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Connor MacLean

Prof. Carolyn Hill

CWP 106

04 November 2014

The Concept of the Political: Carl Schmitt’s Argument for the Total State

When a country is in shambles, others are prosperous, and the world is on the brink of

war, it is natural for some to place blame on existing political structures. In the absolute

destruction left by World War I, Germany was in a state of limbo - everyone wanted someone to

blame, and with the world’s perception of Germany as “the enemy,” Germany turned on the

world. Leading up to the Nazi takeover in 1933, opponents and supporters alike published

hundreds of opinions on the state of the world, using a wide variety of reasoning - from

economic logic to appeals to emotion to scientific ‘fact.’ In the midst, Carl Schmitt, a strong

supporter of the Nazi party and later an influential economist for the Third Reich, published his

manuscript The Concept of the Political, supporting a proposed state in which economics would

not govern any considerations of what he called “the political.” According to Schmitt,

democracy, socialism, liberalism, pacifism, anarchy, and the likes are flawed systems because

they give the common citizen too much voice in the government, leading to a politicalization of

issues that he views as inherently nonpolitical. Schmitt presents the natural tendency towards a

friend versus enemy mentality as the explanation for - and defining factor of - what he calls “the

political.” Nevertheless, Carl Schmitt’s argument is erroneous and deceptive because it uses

sound logic to support false claims by overreaching its logical conclusions.

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Schmitt’s main dispute with the structure of liberal governments lies in the fact that those

types of government include nonpolitical domains in their concept of “the political.” The

political as he defines it refers to international relations based on friend-enemy relationships;

politics, on the other hand, are domestic. The friend-enemy relationship always exists because is

it a natural human tendency to group others into these categories. He distinguishes between the

state and society, arguing that “the equation state = politics becomes erroneous and deceptive at

exactly the moment when state and society penetrate each other […] as must necessarily occur in

a democratically organized unit” (Schmitt 22). In other words, he is saying that government

policy and social issues are separate areas which should not become intertwined, but that because

citizens of a democracy are given a voice in their government, in a democracy, they do. The

initial logic is sound; one may accept the distinction between state and politics as valid and

recognize that they are combined when members of a state may vote to influence how their

government will act. The state then becomes political.

Continuing his argument, Schmitt states that “democracy [is] a doctrine nourished by a

thousand springs, and varying greatly with the social status of its adherents,” which is also

plainly true (23). That is to say, people’s voting patterns tend to reflect their socioeconomic

status, and since voting affects government policy, government policy will be made by the

socioeconomic status of voters. Schmitt’s continued correctness builds credibility, making the

reader more likely to accept his later arguments.

However, furthering his claims, he states that “only in one respect [is] [democracy]

consistent, namely in the insatiability of its demand for state control of the individual,” an

allegation which is simply false (23). Schmitt paints a picture of democracy as an inconsistent

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form of government dependable only in the fact that its end goal is total control over every

aspect of the lives of its citizens. One may be deceived into believing this after reading the logic

he presents leading up to this conclusion, but the final step he takes in making this conclusion is

false. Because citizens of a democracy vote, and thus influence the policy of their state, it is the

individuals who have an insatiable desire to control the state. If the state changes, it is because

the people voted to do so, and in that respect the state is weak compared to the whims of the

people. Therefore, the state does not and can not possibly demand control over the individual.

What’s more, Schmitt contradicts himself by explicitly acknowledging democracy as “a

doctrine nourished by a thousand springs” in his preceding logic. The argument collapses on

itself because it recognizes the power that people hold over democracy, yet goes on to claim that

democracy strips people of their power and aims to control them. The facts presented leading up

to the accusation that democracy is a form of total government are true, but Schmitt makes a

purposefully deceptive final claim that purports to be true when it is false. Although Schmitt’s

principal argument that liberal governments over-politicize social issues may initially be viewed

as a credible opinion, his fraudulent claims about other aspects of democracies destroy the

soundness of his beliefs.

Schmitt credits the existence of the political to the basic human tendency to classify

others into two groups: friends and enemies. Friends are insiders who share some set of beliefs,

while enemies have some fundamental difference that makes their existences so incompatible

that they are willing to kill the other. It is important to note the distinction between two types of

enemies: public and private. Keep in mind that these enemies are members of “the political,” so

should be though of as members of different nations. Those who disagree about affairs of state,

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such as foreign policy relations, human rights’ issues, etc. are public enemies, while those who

disagree about personal beliefs, such as religion, culture, etc. are private enemies. Schmitt

argues that public enemies are part of “the political” while private enemies, in an ideal state,

would not be.

To begin his explanation, Schmitt refers back to the idea that the political is completely

independent from the economy, religion, science, law, aesthetic, etc., and that personal disputes

should not influence public ones, as they do in a democracy. Once again, his logic seems sound

and he makes acceptable claims. He asserts that “rationally speaking, it cannot be denied that

nations continue to group themselves according to the friend and enemy antithesis” characteristic

of human nature (28). If this is accepted as true, then the ideal world which he describes consists

of many states grouped in various alliances, all based solely on public disputes. On the surface, it

seems that his logic could be correct in assuming that this is an attainable goal. However, in the

real world his cold never happen.

According to Schmitt’s logic, two countries can be private friends, but public enemies.

First, consider two real countries, Country A and Country B. Because of their public dispute,

Country A and Country B go to war. According to Schmitt, although Country A and Country B

are at war, they remain private friends. Private issues, including economics, are completely

separate from public ones, and therefore can continue normally and in a friendly manner. By this

logic, the countries could be engaged in total war, yet continue supporting each other morally

and economically. By that fact, Schmitt’s logic collapses. In the real world, no country would

ever provide economic support to a wartime enemy, as doing so would ultimately provide

support for the war against oneself. Unless a country is specifically aiming to lose, this will not

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happen. It is an undeniable fact that wars cost money, so supporting a political enemy

economically (under the guise of private support) equates to supporting that enemy publicly.

Therefore, economics is inherently public. Schmitt agrees that anything nonpolitical can become

political, but fails to accept that because of human nature, it will. The downfall of his argument

lies in the fact that his very own explanation of the existence of the political - the friend versus

enemy relationships inherent to all humans - breaks down the possibility of the separation of

private and public affairs.

Throughout his critique, Schmitt repeatedly misleads the reader into believing that

democracy is a total state which should be replaced with the ideal state he vaguely describes.

After viewing the breakdown of the first part of the argument - that democracy is a total state - it

is important to examine exactly what the ideal state he describes entails. Schmitt says that

although a perfectly peaceful world without war may be ideal, it is unattainable because of the

human tendency to group into friends and enemies. This makes sense, so the hope of a world

with no war can be deemed irrelevant. The ideal state, then, must aim to create as much order as

possible out of the chaos created by human nature.

Schmitt declares that the existence of the political creates order through the constant

threat of possible war. No one wants to experience the atrocities of war, so the threat keeps

nations from being aggressors. Since, because of human nature, the political is inevitable, this is

acceptable logic. Furthermore, through the breakdown of his earlier logic, it it is clear that public

and private issues will mix and that conflict will arise. However, Schmitt believes that the ideal

state will somehow be able to keep the political separate from the social, thus achieving

nonpoliticality, in that they will not mix. But how can this be possible?

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Schmitt mentions briefly that a democracy “must not defend its existing form in any

crisis”; that is to say that a democracy must (and does) constantly change to suit the interests of

its people through their votes (23). In this way, the political and politics are combined, and the

state is not ideal. The ideal state that Schmitt describes is one which does defend itself against

change. This sounds all right, yet he never elaborates on how this can be done. Thinking about

the real world, a state which defends itself against change - and against the whims of its people -

is necessarily totalitarian.

For a state to never change, it must stamp out any and all opposition to maintain rigid

order. Historically, the any nation which has ever attempted this has been totalitarian. The USSR

aimed to protect itself not only from public enemies, but private enemies domestically.

Dissenters were collected and sent to Siberia, where they met almost certain death. In the same

way, Germany during World War II ran concentration camps in order to “purify” society of those

it viewed as private enemies, using public power to do so. In the end, all left living adhere to the

same private and public goals, so the state appears to be nonpolitical. However, through the

means, the public and private spheres become absolutely the same. Therefore, nonpoliticality is

merely a façade veiling absolute politicality.

Interestingly, the ideal state Schmitt embodies all of the evils he seeks to eliminate in

democracy, to an even greater extent than in democracy. Schmitt calls the nonpolitical state

“superior” to the political, yet at its core the state he describes is the epitome of political (32).

Schmitt expects his reader not to fully understand his logic, and to simply believe all his claims.

He deceives the reader into thinking that the ideal state is perfectly nonpolitical because of its

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façade as such. However, underneath what seems to be the possibility of a nonpolitical state,

Schmitt advocates for exactly the opposite of what he seems to be advocating for.

Ultimately, Schmitt’s attempt to use true logic to support his false claims leads to its own

destruction. He intentionally deceives his reader into accepting his logic and believing that his

vague solution is best. What the reader is unaware of is the fact that the solution Schmitt

advocates for is the exact opposite of what it seems. Schmitt purports to dislike democracy

because it combines the political and politics too greatly, but actually he believes that it does not

combine them enough. Schmitt faults liberals for being overly ideal in believing politics can be

eliminated, yet blatantly lies to the reader and claims his ideal state will do it, itself; he presents

the friend-enemy antithesis as an insuperable tenet basic to human nature, yet claims that for the

political it may be overcome; and in the end, he condemns democracy for being what he believes

to be a total state, yet advocates for a state even more total in power and scope. In the end, The

Concept of the Political is an ingeniously planned manipulation of the average person’s thoughts,

pretending to contain airtight logic to support its claims, while in reality using deception to

convince the reader of a lie.

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Works Cited

Schmitt, Carl. The Concept of the Political. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995. Print.

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Critical Information Sheet

1. Intent Statement

Carl Schmitt’s argument is erroneous and deceptive because it uses sound logic to support false

claims by overreaching its logical conclusions.

2. Audience Description

The audience of my paper is people who have read Carl Schmitt’s “Concept of the Political” and

believe the claims he makes. Initially, readers of my paper would disagree with the fact that his

argument is deceptive or incorrect because on the surface it seems solid. They would also

probably contest the fact that it is possible for true logic support untrue claims. They may have

an attitude that any well-known economist must be credible and that they must be acting for the

good of all society. However, they may not consider what “good” means to different people. The

audience will most likely (if they’re not extremely racist) hate Nazis, so the fact that Carl

Schmitt was a Nazi will help my argument that he is not acting for the good of all. What he

thinks of as “good” is not what most people think of as good. Readers will likely be college

students who have read Schmitt in a class. The audience intent statement would probably go

something like “Carl Schmitt’s conclusion is valid because Carl Schmitt’s conclusion is reached

through sound logic.”

3. Strategy Explanation

At first, I wrote the paper using language as dense as Schmitt’s paper; however, I quickly

realized that just as I was bored reading the Schmitt’s paper, my reader would probably get bored

reading mine, too. So I stepped down the language a little bit, but kept it very straightforward to

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maintain the tone typical of many economic papers. Prof. Lough, the economist I interviewed,

said that papers in the field of economics waste no time on unnecessary information and instead

get straight to the point, assuming the reader is well-versed in the background of the paper. That

being said, I did try to include a little more background so that a reader would better understand,

even if they hadn’t read Schmitt’s essay. I chose to use sound logic to break down other sound

logic, because a reader who believe logic in the first place is likely to respond to other types of

logic. I also used real-world examples to contrast the ideals Schmitt presents to show that,

although the ideals sound good on paper, they are impossible in practice. The reader will be

someone who thought the ideal sounded good on paper but possibly had a hard time envisioning

what it actually entailed, and a hard time envisioning reasons it could possibly be incorrect. The

examples provided give a concrete meaning to those counter-situations. Also, the history is

relevant because a reader will know that the Nazis did not create a state that was ideal - in fact

the state they created was far from it.

4. Writer’s Reflection

At first, I had difficulty deciding how to divide up the paragraphs. I tend to write very long

paragraphs, but I realized I could structure the paper in terms of many, short paragraphs. This

way, the reader doesn’t lose track of the thought, and is continually introduced to a new idea and

then quickly brought to accept it. I kind of wanted the whole argument to be “hey, this guy’s a

Nazi, can’t we all agree that he’s crazy?” but while it’s an emotional argument it’s not logical; his

paper does seem to make sense. In fact, when I first read it (and before knowing Schmitt’s

affiliation with the Nazi party) I believed it myself! Much of my writing process was just spitting

out short ideas and quotes to go along with them, in bullet form, and then organizing them into a

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structured argument. So many of Schmitt’s ideas relate to each other so greatly that it was hard to

decide how to categorize them and separate on from another, but in the end I feel like I did a

pretty good job of doing so, but keeping sure to connect them throughout and show that they all

support (albeit erroneously) each other. I really enjoyed being able to meet with other people

during the class workshops and have them read my essay to make sure they understood what I

was saying. The readings we did on logical fallacies was very helpful for this paper! Schmitt

commits a ton of them! It’s also interesting to notice that logical fallacies aren’t just an accidental

thing that breaks down an argument - sometimes they’re intentional, but necessary (as in

Schmitt’s case) because real logic doesn’t exist for the situation and therefore an author must be

deceptive and manipulative. But then again how moral is this? It made me think about the power

of writing.

5. Optional Stuff

Carl Schmitt wrote “The Concept of the Political” just before World War II, when much of the

world was in a state of economic despair because of the effects of World War I. Germany had

been financially devastated, but was recovering. Amid the all the recent attempted revolutions in

Europe, governments which gave ordinary citizens power were seen as very dangerous to the

state. What Europe had gone through had devastated everyone economically, and many wanted

to blame those uprisings. Democracy and other liberal governments were untrusted because they

were seen as leading to these crashes. In his writing, Schmitt tries to convince the reader that

democracy is evil. He says that it ends up acting like a total state because social issues become

issues of the state (since everyone can vote) and that the state should not be involved in social

affairs. This is his main problem with these types of governments. In his paper, it sounds like this

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is true! Everything we believe about democracy seems to be broken down. The reader ends up

questioning how much say they really have in democracy and wondering if they are simply a

puppet of the state. However, my essay seeks to dispel this fear by exposing the faults in

Schmitt’s logic and pointing out the true implications of his claims - a total state none of us

would want.

TH

E C

ON

CE

PT O

F TH

E PO

LIT

ICA

L

EXPA

ND

ED ED

ITION

CA

RL SC

HM

ITT

Translation, Introduction, and Notes by G

eorge Schwab

With "The Age o

f Neutralizations and D

epoliticizations"

(I929) translated by Matthias K

onzen and John P.

McC

ormick

With Leo Strauss's N

otes on Schmitt's Essay, translated by

J. Harvey Lom

ax

Foreword by Tracy B. Strong

TH

E U

NIV

ERSITY

OF C

HIC

AG

O PRESS

Chicago and London

20 The C

oncept of the Political entities, it is in the decisive case the ultim

ate authority. More need

not be said at this mom

ent. All characteristics of this im

age of entity and people receive their m

eaning from the further distinctive trait

of the political and become incom

prehensible when the nature of

the political is misunderstood.

One seldom

finds a clear definition of the political. The w

ord is m

ost frequently used negatively, in contrast to various other ideas, for exam

ple in such antitheses as politics and economy, politics and

morality, politics and law

; and within law

there is again politics and civil law

/ and so forth. By means of such negative, often also

polemical confrontations, it is usually possible, depending upon the

context and concrete situation, to characterize something w

ith clar-ity. B

ut this is still not a specific definition. In one way or another

"political" is generally juxtaposed to "state" or at least is brought into relation w

ith it.' The state thus appears as som

ething political, the political as som

ething pertaining to the state-obviously an un-satisfactory circle.

George Schw

ab, "Enemy oder Foe:

Der K

onflikt der modernen Politik,"

tr. J. Zeumer, Epirrhosis: Pestgabe fur Carl Schm

itt, ed. H. Barion, E.-W

. BOckenforde, E. Forsthoff, W

. Weber (B

erlin: Duncker &. H

umblot,

II, 665-666. 1 T

he antithesis of law and politics is easily confused by the antithesis

of civil and public law. A

ccording to J. K. Bluntschli in Allgemeines Staats-

recht, 4th ed. (Munich: J. G

. Cotta, 1868), I, 219: "Property is a civil law and

not a political concept." The political significance of this antithesis carne particularly to the fore in 1925 and 1926, during the debates regarding the expropriation of the fortunes of the princes w

ho had formerly ruled in G

er-m

any. The following sentence from

the speech by deputy Dietrich (Reichstag

session, Decem

ber 2, 1925, Berichu, 4717) is cited as an example: "W

e are of the opinion that the issues here do not at all pertain to civil law

questions but are purely political ones .... "

2 Also in those definitions of the political w

hich utilize the concept of pow

er as the decisive factor, this power appears m

ostly as state power, for

example, in M

ax Weber's "Politik als B

eruf," Gesam

melte politjsche Schrif-

ten, 3rd ed., ed. Johannes Winckelm

ann (Tlibingen: ,. C. B. Mohr

[Paul Siebeck], 197

1), pp. 505, 506: "aspiring to participate in or of influencing the distribution of pow

er, be it between states, be it internally betw

een groups

The Concept of the Political

21

Many such descriptions of the political appear in professional

juridic literature. Insofar as these are not politically polemical, they

are of practical and technical interest and are to be understood as legal or adm

inistrative decisions in particular cases. These then re-ceive their m

eaning by the presupposition of a stable state within

whose fram

ework they operate. T

hus there exists, for example, a

jurisprudence and literature pertaining to the concept of the political club or the political m

eeting in the law of associations. Furtherm

ore, French adm

inistrative law

practice has attempted to construct a

concept of the political motive (m

obile politique) with w

hose aid political acts of governm

ent (actes de goullernement) could be dis-

tinguished from nonpolitical adm

inistrative acts and thereby removed

from the control of adm

inistrative courts. 3

Such accomm

odating definitions serve the needs of legal prac-

of people which the state encom

passes," or "leadership or the influencing of a political association, hence today, of a state"; or his "Parliam

ent und Regie-rung im

neugeordneten Deutschland," ibid., p. 347: "The essence of politics

is ... combat, the w

inning of allies and of voluntary followers." H

. Triepel, StaatsruM

und Po/itik (Berlin: W

. de Gruyter &. Co., 1927), pp. 16-17, says:

"Until recent decades politics w

as still plainly associated with the study of

the state .... In this vein Weitz characterizes politics as the learned discus-

sion of the state with respect to the historical developm

ent of states on the w

hole as well as of their current conditions and needs." Triepel then justly

criticizes the ostensibly nonpolitical, purely juristic approach of the Gerber-

Laband school and the attempt at its

continuation in the postw

ar period (K

elsen). Nevertheless, Triepel

had not yet

recognized the pure political

meaning of this p,retense of an apolitical purity, because he subscribes to the

equation politics = state. As will still be seen below

, designating the adversary as political and oneself as nonpolitical (i.e., scientific, just, objective, neutral, etc.) is in actuality a typical and unusually intensive w

ay of pursuing politics. 8 •

•• For the criterion of the political furnished here (friend-enem

y orientation), I draw

upon the particularly interesting definition of the spe-cifically political acU

de gouvernement w

hich Dufour ... (Traite de droit

administratif applique, V

, 128) has advanced: "D

efining an act of govern-m

ent is the purpose to which the author addresses him

self. Such an act aims

at defending society itself or as em

bodied in

the government against its

internal or external enemies, overt or covert, present or future. . . ."

22 The C

oncept of the Political

tice. Basically, they

provide a practical

way

of delimiting legal

competences of cases w

ithin a state in its legal procedures. They do

not in the least aim at a general definition of the political. Such

definitions of the political suffice, therefore, for as long as the state and the public institutions can be assum

ed as something self-evident

and concrete. Also, the general definitions of the political w

hich contain nothing m

ore than additional references to the state are understandable and to that extent also intellectually justifiable for as long as the state is truly a clear and unequivocal em

inent entity confronting nonpolitical groups and affairs-in other w

ords, for as long as the state possesses the m

onopoly on politics. That w

as the case w

here the state had either (as in the eighteenth century) not recognized society as an antithetical force or, at least (as in G

er-m

any in the nineteenth century and into the tw

entieth), stood above society as a stable and distinct force.

The equation state = politics becom

es erroneous and decep-tive at exactly the m

oment w

hen state and society penetrate each other. W

hat had been up to that point affairs of state becom

e thereby social m

atters, and, vice versa, what had been purely social

matters becom

e affairs of state-as must necessarily occur in a dem

-ocratically organized unit. H

eretofore ostensibly neutral domains-

religion, culture, education, the economy-then cease to be neutral

in the sense that they do not pertain to state and to politics. As a

polemical concept against such neutralizations and depoliticaliza-

tions of important dom

ains appears the total state, which potentially

embraces every dom

ain. This results in the identity of state and society. In such a state, therefore, everything is at least potentially political, and in referring to the state it is no longer possible to assert for it a specifically political characteristic.

[Schmitt's N

ote]

The developm

ent can be traced from the absolute state of

the eighteenth century via the neutral

(noninterventionist) state

The Concept of the Political

23

of the nineteenth to the total state of the twentieth! D

emocracy

must do aw

ay with all the typical distinctions and depoliticaliza-

tions characteristic of the liberal nineteenth century, also with those

corresponding to the

nineteenth-century antitheses

and divisions

pertaining to the state-society (= political against social) contrast,

namely the follow

ing, among num

erous other thoroughly polemical

and thereby again political antitheses:

religious cultural econom

ic legal scientific

as antithesis of political as antithesis of political as antithesis of political as antithesis of political as antithesis of political

The m

ore profound thinkers of the nineteenth century soon recognized this. In Jacob B

urckhardt's W t'ltgeschichtliche Betrach-

lungen (of the period around IR70)

the following sentences are

found on "dem

ocracy, i.e., a

doctrine nourished by

a thousand

springs, and varying greatly with the social status of its adherents.

Only in one respect w

as it consistent, namely, in the insatiability

of its demand for state control of the individual. T

hus it blurs the boundaries betw

een state and society and looks to the state for the things that society w

ill most likely refuse to do, w

hile maintaining

a permanent condition of argum

ent and change and ultim

ately vindicating the right to w

ork and subsistence for certain castes." B

urckhardt also correctly noted the inner contradiction of democ-

racy and the liberal constitutional state: "The state is thus, on the

one hand, the realization and expression of the cultural ideas of every party; on the other, m

erely the visible vestures of civic life and pow

erful on an ad hoc basis only. It should be able to do every-thing, yet allow

ed to do nothing. In particular, it must not defend

its existing form in any crisis-and after all, w

hat men w

ant more

4 See Carl Schmitt, D

er Hule,' der

Ver!assung (Tiibingen: J. C. B.

Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1931j Berlin: D

uncker & Hum

blot, 1969), pp. 78-79.

The Concept of the Political

than anything else is to participate in the exercise of its power. T

he state's form

thus becomes increasingly questionable and its radius

of power ever broader." 5

Germ

an political science originally m

aintained (under the

impact of H

egel's philosophy of the state) that the state is quali-tatively distinct from

society and higher than it. A state standing

above society could be called universal but not total, as that term

is understood nowadays, nam

ely, as the polemical negation of the

neutral state, whose econom

y and law w

ere in themselves nonpolit-

ical. Nevertheless, after 1848,

the qualitative distinction betw

een state and society to w

hich Lorenz von Stein and Rudolf G

neist still subscribed lost its previous clarity. N

otwithstanding certain lim

ita-tions, reservations, and com

promises, the developm

ent of Germ

an political science, w

hose fundamental lines are show

n in my treatise

on Preuss,s follows the historical developm

ent toward the dem

o-cratic identity of state and society.

An interesting national-liberal interm

ediary stage is recogniz-able in the w

orks of Albert H

aenel. "To generalize the concept of

state altogether with the concept of hum

an society" is, according to him

, a "downright m

istake." He sees in the state an entity joining

other organizations of society but of a "special kind which rises

above these and is all embracing." A

lthough its general purpose is universal, though only in the special task of delim

iting and organ-izing socially effective forces, i.e., in the specific function of the law

, H

aenel considers wrong the belief that the state has, at least poten-

tially, the power of m

aking all the social goals of humanity its goals

too. Even though the state is for him universal, it is by no m

eans tota1. 7 T

he decisive step is found in Gierke's theory of association

(the first volume of his Vas deutsche G

enossenschaftsrecht appeared

5 Kroner's edition, pp. 133, 135. 197.

6 Hugo Preuss: Sein StaaubegriO

und seine Ste/lung in der deutschen Staatslehre (Tlibingcn: J. C. B. M

ohr [Paul SiebeckJ, 1930). 7 Studien zum

Deutschen Staatsrechte (Leipzig: V

erlag von H. H

aessel, 1888), II, 219; D

eutsches Staatsrecht (Leipzig: D

uncker &: Hum

blot, 1892), I, 110.

The Concept of the Political

in 1868), because it conceives of the state as one association equal to other associations. O

f course, in addition to the associational ele-m

ents, sovereign ones too belonged to the state and were som

etimes

stressed more and som

etimes less. But, since it pertained to a theory

of association and not to a theory of sovereignty of the state, the dem

ocratic consequences were undeniable. In G

ermany, they w

ere draw

n by Hugo Preuss and K

. Wolzendorff, w

hereas in England it led to pluralist theories (see below

, Section 4). W

hile awaiting further enlightenm

ent, it seems to m

e that R

udolf Smend's theory of the integration of the state corresponds

to a political situation in which society is no longer integrated into

an existing state (as the Germ

an people in the monarchical state

of the nineteenth century) but should itself integrate into the state. T

hat this situation necessitates the total state is expressed most clearly

in Smend's rem

ark about a sentence from H

. Trescher's 1918 disser-tation on M

ontesquieu and Hegel." There it is

said of Hegel's

doctrine of the division of powers that it signifies "the m

ost vigorous penetration of all societal spheres by the state for the general pur-pose of w

inning for the entirety of the state all vital energies of the people." T

o which Sm

end adds that this is "precisely the integration theory" of his book. In actuality it is the total state w

hich no longer know

s anything absolutely nonpolitical, the state which m

ust do aw

ay with the depoliticalizations of the nineteenth century and

which in particular puts an end to the principle that the apolitical

economy is independent of the state and that the state is apart from

the econom

y. •

2 A definition of the political can be obtained only by discover-

ing and defining the specifically political categories. In contrast to the various relatively independent endeavors of hum

an thought and

8 Rudolf Smcnd, Ver/assung und Ver/auungsrecht (M

unich: Dunckcr

&. Hum

bfot, 1928), p. 97, note 2.

The Concept of the Political

action, particularly the moral, aesthetic, and econom

ic, the political has its ow

n criteria which express them

selves in a characteristic w

ay. The political m

ust therefore rest on its own ultim

ate distinc-tions, to w

hich all action with a specifically political m

eaning can be traced. Let us assum

e that in the realm of m

orality the final distinc-tions are betw

een good and evil, in aesthetics beautiful and ugly, in econom

ics profitable and unprofitable. The question then is w

hether there is also a special distinction w

hich can serve as a simple crite-

rion of the political and of what it consists. T

he nature of such a political distinction is surely different from

that of those others. It is independent of them

and as such can speak clearly for itself. T

he specific political distinction to which political actions and

motives can be reduced is that betw

een friend and enemy.· This

provides a definition in the sense of a criterion and not

as an

exhaustive definition

or one

indicative of

substantial content.t

Insofar as it is not derived from other criteria, the

antithesis of friend and enem

y corresponds to the relatively independent criteria of other antitheses: good and evil in the m

oral sphere, beautiful and ugly in the aesthetic sphere, and so on. In any event it is inde-pendent, not in the sense of a distinct new

domain, but in that it

can neither be based on anyone antithesis or any combination of

other antitheses, nor can it be traced to these. If the antithesis of good and evil is not sim

ply identical with that of beautiful and

ugly, profitable and unprofitable, and cannot be directly reduced to the others, then the antithesis of friend and enem

y must even less

be confused with or m

istaken for the others. T

he distinction of friend and enem

y denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union

or separation, of an association or dissociation. It can exist theo-• Since Schm

itt identified himself w

ith the epoch of the national sov-ereign state w

ith its ius publicum Europaertm

, he used the term Feind in the

enemy and not the foe sense. t O

f the num

erous discussions

of Schmitt's

criterion, particular attention is called to H

ans Morgenthau's LA N

otion du "politique" et la thiorie des diU

erends internationaux (Paris: Sirey, 1933), pp. 35-37, 44-64. T

he critique contained therein and Schmitt's influence on him

is often im

plied in Morgenthau's subsequent w

ritings.

The Concept of the Political

retically and

practically, without having sim

ultaneously to

draw

upon all those moral, aesthetic, econom

ic, or other distinctions. The

political enemy need not be m

orally evil or aesthetically ugly; he need not appear as an econom

ic competitor, and it m

ay even be advantageous to engage w

ith him in business transactions. B

ut he is, nevertheless,

the other, the stranger; and

it is sufficient for

his nature that he is, in a specially intense w

ay, existentially something

different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts w

ith him

are possible. These can neither be decided by a previously deter-m

ined general norm nor hy the judgm

ent of a disinterested and therefore neutral third party.

Only the actual participants can correctly recognize, under-

stand, and judge the concrete situation and settle the extreme case

of conflict. Each participant is in a position to judge whether the

adversary intends to negate his opponent's way of life and therefore

must be repulsed or fought in order to preserve one's ow

n form of

existence. Emotionally the enem

y is easily treated as being evil and ugly, because every distinction, m

ost of all the political, as

the strongest and m

ost intense of the distinctions and categorizations, draw

s upon other distinctions for support. This does not alter the autonom

y of such distinctions. Consequently, the reverse

is also

true: the morally evil, aesthetically ugly or econom

ically damaging

need not necessarily be the enemy; the m

orally good, aesthetically beautiful, and econom

ically profitable need not necessarily become

the friend in the specifically political sense of the word. T

hereby the inherently objective nature and autonom

y of the political be-com

es evident by virtue of its being able to treat, distinguish, and com

prehend the

friend-enemy

antithesis independently

of other antitheses.

3 The friend and enem

y concepts are to be understood in their concrete and existential sense, not as

metaphors or sym

bols, not

The Concept of the Political

mixed and w

eakened by economic, m

oral, and other conceptions, least of all in a private-individualistic sense as a psychological expression of private em

otions and tendencies. They are neither norm

ative nor pure spiritual antitheses. Liberalism in one of its

typical dilemm

as (to be treated further under Section 8) of intellect and econom

ics has attempted

to transform

the enem

y from

the view

point of economics into a com

petitor and from the intellectual

point into a debating adversary. In the domain of econom

ics there are no enem

ies, only competitors, and in a thoroughly m

oral and ethical w

orld perhaps only debating adversaries. It is irrelevant here w

hether one rejects, accepts, or perhaps finds it an atavistic remnant

of barbaric times that nations continue to group them

selves accord-ing to friend and enem

y, or hopes that the antithesis will one day

vanish from the w

orld, or whether it is perhaps sound pedagogic

reasoning to imagine that enem

ies 110 longer exist at all. T

he COI1-

cern here is neither with abstractions nor w

ith normative ideals, but

with inherent reality and the real possibility of such a distinction.

One m

ayor may not share these hopes and pedagogic ideals. B

ut, rationally speaking, it cannot be denied that nations continue to group them

selves according to the friend and enemy antithesis, that

the distinction still remains actual today, and that this is an ever

present possibility for every people existing in the political sphere. T

he enemy is not m

erely any competitor or just any partner

of a conflict in general. He is also not the private adversary w

hom

one hates. An enem

y exists only when, at least potentially, One

fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity. T

he enem

y is solely the public enemy, because everything that has a

relationship to such a collectivity of men, particularly to a w

hole nation, becom

es public by virtue of such a relationship. The enem

y is hostis, not inirnicus in the broader sense; noli!!LOe;, not EX{}Qoe;.9

a In his Rt:public (Bk. V, C

h. XV

I, 470) Plato strongly emphasizes the

contrast between the public enem

y (nOAE!!lOe;) and the private one (EX{}QOe;), but in connection w

ith the other antithesis of war (noAs!!oe;)

and insurrec·

The Concept of the Political

As G

erman and other languages do not distinguish betw

een the private and political enem

y, many m

isconceptions and falsifications are possible. T

he often quoted "Love your enemies" (M

att. 5 :44; Luke 6 :27) reads "diligite inim

icos vestros," uyun<lt'E mue; EX{}QOUe;

U!!WV, and not diligite hostes vestros. No m

ention is made of the

political enemy. N

ever in the thousand-year struggle between C

hris-tians and M

oslems did it occur to a C

hristian to surrender rather than defend Europe out of love tow

ard the Saracens or Turks. The

enemy in the political sense need not be hated personally, and in

the private sphere only does it make sense to love one's enem

y, i.e., one's adversary. T

he Bible quotation touches the political antithesis even less than it intends to dissolve, for exam

ple, the antithesis of good and evil or beautiful and ugly. It certainly does not m

ean that one should love and support the enem

ies of one's own people.

The political is the m

ost intense and extreme antagonism

, and every concrete antagonism

becomes that m

uch more political the

closer it approaches the most extrem

e point, that of the friend-enemy

grouping. In its entirety the state as an organized political entity

tion, upheaval, rebellion, civil war «(HacHe;).· Real w

ar for Plato is a war

between H

ellenes and Barbarians only (those w

ho are "by nature enemies"),

whereas

conflicts am

ong H

ellenes are for

him

discords (at'aaELe;).

The thought expressed here is that a people cannot w

age war against itself and a

civil war is only a self-laceration and it does not signify that perhaps a new

state or even a new

people is being created. Cited m

ostly for the hostis con. cept is Pom

ponius in the Digt:st 50,

16, 118. The most clear-cut definition

with additional supporting m

aterial is in Forcellini's Lex-icon totius latinitatis (1<)65 ed.), II, 684: "A

public enemy (hO

Slis) is one w

ith whom

we are at

war publicly .... In this respect he differs from

d private enem

y. He is a

person with w

hom w

e have private quarrels. They may also be distinguished

as follows: a private enem

y is a person who hates us, w

hereas a public enemy

is a person who fights against us."

• Stasis also means the exact opposite, i.e., peace and order. T

he dia-lectic

inherent in the

term

is pointed

out by Carl

Schmitt

in Politische

Tht:ologit: II: Dit: Lt:gt:ndt: lion dt:r Erlt:digung ;t:dt:r Politischt:n Tht:ologie

(Berlin: D

uncker &; Hum

blot, 1970), pp. Il7-u8.

30

The Concept of the Political

decides for itself the friend-enemy distinction. Furtherm

ore, next to the prim

ary political decisions and under the protection of the decision taken, num

erous secondary concepts of the political ema-

nate. As to the equation of politics and state discussed under Section

I, it has the effect, for example, of contrasting a political attitude of

a state with party politics so that one can speak of a state's dom

estic religious, educational, com

munal, social

policy, and so on. Not-

withstanding, the state encom

passes and relativizes all these an-

titheses. How

ever an antithesis and antagonism rem

ain here within

the state's domain w

hich have relevance for the concept of the

political. lO Finally even m

ore banal forms of politics appear, form

s w

hich assume parasite-

and caricature-like configurations. What re-

mains here from

the original friend-enemy grouping is only som

e sort of antagonistic m

oment, w

hich manifests itself in all sorts of

tactics and practices, competitions

and intrigues;

and the

most

peculiar dealings and manipulations are called politics. B

ut the fact that the substance of the political is contained in the context of a concrete antagonism

is still expressed in everyday language, even w

here the awareness of the extrem

e case has been entirely lost.

This becomes evident in daily speech and can be exem

plified by tw

o obvious phenomena. First, all political concepts, im

ages, and term

s have a polemical m

eaning. They are focused on a specific conflict and are bound to a concrete situation; the result (w

hich m

anifests itself in war or revolution) is a friend-enem

y grouping, and they turn into em

pty and ghostlike abstractions when this situa-

tion disappears. Words such as state, republic,l1 society, class, as w

ell

10 A social policy existed ever since a politically notew

orthy class put forth its social dem

ands; welfare care, w

hich in early times w

as administered

to the poor and distressed, had not been considered a sociopolitical problem

and was also not called such. Likew

ise a church policy existed only where a

church constituted a politically significant counterforce. 11 M

achiavelli, for example, calls all nonm

onarchical states republics, and his definition is still accepted today. R

ichard Thoma defines dem

ocracy as a nonprivileged state; hence a\l nondem

ocracies are classified as privileged states.

The Concept of the Political

31

as sovereignty, constitutional state, absolutism, dictatorship, econom

ic planning, neutral or total state, and so on, are incom

prehensible if one does not know

exactly who is to be affected, com

bated, refuted, or negated by such a term

.12 Above all the polem

ical character de-

12 Num

erous forms and degrees of intensity of the polem

ical character are also here possible. B

ut the essentially polemical nature of the politically

charged terms and concepts rem

ain nevertheless recognizable. Terminological

questions become thereby highly political. A

word or expression can sim

ul-taneously be reflex, signal, passw

ord, and weapon in a hostile confrontation.

For example, K

arl Renner, a socialist of the Second International, in a very

significant scholarly publication, Die Rechtsinstitute des Privatrechts (Tiibin-

gen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1929), p_ 97, calls rent w

hich the tenant pays the landlord "tribute." M

ost Germ

an professors of jurisprudence, judges, and law

yers, would consider such a designation an inadm

issible politicaliza-tion of civil law

relationships and would reject this on the grounds that it

would disturb the purely juristic, purely legal, purely scientific discussion.

For them the question has been decided in a legal positivist m

anner, and the therein

residing political

design of

the state

is thus

recognized. O

n the

other hand, many socialists of the Second International put m

uch value in calling the paym

ents which arm

ed France imposes upon disarm

ed Germ

any not "tribute," but "reparations." "R

eparation" appears to be more juristic,

more legal, m

ore peaceful, less polemical, and m

ore apolitical than "tribute." In scrutinizing this m

ore closely, however, it m

ay be seen that "reparation" is m

ore highly

charged and therefore also political

because this

term

is utilized politically to condem

n juristically and even morally the vanquished

enemy. T

he imposed paym

ents have the effect of disqualifying and subjugat-ing him

not only legally but also morally. T

he question in Germ

any today is w

hether one should say "tribute" or "reparation." This has turned into an internal

dispute. In previous centuries a

controversy existed

between

the G

erman kaiser (and king of H

ungary) and the Turkish sultan on the ques-tion of w

hether the payments m

ade by the kaiser to the sultan were in the

nature of a "pension" or "tribute." The debtor stressed that he did not pay

"tribute" but "pension," whereas the creditor considered it to be "tribute."

In the relations between C

hristians and Turks the w

ords were still used in

those days more openly and m

ore objectively, and the juristic concepts per-haps had not yet becom

e to the same extent as today political instrum

ents of coercion. N

evertheless, Bodin, w

ho mentions this controversy (Les Six Livres

de la RcpuMique, Paris, 1580, p. 784), adds that in m

ost instances "pension"

3 2 The C

oncept of the Political term

ines the use of the word political regardless of w

hether the adversary is designated as nonpolitical (in the sense of harm

less), or vice versa if one w

ants to disqualify or denounce him as political in

order to portray oneself as nonpolitical (in the sense of purely scien-tific, purely m

oral, purely juristic, purely aesthetic, purely economic,

or on the basis of similar purities) and thereby superior.

Secondly, in usual domestic polem

ics the word political is

today often used interchangeably with party politics. T

he inevitable lack of objectivity in political decisions, w

hich is only the reflex to suppress the politically inherent friend-enem

y antithesis, manifests

itself in the regrettable forms and aspects of the scram

ble for office and the politics of patronage. T

he demand for depoliticalization

which arises in this context m

eans only the rejection of party politics, etc. T

he equation politics = party politics is possible w

henever antagonism

s among dom

estic political parties succeed in weakening

the all-embracing political unit, the state. T

he intensification of internal antagonism

s has

the effect of w

eakening the com

mon

identity vis-a-vis another state. If domestic conflicts am

ong political parties have becom

e the sole political difference, the most extrem

e degree of internal

political tension

is thereby reached;

Le., the

domestic, not the foreign friend-and-enem

y groupings are decisive for arm

ed conflict. The ever present possibility of conflict m

ust alw

ays be kept in mind. If one w

ants to speak of politics in the context of the prim

acy of internal politics, then this conflict no longer refers to w

ar between organized nations but to civil w

ar. For to the enem

y concept belongs the ever present possibility of com

bat. All peripherals m

ust be left aside from this term

, in-cluding m

ilitary details and the development of w

eapons technology. W

ar is armed com

bat between organized political entities; civil w

ar is arm

ed combat w

ithin an organized unit. A self-laceration en-

dangers the survival of the latter. The essence of a w

eapon is that

is paid not to protect oneself from other enem

ies, but primarily from

the

protector himself and to ransom

oneself from an invasion (pour it

l'intJasion).

The Concept of the Political

33 it is a m

eans of physically killing human beings. Just as the term

enem

y, the word com

bat, too, is to be understood in its original existential sense. It does not m

ean competition, nor does it m

ean pure intellectual controversy nor sym

bolic wrestlings in w

hich, after all, every hum

an being is somehow

always involved, for it is a fact

that the entire life of a human being is a struggle and every hum

an being sym

bolically a combatant. T

he friend, enemy, and com

bat concepts receive their real m

eaning precisely because they refer to the real possibility of physical killing. W

ar follows from

enmity.

War is the existential negation of the enem

y.· It is the mOst extrem

e consequence of enm

ity. It does not have to be comm

on, normal,

something ideal, or desirable. B

ut it must nevertheless rem

ain a real possibility for as long as the concept of the enem

y remains valid.

It is by no means as though the political signifies nothing but

devastating war and every political deed a m

ilitary action, by no m

eans as though every nation would be uninterruptedly faced w

ith the friend-enem

y alternative vis-a.-vis every other nation. And, after

all, could not the politically reasonable course reside in avoiding w

ar? The definition of the political suggested here neither favors

war nor m

ilitarism, neither im

perialism nor pacifism

. Nor is it an

attempt to idealize the victorious w

ar or the successful revolution as a "social ideal," since neither w

ar nor revolution is something

social or something ideal.13

The m

ilitary battle itself is not the

• Schmitt dearly alludes here to the foe concept in politics.

13 Rudolf Stam

mler's thesis, w

hich is rooted in neo-Kantian thought,

that the "social ideal" is the "comm

unity of free willing individuals" is

CO

Il-

tradicted by Erich Kaufm

ann in Das

des ViJlkerrechts und die clausula rebus sic stantibus (Tiibingen: J. C. B. M

ohr [Paul Siebeck], 19II), p. 14 6,

who m

aintains that "not the comm

unity of free willing individuals, but the

victorious war is the social ideal: the victorious w

ar as the last means tow

ard that lofty goal"

(the participation and self.assertion of the state in world

history). This sentence incorporates the typical neo·Kantian liberal notion of

"social ideal." But w

ars, including victorious wars, are som

ething completely

incomm

ensurable and incompatible w

ith this conception. This idea is then joined to the notion of the victorious w

ar, which

has its habitat in

the

34 The Concept 01 the Political

"continuation of politics by other means" as the fam

ous term of

Clausew

itz is generally incorrectly cited. a War has its ow

n strategic, tactical, and other rules and points of view

, but they all presuppose that the political decision has already been m

ade as to who the enem

y is. In w

ar the adversaries most often confront each other openly;

normally they are identifiable by a uniform

, and the distinction of friend and enem

y is therefore no longer a political problem w

hich the fighting soldier has to solve. A

British diplom

at correctly stated in this context that the politician is better schooled for the battle than the soldier, because the politician fights his w

hole life whereas the

soldier does so in exceptional circumstances only. W

ar is neither the aim

nor the purpose nor even the very content of politics. But as an ever present possibility it is the leading presupposition' w

hich determ

ines in a characteristic way hum

an action and thinking and thereby creates a specifically political behavior.

The criterion of the friend-and-enem

y distinction in no way

implies that one particular nation m

ust forever be the friend or

enemy of another specific nation or that a state of neutrality is not

Hegdian-R

ankian philosophy of history, in which social ideals do not exist.

The antithesis which appears at first glance to be striking thus breaks into

two disparate parts, and the rhetorical force of a thunderous contrast can

neither veil the structural incoherence nor heal the intellectual breach. H

Carl von C

lausewitz (V

om K

riege, 2nd ed. [B

erlin: Ferd. Diim

m-

len Verlagsbuchandlung,

18531, Vol.

III, Part III, p.

120) says: "W

ar is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse w

ith a mixture of other

means." W

ar is for him a "m

ere instrument of politics." This cannot be

denied, but its meaning for the understanding of the essence of politics is

thereby still not exhausted. To be precise, w

ar, for Clausew

itz, is not merely

one of many instrum

ents, but the ultima ratio of the friend-and-enem

y group-ing.

War has its ow

n gramm

ar (i.e., special

military-technical law

s), but politics rem

ains its brain. It does not have its own logic. This can only be

.derived from the friend-and-enem

y concept, and the sentence on page 121 this core of politics: "If w

ar belongs to politics, it will thereby assum

e Its character. The m

ore grandiose and powerful it becom

es, so will also the

war, and this m

ay be carried to the point at which w

ar reaches its absolute form

..•. "

The Concept 01 the Political 35

possible or could not be politically reasonable. As w

ith every political concept, the neutrality concept too is subject to the ultim

ate pre-supposition of a real

possibility of a friend-and-enemy grouping.

Should only neutrality prevail in the world, then not only w

ar but also neutrality w

ould come to an end. T

he politics of avoiding war

terminates, as does all politics, w

henever the possibility of fighting disappears. W

hat always m

atters is the possibility of the extreme

case taking place, the real war, and the decision w

hether this situa-tion has or has not arrived.

That the extrem

e case appears to be an exception does not negate its decisive character but confirm

s it all the more. T

o the extent that w

ars today have decreased in number and frequency,

they have proportionately increased in ferocity. War is still today the

most extrem

e possibility. One can say that the exceptional case has

an especially decisive meaning w

hich exposes the core of the matter.

For only in real combat is revealed the m

ost extreme consequence

of the political grouping of friend and enemy. From

this most ex-

treme possibility hum

an life derives its specifically political tension. A

world in w

hich the possibility of war is utterly elim

inated, a com

pletely pacified globe, would be a w

orld without the distinction

of friend and enemy and hence a w

orld without politics. It is con-

ceivable that such a world m

ight contain many very interesting

antitheses and contrasts, competitions and intrigues of every kind,

but there would not be a m

eaningful antithesis whereby m

en could be required to sacrifice life, authorized to shed blood, and kill other hum

an beings. For the definition of the political, it is here even irrelevant w

hether such a world w

ithout politics is desirable as an ideal situation. T

he phenomenon of the political can be understood

only in the context of the ever present possibility of the friend-and-enem

y grouping, regardless of the aspects w

hich this possibility

implies for m

orality, aesthetics, and economics.

War as the m

ost extreme political m

eans discloses the possi-bility w

hich underlies every political idea, namely, the distinction

of friend and enemy. T

his makes sense only as long as this distinc-

The Concept 01 the Political

tion in mankind is actually present or at least potentially possible.

On the other hand, it w

ould be senseless to wage w

ar for purely religious, purely m

oral, purely juristic, or purely economic m

otives. The friend-and-enem

y grouping and therefore also war cannot be

derived from these specific antitheses of hum

an endeavor. A w

ar need be neither som

ething religious nor something m

orally good nor som

ething lucrative. War today is in all likelihood none of these.

This obvious point is m

ostly confused by the fact that religious,

moral, and other antitheses can intensify to political ones and can

bring about the decisive friend-or-enemy constellation. If, in fact,

this occurs, then the relevant antithesis is no longer purely religious, m

oral, or economic, but politicaL T

he sole remaining question then

is always w

hether such a friend-and-enemy grouping is really at

hand, regardless of which hum

an motives are sufficiently strong to

have brought it about. N

othing can escape this logical conclusion of the political. If pacifist hostility tow

ard war w

ere so strong as to drive pacifists into a w

ar against nonpacifists, in a war against w

ar, that would

prove that pacifism truly possesses political energy

because it is sufficiently strong to group m

en according to friend and enemy. If,

in fact, the will to abolish w

ar is so strong that it no longer shuns w

ar, then it has become a political m

otive, i.e., it affirms, even if only

as an extreme possibility, w

ar and even the reason for war. Presently

this appears to be a peculiar way of justifying w

ars. The w

ar is then considered to constitute the absolute last w

ar of humanity. Such

a war is necessarily

unusually intense and inhuman because, by

transcending the limits of the political fram

ework, it sim

ultaneously degrades the enem

y into moral and other categories and is forced to

make of him

a monster that m

ust not only be defeated but also utterly destroyed. In other w

ords, he is an enemy w

ho no longer m

ust be compelled to retreat into his borders only.· T

he feasibility of such w

ar is particularly illustrative of the fact that war as a real

• Also here Schm

itt dearly alludes to the enemy-foe distinction.

The Concept 01 the Political

37 possibility is still present today, and this fact is crucial for the friend-and-enem

y antithesis and for the recognition of politics.

4 Every religious, moral, econom

ic, ethical, or other antithesis transform

s into a political one if it is sufficiently strong to group hum

an beings effectively according to friend and enemy. T

he political does not reside in the battle itself, w

hich poss<:sses its own technical,

psychological, and military law

s, but in the mode of behavior w

hich is determ

ined by this possibility, by clearly evaluating the concrete situation and thereby being able

to distinguish correctly the real

friend and the real enemy. A

religious comm

unity which w

ages wars

against mem

bers of other religious comm

unities or engages in other w

ars is already more than a religious com

munity; it is a political

entity. It is a political entity when it possesses, even if only nega-

tively, the capacity of promoting that decisive step, w

hen it is in the position of forbidding its m

embers to participate in w

ars, i.e., of decisively denying the enem

y quality of a certain adversary. The

same holds true for an association of individuals based on econom

ic interests as, for exam

ple, an industrial concern or a labor union. A

lso a class in the Marxian sense ceases to be som

ething purely econom

ic and becomes a political factor w

hen it reaches this decisive point, for exam

ple, when M

arxists approach the class struggle seri-ously and treat the class adversary as a real enem

y and fights him

either in the form of a w

ar of state against state or in a civil war

within a state. T

he real battle is then of necessity nO longer fought according to econom

ic laws but has-next to the fighting m

ethods in the narrow

est technical sense-its political necessities and orienta-tions, coalitions and com

promises, and so on. Should the proletariat

succeed in seizing political power w

ithin a state, a proletarian state w

ill thus have been created. This state is by no m

eans less of a political pow

er than a national state, a theocratic, mercantile, or