The Concept of a Civil Wrong

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  • The Concept of a Civil Wrong

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    ThePhilosophicalFoundationsofTortLawDavidG.Owen

    Printpublicationdate:1997PrintISBN-13:9780198265795PublishedtoOxfordScholarshipOnline:March2012DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198265795.001.0001

    TheConceptofaCivilWrongBIRKSPETER

    DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198265795.003.0002

    AbstractandKeywords

    Thischapterisconcernedwiththecommonlaw,butithasaRomanbeginning.BystartingfromtheRomananalysisinwhichithaditsorigin,onecanmosteasilysetoutthecommonlawclassificationinwhichcivilwrongs,ortorts,formoneimportantcategory.Theconceptofacivilwrongcannotbeinvestigatedotherthaninthecontextofthatclassification.Thesecond-centuryjuristGaiuswasthefirsttoadvancethepropositionthateveryobligationarisesfromacontract,awrong,orfromsomeothercausalevent.However,hesawthatthatwouldnotdo,fortherewereindisputableinstancesoflegalobligationhandeddownfromtheunsystematicpastwhicharosefromneither.Theobligationtoreturnamistakenpaymentwasaprominentexample.Thethreefoldclassificationcontracts,wrongs,andothereventswasnottheendoftheRomanstory.Themiscellaneousthirdcategoryposedachallenge.

    Keywords:commonlaw,torts,civilwrong,classification,Gaius,obligation,contracts,wrongs,events

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    Thisessayisconcernedwiththecommonlaw,butithasaRomanbeginning.BystartingfromtheRomananalysisinwhichithaditsorigin,wecanmosteasilysetoutthecommonlawclassificationinwhichcivilwrongs,ortorts,formoneimportantcategory.Theconceptofacivilwrongcannotbeinvestigatedotherthaninthecontextofthatclassification.Differentiationisnottheleastimportantaspectoftheexercise.

    I.TheFourfoldClassificationThesecondcenturyjuristGaiuswas,sofarasweknow,thefirsttoadvancethepropositionthateveryobligationarisesfromacontractorfromawrongorfromsomeothercausalevent.1Hewasattractedbyasimplerproposition,withoutthemiscellaneousthirdcategory:everyobligationarisesfromacontractorawrong.2However,hesawthatthatWouldnotdo,fortherewereindisputableinstancesoflegalobligationhandeddownfromtheunsystematicpastwhicharosefromneither.Theobligationtoreturnamistakenpaymentwasaprominentexample.3

    Thethreefoldclassificationcontracts,wrongs,andothereventswasnottheendoftheRomanstory.Themiscellaneousthirdcategoryposedachallenge.BytheendofthefirstlifeofRomanlawthethreetermshadgivenwaytofour,andthemiscellanyappearedtohavebeenresolved:everyobligationarisesfromacontract,orasthoughfromacontract,orfromawrong,orasthoughfromawrong.4Theasthoughcategoriesgaveusthetermsquasi-contractandquasi-delict,buttheycastnolightonthelinesdrawn.Thecategoriesarenotonlycategoriesofcausativeeventbutcategoriesofexplanation.Weseemtoseetheforceofthepropositionthatanobligationarisesfromcontractorfromawrong,butthereisnoexplanatoryforceintheparallelpropositionsforquasi-contractandquasi-delict.Theasthoughcategoriesaredescribednegatively,sothatthereaderonlyknowswhattheseeventsarenot.Thedoubtsinfectthetwoseeminglysafe(p.32) categories.Whereexactlyarethelinesdrawn?Wherepreciselydoestheexplanatoryforceofcontractandwrongsrunout?

    WeneednotpursuetheRomanstoryhere.WehaveonlytonoticethatthegamewhichGaiusstartedisstillbeingplayedoutinthecommonlawtoday.Thechallengeisthesame,andtheproblemscloselysimilar.SomewouldprefertogobehindGaiussstartingpoint.Thatis,theywouldnotevenacceptcontractandwrongs.However,eversinceseriousandsustainedthoughtaboutthecommonlawbegansomewhatoveracenturyago,5mostjuristshaveacceptedthetwomainRomancategoriesofcontractandwrongsor,usingtheFrenchforwrongswhichthecommonlawstillprefers,torts.Thereareveryfewlawschoolswhichdonotteach,asbasicrequiredcourses,thelawofcontractsandthelawoftorts.BothtopicsofthelawhavesurvivedwellenoughintomoderntimestoearntheirsecondRestatements.6

    Whataboutthemiscellanybeyondcontractandtort?Formanylawyersitisstillterraincognita,territoryunknown.Butmostofthosewhohavedonesomeexplorationthinkthatatleastonemoremajorcategorycanbemapped,namelyunjustenrichment.Thatproducesfourcategoriesandnarrowstheresidualmiscellany:(1)contract,(2)tort,(3)unjustenrichment,and(4)othercausativeevents.Exceptagainstthoseradicalswhowanttoabolishthecategoriesofcontractandtort,thatfourfoldclassificationoughtnow

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    tobesecure.Itseemedtobecomesecurein1937.InthatyeartheAmericanLawInstitutepublishedtheRestatementofRestitution.7ItcouldhavebeencalledtheRestatementofUnjustEnrichment,buttheAmericanLawInstitutechosetocallthelawofunjustenrichmentrestitution.Thatis,theRestatementwasnamedbytheresponsetotheevent,nottheeventitself.

    Takenalone,restitutionisagoodname,butitisnotperfectlycoextensivewiththeautonomouscauseofactioncalledunjustenrichmentanditdoesnotalignproperlywithcontractandtort.Ittendstopushthesubjecttowardsremedies.Infact,restitutionisnowoftentaughtincoursesonremedies,eventhoughitismostlyconcernedwithdefiningcausativeeventsor,synonymously,causesofactionthatis,withidentifyingtheprecisefactswhichrenderanenrichmentunjustandfromwhichtheobligationtomakerestitutionarises.PerhapsitisthebadinfluenceofitswronglyalignednamewhichcostrestitutionthesecurityofaSecondRestatement.Theprojectappearedtobeunderway,butaftertwoTentativeDrafts,itwasabandoned.8(p.33) Despitethathesitation,thefourfoldclassificationofcausativeevents(1)contracts(consent),(2)torts(wrongs),(3)unjustenrichments,and(4)othereventsisunlikelytobeeasilydisplaced,thoughitmaybethatthemiscellaneousfourthcategorycanbemadetoyieldupfurthernominateevents.

    Thequestioninthisessayconcernsthesecondcategoryinthisscheme,whichthecommonlawhabituallycallstortsbutwhichthetitleoftheessaycallscivilwrongs.However,thisclassificationofcausativeeventsisall-important,notonlytotheworkoftheessay,buttothestructureofthecommonlaw.For,eventhoughmostcommonlawyerspaynoconsciousheedtoit,thisfourfoldclassificationunderliestheirthinking,andthecoherenceoftheclassificationisoneofthefoundationsofthelawsrationality.Everytimealawyerselectsatheoryofliabilityhedrawsonit,ifnotdirectlyandconsciously,thenatleastonideaswhichrestuponit.Itisanerror,albeitonewhichisinstitutionalizedinmanylawschoolssimplybecausedifferentprofessorsteachdifferentcourses,todefineorreflectupononecategoryinisolationfromtheothers.Thereasonwhythaterrormustbeavoidedisthatalegalconceptcannotbefullyunderstoodunlessitisclearlydifferentiatedfromothersinitsfield,andtheexerciseofdifferentiationremainsimpossiblesolongasaconceptisstudiedinisolation.

    II.TheThesisinaNutshellThisessayaimsbothtoestablishastableandproperlydifferentiatedconceptofacivilwrongandtodefendthecoherenceofthefourfoldclassificationsetoutabove.Thelatteraimispartandparceloftheexerciseofdifferentiation.Thereadermayfindithelpfulattheoutsettohavesomeforewarningofthepositionswhichwillbetaken.Subject,therefore,totheroutinecaveatthatanoutlinecannotstandalone,thethesisofthispapermaybeenucleatedasfollows.

    (1)Acivilwrongisnomorenorlessthanabreachoflegaldutyowedtoaplaintiff.Corecharacteristicssuchasharmandfaultareanalyticallyinessential.However,(2)afailuretoperformacontractortofulfilanobligationtomakerestitutionofunjustenrichmentortopayataxorsatisfyajudgmentisnolesscapableofbeingdescribedasabreachofduty

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    thannegligentinjuryordefamationoranyotherfamiliartort.Hence,(3)thereisa(p.34)primafaciecaseforassertingthatthefourfoldclassificationcontract,wrongs,unjustenrichment,andothereventsisincoherent:allfourcategoriesappeartoentailbreachesofduty,withtheconsequencethat,ifawrongisabreachofdutyandeverybreachofdutyisawrong,itmustbedangerousnonsensetotoleratethreecategorieswhichentailbreachesofdutyyetontheirfacepurporttobesomethingdifferentfromawrong.However,(4)thebroadconceptofacivilwrongasnothingmorenorlessthanabreachofdutydoesnot,oncloseranalysis,renderthefourfoldclassificationincoherent,althoughitdoesprovokeawarningthatthecomplexityofthatclassificationisnottobeunderestimated.(5)Thekeytothecoherenceofthefourfoldclassificationliesinthedifferencebetweenthepossibilityofdescribingagiveneventasabreachofdutyandthenecessityofsodescribingit.Thethreecategoriesotherthanwrongsarecategoriesofeventinwhichitisunnecessary,thoughnotimpossible,toexplaintheliabilitieswhichtheycauseastriggeredbyabreachofduty.So,forexample,yourliabilitytoreturnamistakenpayment(acategory3event)canbe,butneednotbe,explainedastriggeredbyyourbreachofthedutytoreturnmistakenpayments.Eachofthefirst,third,andfourthcategoriesexistsasanindependentcategoryor,onemightsay,asanindependenttheoryofliabilitybecauseandtotheextentthatthelawpreferstogivethemdirecteffectanddoesnotopttoreducethemtotheanalysisintermsofbreachofduty.(6)Thepracticalmatterwhichturnsonthechoiceofwhetherornottogiveprioritytoanexplanationintermsofbreachofdutyhastodowithremedies.Theremedialpotentialofawrong(breachofduty)ismorediversethanthatofanyoftheeventsinthefirst,third,andfourthcategories.

    Thesixthpropositionaboveislinkedtoanimportantsub-theme.Justastheresponsetocrimesisamatterforpolicyandopentodebate,withinextrinsicconstraintssuchastherenunciationofrecoursetocruelty,socivilwrongssimilarlydictatenoparticularresponse.Althoughrationaldebateastothebestpolicywilloftenfavorcompensationinmoney,thereisnoreasonwhy,subjecttotheexternalconstraints,otherformsandmeasuresofresponseshouldnotalsobeused.

    III.CommonDistractionsTwodistractionsimpedeanalysis.Oneisthetendencyoftorttoexcludeequitablewrongs.Theotheristhemisinterpretationoftheassociationofcivilwrongswithonemeasureofresponse,namelycompensationforloss.Thismustnotbeelevatedtothelevelofalogicalnecessity,asifanyotherremedywouldbeunnatural.

    Thecommonlawiseverywhereheavilymarkedbytheancientjurisdictionaldivisionbetweenlawandequity,althoughdifferentmembersofthe(p.35) commonlawfamilyhavebridgedthegapatdifferentspeeds.Tortdevelopedasacommonlawcategory.Wrongsredressedinequitysuchasbreachoftrust,knowingassistanceinafraud,andabuseofconfidencehavenottraditionallybeenregardedastorts.Theyhavebeenthesubjectofdifferentbooksanddifferentcourses.Salmondexcludedbreachesofequitableobligationssimplyonthebasisofhistoricalclassification;tortwascommonlaw,andthatwasthat.9Incontrast,Winfieldwasmoreagonized.Hedefinedtortiousliabilitythus:

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    Tortiousliabilityarisesfromthebreachofadutyprimarilyfixedbythelaw:suchdutyistowardspersonsgenerallyanditsbreachisredressiblebyanactionforunliquidateddamages.10Heclearlyhadsomedifficultywiththeexclusionofbreachoftrust,butheexcludeditneverthelessintheendontwogroundsthatequitydidnotdealinunliquidateddamages,andthatthelawoftrustsshouldberegardedasaseparatedepartmentofthelaw.11

    Civilwrongsarethusasamatterofhistoryawidercategorythantort.Butitisdifficulttofindortocreateanytheoreticalinterestinorjustificationforthecontinuedseparationbetweenlegalandequitablewrongs.12Ifoneobservestherestrictionoftorttocommonlaw,oneconfinesonesdiscussiontoasub-setofwrongsidentifiedbyhistoryratherthanbyanyrationalprinciple.Thatiswhythisessaypreferstospeakofcivilwrongsgenerallyand,exceptwherethecontextotherwisemakesclear,usestorttodenoteallcivilwrongs,whatevertheirjurisdictionalroot.

    Notwhollyunrelatedtothejurisdictionaldivisionbetweenlawandequityaretheorieswhichdefinethenotionofacivilwrongintermsofaparticularkindofharmremediablebyaparticularmeasureofdamages.Thus,somebelievethattortsnecessarilyentailalosstoaplaintiffcompensableinmoneyandthattheremedymustbecompensationforthatloss.13However,althoughpolicychoicesonthoselinescanbemade,itshouldbeevidentthatthereisnothingabsoluteordefinitiveaboutthenotionoflossreflectedinawardsofcompensatorydamages.Awardsof(p.36) exemplaryandrestitutionarydamagesthelattersometimesdisguisedinotherlanguage,forexampleasaccountsofprofitsormoneyhadandreceiveduponawaiveroftortprovethatthereisnoabsoluteobjectiontoawardsformorethanavictimhassufferedinloss.14Andawardsofnominaldamagessimilarlyshowthatthenotionofawrongisdetachableinprinciplefromthecompensableharmsuffered.Therewouldbenothingincoherentinasystemmakingthepolicychoicetoincreasethepenalanddeterrentfunctionsofthelawofcivilwrongsbyusingmultiplemeasuresofdamagesorevenbyvisitingbeatingsandotherhumiliationsuponthedefendantattheinstanceoftheplaintiff.15

    JulesColemansrecentbook,16sofarasitconcernstortratherthancontract,appearstogivecomforttothosewhobelievethatthelawofcivilwrongsisandmustbedefinitivelylinkedtothenotionofcompensationforloss,sincecompensationforwrongfullossmightbesaidtobeitsinsistenttheme.Thetruemessageofthebookisoroughttobedifferent,thoughthisisrathereasilyoverlooked.Colemansaysfromthebeginningthatheisonlytalkingaboutthecoreoftortlaw,notitsentirety.17Thus,whenhetouchesonnon-compensatoryawardsforwrongs,heisabletodismissthem,notasalientothelawoftortbutasoutsidethecoreandtheconceptionofcorrectivejusticeoperativeinthatcore.Thus,ofrestitutionaryawardsforwrongshesays:CorrectivejusticeimposesthedutyonthewrongdoertocompensatehisvictimsRestitutionaryjusticegivesthevictimtherighttothewrongdoersgainssecuredatherexpense.18

    Itisessentialtotheunderstandingofthenatureofcivilwrongstodispeltheillusionthatcompensationandsuchwrongsareintrinsicallyconnected.Colemanisofcourseentitledtochoosehisownsubjectmatter,thoughtherearedangersintheorizingaboutanot

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    veryclearlydefinedpartofalargerwhole.Intheparagraphfollowingtheassertionsquotedabove,heslipsfromdistinguishingthespheresofoperationoftwoprinciplesofjustice(compensatoryandrestitutionary)todividingtwocategoriesoflaw:Tortlawisthecentralinstitutionfordischargingthedutytorepairwrongfullosses;restitutionisthelegalremedyforrepairingwrongfulgains.Thelatterassertionseemstosaythatrestitutionarydamagesbelongoutsidethelawoftort,notmerelyoutsidehischosencore.Butthatcannotberight,sincethecategoriesdonotmatchup.Tortisacategoryofcausativeevent(p.37) whereasrestitutionisacategoryofresponsetoanevent,justasiscompensation.Thelawoftortmustconcernitselfwithallresponseswhichmightbeappropriatetothetortiousevent,andtherestitutionofwrongfulgainsisoneofthoseresponses.Anaccountoftheprofitsofatortisnomoreoutsidethelawoftortthanareawardsofcompensatoryorpunitivedamages.19

    IV.AUniversalRequirementandtheCoreCaseAwrongisalwaysabreachofdutyaccordingtothenormativesystemwhichisinquestion.Ifthereisnodutybroken,therecanbenowrong.Thenormativesystemwithwhichweareconcernedisthelaw.Alegalwrongcannotbeunderstoodexceptasabreachoflegalduty.Acomplainantmaybelievehislifetoberuinedbyanothersseductionofhisdaughterorhiswife.Itmaybethat,accordingtohisviewofmorality,hehassufferedawrong.Ifso,hisviewofmoralityisthatitincludesadutytothefatherorhusbandnottoseduceornottocommitadultery.Inapluralsociety,manymightagreewithhim.Yetthelawgenerallyisnotplural,anditislessopenthanmoralitytodebate.Inacourt,ifthereisnolegaldutynottoseduceornottocommitadultery,hecannotcomplainofalegalwrong.Similarlywithinfringementsofprivacy.Thepublicrevelationofprivatefactsorsecretphotographsmayinflictterribleemotionalpainonthevictimandtomanymaybeamoralwrong.Butiftheparticularjurisdictionrecognizesnolegaldutytorespecttheseprivacyinterestsofotherpersons,theirinvasioncannotbealegalwrong.Again,onesupermarketmaysetouttocapturethebusinessofanotherandruinthelattersowners,butifthereisnolegaldutynottocompeteornottocompeteinthechosenmodeorwiththechosenpurposetherecanbenolegalwrong.

    Thisuniversalrequirementservestointroduceatwo-tierstructuraltruthaboutlegalwrongs,namely,thatthefactswhichconstitutethebreachofalegaldutywillalmostalways,thoughnotofabsolutenecessity,generateanewanddifferentobligation.20Ifyounegligentlybreakmyleginbreachofyourdutytotakecarenottocausemeforeseeableinjury,yourbreachofthatdutywillgenerateafurtherobligationtopaymemoney.John(p.38) Austin,21followingPothier,22calledtheinitiallegaldutyaprimaryobligationandtheobligationconsequentialuponbreachasecondaryobligationoraremedialobligation.Austincriticizedthefourfoldclassificationexaminedabovepreciselyonthegroundthatitfailedtotakethistwo-tierstructureintoaccountandthereforefailedtonoticethatitdoubledbackonitself.23Wewillreturntothiscriticism,whichsuggestsaprimafacieincoherenceinthefourfoldclassification,laterintheessay.

    Inthecorecase,ofwhicheveryonewillagreethatitconstitutesacivilwrong,thebreachoflegaldutyconsistsofthefollowing:harmtoavictimcausedbyconduct(eitheractsor

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    omissions)ofadefendantinrespectofwhichthedefendantwasblameworthy.Inshort,thecoretortcaseincludesthreeprincipal24elements:(1)harm,(2)conduct,and(3)blameworthiness.Forexample,VscarisdishonestlytakenbyD;orVslegsareinjuredbyDsnegligentcontrolofhisvehicle;orV,achildforwhomDisresponsible,suffersbraindamagebecauseDcruellyfailstofeedhim;orVsreputationisdamagedbyuntruthsknowinglypublishedbyD.

    Itistritephilosophythatcorecharacteristicsoftenturnoutoncloseranalysistobeinessentialtotheconceptunderexamination.Thecrucialquestionisthereforewhethereachofthethreecorefeaturesharm,conduct,andblameworthinessisessentialtothenotionofacivilwrong.

    A.HarmtotheVictimInexaminingthefirstelementofacivilwrong,wefirstmustseparatethetwowords,civilandwrong.Ifthewordwrongistakenalone,itcertainlydoesnotrequirethatthereshouldbeharmtoavictim.Whetherornotweholdtheviewswhichsupportthecondemnation,wecannotdenythesense,foronewhodoes,ofholdingthatawrongiscommittedbyapersonwhoprivatelysmokescannabisorreadspornographicmaterial.Further,itiswrong,aswellasstupid,foradrivertoovertakeasheapproachesthebrowofahill,whetherornotthereisacarinvisiblyapproaching.Ifheisluckyandgetsawaywithoutacollision,hisrecklessdrivingisnonethelessawrong,amoralwrongintheviewofmostpeople,andalegalwronginmostjurisdictions,albeitonthecriminalside.

    Althoughetymologyisnotdecisive,itisinterestingthattherichvocabulary(p.39) inthisfieldomitsallreferencetoavictimharmed.Wrongandtort,likecrookandbent,playonthesamemetaphorwhichcontraststorightandstraight.Wrongconduct,or,usingtheFrenchword,tort,istwisted,ametaphorforcondemnedordisapproved.25Butwhatiscondemnedneednotentailharmtoavictim.Trespass,longusedoutsidethelawtorefertothegeographicallinebetweenmineandyours,stepsinfactacrossthemoreelusiveboundarybetweenrightandwrong.26Sometimesonegoestoofar.Forgiveusourtrespassesimpliesregretforthosetransgressionsandawilltotrytostayontherightsideoftheline.A,malefactorsimplydoesbad.27Adelinquentfailstodo,withoutsayingwhat;butweknowthatwhenadelictiscommitteditisthecallsofrightandgoodconsciencethatareneglected.28

    Allthesewordsmerelydisapproveconduct,withoutregardtoharmdonetoanyvictim.Theysupposedutiesnottoactincertainways.Buttheydonotlimitthoseoutlawedactstothosewhichharmvictims.Itisneitherherenortherethatsomepeoplearguethatthereoughttobenodisapprovalinsuchcases,atleastwherethereisnodangerofharmtoanyone.Thatisanargumentaboutwhatoughtandoughtnotbedisapproved,reflectingpremisesastothevalueoffreedom.Itisanargumentthereforeaboutpolicy,notaboutthenaturallimitsoftheconceptofawrong.

    Thelessonofthisetymologyisunderscoredbywhathashappenedtothewordinjury.Ithasbecomeorientedtothevictim,somuchsothatitnolongerrevealswhetherthe

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    harmwhichthevictimhassufferedisattributabletoanotherswrong.ButinLatinitwasoriginallyorientedtheotherway,iniuriabeingformedfromanegativeparticlein-combinedwithius,iuris,thewordforrightorlaw,andhencesomethingdonenoniure(non-rightly).29

    Theetymologycorroborateswhatwewouldanywayinferfromthemodernusageofthewordwrong,namelythat,standingalone,itdoesnotrequireharmtoavictim.However,theadditionofthewordcivilchangesthatpicture.Acivilwrongisoneinrespectofwhichacitizenmaymakehisowncomplaint,onhisownaccountandnotonbehalfofthecitizenship(p.40) towhichhebelongs.Initsoppositiontocriminal,civilmeansthattheinitiativeinbringingthemattertothecourtistaken,notbysocietyasawholethroughitscustomaryorgansorrepresentatives,butbythevictimofthewrongasthevictimofthewrong.Aprivateprosecutionofacrimebroughtbythevictimisdifferent,fortherethevictimtakestheinitiativeastherepresentativeofsocietyasawhole.

    Thewordcivilthussupposesaplaintiffwhocanclaimtohavebeenthevictimofthewrong.Where,forexample,adefendanthascreatedapublicnuisance,noindividualcansuewhohasnotsufferedspecialdamage.Harmsufferedisthatwhichmostobviouslygivestheindividualthelocusstanditocomplainofconductdisapprovedbythelaw.However,therearecaseswhichshowthatharmisnotessential.Forexample,wrongswhichareactionableinthemselves(perse)chieflytrespassofalltypes,donotrequireproofofanyharminthesenseofdamageorinjury.30Itisenoughthattheprotectedinterestoftheplaintiffisinfringed.Thelandownerwhoselandisenteredissufficientlyavictimbythatinfringement.Again,whereafiduciarymakesagaininbreachofthedutytoavoidpursuinginterestswhichmightconflictwiththoseofthebeneficiary,thebeneficiarysrighttosueforthatbreachofdutyandrecoverthatgainisnotdependentonproofofharm.31Forgoodandsufficientreasonsthelawprotectsthebeneficiarysinterestindisinterestedmanagement.Theinfringementofthatprotectedinterestsufficestocreatethestandingtosue.Thetwoexamplescanberuntogether.Thetrespasserwhomakesagainfromhistrespasswithoutinflictingalossonthelandownerwillhavetosurrenderhisgaintothelandowner.Theinfringementoftheprotectedinterestsupportsmorethananominalremedy.32

    Itcannotbesaidthatthelawspracticeinthisrespectisincoherentthatis,thatitmakestheconceptofacivilwrongimpossibletounderstand.Thenotionofawrongdoesnotintrinsicallyrequireavictim.However,itisinthenatureofacivilwrongtoraiseapracticalquestion:whenshallanindividualbeallowedtocomplainonhisorherownaccountandtotakethebenefitofthesecondaryorremedialobligationbornofthewrong?Theobviousanswerisintermsofharmsuffered.Butitmaybeconvenientorprudenttoallowotherkindsofanswer.Theplaintiffmustbeaffected(p.41) adverselyinamannerwhichthelawdeemssufficienttoidentifyhimasavictimofthebreachofdutyandtogivehimstandingtosueonhisownaccount.Arguably,theeffectontheplaintiffneednotevenbeadverse.Adverselyhereiscertainlytobeunderstoodinaweakortechnicalsense,soasnottoexcludeencroachmentsonprotectedinterestswhichdonotcauselossorharmorsufferingoftheconventionalkind.

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    Thereisafinelinebetweenexploitingthefullpotentialofcivilclaimsandsmugglingcriminallawintothecivilcourts.Thelineisguardedbythepropositionthatincivilwrongstheplaintiffmustbethevictimofthebreachofduty,suingasvictim.Supposethatagivenjurisdictionprovidedthatanyresidentwithinatownwhowitnessedapersonvandalizingmunicipalpropertymightclaim100fromthatpersonbythesameprocedureaswasusedtorecoverordinarydebts.Itwouldnotbepossibleinthatcasetodescribethevandalismasacivilwrong,becausenoplausibleargumentcouldbeconstructedtopresentthewitness-claimantasitsvictim,anymorethanothermembersofthecommunity.

    B.ConductOnecommitsawrongordoeswrong.Therequirementofconduct,meaningeitheractsoromissions,couldpossiblyhaveturnedouttobeattributabletotheaccompanyingverb,nottotheintrinsicnotionofawrong.Butthatisnotso.Awrongnecessarilyinvolvesactsoromissionsbytheallegedwrongdoer.Itisnotpossibleforapersontobeinbreachofduty,andafortiorinotpossibleforhimtohavecommittedawrong,exceptbyhisownactsoromissions.

    If,forexample,weweretoexplainthevicariousliabilityofanemployerforthewrongsofhisemployeesasarisingfromabreachofdutybytheemployer,wewouldhavetogivethatstatementcontentbyspecifyingtheactswhichheoughtnottohavecommittedortheomissionswhichheoughttohavemadegood.Itwouldcomedowntoassertingthathewasunderadutytoemploysafepeopleortosuperviseeffectivelytheireveryaction.Vicariousliabilityshowsthatthelawcanmakeonepersonliableforthewrongofanother,butitalsoshows,inthewordvicariousitself,thatonecannotcommitawrongorbeinbreachofdutyexceptbyonesownactsoromissions.Avicariousliabilityisaliabilitywhichonepersontakesoverfromanother,andassuchnothisbutthatothers,justasavicarwasoriginallyapersoninholyorderswhooccupiedaplacewhichwasnothisbuttherectorswhosesubstitutehewas.33

    Again,ifyoubuildadamtomakeareservoirandthedamburstsandfloodsthepeoplebelow,itisnottheeventwhichconstitutesyourbreach(p.42) ofdutybutyourownfailuretoensurethatthewaterdidnotescapeanddodamage.Youwereunderaduty,ifyoumadeandkeptthepotentiallydangerousreservoir,toensurethatthewaterdidnotescape.34

    TherearesomefierceteachingsintheSermonontheMountwhichmightbecitedtoshowthatawrongcanbecommittedbythoughtalone,andsomemightarguethatthatwouldbeacaseofawrongwithoutactsoromissions.ThusthepassageatMatthew5:2728famouslydeclares,Youhavelearnedthattheyweretold,Donotcommitadultery.ButwhatItellyouisthis:Ifamanlooksonawomanwithalustfuleye,hehasalreadycommittedadulterywithherinhisheart/Thisismoreofaproblemformoralitythanlaw,sincetherearepracticalreasonswhythelawhastoinsistontheexternalmanifestationofintent.Butthesuggestionthatawrongalreadycommittedinthoughtprovesthatconductisinessentialcanbemetbyincludingthoughtwithintheconceptionofconduct.Thereis

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    nothingartificialinthat.Thinkingissomethingthatapersondoes.Itlacksonlytheexternalitiesofconduct.

    Thecorrectconclusionsarethatconductisessential,whetherintheformofanactoranomission,thatinprinciplethoughtsufficesasaformofconduct,butthat,inlawasopposedtomorality,therearepracticalreasonswhyitwouldberash,thoughnotabsolutelyimpossible,toallowcivilliabilitytoattachtodisapprovedthoughtwhichhasnotyetissuedinexternallyperceptiblebehavior.

    C.BlameworthinessThelawcandesignadutysothatitmaybebrokenonlybyapartywhoactsoromitsintentionally,orsothatitisbrokenbyapartywhoactsoromitsnegligently,orsothatitisbrokenbyapartywhosimplyactsoromitswithoutanyfaultatall.Thesethreebasesofliabilityfaultconsistinginbadintention,faultconsistinginfailuretotakereasonablecare,andnofaultatallareoncloserinspectiononlystoppingpointsonaslidingscale.Strictliabilitycanbemadesubjecttoexceptionalexcuses.Therea-sonablenessstandardcanbesetatalevel,say,bestprofessionalpractice,whichmanypeoplecannotattain.Eventhestandardsetbytheubiquitousreasonablemanisunattainablebymanypeoplewhowouldnotwishtoclaimtheprivilegesoftheinsane.Theliabilitybasedonintentionmaybedistortedbydiscountingcertainfactorssubjectivelyrelevanttotheformationofawickedintent,suchasamistakeoflawconcealingthewrongfulnessofwhatwasdoneorignoranceoftheexceptionalfragilityofthevictim.

    Thereisafurthercomplication,whicharisesfromtheoccasionalinteraction(p.43) ofstrictliabilityandthedifficultyofprovingfault.Factswhichtriggerstrictliabilitycansometimesbeunderstoodasdoingsoviaaconclusivepresumptionoffault.Theliabilityisthenconceivedasbasedonfault,eventhoughoftenitisinrealitystrict.WhenJosephsbrothersleftEgypttheywerehauledbackbecauseasilvercupwasfoundinBenjaminsluggage,proofofdishonesttaking,thoughthecuphadbeenplanted.35

    Thereisnoneedtoinvestigateherethesubtletiesofgradationbetweenwickedintentandstrictliabilityortheinteractionbetweenstandardsofliabilityandevidence.Allthatmattersistodecidewhetherthewordwrongcanbewithheldfromthecaseinwhichthedutyisbrokenwithoutproofoffault.Themoredifficultquestionsastothenatureandproofoffaultwillonlyariseifitcanbesowithheld.

    Thequestionisdeliberatelyphrasedaswhetherthewordcanbewithheld,forthereisacertainprimafacieattractivenessintryingtowithholdit.36Categoriesofcausativeeventfindmuchoftheirutilityintheirpowertoexplainthelegalresponseswhichtheycause.Itisplausiblethereforetosupposethattheisolationofcriteriaofblameworthinesswillprovidetheexplanationoftheremedialobligationswhichawrongtriggers.Andthereisthecomfortofsomeetymologicalsupport.Themetaphorwhichcontrastsstraightandrightwithtwisted,bentandcrookedinvitesustocharacterizethewrongdoerandhisconductasworthyofreproach,evenrevulsion.Andinthecorecasethatiscertainlywhathappens,for,inaworldwherehappinessandwell-beingareprecarious,thecorewrongdoeristhedevilsagent,onewhointentionallyrealizesthedangerswhichpeople

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    fearortakesnopainstoavertthosewhichmighthavebeenavoided.

    However,theattemptisboundtofail.Itisimpossibletosupporttheargumentthatwrongcannotorshouldnotextendtothecaseinwhichabreachofdutyisestablishedwithoutproofoffaultor,inotherwords,wheretheliabilityisstrict.Therearetwoessentialreasons,thoughitcanbesaidthattheonemerelyreflectstheother.Oneislinguisticusage.Towithdrawthewordwrongincasesofstrictliabilitywoulddefycurrentusage.Theother,moreimportantandperhapstheexplanationoftheusage,isthat,incountlesscasesinwhichthelanguageoffaultisused,closeranalysisshowsthatwedoinpracticepaylittleattentiontoit.

    Apersonwhosellsacarbelongingtoanothercommitsthewrongofconversion,howevercarefulhewasintryingtoverifythetitleofthepersonwhosoldittohim.37Afiduciarywhosuccessfullypursuesaprofitwhichmighthavetemptedhimtosacrificetheinterestsofhisbeneficiarycommits(p.44) thewrongofbreachoffiduciarydutyeventhoughhebelievedhewasactinginthebestinterestsofhisbeneficiaryandthoughtthathehadmadeafulldisclosure.38Atrusteewhomakesaninvestmentordisbursementwhichisnotauthorizedcommitsthewrongofbreachoftrust,eventhoughhemaybeexcusedinthecaseinwhichheactedbothhonestlyandreasonably.39Apersonwhopublishesastorywhichdefamesanotherisguiltyofthewrongofdefamationevenifhehadnomeansofknowingthatthestorywouldbeunderstoodasreferringtothatperson.40Someonewhostoresadangeroussubstanceisguiltyofawrongifheallowsthatsubstancetoescapeanddoforeseeabledamage,whetherornothetookallreasonableprecautionstopreventtheescape.41Abuilderwhoundertakestocompleteahousebyacertaindayisguiltyofthewrongofbreachofcontractifthehouseisnotcompletedbythatday,evenifheusedhisbesteffortstoovercomethedifficultiesofanadversemarketinlaborandmaterials.42

    Theseexamplesusethewordwronginsixdifferentcontexts,eachofwhichisconstructedtoexcludeblameworthiness.Letusaddonemoredramaticcase.Asleepwalkerkills.Ajurisdictionmightmaketheruleabsolute,Thoushaltnotkill.Letussaythatitmakeshimguiltyofahomicideinalowdegree,calledmanslaughter.Thesleepwalkerwhokillscommitsthatwrong.43Iftheruleisclear,thedebatewillnotbewhetherhehascommittedthewrongbutwhethertheruleshouldbechanged.Solongasthisruleremainsunchangedthesleepwalkerhasindubitablycommittedthewrong.Englishcriminallawcomesclosetothispositioninthecaseinwhichthemindisdisabledbydrugabuse,althoughinfactitevadestheconclusionthatthereisnoculpabilityatall.44Ineffect,thewrongiscommittedthoughthemindisabsent.Theunderlyingdifficultiesneednotconcernus.

    Whattheseexamplesshowisthatwhentheprimarydutyisclearlystatedandclearlybroken,sothatthatwhichisproscribedisindubitablydone,a(p.45) legalwrongiscommittedevenifthedutyissodesignedastobebrokenwithoutculpability.Onemightchallengethisconclusioninoneoftwoways,either(1)byinsistingthatblameworthinessisimperfectlyexcludedineachofthevariousexamples,or(2)byassertingthattheword

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    wrongisincorrectlyused.Butneitherofthesetwochallengesisparticularlyconvincing.

    Wearehabituallyinattentivetoblameworthiness.Thisshowspartlyinthefactthatwetoleratewithoutanxietytheslidingscalebetweenliabilitybasedonintentandabsoluteliability.Butitshowsmoredramaticallyinthewayinwhichwehandlethecommonestofallcivilwrongs,namelynegligence.Negligenceconsistsinthebreachofadutyofcaretoavoiddamage.Thedutyisgivencontentbythestandardsetbythenotionalreasonableman.Itisbrokenbyadefendantwhofailstotaketheprecautionsthatareasonablemanwouldtaketoavoiddamagewhichareasonablemanwouldforesee.Inpracticetheapplicationofthatstandardisaveryimperfectguidetothequestionwhetheradefendantwasworthyofblame,reproach,orrevulsion.Theobjectivestandardignorestheactualcapacitiesofthedefendantand,veryimportantly,takesnoaccountofthefactthatintherealworldthereasonablemanmakesmistakesquiteoftenwithoutforfeitinghistitletorespectasareasonableandcarefulbeing.Further,thenear-universalpracticeofliabilityinsurancehasinclinedthecourtstowardsvictimsanddiscouragedattentiontotheissueofpersonalculpability.

    Inendresult,therefore,therealityofthecommonlawofnegligenceisthatitimposeswhatisineffectstrictliabilityforbadpracticeas,forexample,inthecontrolofamotorvehicleontheroads.Itsetsanobjectivestandardofcompetencetodefinebadpracticebutdoesnotaskwhethertheparticulardefendantwasinfactworthyofreproachfortheparticularincidentinwhichhefellbelowthatstandard.45

    (p.46) V.TheFourfoldClassificationAgain:CoherenceandIncoherence

    A.PrimaFacieIncoherenceThefourfoldclassificationwillberecalledascontaining(1)contracts(consent),(2)torts(wrongs),(3)unjustenrichments,and(4)otherevents.Ifacivilwrongbenomorethanabreachoflegaldutyactionablebyanindividualvictimonhisownaccount,itisclearthatnotonlycategory(2),explicitlynamedwrongs,butalsoallthreeothercategoriesintheclassificationcanincludeorgiverisetowrongs.Thefourfoldclassificationcanthereforeberepresentedasguiltyoffailingtoobservethetwo-tierstructureofobligation.Thisisbecausethecategoryofwrongsonthisviewoverlapstheotherthreecategories:wrongsareallbreachesofprimaryobligation,andtheycontract,unjustenrichment,andotherobligation-creatingeventsarecategoriesofprimaryobligationbreachofwhichisawrong,liketort,generatingasecondaryobligation.Inshort,thefourfoldclassificationisnottreatinglikewithlikebutslippingfromtheprimarylevel(contract,unjustenrichment,andotherevents)tothesecondarylevel(wrongs).Ahostilecriticmightsuggestthatthefourfoldclassificationshouldtrytomakeupitsmindwhetheritwantstocountchickensoreggs:threechickensandabasketofeggscannotadduptofourchickens.

    Meetingthischallenge,thebestdecisionatfirstseemstobetocountonlychickensandthen,separately,onlyeggs.Inotherwords,weshouldaccepttheneedtodistinguishveryclearlybetweentheeventscreatingprimaryobligationsandtheeventscreatingsecondaryobligationsandattemptathoroughclassificationofprimaryobligations.Then,

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    movingtothesecondarylevel,weshouldrecognizethatonthatlevel,sinceallsecondaryobligationsarisefrombreachesofprimaryobligations(wrongs),wrongsmustformtheoneandonlygenericcategory,subjecttointernalsubdivision.ThisiswhatAustinrecommended.46However,thisattractiveprojectimmediatelyrunsintoenormousdifficulties.

    Suppose,first,thatoneretainsasmuchaspossibleoftheoriginalclassification.Onethenwantstosaythatprimaryobligationsarisefrom(1)contract,from(2)[aproblemtobesolved],from(3)unjustenrichment,andfrom(4)otherevents.Buttheproblemtobesolvedturnsouttobeinsoluble.Thatis,itisimpossibletonamegenericallytheeventwhichcreatestheprimaryobligationsthebreachofwhichwaspreviouslyidentifiedbythewordWrongsor,moreaccurately,thosewrongswhicharenotbreachesoftheprimaryobligationsincategories(1),(3),and(4).

    Anothermoreradicalstrategycanbeattempted,jettisoningallbutthe(p.47) firstcategoryoftheoriginalclassification.Allprimaryobligationsthenarisefromcontract(withconsent)orwithoutcontractbecausetheyareimposed(withoutconsent);thoseimposedlieonallcitizenseithergenerally,byvirtueoftheircitizenship,orcontingently,byvirtueofsomeeventsuperaddedtotheircitizenship.Thisrunsintodeeperanddeeperdifficultiesascontingencies(employment,marriage,occupationofland,receiptofmistakenpayments,taxableevents)begintobelistedandsub-classified.Noristhatextraordinarilydifficultgameattractive,becauseitdrivesusfurtherandfurtherfromthecategoriesofthelawasweknowthem.Allthesamewewouldhavetoplayitifitwastheonlywaytomakeourlawmakesense.Butitisnot.

    B.TheCoherenceoftheFourfoldClassificationInfactthefourfoldclassificationiscoherent,thoughtheobservationthatitmovesupanddownthetiersofthetwo-tierstructureofprimaryandsecondaryobligationsisnotonlycorrectbutalsoanimportantwarningofthecomplexityoftheclassificationandtheever-presentdangerofabuse.

    1.Torts(Wrongs)Category(2)Thecategoryofcivilwrongsisacategoryofeventsinwhichtheexplanationofthedefendantsobligationtotheplaintiffishishavingcommittedabreachofduty.Itisintheircharacterasbreachesofdutythatthefactswhichwecallwrongsaccountforthedefendantsliabilitytotheplaintiff.However,breachofduty(wrong)isnottheonlypossibleexplanationofliability.Theothercategoriesintheclassificationarecategoriesofeventwhichcananddoexplainliabilityinotherways.

    Asweturntojustifytheseparateexistenceoftheotherthreecategories,wewillencounteroncemoreandhavecausetoemphasizeanimportantcharacteristicofacivilwrong,namelythatthemeasureofthelawsresponse,orinotherwordsthecontentoftheremedialobligationtriggeredbythebreachofduty,isinprincipleamerematterofpolicy.Thelawhasafreechoiceofwhatitshallbe,subjectonlytoextrinsicconsiderationssuchasthevaluesofproportionality,determinacy,humanity,andsoon.Thewidespread

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    preferenceforcompensationforlossreflectsapolicychoice,notalogicalnecessity.Thereisnomeasureofresponselogicallydictatedbythenatureofacivilwrong.47

    Thiscontrastswiththeothercategories.Inthemthemeasureoftheplaintiffsrecoveryisdictatedbythecausativeeventitself.Itisnotimpossible,however,forthelawtoescapethatin-builtmeasureby,sotosay,movingtheentirematterintocategory(2)which,asweshallsee,canbe(p.48) donebyturningfromdirectenforcementoftheprimaryobligationcreatedbytheeventtoapolicy-determinedresponsetothewrongoffailingtocomplywiththatobligation.Thisimportantpointmaybeillustratedbythesimplecaseofmistakenpayment.Here,thedefendantsunjustenrichmentitselfdictatesrestitutionandnothingelse.Forthewrongoffailingtomakerestitutionthedefendantmight,subjecttoconstrainingextrinsicconsiderationsofthekindmentionedabove,losedoublethesum,orhishouse,orhisthumbs.Wewillspellthisoutmoreclearlyintheparagraphswhichfollow.

    2.UnjustEnrichmentCategory(3)Everysubtractiveunjustenrichment(everyenrichmentwhichisobtainedfromthedefendantincircumstancesinwhichthelawconcludesthattheenrichmentisunjust)explainsthedefendantsobligationtomakerestitutionwithoutanynecessitytocharacterizethedefendantsconductasabreachofduty.48Ipayyou100bymistake.Youareenrichedbysubtractionfrommeand,subjecttosomefine-tuningwhichwemayassumetobesatisfied,themistakeisafactorwhichthelawregardsassufficienttocharacterizeyourenrichmentasunjust.Thereasonbehindthatconclusionis,inthiscase,thattheplaintiffsintentiontotransferwasimpaired.Thesefactsprovideawhollysatisfactoryexplanationoftheobligationtomakerestitution.Thatis,theprimaryobligationissufficientinitself.

    Itshouldbenoted,however,thataplaintiffwhoreliesonthisexplanationofthedefendantsliabilitytomakerestitutionputsinissuenothingwhichbearsonanythingotherthanthesumwhichhaspassedbetweentheparties.Theunjustenrichmentcannotjustifymorethanrestitution.Itprovides,withouttheleastmentionofanywrong,aperfectlysatisfactoryexplanationoftheprimaryobligationtomakerestitution,butitcannotexplainanyothermeasureofresponse.

    Thelawcouldtreatunjustenrichmentdifferently.Letuscontinuetousemistakenpaymentstoexemplifyallinstancesofsubtractiveunjustenrichment.Thelawcouldsay,whetheradditionallyoralternatively,thatwhatexplainstheliabilityoftherecipientofamistakenpaymentis,nottheprimaryobligationarisingfromthereceipt,butthewrongwhichconsistsinthebreachofthatprimaryobligationinotherwords,thewrongofnotmakingtherestitutionwhichthelawrequires.However,ingeneralthereisnopointinsayingthatthereasonwhyadefendanthastomakerestitutionisthatheisinbreachofhisdutytomakerestitution.Itmerelyrestatestheprimaryduty.Thewrongexplanationofthedutytomakerestitutionisthuswhollyunnecessary,exceptunderonecondition.Thatconditionis(p.49) importanttounderstand.Itisthis.Ifthelawwishedtogobeyondtheexplanatorypoweroftheunjustenrichmentitself,by,say,doublingtheamounttoberepaid,itwouldhavetoattachthathostileresponsetothewrongoffailing

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    tomakerestitution.Inotherwordsitwouldhavetoconsidertheeventasawrongincategory(2)ratherthanasanunjustenrichmentincategory(3).Itcouldbedone.Thepotentialforalternativeanalysis,focusingonbreachoftheprimarydutytomakerestitution,ispresentineverycaseofsubtractiveunjustenrichment,but,solongasthecourtdoesfortheplaintiffonlythatwhichtheunjustenrichmentitselfcanexplain,thecategory(2)analysisissuperfluous.Thatis,iftheplaintiffisawardedonlyrestitutionthereisnoneedtoexplainhisclaimasarisingfromthewrongofnotmakingrestitution.

    TheimportanceofthispointcanbeillustratedfromrecentlitigationinEngland.Itiswellestablishedthatincertaincontracts,calleduberrimaefidei,apartyisentitledtoknowallmaterialfacts.49Whataretheconsequencesofnon-disclosure?Aretheylimitedtorescissionofthecontractandrestitution?50Orcanthenon-disclosingpartybemadetomakegoodconsequentiallossestoo?Theanswergiven,ultimately,51wasthatthenon-disclosingpartywasnotliabletopaydamages;liabilitywasconfinedtorescissionandrestitution.Thiscouldmeantwothings.Eithernondisclosureisacategory(2)eventawrongconsistinginthebreachofthedutytodisclosebutoneforwhich,untypically,theremedialresponseisconfinedtorestitution;or,whichismorelikely,thereceiptofabenefitafternon-disclosureisacategory(3)eventandassuchincapableofexplaininganythingbutrestitution.52

    3.OtherEventsCategory(4)Thesamepatternisrepeatedincategory(4)(miscellaneousotherevents).Wemaytakeasexamplesataxableevent,suchasearningincome,anda(p.50) judgment.53Theseeventscreateprimaryobligations.Thoseprimaryobligationscanbeandaredirectlyenforced.Thedefendantsliabilitytopaythetaxorthesumdueunderthejudgmentdoesnothavetobeexplainedbyinvokingthewrongoffailingtopay.Ifthatwrongwereinvoked,thereasonwouldonceagainhavetobethedesiretoreachbeyondtheexplanatorypowerofthecausativeeventitself.Thewrongoffailuretomakepunctualpaymentmightbevisitedwithdiverspenaltiesextrinsictotheprimaryobligationexplicablebytheeventitself.

    4.Contracts(Consent)Category(1)Category(1)ismuchthemostdifficult,partlybecausethehistoryisdeceptive.Thefactthattheprimarytierofcontractualobligationalwayshastobestudiedinordertoestablishthecircumstancesinwhichtherecanbeasecondaryobligationfromthewrongofbreachwouldnot,onthepresentaccount,justifycreatingacategorydistinctfromwrongs.Thequestioniswhetherthelawenforcescontractualobligationasopposedtoobligationsfromthewrongofbreach.Onlyanaffirmativeanswercanjustifytheseparatecategory.

    Itiseasytoseethatacontractiscapableofbeingsufficientexplanationofliabilityinitself,ratherthanastheprimarysuperstructureabovethewrongofbreachofcontract.Indeedsomesystemsdonotthinkintermsofthewrongofbreachofcontractbutonlyintermsoftheprimaryobligationflowingfromthecontractitself.However,itislesseasytosaywithconfidencewhetherandwhenourlawreliesonthatanalysisandwhen,by

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    contrast,itinsists,usuallywithoutthinkingaboutit,onacategory(2)analysisintermsofthewrongofbreachofcontract.Formally,thevictoryoftheactionofassumpsitovertheactionofdebtinSladesCase(1602)54wasavictoryofthecategory(2)analysis,sincethewordingofassumpsitemphasizedthewrongofbreachofcontract:thedefendantwastoshowwhy,whereashepromised(assumpsit),hewickedlybrokehispromise.55Butthewordingoftheformsofactionisnotoriouslydeceptive.Itwouldnotbesafetoplacemuchanalyticalweightonit.Arguablymoderncommonlawstilldealsincategory(1)obligations(primaryobligationsfromcontract)wherefixedsumsofmoneyarepromisedthatis,inrespectof(p.51) contractualdebtsandwherethecontractisregardedasspecificallyperformable.Fortherest,itappearstodealonlyincategory(2)obligations(secondaryobligationsarisingoutoftheprimarywrongofbreachofcontract).Inotherwordsthecorrectconclusionmustbethatformostpurposesthecommonlawapproachescontractthroughthewrongofbreachofcontract.Ineffectitaddsbreachofcontractualdutytothelistoftorts.Butforsomepurposesitstillordersthedefendanttokeephiscovenant,directlyenforcingtheprimaryobligationgeneratedbythecontractitself.

    VI.Conclusion:TheDistinctCategoryofCivilWrongsAccordingtotheviewtakeninthisessay,civilwrongsremainadistinctcategoryofobligation-creatingeventwithinthefourfoldclassificationofsuchevents.Theconceptofacivilwrongisabstractandbroad.Awrongisthebreachofaduty.Alegalwrongisthebreachofadutyrecognizedbylaw(alegalduty).Acivilwrongisthebreachofalegaldutywhichaffectstheinterestsofanindividualtoadegreewhichthelawregardsassufficienttoallowthatindividualtocomplainonhisorherownaccountratherthanastherepresentativeofsocietyasawhole.Obligationsarisingfromwrongsareexplainedandjustifiedasresponsestobreachofduty.Thereasonwhywehaveothercategoriesofcausativeeventisthattherearethreeclassesofeventwhichcreateprimaryobligationswhicharedirectlyenforcedandtowhichthenotionofbreachofduty(wrong)isirrelevant.

    Thecontentoftheremedialorsecondaryobligationtriggeredbyawrongisforthelawtodecideasamatterofpolicyconstrainedonlybyextrinsicconsiderations.Wrongsthemselvesdictatenofixedmeasureofresponse.Itfollowsthatitisunnecessarytoinsistonacompensableharmandincorrecttoorienttheideaofawrongtowardsthevictimonthemodelofinjury.Harmentersthepictureonthebackofthewordcivilbecauseoftheneedtoexplainwhytheplaintiffhasstandingtosueonhisorherownaccount.Butthatstandingcanberecognizedongroundsotherthanharmsuffered.

    Becausetheconceptofacivilwrongisbroadandabstract,itsexplanatorypowerisweak.Tosaythataconsequencefollowscertainconductbecausethatconductisabreachofaprimarydutyistoofferaformalexplanationbutnotasatisfyingone.Therealexplanationhastobecompletedineverycasefromthepoliciesandvaluesunderlyingtherecognitionoftheprimarydutywhichisinquestion.Itistherethateconomicefficiencyhastocontestthefieldwithliberalautonomyandmoralpaternalism,fortheprimarydutieslieonthefrontiersoflaw,politicsandphilosophy.(p.52)

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    Notes:(1)JUSTINIAN,DIGEST44.7.1pr.(GAIUS,AUREA,bk.2).

    (2)GAIUS,INSTITUTES,3.88.

    (3)GAIUS,INSTITUTES,3.91.

    (4)JUSTINIAN,INSTITUTES,3.13.

    (5)Thebeginning,orperhapstheendofthebeginning,ofsuchscholarshipcanbeconvenientlymarkedbythefoundationoftwogreatlawreviews,theLawQuarterlyReviewin1885andtheHarvardLawReviewin1887.

    (6)AndnowthebeginningsofaThirdRestatementforthelawoftorts.See,e.g.,RESTATEMENT(THIRD)OFTORTS:PRODUCTSLIABILITY(TentativeDraftNo.1,1994).

    (7)RESTATEMENTOFTHELAWOFRESTITUTION(1937).

    (8)TheA.L.I,publishedTentativeDraftsNo.1andNo.2in1983and1984.TheprojectdidnotproceedastheInstitutehoped,andsoitwastemporarilysuspendedsometimein1984or1985.MinutesoftheA.L.I.Council,Dec.1114,1985,1(g),at6.Theprojectwasneverresumed,andtheSecondRestatementseriesisnowcomplete.However,asoflate1996,theInstitutehasastudyinprogresswhichislikelytoleadtotheadditionofanewRestatementofRestitutiontotheThirdSeriesofRestatementsoftheLaw.

    (9)Fromthefirsteditionin1907,thishassurvivedtothepresentday.SeeR.F.V.HEUSTON&R.A.BUCKLEY,SALMONDANDHEUSTONONTHELAWOFTORTS(20thedn.,1992)14.

    (10)PERCYH.WINFIELD,THEPROVINCEOFTHELAWOFTORT(1931)32.

    (11)Id.at113115.

    (12)ThepioneeringarticleofP.M.North,BreachofConfidence:IsThereaNewTort?,12LEGALSTUD.:J.Soc.PUB.TEACH.L.149(1972),openedthewayforamorerobustapproachinsistingonafullcross-overbetweenlawandequity.Cf.AquacultureCorp.v.NewZealandGreenMussellCo.[1990],3N.Z.L.R.299,301,perSirRobinCooke,P.

    (13)InCassell&Co.v.Broome,[1972]A.C.1027,LordReidclearlyregardedthelawofcivilwrongsasnaturallyconfinedtocompensatinglosses,anythingelsebeinghighlyanomalous:id.at1086D.Note,however,themorecautiousattitudeofLordWilberforce:id.at1114CD.InGermanlawthecommitmenttocompensationisabsolute.Para.8236oftheBrgerlichesGesetzbuch(CivilCode)[BGB]areexpresslyfocusedonanErsatzpflicht(acompensation-obligation).Zimmermannapparentlyregardsthisasthenaturalpositionofamaturesystem.REINHARDZIMMERMANN,THELAWOFOBLIGATIONS(1990),902,909.

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    (14)SeegenerallyDavidG.Owen,TheMoralFoundationsofPunitiveDamages,40ALA.L.REV.705(1989);P.B.H.BIRKS,CivilWrongs:ANewWorld,inBUTTERWORTHLECTURES55,(199091),7798.Intworecentdecisions,theU.S.SupremeCourthasquiterightlyrefusedtooutlawpunitivedamages.Browning-FerrisIndust.,Inc.v.KelcoDisposal,Inc.,492U.S.257(1989);PacificMut.LifeIns.Co.v.Haslip,499U.S.1(1991).However,itisclearthatitisnottheavailabilityofpunitivedamages,butonlytheirabuse,whichattractstheHaslipCourtshostility.

    (15)Seeinfra,textaccompanyingnote46.

    (16)JULESL.COLEMAN,RISKSANDWRONGS(1992).

    (17)Id.at198.

    (18)Id.at371.

    (19)Itiscrucialtodistinguishbetweenthecauseofactionwhichconsistsinthewrong,whichmayhavedifferentmeasuresofresponse,andtheentirelydifferentcauseofactioninsubtractiveunjustenrichment,whichmaysometimesbeavailabletothevictimofawrongbutwhichwillinvolveare-analysisofhisfacts.SeePETERBIRKS,ANINTRODUCTIONTOTHELAWOFRESTITUTION(1989),3943,106107,313318.

    (20)Itakeobligationinthesenseofdutytomakeaperformancetoanother.Inararecasetheconsequenceofawrongcanbeapersonalliabilityofadifferentkindoreventhecreationofaproprietaryinterest,asappearstobethecasewheninbreachofdutyabribeisreceived.Attorney-GeneralforHongKongv.Reid[1994]1A.C.324.

    (21)JOHNAUSTIN,LECTURESONJURISPRUDENCE(1970),4447,795796.

    (22)ROBERTJ.POTHIER,ATREATISEONTHELAWOFOBLIGATIONS(WilliamD.Evanstrans.,1826)(originallyTRAITEDESOBLIGATIONS),183186.ThediscoveryofthesourceofthisstructureinPothierisduetoProfessorBernardA.Rudden:seeletterfromBernardA.Rudden(1990)10OXFORDJ.LEGALSTUD.288,commentingonBriceDickson,TheContributionofLordDiplocktotheGeneralLawofContract(1989)9OXFORDJ.LEGALSTUD.441.

    (23)AUSTIN,supra,note21,at796800.

    (24)Theelementofcausationimpliedbythewordscausedbyintheprevioussentencehasnoindependentbearingonthepresentdiscussion.

    (25)THEOXFORDDICTIONARYOFENGLISHETYMOLOGY(CharlesT.Onions(ed.),1966)[hereinafterDICTIONARYOFETYMOLOGY],s.v.wrongandtort.ThelatterisfromtheLatintor-quere,totwist.Onionsdrawstheparallelwithwringandwrong.

    (26)DICTIONARYOFETYMOLOGY,supra,note25,s.v.trespassandtransgress.ThemedievalLatintranspassareistheequivalentoftheclassicaltransgredifromwhich

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    transgressio.SeeOXFORDLATINDICTIONARY(1968),s.v.InclassicalLatinthesewordswerenotyetusedforwrong.Seeid.

    (27)Malum=badplusfacere=do.MaleficiumwasusedbyRomanjuristsasasynonymfordelictum:id.

    (28)Delinquo,supinedelictummeanstobelackingorfail.ItwasalreadyusedinclassicalLatintomeanfailinonesduty,offend:id.

    (29)DICTIONARYOFETYMOLOGY,supra,note25,s.v.Cf.JUSTINIAN,DIGEST,9.2.5.1(Ulpian,Edict,bk.18).

    (30)ThetraditionalcasesinEnglishlaw,besidestrespass,arelibelandcertainparticularslanders(imputationsofcrime,professionalincapacity,unchastityofawoman,andcertainantisocialdiseases),butthereareotherinstances,forexample,maliciousexclusionofavote,seeAshbyv.White,92E.R.126(1909),andsuchexclusionfromaninn,seeConstantinov.ImperialHotels,Ltd.,[1944]K.B.693.

    (31)SeeRegal(Hastings),Ltd.v.Gulliver[1967]2A.C.134(1942);Boardmanv.Phipps[1967]2A.C.46.

    (32)See,e.g.,Edwardsv.LeesAdmr,96S.W.2d1028(Ky.1936);RavenRedAshCoalCo.v.Ball,39S.E.2d231(Va.1946).Seegenerally1GEORGEE.PALMER,THELAWOFRESTITUTION(1978)177179;Hon.Mr.JusticeW.M.C.Gummow,UnjustEnrichment,RestitutionandProprietaryRemedies,inESSAYSONRESTITUTION(P.D.Finn(ed.),1990),6067.

    (33)THENEWOXFORDSHORTERENGLISHDrcnoNARY(LesleyBrown(ed.),1993),s.v.vicarious,vicar.

    (34)Theclassicexample,ofcourse,isRylandsv.Fletcher(1868)L.R.3H.L.330.

    (35)Genesis44,discussedbyDavidDaube,STUDIESINBIBLICALLAW(1947),235flf.,248249.

    (36)Cf.JeremiahSmith,TortandAbsoluteLiability,30HARV.L.REV.241,254(1917),andNathanIsaacs,Quasi-DelictinAnglo-AmericanLaw,31YALEL.J.571(1922).ThesearediscussedbyWINFIELD,supra,note10,at207ff.and241ff.

    (37)Personsdealwiththepropertyinchattelsorexerciseactsofownershipoverthemattheirperil:Fowlerv.Hollins(1872)L.R.7Q.B.616,639,perCleasby,B.

    (38)SeeBoardmanv.Phipps[1967]2A.C.46.

    (39)SeeReAllsop[1914]1Ch.1(Eng.C.A.,1913);Perrinsv.Bellamy[1899]1Ch,797;TrusteeAct1925,61(U.K.).

    (40)SeeE.Hulton&Co.v.Jones[1910]A.C.20.AfterGertzv.RobertWelch,Inc.,418

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    U.S.323(1974),negligencemaynowbeconstitutionallyrequiredinAmericawithrespecttounintendedidentificationoftheplaintiff.SeeRESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS,580Bcmts.bandd(1976).

    (41)SeeRylandsv.Fletcher(1868)L.R.3H.L.330,asmodifiedbyCambridgeWaterCo.v.EasternCountriesLeatherPlc[1994]1AllE.R.53.

    (42)SeeDavisContractorsLtd.v.FarehamUrbanDist.Council[1956]A.C.696.

    (43)Infact,inEnglishlawheisnotguiltyofanycrime,notbecausehedidnotperformtheactbutbecausehelackedallintent.SeeBrattyv.Attorney-GeneralforN.Ir.[1963]A.C.386,409.

    (44)SeeReginav.Lipman[1970]1Q.B.152(Eng.C.A.,1969);DirectorofPublicProsecutionsv.Majewski[1977]A.C.443.ThepicturehasbeenchangedbythespeciesofrecklessnessrecognizedinCommissionerofthePoliceoftheMetropolisv.Caldwell[1982]A.C.341,whichmakesitveryeasytoconcludethatadeeplyintoxicatedpersonwasreckless.

    (45)Forabrilliantaccountandjustification,seeTonyHonorResponsibilityandLuck,104LAWQ.REV.530(1988).Foranexpositionofthecontraryview,thatblameworthinessproperlydefinesthecoreoftortresponsibility,seeDavidG.Owen,TheFaultPit,26GA.L.REV.703(1992).Inhisrecentbook,ProfessorColemanappearstoacceptthesubstanceofthisanalysis,butheexpressesitquitedifferently.SeeCOLEMAN,supra,note16,at21633,33035.Hisargumentthatweshoulddistinguishbetweenfaultinthedoerandfaultinthedoingisproblematic.Andwhilehisuseoftheconceptofawrongasmerelyinvolvingconductthatisinvasiveofarightisnotdissimilartothepositiontakenhere,hedistinguishesitfromwrongdoinginacuriousmanner.AfullandfaircritiqueofColemansviews,however,isnecessarilybeyondthescopeofthisessay.

    (46)AUSTIN,supra,note21,at796797&944948.

    (47)Seesupra,notes1319andaccompanyingtext.

    (48)Onsubtractiveunjustenrichmentandthedifferencebetweenitandrestitutionforwrongs,seesupra,note.19,andPETERBIRKS,RESTITUTIONTHEFUTURE(1992),125;ANDREWBURROWS,THELAWOFRESTITUTION(1993),2122,376380.

    (49)Examplesofsuchcontractsareinsurance,familyarrangements,guarantee.Cf.G.H.TREITEL,THELAWOFCONTRACT(8thedn.,1991)354359.

    (50)Itisunnecessarytoinvestigatethequestionherewhetherrescissionshouldberegardedasaspeciesofrestitution.Ifitis,oneshouldnotsayrescissionofthecontractandrestitution.

    (51)BanqueKeyserUllmannS.A.v.Skandia(U.K.)Ins.Co.[1990]1Q.B.665(Eng.

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    C.A.1988)(SteynJ),affdsubnom.BanqueFinancieredelaCite(formerlyBanqueKeyserUllmann)v.WestgateIns.Co.[1991]2A.C.249.SteynJatfirstinstancehadheldthatdamageswereavailable,buthewasreversedonappeal.OnfurtherappealtotheHouseofLords,thedecisionwentoffonanotherpointbutLordTemplemanindicatedthatheagreedwiththeCourtofAppeal:[1991]2A.C.at280.

    (52)Thecorrectanalysisisthatitisanexampleofabenefitconferredbymistake,sothatexploitationofthemistakeistheunjustfactor.However,asbetweencontractingparties,amistakewhichisattributabletosilentnon-disclosurebytheotherpartynormallydoesnottriggerrestitution.Itistherequirementofutmostgoodfaith(uberrimafides)whichproducestheexceptionalcontraryresult.Cf.SybronCorp.v.RochemLtd.[1985]A.C.761.

    (53)Providinganexhaustivelistwouldbeachallenge.Salvagerewardsprovideoneotherexample,andthereisanill-definedgroupofcaseswhichthelateProfessorStoljarchristenedunjustsacrifice:S.J.Stoljar,UnjustEnrichmentandUnjustSacrifice,50M.L.R.603(1987).

    (54)4Co.Rep.91(1602),butnowmuchmorefullyreportedinJOHNH.BAKERANDS.F.C.MILSOM,SOURCESOFENGLISHLEGALHISTORY(1986)420.

    (55)TheconservativeWalmselyJ,evenafterSlade,complainsthatoneconsequenceofthiswastothrowopenthemeasureofrecovery:[I]nanactiononthecasetheplaintiffshallrecovereverythingindamages;andthatisuncertain,becausethejurymaygivehimagreaterorlessersumindamages,whileinanactionofdebtheshallrecoverthedebtcertain.SeeWrightv.Swanton(1604)inSOURCESOFENGLISHLEGALHISTORY,supra,note54,at441,442.Thisexactlyexpressesthedifference,discussedabove,betweencategories(1)and(2).

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