The Crusaders Ac Intro

8/9/2019 The Crusaders Ac Intro

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THE CRUSADERS AC

INTRODUCTION

My partner and I affirm [the topic, Resolved: In the United States, organized political lobbying does more harm thagood.]

To clarify, we define:

Organized political lobbying as, [an organization that] to conduct[s] activities aimed at influencing public officialsesp. members of a legislative body on legislation from Merriam-Websters Dictionary of Law1.

The dependent clause in the US modifies the independent clause organized political lobbying does more harm thgood while more harm than good is merely a result of the verb does. Thus we conclude that in the US onlymodifies the noun organized political lobbying since its a gerund that performs the action of doing more harm thgood. This means even though we can only debate about lobbying in the US, ramifications outside of the US are stirelevant.

[Even if we accept it the other way, it only makes sense to talk about political lobbying in the US that could haveramifications outside of the US. Interpreting it the other way would allow arguments about political lobbying outsi

of the US affecting the US, which is less likely to happen.]

We offer three contentions:

1.

2.

3.

1"lobbying." Def. 1a. Merriam-Webster's Dictionary of Law. 7th ed. 2003.

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THE CRUSADERS AC

REFORM (GENERAL)

[_________], organized political lobbying has consistently prevented reform from happening.

The journal of Rhetoric and Public Affairs2 writes in 2004:

However, agenda management requires an effective rhetoric. On the one hand, manipulating political structures in public policymaking must be legitimized, and legitimation requires symbolic action.21 When policies involcomplex issues, the legitimation may be as simple as claiming that hollow laws are major, substantive changes, or as precise as focusing attention on one part of a bill while obscuring other provisions that make its passagmeaningless. In addition, organizational rhetors have a number of strategies available to undermine popular pressure for reform. Opponents can contain an issue conceptually, either by defining the issue in a way that minimits appeal or by drawing on culturally sanctioned assumptions to frame policy proposals in ways that make meaningful reform seem objectionable and palliatives seem adequate.22 During the 1990s conceptual

containment campaigns supported and funded by U.S. organizations became more sophisticated and more effective as opponentslearned to coordinate lobbying activities with public issue campaigns. The most successful efforts to undermipublic support for reform argued that socioeconomic problems are private sector concerns, not matters forgovernmental policy. This argument gains its credibility from the cultural assumption that free market capitalism is inherently superior to any other economic system, and that government interferencethe free market system is inherently futile and perverse.23 The astonishing success ofthe Harry and Louise attacks on Hillarycare made it abundantclear that organizational rhetors, in the guise of public interest campaigns, can significantly influence populardefinitions of policy issues and thereby short-circuit reform.24 Five years after the demise of the Clinton health care proposal, opponents of theMcCain-Feingold bill regulating the tobacco industry were able to capitalize on advocates arguments that the industry long hacovered up the addictive properties of nicotine. Since the funding mechanisms in the bill relied on increased tobacco taxes, opponents successfully defined the proposal as a tax bill in disguise, one thatunfairly penalized precisely those poor and middle- class victims that the bills proponents had demonstrated were incapable ofshaking their addiction.

The journal elaborates on how its much easier to oppose reform than to require it.

For example, expensing stock options would initially have concentrated costs (on corporate executives, stockbrokers, and institutional investors) because they reduce the profits that corporations report to the general public,

would have diffused benefits (primarily to individual investors). Since there are no established mechanisms through which individual investorscan be informed about the issue, become connected to other individual investors, or engage in coordinatedpolitical action, there is little chance that they will be able to influence policymakers. In short, it is much easier mobilize opposition to expensing options than it is to mobilize pressure to require it. 19 Business elites are advantageously positioned to

dominate the decision-making process. Through fundraising and professional associations they are in constant contact withpolicymakers on a variety of issues, are supported by an overwhelming number of Washington lobbyists, and arlinked to one another through communication networks that can be instantly activated.

2Conrad, Charles. "The Illusion of Reform: Corporate Discourse and Agenda Denial in the 2002 "Corporate Meltdown"" Rhetoric & Public Affairs 7.3 (2004): 311-38. Proj

MUSE. Web. 31 Jan. 2010.

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THE CRUSADERS AC

REFORM (GENERAL)

[_________], organized political lobbying can easily kill reform legislation.

The journal of Rhetoric and Public Affairs3 writes in 2004:

Political elites, including corporate rhetors, prefer that public policies be made in private. Through lobbying and politicalconnections to oversight agencies, elites can use established connections and relationships to dominate privatedecision- making. Public policymaking is risky. It publicizes elite influence over the policy process, and mayallow non-elite groups to discover common interests and to organize in ways that create coalitions that exceed the minimum winning size needed to inireforms that are opposed by elites.14 However, in some cases, normal processes of privatizing public policymaking do break down and issues become highly visible parts of public d iscourse. When that happens, opponents

reform must find ways to shift public attention away from the issue, or to define it in ways that minimize the possibility that meaningful reform will emerge from the policymaking process. The greatestadvantage that opponents of reform have is time. If opponents can only delay policy action until the attention anemotional fervor underlying calls for reform subside, they can maintain the status quo. This is especially true when the medias coveragan issue is episodicfocusing on individual instances of objectionable actionsrather than systemicexplaining the long-term causes of those actions.16 Because the leaders of the executive branches of governmenta

agencies (presidents, prime ministers, governors, or mayors) have a superior ability to focus public and media attention to preferred topics, they are uniquely able to contain populattention so that only those problems and proposals that they prefer to have discussed garner public attention.

3Conrad, Charles. "The Illusion of Reform: Corporate Discourse and Agenda Denial in the 2002 "Corporate Meltdown"" Rhetoric & Public Affairs 7.3 (2004): 311-38. Proj

MUSE. Web. 31 Jan. 2010.

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THE CRUSADERS AC

LOBBYING REGULATIONS FAIL

[_________], trying to regulate lobbyists forces them to work underground.

The National Journal4 writes in November of 2009:

Constraints on lobbyists actually reduce transparency, some argue, by encouraging lobbyists to "deregister." "What we want to do is try and shift the focus from federally registered lobbyists to money and influence in theadministration," said Lee Mason, director of nonprofit speech rights for OMB Watch. "That's where the focus ought to be." Plenty of lobbyists already agree. Frustration has been g rowing on K Street ever since President Oannounced in January that most lobbyists would be barred from serving in the administration. The White House has also imposed limits on lobbyists seeking stimulus funds, and most recently took steps to bar registered lobfrom serving on federal advisory panels. "There will be challenges, but we see it as an opportunity," Trupo said. Administration officials, including Norm Eisen, the White House counsel on ethics and government reform, remet with concerned lobbyists and ITAC chairs but announced that the administration is standing pat. Many reform advocates have applauded the administration's lobbying restrictions and regard the blowback from K Street

almost laughable. Certainly the health care, energy and financial reform debates on Capitol Hill suggest that lobbyists anmoneyed interests are, if anything, more powerful than ever. But even some in the public interest community wonder whether the White House's lobbying edicts really do much to change Washington. Constraints on lobbyists actually reduce transparency, some argue, by encouraging lobbyists to"deregister" and stop reporting their activities. A joint study by the Center for Responsive Politics and OMBWatch recently found that lobbyists terminated their registrations in the first quarter of this year at "significantlyhigher levels than usual." Officials from the two o rganizations stressed that it's not clear why lobbyists are "deregistering," just that the total number of registrations is down.

4The National Journal, November 16, 2009, Lobbyists:Obama's Rules Bring Pain But No Gain

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THE CRUSADERS AC

CORRUPTION

[_________], lobbying makes corruption a lot worse.

Nauro Campos and Francesco Giovannoni5 from the political journal, Public Choice, explain in 2006:

A second contribution that studies the relationship between corruption and lobbying is that by Damania et al. (2004). The crucial distinction with the Harstad and Svesson (2006) approach is that here corruption and lobbyin

viewed as complements, not substitutes. More specifically, the idea is that lobbying is not done in order to change the rules favorably, thus making bribing unnecessary, but it is done to persuadepoliticians to underinvest in law enforcement, thus making bribing easier. This means that, contrary to the previous framework, firms thatchoose to bribe bureaucrats are also more likely to exercise influence through lobbying. With respect to stability, the prediction is agaidifferent. Here, unstable political systems are more likely to generate lobbying. The mechanism is that firms feel more threatened by instability as they worry that future governments will be keener to enforce the law. Sinlaw enforcement requires significant investments, lobbying for underinvestment today will significantlyundermine any future governments law enforcement efforts.

5Campos, Nauro F., and Francesco Giovannoni. "Lobbying, corruption and political influence."Public Choice 131 (2006): 1-21. Print.

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THE CRUSADERS AC

IMBALANCED INFLUENCE

[_________], lobbying creates an unfair influence of public officials. The deep connections that lobbyists have withpoliticians undermine the publics ability to be heard.

Maureen Glabman6, the 2000 Columbia University Reuters Fellow in Medical Journalism, writes in a 2010 article:

Albertine of the American League of Lobbyists adds: "ATLA [Association of Trial Lawyers of America] is uniformly preventing any, even minorevision in the tort reform laws because it is a bread-and-butter issue for them."

ATLA is No. 5 in Fortune magazine's 2001 "Power 25" list of Washington's most powerful lobbying groups, while theis 12 and the AHA 13. ATLA's lobbying expenses were $3 million in 2000. But, then, ATLA doesn't need a big lobbyingbudget: It has power in numbers of bodies. There are only nine physicians in Congress, but there are 218 representatives and senatorwith law degrees.

6Glabman, Maureen. "Lobbyists That the Founders Just Never Dreamed of." Managed Care Magazine. MediMedia USA, Aug. 2002. Web. 30 Jan. 2010.

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The Crusaders Ac Intro

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