INTR13/71-310 2007

Lecture 7:

Alternative Global Forces: Islamic International Relations and Transnational Flows (Case Study)

Topics: -1. Islamic Political Visions of the International Order2. Radical Revisionism, Militant Challenges and Utopian Projects3. Normative Transnational and International Islamic Institutions4. Conclusion: Innovation, Reform and Conflict5. Bibliography, Resources and Further Reading

1. Islamic Political Visions of the International Order

As we have seen cultures, religion and politics have a problematic linkage to foreign policy and the norms mobilised by international institutions (see lectures 1-5). Different religious and cultural systems influence conceptions of national politics, international financial institutions, and diverse visions of international system. These demands, moreover, place serious burdens on communities, governments, and international regimes, and in the most militant cases demand a violent re-ordering of the regional and global political system. In contrast to the ideas of culture conflict and clash of civilisations, as fielded by writers such as Daniel Pipes (1995) and Samuel Huntington (1993, 1996), we shall see that these clashes are driven by divergent political views, different views of social and economic justice, and different sources of authority that are mobilised. Furthermore, in the case of Islam, there are intense conflicts and debates within Muslim communities over appropriate political order that have intensified over the last decade.

Islam represents one of the major world religious and one of the largest cultural systems of the world. Islam is a strong social presence in most of the Middle East, Central Asia and parts of Russia, large parts of western and northern Africa, South Asia and Southeast Asia. Beyond this, however, Islam is growing as a religion globally, and has adherents in most countries around the world now totalling some almost 1.5 billion people, with 45 to 50 countries predominantly Muslim, with sizeable and often growing Muslim minorities even in countries such as France, Britain, Germany, the U.S. and India, with recent debates by historians such as Niall Ferguson showing concern over the changing population dynamics of European verses nearby Islamic societies (Ferguson 2004; Gerner 1996; Esposito 1992). Islam as a cultural system, transformed the face of the world and its political processes from the 7-16th centuries. Islam also forms part of a complex and rich cultural mix in Southeast Asia, and formed an important component of political life in states such as Indonesia and Malaysia.

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Main Muslim Populations (map courtesy PCL Map Library)

It will not be possible to do fully outline Islam as a religion today. The key idea of Islam is surrender to the will of God. Muhammad is the most perfect of God's prophets (living in the 7th century of the Christian dating system), bringing to completion a long line of earlier messengers (including Abraham, Moses and Jesus) who had brought revelation to mankind. The most complete of these revelations is the Qur'an, revealed to Muhammad. Islam is strictly monotheistic, as found in profession of the faith: "There is no God but God, and Muhammad is the Prophet of God." In terms of behaviour, Muslims are also required as far as possible to practice the Five Pillars: - to recite the profession of faith at least once; to observe the five daily prayers; to pay the zakat tax for the support of the poor; to fast during day-light during the month of Ramadan; and to perform if possible the hajj, or pilgrimage to the holy city of Mecca. Islam thus emerged as a powerful ethical vision with demands that most people could understand. It spread rapidly throughout much of the Middle East, Africa, parts of Eastern Europe, Central and South Asia, carried by conquest, trade, cultural diffusion, and itinerate teachers and Sufis (mystics). Its message was aided by its emphasis on social justice and its inherent devotional appeal. Today, Islamic affairs in global affairs are represented as both a threat and opportunity. Samuel Huntington, and other scholars through the 1990s, already argued that the differences between the Western and Islamic civilization could form a major area of contest in the coming decades, with this sense of threat re-iterated through 2001-2007 (Pirio & Gregorian 2006; Hungtington 1993; Huntington 1996; Lewis 1996; Fuller & Lesser 1995). However, this is a gross simplification of the nature of Islam as a political entity. Although radical Islam may reject the West, the main focus of Islam in many countries is the way to keep a core religious belief alive and secondarily to develop a just, modern culture. These themes are active in two states with Islamic dominant populations but republican, largely secular political orders (Indonesia and Turkey), and are a driving concern in countries such as Malaysia, Morocco and more problematic in countries such as Pakistan and Iran.

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In the light of the pre-occupation with the revisionist claims of militant Islam since 2001, we will look at some of these radical claims first, which are not fully representative of the wider Islamic community, but have posed a serious security challenge to modern states in the 21st century. This will includes claims of the construction of 'new Caliphate', and at the more specific role of Islamic courts in Somalia, and the more general effort of Islamic parties to engage in reforming the political order. From there we will turn towards more normative forms which underpin an international Islamic community, e.g. the role of the Hajj, the conceptions of the Ummah, the community of believers (see further below), and then explore on Islamic adaptation of modern financial institutions. The relative success of Islamic Banking as an alternative financial system for Muslims has grown into a vigorous network of institutions that seek to make their conduct compatible to Islamic moral norms (though serious debates have emerged about whether such systems have always distinguished themselves from interest-based systems, see further below). Whether this can link to a wider developmental agenda (via the Islamic Development Bank or to the Organisation of the Islamic Conference and its new reform agenda since 2005, remains to be seen, Jamil 2007), remains to be seen. As we shall see, with over 1.5 billion believers, and strong minority communities through most of the Western world (as well as Russia, China and India), Islam in a loose collective sense has tried over the last 1400 years to position itself as a major force in global affairs, and now has the challenge of working within both democratic and authoritarian state systems, and working within a global system largely devised by Western, 'post-Christian' states. Historically, Islam shaped a cultural space stretching from Western Africa to Eastern Turkestan (modern Xinjiang).

If today militant visions of political order are unlikely to the need of Muslims globally, likewise, it is not clear that the current international order has met the needs and aspirations of mainstream Islamic communities across the world. Likewise, the issue of Islamic politics has become entangled with problematic issues such as Middle Eastern tensions, energy resource access, migration and refugees, international terrorism, and human rights issues.

2. Radical Revisionism, Militant Challenges and Utopian Projects

Western political terminology can be problematic when applied to different cultural systems. So-called 'fundamentalist Islamic leaders' often do not fit in with the stereotype of an anti-modernist, backward looking traditionalism. As noted by John Esposito 'many fundamentalist leaders have had the best education, enjoy responsible positions in society, and are adept at harnessing the latest technology to propagate their views and create viable modern institutions such as schools, hospitals, and social service agencies'. (Esposito 1992, contra Lewis 1990). Rather, militant groups such as Al Qaeda have relied on new technologies (mobile phones, encryption, notebook computers) and new trends in globalisations (flow of communication, ideas, people and money) to support their agenda (Gunaratna 2002).

Indeed, most Islamic reform groups are not fundamentalist in any literal sense, but 'resemble Catholic Liberation theologians who urge active use of original religious doctrine to better the temporal and political lives in a modern world' (Wright 1992, p131). Rafic Zakaria suggests a more fruitful dichotomy, distinguishing between conservative and liberal trends in Islam, where the 'battle between the

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fundamentalists and the secularists can perhaps be more accurately described as a struggle between forces who resist change in Islam and those who wish to accelerate it.' (Zakaria 1988, p14; see further Olesen 1995). Islam has an indigenous tradition of 'revival' (tajdid) and 'reform' (islah), which suggests that any judgement of Islamic revivalism (Esposito 1992, p8) needs to place the particular reforms and ideas of a movement in their historical and ideological context. Islamic revivalism incorporates a much wider movement than anti-Western militant groups. As summarised by John Esposito: -

Revivalism continues to grow as a broad-based socioreligious movement, functioning today in virtually every Muslim country and transnationality. It is a vibrant, multifaceted movement that will embody the major impact of Islamic revivalism for the foreseeable future. Its goal is the transformation of society through the Islamic formation of individuals at the grass-roots level. Dawa (call) societies work in social services (hospitals, clinics, legal-aid societies), in economic projects (Islamic banks, investment houses, insurance companies), in education (schools, child-care centres, youth camps), and in religious publishing and broadcasting. (Esposito 1992, p23)

It must be stressed that from the point of view of most Muslim reformers, Dawa is not viewed as political propaganda, but as a serious effort at social and global reform. These 'call' activities also include a range of social, welfare and teaching activities (for a negative Western view, see Morris 2006), though such 'call' societies have also been used to channel and recruit for militant groups (Gunaratna 2002). The role of the media is thus seen as crucial in the presentation of Islam and in its relationship with other faiths. For example, Dr Zakir Naik, the president of the Bombay-based Islamic Research Foundation has sought to use both Western media and specialised television outlets such as Peace TV, 'a free-to-air, 24 -hour channel dedicated to comparative religion,' headquartered in Bombay and uplinked from Dubai for satellite transmission (Wahab 2006) There has been an effort to reverse some of the negative views of Islam in this new media: -

Dr. Naik espouses a moderate view of Islam while aggressively defending it against its detractors. “Countering Islam-bashing is the biggest challenge,” he said. “We Muslims are unable to present ourselves well; others are coming up with new ways of bashing Islam. We need English news channels. Our long-term aim is to have a news channel. Thankfully, the Muslim world has realized the importance of the media. New channels are being launched.” . . .

Contrary to the opinions of many, he equates Islam with modernity. “Modern means what is best,” Dr. Naik said. “Islam is the most modern way of life. Islam’s rules and regulations are the most practical way of life. Islam is the solution, not the problem. There are black sheep in all communities and some of the media project black sheep from among us, and then the black sheep are taken as representing all Muslims. This is sheer media manipulation.” (Wahab 2006)

There is thus as struggle not just over the political role of Islam, but also about the way its is represented internationally and the way it interacts with the current international system. Major divergences with the Western tradition emerge in the role of women1 and a reduced emphasis on individual rights. Thus Islamic rights agendas are often limited by how Islamic law is interpreted, i.e. the phrase 'according 1 Though Islam had not been without its own reformers since the 19th century, e.g. Qasim Amin, 1863-1908 in his works The Emancipation of Women and The New Woman 'denounced the subjugation of Muslim women as un-Islamic', ESPOSITO, John The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?, New York, Oxford University Press, 1992, p58.

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to law' may limit human rights depending on the particular formulation of Sharia that is accepted (Mayer 1995, pp64-66). Reformist developments in Islamic thought also lean towards human rights circumscribed by economic rights, social justice, and cultural legitimacy (Monshipouri 1994). Many Islam leaders around the world (Egypt. Malaysia, Iran), including religious and political leaders, are in fact keen to emphasise dialogue rather than confrontation with other value systems (Swidler 1996).

Rather than use the term 'fundamentalism', we approach these issues by addressing the range of demands made by diverse Muslim communities. These range from demands for human rights under authoritarian regimes, greater and deeper democratisation (e.g. through much of Central Asia and the Middle East), through to more explicit demands for state system run directly on particular formulations of Islamic law. It is important to distinguish among numerous patterns of demands made by different groups and ideologies. Over the last decade the following issues have come into prominence: -

1) Demands for greater respect for Islamic customs and sensitivities even by non-Muslims, both nationally and internationally, including patterns of restraint, self-censorship and limits on ‘freedom of expression’, e.g. as recently expressed through 2005-2006 Afghanistan, Iran, Azerbaijan and much of the Middle East over cartoons published in Western newspapers that were viewed as demeaning Mohamed.

2) Demands for the ability to pray and live freely as Muslims even within non-Islamic communities, e.g. a space legally possible in Russia but subject to diffuse patterns of prejudice and security monitoring (deepened since 2000 and having a strong impact on Russian minorities through 2006-2007), a trend repeated to a lesser degree in France and the United States. Associated with this is the desire to freely teach and propagate their views at the local, regional and global levels.

3) Demands for implementation of aspects of shariah law at the civil and social level, e.g. regulation of marriage, divorce, and family law. Here problems emerge over individual rights and gender equality. In more extreme customary usages this can also lead back to the ‘dignity’ of the family as the basis for honour codes. For example, even in modernising and 'secularist' Turkey until regulations from 2002 were brought into play to recognise full equal rights for women within family structures. Shari'ah is not just a legal code, but embraced its source concept from the root shr', the road, with Shari'ah therefore being 'the road that men and women must follow in this life', (Nasr 2003, p76). It therefore can include a wide range of public and private life, including moral prescriptions as well as legal requirements. However, the interpretation of the legal system depends upon the diverse orientations of the four different legal schools within Islam, and the way later sayings are interpreted to supported Koranic injunctions. Thus the moderate form of the Hanafi legal school of Sunni Islam is dominant within Central Asia, for example (Haghayeghi 2002).

4) Demands for full implementation of one vision of shariah law within countries with Muslim majorities (early demands made by the Islamic Renaissance Party and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in Central Asia, for example). These demands were also made by minority political groups in Indonesia, under the notion of the Jakarta Charter to change the constitution,

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but since 1999 this has never been able to gain more than 14% of electoral party support (Hosen 2005; Smith 2003, p102; Crouch 2003, p23). Partial and different levels of application of shariah law have been made in Afghanistan under the Taliban, in Iran (but under a Revolutionary Islamic model within a Shiite community), Sudan, and in Somalia with a growing role for Islamic courts through 2006 until they were forcibly removed, in part due to Ethiopian intervention (Pirio & Gregorian 2006; sese below), and in some areas of civil law in Malaysia (relating to the Malay community).

5) The implementation of an Islamic state ruled entirely by Islamic principles and patterns of governance (claimed as the long term goal of militant groups such as Jemaah Islamaiah (JI) in Indonesia, of the IMU for Uzbekistan, as the past and future goal of the Taliban in Afghanistan, and one possible goal for networks of militants in Iraq.

6) Creation of a modern Caliphate as the basis of international order providing leadership for the global community of believers, a claim made for a social movement such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir in Central Asia, and implied in some Al-Qaeda and JI communications (but needing careful analysis, see below). Likewise, JI and related groups may have the vision of building and Islamic state within one nation, but then moving towards a wider Islamic community across much of Southeast Asia (for controversies over this, see below). These models seem to be derived from Sunni historical traditions, but have limited ability to be applied in the modern period (see below).

Several questions flow from this. The first is whether each of these points is a stepping stone towards a greater and more sweeping revision of national governance and then the international order. So, for example, does toleration of Islamic political parties lead to the prospect of governments that will move towards stronger implementation of shariah law and then eventually towards an Islamic state (with wider applications of Islamic concepts in governance, morality, and the economy). Such fears have been mobilised to restrict Islamist parties historically in Algeria, Turkey (until recently), Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Beyond this, however, we need to consider the demands and problems inherent in each of these stages, the cost they impose, and the political trade-offs implied. In fact, sustaining a narrowly interpreted Islamic political order is extremely difficult to achieve.

We can see some of these problems in recent trends in Somalia, which had been through an intense civil war and fracturing of the state among different warlords since the '1991 ouster of dictator Mohamed Siad Barre', leading to it being one of the few complete examples of a failed state (Economist 2007a; Associated Press of Pakistan 2007). International intervention from 1992 was unsuccessful with the United Nations leaving in 1995, leading to continued conflict among clans, and the emergence of only a weak Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (after the 2000 Arta Conference in Djibouti, East Africa), which did not control Mogadishu and operated from the provincial centre of Baidoa (Barnes & Hassan 2007), and sustained a fragile peace that collapsed by late 2006. In this context, Islamic courts in Mogadishu, beginning from 1994 but strengthening 2000-2006 began to play a wider political role than law and order, and became de facto centres of governance that expanded their influence, e.g. to the ports of El Ma'an and Marka, and the Isaley airfield (Barnes & Hassan 2007). In the absence of strong government, they suggested

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a key role for Islam in creating a system that might counter-balance the fragmented rule of clan leaders in the city.

However, by late 2006 this had led to international intervention, led by Ethiopia, but supported by the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD, based on the states of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda), Uganda, by the US and UN Resolution 1725 (Barnes & Hassan 2007; More 2007). The US may have also run covert operations in the country against suspected Al Qaeda affiliates in 2006, as well as supporting and financing a de facto 'warlord Alliance', which even if an effective strategy did raise the political temperature in Mogadishu (Barnes & Hassan 2007; Mire 2007). Likewise, through January and again in June 2007 the US shelled and bombed ‘suspected’ Al-Qaeda targets in Southern and Northeast Somalia.

In spite of claims of victory by December 2006 and the installation of the Transitional Federal Government in Mogadishu, this did not lead to real peace (Barnes & Hassan 2007; for an alternative view, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia 2007). Instead, an Islamic insurgency has grown in the city through March-June 2007, leading to some 2,000 deaths (including many civilians), more than 4,300 wounded, and 365-400,000 people being displaced (Nordland 2007; Barnes & Hassan 2007; Economist 2007c). This signals major concerns about whether a genuine, country-wide peace can be established. The issue here, turns on some of the broader questions we have already raised. Can and should the Islamic courts (and their followers) be viewed as legitimate partners in rebuilding the country, or are they only a symptom of an absence of normal state power? How can diverse Muslim groups (from moderate to militant) be drawn into a future agreement that will provide a better future for Somalia, but also reduce the way its turbulence engages external players (such as Ethiopia and Eritrea) and disturbs the wider region, including much of East Africa (Economist 2007a; Economist 2007c). Likewise, if some of the more extreme militant groups do indeed have links to Al Qaeda, does this pose future problems for both East Africa, Ethiopia, and for US interests? In turn it has been suggested that Ethiopian forces and the Transitional Federal Government have given limited cooperation to UN and aid agencies until recently (Nordland 2007). At present, neither Ethiopia nor the AU seem able to provide a long-term settlement, and it seems unlikely that a strong UN force will be deployed (ABC 2007c).

We can summarise these issues by looking at the negative and positive aspects of the Islamic courts in Somalia as core of stable governance. Positive aspects of the role of Islamic courts within Somalia included: -

Support for the Islamic courts in Mogadishu had functioned for over a decade, and did provide local stability, removed road blocks, had reduced criminal elements, and provided some 'social services and charitable works' (Barnes & Hassan 2007). Likewise, foodstuff prices had stabilised, but staple goods prices have recently increased three-fold (Economist 2007a).

In general, the courts were 'broad mosque', bringing in moderate and militant Islamic groups, e.g. moderate Sheikh Sharrif, and 'radical 'Sheikh Aweys' (Barnes & Hassan 2007).

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The Courts were supported by militias that were the first non-warlord forces since the start of the civil war, with war lords often being viewed as corrupt and self-serving (Barnes & Hassan 2007).

The Courts shifted from narrow clan politics to a wider view of governance: -

The courts followed these practical actions with the declared intent of bringing an alternative means of governance to Somalia through sharia law. This was a decided shift away from factional politics based around clan loyalty. (Barnes & Hassan 2007).

The Courts have been so important that dialogue with Islamist elements must remain a key element in support for the Transitional Federal Government, and for long-term peace, a view recognised by the UN, US and the International Contact Group on Somalia (the European Union, Italy, Norway, Sweden , Tanzania and the United States), but yet to be accepted Somalia's President, Abdullahi Yusuf and the PM, Mohamed Gedi (Nordland 2007; Economist 2007a; Economist 2007c). Slow progress in this area has delayed again the 'national reconciliation' conference last planned for 14 June 2007, though Somalia’s parliamentary speaker has suggested they may be held in July 2007 (Associated Press 2007; Barnes & Hassan 2007; Economist 2007c).

Negative aspects of the role of Islamic courts within Somalia as core of governance included: -

The role of the Islamic courts sparked threat perceptions from Ethiopia and the United States. Ethiopian threat perceptions were driven in part by earlier operations of Al-Itihaad Al-Islaam, the 'Islamic Union', in the Gedo region which borders Ethiopia, as well as fears that there might be an effort by Al Qaeda or its affiliates to 'radicalise' Ethiopian Muslims, though this had not yet eventuated (Barnes & Hassan 2007; Economist 2007). The US has been active in assessing terror linkage in Somalia, and 2007 bombing raid have targeted Al Qaeda linked targets in southern Somalia (Mira 2007). It has been claimed that Al Qaeda cells operating out of Somalia and Yemen were behind the 1998 bombings in Kenya and Tanzania (Gunaratna 2002).

Ethiopia feared Eritrean support for of the Islamic courts, due to longstanding 'regional tensions' and past conflict with Eritrea (Barnes & Hassan 2007). UN peacekeepers are still 'manning the frontier after a 1998-2000 war that killed some 70 000 people' (Reuters 2007a)

The courts, though at first driven by local needs and a wide range of interests, soon included militant and 'extremist groups' that set a wider agenda (Barnes & Hassan 2007). This included links to 'transnational Islamist and business finance networks' and 'former member' of Al-Itihaad Al-Islaam, the 'Islamic Union', a 'chapter of the transnational Muslim Brotherhood' (Barnes & Hassan 2007).

Enforcement of court decisions depended on support of clan power, at first the Hawiye clan and its business interests, leading to tensions with other clan

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'warlords', e.g. with Ali Mahdi, though support was thereafter widened (Barnes & Hassan 2007).

The courts were supported by a military force, Al-Shabaab, 'the Youth', which functioned as an autonomous force (Barnes & Hassan 2007). Although a source of law and order at first, local conflicts led to attacks on security officers associated with the Transitional Federal Government

Militant groups in 2007 soon moved to a wider militant strategy, including the use of land mines, roadside bombings and some suicide bombings (Nordland 2007; Barnes & Hassan 2007; Economist 2007c).

The Courts engaged in some critique of the Transitional Federal Government, which had some international support, had strong nationalist elements, and engaged in sharp criticism of Ethiopia (Barnes & Hassan 2007). This undermined hope of international tolerance of their expanding role.

In the long run, peacekeeping cannot be sustained by Ethiopia, viewed as a traditional enemy, and promised support from major African Union players such as Nigeria has yet to emerge in order to create an 8,000 force to support the 1,600 Ugandans deployed (Economist 2007a; 2007b). Through mid-2007 the African Union has sought logistic and medical support from external sources such as NATO and the UN (Reuters 2007a). Likewise, in the past Somalia was a major market for illegal arms, and its been suggested that a solid arms embargo might prevent the slide of Mogadishu back towards a 'war economy' (Economist 2007a). At present it is not clear whether Uganda and Ethiopia, with backing from the African Union and the U.S., can present themselves as 'a bulwark against Islamist expansion in the Horn of Africa' (Economist 2007b).

2a. Politics and Propaganda

Islamist political claims that it mobilises socio-religious expression of political dissent (Johns & Lahoud 2005, pp19-20). As represented in Western international relations analysis and media coverage these are often presented as a range of loosely connected aims: the right to implement one version of Shariah law within their communities (either at national or local level); justice for Palestinians; a diffuse resentment of US and Western imperialism (at times focused into the real fear of intervention, as in Afghanistan, Iraq, potentially Iran and Somalia); demands for regime change in countries as diverse as Tajikistan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia; demands for self-determination and independence, as in Aceh or for parts of southern Thailand; or even the reshaping of international borders by independence movements, as in the vision of an independent East Turkestan (now largely comprising Xinjiang Autonomous Region within the People's Republic of China). From such viewpoints, the current international system is viewed unbalanced and unjust, with the United Nations and related agencies often promoting a double standard, e.g. with irregular enforcement of Security Council resolutions based on a post-colonial system of imperfect states.2 In this context, such claims seem to Western interests to be either 'fundamentalist', looking back to an idealised past, or dangerously revisionist, looking toward a violent future. 2 See, for example "Declaration of Jihad, August 23, 1996" in MARLIN, Robert O (IV) (ed.) What Does Al-Qaeda Want?: Unedited Communiques, Berkeley, North Atlantic Books, 2004, p3. For Osama bin Laden, the UN is 'nothing but a tool of crime', "Bin Laden Rails Against Crusaders and UN (BBC News Online, November 3, 2001)", MARLIN, Robert O (IV) (ed.) What Does Al-Qaeda Want?: Unedited Communiques, Berkeley, North Atlantic Books, 2004, p37.

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Less clearly articulated are the ideas of the creation of modern Emirates and a reborn Caliphate that would bring together believers in Islamic polities that would reshape existing regional and international orders. The call for an Islamic polity at a national level at times is limited to the demand for a more accountable and ‘Islamist’ government, in other cases justifying rapid transformation of political regimes (as attempted in Algeria, and partly achieved by the Taliban in Afghanistan). In the case of early Indonesian movements (such as Dar'ul Islam from 1948-1962, under the leadership of S.M. Kartosowirjo), there was an effort to build an Islamic state that would give a key political role for Islam within national borders (Kearny & Wlaters 2005; McAmis 2002, p76). Likewise, Osama bin Laden seemed to have supported the idea of a future Caliphate, perhaps build out of one successful front of activity, but eventually embracing a wider footprint in the Middle East (Gunaratna 2002). He has suggested that most of the Gulf states have lost their real sovereignty and are illegitimate, a call against corrupt regimes re-iterated by al-Qaeda again in 2006 (in Marlin 2004; JUS 2006). When these claims are linked to the call for a Caliphate, however, they suggest linkages to specifically Islamic forms of governance. These new forms are inspired by the past but point towards new political projects, and are not modelled on current national projects in Iran, Sudan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Brunei or the Gulf states. For a short time the so-called Emirate of Afghanistan was a partial model to which some militants might turn,3

but one which was readily undermined by American power and by its own limited legitimacy. In the case of recent publicity concerning Jemaah Islamaiah operations in Southeast Asia, there has been a claim that they not only wished to create Islamic polities in Malaysia and Indonesia, and an independent Mindinao, but also envisaged a new Muslim polity that embraces much of the Southeast Asian archipelago (Cochraine 2002, p32).

These more militant, revisionist notions have been played out against a wider sense in Muslim communities that the time is ripe for further development of the role of Islam on the world stage, either to push forward and help transform a greater part of the world into the dar al-Islam (house of Islam), including the reform of corrupt governments, or to find a more lasting interaction between belief, science, and modernisation that does not undermine the pillars of faith (McAmis 2002, p2). Several key questions are hard to avoid for contemporary Muslims, even if formulated in rather blunt terms. A sense of historical dislocation does frustrate many Muslims who see a 'dramatic decline . . . from the leading civilization in the world for over one thousand years into a lagging, impotent, and marginalized region in the world.' (Fuller 2003, p1). From this viewpoint they can question whether the West is ' the greatest threat to Islam in the fifteenth Islamic century?' (McAmis 2002, p72). 'What does it mean today to be a Muslim in a predominantly non-Islamic World?' (Ahmed, II, 2000, p52). When will the current negative conditions be reversed? What level of reform is needed in national governments and the international system to sustain a renewed Islamic civilization? For many Muslims the answer to these questions, including effective opposition to authoritarian governments that have received support from Western democracies, is a reforming Islam or Islamism (Fuller 2003, pp15-16).3 In November 2001, Osama bin Laden considered only Afghanistan as an Islamic state, which was not the case for Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, "Osama Claims He Has Nukes: If the U.S. Uses N-Arms It Will Get the Same Response (Dawn Internet Edition, November 9, 2001, by Hamid Mir)", MARLIN, Robert O (IV) (ed.) What Does Al-Qaeda Want?: Unedited Communiques, Berkeley, North Atlantic Books, 2004, p43.

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Western and regional threat perceptions have been confronted by the partial successes the Taliban through 1996-2001 and their continued embattled survival through 2002-2005, a sustained Taliban offensive in southern Afghanistan from late 2006, plus intense combat operations in 'the Chora district of Uruzgan, the province that is the native place of the Taliban's elusive leader, Mullah Omar' (ABC 2007a), and their continued survival in Pakistan (which President Karzai view as the key to future peace, ABC 2007b), plus the ongoing operations of al-Qaeda or related organisations, the reality of international and transnational terrorism.4 This has furthered intense debate over justice in the international system that has re-emerged since 2001. The resurrection of the ‘Caliphate’ as a political term has been seen in popular media usage through 2005-2007, and has a strange resonance given the fractured history of the early Caliphate, challenges to its legitimacy, its later territorial subdivision (from the 10th century, see below), and the eventual withering and disbandment of the Caliphate as an institution at the end of the Ottoman Empire (through 1922-1924). From 2004 the 'Caliphate' came into usage in Washington as a term for the focus of security threats, and was cited by diverse leaders such as Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Eric Edelman, the Under Secretary of Defence for policy, Stephen Hadley, a national security adviser, General John Abizaid, the top American commander in the Middle East, and Vice President Dick Cheney, who stated that a failed democracy in Iraq might be the basis of this new caliphate that would then destabilise the Middle East (Bumiller 2005). These warnings were made in part on the basis of a letter sent by Ayman al-Zawahiri, a leading ideologist of Al-Qaeda in July 2005, which proposed such a project, even though only 6% of Muslims recently surveyed in the Middle East supported such an agenda. (Bumiller 2005). These visions of a 'totalitarian Islamic Empire that reaches from Indonesia to Spain', as outlined by a December 2005 speech of President Bush, have been mobilised to bolster waning public support for US operations in Iraq (Bumiller 2005; Republican Policy Committee 2005). This vision of a totalitarian caliphate has also been used through 2006-2007 to bolster support for a victory in Iraq (Arkin 2007).

Likewise, no modern 'Islamic state' has the strength and legitimacy needed to carry forward the leadership claims of an international Caliphate: Iran as a Shi'a society cannot provide this role for Sunnis, the Emirate of Afghanistan fell to American intervention, Sudan remains troubled, subject to international scrutiny and unable to project any leadership or influence, and the battle for Iraq continues, with the sharp division between Sunni and Shi'a interests making it an unlikely prospect for a future, united Islamic state willing to project its potential power. Likewise, though changes of power among groups within Somalia make this a troubled, 'fragile' state that forms the locus of transnational disturbances (2006-2007) rather than a source of leadership (see above).

In this setting, the claims that Jemaah Islamaiah and related Islamic dissident groups seek to set up a new Caliphate based on a wide territorial footprint across Muslim-populated areas of Southeast Asia seem a remote political agenda. The term ‘caliphate’ in this setting may be a symbol or stereotype, perhaps used as propaganda by both proponents and critics in the current ideological wars that are one front of the so-called ‘war on terror’. As we shall see, the aims of regional

4 Transnational linkages often work across borders into adjacent states, either operating on a regional basis, as in JI 'cells' in Southeast Asia, or seeking to revise existing borders as illegitimate, as in the Jammu-Kashmir dispute.

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'Islamist' organisations is actually quite diverse, with different goals and methods deployed in a generally reformist agenda. Likewise, the term ‘caliphate’ has emerged in some media in relations to tensions in ‘Greater Central Asia’, viewed in this context as a band of discontent and political transition stretching from Dagestan to Tajikistan (Saidazimova 2006a).

Though there are some proto-democratic features in Islamic thought (shura, consultation, and consensus of judgement based social solidarity, Esposito 1992; Gellner 1994, pp26-29; Hefner 2001)5, there is no automatic guarantee that this will be shaped into a liberal democratic pattern of governance. Put another way, within this general orientation there 'is no such thing as human rights without human responsibilities', but these responsibilities are to the 'Giver of human life' and are framed by divine revelation, not just by human laws (Nasr 2003, p30). Purely secular political solutions, with a sharp division between religion and state, are problematic in Islam. Thus traditional Islamic patterns of government are not so much a theocracy as a nomocracy, focusing on the 'rule of Divine Law' and not a Church or priesthood (Nasr 2003, p30). Though there are also strong aspects of consensus and consultation within Islamic traditions, these do not directly equate with Western concepts of representative liberal democracy. In this sense, the current conflict is very much among Muslims themselves as much as with Western states, and involves both deep religious and ideological divisions (Fradkin et al 2005, p1). It is thus much more than a reaction to American foreign policy and the issue of Palestine (though this are important factors), but a deeper conflict over fundamental principles, and for some militants such as Abu Musab al Zarqawi modern democracy remains fundamentally 'incompatible with Islam' (Fradkin et al. 2005, pp5-11).

It seems that current claims made by militant Islam and its Western critics has generated a divisive non-dialogue of propaganda and counter-propaganda directed to divergent audiences, and leaves little space for genuine political dialogue or accommodation.6 It may be necessary to generate a deeper we wish to open up a social and transnational space in which violence remains the last, rather than the first, resort to those (whether states or social movements) seeking their own vision of justice.

2b. The Caliphate as Islamic Governance

A number of terms from Islamic governance have been imported into popular analysis without a clear appreciation of their lineage and meaning (Kinyon 2004, p1; Nasr 2003, pxii). Terms such as Emir (a general, prince or noble who has an independent command or leads an independent state), Emirate, Sultan, Sultanate, Caliph, Caliphate, Sherif and Mahdi are used to signal various pattern of religious and political leadership in accounts of the Arabic and Muslim history.

The term Caliph in its most basic sense means successor and in its original context means 'the vicegerent of the Prophet', or 'Deputy of God' implying a delegated power such as that held by Abu Bakr as the first khalifah (Nasr 2003, p11; 5 For a reformulation of democracy 'not as a human invention, but divine intention', see KHORASANI, Rajaei "Democracy in an Islamic System", Echo of Islam (Tehran), No. 118, April 1994, pp24-26. On the 'Pious Sultan theory', see OLESEN, Asta Islam and Politics in Afghanistan, Richmond, Curzon Press, 1995, p9.6 On the desperate need for such a political space, see ALI, Tariq The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads and Modernity, London, Verso, 2002.

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Kennedy 2004, pxix). Although the caliph was at first viewed as the temporal, political leader of the threatened Islamic community, it was also expected in the earliest period that he should be 'a man of piety, trust, knowledge, strength, justice, integrity and righteousness' (Ahmed 2000, I, p27). Traditionally, it was also expected that the Caliph should be a member of the Quraish, the tribe to which Muhammad belonged, though some groups such as the Kharijites argued that office should be open to any 'capable' Muslim (Ahmed 2000, I, p61). This placed an enormous burden on the person chosen within the community to have spiritual, moral and pragmatic leadership abilities, though in later period it was not expected that he would necessarily be an expert in law or its interpretation. During the early period he was also the head of the community in that he led the community in prayer and supported key legal decisions, though later Caliphs sometimes chose to delegate this task to specialised officials, the khatibs, from the early 9th century onwards (Ahmed 2000, I, pp275-278). During the period of the first four caliphs an effort was taken to provide consultation among the wider Islamic community, and to try to ensure that some form of community consensus could be achieved, i.e. it was at least proto-democratic in principle (Ahmed 2000, I, p64, p91), though tensions emerged as soon as the claims of Ali ibn Abu Talib were deferred until he eventually became the fourth caliph through 656-661 (Kennedy 2004, p3). The first four caliphs are generally regarded by Sunnis as righteous and pious, signified by the term 'rightly guided caliphs' (Khulfa e Rashidoon, though doubts are sometimes expressed about the third caliph, and sometimes Omar bin Abdul Aziz is added as a later fifth rightly-guided caliph), but this was not sustained in the following the assassination of Ali and the creation of Umayyad dynasty, which in effect converted the caliphate into a 'hereditary sultanate' (Nasr 2003, p116; Ahmed 2000, pp59-73). Writers such as Ibn Khaldun argued that dynasties based on hereditary succession were in fact not caliphs but rather kingships (in AZRA 2005, p7). The assassination of Ali and later conflicts also led to the split between Sunni and Shiites, with the later favouring rule by descendents of the Prophet through his daughter Fatimah and her husband Ali.

The idea of the caliphate as a focus of political leadership and legitimacy linking the international order back to the times of the Prophet and the first caliphs continued to be sustained at the formal and rhetorical level. Thus in the theory of Sunni Islam, even when the Caliphate was itself weak the 'legitimacy of rule . . . flowed from the Caliph who bestowed his favors on ambitious princes and soldiers through a whole range of titles' (Ahmed 2000, I, p58). The early Caliphs, plus even the Caliph Mansur (from 754 C.E), for a time preserved the notion of 'the public performance of monarchy', with the caliph visible at the Friday prayers, and allowing courts of complaint and petition (the mazalim court) where any individual, even the poor and dispossessedm could seek redress for the wrongs of officials, though this process tended to fall to disuse and had to be revived, e.g. in 870 C.E., and strong welfare elements for Muslims (Kennedy 2004, p14, p49, p141, p146, pp204-206).

Illegitimate governments, of course, find it harder to mobilise social and religious support, and tend to need greater levels of force to sustain their regimes (Ahmed 2000, I, p58). At the broader level, Ibn Khaldun asserted that function of the Caliphate was to provide the conditions that allow the community of believers (ummah) to live according to Shariah.7 Islam, with its universalist claims, its wide outreach into

7 Adapting the account in AHMED, Nazeer Islam in Global History: From the Death of Prophet Muhammed to the First World War, 2 vols., Concord, American Institute of Islamic History and Culture, 2000, Vol. I, p274.

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communities from Africa to China, with its willingness to include diverse races and its support for international communication and trade, could this be viewed metaphorically as a form of 'proto-globalization' linking Africa, Eurasia, and an emerging Indo-Asian network. It was perhaps 'the waning of this universalist tradition that led to localization and atrophy of what was once an open and searching intellectual society' (Fuller 2003, p5).

In the long run, it was not possible even within the Sunni world for the Caliphate to retain real military power as the Abbasid caliphate weakened and began to fragment: -

Gradually the actual military power of the caliphs diminished; real military and political power fell into the hands of local kings, and the caliph retained only nominal authority. Under these conditions a new theory of political authority was developed by the Sunni jurists (fuqaha'), in which the caliph remained the symbol of the unity of the Islamic community and the rule of the Shari'ah, and the king or sultan, with actual military and political power, had the duty to preserve public order and protect the borders of the Islamic world. (Nasr 2003, p111)

After the first four rightly guided Caliphs, fierce disputes would arise concerning the leadership of the Islamic world, leading to the split between the Sunnis and Shiites, the later supporting the claims of Ali (as son-law and married to the Prophet's daughter, Fatimah) and his descendants to political leadership, and who still owe allegiance to Imams. The dispute in this case was not just on the issue of who should succeed, but also on the nature of the caliphate itself: -

The Sunnis believed that the function of such a person should be to protect the Divine Law, act as judge, and rule over the community, preserving public order and the borders of the Islamic world. The Shi'ites believed that such a person should also be able to interpret the Quran and the Law and in fact possess inward knowledge. Therefore he had to be chosen by God and the Prophet, not by the community. Such a figure was called Imam. (Nasr 2003, pp12-13)

Likewise, from the 860s onwards there was a serious decline in the Abbasid caliphate, which was now virtually controlled by its Turkish bodyguard, and which encouraged the rise of independent dynasties in Morocco and Egypt (Ahmed 2000, I, p49). In this context, the Fatamids (as Isma'ili Shiites) would establish their own powerful empire (909-1171), centred on Egypt and stretching from Tunisia to Syria and make their own claim to the caliphate in the name of their Imam , and from '910 the Fatimid Ubaidullah had declared himself the Mahdi and the Caliph of all Muslims' (Nasr 2003, p11, p124). Thus there were three different claims to caliphal political leadership, by the Abbasids (based on the power of the Turks), by the Fatimids from Cairo (a claim temporarily relinquished in 1171 when Al Aazid died), and the Umayyads from cosmopolitan Cordoba (Ahmed 2000, I, pp171-217; Ali 2002, p33).

One of the great disasters remembered within the Islamic world was the invasion of the Mongols, who conquered Baghdad and killed the last Abbasid caliph in 1258 (Nasr 2003, p128). This led to a short period when there was one recognised Caliph in North Africa (al Mustanir from 1260-1261), but in 1261 the Mamluke's of Egypt 'resurrected the Abbasid Caliphate in Cairo' by inviting a surviving relative to come to Egypt and continue the Abbasid link as a propaganda tool in their conflicts with the Mongols (Ahmed 2000, I, p234, p308). Although later Mongols leaders adopted Islam

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as the Il-Khanids, they and the following empire of Timur and his descendants lacked the international credentials to lead the Muslim world. By the sixteenth century, the Islamic world had been fractured into three great polities that would represent themselves as leaders of the large Muslim communities - the Ottomans, the Safavids (of Persian), and the Moghuls, controlling most of South Asia (Ahmed 2000, I, p28).

The Ottomans were at first content to use the 'military-political institution' of the Sultanate as their focus for governance (Ahmed 2000, I, pp124-166). The title Caliph, though sometimes used by earlier Ottoman leaders, was formally taken over by the Ottomans in 1517 by bringing the last surviving Abbasid caliph to Istanbul where he abdicated in favour of Selim I (Ihsanoglu 2001, p135; Ahmed II, p40). In part it was taken up due to successful campaigns in Iran (1514) and Egypt (1517), and also a desire in later periods to mobilise this role within the Islamic world as a partial balance against the growing power of European states, though Seyyed Nasr contents that they were really only sultans adopting 'a political order that functioned in many ways like the other caliphates' (Nasr 2003, p131; Ihsanoglu 2001, p203). The re-assertions of the Caliphate from the 13th century onwards might be viewed as necessary 're-inventions' in order provide an international focus for the religious needs of the wider Islamic community during the very periods when its unity had been largely splintered (Ahmed 2000, I, p304).

The diverse line of dynasties that might take up the Caliphate could thus lead to disputes among great powers as to where the Caliphate resided, e.g. between Ottoman and Moghul claims: -

However, there was a clash of grandeur. Both monarchs called themselves 'Caliph', 'shadow of god', 'refuge of the monarchs of the universe'. Ottoman authorities behaved with insolence to Mogul emissaries in Constantinople. The Moguls, for their part, never forgot descent from the great Timur, who had captured the Ottoman Sultan in 1402. Mogul emperors in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries claimed that their capital Agra was the 'abode of the Caliphate'; Constantinople was merely 'seat of the Ottoman sultanate'. (Mansel 1997, p190)

In time the Ottomans extended their claims to the Caliphate to buffer their political power, even as it began to wain in the 18th century: -

This matter took on an even more active form during the reign of Suleyman I. During that time such titles as "halîfe-i kübrâ" (greatest caliphate), "imâmete-i uzmâ" ("supreme imamate"), and "halîfe-i Müslimîm" ("caliph of the Muslims") were used. They were expressions of a universalist perspective on the caliphate which was interpreted as a mission bestowed by God on the sultan. As far as can be determined, for the Ottoman sultan the caliphate took on a somewhat different meaning than it had held during the Abbasid period. For the Ottomans, the idea of the caliphate took on a new meaning which included responsibility for looking after the security of the hajj routes, protection of the sacred places, the defence of Islam, and the inclusion of all Muslims under a security blanket combined with the gazâ tradition. . . . Later, particularly during the period of loss and diminution of the empire, the Ottomans began to place great emphasis on their being the caliphs for all Muslims so as not to lose the authority they had possessed within the Muslim world. (Ihsanoglu 2001, p31; Ahmed 2000, II, p72)

In such roles the Ottoman sultan might also be described as 'God's shadow on earth', 'the leader of the believers', and 'protector of Islam' (Ihsanoglu 2001, p494). One of

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the specific claims and duties of the later Caliphs was that they protected (directly or indirectly) the holy places of Mecca and Medina, and the major hajj caravans. This could be hard to sustain, with the Caliphate soon finding itself unable to cover the breach between different reform and nationalist movements.

In Arabia, the thought of Ibn Wahhab aimed at a return to a 'golden age' of a pure and early Islam, but was in fact the force both for a reformist revival chained to Saudi political ambitions: -

Ibn Wahhab provided a theological justification for almost everything Ibn Saud wanted to achieve: a permanent jihad that involved looting other Muslim settlements and cities, ignoring the caliph, imposing a tough discipline on his own people and, ultimately, asserting his own rule over neighbouring tribes in an attempt to unite the Peninsula. After lengthy discussions, the emir and the preacher agreed to mithaq, a binding agreement, that would be honoured by their successors in eternity. The two clauses inserted by Ibn Saud indicated what he had in mind. Spiritual fervour in the service of political ambition, but not vice versa. (Ali 2002, p75)

Even through the 19th century Muslims were keen to invest concern with the presence of a Caliph on the world stage, perhaps in part due to the increasing of colonialism. Thus once the Moguls fell, Indian Muslims were politically supportive of the Ottoman Caliphate (the pro-Ottoman Khilafat movement), and one British Viceroy suggested that if Britain allowed Istanbul fell to Russian control this would cause violence in India (Mansel1997, p306, p384). For a relatively short period in the late 19th and early 20th century the Ottomans gained some international prestige as the last independent Muslim power and defender of Islam. (Mansel 1997, pp320-322) Thus, even some modernising Sultans would provide a short-term focus for the Islamic world: -

The greatest tribute to Sultan Abdul Hamid is that even today many Muslims around the world invoke his name with nostalgia for a bygone era when a venerated caliph provided a semblance of political focus for the global Islamic community and gave it a sense of universal brotherhood. Muslims as far away as India and Nigeria looked to him for guidance in maters small and large. His office radiated religious, political, cultural and social influence across the Islamic world. The Ottoman fez became not only a hat for the Turks but for Indian Muslims, Egyptians, Moroccans and Malaysians. His failure was that he pursued his modernization program through a highly centralized, personal style, which opened him to charges of despotism. (Ahmed 2000, II, p279)

This tilt towards Islam did provide some groundswell support for the Ottomans, but in the late 19th century it also undermined their claims towards building a multi-religious, cosmopolitan state (Ahmed 2000, II, p275). Even as late as 1914 the Ottomans may have hoped to strike at the British through an eastward campaign to link up with Muslim populations in north-east India, a move that was pre-empted by Russian pressure on north-eastern Turkey and northern Persian (Ahmed 2000, II, p94). In turn, some Indian soldiers were reluctant to fight fellow Muslim Turkish soldiers in Iraq (Ahmed 2000, II, p312), but overall British control remained intact. Indeed, both the British and French were keen to see the collapse of Caliphate as one of the few symbols around which resistance to their geo-political and colonial projects might be focused (Ahmed 2000, II, pp316-317). British willingness to weaken the Ottoman's at various stages helped mobilise opposition in South Asia: -

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In 1919-24 India was swept by the Khilafat movement, an explosion of hostility to Britain and the loyalty to the Ottoman Caliphate which had resurfaced in 1877-8 and 1912-1913. Indian Muslims' concern for the future of Constantinople was shared by Gandhi and some Hindus. The All-India Khilafat Conference organized mass meetings in Delhi, Bombay and Karachi and sent a delegation to Constantinople. There was a pro-Khilafat rising in the Muslim province of Kerala. (Mansel 1997, p391)

Thus the future of the Caliphate as either a religious or temporal institution was of major issue of the modernising Turkish Grand National Assembly. Ataturk's modernising policies saw Islam as an obstruction to modernisation and national-building, thus forcing the National Assembly to abandon the institution as a burden that could not be sustained (Ahmed 2000, II, p320). The Caliphate was abolished through early 1924 (Ihsanoglu 2001, p131; Mansel 1997, p413).

It is not surprising that powerful monarchs such as the Ottoman Sultan saw the Caliphate as a mean of reinforcing their (waning) power and authority, with 19th

century scholars in such as Abu'l-Huda and Jamal al-din al-Afghani supporting the idea of absolute obedience to the Caliph (Mansel 1997, pp322-323). Thus, for a short time, there was a linkage between pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic ideals, but this could be sustained in the face of nationalist and modernising trends in Turkey and the Arabic world (Mansel 1997, pp357-358). This eclipse of the Ottoman Caliphate remains significant, and is explicitly cited as a turning point in the weakening of the Islamic world in an al-Qaeda training manual: -

After the fall of our orthodox caliphates on March 3, 1924 and after expelling the colonialists, our Islamic nation was afflicted with apostate rulers who took over in the Moslem nation. These rulers turned out to be more infidel and criminal than the colonialists themselves. Moslems have endured all kinds of harm, oppression, and torture.8

It is in this context that the effort of various Islamic reformists and modernists became extremely urgent from the late 19th century onwards. One of the most controversial of these was Seyyed Jamaluddin Afghani, who sought to unite the Islamic world under one caliph in Istanbul, which would require a reconciliation between Persia and the Ottoman Empire (Ahmed 2000, II, p286). He also sought to modernise Islam, and his followers influenced reform movements in Egypt, India, and Indonesia, but his efforts to create a wider Renaissance in Islamic thought were not initially successful (Ahmed 2000, II, pp286-287). This call for revival and reform, in different forms, has become more urgent in the late 20th and 21st centuries (see further below). In general, the sense of crisis due to the collapse of the caliphate and the growing power of the West and nationalism has been threefold: -

8 Declaration of Jihad (Holy War) Against the Country's Tyrants: Military Series (Al Qaeda Training Manual) , UK translated document posted on United States Department of Justice Website, Accessed 2005, p7 [Internet Access via http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/trainingmanual.htm]. The document was found by Manchester police in 2000, and thus is also known as the Manchester Document but copies have also apparently been found in Afghanistan, and was used in a 2001 U.S. trial of terrorists (MILES, Donna "Al Qaeda Manual Drives Detainee Behaviour at Guantanamo Bay", American Forces Information Service, 29 June 2005 [Internet Access at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2005/20050629_1901.html). The presence of this manual on a hard disc itself seems to be a breach of the kind of security precautions it outlines, while the technologies in the document itself seem somewhat dated, e.g. facsimile and wireless are discussed but not email, computers, or mobile phones, e.g. see pp29-31. The material seems to reflect lessons learned in the 1970s and 1980s, and may reflect experience from the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan, with the manual mentioning travel security when going for training in Afghanistan via Pakistan, pp58-59.

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In general, I would suggest there were three kinds of responses. First, confronting the European through jihad, which eventually failed. Second, accommodating and adopting European ideas, concepts and practices. This second type of response was the most common one that resulted in the adoption of European ideas, concepts and institutions such as "nationalism", "nation-state", "modernism", "secularism", and the like. The third response was proposing alternative concepts and institutions by returning to the romanticized and ideal Islamic concepts. With respect to this, some Muslim scholars and activists such as al-Afghani and 'Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi, for instance, appealed for the re-invigoration of the caliphate (al-khilafah) as the single, universal Islamic political entity, which, it was believed, would unify the fragmented ummah. Other Muslim theologians, who found that it was very difficult to establish such a caliphate, proposed another alternative concept, namely the dawlah Islamiyyah (Islamic state), which would be founded in a certain Muslim country. (Azra 2005, pp7-8)

2c. Resurrecting the Caliphate for the 21st Century?

In spite of Western efforts to de-legitimize Osama bin Laden as a psychologically warped extremist, in fact he not only been able to maintain a following but has also been granted some credibility within wider Islamic sensibilities (Kinyon 2004, p1). This is not based on being a learned or holy man, but rather his role as a warrior who claims to be acting in defence of both the holy places of Islam and in defence of the wider Islamic community which he sees as being under attack both from US (and its allied) military power and from insidious Western values. In this context his apparent popularity in parts of the Islamic world rests on a sense of generalised dissatisfaction with the global system, and specific sense of political dislocation. He has also tried to mobilise historical and traditional elements of Islamic thought. The warrior tradition was a noted part of the early expansion and defence of Islam, as well as re-iterated in the defence and expansion of the borders of the Islamic world as the Ottomans expanded their own frontier. Today: -

Bin Laden's support rests on his claim that he is a self-declared amir (commander), who is willing to do what no other Arab leaders are doing. In the absence of true leadership, he is a de facto military commander, the only one willing to stand up against the western infidels and occupiers. In Islam, there is no obligation for the military leader to be a religious man as well, and bin Laden makes no claim on being one. (Kinyon 2004, p1)

Although Bin Laden might claim a role as an Emir or General (Gunaratna 2002), he is not able to assume other titles such as Caliph, since he is not the leader of or supported by a powerful Muslim state. He does not meet all the criteria for the Mahdi, whose apocalyptic proclamation in any case would probably not sit well with the revolutionary agenda of al-Qaeda and related groups, contra the confused comparative efforts made by some Western writers (see McDonald 2002; Nasr 203, pp73-74). Nor does Osama bin Laden have the kind of religious training that would entitle him to issue a fatwa, which in any case are usually only viewed as valid if they have been debated by religious scholars and a wide consensus reached (Marlin 2004, p18; Gunaratna 2002). In June 2007, in response to the knighthood awarded writer Salman Rushdie, conservative Pakistani clerics gave Bin Ladin the title of '"Saifullah", or sword of Allah' (Apunyi 2007), but this seems a largely reactive measure.

It is possible, however, that both al-Qaeda and JI seek to establish a strong Islamic state within initial borders, before a wider range of regional operations that might

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reshape international politics. On this basis, a letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri, a key al-Qeada leader, to Iraqi insurgents suggests that the collapse of the US presence was crucial as a prelude to establishing an Islamic state in Iraq that would then take the conflict to key 'secular' neighbours including Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, and only then confronting Israel (JUS 2006). There are some scattered political claims that suggest a more pragmatic approach towards sustaining a project future caliphate. One of these is not just the protection of holy sites and Muslims, but also an effort to protect the physical resources of the Middle East, as noted in one of the early Al Qaeda communiques: -

I would like here to alert my brothers, the Mujahideen, the sons of the nation, to protect this (oil) wealth and not to include it in the battle, as it is a great Islamic wealth and a large economic power essential for the soon-to-be established Islamic state, by Allah's permission and grace. We also warn the aggressors, the U.S.A., against burning this Islamic wealth (a crime which they may commit in order to prevent the oil, at the end of the war, from falling into the hands of its legitimate owners, and to cause economic damage to the competitors of the U.S.A. in Europe or the Far East, particularly Japan, which is the major consumer of oil of the region).9

The situation in Southeast Asia is equally problematic for groups seeking to sustain radical political projects. In general terms, Islam in Indonesia has been strongly influenced by pre-Islamic syncretic systems (leading to 'Kejawen' forms of Islam), a strong mystical inclination, and the importance of Sufism (Aveling 1979; McAmis 2002, p45). In part, this divergence has been accommodated by the concept of adat or local customary law, which has in most areas has run alongside the core religious tenants of Islam, creating a wider social space for divergence (McAmis 2002, p63). Other patterns that may have been influenced by the Hindu past include a special reverence for the teacher (guru), though this has in part converged on the idea of the special blessings that Muslim teachers and holy persons can impart on their students (McAmis 2002, p69).

However, it is also true that small but influential numbers of Arabs, Persians, South Asians, those who returned from the struggle in Afghanistan, and those returning from the Hajj have also added new layers of Islamic belief since the 17th century. We should note that large numbers of Southeast Asian Muslims make the pilgrimage to Mecca each year, and in the past the Indonesian government gave some financial support for up to 10,000 people making the trip (McAmis 2002, p69). Arabic has also remained the primary language of advanced Islamic instruction, though in many cases used ritually rather than fully understood linguistically, and Malay became a secondary vehicle for commentary and dialogue on Islam at least as early as the late 17th century when an interpretation of the Qur'an was provided in Malay by Shaykh Abdul Rauf al Sinkili (Ahmed 2000, I, p396; see further Mansurnoor 1990). During these centuries Malay was not only one of the key lingua franca for regional trade, but was also one of the vehicles for religious transmission as well (Ahmed 2000 I, p398). This transnational linkage provides a direct sense of community with the wider Islamic global society, as well as being a focus for renewed missionary and 'call' activities, da'wa, including the call religious renewal (McAmis 2002, p80). People who have been through this experience not only have increased prestige within

9 "Declaration of Jihad, August 23, 1996" in MARLIN, Robert O (IV) (ed.) What Does Al-Qaeda Want?: Unedited Communiques, Berkeley, North Atlantic Books, 2004, p9.

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their local communities, but are unlikely to impressed by Western visions of global affairs as presented in modern media outlets and foreign policy agenda.

It is in this context that we can see the enormous prestige and influence of Muslim religious leaders both via village institutions and through teaching institutions such as the pesantren, madrasah (theological schools, whose role became formalised in the Islamic world from the 11th century onwards), sekolah Islam (Kennedy 2004, p260; McAmis 2002, p65). Though local custom have been strongly influenced by local belief systems at the level of the 'abangan', sometimes viewed as nominal Muslims, it now seems that the santri as devout Muslims seem to have gained some greater influence at the grass roots level in recent years (McAmis 2002, p49). It is such a context that figures such as Abu Bakar Bashir, via the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), can gain a certain degree of influence among a strong religious minority within Indonesia. In is important not to exaggerate the conservative or negative teaching of some pesantren in Indonesia. In fact the pesantren are a key element in the national educational program and since 1994 of these have been modernised through the adoptions of the curricula developed by the Ministry of National Education and the Ministry of Religious Affairs (Azra 2005, pp13-14). Likewise, Indonesia remains a multi-religious society, with most Muslims in the country supporting a pluralist democracy and not favouring a move towards an Islamic state, nor supporting wholesale extension of strict shariah codes of law (see Hosen 2005).

It can be seen, then, that the political project of the Caliphate as put forward by al-Qaeda, JI and related groups is at best fragmentary, often mixed with revolutionary elements of 20th century European political practice (Nasr 2003, pp181-184), and at worst a utopian reworking of a call to the past that does not coincide with the current challenges facing Islamic communities, in spite of some superficial similarities. Thus: -

The modernism and so-called fundamentalism that are evident in certain sectors of Islamic society and in certain lands have caused traditional Islamic life to wither, but have been unable to create any significant theological world view that could challenge the traditional one (Nasr 2003, p174).

This project might seem unlikely in the face of the U.S.'s dominant strategic power, continued Russian and Chinese tensions with Islam, continued international interventions in the Middle East and Central Asia, and the apparent robustness of governments in Southeast Asia, though Thailand and Philippines have come under increasing pressure from 2006 (see Strategic Comments 2006a; Yong 2006). However, militant Islamists have viewed themselves as the victor in the war against the Soviet Union (in Afghanistan from 1979), as slowly winning the war of hearts and minds in the Islamic world, and Al Qaeda has spoken of its victory against the U.S. in Beirut, Aden, and Mogadishu (in Marlin 204, p13, p73). From the point of Osama bin Laden, these different conflicts are part of a longer chain of an integrated war between Crusaders and Muslims (in Marlin 2004, p39), thereby engaging a long-term viewpoint and a global strategy of conflict. From this point of view, conditions in Pakistan, Palestine, and Iran are far from positive, while ongoing repression in the Central Asia also provides a possible focus for conflict. Problematic and slow stabilisation efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan suggest that there is a need for sustained multilateral international support for these new governments if they are to become genuinely accepted as local and legitimate sources of governance. At

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present, groups such as JI and Al-Qaeda seem able to disturb the current international order but destroy it. Nor do their statements suggest an adequate vision of alternative governance. In the contemporary setting, this leave open the issue of how Islamic society should sustain itself in the modern period of Western global dominance.

3. Normative Transnational and International Islamic Institutions

It is possible to conceptualise key elements of Islam's religious system as supporting current normative roles for Muslims within global society. The five pillars of Islam, of course, are the Shahada (profession of faith), the Salat (five daily prayers), the Hajj, pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina where possible (the 'greater' Hajj occurs during the last lunar month of the year), Zakat (giving of money to hose in need) and Sawm (fasting in daylight hours of the month of Ramadan, see further Nasr 2003). We can link some of these fundamentals to wider flows in the transnational system today, e.g. the Hajj which brings together hundreds of millions of Muslims each year, with the number reaching 1,557,447 pilgrims in 2006 (BNA 2006). The geographical centrality of the holy places in Arabia is also reinforced by the tradition whereby prayer is conducted facing towards Mecca, with the mihrab, a niche, or even small plaque, showing the direction of the holy site (Kennedy 2004, p141)

3a. The Ummah as the Community of Believers

Likewise, the ummah, the community of believers, provides another focus for a transnational network that is nearly global in reach and comprises almost 1.5 billion members. It is crucial to note that for many Muslims this is a key level of their identity, especially when state or governmental structures have been weak or oppresive. As noted by Seyyed Nasr: -

One of the key concepts in Islam is that of the ummah, or the totality of people who are Muslims and constitute the Islamic world. Islam sees history itself in religious terms and refers to other people not primarily by their linguistic or ethnic affiliations but their religious identity, hence the reference to the ummah of Moses or Jesus so often found in Islamic text when discussing Judaism or Christianity. The Islamic ummah is one, bound by solidarity to the Quranic message of Divine Oneness and Sovereignty, the messengership of the Prophet, and acceptance of the Divine Law (al-Shari'ah). Muslims are united by the powerful bond of brotherhood and sisterhood, a bond that is felt strongly to this day despite all the turmoil that has pitted and continues to put Muslims against one another. (Nasr 2003, p15)

This sense of solidarity and brotherhood, ukhuwwah, helped make Islam an appealing religion not just to Arabs, but soon spread to Persian, Turks, Egyptians and a wider community that stretched from Western Africa through Central Asia to enclaves in southern China (Nasr 2003, pp15-16; Quran 3:103). In theory, membership within Islam overcame barriers of ethnicity, race, and status, and 'rejected all forms of racism and tribalism' (Nar 2003, p16, following Quran 49:13), making it an ideal universalising religion. In theory, alongside its core religious believes, Islam could benefit from the great diversity of its followers. Persians, Turks, and Indians would soon contribute to the rich culture and intellectual tradition of Islam. Thus, 'Islam is like a vast tapestry into which all these local cultural

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modes and varieties are woven like arabesques; the larger pattern they make reflects the Oneness of the Divine Principle' (Nasr 2003, p24).

Having said this, political unity became problematic as soon as the Prophet died, and could not even be easily sustained even through the Abbasid period (Kennedy 2004). The division between Shia and Sunni groups, different claims by different leaders to the prestige of the Caliphate, and a range of orthodox and non-orthodox practices soon created a range of division within the Islamic world. This can be seen, for example, in secondary pilgrimages made to the shrines and tombs of saints by many Muslims, a practice common in Central Asia (especially Uzbekistan), Iran, parts of Iraq Pakistan, and parts of Indonesia, especially Java (Kennedy 2004, p239). This belief in the intercessory power of saints, teachers, and Sufi sheikhs has been viewed as at best unorthodox and verging on idolatry by stricter interpreters, e.g. it is strongly opposed in modern Arabia and Malaysia. Likewise, the impact of de-colonisation, nationalism and modernisation has left a checkerboard of Muslim societies whose states are often at odds with each other, e.g. historical tensions between Syria and Turkey, Iran and Turkey, and between Saudi Arabia and Iran. In such a context, the identity with the umma remains as an ideal and aspiration, and the structures of family and local community may become a stronger reality for many Muslims (Nasr 2003, p103).

Early Islam focused on the ideal of Tawhid as a widely conceived 'God-centred civilization' which could be established on earth (Ahmed 2000, I, p74, p89). This also implied a debate on authentic and 'unauthentic' traditions and practices, and a utopian push towards a universal political order based on a unity among believers across diverse cultures and transcending states: -

Islamists furthermore suffer overall from a tendency to seek an idealized social unity, and idealized homogeneous national - or even umma - identity that discourages diversity and difference that is seen as fractious, divisive and harmful to the umma. (Fuller 2003, p19)

Likewise, Muslim communities under pressure within Western countries, e.g. France through 2003-2006, have at times rebounded towards a stronger Islamic identity focused on the ummah, particularly if they remain within minority communities and do not work within the wider French community (Spencer 2005). Islam has emerged as the second largest religion in France, with over 4 million Muslims in the country in the late 1990s and heading towards 10% of the population in the 21st century (see Caldwell 2000; Crittenden & Ferguson 2006), and when compared with the 8-9% of highly active Catholics, this has worried conservative commentators (Hanley 2003, p28). At the broader level, it can also be asked in the post-2001 whether France and Europe as a whole is really willing and able to protect the rights of its Muslim Minorities, in spite of the legal requirement to do so. From 1989 the 'Islamic Scarf' case was concerned with the refusal of a junior high-school principal to allow three Islamic girls to wear scarves in school, basically on the basis of secularism in schools and egality in education, a debate that continued through the 1990s down to 2004 (Milner & Parsons 2003, p12; Wieviorka 1994, p250). The issue of the division between Church and State, laicité (Pierre & Quandt 1995, p140), a core tenant of French republican tradition, was re-iterated through February 2004 with the National Assembly banning all religious symbols in state

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schools, including headscarves, turbans, skullcaps, and large crosses (Milner & Parsons 2003, p12).

At various time Islamist groups have also sought an internationalised approach through linkages into the wider umma. Thus from 1990 with the formal creation of the 'all-Union' Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) which aimed to create a revival of Islam in Eurasia and Central Asia, with three main structures: the first in Central Asia, plus a Moscow based centre to help Muslims within Russia, and another group based in the North Caucasus. The group soon set up branches in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, aimed at helping propagate Islam and be involved in 'cultural, sociopolitical and economic life'. (Akcali 1998). This organisation, however, had a strongly internationalist orientation, based on the view of a global community of believers (the umma), leading to early contact and cooperation between members in Tajikistan and the mujahidin in Afghanistan. For many Central Asians, the ability of Afghanistan to resist the Soviet invasion during the 1980s, showed it was possible for Islamic communities to resist Russian domination in the 1990s (Akcali 1998), a lesson being partly repeated through the continued resistance of the Taliban parts of southern Afghanistan through 2005-2007. These patterns of local and transnational identity have made it very difficult for the top-down approach of nation-building to be applied in Central Asia, especially if religious and opposition are effectively excluded a political voice (see further Akcali 2003). Likewise, for radical thinkers such as Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi (1903-1979) Muslims should constitute a jama'at, a community rather than a nation, and as such 'secularism, nationalism and democracy are the roots of calamities' (Johns & Lahoud 2005, p12). ). More generally, for many Muslims living in troubled states there is a real tension between religious and national identity.

3b. Islamic Views on Trade and Banking

The Islamic tradition has a generally positive view of trade, largely based on the early history of Mohammed’s involvement in the Arabian caravan trade. The view of Mecca as a major trading centre with direct connections onto the incense trade has recently been challenged as invalid since Mecca is not directly on the incense route, and since Mecca itself was only a centre for pilgrimage after the rise of Islam (Crone 1987, p196). This does not reduce the reality of some form of local caravan trade being conducted between Mecca and southern Syria (Crone 1987, pp160-168). Montgomery Watt suggests that in the 7th century Mecca had already established a commercial network, with recorded winter caravans to the Yemen, and summer caravans to Syria, along with relations with Abyssinia (Watt 1988, pp39-44; Qu'ran 106:2). Once Mohammed had established his role as the foremost prophet in Arabia, this meant that both Mecca and Medina in turn became centres for pilgrimage and trade, a trend which continued for over a thousand years (Crone 1987, p172; Meilink-Roelofsz 1962, p225). Pilgrimage and attendant trade in Mecca developed more strongly after the rise of Islam (Crone 1987, pp173-177).

Even though Islamic morality is strongly opposed to usury (Udovitch 1970, pp61-62; see further below), its demand for truth and honesty in contracts, oaths and verbal agreements has meant that it is a religious ethic which aids the role of trade in wealth generation for the community. The hadith tradition itself repeatedly emphasises values such as 'acting justly, trustworthiness, diligence, perseverance,

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initiative, creativity' (Ghazali 1996, p15). Likewise, good reputation and honest conduct were essential for business activities such as the 'credit partnership', as found in Hanafite law (Udovitch 1970, pp54-55). Therefore, in order to create a just, Islamic economic system, it was necessary for many Islamic values, 'including honesty in business dealings, faithfulness to contracts, and the duty of sharing with others' (Iqbal & Mirakhor 1987, p23) to be internalised individually and enculturated within society as a whole.

Islamic jurisprudence also readily allowed the creation of responsible and flexible business partnerships which facilitated long-distance trading arrangements (Udovitch 1970, p38), probably aiding the success of Muslim traders in long sea voyages into the Indian Ocean and further eastwards (see further Chaudhuri 1990). In particular, this included 'partnership and commenda contracts which were the two basic legal instruments through which these economic functions could be accomplished' (Udovitch 1970, p38; see also Meilink-Roelfofsz 1962, p296). The commenda was particularly useful for investment in such trade:

The commenda is an arrangement in which an investor or group of investors entrusts capital or merchandise to an agent-manager, who is to trade with it, and then return to the investor(s) the principal and a previously agreed share of the profits. As a reward for his labour, the agent receives the remaining share of the profits. Any loss resulting from the exigencies of travel or from an unsuccessful business venture is borne exclusively by the investor(s), the agent is in no way liable for a loss of this nature, losing only his expended time and effort. (Udovitch 1970, p47)

Qurannic principles formed the basis of a virtual 'merchant law' designed to exclude 'unjustified enrichment', and reduce elements of chance in contracts (Udovitch 1970, p40; see further Attia 1986, pp101-102). The fourteenth century thinker Ibn Khaldun (1332-1402) should argue that the most advanced form of sedentary civilisation required mutual trade and cooperation, international trade and economic growth (Mehmet 1990, pp82-83).

Islamic economic systems, including banks, investment houses and insurance companies, are part of a broadly based Islamic revival in many parts of the world, seeking to return Islam to a central social role in modern life (Esposito 1992, p23; Ferguson 1996). Islamic banking is an area where different cultural systems have interacted vigorously. Any Islamic institution must seek to correlate its activities with the basic tenants of Islamic law, but due to the very changed economic environment of the modern era, sustained debate has emerged on appropriate limits of Islamic financial activities.

The main divergence between Islamic and Western economic systems is the rejection of unfair interest in money lending (viewed as Usury, Riba) and an effort to reconcile social justice with the needs of market economies, resulting in various combinations of social intervention and planning alongside market mechanisms (Kandil 1995; Khan & Mirakhor 1990, p353; Preley & Sessions 1994, p585). A concise formulation of the interaction of Islamic conceptions of social justice with the economy has been provided by John Presley and John Sessions: -

Justice and equality in Islam means that people should have equal opportunity and does not imply that they should be equal in poverty or in riches . . . However, it is incumbent on the Islamic state to guarantee a subsistence level to its citizens, that is

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a minimum level of food, clothing, shelter, medical care and education (Quran 2:275-9). The major purpose is to moderate social variances within Islamic society, and to enable the poor to lead a normal, spiritual and material life in dignity and contentment. (Presley & Sessions 1994, p585)

No definite agreement has been reached on the difficult problem of whether interest should be banned altogether, a view taken by many Islamic jurists, or whether some sort of low interest rate indexed to inflation (Mehmet 1990) is allowable under Islamic principles. Even within Islamic scholarship opinions vary. In 1995, for example, the Grand Mufti of Egypt, Sheik Mohammed Sayyed Tantawi, had suggested that there was little real difference between fixed interest rates of Western banks and the investment schemes offered by Islamic banks, a view not supported by many traditional scholars (Evans 1995). For Muslims the key moral concern with usury is that it often exploits the poor (Haque 1995, p1). As noted by Prof. Bob McKeon at the University of Alberta: 'In static economies, it's extortionary to take any interest from the needy. But in advanced economies, where concentration of capital multiplies productivity, interest is no longer simple usury.' (in Woodward 1995) Usury, Riba, seems to be based on the notion of unfair addition added to a loan in its repayment (Mehmet 1990, p78). There are 20 injunctions against Riba in the Koran, of which 2:275 is extremely clear where it states: 'But God has permitted trading and made usury unlawful' (in Maurer 2005, p55). Ozay Mehmet suggests that it is, 'therefore, open to debate as to whether the Islamic prohibition refers to the interest rate (as the opportunity cost of capital) or usury (as an unjustified extra value in excess of the allowable opportunity cost of capital)' (Mehmet 1990, p78). On the other hand, most Islamic scholars insist that any sort of set interest is forbidden under Shariah, including any indirect advantage or benefits that might be owed to the lender (Nienhause 1986, p3; Afzaal 1997; Nomani & Rahnema 1994, pp1-20). In general terms, the aim seem to be to ensure that both the lender and debtor share risks and uncertainty, and become more equalised in the transaction (Maurer 2005, p56).

Fortunately, a number of financial operations which do not involve interest at all, and which work quite differently from the creation of debt, are open to Islamic banks. These include Murabaha, where the 'bank buys the goods in question from suppliers and delivers them to the customer at an agreed marked-up price', Mudaraba, where money is invested for worthwhile projects in trade and commerce with some of the profits returned to the investors (Inalcik 1994), and the bank receiving a management fee, Musharaka, similar to normal joint ventures, Modaraba, a form of capital trust financing (with the capital protected), and Ijara, similar to leasing.10 Mudaraba, 10 KHAN, Mohsin S. & MIRAKHOR, Abbas "Islamic Banking: Experiences in the Islamic Republic of Iran and in Pakistan", Economic Development and Cultural Change, 38, January 1990, p355; IQBAL, Zubair & MIRAKHOR, Abbas Islamic Banking, Occasional Paper No. 49, Washington DC, IMF, March 1987, pp3-4; PRESLEY, John R. & SESSIONS, John G. "Islamic Economics: The Emergence of a New Paradigm", The Economic Journal, 104, May 1994, p587; WARREN, Peter M. "With a Scholarly Touch, Citicorp Makes Its Pitch for Islamic Investors; Finance: Bank Counts on 'Guardians of the Faith' to Make Sure Money is Handled in Accordance with Laws of the Koran", Los Angeles Times, 11 August 1996, (Orange Country Edition, pD-9) [Electric Library, Internet Access]; NIENHAUS, Volker "Islamic Economics, Finance and Banking - Theory and Practice", in EL HELW, Mahmoud (Chairman) Islamic Banking and Finance, London, Butterworths, 1986, pp9-10; ALTAMIMI, Younes "The Experience of Islamic Banks in the Middle East", in EL HELW, Mahmoud (Chairman) Islamic Banking and Finance, London, Butterworths, 1986, p33; ALLAWI, Luay "Leasing: An Islamic Financial Instrument", in EL HELW, Mahmoud (Chairman) Islamic Banking and Finance, London, Butterworths, 1986, pp120-127. At least until 1990, it has been argued that many Islamic banks often in fact rely on short-term trade financing, since mudaraba and musharaka involve

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profit sharing, and the business organisations built around the shirka (partnership) were the bases of commercial trade in Muslims societies of the past (Haque 1995, p129). In all these operations, some real service, good, or resource is transacted, i.e. the bank provides some direct business function, and is not simply involved in manipulating paper values. It was through these mechanisms that capital and traders were brought together, sharing a set ratio of the profits of any venture, but not a set rate of return on a principle sum invested. Risk and responsibility was also distributed legally beforehand in these operations, depending on the type of relationship between the different parties (Haque 1995, pp160-162).

In general, Muslim economic principles accept the notion of normal profits and the operation of a generally free market, but are opposed to exploitative practices based on interest, unfair profits, monopolies, oligopolies, hoarding, the sale of future values of crops, and speculation (Mehmet 1990, p77). Certain types of investment, e.g. in brewing or gambling, pork processing industries, or industries associated with pornography prostitution, are also prohibited in Islamic thought, with armaments industries and tobacco sometimes included in this list of prohibitions (Maurer 2005, p62; Mustrull 1996; Mehmet 1990, p77; Allawi 1986, p122). Riba is thus a much wider concept than just set interest on a loan, it includes a wide range of economic activities which are conceived of as unjust, exploitative, or not offering a fair balance between the parties involved in a transaction (Haque 1995, p168). It must be stressed that this condemnation is not just on technical grounds: it is a powerful moral argument that those who 'devour riba' are wicked, greedy and sinful (Haque 1995, p8). From this point of view such persons deserve punishment since they are destroying others and undermining their own communities.

There has sometimes been an unwillingness to see a distinction between interest on loans and shared profits or dividends from investments, but this distinction between interest and shared profit systems is not just a matter of semantics or clever accounting (Maurer 2005, p57; Economist 1993;Ingram 1986, p54; Carlson 1986, p79). Although these criticisms might be valid in some particular cases, there are substantive reasons not to be dismissive of the role of the Islamic economic institutions globally. There are four immediate reasons which suggest that Islamic economic institutions will remain important. Firstly, for Muslims globally, many of whom are seeking to retain the heart of Islamic belief during periods of rapid industrialisation and modernisation, there is in fact a huge global market for a religiously acceptable and culturally compatible form of banking. In the past, some observing Muslims have either had to refuse interest on conventional bank accounts, to donate such interest to a charity, or to rely on investing in stocks directly (Mastrull 1996). Recent estimates suggest that Islamic banks globally have assets of over $60 billion, and are actively involved in infrastructure development, with total financial assets of Islamic Banks and companies in 2005 at $250 billion 'not including

'an unusually close and trusting association between the bank and the borrower', MOORE, Clement Henry "Islamic Banks and Competitive Politics in the Arab World and Turkey", Middle East Journal, 44 no. 2, Spring 1990, pp234-235. For other permitted types of loan and investment structures, see KHAN, Mohsin S. & MIRAKHOR, Abbas "Islamic Banking: Experiences in the Islamic Republic of Iran and in Pakistan", Economic Development and Cultural Change, 38, January 1990, pp355-356. Islamic Banks have also used Profit-and-Loss-Sharing (PLS) investment schemes to some extend, though this does expose the bank to greater risk, NIENHAUS, Volker "Islamic Economics, Finance and Banking - Theory and Practice", in EL HELW, Mahmoud (Chairman) Islamic Banking and Finance, London, Butterworths, 1986, pp9-11.

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Islamic investment funds and insurance' (BNA 2006b; Mardini 1996; Warren 1996; Aziz 1997). Private-sector commercial banks offering these services have greatly expanded since the opening of the Dubai Islamic Bank in 1975 (Moore 1990, p235). It has been estimated that there from the mid-1990s some 300 Islamic banks and financial institutions have been operating in 25-40 countries (Mardini 1996; Warren 1996). Islamic banking has grown rapidly recently and although at first mainly located in the Middle East, Africa, South and South-East Asia, this tradition has now spread to North America, Europe, Central Asia (Mardini 1996; Kamaludin 1989; Khalaf 1995, p35; Al Bahar 1996), and Australia.

This growth has meant that even traditional Western banks are willing to open Islamic branches, e.g. in July 1996 Citibank opened such a branch in Bahrain (Citi Islamic Investment Bank), with the Netherlands' largest bank, ABN Amro, following suit later in 1996.11 In the Citibank case, special Sharia boards will oversee investment schemes to ensure they confirm to religious requirements (Warren 1996). Bearing in mind the growth of Islam globally, and the continuing economic development that is occurring in much of the Middle East, South and South-East Asia, this area of banking is likely to continue to grow. Such Islamic assets in the 1990s have been growing on a global basis at 10-15% annually, while total assets for Banks (outside of companies) rose in 2005 from $ 61 to 85 billion, marking a 35% increase rate (BNA 2005b; Khalaf 1995; Straits Times 1996), and are likely to become an important element of the global financial system.

Although US and Canadian institutions are not all fully compliant with Shariah rules, and there has been greater scrutiny of such funds and informal money transfer systems (hawala) since 2001 (Maurer 2005, pp59-60; Abuza 2003; Parker 2006), they have made efforts at accommodating these Islamic markets and funds, including large institutions such as Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs and Bank of America (Parker 2006). In the past, such informal transfer systems and Islamic aid agencies had be view as transnational conduits for terrorist funding, especially by Al Qaeda in the 1990s (Gunaratna 2002).

In developing countries, of course, there is a possibility that segments of the population remain trapped in real poverty or development lags. These trends suggest that alternative economic systems, which do not reject the notion of social justice as an external economic cost, may have a major role to play in aiding social cohesion and distributed economic development. At the community level, Islamic banks or credit unions can provided a needed source of 'social investment'. Islamic banking can therefore provide a focus for communally-based financial operations. Islamic banking can also provide more affordable ways for ordinary people to buy homes, utilising interest-free credit unions. The scheme is for prospective house buyers to pay into a fund, receiving the entire amount for their house 'when their turn comes up, and keep paying until the fund is reimbursed' (Woodward 1995). Other possible uses for this type of 'social lending' include 11 WARREN, Peter M. "With a Scholarly Touch, Citicorp Makes Its Pitch for Islamic Investors; Finance: Bank Counts on 'Guardians of the Faith' to Make Sure Money is Handled in Accordance with Laws of the Koran", Los Angeles Times, 11 August 1996, (Orange Country Edition, pD-9) [Electric Library, Internet Access]. In fact major Western banks have been helping channel excess liquidity from Islamic banks into non-interest based investment for some years, with an estimated 10% of Islamic funds being channelled into major Western banks, KHALAF, Roula "Banking the Islamic Way", World Press Review, January 1995, p35.

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financing student education (Ingram 1996). Of course, Islamic banks or credit unions would be prohibited from taking over or refinancing existing interest-based debt: they are not a source of 'free money'. At the same time, moreover, interest-free banking of this type could be attractive not just to Muslims, but also to Christians and Jews who strictly follow prohibitions against usury in their own traditions.12

Islamic banking may offer opportunities to specific countries in the South Asian, Asia-Pacific and Afro-Middle Eastern regions. Malaysia in particular, with it developed economic and communication infrastructure, combined with its understanding of Islamic realities, has provided a major service in helping further develop Islamic banking in South-East Asia, the Indian Ocean region, South Asia, and the Middle East, and in the developed nations with Islamic populations. Malaysia has had experience with Islamic banks since 1981, and has also been active in the creation of an Islamic insurance company, an Islamic Economic Development Foundation and IKIM, the Institute of Islamic Understanding, and an Islamic University (Camroux 1996). Malaysia has developed a sizeable Islamic banking sector, a true Islamic interbank market, and strong international operations being developed on the island of Labuan, an international offshore financial centre, IOFC (Aziz 1997; Khalaf 1995). There are several opportunities for this international role to be extended. Malaysia was given the brief to develop Islamic banking and insurance within the D8 organisation, a grouping of Islamic states designed to cooperate with each other and act as a parallel organisation to the G8. The D8, launched in June 1997, includes Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan and Turkey, and aims 'to develop trade, industry and financial projects’ (Butler 1995). Within this organization each country has been given areas for special attention, with Indonesia focusing on human resources, while Malaysia focused 'on privatization, banking and Islamic insurance' (Butler 1997). The Declaration of the D8 stressed the need for development and the eradication of poverty. The group also noted that ‘old policies of double standards, discrimination and oppression have continued and in some cases intensified’ and ‘the insufficient share of our economies in the global trade activities as well as the inadequate role of our countries in the global economic decision-making’ (D8 Declaration 1997). The fifth D8 Summit was held in Bali in 2006, with poverty and energy issues being central issues discussed, with dialogue on 'lowering trade barriers and boosting economic cooperation' and Iran's nuclear program (News Agency Qatar 2006; Radio Australia 2006). Malaysia, with its careful positioning of an important but not dominant role for Islam within its multicultural state, has been well suited to develop Islamic banking in this wider regional context.

The Islamic Development Bank (IDB), founded in Jeddah in 1974 by 37 Islamic countries, and active in some 45 countries or more, has played an active role in 'co-financing projects, trade financing, equity participation, promoting training and research in the fields of Islamic banking and economics' (Altamimi 1986, p31; see also El Helw 1986), using a multilateral approach and Islamic principles. From 2005, the IDB has developed a future vision statement looking toward major poverty 12 Both religions were originally deeply opposed to interest on loans, e.g. in the Middle Ages Christians were not supposed to be involved in money lending. However, by the early modern period, justifications were found to step around this regulation, HAQUE, Ziaul Riba: The Moral Economy of Usury, Interest and Profit, Kuala Lumpur, Ikraq, 1995, p169. The ability to raise and use capital, of course, was one of the pre-requisites for the capitalist age, and for the great trading expeditions that spread around the world from the 16th century onwards. Put another way, the West decided to legally regulate interest on loans, rather than ban it.

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reduction in Muslim countries through till 2020 (News Agency Emirate 2005). However, the IDB has taken up a very wide scope of activities, as can be seen by a selected sample of their activities and meetings through 2005-2006, perhaps indicating an over-ambitious agenda.

IDB Events 2005-2006 (modified from http://www.isdb.org/english_docs/idb_home/news.php)

08/07/2006 Moody's Investors' Service Assigns Aaa Long-Term and Prime-1 Issuer Ratings to the Islamic Development Bank

02/07/2006 Workshop on Capacity Building in Facilitation of Trade and Investment 26/06/2006 Workshop on "Capacity Building for Facilitation of Trade and Investment for OIC

member countries" 20/06/2006 Speech Delivered by RT Hon Gordon Brown MP, The Chancellor of the Exchequer,

HM Govt., UK, at the Islamic Finance and Trade conference 2006, London 15/06/2006 Chancellor of the Exchequer Announces UK to Become Gateway for Islamic Trade

And Finance 29/05/2006 Islamic Development Bank Provides Urgent Relief Assistance to Indonesia for

Victims of the Java Earthquake 14/05/2006 Proclamation of the Three Academic Research Institutions and Centres that Won the

IDB 1427/2006 Prize for Science and Technology 10/05/2006 IDB support for infrastructure projects in Pakistan 08/05/2006 Proclamation of the Winners of the 1427H/2006 IDB Prize for Women's

Contribution to Development 27/04/2006 US$ 36 Million from IDB for University Reconstruction in Indonesia 10/04/2006 IDB Extend US$ 10 million For trade financing operation in favor of Tunisia 09/04/2006 IDB Manages Islamic Financing to Rabigh Refinery & Petrochemical Project in

Saudi Arabia 01/04/2006 Yemeni Trade and Industry Minister seeks IDB assistance for joining WTO 25/03/2006 HRH Prince of Wales Endorses the Establishment of Youth Enterprise Programmes

in IDB Member Countries . 15/03/2006 IDB Allocates US$ 103 Million for Combating Bird Flu in affected Member

Countries 14/03/2006 The Islamic Development Bank Extends US$ 52 Million for Two Development

Projects in Lebanon 21/12/2005 The Islamic Development Bank 1440H Vision Commission Finalizes Vision

Document 01/10/2005 The Islamic Development Bank conducts a regional vision workshop for member

countries in Africa

There have also been efforts to harmonise international Islamic banking, shariah commitments, and international banking rules via a review process, conducted by liaison among groups such as the OIC, and the Bahrain-located Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions, AAOIFI (Maurer 2005, p60), the Islamic Financial Services Board,13 and the IDB: -

13 The IFSB describes itself as ' The Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) , which is based in Kuala Lumpur, was officially inaugurated on 3rd November 2002 and started operations on 10th March 2003. It serves as an international-standard setting body of regulatory and supervisory agencies that have vested interest in ensuring the soundness and stability of the Islamic financial services industry, which is defined broadly to include banking, capital market and insurance. In advancing this mission, the IFSB promotes the development of a prudent and transparent Islamic financial services industry through introducing new, or adapting existing international standards consistent with Islamic Shari'ah principles, and recommend them for adoption. To this end, the work of the IFSB complements that of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, International Organization of Securities Commissions and the International Association of Insurance Supervisors'[ http://www.ifsb.org/index.php?ch=2&pg=1&ac=1].

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Approving a product for Islamic banking purposes is a laborious affair thatcan take up to two years. Researchers are commissioned to examine a paper onthe subject. This finding is then discussed by up to five members of the Shariaboard supervising the given institution. They will accept, amend or reject thepaper.

The board will then refer it to another Sharia committee who will review it inconjunction with the person who originally launched the inquiry.

Next a board of 15 scholars, who meet twice a year in Mecca and Medina, willundertake a further review. The outcome is then reviewed by the entire industryfrom bankers to legal bodies across all the Islamic states. . . . (Watts & Gamazo 2006)

Islamic Banking and other services could provide another needed area of trade and investment in underdeveloped regions. Here we see the meeting of modern economic cultures (accounting, communication and investment systems) with the demands of the traditional Islamic economic system. Furthermore, the enhancement of linkages in the region via Islamic Banking is likely to further strengthen regional trade and investment, Here, the development of culturally compatible forms of banking could help mobilise more savings and act as a source of funds to allow further regional development and investment.

4. Conclusion: Innovation, Reform and Conflict

As we have seen, there has been considerable innovation in making modern institutions, from elective democracy to modern banking, more compatible with Islamic norms. However, with current relative failures in some states with Islamic populations, and the limited accountability of others, its remains to be seen whether these nations will meet the need of the wider ummah. Fortunately, radical utopian projects such as a revitalised caliphate seem to have limited resonance with modern Muslim populations. In this area, both hard and soft power options, including breaking down cultural prejudices and building new patterns of trust (Effendy 2007), are needed to reduce ideologist conflicts that are being played out globally but are inflamed by local conflicts, e.g. in Palestine, Somalia, and Central Asia. We can question, however, whether the international system is responsive enough to meet the deeper aspirations of almost one quarter of the global population.

5. Bibliography, Resources and Further Reading

Resources

The Islamic Development Bank group, a 'multilateral development financing institution, established to foster social and economic development of it's member countries and Muslim communities world-wide', has its homepage at http://www.isdb.org/

Basic information on the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) can be found at http://www.icci-oic.org/oi/1.htm and http://www.oic-un.org/

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Al Nakhlah is a useful, free, on-line journal on Middle Eastern and Islamic affairs, provided by the Fletcher School, Tufts University, located via http://fletcher.tufts.edu/al_nakhlah/

A range of critical views on Islam in world affairs can be found at the Hudson Institute, located at http://www.hudson.org/

Further Reading

AHMED, Akbar S. Journey into Islam: The Crisis of Globalization, N.Y., Brookings Institution, 2007

ALI, Tariq The Clash of Fundamentalisms: Crusades, Jihads and Modernity, London, Verso, 2002

BARNES, Cedric & HASSAN, Harun The Rise and fall of Mogadishu's Islamic Courts, Chatham House Briefing Paper, Africa Program, AFP BP 07/02, April 2007 [www.chathamhouse.org.uk/pdf/research/africa/bpsomalia0407.pdf]

ESPOSITO, John The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?, New York, Oxford University Press, 1992

NATHAN, K.S. & KAMALI, Mohammad Hashim (eds) Islam in Southeast Asia: Political, Social and Strategic Challenges for the 21st Century, Singapore, ISEAS, 2005

JOHNS, Anthony H. & LAHOUD, Nelly (eds) Islam in World Politics, London, Routledge, 2005

KINYON, Rebecca "Osama bin-Laden: Legitimate within Islamic Legal Thought?", al Nakhlah, Spring 2004, pp1-5 [Internet access via http://fletcher.tufts.edu/al_nakhlah/]

Bibliography and Further Research

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