ANDREW O. FORT

THE CONCEPT OF SAKS. IN IN ADVAITA VED.~NTA

The nature of knowing and the knower are central concerns in many schools of Indian thought. Several refer to an unchanging knower or seer "behind" the ever-fluctuating intellect. Adherents of advaita Vedanta in particular have examined the fundamental difference between the knowing self and the intellect. In advaita, the knowing self is often called the s~ksin, commonly rendered witness. 1

I propose to look at the use of this concept by various advaitin thinkers from Safikara (c. 700-750, following Nakamura (1983)) to Dharmar~ja (c. seventeenth century), attending to persisting themes as well as varying emphases. 2 My primary interest is to differentiate two conceptions of sgk.sin: sak.sin as witness, an eternal, passive observer, and sgk.sin as field, the context or "space" for all contents or form. The distinction between witness and field should be of interest to students of advaita or other Indian schools of thought and of philosophy of mind generally.

Almost all advaitin writers ascribe certain characteristics to the sgksin. It is eternal, non-dual, and unchanging a ; moreover, it is particularly differ- entiated from the mind or intellect (antah.karana, dhi, buddhi) and the perceiver, perceiving, perceived triad. 4 The s~k.sin is also linked with pure consciousness (caitanya) and the self (gtman, versus the jiva or [gvara). It is self-luminous and self-evidencing. The image of pure light is suggestive here: like the s~k.sin, light immediately reveals all objects and is not depen- dent on them; the s~k.sin and light are pervasive and unconditioned.

The s~ksin is often described as a passive knower or observer (thus "wit- ness"). From this point of view, a problem immediately arises: using such a concept assumes something to be witnessed (sLk.sya), thus intrinsic differen- tiation or limitation. There must be some limitation for there to be witnessing of anything. If the s~k.sin is described as pure, pervasive consciousness, is it then appropriate to call it a "witness"?

The advaitin consensus seems to be that this witnessing arises from the self's merely adventitous connection with the intellect or antal!.karan.a (internal instrument). This mental instrument, part of everyday appearance

Journal oflndian Philosophy 12 (1984) 277-290. 0022-1791/84/0123-0277 $01.40. 1984 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.

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(vyavah~ra/sarfis~ra), relates the s~k.sin to "things" which arm seen. It performs the active seeing of "objects". Ultimately, however, the ~tman, being all, is merely observing itself (as appearance).

Another way of looking at the s~ksin may also prove illuminating, s This way is focussed less on its knower/observer aspect. From this point of view, the s~k.sin is the "field" of consciousness/being within which the knower/ knowing/known distinctions arise. By the term field, I am not suggesting a physical area (k.setra), part of the objective realm, but rather the context for contents, or "space" in which forms may appear (as an energy field in physics). S~k.sin is the field of consciousness and "external" being.

In this conception, the falsely individualized 'T ' discriminates specific contents (thoughts and "objects") within the pervasively illumined field or context. This 'T ' identifies itself with a portion of the field (or takes a specific point-of-view, depending on whether one wants to emphasize the physical or mental aspect). The field is more extensive than, and the "ground" of, the viewer.

In advaitin terms, the non-dual field consists of unmodified, eternally pure consciousness (caitanya) within which specific, momentary modifications/ manifestations take place. What we call the known is that which a v.rtti (mental modification) 6 is holding before the intellect or internal instrument.

Active seeing (observing or viewing a particular thing) thus arises in the "localized" ant al3karan.a and its v.rttis, which are not intrinsic to the s~k.sin. This conception therefore minimizes the witnesser/witnessed duality, emphasizing that conditioned "things" appear within the unconditioned field. In the conclusion, I will suggest that these two conceptions indicate two different but related usages of sak.sin: ontologically, sgk.sin is essentially (svarfipa) ~tma-caitanya, and psychologically or empirically, s~ksin is the observer, the first and last vestige of person-ality. In the writings considered below, we shall see elements of both conceptions.

I now turn to a discussion of some advaitin thinkers who have analyzed the concept of s~ksin, starting with Safikara, the main progenitor of this school.

SAI~KARA ON THE SA_K.SIN

Saflkara refers to the sgksin in a number of texts, the most important of which are the Brahmasfitra (BS) bh~sya and the Upadegas~hasrL Saflkara

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most commonly regards the s~k.sin as a facet of the self, calling it the eternal, immediate, and self-luminous witness of the mind and senses. It observes and illumines the internal instrument and its manifestations (vrtti), which, along with the senses (indriya) and objects (vi.saya), are part of lower, everyday seeing 0okad.r.s.ti). Saflkara does not give an elaborate explanation of the perceptual process; the nature of the illuminer is his main interest. 7

The BSbh~.sya contains a number of references to the s~kiin, although most are in passing. In the commentary on I. 1.4, the self is said to be the witness of the I-notion (aharhpratyaya), and different from the actor. The unchanging self is witness of the three states (waking, dream, and deep sleep) according to the II. 1.9 commentary, 8 and brahman is said to possess sak.sitva of all objects (dr~ya) in the remarks on III. 2.23.

In II. 2 .28-30, Safikara discusses the sak.sin in a bit more detail. Here, Safikara is arguing against the Buddhist vijfi~nav~dins, asserting that there is an unchanging consciousness beyond particular cognitions (pratyaya). He states that the witness and cognitions are by nature different; from this difference the apparent perceiver/perceived (upalabh) relation arises. The witness, unlike particular cognitions, is self-established (svayariasiddha) and undeniable (thus overcoming any problem with infinite regress, anavasth~). Safikara concludes that all cognitions need a basis (adhis.t.hSna); here the basis is the unchanging seer.

The discussion of perception in the commentary on BS II. 3.32 and 40-1 also illumines the role of the s~k.sin. At issue is the nature of the knower. The purported knower is the internal instrument (also called manas or mind). To Safikara, this "knower" is actually only an adventitious limitation (up~dhi) of the self, the witness and true knower. The anta.hkara.na only registers manifestations arising from the senses. The intellect's attention (avadh~na) or non-attention to this sense data is what varies in perception (upalabdhi); thus, the intellect is the cause of apparent change and diversity. The self is the constant knower (cetayatr), or witness, of the intellect and is itself the basis of perception (thus suggesting field as well).

It is surprising to note the absence of the term saksin in Safikara's BrhadSranyaka Upani.sad (B~U) bh~sya. Of course, the term does not appear in the B~U itself, and Saflkara is often reticent to use terms not present in ~ruti. However, the B~U does discuss perception and seeing in many places. For example, the light of the self (~tma-jyotir, ~tma-caitanya) is discussed in IV. 3 .6 -7 , but even when the illuminer of the buddhi is considered,

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the sgk.sin goes unmentioned. Similarly, when two types of seeing (loka- and ~tma- dr.s.ti) are analyzed in B~U I. 4. 10 and III. 4. 2, the eternal, self-luminous seer is never called the s~ksin, just the self. 9 This would seem to confirm the close relationship of the s~k.sin and the self, with the self being the key term, and sgk.sin indicating one facet of the self.

Safikara gives us a clearer idea of the sgksin in the Upadegas~hasrL his most important statement not in commentary form. The term s~k.sin is quite common in the verse portion, unlike the BS and BfiU commentaries (or the prose portion of the Upade~asahasr~ itself for that matter). Here the self is repeatedly called the witness of the intellect (dhi, buddhi) and its notions. The sgk.sin is pure, non-dual, and without quality (agu.na, here suggesting the field conception). It is similar in some respects to the seer (dra.s.tr), but the latter is more tied to the everyday seeing (of both thoughts and objects) called d.rsti. Verse 15.4 states that the s~k.sin is different from all mental activity as the seer is different from any particular object.

For Safikara, the s~k.sin is particularly the knower (boddh.r, cetr) and observer as opposed to the actor. The witness' pure observation is unrelated to change or action (akriya, avik~ra, ak~raka). The limited buddhi is what changes. In fact, the intellect and the I-notion constantly vary.

To sum up, Safikara seems to be making three main points regarding the s~ksin, emphasizing the witness conception. First, the s~k.sin is an aspect of the eternal, unchanging self. Second, the s~ksin is different from and the basis (adhi.s.thAna) of the mind/intellect (antahkarana, dhL buddhi). Third, the s~ksin observes the notions or manifestations (pratyaya, vrtti) of the intellect as well as so-called external objects. Thus, Safikara seems to be arguing for the sgk.sin as passive observer, rather than field or context of observation. However, by linking the sgk.sin to the self, the field aspect must be present, for the ~tman is, in its essence, the unconditioned field of consciousness/being.

SURESVARA ON THE S.~KSIN

Of Saflkara's immediate followers, only Sure~vara (c. 720-70) regularly refers to the sak.sin. Both the field and witness ideas are evident. A number of references appear in his Nai.skarmyasiddhi and Salfibandha-v~rttika. In the latter text, verses 150-1 introduce one of Sure~vara's prominent themes, that of the self as field which lies beyond the apparent pramfit.r/pram~n.a/

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prameya triad.l The witnesser-witnessed relation which appears to function on the pramfin.a level does not exist in the pure field-like essence (sLk.si-vastu). Witnessing is actually a splitting of the self's fundamental s~k.sin-s~ksya unity (1087).

Also in the Sarhbandha-v~rttika, Suregvara points to the immediacy (sgk.s~t) and unconditioned (avige.sa, avilupta) nature of the s~ksin's seeing (793,796). Finally, he emphasizes the similarity of the self and the s~ksin. The s~k.sin is called pratyag-fitman, fitmasvarOpa, and atma-anubhava in the above-mentioned verses.

Like Safikara in the Upadegas~hasrL Suregvara in his Nai.skarmyasiddhi emphasizes that the sak.sin is unchanging (avikriyg), unlike the intellect. II. 66-7 and 76-7 assert that the witnessing self illumines and pervades the intellect, unmoved by the latter's motions (v.rtti, vikriy~). The s~k.sin merely observes sufferings (and joys) attached to the buddhi (II. 80).

In the above, Suregvara partially follows Safikara's understanding; passive observation is the predominant theme. Yet the silk.sin as field conception is evident: the unchanging sgk.sin is like the self (implicitly a context or field) and unlike the intellect. Both conceptions appear in Suregvara's strong emphasis on the difference between knower/known duality and the seeing of the immediate, non-dual s~ksin.

PADMAPADA, V.~.CASPATI MISRA, AND SARVAJgT~tTMAN ON THE S*K .SIN

Later advaitins such as Padmap~da, V~caspati Migra, and Sarvajfifitman 11 refer occasionally to the s~ksin, though it is not a major concept in advaitin thought at this point.12 In Paficap~dika verse 41, Padmap~da says the s~k.sin is unified, immediate consciousness.13 The s~k.sin is different from the I-notion (aharnpratyaya, aharhkfira), which is superimposed on it. In fact, the s~k.sin witnesses the transformations of the I-notion (121,316).

Vficaspati Migra, in his Bh~matf on Safikara's BS bh~.sya, mentions the s~ksin briefly in his comments on I. 1.4 and II. 2.28. In the former, V~caspati writes that the param~tman witnesses the jfv~tman (that is, the agent and object of ahalfipratyaya). Ultimately, jiva- and parama- fitman are one, but jiva is the conditioned form and silk.sin is the pure form. In II. 2.28, he adds that the immediate and eternal sSk.sin seizes experience (upalabdhi). Above, both V~caspati Migra and Padmap~da emphasize the witness conception of s~k.sin.

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In Sarvajfiitman's Samk.sepa~iririka, it is plainly stated that the concept of witnessing implies duality between witnesser and what is witnessed (which are mutually dependent). This idea of duality, Sarvajfiitman adds, is caused by ignorance (III. 67,132,190). He also says the unchanging non-dual puru.sa illumines and witnesses that which is imagined (parikalpita, II. 29-30).

Sarvaj~itman thus makes explicit the problem of duality in the concept of the witness, although he does little beyond pointing it out. He simply asserts that the witnesser/witnessed dualism is ignorance, and affirms that a non-dual self (here called puru.sa) underlies all.

VIDY,~RA.NYA ON THE S.~.KSIN

Vidyira.nya (c. fourteenth century) is the next author for whom the siksin plays a significant role. The sik.sin appears repeatedly in his Paficadagf (although rarely in his Jgvanmuktiviveka). Vidy~ra.nya emphasizes that the sgk.sin underlies the individual buddhi.

Vidyira.nya, like earlier advaitins, generally links the s~k.sin with the itman, which is the witness of the world with all its forms, the mind with its manifestations, and impermanence in general. The sgk.sin also witnesses sleep and that which is empty (gfinya). Without an observer, sleep and emptiness cannot be known (VI. 76). Further, as Saflkara says, the s~k.sin is not the doer (kart.r); it reveals the doer, doing, and resulting objects (X. 9).

There are two passage where the sik.sin is particularly prominent. In the first (VII. 215-42), the qualityless sik.sin is said to be beyond the enjoyer/enjoying/ enjoyed (bhuj) triad; duality and suffering are connected to the cidibhisa, or mind-semblance.14 The mind-semblance superimposes the reality proper to the silk.sin onto the enjoyer, and this superimposition causes delusion (bhrinti). When this delusion is discriminated (vivic), even cidgbhgsa thinks on (cint) the witnessing self (231-4). The mind-semblance then emulates (anukgri) the s~k.sin, as a prince does a king (240), and ultimately destroys itself (sva-viniga) to be absorbed into the sik.sin. The basic point is, of course, that the mind- semblance is deluded and ultimately longs to be merged into the self.

The second group of verses which discusses the siksin is X. 10-25; this passage describes the sak.sin as a lamp in a theatre. The s~k.sin's self-luminous (sva-prakiga) nature is emphasized. These verses state that the sik.sin shines through (or en-light-ens, bh~) sense-experiences like a lamp illumines a theatre, whether or not an audience (the visaya) or dancer (the ahariakira, dhi) are

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present (X. 10-12). The ever mobile intellect (dancer) goes in and out, moving in time and space, while the unmoving sgk.sin (lamp) illumines all. Vidygranya stresses that the intellect's movement (caficala) is falsely super- imposed on the saksin. Ultimately, the intellect conceives (k!p, meaning reveals a object's presence), while the saksin pervasively illumines (prakgg, meaning reveals the field for the object's presence or absence). We see again that the s~k.sin is prior to the intellect or mind; it passively illumines mental movement and manifestation.

Vidygranya thus concurs with Safikara's main points regarding the sak.sin: it is an aspect of the self, it underlies the intellect, and it is a passive observer. However, with the lamp image, there is more emphasis on the concept of the sgk.sin as luminous field, within which all activity takes place. The cid~bh~sa's absorption (ava~i.s) into the s~k.sin also suggests the field idea.

MADHUSUDANA SARASVATI ON THE S~.K.SIN

We now turn to a later and exceptionally challenging thinker, Madhusfldana Sarasvati (c. sixteenth century). His analysis of the saksin, and his thought in general, is more refined than that of earlier thinkers. Below, I will briefly explore some issues concerning the silk.sin in Madhustidana's Advaitasiddhi (AS) and Siddhantabindu (SB), particularly the relationship between ignorance (avidyL ajfi~na) and the sgk.sin. More research on this topic, and his thought in general, would be welcome.IS

To Madhustidana, the s~k.sin is eternal, non-dual, and firmly fixed (kfLtastha) It i~the knower and unseen seer 16 which illumines and is other than the object-ive world. 17 The sgksin is also distinct from the three states of waking, dream, and sleep. (SB 150, 172). 18

Like many earlier advaitins, Madhustidana emphasizes that the s~k.sin is invariable (avyabhicara) as it observes the varying knower/knowing/k0~own triad. This knower (pram~tr) cannot witness its own changes (vik~ra); it is an object, subject to transformation (pari.n~ma, SB 59-60). According to SB 169-170, the sak.sin becomes knower due to conditioning by up~dhis (adventitious limitations). 19 In the Advaitasiddhi, Madhustadana adds that the sfiksin is not dependent on the pram~nas and does not grasp objects with particular marks (dharmin, 802). While sak.sin as witness is predominant here, the sgk.sin as field concept can also be seen. The s~k.sin is the pervasive context within which the knower and known arise.

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Madhusfidana elsewhere mentions the s~k.sin's relationship with the j Na and igvara, particularly on SB 139. In the Advaitasiddhi, he writes that the s~k.sin is different from, yet common among, all jivas (754). In the Siddh~ntabindu passage, the jlva, lsvara, and s~k.sin are all called the self, seen as three due to different up~dhis. Caitanya figures prominently here: there are references to sgk.si-caitanya, jiva-caitanya, and i~vara-caitanya. Pure self-consciousness (~tma-caitanya) pervades the others.

Madhustidana continues that i'svara is limited because it is the non-eternal cause of entities and the jiva is limited in being tied to the antahkara.na and its modifications. He also relates rvara and the s~k.sin as follows: either the s~k.sin is the image (bimba) and igvara its reflection (pratibimba) or rgvara is the image and the s~k.sin is the examiner (anusafiadMt.r) of the image. In this context, the s~ksin is clearly used in the sense of witness/observer.

Madhusgdana commonly links the term caitanya (consciousness) with the s~k.sin. In the SB, he differentiates two kinds of caitanya: s~ksi- and buddhi-. Sgk.si-caitanya is non-different, underlying mental states and their modifications. Knowledge of it gives direct rise to mok.sa (SB 104, 106). Buddhi-caitanya makes consciousness appear to be different in different bodies, for each person has her/his own buddhi (SB 88). In SB 115, Madhusfidana adds that there are two kinds of concealing (~varana) .... one residingin the s~k.sin when particularized (avachinna) in the internal instrument, the other residing in buddhi-caitanya when particularized in objects.

In the Advaitasiddhi, emphasis is on the relationship among consciousness, the s~k.sin, and ignorance. Madhustidana repeatedly defines the s~k.sin as consciousness reflecting (pratiphalita) an avidyg-v.rtti, the mental modification of ignorance (557,575,754). In other places, Madhusadana states that the s~k.sin is associated (upahita)with ignorance (261,441,545,754). The latter two references explicitly differentiate the s~k.sin from pure cit or brahman. Madhustidana fllrther writes on AS 395 that alt faults (do.sa) arise, not from pure caitanya, but from the particularizing (avacchedika) avidyg-vrtti.

As Sanjukta Gupta (1966) points out, 2 Madhusfldana seems to be using the s~k.sin in two senses: as metaphysical reality and as epistemological fact. The s~ksin ultimately is atma-caitanya, metaphysically real and eternal, but it is also essentially limited epistemologically by an avidy~-vrtti, that is, the s~ksin arises and ceases only with this v.rtti.-The avidyg-vrtti is special in that it is a mode of avidy~ and not of the anta.hkara.na, as are other v.rttis. The avidy~-v.rtti, unlike anta.hkara.na-vrttis, never ceases (in sleep, swoon, etc.).

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The sak.sin, then, is fundamentally linked to a flawed, limiting avidyfi- v.rtti (AS 397,410, SB t63). We can go further, saying that the s~k.sin does not arise without ignorance, which returns us to Sarvajfiatman's point about the intimate relation of witnesser-witnessed dualism and ignorance? 1

The Advaitasiddhi's references to what is known by, or object to, the witness (s~ksi-vedya) also bear on this issue? ~ Madhust~dana repeatedly says that ajfi~na/avidy~ is known by the s~ksin. 2a Further, the s~k.sin is not limited by objects in any way; rather, it reveals all objects, including ignorance. What is not entirely clear is how a witness can observe (or grasp) ignorance as an object while being fundamentally linked with it.

In sum, then, we are told that the s~k.sin is not pure brahman or caitanya. With pure or non-dual consciousness, a "witness" is superfluous. The s~ksin is somehow modified by ignorance; there is no witness without avidyL Further, the s~k.sin is primarily regarded as the observer/examiner, due to its tie to avidyL Emphasis is on its difference from the ever-changing knower (pramgt.r), rather than on the s~k.sin as field of knowing. An important question remains, however: how exactly is the s~ksin associated with ignorance, especially when it is often said that ignorance is known by (or an object to) the witness?

DHARMARA.JA ON THE SAKSIN

The final text considered here is Dharmar~jadhvarin's Ved~ntaparibha.sL a seventeenth century discussion of advaitin epistemology. There are a number of references to the sSk.sin in the first chapter, which is on perception (pratyak.sa) as a means of knowledge. Apparently influenced by Madhusfidana, this understanding of the s~ksin is even more refined than earlier conceptions. Dharmar~ja even differentiates between a kevala-s~k.sin (field of consciousness/ being) and plain or simple s~k.sin (the witness).

We are introduced to the kevala-s~k.sin in I. 52-4. The anta.hkara.na and its marks (dharma) are objects (or contents) within the kevala-s~k.sin's field; the contents rest there without any prama.na functioning. The kevala-s~k.sin comes to know (vid) the internal instrument (and its marks) by vrttis, the manifestors of mental activity. In fact, the v.rttis are indispensible for the kevala-s~k.sin to know any "thing" or object. For example, VII. 9 states that even absence (abh~va) is not known by the kevala-s~k.sin because it is not known to ~(.rtti-jfi~na. Thus, the kevala-s~k.sin is the context of mental activity, and its "knowing" arises through v.rtti-jfi~na.

A later twist is added in I. 89, where vi.saya-caitanya (object-consciousness)

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is equated with the plain or simple s~k.sin (see also I. 67) in that both manifest things (here, silver) to be known by (or within) the kevala-s~k.sin. This again suggests that the kevala-shk.sin is the illumining field and some manifestor (here s~k.sin, not v.rtti) is needed to know objects.

The s~k.sin is specified further in I. 66-74, where ,*.he j~va and jNa-shk.sin, f~vara and f~vara-s~k.sin, and the plain s~k.sin are mentioned. We learn that the j fva is consciousness particularized (avachinna) in the internal instrument, while the s~k.sin is consciousness associated with (upahita) the internal instrument. Put another way, the anta.hkara.na is a vi~e.sana or basic constituent of the j fva, whereas the anta.hkarana is an upfidhi or adventitious associate of the saksin. Thus the jfva is fundamentally limited by one's internal instrument, while the s~ksin is not. 24 A result is that the jfva-s~k.sin (versus simple s~k.sin) essentially varies with each individual (pratyagStman) according to his/her anta.hkara.na. Another implication is that the apparent differences in the s~ksin are due merely to their adventitious connection with the jfva and the anta.hkara.na's v.rttis. Thus, the plain s~k.sin is related to mental limitations, but is not essentially tied to these limits.

The f~vara-s~k.sin is consciousness associated with single, eternal m~y~ (illusory appearance); this association is also adventitious. Finally (in I. 74), Dharmar~ja introduces parame~vara, which is caitanya particularized in m~y~. He elaborates by stating that ~varatva arises when m~y~ is particularized, while s~ik.sitva is merely associated with m~y~. In the next line, Dharmar~ja concludes that while ~varatva and s~k.sitva are different (because linked with m~y~ differently), f~vara and s~k.sin (their bases) are not different.

In the above, Dharmar~ja makes two main points. First, the kevala-s~k.sin (the field of consciousness/being) needs a manifestor (either v.rtti or plain s~k.sin) for knowing particulars. Second, the jfva, f~vara, and s~k.sin are interrelated but different, and the differences focus on their relationships with the anta.hkara.na and m~yL All are somehow implicated in apparent duality, which accounts for the simple sLksin being conceived as knower/ observer. A more extensive discussion of the witness by Dharmar~ja would have been intriguing.

In this paper, I have shown some continuing themes and some divergent emphases in the advaitin analysis of the sgksin. The s~ksin is consistently regarded as eternal, non-dual, self-luminous, unvarying, and like consciousness and the self. It is also particularly differentiated from the mind or intellect and the knower/knowing/known triad. However, the sgk.sin is taken to be

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more complex in the thought o f Madhusfidana Sarasvatf and Dharmar~ja:

the former emphasizes its twofold relationship with consciousness and

ignorance, while the latter introduces a variety of witnesses (j fva-, f~vara-,

kevala-, and plain sgk.sin) which are similar but not the same.

I have also stressed the role o f two related (but not identical) conceptions

o f the sgk.sin: one suggests the s~k.sin is a passive observer or witness, in some

way implicated in duality; the other considers the sgk.sin as a luminous field

or context o f consciousness/being. We can consider these related conceptions

as two facets of the s~k.sin, as Devabrata Sinha (1965) has suggested. 2s On

the highest level (param~rtha), or in essence (svanipa), the silk.sin is non-dual,

pure consciousness, and field or context terminology is appropriate. On the

psychological or empirical level, however, the sgk.sin is the first and last

vestige o f individuality, the evidencer of all knowing. Here, to speak of the

passive observer or witness is more accurate. While these distinctions should

not be overdrawn, awareness of these differing emphases should prove useful

in further study of advaitin thought.

Texas Christian University Dept. of Religious Studies Fort Worth, TX 76129, U.S.A.

NOTES

I would like to thank Wilhelm Halbfass of the University of Pennsylvania for looking over a prior draft. I would also like to express my gratitude to Harvey P. Alper of Southern Methodist University for his close reading and numerous useful suggestions. The remaining flaws are, of course, my responsibility.

1 I would like to mention here Tara Chatterjee's (1982) recent article on the same topic for this journal. While making some useful points, this essay showed a tendency to use technical terms, in both English and Sanskrit, with insufficient precision. Textual support for important points was also limited or lacking.

For example, the s~k.sin is termed the individual's "principle of consciousness... which sees all our experiences" (p. 339). The precise meanings of "consciousness" and "experience" are not discussed, nor are Sanskrit equivalents for these terms given. Such is also the case for references to mental "state", "occurrent", and "mode" on p. 343. Neither do we find textual evidence for assertions like "Advaita philosophy entertains the concept of ahamk~ra side by side with the concept of s~k.sin." (p. 354), or "the anta.hkarana is almost identical with mind" (pp. 350-1). Definitional clarity and textual support would, I believe, have strengthened Chatterjee's case. 2 The source of s~ksin as a philosophical concept is obscure. It is virtually unattested in the major Upanisads (one reference each in Svet~vatara 6. 11 and Maitri 6. 16.) It is mentioned once in the S~fikhya kSrik~s (19), where the purusa is said to be the witness of pralqti.

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The s~ksin becomes more prominent in relatively late disputes between advaitins and the Ny~ya and Mfm~ms~ schools. Advaitins argue against the Ny~ya idea of anuvyavasgya or retrospection which reveals the original cognition. Advaitins say that an unchanging revealing subject is necessary to avoid the problem of infinite regress (anavasth~) with such retrospection. For examples of these discussions, see Devabrata Sinha's "The Concept of S~ksin in Advaita Vedanta." Our Heritage (1954): 325-32. 3 As V~icaspati MiCra says in his Bhamati on Safikara's Brahmast~tra-bh~sya "asya s~ksina.h sadg asarfidigdh~viparitasya nityas~ks~tk~rat~ an~gantuka prakg~atve gha.tate." (Bh~matf II. 2.28, quoted in Devabrata Sinha, The ldealist Standpoint, p. 82). 4 Pramgt.r, pram~.na, and prameya are commonly used. Forms of ~ , bhuj, and grab also appear. 5 Both T. R. V. Murti (A]~dna, pp. 171 ff.) and Devabrata Sibha (The ldealist Standpoint, pp. 72-9) have facilitated my understanding here. 6 The concept of vrtti is complex and bears further investigation. In brief, a v.rtti is a mental modification which is transformed into (or takes the shape of) an object (visaya) and, upon entering the anta.hkarana, is passively illumined by the s~ksin. The anta.hkarana is the unconscious and contingent mental instrument which connects the vrttis with luminous consciousness. The perceptual process goes something like this: the object appears (which does not mean it is ultimately real), the vrtti goes out and transports the object back to the anta.hkarana after taking its shape, and the anta.hkarana then presents the v.rtti to the s~k.sin, which illumines it. 7 It is interesting to note that N. K. Devaraja, in his book on Safikara's epistemology, repeatedly refers to the advaitin distinction of s~k.si- versus v.rtti- jfi~na, despite the fact that Safikara himself never directly uses these terms. Such a distinction comes much later, with Madhust~dana Sarasvatr and Dharmar~ja. (See An Introduction to Sankara's Theory of Knowledge [Delhi: Mofilal Banarsidass, 2nd rev. ed., 1972], pp. 94-5) . 8 I would like to mention briefly here Tara Chatterjee's (1982) discussion of the advaitin conception of deep sleep (susupti) as pure, unvarying Self-manifestation. She writes that this idea "fails to impress me. For a theory which attaches more importance to a sleeping individual rather than a waking one fails to attract me." (p. 353) First, rather than focussing on one's personal feeling about this idea, one might ask why advaitins would argue for this apparently strange position. Second, an advaitin could argue that Chatterjee's position is based on the waking perspective, which is the most deluded and nonself-like condition. Finally, advaitins do not say that the sleeping individual is more important than a waking one - they argue that the sleeping condition is more like the self. 9 In IV. 10.4, however, there is a passing mention of the par~tman as witness to the notions of all beings (sarva-pr~nita-pratyaya-s~ksi). A similar phrase, substituting buddhi for pr~nita, appears in the commentary on Mund.aka Upanisad II. 2. 4 and 9. 10 The Naiskarmyasiddhi also refers to the s~ksin's freedom from apparent seizer/seizing/ seized (grah) differences (II, 107-8). 11 According to Hajime Nakamura, their dates are: Padmap~da (720-70); Sarvajfigtman (750-800); V~caspati MiCra (c. 840). See A History of Early Vedanta Philosophy (Delhi: Motilal Benarsidass, 1983), p. 88. 12 Many so-called minor Upani.sads were also written during this time, and the term s~k.sin israre in them as well. Sometimes there are brief references to the witness of senses, mind, or world (Annapfir.na, Mah~, Tejobindu), but these references are not elaborated or analyzed. The largest number of references are in the Nrsirhhottarat~panfya,

SfitK.SIN IN ADVAITA VEDANTA 289

where the sgk.sin is a synonym for seer (drast.r.), but still merely One term in a list of epithets for the self. 13 Aviesa, kti.tastha, aparoksa, and ekarasa caitanya. 14 Cidhbhgsa is a key term in the Paficada'sf. I translate it as mind-semblance, i.e. the apparent individual conscious element in the jfva which "enjoys". 1 s The best available current resource is Sanjukta Gupta's Studies in the Philosophy of Madhusadana Sarasvatf (Calcutta: Sanskrit Pustak Bandar, 1966). 16 Referring to the BaU III. 7 -8 ; he elsewhere calls the Upanisads th e "king of pram~pas". 17 SB 62, 172, AS 276. There are many different editions of both the SB and AS. My references are to the page numbers in the following editions: Siddhdntabindu. S. Subrahma.nya S gstrL ed. (Varanasi: Mahesh Research Institute, 1978);Advaitasiddhi. Ananthak.rsna Sgstrf, ed. (Bombay: Nirnaya Sagara Press, 1917). 18 In this context, the s~k.sin is called tur~ya, the fourth beyond the three ever-varying states which are subject to ignorance. The Advaitasiddhi adds that the s~ksin's avidyg- v rtti is different from that of susupta (AS 559). 19 Quoting Sure~vara's B~U vfirttika here, Madhusfidana says the witnessing self observes the seer, which then perceives object-ive changes. Sure~vara is also mentioned on 139 as identifying f~vara with the s~ksin, unlike Madhusgdana's examiner/mirror concept (see following note). Also, mention of cid~bhfisa (SB 88) could refer back to Vidy~ra.nya (p. 282). 20 See Gupta (1966), pp. 134-38. 21 Surendranath Dasgupta, in his useful account of Madhusfidana's thought, states explicitly that there is no sfiksin without an avidya-v.rtti. According to Dasgupta, Madhustidana also says that s~ksi-caitanya, rising above the buddhi and its vrttis, reveals objects and ignorance, unlike v.rtti-jfign a, which opposes ignorance. See A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. IV: 263-75, 290-4,307. 22 The most extended account of the essential nature (svarapa) of s~k.si-vedya is on AS 557-8, and contains an elaborate series of pt~rvapak.sin and siddh~ntin exchanges. 2a AS 410, 548, 550, 575, 650, 876. 24 Jadunath Sinha emphasizes this point in his History oflndian Philosophy (Calcutta: Sinha Publishing House, 1952), Vol. II: 493-5. 25 See D. Sinha, The Idealist Standpoint, pp. 73-79.

B IBL IOGRAPHY

Primary texts Safikara (1980). Brahmas~tra-~ahkarabhds.yam. Edited by J. L. Sastri. Delhi: Motilal

Banarsidass. Safikara (1977). Brahmas~tra Bhd.sya. Translated by Swami Gambhirananda. 3rd edition.

Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama. Safikara (1964). ]~ddida~opani.sad-~ahkarabhd.syam. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. Safikara (1973). UpadekasdhasrL Edited by Sengaku Mayada. Tokyo: Hokuseido Press. Surevara (1906). Nai.skarmyasiddhi. Edited by G. A. Jacob. Bombay Sanskrit Series

No. 38. Surevara (1958). Sainbandhavdrttika. Edited and translated by T. M. P. Mahadevan.

Madras: Univ. of Madras Press. Padmap~da (1948). Pa~capddika. Edited and translated by D. Venkataramiah. Baroda:

Oriental Institute (Gaekwad's Oriental Series No. 107).

290 ANDREW O. FORT

Sarvajfi~tman (1972). Safnk.sepa~drrrika. Edited and translated by N. Veezinathan. Madras: Univ. of Madras Press.

V~caspati Migra (1933). The Bhdmatf of Vdcaspati on Sankara "s Brahmasatra Bhd.sya. Edited and translated by S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri and C. Kunhan Raja. Madras: Theosophical Publ. House.

Vidyfiranya (1965). PanchadashL Edited and translated by H. P. Shastri. 2nd edition. London: Shanti Sadan.

MadhustXdana Sarasvaff (1917). Advaitasiddhi. Edited by Ananthakrsna Sastri. Bombay: Nirnaya Sagara Press.

Madhust~dana Sarasvaff (1978). Siddhdntabindu. Edited by S. S. Subrahmanya Sastri. Varanasi: Mahesh Research Institute.

Dharmarfijfidhvarin (1942). Veddntaparibhd.sa. Edited and translated by S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri. Madras: Adyar Library.

Secondary Sources Dasgupta, Surendranath (1922). A History oflndian Philosophy. Vol. IV. Cambridge:

Cambridge Univ. Press. Devaraja, N. K. (1972). An Introduction to Sankara's Theory of Knowledge. 2nd revised

edition. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. Gupta, Sanjukta (1966). Studies in the Philosophy of Madhus~dana SarasvatL Calcutta:

Sanskrit Pustak Bandar. Mahadevan, T. M. P. (1969). The Pa~cada~ ofBhdratatfrtha- Vidydranya: an interpretive

exposition. Madras: Univ. of Madras Press. Malkani, G. K. (1933). Editor.A]adna. London: Luzac. Nakamura, Hajime (1983). A History of Early Veddnta Philosophy. Delhi: Motilal

Banarsidass. Sastri, C. Markandeya (1973). Sure~vara's Contribution to Advaita. Vemur, Andhra

Pradesh: Sundari Samskrita Vidyalaya. Sinha, Devabrata (1965). The Idealist Standpoint. Visvabharati: Centre for Advanced

Study in Philosophy. Sinha, Jadunath (1956). A History of Indian Philosophy. Vol. II. Calcutta: Sinha

Publishing House.

Articles Chatterjee, Tara (1982). 'The Concept of S~ksin', Journal of Indian Philosophy 10:

339-56. Chaudhuri, A. K. R. (1953). 'The Concept of S~ksin in Advaita Vedfinta', Our Heritage

(1953): 69-76. Sinha, Devabrata (1954a). 'The Concept of S~ksin in Advaita Vedanta', Our Heritage

325-32. Sinha, Devabrata (1954b). 'An Inquiry into Self-Consciousness', Calcutta Review

105-14.