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Original Article

The demise of a new conservation and development policy? Exploringthe tensions of the Yasunı ITT initiative

Lorenzo Pellegrini a,*, Murat Arsel a, Fander Falconı b, Roldan Muradian c,d

a International Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlandsb FLACSO Ecuador, Ecuadorc CPDA, Universidade Federal Rural do Rio de Janeiro, Brazild PPGE, Universidade Federal Fluminense, Brazil

A R T I C L E I N F O

Article history:

Received 21 March 2014

Received in revised form 7 May 2014

Available online xxx

Keywords:

Ecuador

ITT oil block

Yasunı National Park

A B S T R A C T

The Yasunı ITT is known as a government-led proposal to ban oil exploration and extraction activities

within an Ecuadorian National Park and to obtain financial resources from the international community

to compensate (partially) forgone oil revenues. The initiative brought into focus and tried to solve a

classic dilemma: conventional policy options would imply either that Ecuador forgoes large revenues, or

that the world loses a natural and cultural patrimony irreversibly. The ground-breaking significance of

the initiative is reflected by the attention and endorsements received at the national and international

level. However, attention and endorsements have been accompanied by a difficult process of

implementation and eventually the (temporary?) termination—in mid-2013—of the initiative. In this

paper we analyze the numerous tensions that have characterized the development of the proposal and

can help explain the imbroglio. The aim of this paper is to highlight and contextualize these tensions that

reside in specific features of the socio-political configuration of the state—society relationship in Ecuador

and the position of the country in the international arena, in the very novelty of the initiative and the

misfit with the existing global environmental policy frameworks. We argue that the demise of the

initiative depends to a large extent on the inability of policy makers to identify and resolve these

tensions.

� 2014 Published by Elsevier Ltd.

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1. Introduction

The Yasunı Ishpingo Tambococha Tiputini (Yasunı ITT) initia-tive proposed to enact a permanent ban on oil exploration andextraction activities within an Ecuadorian National Park and toobtain financial resources from the international community tocompensate (partially) forgone oil revenues (see Fig. 1). Initiallyput forward by Ecuadorian civil society actors and later promotedand owned by the national government, the proposal aimed toprotect a biodiverse national park of global importance and thepeople in voluntary isolation residing within its boundaries (Arsel,2012; Espinosa, 2013; Finer et al., 2010; Larrea and Warnars,2009). The initiative brought into focus a classic dilemma (or atrade-off) between extraction by a state that needs economicresources versus the conservation of global public goods and the

* Corresponding author at: International Institute of Social Studies, Erasmus

University Rotterdam, Kortenaerkade 12, 2518 AX The Hague, The Netherlands.

Tel.: +31 70 4260776.

E-mail address: Pellegrini@iss.nl (L. Pellegrini).

Please cite this article in press as: Pellegrini, L., et al., The demise of a nof the Yasunı ITT initiative. Extr. Ind. Soc. (2014), http://dx.doi.org/1

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2014.05.001

2214-790X/� 2014 Published by Elsevier Ltd.

rights of indigenous people. Conventional policy options wouldimply either that Ecuador forgoes large revenues related to theprobable oil deposits in the area, or that the world—Ecuadorincluded—loses a natural and cultural patrimony irreversibly andthat the rights of indigenous people are infringed upon.1 Theinitiative’s objectives combined conservation and local socio-economic development, solving the dilemma of ‘developmentversus conservation’ by including financial instruments for theglobal community to contribute to the conservation of the areathrough the provision of economic resources to the Ecuadorianstate.

The Yasunı National Park is one of the most biodiverse spots onEarth and in one hectare there are more tree species than there arenative tree species in the whole of North America.2 At the same

1 For a recent example of local dynamics and impacts of oil extraction in

Amazonian indigenous territories, see: Haselip, 2011; Haselip and Romera, 2011.2 The data on the Yasunı ITT mentioned in the introduction are from the Yasunı

ITT Fact Sheet (2011) UNDP, available at http://mdtf.undp.org/yasuni, accessed on

the 11/05/2013.

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Fig. 1. The Yasunı Natural Park and the ITT oil block, with the overlapping indigenous territories, neighbouring parks and other oil blocks.

4 The endorsements include those by the Ecuadorian National Assembly,

numerous environmental and indigenous non-governmental organizations and

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time the area is also characterized by large oil reserves estimated at846 million barrels which, if extracted, would provide approxi-mately US$ 7.2 billion in revenues. Apart from the direct benefits tothe local socio-ecological systems, the avoided extraction willresult in averting the emission of 407 million metric tonnes of CO2

from non-extraction and of 800 million metric tonnes of CO2 fromavoided deforestation.

While the area was declared an ecological reserve of biosphereby United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza-tion (UNESCO) in 1979 and currently it is a national park, oilexploitation is permitted under national legislation, under specialconditions. Specifically, Article 407 of the Ecuadorian constitutionrequires that when it comes to exploiting oil or other non-renewable resources in a protected area, the President of theRepublic must request permission from the National Assembly,which has to declare extraction as being in the national interestand may call a referendum. Within the context of the Yasunı ITTinitiative, to forgo indefinitely oil exploitation in the area, theEcuadorian state was requesting contributions from the interna-tional community for US$ 3.6 billion—that is, half of the totalrevenues accruing to the state if extraction takes place. To collectthese contributions, the Yasunı ITT Trust Fund was established inAugust 2010 and by May 2013 approximately US$ 337 million havebeen committed; this amount is short of the objective of US$ 360million per year, especially considering that only a fraction ofcommitted sums have actually been deposited in the fund.3

3 This amount includes US$ 221 million that are committed, but not deposited in

the fund yet and US$ 49 million of development assistance resources devoted to the

objectives of the initiative, but not through the fund (source: the State Secretary of

Ecuador).

Please cite this article in press as: Pellegrini, L., et al., The demise of a nof the Yasunı ITT initiative. Extr. Ind. Soc. (2014), http://dx.doi.org/1

Contributions to the initiative could be made by governments,private entities, inter-governmental and non-governmental orga-nizations and individuals. The Yasunı ITT trust fund is managed bythe multi-partner trust fund office of the United NationsDevelopment Program (UNDP).

The contributions could take the form of donations or they mayentitle the contributor to hold Yasunı Guarantee Certificates (YGC).The Ecuadorian government would issue certificates for up to 407million tonnes of CO2 and the ‘price’ of the certificates is setaccording to the European Union Allowance of the Leipzig carbonmarket. Resources from the fund could be used to facilitate theimplementation of projects in Ecuador dealing with biodiversityconservation, renewable energy sources, social development in thesurrounding areas and in innovation and science in the fields ofbio-knowledge, energy and water management. In the event thatthe government breaks the contract (and decides to exploit thereserves in the Yasunı National Park) YGC holders would beentitled to compensation in accordance with their nominal value.

The ground-breaking significance of the initiative is reflected bythe attention it has attracted and the endorsements received at thenational and international level.4 However, attention and endorse-ments have been accompanied by a difficult process of implemen-tation, delayed and minimal provision of funds to the Trust and

movements, UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), OAS (Organization

of American States), CAN (Andean Community Nations), CAF (Development Bank of

Latin America), European Union, UNASUR, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Rio

Group, the ALBA countries (AlianzaBolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra

America), OPEC, and the OCTA (Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization). The

initiative also has the support of Spain, Belgium, Germany and France.

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eventually the freezing of the initiative in mid-2013, when after areview the President of Ecuador, Rafael Correa has declared thedemise of the initiative and blamed the international communityfor the lack of progress in fund collection. The Trust is currentlyplanning the full reimbursement of donations.

At the time of writing (February 2014) it is too early to seal thefinal demise of the initiative since parts of the political establish-ment and social movements in Ecuador have reacted to thegovernment’s announcement of the initiative’s termination bytaking steps to call for a popular referendum on the issue. Given thepopularity of both proposal and of President Correa, the outcome ofsuch consultation is highly uncertain.

The aim of this paper is to contribute to the growing literatureon the Yasunı ITT (e.g. Arsel, 2012; Arsel and Angel, 2012; Davidsenand Kiff, 2013; Rival, 2010; Vogel, 2009) by highlighting andcontextualizing the tensions that the initiative has been facing.

We define a tension as a situation that arises when there is aninconsistency in terms of objectives, means or scope, reflected indilemmas and/or contradictory propositions. In the case of theYasunı, tensions arise because of mismatches between theproposal and the institutions that should facilitate it and becauseof dilemmas involved in framing the proposal in a way that wouldbe acceptable domestically and internationally. These tensionsreside in specific features of the socio-political configuration of thestate—society relationship in Ecuador, the discourse on nature andthe position of the country in the international arena. Others arisebecause of the very novelty of the initiative and the misfit with theexisting global environmental policy frameworks. Our contribu-tion is to systematically analyze these tensions in a comprehensivemanner and derive their implications. We argue that the failure ofthe initiative relies to a large extent on the inability of policymakers—at the domestic and international scale—to identify andresolve these tensions.

The analysis presented here is based on information collectedover the years through extensive discussions with policy makers,academics, non-governmental organizations and social move-ments. One of the authors has served as minister in two differentperiods—foreign affairs and planning and development—duringPresident Correa administration, which provided us with first-hand information on technical and political issues surrounding theinitiative. We also analyzed policy documents and the rapidlyexpanding academic literature on the case.

The next section presents the international and nationalcontext of the Yasunı ITT, the following discusses the tensionsfaced by the proposal and the final section concludes.

2. Contextualizing the Yasunı ITT proposal

2.1. Globally

The Yasunı ITT initiative has emerged and developed within thecontext of several shifts at the global level which have beenshaping the relationship between economic development andenvironmental policy. The existence of environmental crises—dueto global environmental change—has been recognized as afundamental political issue even though very little concrete actionhas been taken at the global level (Speth, 2004). Similarly, a fewdissonant voices notwithstanding, the existence of human-induced global climate change has become accepted not only bythe vast majority of the world’s climate scientists but also by thepublic (Giddens, 2009). At the same time, what has been called the‘Great Financial Crisis’ has had a major impact on global economicdynamics, with economic growth in Europe and the United Statessuffering dramatic setbacks (Buscher and Arsel, 2012). While theglobal economy has been affected by this still unfolding process,the economy of China in particular and other rapidly expanding

Please cite this article in press as: Pellegrini, L., et al., The demise of a nof the Yasunı ITT initiative. Extr. Ind. Soc. (2014), http://dx.doi.org/1

countries, including Turkey, Brazil and India, have recoveredquickly and continued with their impressive levels of expansion.One offshoot of this dynamic has renewed questions regarding thestrength of the neoliberal model in achieving economic growth andreducing poverty. Specifically, the Washington Consensus, whichdominated the previous two decades in international developmentpolicy, has been declared bankrupt (see, among others, Stiglitz,2009), and the search for a post-neoliberal development order hasintensified.

Latin America has been particularly prolific in producing a hostof new leaders who have come to power with promises toarticulate such an alternative political economic agenda. It ispossible to count Rafael Correa of Ecuador as part of this ongoing‘Left Turn’, which also includes the presidents of Argentina, Bolivia,Brazil, El Salvaldor, Nicaragua, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela tovarying degrees. These leaders are united by their strongpronouncements on the need to counter, or at least severelymodify, the precepts of the Washington Consensus. Some of themhave expressed the aspiration to rethink the modalities of naturalresource-led economic development and environmental conser-vation (Pellegrini, 2012).

Even if neoliberalism has come under pressure as a way to bringabout economic development, it continues to dominate environ-mental policy (Arsel and Buscher, 2012). In this context, market-based mechanisms have become hegemonic in internationaldiscussions on how best to achieve environmental protections.The phenomenal growth of payments of ecosystem services(Muradian et al., 2013), species banking, biodiversity derivatives,and other mechanisms that seek to capitalize on markets’ ability toallocate resources bear testimony to the march of the commodifi-cation of nature in a process that has been described as ‘sellingnature to save it’ (McAfee, 1999). Whereas command-and-controltype mechanisms that privileged the state as the key actor inachieving environmental protection have been the most commonenvironmental policy tools, the rise of market-based initiativeshave transformed the role of the state from that of the guarantor ofconservation to the enabler of market mechanisms entrusted withbringing about sustainability (Muradian and Rival, 2012, #3110).While the debate on this issue is too large to be discussed here, it isclear that developing countries and local communities have beenpresented with a set of new approaches to conservation—andaccompanying promises of large financial transfers. Takentogether, these developments are set to dramatically alterenvironmental policy making by relying on economic incentivesto achieve behavioural change. It is important to note that, despitetheir outspoken left-leaning leaders, countries such as Ecuadorhave not necessarily resisted this trend. In fact, one of the moreprominent and oft-cited success stories in Ecuador is the SocioBosque programme that provides direct payments to farmers andindigenous people for conserving forest resources (De Koning et al.,2011). It is not surprising, therefore, that the Yasunı ITT initiative,especially in its later variants, too has sought to make use ofmarket-based instruments.

2.2. Ecuador

According to Ocampo (2008), the recent economic history ofLatin America can be divided into three periods: exports-baseddevelopment during the nineteenth and early twentieth century;industrialization led by the State until the 1980s; and marketreforms at the end of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.During the 1980s, the so-called ‘‘lost decade’’, most Latin Americancountries implemented neoliberal policies with varying intensity,focusing on structural adjustments. In Ecuador, neoliberal policieshave been applied from the 1980s to the beginning of the twenty-first century with privatization, deregulation, liberalization of trade

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and financial accounts and reduction of the size of the state(Falconı and Oleas, 2004). However, structural adjustmentpolicies were resisted by social mobilization and the politicaland economic adjustment undertaken by Oswaldo Hurtado(1981–1984), Leon Febres Cordero (1984–1988) and RodrigoBorja between 1982 and 1992, followed a ‘‘tortuous path’’(Thoumi and Grindle, 1992). Policy changes were often enactedsuccessfully, but, simultaneously, were altered in response to avariety of political and economic pressures and, in some cases, dueto external shocks or natural disasters. The unequal distribution ofassets, income and consumption increased as result of neoliberalpolicies, the state was weakened, and its powers constrained interms of planning, regulation and redistribution. On January 15,2007 Rafael Correa took office with the objective of turning thecountry away from its neoliberal path.

The shift away from neoliberalism was also marked by arepositioning of the environmental agenda, which has led to theascendance of eco-centric values challenging the main tenets oftraditional environmentalism (Gudynas, 2011a). A new environ-mental agenda is concretized in the Ecuadorian Constitution,adopted in 2008, that defines nature as a rights-holding entity(Arsel, 2012). Furthermore, such a recognition of rights is coupledwith stating that nature is entitled to full respect to allow itscontinuing existence and maintaining and regenerating its vitalcycles, structure, functions and evolutionary processes. Theadoption of the ‘greener’ Constitution was accompanied bysupport for global environmental proposals such as the ecotax5

and the Yasunı ITT proposal. The coherence of the environmentalagenda of the Ecuadorian government is sometimes questionedand the continuing reliance on extraction to generate staterevenues is symptomatic of the dissonance between ambitiousenvironmental policies and the continuation of the extractiveeconomic model (Gudynas, 2011b).

In the social sphere, the National Development Plan andNational Plan for Good Living prioritize equity and put forward a‘post-neoliberal’ agenda (Davidsen and Kiff, 2013; Senplades, 2007,2009). There is an increased emphasis on the role of the state asplanner, regulator, distributor and investor.

The structure of the Ecuadorian economy has traditionally beenbased on the extraction and export of primary commodities.Primary exports in 1990 reached 86 per cent of the total, in 2000they accounted for 75 per cent. By 2010, primary exportsaccounted for 77 per cent of total foreign sales (BCE, 2011). Oilrepresented 51 per cent and five commodities (oil, bananas,shrimp, flowers and cocoa) accounted for 73 per cent of totalexports. These figures underscore the importance of naturalresources in general and oil in particular for the Ecuadorianeconomy and society.

Public investment in Ecuador has grown significantly since2007, rising from US$ 63 per person in 2006 to US$ 353 in 2011(ECLAC, 2012). The government is also targeting its spending tospecific sectors and increasing social spending. The main focus,reflected in the distribution of the 2011 budget, is now education(12 per cent), health (6 per cent), energy (6 per cent) and roads (5per cent). High commodity prices and the social and economicpolicies implemented by Rafael Correa’s government havecoincided with reduced poverty incidence (income povertydecreasing from 37.6 per cent% in 2006 to 28.6%per cent in2011; source INEC).

5 Daly (2007) initially proposed the ‘ecotax’ as a an environmental levy of 3%

applied to the value of a barrel of oil exported and that could be administered by the

countries of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). This ecotax

should also apply to other fuels exported in proportion to their environmental

impact. President Rafael Correa raised this proposal within OPEC.

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The degree of dependence on the extraction of natural resourceis also reflected in the composition of the flows of foreign directinvestment (FDI). In the whole of South America the top sector interms of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows is naturalresources, with 43 per cent of the total. Compared with 2005–2009, in 2010 there was a remarkable increase in the proportion ofnatural resources on total FDI, underscoring the trend towards‘primarization’ of South American economies (ECLAC, 2011). A keynew player is China. Indeed, over 90 per cent of investments byChinese companies in Latin American, went to the extraction ofnatural resources in 2010 (ECLAC, 2011). It is important to notethat during the period 2006–2009 Ecuador was the main recipientof Chinese investment in Latin America—US$ 200 million, withmining and quarries taking more than three quarters of the total(US$ 159 million).

Overall, the Ecuadorian state is using the revenues generated byoil extraction to finance a large share of its state budget and thecontinuing dependency on the oil sector is reinforced by the needto fund increasing public investment and ambitious social policies.This financial model limits the policy options when it comes toprotecting nature and controlling extraction.

3. Tensions

Now we turn to the specifics of the Yasunı ITT proposal andexamine tensions related to the actors who initiated and laterappropriated the proposal, and issues surrounding trust, legitima-cy, morality, sovereignty and the global institutional framework.

3.1. The state versus Civil Society in Ecuador

The relationship between Ecuadorian civil society and theYasunı ITT initiative has a complex history. In fact, the broadcontours of the idea of leaving oil under the ground have theirorigins in civil society and were significantly more ambitious.Organizations such as Oilwatch, Accion Ecologica and Pachamama,as well as intellectuals such as Alberto Acosta, have laid thefoundation of what later became the Yasunı ITT initiative. Thisgroup of activists and thinkers developed a critique grounded in aversion of the ‘resource curse’6 that linked Ecuador’s persistentproblems of poverty, environmental degradation and underdevel-opment to the country’s dependence on oil extraction. Thus anearly proposal made by Oilwatch was to enact a blanketmoratorium on oil extraction in the whole of the EcuadorianAmazon. The organization made an ‘eco-logical call for conserva-tion, climate and rights’ in a 2005 experts’ meeting in Italy, whosetiming proved to be fortuitous. The following year, a similarproposal was included in Correa’s electoral campaign in 2006.Following the electoral victory of Correa and his Allianza PAISmovement, Alberto Acosta became the Minister of Mines andEnergy and the initiative began a process of migration from civilsociety into the hands of the state. Parallel to the official adoptionof the proposal, which came to focus exclusively on the ITT bloc ofthe Yasunı National Park rather than the much larger area initiallyproposed by Oilwatch, was the migration of several keyenvironmental activists to the state, who were motivated by thestrong pro-conservation message of the early Correa administra-tion (Arsel and Angel, 2012; Rival, 2010).

The proposal has since come to be identified very strongly withCorrea himself as well as the Ecuadorian government under hisrule. Nevertheless, since the adoption of the Yasunı ITT initiative aspart of the government’s environmental agenda, the relationshipbetween the state and civil society has become increasingly tense.The Correa administration has repeatedly emphasized that the

6 See, for example, Acosta (2009).

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initiative did not form a binding commitment and if thenecessary international financial contributions were not forth-coming, exploitation of the reserve would have to commence.Furthermore, Correa has made a number of personal declarationsthat further strained the relationship between indigenous andenvironmental organizations and the state. Chief among these isthe declaration Correa made that environmentalists andindigenous groups are acting as ‘infantile’ critics who, muchlike his politically conservative critics, are trying to underminethe progress of his regime (Becker, 2011: 181). Such statements,reflect a fundamental tension between the Correa regime and hisprevious allies in environmental and indigenous communities.This tension exemplifies the dilemma between ‘environment’and ‘development’. While all parties involved in debates on howbest to mitigate the negative environmental effects of economicdevelopment wish for a ‘win-win’ solution, such optimisticoutcomes have rarely been documented in developing countries,especially in those heavily dependent on extractive industries(Bebbington, 2011). Thus, faced with an ‘either-or’ choice,Ecuador’s environmental and indigenous communities haveoften advocated a ‘conservative’ and cautious approach, empha-sizing the fundamental importance of the Amazon, not only froman ecological, but also socio-cultural, perspective. Correa, on theother hand, has expressed his choice in typically blunt fashion bysaying that for Ecuador to say no to natural resource-leddevelopment would be tantamount to ‘beggars sitting on a bag ofgold’, and argued that extractive processes need not bedestructive (Caselli, 2010).

Thus, there is an ongoing tension between the developmentpolicies of the Correa administration, which depends heavily onrevenues from various extractive processes, and Ecuadorianenvironmental and indigenous non-governmental organizationsthat fear that the cost of this development is likely to be large-scale and lead to irreversible ecological destruction. The survivaltill mid-2013 of the Yasunı-ITT initiative despite the tensionsdescribed here, originates in the glimmer of hope to moveEcuador beyond the ‘either-or’ dilemma between environmentand development. This is perhaps why Correa has continued foryears with what Pamela Martin has called a ‘ping pong’ betweenPlan A of leaving oil underground and Plan B of extraction(Martin, 2011) and representatives of civil society havecontinued to take part in discussion and negotiations with thestate (Arsel and Angel, 2012).

3.2. Trust among contractual partners: the Ecuadorian government

vis-a-vis the global community

The Ecuadorian government has been offering to keep the oilreserves of the Yasunı ITT indefinitely underground through acontract between the contributors and the state that does not havea definite time of termination. Contracts are means to ensure that atransaction can be performed and to minimize risks since theparties usually do not have full information about the intentions ofother parties. Most contracts are however incomplete and involvecosts associated with carrying out the transaction (Anderlini andFelli, 1999). Behavioural uncertainty is one of the most importantconsequences of information asymmetry between the parties(Vetschera, 2004). In the long term, contracts between distantparties (in geographical, cultural and legal terms) tend to be themost problematic. In addition to these challenges, in the case of theYasunı ITT initiative, future compliance will depend on decisionstaken by different stakeholders to the ones that initiated thecontractual relations, and therefore the risks associated withbehavioural uncertainty tend to be amplified. Reducing this type ofrisk is normally costly, since it involves a set of monitoring,enforcement and penalty measures. Trust is a common mechanism

Please cite this article in press as: Pellegrini, L., et al., The demise of a nof the Yasunı ITT initiative. Extr. Ind. Soc. (2014), http://dx.doi.org/1

through which these transaction costs can be minimized (Liu,2012).

A relevant question is then to what extent the contributorscould trust the Ecuadorian state to keep its promise in the longrun. The need for trust among the parties was particularlyacute in the Yasunı ITT contract because the providers of fundsare in a vulnerable situation due to two factors. First, the value ofthe Yasunı Guarantee Certificates will decline over time in realterms (since they are unlikely to be traded in internationalcarbon markets and they do not gain interest), while a possiblescenario is that the value of oil underground will increase (if weassume that oil will be a scarcer commodity in the future anddemand for it will keep growing). Thus, in a future scenario ofrelatively high prices of oil, it could be very profitable for thestate to exploit the Yasunı ITT reserves, even if it has tocompensate contributors for the value of their certificates. Theproblem with the value of the certificates is aggravated by thefact that the European Union Allowance is taken as reference forthe estimation of the ‘price’ of the certificate. However the valueof carbon in the European cap-and-trade market has beendecreasing during the past years, undermining its use as areference. Second, in practical terms, it would be difficult for thecontributors to claim compensation if future Ecuadoriangovernments decided to break the contract and exploit thereserves. Even though the certificates are legally binding, thearbitration process to enforce sanctions and receive compensa-tion from a government (that could oppose it) would be verylengthy and costly.

Recent and historical political instability in Ecuador does notcontribute to building trust among the parties. Though thereputation of the government has somewhat improved with theCorrea administration, domestically (Donoso et al., 2010) andabroad, the Ecuadorian political system still suffers from instabili-ty—as shown during the attempt of coup d’etat in 2010. Thisenhances the uncertainty regarding the positions of futureEcuadorian governments towards the Yasunı initiative.

In conclusion, asymmetric risks and behavioural uncertaintieshighlight the need to build trust among the parties and thenecessity of designing mechanisms to reduce the potential foropportunistic behaviour by the Ecuadorian state in the future. Inthis regard, the way the trust fund has been structured might notbe sufficient to ensure that the Ecuadorian government wouldleave oil underground and might explain, to some extent, the lackof confidence that the Yasunı ITT oil filed would be left unexploitedforever.

3.3. Legitimizing the Yasunı ITT Initiative

The initiative intersects the issue of legitimacy in two distinctbut interrelated ways. On the one hand the popularity of theproposal—at least in Ecuador—has paved the way to acontroversial discussion about whether to exploit oil reserveslocated in a national park of extremely high ecological andhuman value. This discussion would have probably faced muchstronger resistance from different sectors of the civil society if itwere not embedded in the initiative. In fact, the eventualdecision to exploit the reserves is in principle more legitimatesince the requested funds by the Ecuadorian government (US$3.6 billion in 13 years) were not provided by the internationalcommunity in a reasonable period of time. However, blamingforeign countries for destroying a national and global heritagecould also be seen as a Machiavellian move by the Ecuadoriangovernment unwilling to accept full responsibility for theimplications of such decision.

At the same time, the search for legitimacy (domestic andinternational) is one of the major challenges of the Yasunı

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initiative. As a strategy to gain legitimacy vis-a-vis the interna-tional community, the proponents of the initiative have resorted tothe discourse on avoided carbon emissions, in order to createlinkages with the post-Kyoto policy discussion on inter-countrytransfers of resources to combat climate change. Since theinitiative does not fit with the principles guiding the Kyotoprotocol, the Ecuadorian government has proposed the notion ofNet Avoided Emissions. However, so far the Yasunı GuaranteeCertificates have only symbolic value, and it is unlikely that theywill be tradable even in the international carbon voluntary market.This creates inconsistencies with the global governance regime forcombating climate change. First of all, if governments andenterprises cannot claim the YGC as carbon credits, the incentiveto participate is low. Comparing to REDD+ projects, for instance,the Yasunı initiative will be at a disadvantage. Indeed, the mainargument given by the Norwegian government for not contribut-ing to the Yasunı fund was that the Norwegian state has a priorityto cooperate with projects within the REDD+ framework (whichexclude the Yasunı initiative). Secondly, the Yasunı initiative hasset a cap of 407 million metric tonnes of carbon as a limit to theamount of Yasunı Guarantee Certificates that can be provided. Ifcredits cannot be traded by ‘buyers’, there is no reason to set such acap. It follows then that, at the international level, the initiativewas located in a grey area from a governance perspective.

The strategy to legitimize the Yasunı initiative using thediscursive tool of avoided carbon emissions is problematic in thatthe principles guiding the global governance regime for combatingclimate change have remained unchanged. Despite the attempts toincorporate the Yasunı initiative into the post-Kyoto discussionabout avoided emissions in developing countries and into marketsfor carbon credits (aiming to mobilize resources from richcountries), the initiative is incompatible with the current rulesregulating such markets.7

Thus, domestically a proposal that aims at combining sharedinternational responsibility with environmental conservation andthe developmental objectives of Ecuador might end up legitimizinga controversial extraction process—while at the international levelthe proposal’s legitimacy is questioned, because it does not fit inthe current institutional framework dealing with climate changemitigation.

3.4. A moral dilemma: between conservation and extraction

Due to the high economic costs for Ecuador to safeguard therights of nature and indigenous communities in voluntary isolationin the Yasunı National Park and considering that these communi-ties and the biodiversity of Yasunı are global patrimonies, it isreasonable to appeal to the international community for jointresponsibility. Nevertheless, the call for global monetary compen-sation for conserving the livelihoods and culture of a veryparticular group of people and natural environment raises a deepmoral dilemma in that it opens up the possibility of blackmailingover fundamental rights in case the compensation is notforthcoming. The monetary compensation and human rightsdiscourses are usually incompatible and incommensurable,meaning that human rights are normally thought as somethingthat should be protected ‘at all costs’. The mismatch between thelogic of carbon markets, on the one hand, and the unalienablerights of people in voluntary isolation to maintain their livelihoodsis another of the inconsistencies that have emerged due to thedecision to try to legitimize the initiative using the proposition of‘net avoided emissions’. An alternative would have been to appealto the notion of the ‘cost of safeguarding basic rights’ and theinternational community’s responsibility in sharing the burden of

7 See also Section 4.

Please cite this article in press as: Pellegrini, L., et al., The demise of a nof the Yasunı ITT initiative. Extr. Ind. Soc. (2014), http://dx.doi.org/1

covering these costs. Such costs concern not only the differenttypes of direct costs (for instance of securing the integrity ofprotected areas) but also opportunity costs. Highly threatened andhighly valuable protected areas deserve special treatment by theinternational community, including compensation to the countrieswhere they are located, the cost of maintaining them and theforgone revenues due to restrictions on the economic activitiesthat can be carried out in these locations. The same holds forhuman communities in voluntary isolation.

The call of the Ecuadorian government for monetary compen-sation from international community to cover part of the forgonerevenues from oil extraction may have generated clear incentivesfor the state to conserve the Yasunı National Park. However,monetary transactions are not morally neutral and monetaryincentives might backfire if their moral meaning is in conflict withthe moral framework of intrinsic motivations to undertake aparticular task (Bowles, 2008; Gneezy et al., 2011). The mostknown example of this dynamic is the finding that monetaryrewards can reduce the donation of blood by volunteers (Laceteraand Macis, 2010). In the case of the Yasunı initiative, externalmonetary compensation could undermine the intrinsic motivationof the Ecuadorian government to conserve Yasunı due to the rightsof Nature and people in voluntary isolation (ensured by itsconstitution). In the scenario where the international communitydoes not contribute the expected resources, the decision to exploitoil reserves might be triggered in part by retaliation.

One of the strongest contradictions of the initiative is that itenables the Ecuadorian state to blame the international commu-nity for the destruction of a very valuable National Park within itsterritory. As argued above, paradoxically, the possibility ofobtaining monetary incentives for conservation might backfire,and actually legitimize the decision to exploit oil under a protectedarea.

3.5. Sovereignty and cooperation with the global community

The issue of sovereignty is topical in the context of naturalresources in Ecuador. In fact, one reading of the history of thewhole Latin American continent since the ‘discovery’ is that ofcolonialist appropriation of national wealth driven by thecapturability of natural resources (Galeano, 1973). The Spanishconquest and domination were indeed marked by the expropria-tion of large quantities of natural resources and the use of slavelabour to extract and transport them. After the colonial experience,foreign control of these resources continued through transnationalcompanies exploiting natural resources in league with corruptnational elites (Dunkerley, 2007; Pellegrini, 2011). In line withthese experiences in the continent, in Ecuador too there is a sharedunderstanding that the riches of the country have not always beenused for national benefit but rather exploited for the gain of foreigninterests (Falconı and Vallejo, 2012).

This historical background is part of the rationale behind thenationalism surrounding the subject of natural resources and oneof the roots of the popularity of measures such as the nationaliza-tion of hydrocarbons—the so-called ‘oil nationalism’.8 Indeed,nationalization of hydrocarbons has figured prominently in theelectoral platform of Rafael Correa, it has been implemented with anumber of high-flying policy measures and it is now enshrined inthe constitution.

Against the backdrop of the environmental history and currentpolicies of the country, the Yasunı proposal became potentiallycontentious because it involves oil reserves—more precisely, theright to extraction of these reserves—but also environmentalvalues of the Amazon forest. The triumph of these values is at times

8 See Villavicencio Valencia (2011).

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interpreted as the new frontier of colonialism—or eco-imperialism(Driessen, 2005)—that is aiming at transforming the wholeAmazon forest in a global reserve and limit the sovereignty ofindividual countries over its own natural resources.

The Ecuadorian government had to reach a compromisebetween the national sentiment urging the sovereign use ofrevenues and the need to have a credible and attractive fund thatwould elicit donation from the international community. Thus, onthe one hand, the country should be able to spend the revenues inthe fund according to national developmental priorities. Thegovernment chose to employ the capital for investment in thestrategic renewable energy sector and the return on capital is spenton forest management and on the Yasunı Park for activities relatedto environmental management and ‘social development’. On theother hand, the fund governance structure has been designed withthe involvement of supra national institutions (the United NationsDevelopment Program, UNDP) and the participation of Ecuadoriancivil society. The steering committee of the fund would be co-chaired by a representative of the Ecuadorian government and ofUNDP and includes two representatives of the donor community,two representatives of the Ecuadorian government and tworepresentatives of Ecuadorian civil society—including one fromindigenous groups. In contrast with the management of oilrevenues, in this set up, the international community would stillhave a say on the way the revenues collected in the fund are spent,and the participation of civil society in the steering committee ofthe fund brings civil society back in the initiative.9

3.6. Global conventions on indigenous people, biodiversity and

climate change

Several global initiatives intersect the policy space of the Yasunısince the most prominent values to be protected include humanrights of indigenous people and also environmental values relatingto biodiversity and (avoided) greenhouse gas emissions. Theseinitiatives are instruments to achieve objectives that are shared bythe Yasunı, however their institutional structure is not compatible.Here we discuss the mismatch between the initiative and the maininternational agreements that deal with rights of indigenouspeople, biodiversity and climate change: the International LabourOrganization Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal People (ILO,169), the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the UnitedNations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC).

ILO 169 convention, adopted in 1989 and ratified by Ecuador, isa binding regulation obliging governments to protect the rights ofindigenous people; including rights over territories and naturalresources. In cases where the state retains property rights overnon-renewable resources in the sub-soil, indigenous people are tobe consulted before the exploitation of the resource commences.Furthermore, indigenous people have the right to compensationfrom damages generated by extractive activities and to participatein the benefits (Rosendal et al., 2008). This convention does have abearing on the Yasunı because it limits the scope of action of thegovernment in indigenous territories; however its possiblefunctionality towards the initiative is unclear. In fact, theapplication of the consultation provision seems inapplicable whenpeople in voluntary isolation are affected by extractive projects.Furthermore, it is to be noted that the responsibility to enforce theconvention resides at the national level and that there is nofinancial mechanism to share globally the costs associated with theprotection of indigenous rights. Thus, while the principle ofcollective responsibility for the contribution to conservation is thekey feature of the Yasunı initiative, the ILO 169 focuses on

9 See the ‘Terms of Reference of the Trust Fund Yasunı-ITT’, http://mptf.undp.org/

yasuni.

Please cite this article in press as: Pellegrini, L., et al., The demise of a nof the Yasunı ITT initiative. Extr. Ind. Soc. (2014), http://dx.doi.org/1

indigenous rights and sees the state as the institution that has theresponsibility of enforcing these rights regardless the associatedcosts. In other words, when the Ecuadorian state is faced with thedilemma between respecting indigenous rights and generaterevenues, the ILO 169 favours the first alternative neglecting theglobal dimensions of the duties and costs of the convention.

The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) entered into forcein 1993 with the objective of conserving biodiversity and ofpromoting equitable sharing mechanisms for the benefits arisingfrom of biodiversity. The principle of equity seems to bode well forthe Yasunı initiative, however in the case of the Yasunı costs topreserve biodiversity—rather than benefits originating frombiodiversity itself—are to be shared equitably and CBD does notcontain provisions with respect to cost-sharing. More broadly, theoverall effectiveness of the convention has been called intoquestion since world leaders in 2002 committed through the CBD‘to achieve by 2010 a significant reduction of the current rate ofbiodiversity loss’ (Secretariat of the Convention on BiologicalDiversity, 2001), this objective has been missed and there are clearindications that biodiversity loss has rather increased over time(Butchart et al., 2010). An assessment of the reasons for this failureincludes as a primary cause the lack of adequate funding (CBD,2010) which brings us back to the issue of costs of biodiversityprotection.

Apart from biodiversity and indigenous people, the conserva-tion of the Yasunı creates also benefits in terms of avoideddeforestation and the avoided emissions that would be generatedby the consumption of the fossil fuels within the ITT oilfield. Thislatter benefit in terms of contribution to emissions reduction isentirely neglected by the current institutional framework onclimate change. In fact, the route taken by the internationalcommunity in terms of avoiding climate change and mitigating itseffects, as organized in the United Nations Framework Conventionon Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the subsequent Kyoto protocol,focuses solely on the demand/use side of Greenhouse Gases(GHGs). As a consequence all the instruments aimed at abatingemissions focus on the location of consumption and emissions. Inthe case of oil, the attention is on consumption and numerousprovisions are envisaged to diminish oil demand globally, whileno efforts are made to limit extraction and/or compensate theavoided removal of fossil fuels. As a consequence of this choice,avoided emissions from forgone extraction—such as in the case ofthe Yasunı proposal—are not contemplated in the UNFCCCframework.

While Ecuador is a party in the UNFCC and the CBD and is alsoparticipating in the post-Kyoto protocol debates on climatechange, on the one hand the country was not able—by itself orwith its regional and global allies—to shape the future instrumentsto implement these conventions in order to make them compatiblewith the Yasunı initiative. On the other hand, the chances of theinitiative’s success depended very much on a supportive interna-tional institutional (governance) framework.

4. Conclusions

The Yasunı ITT initiative had the potential to become a newmodel to promote effective global collaboration in conservingprotected areas and of modalities to share equitably costs andbenefits of conservation. The failure of the initiative to become aconcrete policy depends critically on numerous tensions pertain-ing to several aspects of the proposal that refer both to its specifichistory and features of the Ecuadorian state, while others point topeculiarities of the global institutional framework. In particular,specific tensions relate to the actors promoting the proposal, andissues around trust, legitimacy, morality, sovereignty and globalinstitutional framework.

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The tensions identified in this article apply to potential similarinitiatives. Some of these reflect the fact that most of the mega-biodiverse locations in the world are in developing countries whoshare the ‘trust’ problem faced by the Ecuadorian state. Problemsconcerning legitimacy and participation of civil society are likely tobe found in many developing countries as well. Other questions,such as sovereignty and moral dimensions, on the other hand,transcend the developed—developing country dichotomy andwithout a global institutional structure to support such initiativesthey are unlikely to be dealt with in a conducive way. Similarly,global agreements on the rights of indigenous people and theconservation of biodiversity in the future might create an enablinginstitutional environment for Yasunı-like initiatives if their focus isnot limited to benefits, but also on sharing models of costs impliedby the achievement of their objectives.

Overall, the Yasunı model offered a novel opportunity to createa win—win situation for the protection of indigenous rights, theconservation of biodiversity and the furthering of developmentobjectives at the national level. It also had the potential to offer aninstrument that could contribute to environmental and develop-mental objectives of the global community. At the same time, theinstrument was characterized by several tensions and we arguethat the failure of the initiative was due to a large extent the abilityof policy makers—at the domestic and international scale—toidentify and resolve these tensions. In fact, the failure of theinitiative might ultimately contribute to the legitimization ofextractive activities by the Ecuadorian government.

Acknowledgments

The support of the Conflict and Cooperation over NaturalResources in Developing Countries (CoCooN) programme and ofthe Visitors Travel Grant programme of The Netherlands Organi-sation for Scientific Research (NWO) are gratefully acknowledged.

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