THE CROATIAN-AMERICAN CONNECTION -...

During America’s War for Independence

THE CROATIAN-AMERICAN CONNECTION

Edited by James F. AdomanisMaryland Center for Civic Education

Dedicated to all of my Croatian friends,especially the CIVITAS groupies.

Copyright 2005 by James F. Adomanis

ISBN 0-9704575-5-3

THE CROATIAN-AMERICAN CONNECTION

During America’s War for Independence

Practitioners of Clio interested in analyzing Croatian and American historical interactions, tend to be

more Croatian-trained than American-trained. For example, one Croatian-American self-published pur-

veyor, Adam S. Eterovich, has single-handedly put forth some unusual theories related to Croatian involve-

ment in the history of the early Americas. His works have delved into topics involving Croatian seamen,

settlers, and pioneers, who were part of the earliest voyages into the Mediterranean Ocean, the Atlantic

Ocean waterways, antebellum Southern settlement in the Gulf of Mexico, and even westward expansion

into the Pacific and California. American scholars, such as Susan Mosher Stuard have focused on the

history of Ragusa (Dubrovnik) and its involvement with the Venetian maritime industry. Modern histori-

ans tend to focus on post World War II Yugoslavia, its breakup, and the re-emergence of modern Croatia in

the 1990s during the Second Balkan War, known in Croatia as Domovinski Rat or the War for Homeland.

The publication series, The Croatian-American Connection, is an editor’s attempt to excite more United

States scholars into researching this rich, yet underdeveloped academic arena. Building on previous efforts

already published by Croatian scholars, the Maryland Center for the Study of History and Civic Education

in cooperation with Jure Kristo of the Croatian Institute of History and Kate Bagoje of the Association of

Friends of Dubrovnik Antiquities, is planning to release works usually not available to researchers in the

United States. The first of the series is Dragoljub R. Zivojinovic’s article “Ragusa, Great Britain, and the

American Revolution, 1763-1783” which was originally published as part of a symposium “Dubrovnik’s

Relations with England” held at the University of Zagreb in April 1976 and published by the Department of

English, Faculty of Philosophy in 1977. The editors included Rudolf Filipovic of Zagreb University and

Monica Partridge of Nottingham University. Zivojinovic’s essay explores several factors about what the

THE CROATIAN-AMERICAN CONNECTION: During America’s War for Independence

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Ragusan nobility knew about the events of American War for Independence through diplomatic dispatches

being sent to Ragusa by its agents in various European centers. One agent, Francisco Favi, met with the

American delegation in France during the Treaty of Paris of 1783 negotiations and attempted to procure a

commercial treaty between Ragusa and the newly founded country, the United States of America.

The editor has enhanced the original scholarship of the writers in this planned series by adding details

and images based on research conducted both in Croatia and the United States. The bulk of the essay is as

it appeared in English and published in Croatia. There was no attempt on the part of the editor to make

major changes in grammar or structure, but occasionally he did change spellings. There has also been a

conscious effort to make these essays instructional materials as well. For that reason, various documents

have been included in the body of work or appear in the Appendix for investigation by students.

The editor would like to thank my good Croatian friends Jure Kristo, Kate Bagoje, Miho Katicic, and

Helena Strugar for their part in identifying materials, translating in some cases, and supporting this en-

deavor. I would also like to thank my U.S. connections, Dr. Diane Palmer, my proof reader, and Jennifer

Johnson, my editor-in-chief. Partial funding for this project came from the Center for Civic Education’s

CIVITAS: An International Civic Education Exchange Program funded by the United States Department of

Education, which enables all members of the CIVITAS network to receive copies.

I hope readers enjoy this excursion into Croatian-American connections as much as I did in “discov-

ering” it.

James F. Adomanis, Ph.D.Arnold, Maryland

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Ragusa & the American Revolution, 1763-1783Several factors have contributed to the writing of the “Ragusa,Great Britian and the American Revolution, 1763-1783” ar-ticle by Dr. Zivojinovic. First was the Bicentennial celebra-tion of the American War for Independence and the desire toexplore what the Ragusan nobility and people in general knewabout it; second, a wish to analyze in some depth the natureof the reactions of the ruling class of the Republic of St. Blaisewhen the war in Europe, North America, the West Indies, onthe high seas and oceans and elsewhere broke out; in particu-lar, a wish to explore why and how Ragusa reacted to the ex-tension of the war, and to find out whether it nurtured cer-tain hopes and expectations, if any, in regard to its ultimateoutcome. Due attention ought to be paid to the attitudes takenand suggestions made by the Ragusan diplomats and consulsfrom various European capitals and major ports, their argu-ments and dispositions for taking sides with the belligerents;a desire to see whether the arguments and claims made byhistorians Echeverria, R.R. Palmer and J. Godechot concern-ing the extent of knowledge of North America in general andthe British colonies in particular in Southern Europe couldbe accepted as valid. The above mentioned authors arguedthat the extent and quality of knowledge was poor and unsat-isfactory and that this fact had determined the attitudes andpolicies towards the war on the part of Venice, Ragusa andother states in Southern Europe.Editor’s Note: For detail of this topic, see Zivojinovic’s bookAmericka Revolucija i Dubrovacka Republika 1763-1790(Beograd: Prosveta, 1976).

Background: Events in Ragusa & EuropeThe Ragusan Senate was to witness thirty-five wars fought in Europe during the 18th Century [See Table 1]. Croatians

soldiers were commonly used to support military forces and operations in neighboring jurisdictions when it was deemed benefi-cial by their leadership. One document of Croatian history written in 1778 by a foreign minister spoke out about the horrorsof warfare. [See Appendix 1]. After the outbreak of the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763), and even before, the Ragusan Senate,a body responsible for devising and carrying out policies of the State, showed substantial interest in and concern for the courseof the war. Ragusan consular agents scattered throughout Europe, especially in major ports in the West (Cadiz, Marseille,Lisbon Genoa, Leghorn) began to pour in a variety of information to Ragusa about major events. British military successes inNorth America, especially in Canada, figured prominently in these reports. The final outcome of the War, as settled by theTreaty of Paris concluded in February 1763, made the Senate uneasy and nervous about the future. The Treaty of Paris con-firmed the almost complete domination of the British navy over the seas and sea routes, as well as a substantial extension ofBritain’s colonial empire. It also brought to an end the colonial empire of France in North America and seriously threatenedthe Spanish Empire in the southern parts of the continent. The outcome of the Seven Years’ War and the defeat of the Bourbonkingdoms were conceived in Dubrovnik as a serious setback for the future.

Figure 1– Rugusa (Dubrovnik) CroatiaLocated on a promontory of the Dalmatian coast in the AdriaticSea, Rugusa, now known as Dubrovnik was first established inthe 7th century by Romans fleeing Slav incursions. Later, however,Slavic people settled in the city, which became a link betweenLatin and Slavic civilizations. Later the city and surrounding areabecame the powerful merchant Republic of St. Blaise. A RugusanSenate was established in 1253, however, only the nobility couldhold membership. Dubrovnik (Ragusa) today is Croatia’s thecounty’s most popular tourist destination.


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There were several reasons for this. By the late 1740s,the Ragusan merchant marine was in a state of bustling activ-ity, with captains and ship owners rapidly building and ac-quiring new ships. Thus, maritime activity became the mostprominent branch of an otherwise stagnant economic life inthe Republic, bringing in by far the greatest income and earn-ings, engaging at the same time the largest percentage of thepopulation. This maritime economy became instrumental tothe material prosperity of the Republic during the second halfof the 18th century. British domination over the seas and firmcontrol of Gibraltar seriously menaced the Ragusan merchantmarine business activities, which found their place primarilyas carriers of goods and passengers, on an international scale,from various Mediterranean ports in Spain, Portugal, NorthAfrica, the Italian states, Greece, Turkey, Egypt, Asia Minorand elsewhere. A good many of the Ragusan captains, in or-der to improve earnings, ventured as far as the Netherlands,England, the Baltic Sea ports, Scandinavia, and even the Span-ish possessions in the West Indies and South America. Enter-prising and venturesome, the Ragusan captains frequentlycontracted business which was not always considered to be inaccord with the proclaimed neutrality of the Republic or thedemands of certain Powers, especially in time of war. Involve-ment with contraband, in time of crises, when the freight rateswere tripled or quadrupled, brought Ragusans into conflictwith Britain and other states. Thus, the Ragusan ships be-came easy prey for the British men-of-war, while subsequentpolitical and diplomatic troubles created for the Senate evi-dent embarrassment and fear of possible British retaliation.During the Seven Years’ War, in 1759, the Senate informedthe Admiralty in London that Ragusan captains would ad-here strictly to the Neutrality laws. However, unable to carryout this obligation and to force the strong-willed captains toabide by them, the Senate looked for help and privileges, al-though in disguised form, from the Bourbons–France andSpain.1

The orientation towards Spain and France was of longduration and tradition. It was particularly evident in the caseof Spain, where Ragusans enjoyed substantial privileges andrights from the Middle Ages. These were extended and con-firmed by Charles V (1517-1555) and his son Phillip II (1556-1598). Ragusans were free to come and do business in Spain.Many of them spent their lives there, with those being mostcapable, achieving prominence in the Spanish administrative

Table 1Wars of 18th Century Europe

1700-1721 Great Northern War

1701-1714 War of Spanish Succession

1702-1705 Camisard Rebellion

1703-1711 Kuruc Rebellion

1705-1706 Bavarian Rebellion

1710-1711 Russo-Ottoman War

1712 2nd War of Villmergen

1713 Gorizia Peasant Rebellion

1715-1716 Jacobite Rebellion

1716-1718 Austro-Ottoman War

1718-1720 War of Quadruple Alliance

1726-1727 East Frisia, Prince vs. Estates

1729-1732 Corsica

1733-1735 War of Polish Succession

1733-1743 Corsica



1740-1748 War of Austrian Succession

1741-1743 Swedish-Russian War

1744 Transylvanian Unrest

1745-1746 Jacobite Rebellion

1745-1753 Corsica

1755-1768 Corsica

1765-1766 Hungary : Peasant Rebellion Eisenburg

1768-1772 Confederation of Bar


1773-1774 Pugachev’s Rebellion

1775 Bohemian Peasant Rebellion

1775 Malta-Rebellion of the Priests

1778-1779 War of Bavarian Succession

1784-1785 Transylvanian Peasant Revolt

1787 Prussian Invasion of the Netherlands

1788-1790 Swedish-Russian War



1 Dragoljub R. Zivojinovic, Americaka Revolucija I Dubrovacka Republika,1763-1790 (Beograd: Prosveta 1976), 49; Z. Muljacic, Obnova dubrovackeplovidbe sa Engleskom. Nase More, Vol. 1 (1959), 155; L. Voinovit LaMonarchie Francaise dans L’Adriatique (Paris 1918) 124-129.

2 J. Tadid, Spanija i Dubrovnik u XVI veku (Beograd 1932), passim; T. Popovic,Dubrovnik i Turska u XVI veku (Beograd 1972), 154-156, 171-173.

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and military service. The Span-ish kings took it upon them-selves to protect the Republic ofSt. Blaise in time of crises, whilethe Ragusan Senate, at times,supplied the Spanish court withinformation about the political,military and social conditionsand situation in Turkey.2

The connection withSpain opened new ways andmeans of acquiring a certainamount of knowledge about theSpanish colonial empire inAmerica. The Ragusans cap-tains merchants, officers,priests, adventurers were al-lowed to go live and workthroughout that vast empire.They created and circulated sto-ries of enormous wealth; every-one who ever heard these sto-ries desired to share in thatabundance of precious metals.The fact that the Ragusans wereloyal Catholics facilitated theiraccess to the New World (“Nuovo Mondo”) or Indies (‘Indie’or “Indie Nuove”), as the newly discovered continent wasknown among the people in Ragusa.

Sometimes the Ragusans had been anxious to contrivelegends in order to establish and confirm their position in theNew World. One of these was a persistent pretension thatRagusans were among the crew sailing with Columbus in 1492.There is nothing to this, as the list of the crew was preservedand published, with no Ragusans mentioned in it. BesidesColumbus, there were only four foreigners on board thoseships.3

A complete report forwarded to the Senate aboutMagellan’s circumnavigation significantly expanded knowl-edge about the New World in the Republic of Ragusa.4 Withno specific details available, the general quantity and qualityof knowledge in Ragusa, was kept to simple generalities. Thesetwo facts, the Ragusans’ knowledge of enormous wealth inprecious metals and a lack of detailed descriptions, frequently

made the New World the subject and motive of the works ofRagusan poets and literary men Marin Drzic, M. Vetranovic,Dz. Ivan Gundulic, and Dj. Junise Palmotic.5

Initial knowledge of the French and English colonies inNorth America was even scantier, if it existed at all. The pos-sessions of these powers came into existence almost a centurylater, when the presence of the Ragusans in the Spanish terri-tories had become recognized and firm. The English settle-ments along the east coast never appeared to the Ragusans asthriving and prosperous. No precious metals were discoveredthere. The system of private companies and religious com-munities, especially the Puritans, known for their lack of tol-erance towards Catholics, was not attractive to the Ragusanseither. The enforcement of the English Navigation Laws dur-ing the 17th and 18th centuries excluded all continental Eu-ropean nations, including the Ragusans, from traffic with thecolonies.

3 Duchess dt Alba, Nuevos Autografos de Colon (Madrid 1902), 7-10, publishes the original list of the crew S.E. Morison, The European Discovery ofAmerica. The Southern Voyages, 1492-1616. (New York 1974), 45-51, confirms this fact about the composition of the crew; Zivojinovic, op. cit. 19-21.

4 S. Gavrilovic, “Documents in the Archives of Ragusa Magellan’s voyage,” The Hispanic American Historical Review, XLV, 2 (1965), 595-608.5 Zivojinovic, op.cit., 26-31, 38-47.

Figure 2 - Modern Ragusa (Dubrovnik)The port of Ragusa was the economic hub of the Republic of St. Blaise in the 18th century. Ragusanships ventured far beyond the Adratic and Mediterranean seas in search of profits–to the Neth-erlands, England, and even Spanish possessions in the West Indies and South America.


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Much the same held true for the French settlements inNew France (Canada). Their geographic position, rough cli-mate, limited number of Europeans and the constant strugglesbetween the English and French, supported by the Indiantribes, made these settlements unpromising and efforts to reachthem unrewarding. Despite the fact that there existed goodrelations between France and Ragusa, the prospects ofRagusans going and trading in New France were limited in-deed. On the whole, it might be said that Ragusan knowledgeof the different parts of the New World depended on circum-stances, their pragmatic approach, and geographic conditions.6

During the course of the Seven Years’ War the atten-tion of the Ragusans gradually began to change. More news,although still insufficient regarding the French and Britishsettlements in North America, increased slightly the amount

of knowledge about them in Ragusa. News about the militaryoperations had educational value for the Ragusan Senators.However, by far the greatest attention during the war was di-rected towards its European aspects and consequences. Soonafter the war ended, Ragusans no longer had much interest inAmerica or of the significant changes underway there. Noanalysis of the consequences of the war was made; it lookedas if the Senators had neither an interest in nor need for suchan analysis. The emerging pattern of European power poli-tics, instead, remained always present in the minds of the rul-ing class in Ragusa. The Senate recognized the fact that theBritish domination of the seas became almost complete andtook pains to adjust its attitude and policies towards this in-convenient reality.

Given the circumstances and precedents, it was onlynatural that the Senate paid no attention to the situation inthe thirteen British colonies in America and the events be-hind the growing rift between them and London [Table 2].For a long time after, the Senators were blissfully unaware ofthe French interest in the British colonies as well, a fact whichcould be explained through disregard. In fact, the Senatorsand aristocracy never bothered to acquaint themselves withthe causes of the growing discontent and dissatisfaction withinthe colonies toward the new imperial policy devised byWhitehall. The complexity of the causes, arguments andcounter-arguments used by both sides excluded the possibil-ity of the Senators making an assessment, even limited inscope. Limited aims and a pragmatic approach to internationaland internal relations on the part of the Republic fostereddisregard for the English Colonies.7

Most likely, the only news, though fragmentary, to cometo Ragusa was from Rudjer Boskovic, one of the most promi-nent physicists, mathematicians and astronomers of the time.During the late 1760s, he lived in Milan and correspondedregularly with his relatives and the Senate in Ragusa. Boskovicobviously followed the intricacies of international politics andpassed bits of it on to Ragusa. Writing to his sister, Anica,from Milan, in October 1768, Boskovic insisted that the warbetween the great Powers was to break out in the course of1769. “It would have happened earlier, save for the troublesthe English are having in America.” It was the first news toreach Ragusa, although it was in a letter to private person.8

In May 1770, Boskovic wrote again to Anica that En-gland was confronted with a great deal of trouble in the colo-nies. The clash sharpened when British regulars killed sev-eral people in Boston. The incident could have forced the

6 Ibid., 15-19.7 Ibid., 49-51, 54-56.8 Z. Markovic, Rudje Boskovic, I-II (Zagreb 1968-69), II, 755; Zivojinovic, op.cit., 132-139.

Figure 3European Colonies in North America, 1750

Ragusa’s knowledge of the French and English colonies inNorth America in the 1750s was scanty at best. The eastcoast English settlements, in particular, with their tightlyknit regious communities held little attraction for CatholicRagusans.

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British government to dispatch new troops to the colonies. Incase this occurs, wrote Boskovic, the disruption between thesecolonies and London was imminent. If this happens, Englandwas bound to lose her privileges in America, predictedBoskovic.9 He was referring to the so-called “Boston Massa-cre” which occurred on March, 5, 1770, when several peoplewere killed. The incident, as well as Boskovic’s sympathiesfor France, contributed to his anti-British attitude. Thus,Anica Boskovic had more information about the state of af-fairs in the colonies than the Ragusan Senate.

After Boskovic’s arrival in Paris, in 1774, where he as-sumed a high position in the Ministry of Marine Affairs, hewas able to gain more information about the crises in the colo-nies.10 In October 1774, Boskovic reported about the meetingof the First Continental Congress of the colonies in Philadel-phia. The events brought about the crisis in the British colo-nies in America, where “the birth of a new Republic similarto the one in the Netherlands..., which will take all measuresto secure its liberty, now takes place.” A month later, Boskoviccommented upon the intensification of the clash between thecolonies and metropolis, arguing that no measures, compul-sory or otherwise, “will bring about pacification of the colo-nies.” Instead, he claimed, unity among the colonies will bestrengthened.

9 Markovic, ibid., II, 760.10 Boskovic to the Seante, Paris, June 6, 1774. Gradja za zivot I rad Ridjera

Boskovica, I-II (Zagreb, 1950-57), I, 13-14, 17-18; Markovic, Boskovic, II,831; Zivojinovic, op.cit., 140-141.

“the birth of a new Republicsimilar to the one in the

Netherlands..., which will

take all measures to secureits liberty, now takes place.”

Ragusa had small interest in, and received little news of, the eventsleading up to the American Revolution. Rudjer Boskovic, a promi-nent physicist, mathematician and astronomer, wrote his sisterin Ragusa of the increasing tensions and conflict between GreatBritain and its North American colonies including the BostonMassacre.

Figure 4 - Rudjer Boskovic Table 2Events Leading to the American Revolution, 1754-1775

1754-63 French and Indian War (Seven Years War)

1763 Proclamation of 1763

1764 Sugar ActCurrency Act

1765 Quartering ActStamp ActThe Stamp Act Congress

1766 Repeal of Stamp ActDeclaratory ActQuartering Act in New York

1767 Townshend ActsNonimportation Agreements“Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvaniato the Inhabitants of the British Colonies.”

1768 Massachusetts Circular Letter

1769 Virginia’s Resolutions

1770 Townshend ActsAn End to Non-importationConflict between citizens and British troopsin New YorkBoston Massacre

1772 The “Gaspee Affair”Committees of Correspondence

1773 Tea ActBoston Tea Party

1774 Coercive ActsQuartering ActThe First Continental CongressNew England Prepares for War

1775 New England Restraining ActLexington and ConcordThe Second Continental CongressWashington named commander-in-chiefBunker HillOlive Branch PetitionCongress Treats with the IndiansCongress Creates a NavyCongress Searches for Foreign Aid


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America’s War for Independence, 1776-1783

Once the colonies had claimed their independence andbecome engaged in fierce fighting with the British army andnavy in the autumn of 1776, Ragusan diplomacy quickly tooknotice. Diplomats and consuls carefully watched militarypreparations in France, Spain and England. They did not ruleout the possibility of a new war, while endeavoring to pre-serve Ragusan neutrality to avoid conflicts with different pow-ers and to provide attractive business opportunities and goodearnings for their merchant marine. In September 1776, theRagusan diplomatic agent in Vienna, Sebastian d’Ayala, com-mented that Great Britain was in a difficult situation, espe-cially in regard to France and Spain. He repeated this severaltimes later on, adding that the internal situation was not prom-ising either.11 Ayala’s assessment of the situation was correct,as England found herself isolated, in confrontation with sev-eral hostile nations, militarily unprepared, and above all, tooarrogant to look for allies.

Early in 1776, Congress named commissioners to treatwith foreign nations. Congress sent a delegation of three mento Europe–Silas Deane, Benjamin Franklin, and Arthur Lee–to prepare treaties of commerce and friendship, and to at-tempt to secure loans from foreign nations. France was the guiding spirit of the anti-British coalition, which included Spain,the Netherlands, the colonies and several minor states. Secret aid given to the colonies by France and Spain and propagandacarried out by French agents were soon to bear fruit.12 It was only natural that Ragusa, slowly and reluctantly, always guided byher natural instincts for survival as well as inner sympathies, drew closer to the Bourbons, notably France. The increase inFrench aid to the rebellious colonies opened new possibilities for Ragusan captains, who became anxious to exploit thembecause they could charge two or three times more for their services than in normal times. The propensity of the captains to usethe opportunity and make extraordinary earnings clashed with the strict orders of the Senate not to accept such cargoes,repeated on several occasions in 1776-1777 and later on to consuls and captains. Fear of British retaliation appeared to be themajor deferment to Ragusan engagement in this lucrative business. This contributed perceptibly to the ever-growing resent-ment of England, her policies and maritime domination. Thus, it is no wonder that the Senate was watching with approval theefforts of the Bourbons to rid themselves of Britain’s maritime supremacy.13

From 1777 on, Ayala and the Ragusan diplomatic agent in Paris, Francesco Favi, kept forwarding to the Senate informa-tion and news about the current state of affairs in Europe and America. Their reports were very elaborate and incisive, and assuch had substantial value for the Senators in Ragusa. The policies of France and Spain towards the colonies were analyzed ingreat detail, especially the matter of secret aid in arms, ammunition equipment for war, the problem of American ships anchor-ing in French and Spanish ports, and British protests against this with the French Foreign Minister, Count Vergennes.14 Ayalaclaimed that England, in view of such contingencies, could have declared war against France had she wanted to. Ayala ven-tured even further when claiming, though discreetly, that Britain could not, in her dispute with the Americans, count upon thesupport of other parts of the Empire or even of Loyalists in the colonies themselves. Ayala warned the Senate about thepossibility of England gaining support from Austria, Russia and Prussia in her efforts to suppress the rebellion and weaken the

Figure 5 - American Declaration of IndependenceAfter the Colonies declared their independence from Great Britain,Rugusan diplomats began to pay close attention to events inAmerica. While there was some sympathy for the colonies’struggle, it was the possibility of war and power shifts in Europethat concerned the Ragusan Senate. Ragusan captains sought toexploit the conflict, charging two to three times more for shippingcargos. Fear of British retaliation soon deterred this lucrativebusiness.

11 Ayala to the Senate, Vienna, September 27, 1776. Acta Sanctae Mariae Maioris, XVIII, series 31.3062/8. Historical Archives in Dubrovnik (Ragusa).Hereafter cited as ASMM – XVIII; Zivojinovic, op.cit., 54-55.

12 E. S. Corwin, French Policy and the American Alliance (Princeton, 1916), 121-149; Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Diplomacy of the American Revolution(Bloomington, 1957), 21-22; Zivojinovic, op.cit., 55-56.

13 Zivojinovic, ibid., 57-58.14 Ayala to the Senate, Vienna, July 24, 1777. ASMM-XVIII, 31.3062/17; Zivojinovic, ibid., 59.

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Bourbon coalition. The Ragusan agent frequently sent newsabout military operations in America, as well as reactions offoreign ministries to these. Ayala’s reports revealed evidentsympathy for the struggle of the colonies for freedom and ap-parent contempt for and distrust of Britain and her policies.He also kept in touch with William Lee, sent by Congress ona diplomatic mission to Vienna and Berlin. In the spring of1778, Ayala met with Lee in Vienna, and in the letters to theSenate described him as a “representative of the United Statesof America.” Lee’s failure to secure official reception by Em-press Maria Theresa was explained by Ayala as a result of thefact that there existed between the Courts in London andVienna a cordial relationship and understanding.15 Ayala’sreports made the Senate even more conscious of the possibledangers and the complexity of the situation, adding to its de-cision to stay aside from the conflict.

Well educated, Arthur Lee, brother of William, was con-sidered an intellectual presence in London. Graduating withhonors from Edinburgh University with a degree in medicine,he also studied law in London before abandoning these ca-reers to write political tracts in support of the colonies. Un-der various pen names, Lee was as prolific as he was patriotic.His pamphlets were distributed throughout Europe andAmerica and served to rally sympathizers in support of theAmerican cause. A 1775 editorial in the Virginia Gazettepraised “the amiable Dr. Lee, admired by all for his literaryabilities and excellent pieces in Vindication of the colonies,shines conspicuously as one of the first patriots of his age.”

With war imminent, the Continental Congress namedLee its secret agent in London. In this role he made contactwith the French agent, Beaumarchais, and initiated a flow ofsupplies between France and America. A few months later,Congress named Lee, along with Benjamin Franklin and SilasDeane, as Commissioners to the court of Versailles. It alsomade William its commercial agent in French ports. By Juneof 1776, both brothers were in Paris. William Lee later be-came commissioner to the courts of Berlin and Vienna. ArthurLee, in concert with Franklin and Deane, made overtures tothe Courts of Madrid and Berlin. Neither Germany nor Spainintended to establish diplomatic relations with the new na-tion until France entered the war; thus their efforts to secureinternational support for the American cause proved futile.The careers of William and Arthur Lee were impeded by bit-ter debates with Silas Deane, each questioning the other’sallegiance to his country. The controversy divided the Conti-

15 Ayala to the Senate, Vienna, April 2, May 4, June 9, 18, 25, July 1, 1778.ASMM-XVIII, 31.3062/5 45, 49, 53, 54, 55, 56; Robert B. Morris, ThePeacemakers: The Great Powers and the American Independence (NewYork, 1970), 152; Zivojinovic, op.cit., 60-62.

Table 3America During the Age of Revolution, 1776-1789

1776 “Common Sense”

The British evacuate Boston

Congress authorizes the Colonies towrite constitutions

Congress declares the Colonies’ independence

Battle of Long Island

Congress names commissioners to treatwith foreign nations

The Battle of White Plains

Retreat through New Jersey

Battle of Trenton

1777 Battle of Princeton

The British attack Philadelphia

Battle of Saratoga

The “Conway Cabal”

Articles of Confederation

1778 Franco-America Alliance

The British attempt to make peace

John Paul Jones wins American victories at sea

The Battle of Monmouth

1779 The British attack in North and South

Spain joins the war

1780 The British take Charleston, South Carolina

A mutiny in the Continental Army

The treason of Benedict Arnold

1781 Congress creates a Department of Finance

The Articles of Confederation are ratified

The Battle of Yorktown

1782 Peace negotiations begin in Paris

1783 The Army Complains

Congress Ratifies the Preliminary Articlesof Peace

The Loyalists and British Evacuate New York

The American Army Disbands

Congress Is Threatened


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nental Congress in a vituperative de-bate. The political infighting resulted inthe reorganization of the diplomaticcorps and all but one of the positionsheld by the two brothers was eliminated.Neither brother was ever reappointedto an important government post.

After the Americans triumphedover the British forces at Saratoga inOctober 1777, the French court decidedto take a decisive step towards the con-clusion of a treaty of alliance and friend-ship with the United States. The treatywas signed in February 1778, bringingFrance openly to the American side andpreparing the ground for a new war withGreat Britain. The prospects of Spainjoining in were left open.16 The contentsof the treaty were quickly forwarded to Ragusa, while an as-sessment of its possible implications became the subject ofnumerous reports by diplomats and consuls. For AndreaRangoni, consul in Marseille, the treaty opened the road forwar, militarily and commercially; in this respect, Rangoni fore-cast vast possibilities for neutral shipping.17

Favi commented that the treaty was concluded on thebasis of mutual equality and reciprocity, and that Englandcould not hope to revive her commercial exchange withAmerica.18 Ayala insisted that a military conflict was unavoid-able, although both sides took time to prepare respective naviesand armies for the pending struggle.19

Both Ayala and Favi took trouble to enlighten the Sena-tors about the causes of future war and its possible conse-quences throughout the world. Ayala argued that France “de-cided to exploit present circumstances in order to diminishBritish power.” Later on, he suggested that the decision toenter war ought to be ascribed to the desire of France to “com-pensate herself for the losses sustained in the past.” Favi sharedthese views, but added that France had to act for internalreasons as well. He warned that the British chances to get thecolonies under control in a war in which “France, Spain andthe Americans acted jointly were becoming very slim, indeed.”Such a claim was not quite correct, as Spain was not a mem-

Figure 6 - British General Burgoyne Surrenders at the Battle of SaratogaAfter the American victory at the Battle of Saratoga in 1777, France officially entered thewar on the side of the Colonies. Ragusan diplomats correctly concluded that Francedecided to make war for reasons of her own and not out of love for the Americans.

16 Bemis, ibid., 62-65.17 Rangoni to the Senate, Marseilles, March 21, 1778. ASMM-XVIII, 76.31115/73. The consul proposed that Ragusan ships be allowed to exploit the opportu-

nity offered, but his proposal stood no chance of being entertained by the Senate; Zivojinovic, op.cit., 64.18 Favi to the Senate, Paris, July 20, October 12, 1778. ASMM-XVIII, book XX/2514, XX2518; Z. Muljacic, Americka revolucija I dubrovacka pororska

trgovina. Pomorski Zbornik 6 (Zadar 1968), 523.19 Zivojinovic, op.cit., 64-65.20 Zivojinovic, ibid., 65-66.21 The Senate to Favi, Ragusa, June 13, 1778. Letters e Commissioni di Ponente vol. 108, folio 34; Zivojinovic, ibid., 66-67.

ber of the alliance, and, in fact, voiced her disapproval ofFrance’s decision to sign the treaty with the rebellious colo-nies. The Ragusan diplomats correctly concluded that Francedecided to make war for reasons of her own and not out oflove for the Americans.20

Confronted with growing crises and pending war, theRagusan Senate, although reluctantly, defined the attitude ofthe Republic and revealed its most intimate sentiments to-wards the belligerents. In a letter to Favi, dated June 13, 1778,the Senate admitted that the outbreak of war was imminent,thus creating a great deal of anxiety and uncertainty for theRepublic. Significantly, the Senate had indicated that withina short time there would occur a change in the existing order“fra giorni si debba veder qualche mutazione del presentesistema.” This sentence most likely reflected a deeply sup-pressed dissatisfaction with and protest against British domi-nation over the seas and oceans, as well as the Senate’s inner-most desire to have it ended after the war. The statement im-plicitly could also have meant a tacit approval for France andher support for the embattled Americans.21

In Favi’s letter dated July 20, 1778, he noted: “In mypreceding letter of the 11th of May, I had the honor of in-forming Your Excellencies that the departure of the Frenchsquadron dispatched to America under the command of the

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Comte d”Estaing appeared to make a conflict between Franceand Great Britain inevitable. Events have confirmed thisopinion, and war can be said to have begun between the twopowers, although there is not a formal declaration of it asyet...

This ministry has received ratified contract signed withUnited States of America, which Congress brought unani-mous. Most of the articles of that contract concerning trad-ing were published in the newspapers in London and in theNetherlands, and soon they will be published in other Euro-pean public papers.”

Soon after war broke out in 1775, the Senate decidedto tighten control over the merchant marine and the cap-tains, while demanding from France that it grant the Ragusanships freedom to visit her ports and carry out business regu-larly, as if there were normal times. This decision of the Sen-ate, in accordance with its neutrality policy, brought aboutgrumblings on the part of the captains, but to no avail. Insubsequent months the Senate tightened again its control overthe merchant marine by voting several new regulations whichprohibited the purchase of ships belonging to the belligerentsas well as those built in their shipyards. This was done uponthe demand of France. Severe fines were set for those whodisobeyed the laws. Similar orders and laws were voted by theSenate several times, thus showing that these were not car-ried out properly and that the captains tended to disregardthem. The extension of the war, after Spain joined France, inthe summer of 1779 brought about new examples of disobedi-ence of the laws on the part of the captains. This threatenedto involve the Republic in a clash not only with ever-suspi-cious Britain, but even with the Bourbon states as well.22

Spain’s entry into the war immediately drew the atten-tion of the Ragusan diplomats and the Senate immediately.Her reluctance to join France despite mutual interests andanxiety to see Britain defeated could not but puzzle theRagusans. The Spanish court, however, had definite reasonsfor avoiding war if possible and achieving its aims through diplomatic deals. Carlo M. Dodero, consul in Cadiz, insistedthat Spain, despite hesitation had to involve herself in thewar on the French side. Favi was more specific, arguing thatSpain wanted to negotiate with England, and only if she failedto achieve her goals would she declare war.23 Spain, however,would not make her decision only for “helping the Frenchand Americans, but to return Gibraltar.” In December 1778,Favi assured nervous Senators that if Spain would enter the

war, this eventwould “speed up thedefeat of Britain.”24

The Senate ex-pressed satisfactionfor such informa-tion. In March1779, Ayala con-firmed Favi’s infor-mation, adding thatdelay was out ofsheer necessity,namely from aSpanish desire toprotect possessionsin America. In May,after the Conven-tion of Aranjuez be-tween France andSpain was signed,Ayala wrote thatCharles III refusedto recognize the in-dependence of theAmerican republic, its system and constitution. Thus, the Sen-ate was made aware of Spain’s policies and apprehensions inregard to the American republic.25

France as a member of the Bourbon Alliance with Spainencouraged that country to enter the war. In the April 121779 secret Convention of Aranjuez, the conditions for Spain’sentry were established. This Convention activated the articlesof the Bourbon Family Compact relating to mutual assistancein case of war. It contained an article relating to mutual assis-tance for the invasion of Britain in accordance with the op-erational plans then held in France. Spain promised not tomake a separate peace, recognizing France’s obligation to theAmerican colonies not to make peace unless American inde-pendence was secured. “The critical section of the conven-tion related to the war aims of the Bourbons. Spain and Francepromised not to end the war until the former had obtainedthe restitution of Gibraltar and the latter the abrogation ofthe restrictions placed in 1763 upon fortifying Dunkirk.Floridablanca (the Spanish negotiator) tried unsuccessfullyto insert the capture of Minorca and the Atlantic coast ofFlorida into the category of absolute preconditions for peace.

Figure 7 - King Charles III of SpainAlthough Spain did join France in the waragainst Great Britain in 1779, Ragusadiplomat Sebastian Ayala noted indispatches that King Charles III refused torecognize American independence andits constitution.

22 Zivojinovic, ibid., 67-69.23 Ibid., 70-72.24 Favi to the Senate, Paris, November 23, December 7, 1778. ASMM-XVIII, book XX/2520, XX/2521.25 Ayala to the Senate, Vienna, June 3, 779, ibid., 31.3062/97; Zivojinovic, op.cit., 73.


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Each powerthen stated itsother war goals.France an-nounced its in-tention to ac-quire the expul-sion of theBritish fromNewfoundland,freedom ofcommerce andthe right to for-tify her tradingposts in India,the recovery ofSenegal, theretention ofDominica, andthe rectificationof the Treaty ofUtrecht (1713),governing com-mercial rela-tions with Brit-

ain. Spain announced her intention to obtain the reacquisi-tion of East and West Florida, the expulsions of the Englishfrom their illegal settlements on the Bay of Honduras, therevocation of English timber rights on the coast of Campeche,and the restitution of Minorca.”

When the navy and army needs for each objective ofthe Convention are considered, it is clear the convention re-flected a Europe-centered approach to the war. The Ameri-can Colonies were not directly mentioned. An invasion planwas a central feature of the convention, drawn up by Frenchofficials Sartine and Montbarey. The plan, ready since March19, called for 20,000 troops to occupy the Isle of Wight andsubsequently to land at Gosport from which the Portsmouthnaval arsenal and hopefully the British fleet could be de-stroyed. Vergennes hoped the transports and supply ships couldbe collected by the end of May. Spain was to pay for the inva-sion. The Irish nationalists were extremely interested in in-vading Britain, and both Spain and France had Irish Regi-ments which would have been enthusiastic participants. Vari-ous French generals, including Lafayette, sought command ofthe invasion force. It was to be a quick and decisive stroke,but “Since to attack England would require 70,000 infantry

and 5,000 cavalry, Vergennes (the leading French minister)suggested instead attacking Ireland with 27,000 infantry and3,000 cavalry, half to be provided by each country. Vergennesexpected the Irish, particularly the Irish Presbyterians withtheir passion of democracy, to rise against the English….”When the Spanish made clear they would not provide troops,but only limited naval support, Vergennes began to consideralternative invasion plans. This went on all through the sum-mer of 1779. One plan after another was studied and put onhold. The situation was finally resolved in August, 1779, whenthe combined French and Spanish fleet could not find anddestroy the English fleet protecting the British Isles, suchdestruction being the prerequisite for invasion. The troopswaiting to attack were needed for other missions. Though Brit-ain did not know it at the time, it gained its first priorityobjective in August, 1779. The French minister, Vergennes,gradually moved the focus of the war to the Western Hemi-sphere, though the terms of the Convention were not changed.

Throughout Ayala’s, Favi’s and Dodero’s letters and re-ports, a feeling of sympathy for the Americans and an evidentlack of sympathy for England constantly prevailed. In com-menting on the contents of a speech from the throne deliv-ered before Parliament by King George III on December 26,1778, in which he insisted that Great Britain would fightagainst the French and Americans until a victorious end, Faviexpressed the view that it could not be so. He admitted thatEngland could inflict substantial losses on her enemies by ex-tending the war. However, the war “will cause the greatestdamages to her and, thus speed up her fall.” Favi also wasfamiliar with the failure of the British mission, headed by EarlCarlisle, sent to America in order to achieve reconciliationwith the colonies. This and other developments led Favi toconclude, early in 1779, that despite internal conflicts andforeign pressures, America had secured its freedom and inde-pendence. Great Britain would, ultimately, have to withdrawfrom her former colonies because her armies achieved no suc-cesses and the Americans refused to entertain a proposal, asoutlined by Earl Carlisle, to give up their struggle and securemere autonomy within the Empire.26

The Ragusan diplomats did not hide their sentimentswhen confronted with various, sometimes sinister, initiativesat mediation. Rumors which spread and steps which were ac-tually taken claimed their attention and prompted reactions.The first intimation about the alleged initiative by EmpressCatherine II came to Ragusa in the spring of 1779, but it wasnot a clearly formulated proposal. Ayala claimed that “therewas some possibility that the Powers considered the proposal

26 Zivojinovic, ibid., 74-78.

Figure 8 - King George III of EnglandOn December 26, 1778, King George III gavea speech in which he insisted that Great Brit-ain would fight against the French andAmericans to a victorious end. Rugusa dip-lomat Favi wrote home that while Englandcould inflict substantial losses on her en-emies the war “will cause the greatest dam-ages to her and, thus speed up her fall.”

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because of Russia’s influence with European courts.”27 Noth-ing came of it at that time, but the rumors received a newimpetus in August 1779, when it became apparent that theEmpress indeed intended to intervene in order to prevent afurther spread of the war. Favi insisted that England wouldnever accept this and that the war would go on. Consul Doderosounded very optimistic about the outcome of the struggle,adding that mediation stood no chance of being accepted byAmerica, France and Spain. He voiced optimism as to theoutcome of the war and predicted heavy defeat for Great Brit-ain at the hands of skilled forces. In the summer of 1779,Dodero wrote the Senate: “Poor English, after they have lostthe support of their colonies, and the Dutch, they are nowconfronted with the loss of their maritime empire.” Doderovoiced a goal which was so dear to the Bourbons and otherEuropean states, including Ragusa as well. He also claimedthat after victory over Britain, which he believed was assured,France would put upon her throne an absolutist king whowould be forced to change British maritime policy and, thuswould open seas, oceans and seaways for free use by all na-tions. Also, England would be allowed to keep only a smallnumber of her men-of-war.28 It was a dream hardly realizable.Even Ayala came close to Dodero’s pretensions, claiming that“the cause of Britain in America was in a very poor shape.’Despite wild rumors and pretensions, no mediation effortsseemed to have attracted much attention by the fall of 1779.Ayala confirmed this in November 1779, remarking that “noone wants to negotiate at this moment.”29

When Congress, in the fall of 1779, appointed severalcommissioners to join Benjamin Franklin in order to negoti-ate for peace, word of it spread quickly throughout Europeancapitals. The appointment of John Adams and John Jay madeAyala attentive as well. In December 1779, Ayala wrote thatrumors had it that negotiations between England and theAmericans would start in Bruxelles soon. He did not believethis was possible, as he assumed that the Americans wouldnot renounce their independence and freedom and return totheir earlier status within the Empire. Besides, Ayala claimedthat the clashes between the government and opposition inEngland made the aims of the Americans easier to achieve.With a bit of irony he wrote in late 1779 that it was not “cus-tomary for the enlightened ministers (of His Majesty), as theywere, to believe that they can pacify the colonies easily, de-spite the fact that these enjoy the support of two great pow-ers. This view was even more unusual in view of the fact that

England could not defeat the colonies at a time when the colo-nies were fighting alone.30 Ayala assessed the weaknesses ofthe British position, the prospects of the war and its ultimateoutcome. He was critical of British policies, arguing that itwas a consequence of “the political blindness, unrealistic andstubborn policy, contrary to the interests of the majority ofEuropean powers.” Such a conclusion, most likely, elated theSenators, although no reaction on their part is known. Ayalaand Favi continued to report on Adams’ activities in Parisand The Hague.

In the spring and summer of 1780, despite British mili-tary successes in the southern colonies (the fall of Carolinaand Charleston) and French defeats in the West Indies, theRagusan diplomats never doubted that the Americans wouldcome out victorious and repudiate all mediation of forts whichwould deprive them of their freedom. Ayala claimed, accu-rately enough, that the British commanders had been unableto defeat the Americans on the battlefields, who were pre-pared to fight, thus advancing the cause of liberty. In fact, theAmericans were growing stronger, “radiating forcefully thespirit of independence.”31 Favi tended to agree with this esti-

27 Ayala to the Senate, Vienna, March 29, April 19, 1779. ASMM-XVIII, 31.3062/88, 31.3062/91; Zivojinovic, op.cit., 81-82.28 Dodero to the Senate, Cadiz, August 6, 1779. ASMM-XVIII, 88.3127/83.29 Ayala to the Senate, Vienna, November 4, 1779. ibid., 31.3062/114; Zivojinovic, op.cit., 83-84.30 Ayala to the Senate, Vienna, December 20, 1779. Ibid. 31.3062/119; Zivojinovic, ibid., 85-86.31 Ayala to the Senate, Vienna , June 8, 1780. ibid.32.3063/6.

Figure 9 - Benjamin Franklin in ParisWhen Congress appointed several commissioners in the fall of1779, including John Adams and John Jay, to join the popularBenjamin Franklin in Paris, word of coming peace negotiationsspread quickly throughout Europe. Rugusa diplomat Ayala dis-missed the rumors because he believed the Americans wouldnot renounce their independence from Great Britain.


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mate, adding thatthe resolution ofCongress of Janu-ary 31, 1780, repu-diated rumors thatthe United Stateswas ready to nego-tiate with England.According to Favi,the resolution“shows clearly theintention of theAmericans to pre-serve their inde-pendence and free-dom, which every-body feels now.”32

On this occasion,as in earlier in-stances, Ayala andFavi again clearlyprojected their con-fidence about theAmerican victory.

In the fallof 1780 Ayala un-leashed a severe at-tack upon Britishduplicity and herefforts to get Spainto leave the war. He

accused Whitehall of spreading false rumors in order to makethe Spaniards fear for the future of their American empire.After explaining possible reasons for this British policy, Ayalainsisted that the “English lords would like to create fear inMadrid for her colonies by suggesting that what has happenedto them could happen elsewhere” He discarded such a possi-bility outright and explained that between the British andSpanish colonies there “existed enormous differences.” Theformer, having “developed all sciences and crafts, were equalwith every European state.” The latter, however have been inthe “state of original underdevelopment and ignorance.” Thisfact made obvious that the “desire for freedom might be bornafter several generations only.”33 Such comparison had edu-

cational value for the senators, helping them to acquire knowl-edge about the state of advancement of the colonies inAmerica and to understand the causes of the conflict betweenthem and the metropolis.

In the summer of 1780 Catherine II and her wily Chan-cellor, Count Nikita Panin, decided to mediate on the basis ofa division of the former colonies. Several of them, free of Brit-ish military presence, would secure independence while oth-ers (the southern states, Long Island and New York) wouldhave to recognize British sovereignty. George III and LordNorth refused the idea, while Count Vergennes was preparedto accept it. If realized, it would have freed France from herobligations toward the Americans and still made her appearto be fulfilling the provisions of the treaty of alliance.Vergennes took it upon himself to secure American accep-tance of the proposal. Emperor Joseph II of Austria joinedCatherine II in the venture.34

Ayala and Favi, although not completely familiar withthe nature of the mediation proposal, claimed that the Rus-sian initiative did not include the recognition of the Ameri-can Republic. Ayala also noticed that France had changedher stand and was ready to negotiate; he did not know aboutthe plan for the division of the colonies. In view of the Britishrefusal to accept the proposal for recognition of Americanindependence, Ayala concluded, quite correctly, that themediation by the two European empires stood no chance ofcoming about. In June 1781, sensing intuitively the divergentviews of Vergennes and Congress, Ayala argued that theAmericans did not depend upon France and her support. “TheAmericans began fighting and went on for several years, whiletheir courage and activity declined and diminished from themoment France joined to help them.”35 This, of course, wasan exaggeration, but it indicated the readiness of the newRepublic to go on fighting without France, if necessary. Ulti-mately, British refusal made mediation efforts pointless andfruitless.

The British defeat at Yorktown at the hands of theAmerican and French forces in October 1781, changed thesituation completely. The news of this reached Ragusa soonafter it was known in London and Paris. Early in December1781, Favi mailed a detailed description of the surrender ofGeneral Cornwallis and his troops. For Favi it was the end,since after the surrender of Cornwallis and his army “Englandwill not succeed in her efforts to reconquer America which is

32 Favi to the Senate, Paris, June 19, 1780. Ibid. book XX/3057/3. The Senate thanked Alya and Favi for information sent, adding that they have satisfied thecuriosity of the Senators; Zivojinovic, op.cit., 92.

33 Ayala to the Senate, Vienna, October 9, 1780. ASMM-XVIII, 32.3063/22; Zivojinovic, ibid., 94-95. Ayala also confirmed the belief that the British positionin North America was anything but envious.

34 Morris, ibid., 157-170.35 Ayala to the Senate, Vienna, June 4, 1781. ASMM-XVIII, 32.3063/50; for a detailed analysis, see Zivojinovic, op.cit., 98-103.

Figure 10 - Catherine II of RussiaIn 1780, Catherine II, through herChancellor, Count Nikita Panin, offered tomediate in the American conflict–thosecolonies currently free of the Britishmilitary presence would gainindependence while the others wouldhave to recognize British sovereignty.None of the parties involved wereinterested. Before the end of theAmerican Revolution, virtually everymajor European power would becomeinvolved in some way, and, the RagusanSenate, with its excellent diplomaticnetwork, were kept informed of alldevelopments.

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considered to be lost for her.”36 The Senate, after receivingthe news, in disbelief, demanded more information about it.This demand was satisfied instantly, when Ragusan noble-man and composer Luksa Sorkocevic (Sorgo) (1734-1789)was told in Vienna by responsible Austrian statesmen, in De-cember 1781, that England stood no chance of “forcing theAmericans to return to their previous status, since they be-came most independent.”37 Subsequent news only confirmedhis impression that the British defeat in America was com-plete and that the independence of the colonies was assuredin a war which “England initiated without reason and carriedout badly.” Certainly, this was another indication as to whatthe Ragusan diplomats thought about British policies in thetime of the crisis.

Operations on land and sea, naturally, attracted the at-tention of consuls and diplomats; senators were constantlydemanding the most recent information about the strengthof the fleets in harbors or on the high seas, and of the armiesin the fields. Consuls and diplomats eagerly responded to suchdemands, describing fully the vicissitudes in fighting, coop-eration among the allies, their successes and defeats. Thanksto numerous letters, the senators acquired substantial knowl-edge about North America and the West Indies–of rivers,plains, ports, mountains and islands. The names of admiralsd’Estaing and De Grasse, commanding the French fleets, gen-erals Lafayette, Rochambeau, Washington, Baron von Steubenand Nathaniel Green, on the American side, and admiralsHardy, Parker, Rodney, Byron and generals William Howe,Clinton and Cornwallis, on the British, became familiar fig-ures for the senators and citizens of Ragusa.38

From the reports of consuls and diplomats, despite fre-quent defeats and failures on the battlefields, it became clearthat the American and French alliance was working smoothly,while their confidence in ultimate success seemed unshak-able. Sometimes, Ragusan diplomats were privy to well-keptsecrets such as, for example, a plan for a joint Gallo-Spanishlanding in England in the summer of 1779 stipulated in Ar-ticle 11 of the secret convention of Aranjuez, concluded be-tween Spain and France early in 1779. Consul Dodero sentinformation about the strength of the joint fleets and theircommanding officers and the readiness to end the war by in-vading southern England. However, the inactivity of the fleetsmade the operation a complete failure, a fact which was men-

tioned in Ayala’s re-ports. Familiar withthe lack of defenseand confusion in En-gland, Ayala severelycastigated admiralsOrvilliers andCordoba, the com-manding officers ofthe Gallo-Spanish ar-mada, for lacking ini-tiative and courage.He believed it was anopportunity to endthe war, since the su-periority of the jointfleets “could have de-stroyed, in a singlebattle, the majorforces of the Britishstate.”39 Ayala inti-mately expected suchan outcome of theoperation and musthave been disap-pointed with the decision brought about in Paris to withdrawthe naval forces and to order their return to Coruna and Brest.

The British military presence and successes in Georgiaand South Carolina during 1779 threatened to end in the com-plete control of the southern Colonies. Favi, however, believedthe British successes were of minor significance and that Geor-gia was useless for them. Moreover, he insisted that the En-glish troops “will withdraw alone or will be expelled by theAmericans.”40 The British successes were temporary, since theAmericans were determined to preserve their independence.Neither did Ayala pay much attention to operations in Geor-gia and South Carolina. When the British troops, in May 1779,put Charleston under siege, Ayala insisted that it matteredvery little. “As long as the American forces and the colonies-keep-together, fighting for their constitutional order,” wroteAyala, “the rest matters very little and does not deserve theattention of the public.”41 The Senators also were informedabout the French naval efforts in the West Indies and the dar-

36 Favi to the Senate, Paris, December 10, 1781. ASMM-XVIII, book XX/3057, 16, described in detail the causes of the defeat of the British army at Yorktown;H. H. Peckham, The War for Independence: A Military History (Chicago, 1959), 187-188 describes the development of British strategy.

37 Diary of Luksa Sorkocevic (Sorgo), Vienna, December 22, 1781, folio 96, Historic Archives in Dubrovnik; Zivojinovic, op.cit., 104-105.38 Zivojinovic, ibid., 107-109.39 Ayala to the Senate, Vienna, September 20, 1779. ASMM-XVIII, 32.3063/115; Morris, The Peacemakers, 39-40.40 Favi to the Senate, Paris, March 1, 8; April 5, May 3, 10, 31, 1779. ASMM-XVIII, book XX/2527, XX/2528, XX2530, XX/2531, XX/2532.41 Ayala to the Senate, Vienna, August 3, 1779. Ibid., 31.3062/106; Zivojinovic, op.cit., 113-14.

Figure 11British General Lord CornwallisIn 1781, diplomat Favi wrote a detaileddispatch of the of the surrender ofCornwallis to American troops atYorktown, declaring “England will notsucceed in her efforts to reconquerAmerica...” The Ragusan Senate,stunned by the news, demanded moreinformation.


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ing exploits of the famous American privateer John Paul Jonesin the waters around the British Isles.

When British General Clinton decided to exploit ini-tial successes in the South and invaded South Carolina, thecrisis for the Americans seemed to gain momentum. On May12, 1780, the American garrison in Charleston surrenderedto General Cornwallis, 5500 Americans being taken prisoner,together with enormous war booty. The extent of the defeat,one of the heaviest suffered by the Americans during the war,was described in some detail by both Favi and Ayala. Theywere suspicious initially and thought it was one of British tricksdesigned to confuse the Europeans and discourage Americanallies. Long after the fall of Charleston, in July 1780, Ayalaexpressed doubts that Clinton’s troops had taken the city.Moreover, he claimed the British situation in the colonies was“very bad.” Favi insisted that the British would have to giveup the siege and that general Clinton had been killed.42

The fall of Charleston, when confirmed, caused shockamong America’s friends in Europe. Ayala admitted ruefullythe news caused great surprise. His confidence was shaken, ashe conceded that the loss of Charleston was a serious setbackfor the Americans, which were thus left without men, shipsand guns. Yet, despite admission of the defeat, Favi kept hisoptimism about the ultimate outcome of the war high indeed,maintaining that it would not interfere with the morale ofthe troops and slow down future operations.43

When the operations moved into the area betweenNorth Carolina and Virginia, Favi followed closely all reportsreaching the French capital. He was elated to report that theBritish forces, commanded by Colonel Ferguson, were defeatedby the Americans near King’s Mountain, early in October1780. The defeat, according to Favi, confirmed the weaknessof the British hold over Carolina, forcing Clinton to with-draw his forces to Charleston. Further encounters betweenthe two armies found place in Favi’s reports to the Senate aswell.44 He described the battles at Cowpens, fought early inJanuary 1781, where the British had suffered a heavy defeat,and at Guilford House, in March, and Hobkirk Hill, wherethe British won after sustaining heavy losses. Favi, while ad-mitting the outcome of the battles, argued that the Britishwould be unable to exploit them. “The English are paying for

their victories too dearly,” concluded Favi. A similar view wasexpressed as well by General Clinton in a report to the Britishgovernment.45

Final operations in Virginia and the French- Americancooperation there in the summer and fall of 1783 were watchedclosely by Favi. He believed that the final battle could be foughtthere, described the set-up around Yorktown, the arrival ofthe French fleet from the West Indies under De Grasse andthe inability of Clinton to send reinforcements to Cornwallissurrounded by the Americans and French in the Chesapeake.Favi believed them to be “fatal” for Cornwalis.46 In a letter tothe Senate after the news about the surrender reached Paris,he concluded that it was “a debacle for Great Britain.” Favicontinued to send information about military operations, buthis attention soon shifted towards other theaters of war–theWest Indies, Florida and Gibraltar. By early 1782, the primeenemies had become the Bourbons, France and Spain, againstwhich the British government decided to wage war-with allremaining energy.47 In North America the British forces evacu-ated all territories in the interior, while keeping garrisons inmajor ports along the coast–Charleston, Savannah and NewYork.

Reports sent to the Senate about military campaignsacquainted the Senators with the ways the war was fought,with the strength of the armies and navies, with the enthusi-asm as well as the crises that the Americans were undergoingduring the struggle. These reports made the Senators awareof the internal situation in belligerent countries and thestrength of the French-American alliance. Consuls and dip-lomats demonstrated abundantly their unreserved support andsympathy for the struggle of the Americans for freedom andindependence, on the one hand, and the distrust of and ha-tred for Great Britain, on the other hand. They eagerly wishedher defeat in Europe and America.48

42 Ayala to the Senate, Vienna, June 8, 1780. ASMM-XVIII, 32.3063/6; Favi to the Senate, Paris, July 3, 1780. Ibid., book XX/3057, 3.43 Ayala to the Senate, Vienna, July 3, 1780. Ibid. 32.3063/10; Favi to the Senate, Paris, July 3, 1780. Ibid., book XX/3038; Zivojinovic, op.cit., 118-119.44 Favi to the Senate, Paris, January 1, 15, February 26, April 16, 1781. ASMM-XVIII, book XX/3045, book XX/ 3057, 9, book XX/3038; Peckham, op.cit. 147-

152.45 Favi to the Senate, Paris, May 14, 21, June 18, 1781. Ibid., book XX/3057, 12, book XX/3051, book XX/3052; Zivojinovic, op.cit., 122-23.46 Favi to the Senate, Paris, November 9, 1781. ASMM-XVIII, book XX/3056; W. Wilcox, “The British Road to Yorktown: A Study in Divided Command,“

American Historical Review, LII, I (1946), 1-35, argues that Admiral Rodney and General Cornwallis were responsible for the British defeat at Yorktown.47 Zivojinovic, op.cit., 125-26.48 Ibid., 130.

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The Paris Peace Treaty of 1783

Even before the fighting stopped, Favi, Ayala and othersforwarded a variety of information about the prospects for peace,although they were not, in view of the desire of Great Britain todefeat the Bourbon kingdoms quite promising. The Senate natu-rally was very anxious to see a quick peaceful conclusion, watch-ing with unconcealed concern British victories over the Spanishand French forces around Gibraltar and the West Indies. In themeantime, the initial contacts between the American and Brit-ish negotiators, in the spring of 1782, were dully reported to theSenate; for his part, Favi recommended a policy of careful obser-vation.49 In fact, no other course was possible. He pointed outdifficulties in reaching an accord between numerous belligerents,notably France and Spain, leaving the United States aside forthe time being. The Consul in Cadiz, Paolo Greppi, claimed thatEngland had given up all hope of forcing the Americans backinto the empire and was reconciled to the defeat suffered at thehands of the former colonies.50 This was disturbing, as it meantthat an intensification of the war in the European theatre waspending. Favi was familiar with the conflicts within the Britishgovernment, notably between Earl Shelburne and Charles JamesFox, who insisted upon a complete and unconditional recogni-tion. Shelburne, supported by George III, was prepared to do soin the general treaty of peace. Fox, who was friends with EdmundBurke, was the foreign secretary and thought that the negotia-tions for peace with the Americans came within his jurisdiction.Fox wanted to recognize the independence of the colonies im-mediately. Ayala was inclined to support Fox’s approach as well,arguing that it would be convenient for England in the futureand would spare her possible humiliation. This was another indication that Fox and his supporters sympathized with theAmericans and those English who wanted to settle the matter quickly.51

From the summer of 1782 on, Favi favored joint, not separate, negotiations between the belligerents and England. Hewas reflecting the preference of Vergennes, believing firmly that France was prepared to continue the war until final victory. Hewas very soon to be disappointed. The Americans, suspicious of Vergennes’ double policies and his support for Spain, decidedto negotiate directly with British agents in Paris. Jay, Adams and Franklin decided to assume a more conciliatory attitude anddisregard the instructions from Congress to consult the French. Favi could not uncover this tendency, although he knew thatthe American and British delegates were negotiating.

Early in September 1782, Earl Shelburne decided to recognize the independence of the United States. The Americansaccepted this despite Vergennes’ demand that a general and not a separate treaty be concluded.52 On November 30, 1782, afternumerous interventions and discussion, the preliminary treaty of peace between Great Britain and the United States wassigned in Paris. Early in December, Favi became acquainted with the treaty. In his reports to the Senate, Favi dwelt primarilyupon the territorial settlements in North America, the West Indies and India.53 He insisted that the deal was convenient for

Figure 12 - The American Peace NegotiatorsThis illustration shows a portion of a painting by Benjamin Westof the American negotiators of the Paris Peace Treaty of 1783between Great Britian and its former colonies: (left to right)John Jay, John Adams, Benjamin Franklin and Henry Laurens.The painting remained incomplete because British negotia-tors chose not to sit for their half of the portrait; it has servedas a powerful symbol of the division between Great Britainand its former American colonies. A full copy of the Paris PeaceTreaty of 1783 is printed in the Appendix.

49 Ibid., 150-51.50 Greppi to the Senate, Cadiz, June 7, 1782. ASMM-XVIII, 89.3138/5a.51 Favi to the Senate, Paris, July 10,, 1782., Ibid., book XX/2768; Zivojinovic, op.cit., 154.52 Zivojinovic, op.cit., 155-57.53 Favi to the Senate, Paris, December 2, 9, 1782. ASMM-XVIII, book XX/2781, book XX/2782; Greppi to the Senate, Cadiz, December 13, 1782. Ibid.,

89.3128/16; Morris, The Peacemakers, 350-85.


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England as well. Thus, he assured the Senate that Great Brit-ain did not lose her Empire in America completely, despitethe fact that the defeat there was total. England also preservedher position as the first naval and maritime power so thatFrance and Spain did not achieve their goals.

In April 1782 Benjamin Franklin rejected informalpeace feelers from Great Britain for a settlement that wouldprovide the thirteen states with some measure of autonomywithin the British Empire. Franklin insisted on British recog-nition of American independence and refused to consider apeace separate from France, America’s staunch ally. Franklindid agree to negotiations with the British for an end to thewar. Joined by peace commissioners John Adams and JohnJay, Franklin engaged the British in formal negotiations be-ginning on September 27, 1782. Although Franklin demandedthe cessation of Canada to an independent America, he knewthat the British Government of Lord Shelburne, opposed to

American independence, was unprepared to ac-cept that offer. Two months of hard bargainingresulted in a preliminary articles of peace in whichthe British accepted American independence andboundaries–a bitter pill to George III–resolved thedifficult issues of fishing rights on the Newfound-land banks and prewar debts owed British credi-tors, promised restitution of property lost duringthe war by Americans loyal to the British cause,and provided for the evacuation of British forcesfrom the thirteen states. The preliminary articlessigned in Paris on November 30, 1782, were onlyeffective when a similar treaty was signed by Brit-ain and France, which French Foreign MinisterVergennes quickly negotiated. France signed pre-liminary articles of peace with Great Britain onJanuary 20, 1783, which were followed by theforParis Peace Treaty signed on September 3,1783.

In February 1783, Favi ventured a proposalthat the Ragusan Senate fully recognize the in-dependence of the new Republic in America.54

The Senate, fearful of eventual British retaliationagainst the merchant marine, did not considerthe proposal as expedient. Finally, Favi was noti-fied in May that there would be no formal recog-nition, although he was instructed to visit theAmerican representatives and recommend the

protection of Ragusan ships. Official de facto recognition wasto be granted after all European states, including Great Brit-ain, had done so.55 Later on, Favi recommended that the Sen-ate extend de jure recognition as well, and send an officialcommunication to the President of Congress. Senators refusedFavi’s demand, deeply fearful of Great Britain and her navalpower. The desire to protect their merchant marine, the onlyinstrument for earnings and existence left, prevented Ragusafrom extending full recognition to the United States. The re-alization that there was no change in the “existing system”found its expression in this decision. When the peace treatywas signed on September 3, 1783, ending the war, Favi didnot consider it expedient to send the text of it to Ragusa. Itmerely repeated the terms already agreed upon, which werefamiliar to the Senate.56

54 Favi to the Senate, Paris, February 17, 1783. ASMM-XVIII, book XX/2792.55 Consilium Rogatorum 191, folio 49, April 26, 1783; Letters di Ponente 115, folio 65, May 19, 1783; Z. Muljacic, Odnosi Dubrovnika I Sjedinjenih Americakil

Drzava. Nase More, III, I (1956), 67.56 Zivojinovic, op.cit., 162-63.

Figure 13 - British Naval Power Remains SupremeDespite the loss of its colonies in North America, British naval power retainedits worldwide dominance after the signing of the Paris Peace Treaty of 1783.This fact was not lost on the maritime Republic of St. Blaise. Fearing Britishretaliation against its merchant marine and shipping livelihood, the RugusanSenate refused to officially recognize American independence.

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The Impact of the American War for Independence on Ragusa

The events in North America, 1775-1783, pro-duced, on the whole, contradictory sentiments and reac-tions among the Ragusans. While familiar with militaryand diplomatic events and developments, the Ragusan no-bility had very limited knowledge of the internal aspectsof the war for independence. Favi and Ayala were silentabout these problems, either because of their own igno-rance or fear of annoying conservative Senators. Thus,military and political aspects of the struggle were alwaysin the foreground, while ideological problems were ratherunintentionally pushed into the background.

This, however, does not mean that certain individu-als had been unaware of these aspects of the war as well.Some had seen the events in America as a revolutionarystruggle, the outcome of which brought to mankind, newvalues and offered fresh solutions. These were to be thetools for reforming the Ancient Regime in Europe. TheRepublic of Ragusa was no exception in this respect. Theclash between the old concepts about the state and aris-tocracy and their-functions in society, supported by theCatholic hierarchy and conservatives, were evident in theRepublic during the second half of the 18th century.57 Therising bourgeoisie, deprived of political influence andpower, and several enlightened aristocrats, representingthe growing demand for social, economic and politicalreforms, created a natural coalition. In Ragusa there ex-isted no conditions for promoting the cause of reform, social, political, or otherwise. No newspapers and journals were printed;the Senate subscribed to several newspapers, mostly French, Italian and Dutch, but they were intended for the exclusive use ofthe Senators. Very few books, mostly religious in character, were printed in Ragusa. Control over the circulation of books wasvery tight and became even more so when the authority realized that the smuggling of undesirable works (encyclopedists,materialists) was becoming widespread. Ragusa also had neither university, a fact which meant that neither academic discus-sion was possible, nor certain books desirable. Intellectual life in Ragusa was very modest, at best.58

Despite existing circumstances, the nobility was acquainted with events in America. Official reports and newspapers,mostly sympathetic to the cause of the rebellious colonies (Gazzetta di Leyde, Gazzetta di Toscana, Mercure de France) kept theRagusan senators well informed about current events and developments. The newspapers also published various documentsdealing with constitutional problems, diplomacy, political aspects of the life of the colonies. The growing interest in the warand discussions about it worried Senators, so that they forbade the reading of newspapers and their political contents outsideof the Senate office. During the war the Senate also decided that discussions about the war and its outcome were dangerous;it ruled that conversations about the war and peace should be punished severely.59

The only person, so far, whose views and attitudes towards the events in America can be ascertained in some detail, wasToma Basiljevic-Baselji (1756-1808), a scion of one of the oldest Ragusan noble families. Educated in Switzerland and Ger-many, Basiljevic was able to follow closely the events in Europe and America. His remarks and views about revolutions in theNew and Old Worlds are scattered through his writings about the need for reforms in Ragusa. For Basiljevic the events in

57 Ibid., 167-69; B. Kovacevic, Slobodna misao u Dubrovniku pre karj dubrovacke samostalnosti. Miseo V, 9 (Beograd 1931), 1405.58 Zivojinovic, ibid., 169-70.59 Ibid., 170-173.

Figure 14 - The Implications of RevolutionWhile the Rugusan nobleman Toma Basiljevic-Baseliji (1756-1808) wascritical of the excess of the French Revolution, he felt the AmericanRevolution was a positive stimulus for other nations. He highly praisedthe Articles of Confederation under which the United States firstoperated as an example for other states. Basiljevic expressed theseviews in private writings. In the 18th century, no newspapers werepublished in Ragusa and very few books other than those of a religiousnature were published in the city. During the American Revolution,the Ragusan Senate subscribed to several foreign newspapers butforbade the reading of them and their political discussions outsidethe Senate office.


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America were of a revolutionary character and a part of hisviews on revolutions in general. The struggle of the Ameri-cans for freedom was a stimulus to other nations and states, amodel for accomplishing badly need social, economic, andpolitical reforms. While castigating the excesses of the FrenchRevolution and its blood-letting, Basiljevic seemed to approveof the rather mild, restrained character of the American ver-sion.60

In his tract Epogues de la Revolution FrancaiseBasiljevic argued that the revolution in America was the pre-decessor to that in France. A firm believer in the ideas ofphilosophes and Encyclopedists, the works which opened tomankind a vision of the future, Basiljevic insisted that“America, by achieving her freedom, opened the road for theirapplication in a practical life.” Thus, Basiljevic admitted thatthe ideas of the philosophes were known in Ragusa as well.The success of the struggle in America Basiljevic conceivedas a stimulus for the destruction of the Ancien regime inFrance and Europe.61

There was a similarity between the revolutions inAmerica and France, Basiljevic also found, in the composi-tion of the armies. He accused King George III of hiring mer-cenaries to fight in America. These stood no chance against anational, people’s army fighting for their country and free-dom. In his notes Basiljevic also highly praised the Articles ofConfederation, pointing out that it could serve as a model,“an example” for other states. He thought, however, that afederal structure was convenient for large states only.62

Contrary to Basiljevic, another Ragusan nobleman,Antun Sorkocevic-Sorgo, living in Paris, long after the eventsin America and France took place, entertained different views.Although critical of the existing political system in Ragusa,calling it “our stupid government,” Sorkocevic thought thatevents in America and France were essentially different. Com-menting upon the wars and activities of the Ragusan mer-chant marine in times of war, Sorkocevic argued that the cap-tains and ship owners used those opportunities to earn a greatdeal of money. “It happened,” wrote Sorkocevic, “first duringthe war for American independence, and was repeated dur-ing the French revolution.”63 Although Sorkocevic did notelaborate more about his statement, it was obvious that hedrew a definite distinction between the two events. If nothingelse, his statement could serve as an example of the diversityof views and opinions among the Ragusan nobility regardingthe events in America.

60 Z. Muljacic, Tomo Basiljevic-Baselji, predstavnik prosvjecenja u Dubrovniku (Beograd: SANU 1958), passim.61 Archives of the Basegli family, B 2/5, file 10. Historical Archives in Dubrovnik; Zivojinovic, op.cit., 187-88.62 Archives of the Basegli family, B 2/5, file 2; Z. Muljacic, Tomo Basiljevic-Baselji, 20-21, 86; Zivojinovic, op.cit., 188-89.63 A Sorgo, Fragments sur l’historie politique et litteraire de l’ancien Republique du Raguse (Paris, 1837), 19; Zivojinovic, ibid., 191.

Conclusions

The initiation of the war for independence in NorthAmerica was not noticed in Ragusa immediately, since theregion was hardly known to the people. However, soon afterthe war started and different nations were involved in it, theRagusans showed their sympathy for and interest in thestruggle of the colonies for independence. The political ori-entation of the Republic of St. Blaise towards the Bourbonkingdoms, on the one hand, and fear of Great Britain anddesire to see her maritime power diminished, on the otherhand, determined her policies towards the American War forIndependence. The Ragusans did not share the views of themajority of European states that the Americans were rebelsagainst a legal government and king. Also, a belief in theirultimate victory was evident, a fact which was entertained bythe Ragusan diplomats throughout Europe. The Senate offi-cially endeavored to carry out a policy of strict neutrality, outof the fear of British retaliation. Long after the war ended theSenate hesitated to recognize the new Republic and eventu-ally granted only de facto and not de jure recognition. TheSenate also refused to conclude, despite repeated offers, atreaty of commerce with the United States.

While some individuals in Ragusa made clear a distinc-tion between the Amercian Revolution (before 1776) and theAmerican War for Independence (after 1776), the conserva-tive ruling nobility saw the separation between the coloniesand Great Britain as the essence of revolution and therefore,dangerous. It was for them a radical break from the past, notonly with the accepted social order but also with past inter-national treaties and practices of the great European powers.The nobility was impressed by the fact that the American Warfor Independence was the first time a portion of an empirehad rejected the central authority and achieved independencethrough the use of arms.

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Appendix I

THE CROATIAN VOICE OF PEACE 1778translated from German 1778 edition by Borislav Arapovic

O GOD, the lover of peace, the enemy of war, of bloodshed and of all the terrible evils that the monster, war, creates.

Command every conflagration of war now blazing on your earth to be extinguished at this instant. Command also that the fireof war still smoldering in the ashes be put out forever, and preserve for mankind, preserve for us also peace! ... peace! ... Amen.

WAR, my brothers, what a terrible word!.. Terrible to the peaceable townsman, whose trade flourishes only in time ofPEACE... Terrible to the peaceful countryman, who can access till his fields properly only in the embrace of security!.…Terriblealso to the fighting man himself, who knows the value of his blood, his healthy body and his life, who is not consumed byarrogant ambition, nor by base greed for plunder! If the very word “war” terrifies us, what fearful horror does war itself notcause, the most dreadful of all earthly evils? My bones shake, my heart trembles, my blood runs cold when I imagine war in allits horror.

Allow me, esteemed brothers, to paint for your eyes today the hideous picture of war that my soul has conceived,and of the

HORRORS OF WARBOTH FOR THE COUNTRIES UPON WHICH THIS MONSTER FALLS,

and alsoFOR THE ARMIES BY WHOM WAR IS CARRIED ON

In this I have, as a patriot (for you all know that I am a patriot) no shameful intention of weakening your martialcourage. Least of all could I succeed in this with you, for who could instill fear in you, brave warriors? I want to lay before youthe HORRORS OF WAR only in order to provoke in you an aversion to all excess, to all cruelty, all inhumanity whichmultiplies the evils of war, and in order to awaken in your hearts a love for humanity, a merciful compassion toward yourinnocent fellow Christians, and also that the great duty to pray for the preservation of peace should lie very close, very palpableto your hearts. May the eternal Father of mankind enable me to succeed in my endeavor, for the sake of His grace, Amen!

What hideous monster does my spirit see? Menacing, blazing wrath flashes from its eyes, it gnashes its teeth and foamswith rage. In its right hand it carries a dagger which drips reeking human blood. In its left hand is a torch, whose flame thirstsfor palaces and hovels, its gaping jaws gorge on the wealth of the storehouses and the sweat of the countryman, its hungerdevours wild game in the field, the birds of the air and flocks in the pastures. Beneath its heavy tread crops wither, the fruits ofthe fields and gardens are lost. Wherever it takes its devastating course, villages are set aflame, towns are burnt to ashes,fortresses besieged and stoned, their residents soon reduced to starvation; soon they are smitten by the edge of the sword; thepossessions of whole families are turned to ashes, calamity and disaster are spread everywhere. Need I tell you the name of thismonster?... Its name is war!... Oh war!... How terrible you are to those countries over which you spread your wings!

You have indeed... yet another aspect, which appears to me with equal horror. I see the battlefield. An appalling scene!Corpse upon corpse piled up! Fathers of children left unprovided for; only sons–the support and stay of aged parents; husbands–their tender spouses’ only happiness, only delight; young men in the flower of youth–budding men of the future, pillars ofsociety, smitten by the bullet and the sword, robbed of their clothes by the hand of inhumanity, stripped, drenched in rivers oftheir own noble blood. I see the dying, the unfortunate ones convulsed by their fatal wounds, writhing with shattered, muti-lated limbs among their dead companions. I hear their moans, their screams... Help! Save me! (pleads one), Kill me! (criesanother). My spirit is shaken. Turn away, my eyes... away from this ghastly scene!... from this terrible consequence of war.

Far away from the battlefield, in the dim future, I perceive things which are not indeed so terrible, though which cannotleave a tender heart unmoved. Cripples, miserably dragging around a body made incapable of earning a living, weighed down bypoverty, often even to the point of hunger and wretchedness. The suffering ones, tormented by the constantly recurring pain oftheir wounds. The sick ones, slowly being consumed in consequence of the hardships of war - is not the horror of war seen in


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them too? OH, WAR! How dreadful you are even to the armies which you lead on to the fields of MARS thirsting after humanblood?

And you, my brothers! Will you march onward to those terrible fields? Will you be led to face the sharpened swords, thethunderous fire, the death spewing guns of the victorious Prussians? Will you march against the great FREDERICK, whom halfof Europe could not defeat in the last war... will you join combat against his brave warriors, drilled in arms?... Have you seenhim, the great KING, the laurel-winning HERO?... Have you seen his armed hosts? Greatness is enthroned on the MONARCH’Sforehead! Majesty, exalted solemnity–but also magnanimity, also gracious mercy speak from his eyes. On his throne he is anANTONY, in the council a SOLOMON, at the head of his army... I know no hero with whom I can compare him. Since theworld has learnt of him, it has ceased to call an ALEXANDER great, or a CAESAR, a POMPEY, a CHARLES XIT... these areCONQUERORS only, not HEROES. His men are like the children of ANAK. Their courage is the courage of a lion; their lovefor their king is the love of children for their father. The swords held by their sinewy arms are the scythes of death; from theirbarrels MARS launches the fastest lightning-bolts; their commanders are trained in the art of war at the war school of thegreatest master; they know no fear, they have learned the whole art of war, all except retreat. There are more SCHWERFNS,more WINTERFELDS, more KLEISTS among them; and will you overcome these? Oh, peace, peace! Do not withdraw fromus!

Do not think, my brothers, that the aim of my address is to breathe fear into your hearts. He who makes a favorableimage of his adversary for himself and regards him as strong and bold, will fight the more circumspectly, the more boldly againsthim. It is not for me to spur you on to courage. I must leave this to your commanders, who have a greater right to do so. I wantonly to ask that you pray with us for peace–not for the destruction of your enemies. If Christians pray against Christians, howcan that please the Father in heaven, whose children both we and they are? I will only admonish you not to commit any act ofbrutality - not to rob, nor plunder, nor destroy the homes of the innocent with fire, nor mercilessly kill the defenseless old, norbabbling babes, nor those whose blood cries for vengeance; that you do not violently besmirch the virginity of women, normaliciously practice wantonness, nor sinfully destroy the fruits of the earth, the victuals of the townsman and the countryman,nor expose yourselves to sickness and suffering through excess and dissipation. A Christian soldier must not be a robber, nor amurderer, an incendiary, a debauched libertine, a butcher, nor an inhuman brute. You are all followers of the ancient Christianfaith. Oh, may you all, as your faith requires, be faithful to your GOD, faithful to your Emperor, faithful to your standards, trueChristians, true heroes, Amen!

But you, mysterious One, you who so often speak to men saying:PEACE BE UNTO YOU!

call with that almighty voice, by which you call worlds into being from nothing,call divinely to those MIGHTY ONES, who have laid hand on sword:

PEACE BE UNTO YOU! AMEN

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Appendix II

The Paris Peace Treaty of 1783

Two years after the conclusion of the Revolutionary War, American and British delegations met in Paris toformalize Britain’s recognition of the nascent United States of America.

In the name of the most holy and undivided Trinity.It having pleased the Divine Providence to dispose the hearts of the most serene and most potent PrinceGeorge the Third, by the grace of God, king of Great Britain, France, and Ireland, defender of the faith,duke of Brunswick and Lunebourg, arch-treasurer and prince elector of the Holy Roman Empire etc., and ofthe United States of America, to forget all past misunderstandings and differences that have unhappilyinterrupted the good correspondence and friendship which they mutually wish to restore, and to establishsuch a beneficial and satisfactory intercourse, between the two countries upon the ground of reciprocaladvantages and mutual convenience as may promote and secure to both perpetual peace and harmony; andhaving for this desirable end already laid the foundation of peace and reconciliation by the ProvisionalArticles signed at Paris on the 30th of November 1782, by the commissioners empowered on each part,which articles were agreed to be inserted in and constitute the Treaty of Peace proposed to be concludedbetween the Crown of Great Britain and the said United States, but which treaty was not to be concludeduntil terms of peace should be agreed upon between Great Britain and France and his Britannic Majestyshould be ready to conclude such treaty accordingly; and the treaty between Great Britain and Francehaving since been concluded, his Britannic Majesty and the United States of America, in order to carry intofull effect the Provisional Articles above mentioned, according to the tenor thereof, have constituted andappointed, that is to say his Britannic Majesty on his part, David Hartley, Esqr., member of the Parliamentof Great Britain, and the said United States on their part, John Adams, Esqr., late a commissioner of theUnited States of America at the court of Versailles, late delegate in Congress from the state of Massachu-setts, and chief justice of the said state, and minister plenipotentiary of the said United States to their highmightinesses the States General of the United Netherlands; Benjamin Franklin, Esqr., late delegate inCongress from the state of Pennsylvania, president of the convention of the said state, and minister plenipo-tentiary from the United States of America at the court of Versailles; John Jay, Esqr., late president ofCongress and chief justice of the state of New York, and minister plenipotentiary from the said UnitedStates at the court of Madrid; to be plenipotentiaries for the concluding and signing the present definitivetreaty; who after having reciprocally communicated their respective full powers have agreed upon andconfirmed the following articles.

ARTICLE 1:His Brittanic Majesty acknowledges the said United States, viz., New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, RhodeIsland and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia,North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia, to be free sovereign and independent states, that he treatswith them as such, and for himself, his heirs, and successors, relinquishes all claims to the government,propriety, and territorial rights of the same and every part thereof.


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ARTICLE 2:And that all disputes which might arise in future on the subject of the boundaries of the said UnitedStates may be prevented, it is hereby agreed and declared, that the following are and shall be their bound-aries, viz.; from the northwest angle of Nova Scotia, viz., that angle which is formed by a line drawn duenorth from the source of St. Croix River to the highlands; along the said highlands which divide thoserivers that empty themselves into the river St. Lawrence, from those which fall into the Atlantic Ocean,to the northwesternmost head of Connecticut River; thence down along the middle of that river to theforty-fifth degree of north latitude; from thence by a line due west on said latitude until it strikes the riverIroquois or Cataraquy; thence along the middle of said river into Lake Ontario; through the middle of saidlake until it strikes the communication by water between that lake and Lake Erie; thence along the middleof said communication into Lake Erie, through the middle of said lake until it arrives at the water commu-nication between that lake and Lake Huron; thence along the middle of said water communication intoLake Huron, thence through the middle of said lake to the water communication between that lake andLake Superior; thence through Lake Superior northward of the Isles Royal and Phelipeaux to the LongLake; thence through the middle of said Long Lake and the water communication between it and the Lakeof the Woods, to the said Lake of the Woods; thence through the said lake to the most northwesternmostpoint thereof, and from thence on a due west course to the river Mississippi; thence by a line to be drawnalong the middle of the said river Mississippi until it shall intersect the northernmost part of the thirty-first degree of north latitude, South, by a line to be drawn due east from the determination of the line lastmentioned in the latitude of thirty-one degrees of the equator, to the middle of the river Apalachicola orCatahouche; thence along the middle thereof to its junction with the Flint River, thence straight to thehead of Saint Mary’s River; and thence down along the middle of Saint Mary’s River to the AtlanticOcean; east, by a line to be drawn along the middle of the river Saint Croix, from its mouth in the Bay ofFundy to its source, and from its source directly north to the aforesaid highlands which divide the riversthat fall into the Atlantic Ocean from those which fall into the river Saint Lawrence; comprehending allislands within twenty leagues of any part of the shores of the United States, and lying between lines to bedrawn due east from the points where the aforesaid boundaries between Nova Scotia on the one part andEast Florida on the other shall, respectively, touch the Bay of Fundy and the Atlantic Ocean, exceptingsuch islands as now are or heretofore have been within the limits of the said province of Nova Scotia.

ARTICLE 3:It is agreed that the people of the United States shall continue to enjoy unmolested the right to take fishof every kind on the Grand Bank and on all the other banks of Newfoundland, also in the Gulf of SaintLawrence and at all other places in the sea, where the inhabitants of both countries used at any timeheretofore to fish. And also that the inhabitants of the United States shall have liberty to take fish ofevery kind on such part of the coast of Newfoundland as British fishermen shall use, (but not to dry orcure the same on that island) and also on the coasts, bays and creeks of all other of his Brittanic Majesty’sdominions in America; and that the American fishermen shall have liberty to dry and cure fish in any ofthe unsettled bays, harbors, and creeks of Nova Scotia, Magdalen Islands, and Labrador, so long as thesame shall remain unsettled, but so soon as the same or either of them shall be settled, it shall not belawful for the said fishermen to dry or cure fish at such settlement without a previous agreement for thatpurpose with the inhabitants, proprietors, or possessors of the ground.

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ARTICLE 4:It is agreed that creditors on either side shall meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the fullvalue in sterling money of all bona fide debts heretofore contracted.

ARTICLE 5:It is agreed that Congress shall earnestly recommend it to the legislatures of the respective states to providefor the restitution of all estates, rights, and properties, which have been confiscated belonging to real Britishsubjects; and also of the estates, rights, and properties of persons resident in districts in the possession on hisMajesty’s arms and who have not borne arms against the said United States. And that persons of any otherdecription shall have free liberty to go to any part or parts of any of the thirteen United States and thereinto remain twelve months unmolested in their endeavors to obtain the restitution of such of their estates,rights, and properties as may have been confiscated; and that Congress shall also earnestly recommend tothe several states a reconsideration and revision of all acts or laws regarding the premises, so as to render thesaid laws or acts perfectly consistent not only with justice and equity but with that spirit of conciliationwhich on the return of the blessings of peace should universally prevail. And that Congress shall alsoearnestly recommend to the several states that the estates, rights, and properties, of such last mentionedpersons shall be restored to them, they refunding to any persons who may be now in possession the bona fideprice (where any has been given) which such persons may have paid on purchasing any of the said lands,rights, or properties since the confiscation.And it is agreed that all persons who have any interest in confiscated lands, either by debts, marriagesettlements, or otherwise, shall meet with no lawful impediment in the prosecution of their just rights.

ARTICLE 6:That there shall be no future confiscations made nor any prosecutions commenced against any person orpersons for, or by reason of, the part which he or they may have taken in the present war, and that no personshall on that account suffer any future loss or damage, either in his person, liberty, or property; and thatthose who may be in confinement on such charges at the time of the ratification of the treaty in Americashall be immediately set at liberty, and the prosecutions so commenced be discontinued.

ARTICLE 7:There shall be a firm and perpetual peace between his Brittanic Majesty and the said states, and between thesubjects of the one and the citizens of the other, wherefore all hostilities both by sea and land shall fromhenceforth cease. All prisoners on both sides shall be set at liberty, and his Brittanic Majesty shall with allconvenient speed, and without causing any destruction, or carrying away any Negroes or other property ofthe American inhabitants, withdraw all his armies, garrisons, and fleets from the said United States, andfrom every post, place, and harbor within the same; leaving in all fortifications, the American artilery thatmay be therein; and shall also order and cause all archives, records, deeds, and papers belonging to any ofthe said states, or their citizens, which in the course of the war may have fallen into the hands of his officers,to be forthwith restored and delivered to the proper states and persons to whom they belong.


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ARTICLE 8:The navigation of the river Mississippi, from its source to the ocean, shall forever remain free and open tothe subjects of Great Britain and the citizens of the United States.

ARTICLE 9:In case it should so happen that any place or territory belonging to Great Britain or to the United Statesshould have been conquered by the arms of either from the other before the arrival of the said ProvisionalArticles in America, it is agreed that the same shall be restored without difficulty and without requiring anycompensation.

ARTICLE 10:The solemn ratifications of the present treaty expedited in good and due form shall be exchanged betweenthe contracting parties in the space of six months or sooner, if possible, to be computed from the day of thesignatures of the present treaty.

In witness whereof we the undersigned, their ministers plenipotentiary, have in their name and in virtue ofour full powers, signed with our hands the present definitive treaty and caused the seals of our arms to beaffixed thereto.

Done at Paris, this third day of September in the year of our Lord, one thousand seven hundred and eighty-three.

SignersBenjamin Franklin, David Hartley, John Adams, John Jay

THE CROATIAN-AMERICAN CONNECTION -...

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