The Crisis in Bangladesh and the Accord on Fire and

Building Safety

May 28, 2013

Building Collapse in Bangladesh• Garment factory producing for major Western

retailers• Poorly constructed building, located on a drained

swamp, with additional floors added illegally • Workers notice cracks in walls, express fear to

management• Management tells workers building is safe and

they must work• The next day, the building collapses, crushing

workers en masse• Some escape, many die. Rescue workers pull

bodies out of the rubble for days

Spectrum Sweater Factory - 2006• Massive building collapse• 64 dead• Hundreds injured• Major buyer: Inditex• Retailers, factory owners, government all vow to move

urgently to improve safety practices• Nothing changes: industry continues down the road to Rana

Plaza

A horrific rash of events for garment workers in Bangladesh…factory collapse, explosion and fires... The Bangladesh garment industry is notoriously stricken with labor violations, but the recent tragedies have incited international pressure and investigations…”

Yahoo News, 2006

Major Bangladesh Factory Disasters: 2005/2006Moon Fashion FireBiswas Garment FireShan Knitting FirePhoenix Garment CollapseShamim Spinning FireSayem Fashions StampedeSpectrum Sweater Collapse

Cumulative Death Toll: 205

Response to Spectrum and other disasters

Inditex: “Although the factories of the suppliers in Bangladesh were being audited when the catastrophe occurred, Spectrum was not included in the review-normalization process for two reasons: first, the contractual manufacture relationship had taken place through a trader in India, and secondly the supplier did not provide the name of its subcontractors.”

“The audit of the Asian manufacturers, carried out in accordance with BSCI methodology and by SAI-certified auditors, is in progress and is expected to be complete by the end of May.”

BGMEA/Government/ILO : “In February 2006, BGMEA began a programme of factory inspections to ensure there are fire exits, no locked exits, and to conduct fire drills. Since March 2006 BGMEA has recruited 20 staff in addition to the existing 20 to carry out these inspections. 1042 factories in Dhaka and 253 in Chittagong have been inspected in April 2006.”

After the Gharib & Gharib fire: February 2010

“The teams will make surprise visits and immediately inform BGMEA if they find any factory lacking adequate safety measures…BGMEA and BKMEA will take actions against the non-compliant factories…all garment factories must keep their rooftops accessible; the rooftop doors, factory entrances, fire escapes, and emergency gates must always remain unlocked; fabrics and other flammable materials cannot be kept laying around on factory floors; and all factories must arrange fire drills on a regular basis.”

After the Hameem fire: December 2010Unions, NGOs convene meeting in Dhaka, April 2011, and implore brands and retailers to commit to an urgent program of independent inspections and to pay for renovations are repairs.

Industry response, as conveyed by Walmart and Gap: “Specifically to the issue of any corrections on electrical and fire safety, we are talking about 4,500 factories, and in most cases very extensive and costly modifications would need to be undertaken…It is not financially feasible for the brands to make such investments.”

Death Toll in Garment Factory Disasters Since 2010

Year Factory Brand Deaths2010 Gharib & Gharib H&M 212010 Hameem/TIS Gap, Target, VF, PVH, others 292012 Ali Enterprises KiK 2622012 Tazreen Fashions Walmart, Sears, ECI, others 1122013 Smart Export Inditex/Zara 82013 Rana Plaza Benetton, WM, JC Penney, others 1,1272013 Tung Hai Primark 8

Total Deaths: 1,601

Rana Plaza• Five factories, owned by three companies: Ether Tex, New

Wave Style, Phantom Apparel • Buyers: Walmart, El Corte Ingles, Benetton, Inditex, JC Penney,

Children’s Place, Carrefour, Primark, Joe Fresh, KiK, others• Obvious warning signs of structural failure; workers pressured

to work anyway; threatened with loss of one month’s pay• Final toll: 1,127 dead; more than 2,000 injured, including

many on-site amputations • Worst factory disaster in the history of the global garment

industry• Three of the four worst have occurred in the last eight months

Rana Plaza

Tazreen Fashions

Triangle Shirtwaist

Triangle Shirtwaist to Rana Plaza• Apparel sector in the Early 20th century: sub-poverty wages,

minimal regulation, abusive conditions, dangerous factories• 1911: Public revulsion over Triangle disaster spurs reform• 1910s to 1930s: Unions and regulators progressively reform

the US apparel sector: decent wages, unions, safe workplaces, reasonably tough regulation; “golden age” for apparel workers through 1960s

• 1970s to 2000s: Brands and retailers outsource most US apparel production to the Global South

• Apparel sector in the early 21st century: sub-poverty wages, minimal regulation, abusive conditions, dangerous factories

Contemporary Apparel Production: The Model • Brands and retailers place relentless price and delivery

pressure on local contractors• Local contractors meet these demands by ignoring worker

rights and safety standards to cut costs, speed production• Local government looks the other way; industry auditors are

ineffectual• Result: poverty wages, oppressive conditions, dangerous

factories• Not a “Bangladesh problem,” but a problem of the global

apparel industry• The problem manifests itself in a particularly destructive way

in Bangladesh, because local regulation is especially lax and most factories are in multi-story buildings.

Bangladesh Garment Industry: Thousands of Deathtraps• Many poorly constructed buildings with weak foundations;

floors added illegally after original construction• Most factories lack proper fire exists:• Open stairwells, which act as chimneys rather than escape

routes• No external fire escapes

• Missing safety systems• No emergency lighting• Missing fire extinguishers

• No worker role in safety management, no unions, weak or no safety training

• Managers restrict egress: lock doors to control workers; delay exit to avoid loss of production, hoping alarms are false

Lethal Partnership: The Global Apparel Brands and Bangladesh• Conditions:• Minimum wage: $37/months (18 cents an hour)• Routine harassment and intimidation as management strategy to

speed production• Unionists are fired – or worse• Most dangerous place in the world to be an apparel worker

• The industry’s response to deteriorating labor conditions in recent years? They have poured orders into the country. • Bangladesh now 2nd largest apparel producer after China• 5,000 factories; 3 million workers (far more than US peak)

• More than 2,000 killed in fires and collapses since 2005 • Buyers are getting what they pay for: an industry of Triangle

Shirtwaist factories • Bangladesh is winning the race to bottom, with room

to spare

The Bankruptcy of Industry Auditing and the Voluntary “CSR” Model• All factories where major disasters have occurred had been repeatedly

audited under industry audit regimes• Ali Enterprises, 262 dead: SA-8000 certified – 3 weeks before fire• Tazreen, 112 dead: Audited by WM (UL Responsible Sourcing), others• Hameem/TIS, 29 dead: Audited by Gap, A&F, VF, others• Gharib & Gharib, 21 dead: Audited by H&M• Rana Plaza, 1,127 dead: Passed audits by BSCI, multiple buyer audits

• Industry auditing: massive conflicts of interest, no transparency• Industry auditors don’t have expertise/time for proper inspections: no fire

safety training, no electrical or structural expertise• Industry auditors do not even look at biggest hazards• No assessment of emergency exit structures, despite deadly fires• No assessment of structural integrity, even after Spectrum

• Auditors can’t ask brands to raise prices, pay for repairs • BSCI: “You can’t expect too much from social audits.” Yet brands have

claimed for years that audits are adequate to protect workers.

"It's very important not to expect too much from the social audit…BSCI and other initiatives contribute to improve the situation. ... But it's a long way we have to go.“

Lorenz BerzauManaging DirectorBusiness Social Compliance

Initiative(Two Rana Plaza factories passed BSCI audits)

Walmart: Don’t Worry – Workers Are Protected by Our Incompetent Inspections

Walmart’s CEO, Mike Duke, in a public statement: “We will not buy from an unsafe factory.”

Walmart’s head of labor rights compliance, in an internal memo: “Fire and electrical safety are not currently adequately covered in ethical sourcing audits.”

What is needed?• A radical shift away from voluntary self-regulation

to binding labor-management agreements• Not just inspections – industry-wide program of

renovations and retro-fitting to make unsafe structures safe• Many factories can’t pay: progress can’t be

achieved without financial support from buyers• Buyers must accept that safe factories cost more• Renovation program must be backed up by

inspections with public reports • Workers must be able to fight for their own

protection

Development of the Accord• Dec. 2010 WRC, CCC, others propose plan after TIS fire kills 29• Apr. 2011 Plan promoted at ITG- led meeting in Dhaka;

brands reject financial responsibility for safety upgrades

• Mar. 2012 PVH signs agreement after ABC News story• Apr-Sep 2012 Unsuccessful negotiation with Gap, which

refuses any binding safety commitments• Sep. 2012 German retailer Tchibo signs agreement• Nov. 2012 Tazreen Fashions fire kills 112• Jan. 2013 Smart Export fire kills 8• Apr. 2013 Rana Plaza collapse kills 1,127• May 2013 Tung Hai fire kills 8• May 2013 40 brands and retailers sign revised safety

agreement, renamed Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh

• June 2013 Implementation begins

Why is it a huge challenge to get companies to sign?• Because the agreement is real, not the usual non-binding,

feel-good CSR fluff• Binding, enforceable and transparent

• Companies must pay for repairs and renovations• Companies must end business with factories that

refuse to undergo renovations and operate safely• Companies must stay at least two years at safe

factories• Imposes higher costs and constrains sourcing decisions,

blunting the relentless push for lower prices and faster delivery that define industry sourcing strategy

Strategy Post-Rana• Seizing the media moment to secure enforceable

commitments• Out-maneuvering the industry and its apologists

and protectors

How Accord was achieved…• Linking specific brands and retailers to recent disasters; proving

these connections with documents and labels found on-site• Focusing media attention on individual brand responsibility, the

total failure of industry CSR programs to protect workers, and the small cost of saving lives (less than 10 cents per garment)

• Holding firm on the need for a binding, enforceable agreement with financial commitments from brands/retailers

• Contributions from numerous key players: Clean Clothes Campaign, UFCW, Machinists, Steelworkers, AFL-CIO, Change to Win, SEIU/Workers United, ILRF, Maquila Solidarity Network, Avaaz, SumOfUs, USAS, Corporate Action Network

• Crucial leadership of Industriall and UNI

The Accord: Unprecedented Commitments• Thorough, independent inspections with full public

reports• Brands/retailers must require factories to undergo all

necessary renovations and must pay for them• Brands/retailers must end business relationship with

any factory that refuses • Brands/retailers must make 2-year commitment to

safe factories• Central role for workers and unions: union access,

OHS committees, right to refuse dangerous work• All commitments binding and enforceable

Unprecedented

The first binding agreement ever signed by global corporations that forces them to pay to improve working conditions and to align their sourcing decisions with their labor rights obligations

Signatory Brands and Retailers

40 signatory companies, from 13 countries• H&M – largest producer in Bangladesh• Inditex – world’s largest fashion retailer• Carrefour – world’s 2nd largest general retailer• Most major apparel retailers in W. Europe• North America: PVH/A&F/LoblawGaps:• Gap, VF• Walmart, Target• JC Penney, Macy’s, Kohl’sSignatories represent: • At least 1,500 factories and 1 million workers

Implementation• Implementation plan in 45 days• 12-member planning committee

focused on swift implementation• First priority: inspections and

renovations to mitigate most serious widespread hazards

The road ahead.• Accord implementation: A huge undertaking• Goal to get repairs/renovations started in 3

months or less – immediate focus on swift mitigation of the gravest hazards• Binding nature of Accord gives us the tools to

ensure compliance, but there will be many battles• Effort to bring on additional US retailers must be

strengthened – will get boost from public inspection reports

A new model for labor rights reform in global supply chains• 1980s to 1990s: No private regulation• 1990s to 2010s: Self-regulation: the “CSR” Era

• Voluntary corporate initiatives• Non-binding, minimal transparency• No obligations on prices or supply chain practices

• 2013 to?: Regulation thru enforceable pacts• Accountability to worker organizations through binding,

enforceable agreements• Supply chain practices aligned with labor rights

obligations, including higher prices to factories or other means of paying for improved conditions

• Full transparency