All views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not

necessarily represent the views of the Hellenic Observatory or the LSE

© Melina Skouroliakou

The Communication Factor in Greek Foreign Policy:

An Analysis

Melina Skouroliakou

GreeSE Paper No.55

Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe

FEBRUARY 2012

ii

_

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT __________________________________________________________ iii

1. Introduction _______________________________________________________ 1

2. The Concept of Public Diplomacy ______________________________________ 2

3. Public diplomacy and target audiences _________________________________ 7

4. Communication and foreign policy in Greece ____________________________ 9

5. Communication policy in foreign policy ________________________________ 17

6. Communicating Greek foreign policy to the Greek public __________________ 22

7. Suggestions for a foreign policy communication plan _____________________ 24

8. Structures ________________________________________________________ 25

9. Operation ________________________________________________________ 29

10. Content _________________________________________________________ 31

11. Conclusion ______________________________________________________ 33

Appendix ___________________________________________________________ 35

References _________________________________________________________ 37

Acknowledgements

Well, I owe much, to many people. First of all, I have to thank Dr Spyros Economides, for his

guidance, support and most of all patience throughout my research and the writing of this

paper. His comments and suggestions gave to me a whole new perspective to build on. A

great deal of my research was based on the experiences of the interviewees, whose

knowledge of Greek foreign policy and communication helped me bridge these two areas. I

thank them all for taking the time to share these experiences and views with me. I must also

thank Professor Kevin Featherstone and all the Hellenic Observatory team who made me

feel as part of the team and made my staying in London truly memorable. Last but not least,

if it weren’t for ENAT’s (the Union of Press Officers) initiative, none of this would have been

possible.

The views expressed in this paper represent are my personal views and not those of the

Embassy of Greece or any of the interviewees.

iii

The Communication Factor in Greek Foreign Policy:

An Analysis

Melina Skouroliakou#

ABSTRACT

This paper looks into the communication factor in Greek foreign policy. It

aims at identifying communication patterns and models used to convey

Greek foreign policy positions abroad. It examines critically the efficacy

of the applied practice and argues that the communication factor has

been disregarded by foreign policy-makers, making successful promotion

of Greek foreign policy problematic and hurting the image of the country

internationally. The paper suggests that Greece should invest in public

diplomacy, especially relationship building, in order to communicate its

foreign policy more effectively.

Keywords: communication, foreign policy, public diplomacy, Greece,

Turkey, FYROM.

# Melina Skouroliakou, Press Officer, Press and Communication Office of the Embassy of

Greece in Paris, m_skouroliakou@hotmail.com

1

The Communication Factor in Greek Foreign Policy:

An Analysis

1. Introduction

The scope of this paper is to examine Greek foreign policy from a

communication point of view. There is an underlying difficulty in

analysing this aspect of foreign policy, which lies in the combined use of

concepts, methodological and analytical tools from different realms,

namely International Relations and Political Science on the one hand and

Communication and Media on the other. Despite the association

between these disciplines, certain aspects of this relationship have been

inadequately explored. Gilboa points out that ‘scholars studying foreign

policy making often ignore the roles and effects of the media and public

opinion, and their colleagues in communication often ignore foreign

policy in studies of roles and effects’ (2002: 732). Similarly, Robinson

observes that ‘the discipline of International Relations tends to pay little

attention to public opinion and media’ (2008: 138).

Moreover, diplomacy and foreign policy, though closely intertwined, are

not synonymous. As Kamath notes ‘foreign policy is the totality of a

nation’s relations with another state or other states in the International

Political System. Diplomacy does not make policy. Diplomacy is one of

the several instrumentalities available to a nation to secure their foreign

policy objectives’ (1990: 16). The interest of this paper is not to analyse

2

foreign policy positions – i.e., what they are, how they are formed or

why - but to see how they are communicated to specific audiences.

Since diplomacy is concerned with the implementation of foreign policy,

this paper will focus on diplomacy put forward to promote foreign policy

positions. It becomes evident that diplomacy and communication are

thoroughly interlinked since diplomacy is unthinkable without

communication. ‘Whenever communication ceases, the body of

international politics, the process of diplomacy, is dead’ (Van Dinh 1987:

8). All the same, there is considerable dearth of literature specifically

linking communication and foreign policy in the way it is developed here,

i.e., on communicating foreign policy. This relationship is only partially

treated in the literature and almost entirely through the lens of the

influence of the media on foreign policy formation.

Public diplomacy is one result of this transformation. The concept of

public diplomacy is a theoretical and analytical challenge in itself, and

there is much controversy around its definition and meaning (Roberts

2007), or how it is related to traditional diplomacy or foreign policy. As

the communication face of foreign policy, public diplomacy is the central

concept in this paper so it is necessary to explore it in depth.

2. The Concept of Public Diplomacy

The concept of public diplomacy has been quite controversial and many

definitions have been put forward. They share, however, some common

elements: (a) the aim to exert influence on foreign public audiences; (b)

the interaction with non-governmental actors; (c) the distinction

3

between old/traditional and new/public diplomacy. The idea of public

diplomacy is not new, although it has re-emerged dynamically after the

end of the Cold War and more countries are consciously and actively

concerned about public diplomacy than was previously the case.

For the US Defence Science Board (2004) ‘public diplomacy seeks

through the exchange of people and ideas to build lasting relationships

and receptivity to a nation’s culture, values and policies. It seeks also to

influence attitudes and mobilise publics in ways that support policies and

interests’ (in Waller 2007: 33). Roberts defines public diplomacy as ‘a

governmental or governmentally funded foreign policy activity. Its

objective is to create, for a given country, as positive a climate as

possible among foreign publics in order to facilitate the explanation and

hopefully acceptance of its foreign policy’ (2007: 45). It is important to

note that public diplomacy unfolds in the course of time and that public

diplomacy is a foreign policy activity primarily orchestrated by the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs.1 Public diplomacy is principally occupied with

managing information on a country and its foreign policy, using widely

information and communication technologies. As the flow of

information has increased and reaching different audiences has been

immensely facilitated by the new technologies, the magnitude of public

diplomacy has increased.

Mark Leonard identifies three dimensions of public diplomacy: reactive,

proactive and relationship building (2002: 10). Time is the core element

in this categorisation. These dimensions work jointly with three different

1 Many actors outside the MFA and often not controlled by it (NGOs, think tanks etc.)

conduct activities which can have a ‘public diplomacy effect’. However, the interest of this

paper is public diplomacy funded and conducted by governmental authorities.

4

’spheres’: political/military, economic and societal/cultural (ibid: 10),

describing the type of activities in place.

Reactive public diplomacy usually responds to a special event or

important piece of news. Leonard describes this first dimension of public

diplomacy as ‘news management’ (2002: 12-13). When faced with

negative press coverage, a country and its embassies should be ready to

respond. In some cases such a response presupposes an agreed planned

course of action, taking the form of communication crisis response

plans. In terms of public diplomacy this could be achieved through

interventions in the media or even campaigns already designed to be

implemented when particular issues emerge. Positive coverage does not

pose a problem of course, but it could definitely be taken further. Also,

the frequency with which some news appears provides a good

opportunity to promote foreign policy positions to foreign audience. For

instance, the annual report of the European Commission on the

candidate countries for accession provide an excellent opportunity to

talk about Greek positions on the issues of FYROM or Turkey to

European publics. The second dimension of public diplomacy - proactive

public - diplomacy, unfolds in weeks or months. It takes public diplomacy

a step further not only in terms of timeframe, but in terms of objectives

and means. While reactive public diplomacy deals with news

management, proactive public diplomacy deals with perception

management. In other words, it is concerned with the image and

perception of a country. Successful management of this perception is

important if messages are to be communicated effectively. The image

that foreign publics hold of a country can influence their reception of

5

messages. Unlike the first dimension of public diplomacy where action is

mostly driven by events proactive public diplomacy allows all three

spheres of public diplomacy to be smoothly developed. The idea here is

to put down a number of messages (in the military, economic or cultural

field) and play them out. Surely enough this requires coordination and

forward planning, because the planned activities usually fall under the

mandate and responsibility of different institutions or public services. So,

cooperation in the areas of culture, tourism and trade, for example,

might be needed. At this stage, public diplomacy has more lasting goals

than in the first stage. While in the latter case the aim of public

diplomacy is mostly to reverse any negative coverage caused by running

events, in this case the aim is to disseminate specific messages reflecting

the perception a country wishes to promote for itself. Leonard names

this dimension of public diplomacy ‘strategic communication’ (ibid: 14).

For example, a series of seminars on Greek and Balkan history, co-

organised by the embassies in association with local institutions, could

offer the opportunity to present to a large, foreign and young audience

the Greek view on the Macedonian question.

Deciding on the message(s) which would support to create a desired

perception of a country is of course a huge task. Powell suggests that

very few, preferably one message, should capture what is wished to be

promoted, since peoples’ constant daily exposure to loads of

information diminishes the possibility of them recalling most of the

messages they receive (in Leonard 2002:15-16). The message should give

the country an identity and create connotations. Therefore, it should be

imaginative and repetitive. The advertising campaign of the Greek

6

Tourist Organisation is a case in point: the slogan changes far too often,

if not every year, every two years, from ‘Live your myth in Greece’

(2008) to ‘Kalimera’ (2009) to ‘You in Greece’ (2010) ‘.

Relationship-building is the third dimension of public diplomacy

(Leonard 2002: 18-21) and the most lasting one. Relationship building

develops over years and aims at building contacts and creating networks

of communication among peers: media, non-governmental actors,

academia and so on. The purpose of relationship-building is to exchange

ideas and experiences and ultimately develop a deep understanding of

the country and its culture. By enhancing knowledge of a country and its

people, one gets a profound insight on the mentality and behaviour of

people, on their beliefs and values, and can therefore better understand

their views and positions in matter of politics, economy and culture. So,

even if one becomes critical about what they experience, what matters

really is the exposure and involvement in a different cultural

environment. Joseph Nye eloquently describes this ‘learning’ and

intermingling procedure as ‘complexifing the thinking’ [of people] (in

Leonard 2002: 19).

Building relationships is different from disseminating messages, which is

central in proactive public diplomacy, since a relationship is a two-way

process. This dimension of public diplomacy allows the three spheres to

be fully developed and provides the space and time to explore and

utilise several aspects of mutual and common features between the

parties. Relationships are not static and it takes time and effort to

maintain and cultivate them. Sharing common visions in politics, cultural

and educational exchange programmes, seminars and conferences or

7

joint projects are means of creating bonds between states and their

people.

Although the three dimensions might exist separately, they are well

connected. Relationship building establishes the basis of creating any

kind of connection between two parties. When the relationship has been

created and has been stabilised, it has prepared the ground for receiving

messages and managing individual issues. So, when the time comes to

discuss matters, the background work that has been done facilitates the

process.

Ultimately, public diplomacy could increase people’s knowledge,

familiarity and appreciation for a given country and hence increase the

possibility to influence the public to develop a favourable view

concerning matters in the country’s interests. Public diplomacy

constitutes an excellent instrument of a state’s soft power (Nye 2008:

95). Nonetheless, this does not mean that public diplomacy is a ‘soft’

instrument, for it pursues a variety of objectives ranging from cultural

and political dialogue to alliance management and conflict prevention

(Melissen 2005: 14).

3. Public diplomacy and target audiences

When a country wishes to promote its foreign policy priorities, it needs

to address different groups of people. One major group is foreign policy

makers. The second important group is the media and the third is the

general public. The last two are the focus of public diplomacy.

8

The general public is perhaps the most difficult audience to handle

under any circumstances. It is heterogeneous, unpredictable, indifferent,

opinionated, passive, active, informed, misinformed, multifaceted,

diverse, mutable and, needless to say, numerous. It does remain,

however, the primary target of any communication policy of a large

scale. Given its inherent complexity but also the imperative need to

manage it, it is necessary to learn about it. Quantitative and qualitative

categories as well as second and third dimension public diplomacy

activities can contribute in acquiring profound knowledge of any

concerned public.

It is also essential to mention that influencing the public on foreign

policy is a great challenge, because it is often burdened with fixed views

and stereotypes, it is ‘ill-informed […] and hence has no good judgement

when it comes to foreign policy’ (Lippmann in Kamath 1990:240). As a

result, the public is less susceptible to change views than knowledgeable

audiences. The public is generally indifferent when on foreign policy

except for landmark events, such as 9/11 or the 1999 Kardak/Imia crisis.

The media is the second major group public diplomacy aims at. Public

diplomacy aims at including the media in as many activities as possible

both as a target group and as means of reaching to and enhancing the

knowledge of the public.

It is important to have profound knowledge of a country’s media culture,

namely the legal framework, possible restrictions in the freedom of the

press, leading media opinion makers and so on. Undoubtedly, the

Internet has affected the way the media works and the game of

9

information is played under new rules. News webpages, blogs and online

forums create space for expression and dissemination of information

and form public opinion. At the same time, the influence of traditional

media remains strong in shaping public opinion. So, the media offer

great opportunities to present views and opinions, engage in dialogue,

give interviews, etc., as a part of a public diplomacy strategy to promote

a country’s views.

Moreover, the media is itself a target group; therefore public diplomacy

officials need to develop personal relationship with selective, influential

media representatives and journalists. Journalists covering foreign policy

are a knowledgeable and experienced group, in contrast to the public.

Consequently, they can be quite influential when conveying views on

foreign policy. This relationship can be further supportive to public

diplomacy goals, since it a) provides an immediate channel of

information about the public; b) it can feed the public with targeted

messages.2

4. Communication and foreign policy in Greece

The relation between communication and foreign policy has not been a

good one in the case of Greece. As Kapopoulos eloquently puts it

“communication of foreign policy in Greece has stayed in the 1970-80s”.3

In fact, with very few exceptions, communication has virtually never

2 Public diplomacy officials pursue contacts with other groups as well, such as think tanks,

civil society organisations, the diaspora etc. Although they can assist considerably to the

goals of public diplomacy – especially diaspora – the main focus of this paper is the public

and the media, because they are a sine qua non for public diplomacy. 3 Interview with G. Kapopoulos on 5 November 2010.

10

been taken into account when promotion of foreign policy was the

matter4 so even claiming that communication is to foreign policy

‘incidental to the larger process’ (Nimmo and Sanders 1981: 391) could

be an understatement. Quite surprisingly, the need to communicate

foreign policy to foreign publics has been recognised by policy makers.

The ‘no relations’ between communication and foreign policy should be

attributed to a number of reasons that reflect the structure, means and

content of foreign policy in Greece.

As mentioned in the first part, communication policy is an instrument, a

means to promote foreign policy to foreign publics. In Greece,

communication has not been viewed as such, so no structures have been

created to support a system of promotion of foreign policy positions

through public diplomacy channels. There is no ‘organisational system’,

as Snyder puts it (1962: 95), no system of relationships, allocation of

responsibilities, scenario planning or problem solving that could build a

short and long term communication policy. From a theoretical point of

view, communication policy has not been acknowledged as a foreign

policy instrument and therefore no attention has been paid on how to

develop its possibilities. Actually, foreign policy goals have been pursued

mostly, if not exclusively, through traditional diplomacy paths, i.e.

government to government relations. Such approach has limited the

available audience leaving out the public. It barely triggered debate and

dialogue between different publics to develop a different view of foreign

policy, even concerning publics of immediate interest, such as the

4 All nine interviewees admitted to the importance and need of communicating foreign

policy to different audiences, although equally admitting that this has never been the case,

with very few exceptions.

11

Turkish one or the one in FYROM. Any efforts are usually initiated by

NGOs or think tanks, but are generally not government funded, so they

cannot account for government policy. For instance, ELIAMEP (Hellenic

Foundation for European and Foreign Policy), in its long history, has

organised many seminars, conferences and round tables concerning

Greek-Turkish relations or FYROM. But ELIAMEP has its own agenda in

research and activities and does not follow the agenda of the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs.

Secondly, foreign policy functions in an environment of deficient

structures. Weak structures in turn support weak mechanisms. More

often than not, there are no mechanisms at all. Although the broad

infrastructure is there (e.g. there is a Ministry of Foreign Affairs),

bureaucracy, which is supposed to link the different parts, is

dysfunctional and ineffective. For example, there is no joint platform of

cooperation between different ministries to form a common strategy for

public diplomacy, each one contributing its own ideas, means and

resources. The reality instead is overlapping responsibilities and

individual action, without central planning.

In terms of lack or insufficiency of institutions, public diplomacy makes

no exception. In most European countries and the United States the

structure of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs includes a division of public

diplomacy and public affairs or information. In Greece, this division is

called the Information and Public Diplomacy Department (Υπηρεσία

Ενημέρωσης και Δημόσιας Διπλωματίας). It is headed by the Ministry’s

Spokesperson and its primary task is to inform the media covering

diplomatic issues of the activities and progress in foreign policy issues.

12

The Public Diplomacy branch, to our knowledge, stays insofar inactive in

terms of public diplomacy, at least as having defined and analysed in this

paper. It is not engaged in any sort of research and planning of short or

long term activities that would fall under any of the three dimensions of

public diplomacy as elaborated earlier, though the Ministry’s Spokesman

suggest that there is a wish to activate the public diplomacy branch to

this direction.5 According to the head of the Department (the Ministry’s

Spokesperson), since 2010 the Ministry has been going through a period

of restructuring and of redefining the means of foreign policy conduct,

shifting the emphasis onto society, i.e. passing information directly to

the people. This new ‘framework of strategic communication for the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ aims at making both the Ministry and the

embassies more extroverted in order to better communicate the

messages of the Ministry - and the Greek government as a whole – to

foreign publics (Delavekouras 2010). As Delavekouras himself admits,

‘this requires a change of culture in the Ministry, the embassies and the

press offices. The personnel should become more open and extroverted

and reach even more to the public’ (ibid).

In practice, in the Greek Embassies public diplomacy is conducted by the

press officers, whose main preoccupations are a) contact with the press,

and b) enhancing relations with the public. Press offices follow local and

international press, create and maintain relations with the media and

initiate public relations activities, such as seminars, conferences,

educational programmes, promotional events and so on. Their aim is to

identify features that could be cultivated to eventually bind the people

5 Interview with Delavekouras on 4 December 2010.

13

of the countries bilaterally and enhance their understanding of each

other. This is a huge task, in itself requiring resources and

communication management skills that go beyond mere diplomatic

training. This is hardly the training a career diplomat receives. It is,

however, the training that press officers undergo.

The Secretariat General of Information and Communication is a

pertinent public body designed to deal with communication policy. The

Secretariat is staffed by press officers and journalists. As a highly

qualified body of public officials (an exception, rather than the rule, in

the civil service)6, the press officers receive their training on

communication, marketing and public diplomacy techniques at the

National School of Public Administration. Abroad, they are the public

face of the embassy. In Greece, they support the work of foreign media

in Greece, supply other government institutions with incoming

information from the press offices and produce reports based on

international media coverage on issues related to Greek foreign policy

matters. They do not participate, however, in any kind of

communication policy planning administered either by the Secretariat,

or by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and contrary to standard practice

abroad, the press officers are not staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Cooperation between the Secretariat and the Ministry is at times close

and fruitful, but there is a smouldering rivalry concerning respective

6 According to the 2010 census, out of the 768.009 civil servants only 10% has a master’s

degree (‘A rabbit for IMF’ [Enas lagos gia to DNT], Eleftherotypia, 19/09/2010, p.41, at

http://enet.s3.amazonaws.com/2010/09/190910/index.html. Fifty-eight percent (58%) of

press officers have a master’s degree, while 5.6% hold a PhD as well. A 39% speaks three

foreign languages (that is other than Greek) and almost 50% speak an uncommon foreign

language (e.g. Finnish, Jewish, Japanese, Arab, Portuguese, etc).

14

competences fuelled partly by an overlap of responsibilities – at times

unclearly defined – in which communication diplomacy is divided

between the two institutions, hence hindering the actual

implementation of any communication policy.7 Press officers claim the

realm of public diplomacy for themselves, as the sole and only body in

Greek public administration trained to conduct public diplomacy, while

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has ‘institutionalised’ this with a

Department. It is true that the Secretariat does have the resources

(human and financial) and the means (works directly with foreign and

Greek press, foreign correspondents and the Greek Press Offices located

in selected Greek embassies) to build a public diplomacy strategy.

Nevertheless, the present structure of the Secretariat does not permit

the least the deployment of its potentials.

The Secretariat is one big paradox of the Greek administration and

reflects quite powerfully the absence of vision and strategy in foreign

policy and communication policy. For once, the press officers are not

staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Moreover, the Secretariat does

not seem to be finding its place in any Greek governmental scheme.

Known until 2004 as the Ministry of Press, it has shifted ‘host

institutions’ ever since. Under the first Karamanlis administration (2004-

2007), the Ministry of Press was abolished and replaced by the

Secretariat General of Communication and the Secretariat General of

Information.8 From 2004 to 2009 the Secretariats fell directly under the

7 See the law N. 2594/2008 article 2 on the function and role of the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs and law N. 3166/2003, article 4, on the role and function of the Press Offices of the

Secretariat General of Information and Communication. 8 N. 3242/2004 (in Greek), at http://www.et.gr/idocs-

nph/search/pdfViewerForm.html?args=5C7QrtC22wGQ_kZuUB4NxXdtvSoClrL8sN_CI5tJ5zV5

15

authority of the Prime Minister. From January 2009, following a

governmental shuffle, until October 2009 (when early national elections

took place), the Secretariats moved to the Ministry of Interior. After

PASOK took office in October 2009, the two Secretariats were merged

into one (only one Secretary General was appointed) and restored to

their former status under the Prime Minister, with the Government

Spokesperson as their political head. The government reshuffle of

September 2010 moved the Secretariats back to the Ministry of Interior.

The reshuffle of June 2011 has placed them back under the direct

authority of the Prime Minister. Moreover, in July 2011 a presidential

decree has recreated two Secretariats: the Secretariat General of

Information and Communication; and the Secretariat General of Mass

Media. The press officers fall under the former.

When no government can decide what to do with a public body, two

things are possible: a) it has no policy or plan whatsoever; b) the public

institution is redundant. In this case, both are true. If there was an actual

communication policy to serve foreign policy, the Secretariat General of

Information and Communication would have been abolished and had its

personnel reassigned.

Thirdly, as anywhere else in Greek politics, communication policy is a

highly personalised state of affairs, as a result of the absence of

structures and functional institutions. Clientelism often prevails over

standardised processes, jeopardising continuity and consistency in the

public sector. Key positions (such as the General and Special Secretary),

MXD0LzQTLWPU9yLzB8V68knBzLCmTXKaO6fpVZ6Lx9hLslJUqeiQlqVK3b5Pb7RKErCKwzM23

OtwUkphgdv1PQM6ikZMtto, last visited on 19/12/2010.

16

instead of being occupied by career civil servants are subject to political

bargaining, serving personal political ambitions rather than the public

interest. The Secretary General should have profound knowledge of the

Ministry and the personnel serve a vision and set goals. Unfortunately,

Secretaries General change far too often to allow a Ministry to set and

implement any action plan. Moreover, there is poor, if any, participation

of career civil servants in the actual planning or decision making of the

Ministries. When it comes to high policy levels, Ministers invite

independent advisors, often with no relation or knowledge whatsoever

with the work of the Ministry, leaving experienced qualified personnel

misused and squandered.

Fourth, Greece has only belatedly recognised the potential benefits of

communication policy. Opening up foreign policy to the public has long

been a reality for countries such as the US and the UK (Cohen 1986,

Roberts 2007) but has not been embedded in Greek foreign policy,

despite having recognised its importance.9 Communication policy

provides an excellent opportunity for small or medium sized countries to

increase their visibility in the international political arena. As Ellis

recognises, ‘the need for communication policy in Greece is

disproportional to its size. Everybody is going to listen to the US, no

matter the subject, but not a small country’.10

Greece does have foreign

policy goals that would eventually need the support of even ‘remote’

countries, such as China. Communication policy, especially long term,

can create willing listeners for the Greek views.

9 See footnote 6.

10 Interview with A. Ellis on 5 November 2010.

17

What was underlined and heavily emphasised by all interviewees is that

there is no standardised process of communicating foreign policy

positions. Communication has never been on the discussion agenda of

the Council of Foreign Policy, a consultative body to the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs.11

Communication of foreign policy, either government to

government or government to public, is a matter of individuals who

replace the absent institutions of the Greek state. There are no

supportive mechanisms, no strategic planning and this does not change

under different governments.

Having examined the link between communication and foreign policy in

Greece, we will shift the focus now on specific foreign policy cases to see

how communication has been played out.

5. Communication policy in foreign policy

Greek-Turkish relations and FYROM’s name issue have long dominated

the Greek foreign policy agenda. According to Greece, Turkey is a

revisionist state whose long-term goal is to change the status quo of the

Aegean Sea in its favour. FYROM’s goal is irredentism against the Greek

part of Macedonia, more eloquently indicated by its constitutional name

(‘Macedonia’), which is like red rag to a bull for Greece. In both cases,

the issues between the two countries have remained essentially

unresolved since their appearance. There is still no agreement on

FYROM’s name, nor has there been any substantial progress in the issues

dividing Greece and Turkey over the Aegean (constitutional shelf,

11

Interview with M. Koppa on 1 November 2010.

18

territorial waters, airspace, demilitarisation of the Aegean islands, FIR12

).

Supposing that Greece’s long-term goal is to preserve the Aegean status

quo and prevent the recognition of FYROM as Macedonia, Greek foreign

policy has failed. The status quo has indeed not changed but the cost of

preserving it has been high.13

FYROM has been recognised with its

constitutional name by 133 countries,14

including many European Union

member states. The United Nations has 193 members so that makes

almost 70% (including all of the permanent members of the Security

Council except France) of the world’s nations.

Over the years Greece has gained less understanding and sympathy over

its positions. This should be largely attributed to the rigid, introverted

and ethnocentric approach to foreign policy. This means that Greece has

been concerned with its own problems and has stayed behind in

following the European and international agenda.15

What is more,

Greece has failed to make its counterparts interested in its issues

because it has failed to associate these issues to the international

agenda and to listen to the problems of the others.16

Moreover, Greece has tried to convey its position mostly, if not

exclusively, through traditional diplomacy channels. Reaching out to the

public opinion of the concerned countries has not been on the agenda.

12

Flight Information Region. 13

Dogfights between Greek and Turkish aircrafts are almost everyday practice. This is

extremely costly not only in terms of resources and money but also of lives, as many Greek

soldiers have lost their lives in such fights or similar military exercises (at least three during

the last decade). From 2000 to 2009 the Greek-Turkish dogfights cost 450 million Euros

(http://www.turkishpress.com/news.asp?id=359294, last visited on 03/10/2010). 14

As of December 2011, (http://www.mfa.gov.mk/?q=node/452&language=en-gb, last

visited on 02/02/2012). 15

Interview with E. Antonaros on 4 November 2010. 16

Ibid and interview with L. Tsoukalis 19 November 2010.

19

The existent and on-going mistrust and cautiousness towards the

respective people proves the case. The rigid, introverted and

ethnocentric approach to foreign policy was reflected to the

communication of it as well. Both at the government to government

level and at government to public conveying foreign policy has been

problematic. Presenting a case on a “good” versus a “bad guy” basis or

“right” versus “wrong” has not been proven productive. Greece presents

its positions disregarding the European political context and it barely

listens to other countries. While sticking to its own problems, it stays

aside of the contemporary debates resulting in European policies,

ultimately working against its own interests: diplomacy is a multilevel

give and take game where empathy is vital; what might not be

interesting to you could be crucial for someone else, so listening and

comprehending others is important if you want your case to be heard.17

For many years, Greece has been promoting its positions to its

counterparts by insisting on their rightness and by reporting Turkish

activities against Greece (e.g. violation of the airspace). This

monotonous repetition of ‘victimisation’ of Greece and Turkey’s

aggressive activities has brought fatigue to many of Greece’s

counterparts, turning even the most open listeners to indifferent

audience. As Antonaros puts it “how would Greece feel if Spain talked

and talked continuously about its differences with Morocco?”18

Moreover, despite the repetition, international public opinion has no

true knowledge of Greece’s differences with Turkey, or what Greek

17

Ibid. 18

Interview with E. Antonaros on 4 November 2010.

20

positions are.19

The absence of any kind of organised plan or activity for

the promotion of Greek foreign policy positions is, as Koppa adds, the

reason why “our positions are not easily understood”.20

Apart from Cyprus’s accession to the European Union in 2004, no major

development took place in Greek-Turkish relations during the last ten

years. There has been no tension and relations have remained calm. Yet,

the issues still remain open. In case of a settlement, the great challenge

for Greek foreign policy would not be as much how to communicate this

to the international public opinion, but to the Greek one, as it will be

explained later on.

Relations with FYROM are at a standstill, at times in deterioration,

following nationalist outbursts from FYROM.21

Since 1991, when

nationalist sentiment in Greece over the name of the new state was

extremely high, Greece has actually moved back from its original

position, according to which ‘Macedonia’ or its derivatives would not be

accepted. Now, composite names such as ‘Democracy of New

Macedonia’ or ‘North Macedonia’ are the names suggested by Greece.22

Managing the name issue was, from a communication point of view, a

disaster. Greece has had sever difficulty in conveying its position on

FYROM: ‘nobody is really interested when talking about Alexander the

Great. This means nothing to Europeans. Instead, we could have talked

19

Interview with G. Kapopoulos on 5 November 2010. 20

Interview with M. Koppa on 1 November 2010. 21

For example, renaming Skopje’s airport to Alexander the Great airport (2006), presenting

the former Greek Prime Minster, Costas Caramanlis in an SS costume in posters around

Skopje (2008) or placing a twelve-meter statue of Alexander the Great in the central square

in Skopje (2011). 22

Let it be noted that such were the names that FYROM was too eager to accept in 1991.

21

about stability in the Balkans and helping a country with internal

problems potentially precarious for the whole region”.23

The Greek

position on FYROM was not easy to communicate, as it challenged the

right of the country to self-determination, which of course was

completely incomprehensible to foreign audiences, not to mention a

breach of human rights. Perception of messages is quite delicate in

communication per se, let alone when foreign policy is involved. So, it is

debateable whether Greek positions became clear to foreign audiences

when arguing that “Macedonia is Greek”. It sounds more like

irredentism towards FYROM, rather than expressing an identity, as the

Greeks wanted to illustrate. It was when Greece accepted the composite

name, around 2007, that she actually started having listeners to its

views.24

From a communication’s point of view, managing FYROM’s bid for NATO

membership in NATO’s Summit in Bucharest in April 2008 is viewed as a

success.25

Foreign policy decision on de facto vetoing FYROM’s

membership, unless an agreement on the name was achieved, had

already been announced at the official statements of the newly elected

(2007) Karamanlis government. Messages from abroad pointed to

FYROM becoming accepted as a member. So, Greece needed to

implement a campaign that would a) inform international public opinion

on its positions and b) try to influence to its favour ambivalent countries.

Press offices (including the Bucharest press office), embassies and the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs were successfully coordinated to provide

23

Interview with G. Kapopoulos 5 November 2010. 24

Interview with A. Ellis on 5 November 2010. 25

Almost all of the interviewees referred to it as such.

22

international public opinion through foreign correspondents and

interviews with Greek views. Antonaros notes that one-page articles

appeared in major international newspapers in Bucharest presenting

Greek arguments in a clear coherent way. “This way proved successful

and won the support of Greek position by our NATO counterparts”.26

The mobilisation and cooperation of all competent bodies proved that

there is a mechanism in place. However, there are no institutional bonds

between the bodies that would be automatically put in place when

needed. Managing FYROM’s bid for NATO membership was a successful,

but ad hoc communication campaign.

In the course of these years, Greece has done very little to reach public

opinion in other countries. And when it did, foreign audiences had no

way of associating themselves to Greece’s concerns. In order to support

a cause one has first to understand it, associate with it, find a common

ground by sharing similar concerns, needs and values. Only then it is

possible to be receptive and supportive. Greece, has adopted a rather

rigid, one-sided approach leaving little room for success.

6. Communicating Greek foreign policy to the Greek public

This paper is concerned with how foreign policy positions are

communicated to foreign publics. However, it is worth referring to how

Greek foreign policy positions are communicated to the Greek public as

well. Communicating foreign policy to the Greek public is in many ways

26

Interview with E. Antonaros on 4 November 2010.

23

connected to communication abroad and thus can be an indication of

why Greece has invested so little in communication abroad.

Informing national publics on foreign policy is not a matter of public

diplomacy but of public affairs. In Greece, informing domestic public

opinion on international matters concerning the country is a

competence of the Secretariat General of Information and

Communication.27

The rhetoric of right and wrong has been reproduced in Greece as much

as it has been promoted abroad. The Greek public, especially in the case

of Turkey, has been embedded with hostile images of the “Other”, which

remain still very strong (Millas 2001). Moreover, to the Greek public

‘compromise’ is a word with very negative connotations. So the public is

very hostile to the idea of compromise. What is considered as a desired

outcome in international affairs, in Greece it equals national treason.28

For instance, an agreement with Turkey on the territorial waters, e.g.

with selective expansion from 6 (present status) to 8 and 12 miles

depending on the area, would be received by the public as a sell-out.

Therefore, negotiated agreements at the highest level cannot be

communicated to the Greek public.29

Similar is the situation concerning

FYROM’s name. A composed name was unthinkable in Greece at the

beginning of the 1990s, but it is the official position nowadays.

Foreign policy in Greece is heavily emotionalised. It suffices to say that

foreign policy issues are called “national issues’. The term itself is

27

See article 1, of Presidential Decree 258/1993. 28

Interviews with E. Antonaros on 4 November 2010, L. Tsoukalis on 19 November 2010, T.

Skylakakis on 3 November 2010. 29

Interview with G. Kapopoulos on 5 November 2010.

24

problematic in communication. Popularism is deeply implanted in Greek

public opinion or as Tsoukalis puts it “in Greece, both communication

and politics, is dominated by the “inland”, i.e. a deeply ethnocentric part

of society, read patriotic, which has poor understanding of the

international environment”.30

As a result, compromise in foreign policy is

difficult to achieve and equally difficult to convey to public opinion,

without significant political cost.

Both domestically and internationally, Greece has followed a rigid path

in communicating its foreign policy: the ethnocentric rhetoric juxtaposed

with limited outreach to international public opinion has led to

ignorance and confusion about Greek foreign policy positions.

7. Suggestions for a foreign policy communication plan

This paper has tried to identify and describe the relation between

communication and foreign policy in Greece. It has been shown that

communicating foreign policy positions abroad has not paid much

attention to international public as a target audience and

communication has been largely limited to ad hoc reactions to specific

events. There is no long-term communication policy, which could be

realised through a three-level public diplomacy strategy. However, there

are steps to be made towards enforcing communication of foreign policy

abroad.

The research showed that there are no patterns or models of

communicating foreign policy abroad. This does not change under

30

Interview with L. Tsoukalis on 19 November 2010.

25

different governments. It is explained by the absence of structures and

functioning mechanisms that would coordinate implicated actors. What

research has actually shown is that communicating foreign policy is

purely a matter of luck, for it is almost exclusively depended on

individuals. So it is a matter of the right person in the right place at the

right time.

Communicating foreign policy more effectively means a fundamental

change in the way foreign policy works today, in terms of structure,

operation and content. In other words, it needs a communication

strategy, i.e. an organised set of activities that would allocate

responsibilities to and coordinate relevant state bodies, decide on the

message of communication and the context in which foreign policy

would be promoted and suggest means of action. Predominant should

be the role of public diplomacy.

8. Structures

It has become evident from the analysis that Greece is in short of the

required structures to effectively communicate its foreign policy.

There is immediate need for evaluation of the existing structures,

resources and personnel the state has at its disposal and wishes to

commit to this cause. Two are the major state bodies engaging in

communication and foreign policy; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with

the Information and Public Diplomacy Department and the Secretariat

General of Information & Communication with the Press Offices located

in selected European countries, the US, China, Australia and the Middle

26

East, which have long practiced public diplomacy31

and at times they are

better equipped and manned than the Embassies.32

These two bodies need to merge. Press Officers and Press Offices

should move under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the

Department of Information and Public Diplomacy. The Secretariat

General of Information and Communication will be then abolished.33

In

turn, this merge would solve practical but substantial problems such as

a) overlapping of responsibilities and b) lack of central planning.

Although within the competences of the Press Offices is the “information

of the international public opinion and the media on national issues and

the political, economic, cultural and social developments in the country,

the promotion of the positions of the country abroad and the contacts

with media representatives”,34

the Greek Embassies should, among

other things, “inform the governments of other countries and the public

opinion makers and initiate actions for the promotion and support of

matters of Greek interest”.35

Moving the Secretariat under the Ministry

of Foreign Affairs would improve cooperation, but it is necessary to

31

In 2007 the Union of Press Officers created an International Communication Policy Forum

with the aim to sensitise all the implicated actors and the academic community in Greece in

matters of communication policy, the image of Greece and public diplomacy. It also runs a

webpage for debate and reflection on public diplomacy issues and it organises relevant

events and activities. See http://icp-forum.gr/wp/, last visited on 25/09/2011. The

Department of Press Officers was established at the National School of Public Administration

in 1993 (the School operates since 1983). Before the Press Officers started occupying the

relevant posts at the Press Offices abroad, these positions were largely – if not exclusively –

covered either by journalists or by politically appointed personnel, often having no training

whatsoever to perform the tasks required. 32

Interview with G. Kapopoulos on 5 November 2010. 33

There is a large number of journalists employed by the Secretariat General of Information

and Communication and the Secretariat General of Mass Media. Many of them are also

employed by privately owned media. In the case of abolishing the Secretariats, they should

be dismissed. 34

See art. 4, N. 3166/2003. 35

See art.32.1, N. 2594/1998.

27

establish a mechanism charged with communication policy planning.

That would also allow better coordination with other relevant

institutions (Ministry of Culture and Tourism, Ministry of Development

etc.). This mechanism would develop communication policy based on

the three-level dimension of public diplomacy and provide guidelines on

implementation. Having identified the growing need for global outreach,

establishing a mechanism for public diplomacy in the form of a

committee has been put forward by the Union of Press Officers (ENAT)

already in 2008.36

ENAT recommends the creation of a Greek Strategic

Committee for Public Diplomacy with executive and operating

competences, saving special role for the Secretariat of Information and

Communication and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Provided that the

Secretariat is merged with the Ministry this body would be administered

by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with central role of the Department of

Information and Public Diplomacy. It would have a decisive rather than a

mere consultative role and would be the government’s advisor on public

diplomacy issues.

Within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Information and Public

Diplomacy Department, although charged with informing foreign publics

on issues of foreign policy, in practice it supports the work of the

Spokesperson of the Ministry (Papakonstantinou 2005: 82). The

Directorate of Services Abroad and the Directorate of Public Relations of

the Secretariat General of Information and Communication aim at

covering this discontinuity (ibid). In a future merge of the Secretariat

with the Ministry, the Department of Information and Public Diplomacy

36

Available (in Greek) at http://icp-forum.gr/wp/?p=284, last visited on 28/09/2011.

28

will be responsible for promoting Greek foreign policy to both

international and domestic audience. It would be organised on two axes,

one addressing the Greek public (i.e. charged with public affairs) and the

second having global outreach (public diplomacy). Since informing

foreign and domestic publics is the major role performed by the

Secretariat General of Information and Communication37

, transferring

these competences in the Department of Information and Public

Diplomacy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would not pose serious

problems.

Finally, the range of initiative within the Embassies should be increased.

The current practice does not leave to the Embassies much room for

manoeuvre, although they should be playing an important role in the

promotion of foreign policy positions, because they have a much better

picture of the social, economic and political being of the country of duty,

as well as of the human attributes and living patterns which mould the

society. Inevitably, the role of Press Officers and diplomats becomes

more demanding, since they would need to engage in more initiatives,

craft policy plans and become more exposed to the public. An evaluation

system should be also put in place, delivered to the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, in order to measure the utility of the practices used, identify

gaps and address possible issues.

Last but not least, there is the question of funding public diplomacy

activities. This should be done by cutting on the defence budget. Greece

should be a ‘soft power’ rather than a ‘hard power’ state. Greece has

37

See article 1of PD (258/1993).

29

one of the highest military expenditures among NATO countries. In

2009, Greece came only second to the US, followed by Turkey.38

Greece

should reallocate these resources to public diplomacy training, cultural

and business activities abroad and promotion of a positive image of the

country.

9. Operation

Operation refers to how foreign policy will be communicated. Foreign

policy is communicated both by diplomats and by press officers but to

different audiences and with different means. Informing the Greek

public on foreign policy is equally important.

Media outreach is central to the activities of both domestically and

internationally oriented communication policies. The way foreign policy

is reported in the media has immediate impact on the perception of the

public about foreign policy. So it is important, especially with regards to

the third level of public diplomacy (relationship building) to establish

long-lasting relations with the media, both printed and electronic.

Besides, certain type of media can serve as excellent means for public

diplomacy: ‘public diplomacy is most easily conveyed on TV and is most

instantaneously seen’ (O’Heffernan 1991: 55). In the era of globalised

networks, special emphasis should be put on the Internet too. When

media is concerned, all three dimensions of public diplomacy become

relevant and equal attention should be paid to explaining foreign policy

38

According to SIPRI, Greece’s military expenditure in 2009, as a percentage of GDP was 3,2;

the percentage for the US was 4,7 and 2,7 for Turkey (SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,

available at http://milexdata.sipri.org/files/?file=SIPRI+milex+data+1988-2010.xls, accessed

on 25/09/11.

30

both to domestic and foreign media (Nye 2008: 101). Also, the media is a

continuous source of information about social, economic and political

reality of foreign countries that can assist public diplomacy

development. Finally, face to face contact and in depth information on

foreign policy positions is important in public diplomacy. It creates

credibility between the parties and develops trust.

Secondly, knowing the audience is important. Exchange of information

between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Embassies is vital. The

Embassies should provide information on the culture, values and ideas

of the society in question and make sincere efforts to understand it. One

of the major mistakes of US public diplomacy after 9/11 was that the

Bush administration did not care about learning the societies it affected

with its policies (in Rashid 2009: LVI). Also, the Embassies would provide

the Ministry with feedback on the image the country holds for Greece

and thus identify areas where attention should be paid in order to

change a possible negative view to a positive one. In addition, it should

identify the views of public opinion with regards to Greek foreign policy

goals.

Third, public diplomacy should target countries within Greece’s interest,

namely countries with which either it shares interests or it is competitive

and hence it needs to know better. Leonard makes a clear distinction

between ‘co-operative’ and ‘competitive’ public diplomacy and how they

should be developed (2002: 22-30). Therefore, Greece is interested in

what Turkey does in its own areas of foreign policy, but also in the area

of culture or tourism. As Melissen put it: ‘the “power of the better

argument” should be considered integral to the concept of public

31

diplomacy…diplomatic argumentation should be a matter of conviction,

resulting from and resulting in the transference of genuine belief

grounded in understanding of the issues and knowledge of the facts’

(2005: 71).

Fourth, public relations activities have enormous potential as means of

public diplomacy. Indeed, with regards to the second and third

dimension of public diplomacy, namely the proactive public diplomacy

and long-term relationship building, public relations are crucial in

communicating messages, promoting agendas and reaching audiences.

Fifth, public diplomacy should engage all possible actors that could

contribute to promoting the positions of the country’s foreign policy.

Apart from the ones mentioned already (the media and the public),

there is a variety of other actors that could be engaged: the academia

and think tanks, selected communication experts and the Greek diaspora

could all play a part, with one way or another and depending on their

competences, to serve public diplomacy’s goals.

10. Content

Greece has been quite ‘rigid’ in how it has chosen to pursue its foreign

policy goals. This means that it has shown short-sightedness and has not

tried to accommodate concerns of others, and thus, it often offered

problems rather than solutions. This is the case both concerning

relations with Turkey and the name of FYROM. Greece is also a small

country and its foreign policy interests may not concern others except

Greece. This is why Greece should try to accommodate its foreign policy

32

concerns within a larger agenda and be more flexible in its approach.

Differently put, it should try to enlarge the pie rather than divide the

pieces. The example of clandestine migration coming from Turkey is a

case in point. It took far too long for the European Union through

FRONTEX to become involved in what is in essence an EU security policy

matter, but that of course was not solely EU’s fault. It was also a

problem of Greek foreign policy in failing to create channels of

communication of the problem to European audiences.

This narrow-mindedness in foreign policy has been costly for its goals.

The need to enlarge Greek foreign policy agenda and include ‘low

politics’ issues have been long acknowledged,39

as has the need to reach

to the public. Tsoukalis describes this openness as “getting out of our

shell”.40

Adopting an expanded view in certain issues of foreign policy

does not mean a change in the goals of foreign policy per se. It simply

means a change of approach in pursuing them; and such basically

includes embracing the needs and addressing the concerns of others. It

also means to actively participate in European political and economic

developments. As Leonard names it, Greece should ‘prove its relevance’

(2002: 52) for others to listen to what it has to say.

Finally, foreign policy messages should be conveyed in a way that is

understandable to others; “it does not matter what you say, but what

the others understand”.41

Labels such as ‘national issues’, when referring

39

For example, interview with G. Kapopoulos on 5 November 2010; interview with L.

Tsoukalis on 19 November 2010 and Tsoukalis interview to International Communication

Policy Forum on 19 July 2009. 40

International communication Policy Forum interview with L. Tsoukalis on 19 July 2009. A

book with the title “What if we came out of our shell?” was published in 2009. 41

Interview with T. Skylakakis on 3 November 2010.

33

to foreign policy matters obstruct communication and relationship

building rather than creating willing audiences. The message should be

clear, consistent domestically and abroad, repetitive and put in context

for people to comprehend it.

11. Conclusion

It has been the point of this paper that Greek foreign policy is in need of

a communication policy in the form of public diplomacy. By engaging

international audience to promote foreign policy Greece enlarges its

perspectives and participates more dynamically in political and

economic developments. Public diplomacy, especially through its third

dimension – relationship building – can create or enhance a certain

image of a country in the long term. The image and perception others

have of a country play a vital role on its standing internationally. To that,

the people of the country influence dramatically the country’s image. As

Anholt very bluntly but realistically puts it ‘the people are the brand’ […]

the people and their education, abilities and aspirations […] ultimately

make the place what it is’ (2007: 75).

Furthermore, the image of a country is subject to change; nevertheless,

it is associated with certain values and ideas, which traditionally fuel its

image. Greece’s image since 2011 has suffered severe damage due to

the financial crisis. However, its ancient history and culture, which have

formed its identity and have exerted influence worldwide, will continue

to be a source of invigorating the country’s image.

34

Public diplomacy is closely bound to a country’s image, policies and

reputation, or as Anholt defines it (2007), its ‘competitive identity’. The

use of public diplomacy lies in the power it has to affect the background

reputation of a country, especially through communication campaigns

and relationship building. Greece should decide on the image it wishes

to promote, taking into account the image it has created - before the

financial crisis – as well as the image it wishes to renounce, combined

with its foreign policy priorities and objectives. At the end of the day,

communication can hardly be separated from foreign policy, ‘public

diplomacy is as much a communication phenomenon as a political one’

(L’Etang 2009: 613). One follows the other. The problem in Greece has

been that communication has not been following or in any way linked to

foreign policy, therefore promoting foreign policy goals has been

difficult. Building a new image for the country, for which is in great need

because of the financial crisis, will eventually support its foreign policy

goals. However, in order to do that strong political will and wide social

acceptance is required, which are impossible to achieve without a

change of culture.

35

Appendix

Public diplomacy and common misperceptions

Public diplomacy and public affairs: Public affairs have lately been called

‘domestic public diplomacy’ (Melissen 2005: 8). Public diplomacy

addresses foreign audiences, while public affairs deal with informing and

promoting a country’s policies – of either domestic or international

character – to the national public. The audience of public affairs is

national rather than international. Public affairs activities are also

managed by the ministry of foreign affairs.

Public diplomacy and propaganda: Propaganda is one-way

communication, while public diplomacy is a two-way communication

process. In public diplomacy, the target audience consciously

participates in the process of communication. The third dimension of

public diplomacy illustrates its difference from propaganda, since

propaganda leaves no space for dialogue or relationship building on

equal terms. It aims at penetrating and influencing the audience’s sub-

conscious level of perception, leaving no room for active thinking.

Nation branding and public diplomacy: These two concepts are better

distinguished by their aim. The purpose of nation branding is to

(re)shape and (re)structures the whole identity of a state (Dinnie 2008),

while public diplomacy is an instrument of foreign policy aiming at

gaining support of foreign policy positions by building long-term bonds

between respective countries. Nation branding aims at defining a

country and associating it with certain recognisable connotations (for

example identifying Greece with environmental protection or peace

36

keeping instead of ancient history and culture). Public diplomacy and

nation branding often get mixed up. If a nation manages to brand itself

well and preserve this image in time, it might aid public diplomacy goals,

but under no circumstances does it guarantee any success. Even if a

nation remains a good brand but its foreign policy choices are viewed

with mistrust, the brand will not suffice to influence the publics. It may

assist in other areas, where nation branding is strong, such as tourism,

trade, investment etc. but its effect on foreign policy is questionable.

37

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Koppa, Marilena, Member of the European Parliament (interviewed on

01.11.2010)

Skylakakis, Theodoros, Member of the European Parliament (interviewed on

03.11.2010)

40

Tsiodras, Dimitrios, Journalist, Eleftherotypia, Head of Prime Minister Lukas

Papademos Press Office (interviewed on 01.11.2010)

Tsoukalis, Loukas, Professor of European Organization, University of Athens,

President of ELIAMEP (Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign

Policy) (interviewed on 19.11.2010)

Further reading

Bland, Michael, Theaker, Alison and Wragg, David (2000) Effective Media

Relations, London: Kogan Page Limited.

Cialdini, Robert B. () Influence Science and Practice, Needham Heights, MA:

Allyn & Bacon.

Cohen, Bernard C. (1957) The Political Process and Foreign Policy The Making

of the Japanese Peace Settlement, New Jersey: Princeton University

Press.

Couloumbis, Theodoros A., Kariotis, Theodore and Bellou, Fotini (eds.) (2003)

Greece in the Twentieth Century, London: Frank Cass.

Dayan, Daniel and Katz, Elihu (1992) Media Events: The Live Broadcasting of

History, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Deese, David A. (ed.) (1994) The New Politics of American Foreign Policy, New

York : St. Martin's Press.

Eban, Abba Solomon (1998) Diplomacy for the Next Century, New Haven : Yale

University Press.

Esser, Frank and Pfetsch, Barbara (eds.) (2004) Comparing Political

Communicatin: Theories, Cases and Challenges, Cambridge ; New York :

Cambridge University Press.

Featherstone, Kevin (2006) Politics and Policy in Greece The Challenge of

Modernisation, Oxon: Routledge.

Frankel, Joseph (1963) The Making of Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Decision-

Making, London: Oxford University Press.

Gallhofer, Irmtraud N. and Saris, Willem E. (1996) Foreign Policy Decision-

Making: A qualitative and Quantitative Analysis of Political

Argumentation, Westport: Praeger.

41

Hamilton, Keith and Langhorne, Richard (1994) The Practice of Diplomacy: Its

Evolution, Theory and Administration, London; New York: Routledge.

Havick, John J. (1983) Communications Policy and the Political Process,

Westport: Greenwood Press.

Iyengar, Shanto (1991) Is Anyone Responsible? How Television Frames Political

Issues, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Johnson-Cartee, Karen S. and Copeland, Gary A. (2004) Strategic Political

Communication, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Lippmann, Walter (1922) Public Opinion, New York: Harcourt, Brace and

Company.

Luttbeg, Norman R. (1968) Public Opinion and Public Policy Models of Political

Linkage, Homewood: The Dorsey Press.

Miller, Derek B. (2007) Media Pressure on Foreign Policy: the Evolving

Theoretical Framework, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

McQuail, Denis (1987) Mass Communication Theory, London: Sage.

Monroe, Price E., Rozumilowicz, Beata and Verhulst, Stefaan G. (eds.) (2002)

Media Reform Democratizing the Media, Democratizing the State,

London: Routledge.

Nacos, Brigitte L., Shapiro, Robert Y. and Isernia, Pierangelo (2000)

Decisionmaking in a Glass House: Mass Media, Public Opinion, and

American and European Foreign Policy in the 21st Century, Lanham:

Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Negrine, Ralph (1996) The Communication of Politics, London: Sage.

Nimmo, Dan and Combs, James E. (1992) The Political Pundits, New York:

Praeger.

Renshon, Stanley A. and Welch Larson, Deborah (eds.) (2003) Good Judgement

in Foreign Policy, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Seib, Philip (1997) Headline Diplomacy How News Coverage Affects Foreign

Policy, Westport: Praeger.

Tanter, Raymond and Ullman, Richard H. (1972) Theory and Policy in

International Relations, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

42

Tumber, Howard (2000) Media Power, Professionals and Policies, London;

New York : Routledge.

Zahariadis, Nikolaos (2005) Essence of Political Manipulation Emotion,

Institutions, & Greek Foreign Policy, New York: Peter Lang Publishing.

Latest Papers in this Series

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53. Prasopoulou, Elpida, In quest for accountability in Greek public

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and Performance: Lessons from the Privatization of OTE, April 2011

45. Lyrintzis, Christos, Greek Politics in the Era of Economic Crisis:

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44. Monastiriotis, Vassilis and Jordaan, Jacob A., Regional Distribution and

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2011

43. Apergis, Nicholas, Characteristics of inflation in Greece: mean spillover

effects among CPI components, January 2011

42. Kazamias, George, From Pragmatism to Idealism to Failure: Britain in the

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41. Dimas, Christos, Privatization in the name of ‘Europe’. Analyzing the

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37. Vraniali, Efi, Rethinking Public Financial Management and Budgeting in

Greece: time to reboot?, July 2010

36. Lyberaki, Antigone, The Record of Gender Policies in Greece 1980-2010:

legal form and economic substance, June 2010

35. Markova, Eugenia, Effects of Migration on Sending Countries: lessons

from Bulgaria, May 2010

34. Tinios, Platon, Vacillations around a Pension Reform Trajectory: time for

a change?, April 2010

33. Bozhilova, Diana, When Foreign Direct Investment is Good for

Development: Bulgaria’s accession, industrial restructuring and regional

FDI, March 2010

32. Karamessini, Maria, Transition Strategies and Labour Market Integration

of Greek University Graduates, February 2010

31. Matsaganis, Manos and Flevotomou, Maria, Distributional implications

of tax evasion in Greece, January 2010

Online papers from the Hellenic Observatory

All GreeSE Papers are freely available for download at http://www2.lse.ac.uk/

europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/pubs/GreeSE.aspx

Papers from past series published by the Hellenic Observatory are available at

http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/hellenicObservatory/pubs/DP_oldseries.htm