediate needs. A much later review of J. L. Hammond’s GZadstone and Ireland summed up his hopes. ‘Yet he was the greatest popular leader of his age and this because he offered to them not material bribes but as Dr Hammond rightly observes “something to satisfy their ~elf-respect”.’~~ Fisher was, as the result of war, by no means certain that the working class would ever again be responsive to this kind of appeal. The impact of the Russian Revolution raised for him the question whether the labour movement supported constitutional methods and believed in orderly parliamentary progres- sion. He feared that there were elements which might now be tempted down revolutionary paths. Much depended, in Fisher’s view, on the behaviour of the two major parties towards a new situation. Labour’s growing strength in the country at large needed to be accepted. During the cabinet debates on House of Lords reform he proposed increased labour representation in that chamber to curb extremist pressure on the moderates in that party. ‘The difficulty that he foresaw was a real one, namely that the Labour Party on coming to power would have to decide as between constitutional and revolutionary action and would have behind it the extremists who would be constantly pressing the problem of extreme action.’74 Labour leaders must be put at ease in the parliamentary system by personal contact and consultation. J. H. Thomas

l3 H. A. L. Fisher, Pages From The Past (1939). p. 134. 74 PRO CAB 27/113, cabinet committee on House of Lords reform, 13 Dec. 1921. For the high politics that surrounded the attempt to contain the Labour Party in the post-war era see M. Cowling, The Impact of Labour (1972). On the coalition government’s assessment of Labour see C. J. Wrigley, Lloyd George and the Challenge of Labour: The Post-war Coali- tion 1918-1922 (1990). He writes: ‘Hence Lloyd George and other ministers went on to positing the Labour leadership not as a menace in itself but as being made up of weak politicians who were puppets of the wider Labour movement and would be unable to control any outbreak of serious civil disorder’ (p. 305). This seems to sum up Fisher’s own views entirely.


DENNIS DEAN 79

and G. N. Barnes, two leading Labour frontbenchers, were regarded as totally parliamentarian, and earned his greatest respect. Fisher insisted on adding William Graham to the Royal Commission on Oxford and Cambridge, telling his officials, ‘It is also desirable that Labour should be represented on the Cornmis~ion.’~~ He was never enthusiastic about the prospect of new anti-socialist groupings formed to squeeze Labour out of parliament.

Fisher believed that Lloyd George was the only establis’hed leader who knew instinctively how to deal with the working class and the labour movement. While other ministers grew increasingly weary of the premier’s attempts to deal with difficult industrial situations, Fisher continued to welcome his interventions. Thus, he recordled after one of his settlements, ‘The Prime Minister in his opinion has saved the day. The PM’s good humour and wit carried them off their feet and the Government hasn’t in reality conceded anything.’76 Lloyd George was seen by him as a man for the people who could underst,and their anger and frustration even when, as a statesman and national leader, he could not always condone their actions. Fisher also shared ]Lloyd George’s view about the way in which better conditions would eventually emerge. He rejected grandiose blueprints and planning schemes in favour of modest piecemeal advances. A speech at Plymouth expressed these views, which had been strongly reinforced by war:

I have always held and still hold that it is desirable to confine the inter- ference of Government in trade and commerce within the innermost possible limits. I am no lover of State control and an experience of State control and socialism, necessary and indispensable as thley have been have not left a very favourable memory either in the House or country?’

Traditional liberal methods of free trade and a return to fair competi- tion, in his view, were cornerstones of a revived economy. Temperamen- tally, Lloyd George, at least in the immediate post-war period, appeared close to this position. His key to renewed prosperity came not from new economic theories, but from solutions on the political front such as a lasting peace in Europe, speedy demobilization of the troops and a trade revival based essentially on the efforts of private industry.

Lloyd George’s President of the Board of Education emerges clearly as a figure of consequence in government and an important figure among the ranks of coalition Liberals. The prime minister paid attention to his views on social, international and politicd affairs. He represented one strand of opinion, namely Liberal sentiment, which a pressurized leader in a highly opiniated coalition government needed to take into account in his quest for political survival. There were strong personal reasons,

75 PRO ED 24/1190, Fisher memorandum, 22 July 1919. 76 Fisher Papers, Box 5, Fisher to Lettice Fisher, 6 Oct. 1919. l7 H. A. L. Fisher, Liberal Magazine, 7 June 1921.

0 The Historical AssoCiation 1994


too, for his attachment to Fisher. Lloyd George, still feeling an outsider, craved reassurance, recognition and acknowledgment. Fisher’s presence in his government increasingly appeared to give him these responses. In contrast to others who surrounded him, Fisher appeared less self- interested, less liable to try to exert backstairs influence. Moreover, his importance and survival continued to depend on the prime minister’s support. In measuring capacity for making real trouble within the government Fisher was very low on the political scale.

Fisher had undertaken to play the role of Lloyd George’s ‘Liberal conscience’. This was essentially a Victorian Liberal conscience, staunch in defence of free trade, generous and civilized treatment for Indians and Irish, international reconciliation and an adherence to civil and religious liberties. It went no further, taking up little of the advanced Edwardian New Liberalism. Fisher was not an eager social reformer. His view on the role of the state and how it used its power was a limited one. In matters of empire he remained doubtful about extensive self-government for areas such as India. Total war made political life more difficult for people of his kind. It had seriously weakened the Liberal Party and its optimistic view of future trends. The long march of democracy leading to more extensive working-class participation, perhaps even domina- tion, was now in sight. Established politicians would have to live with this. Fisher accepted it as inevitable, but hardly welcomed it with enthusiasm. A strand of pessimism, which had never been far from those of the academic late Victorian Liberal generation, was deeply ingrained in Fisher. He continued to hope that a more democratic, less deferential world would not throw up forces of aggressive imperialism or virulent class conflict. Gladstonian Liberalism, with its moral causes and sense of duty, its ability to appeal to academic political economists and aspiring trade unionists alike, still offered the most encouraging beacon of inspiration. In this new political world Lloyd George, while not another Gladstone, was most likely to steer the country through a very difficult transitional stage.

In his desire to strengthen Lloyd George’s Liberal stance, and to draw his attention to traditional concerns which continued to occupy many Liberal thinkers, Fisher had hoped that he would be one strong voice among several, particularly after the 1918 election. Here he made a serious miscalcula,tion. On many issues Fisher, Churchill, Addison and Montagu, the senior coalition Liberal ministers, pulled in different directions. They seldom worked together. Fisher’s own base remained a narrow one. The kind of group from which he had drawn his strength, the Murrays and the Trevelyans, who still saw themselves as moulders of opinion, were destined to count for much less in this wider post-war world. He disliked electioneering, political deals and making populist speeches. Even within Liberalism he had little real contact with its mass support, such as Nonconformism, the Celtic fringes and sections of the well-established working class. He held to a belief that these were worlds which Lloyd George knew instinctively how to handle. For most of the


DENNIS DEAN 81

coalition period, Fisher was forced to rely on his friendship with Lloyd George in his efforts to secure the survival of the Liberal csiuse. He may, on occasion, have forced the prime minister to take a firmer line with Conservative ministers on issues dividing the two groups. ‘Friendship on its own, however, was never likely to be enough, given all of the prime minister’s other preoccupations.

Fisher never fully grasped Lloyd George’s perception of his own position. He had a vision of political normality which meant a return to a world in which the reunited forces of Liberalism woulcl emerge as a predominant force. The prime minister never shared this vision. Fisher’s ‘normal political world’ was likely to imply his own c:xclusion and downfall. He had come to power in crisis and emergency. His indispensability almost depended on a sense of crisis and instability. Too many lasting enemies had been made in his rise to leadership for him ever to depend on traditional loyalties to come to his aid. He toyed, while in government, with a reorganization of political parties and new kinds of alliances. Fisher’s option - a return, at the right moment, to a reunified Liberalism - presented serious dangers for him.

By the later 1920s Fisher had gone back to academic life,, where he was showered with distinctions. He maintained his Liberal views, although these often seemed very distant from either the preoccupations of Liberal summer schools or some of Lloyd George’s later ideas for social reconstruction. He took part, as a public duty, in initiatives which were derived from middle opinion in the troubled 1930s. His writings, at this stage, represented most strongly his concern that his assumptions and values, once so strongly represented in late Victorian Britain, should still permeate the new, rather forbidding, political world of the 193Os, now represented by newer political parties and forces. His description of the political and intellectual world of Bryce revealed both pri’de and a tinge of regret. It was a tribute to not only Bryce’s but Fisher% own passing world:

The Liberal creed, as it was then expounded in Parliament and the country, was an inspiring body of doctrine, equally acceptable to the idealist and the professor of economics and appealing to the generous sentiment which is characteristic of British youth. While its general aim was the steady elevation of the masses of the people, it was comparable with a strong and even passionate devotion to Parliamentary traditions and with an emphatic repudiation of policies savouring of Socialism and revolution. ’13

’* H. A. L. Fisher, James Bryce (2 vols., 1927). i . 175.

0 The Historical AsJociation 1994

The Dilemmas of an Academic Liberal Historian in Lloyd George's Government: H.A.L. Fisher at the...

Documents

Transcript of The Dilemmas of an Academic Liberal Historian in Lloyd George's Government: H.A.L. Fisher at the...