The Common Good: A Buck-passing Account Eric Beerbohm and...
Transcript of The Common Good: A Buck-passing Account Eric Beerbohm and...
ForthcomingintheJournalofPoliticalPhilosophy
TheCommonGood:ABuck-passingAccountEricBeerbohmandRyanDavis
The“commongood”isappealedtobyphilosophers,politicalscientists,andpoliticiansalike.
Althoughtheirpurposesarediverse,mostinvocationsofthecommongoodshareaunified
orientationtowardit.Thecommongoodistakentobeanidealworthyofourpoliticalpursuit.The
commongoodrepresentsawayofrisingaboveprivateorparochialinterests,settingasidepolitical
posturingorgamesmanship,andworkingtowardgoalswhosevaluenonecoulddeny.1Givenits
uniformlypositivevalence,itshouldnotbesurprisingthatthecommongoodisoftenpairedwith
theotherguidingconceptofpoliticalsociety:justice.Wearefrequentlytoldthattheappropriate
aimofadeliberativedemocracyistoward“justiceandthecommongood,”implicatingboththatthe
commongoodissomethingbeyondjusticeitself,butalsothatbothconceptsplayasimilar
function—asappropriateguidestopoliticalactivity.2
Whatwillinterestushereisnothowjusticeandthecommongoodaretreatedsimilarly,but
inacontrastbetweenthem.Whilejustice—perhapswithoutmuchcontroversy—isthemost
examinedconceptinpoliticalphilosophy,therehasbeenrelativelylittlesystematicstudyofits
complement.Ifweagreethatjusticeifthe“firstvirtue”ofpoliticalsociety,itmaywellwarrant
greaterscrutiny.Yetthecomparisonbetweenjusticeandthecommongoodsetsinreliefthedeep
disparityinattention.Ifthecommongood,aswellasjustice,shouldguideourpoliticalreasoning
andaction,thenthisconceptlikewisemeritstheoreticalattention.
Ouraimistoprovidetheoutlinesofatheoryofthecommongood.Wewillproposea
partiallyrevisionaryaccount.Onourview,tosayaproposalisinthecommongoodistosaythat
1See,recently,DominiqueLeydet,“PartisanLegislaturesandDemocraticDeliberation,”Journalof
PoliticalPhilosophy22:3(2014);EricMcGhee,SethMasket,BorisShor,StevenRogers,andNolanMcCarty,“APrimaryCauseofPartisanship?NominationSystemsandLegislatorIdeology,”AmericanJournalofPoliticalScience58:2(2013):337-351
2See,forexample,EricMacGilvary,“DemocraticDoubts:PragmatismandtheEpistemicDefenseofDemocracy,”JournalofPoliticalPhilosophy22:1(2014):105-123.HereMacGilvaryisfollowingJoshCohen,“AnEpistemicConceptionofDemocracy,”Ethics97(1986):26-38.
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therearereasonstoacttogethertobringitabout.WetakethisaccounttoofferwhatCarnapcalled
anexplicativeconcept.3Ourviewpreservesafairamountofthemeaningofthewordineveryday
use.Atthesametime,werefinetheconcepttomeetasetofthreerelevanttheoreticaldesiderata,to
bedescribedinsection1.Section2willpresentourpositiveaccount.Sections3and4willinturn
illustratehowouraccountmeetsthedesiderata,andrespondtoobjections.
1. DesiderataforaTheoryoftheCommonGood
Weshouldnotethatourprimaryaimwillbetowardtheory-building,andsowillbeexploratory
ratherthancritical.Forexample,wewillnotarguethatalternativewaysofspecifyingtheconcept
ofthecommongoodwillfailtomeetourdesiderata.Ouraimisnottoprecludeotherwaysof
theorizingthecommongood,buttosuggesttheneedfortheoryinthefirstplace.Conceptual
choicesshouldnotbemadeunconsciously,andouraimistomakeexplicitsomepossibleoptions.
Aswithanyconceptualchoices,therearecostsandbenefitstoourfavoredview.Withthisas
background,wewillsuggestthatatheoryofthecommongoodshouldmeetthreecriteria.Itshould
bedistributivelyneutral,non-partisan,andextensionallyadequate.
First,theconceptofthecommongoodshouldnotprivilegetheinterestsorvaluesofsome
membersofasocietyoverothers.Anygood-centeredapproachbringsacertainhazardtopolitical
deliberation.Itallowscitizenstomakeargumentsthatpaperoverinterpersonaltrade-offs.Inso
doing,itcreatesthepossibilitythattheconceptitselfcouldbiasthedistributionofgoodsor
resources.Suchaconsequence,webelieve,shouldcountasatheoreticalcost.Instead,aconceptof
thecommongoodshouldbedistributivelyneutralamongtheinterestsofrelevantparties.
Itmayhelptohaveaconcreteexampleofhowconceptofthecommongoodcanbeinvoked
inawaythatrunsafoulofdistributiveneutrality.RobertMosesensuredthatsomeofNewYork’s
3RudolfCarnap,MeaningandNecessity:AStudyinSemanticsandModalLogic.(Chicago,IL:The
UniversityofChicagoPress,1947)
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overpassesweresolowthatbusescouldnoteasilytravelfromthepoorestboroughs.4Herethe
distributiveburdenplacedontheleastwelloffwasmorallyunacceptableonarangeofegalitarian
views.Mosesdefendedhisblueprintinabstractions.Hewasparticularlyfondofcitingthecommon
orpublicgoodashisally.Ofcourse,hisactionswerenotactuallysanctionedbyagood-oriented
approachtopoliticalmorality.Butitraisesthedistributiveworryabouthowtheconceptofthe
commongoodcanbeused.Ifpublicofficialsthinkofthemselvesasmakingdecisionsthataregood-
for-us,theymaybetemptedtoglossoverdisparitiesconcealedbehindthisnormativebanner.
AlthoughthecaseofRobertMosesisanextremeinstanceofdeployingthe“commongood”
asaguisefordistributivebias,realizingdistributiveneutralitycanbedifficulty.Asanother
example,consider“objectivelist”theoriesofthecommongood.Accordingtotheseaccounts,the
commongoodisgivenbyalistofgoodstakentobepositivelyvaluabletoeverymemberofa
politicalcommunity.Evenseeminglyuncontroversialitemsonsuchlistscanbedistributively
consequential.Manyobjectivelistsofthe“commongood”willcitenationalsecurity,forinstance.5
Whilenationalsecuritymaybeintheinterestofeverycitizen,allocatingresourcesinawaythat
marginallyreducesthesusceptibilityofthepoliticalstatetoattackmaymeanlittletocitizens
whosebodilysecurityisvulnerabletoviolencebyothermembersoftheirhousehold,community,
oreven,possibly,localgovernmentauthorities.Anotherfrequentitemonlistsofthecommongood
isequalityineducation.6Whilecertainlyaworthyideal,allocatingresourcestoachieveequalityin
educationmaymattermosttothosewhoalreadyreceiveaneducationthatprovidesbasiccivic
capacities.Forthosenotyetinthisgroup,equalityineducationmaynotbeameaningfulideal.7In
4RobertCaro,ThePowerBroker:RobertMosesandtheFallofNewYork(NewYork:VintageBooks,
1975).5Forexample,BrianM.Barry,PoliticalArgument(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1965),p.
195.6ThiselementhasaRawlsianpedigree.SeealsoSamuelFreeman,“DeliberativeDemocracy:A
SympatheticComment,”Philosophy&PublicAffairs29:4(2000):371-418,p.412.7Forthispoint,seeElizabethAnderson,“FairEqualityinEducation:ADemocraticEquality
Perspective,”Ethics117(2007):595-622.Animportantpaperinthehistoryofsociologyonclassandeducation,whichvividlyportraysthevariedwaysinwhichstatusinfluencesmanyaspectsofeducation,isJeanAnyon,“SocialClassandSchoolKnowledge,”CurriculumInquiry1:1(1981):3-42.
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eachofthesecases,aseeminglyuncontroversialitemonanobjectivelistofthecommongoodmay
quietlyimportcertainbackgroundassumptionsaboutwhichdistributiveissuesaremostpressing.
Oursecondproposeddesideratumforaconceptofthecommongoodisthatitshouldbe
non-partisan.Theconceptofthecommongoodshouldbespecifiedinawaythatallowsforthefull
rangeofsubstantivedebateaboutwhatshouldcountaspartofthecommongood.Wehavea
strongmethodologicalreasontofosteragreementaboutcoreconcepts,sincethatallowsforthe
possibilityofgreaterclarityindisagreementsamongconceptions.Toseetheforceofthisreason,
wecanagainlooktoconceptofdistributivejustice.Membersofasociety–andtheirresident
philosophers–canagreethattheyareinterestedincomingupwiththerightdistributionof
benefitsandburdensinacooperativesocialarrangement.Theconceptofjustice,inthissense,
helpssettheircollectiveproblem.Theywilldisagreeaboutwhichparticulartheoryoffersa
plausibleanswertothispredicament.Buttheyhaveaplatformonwhichtodisagree,make
concessions,andevensearchforoverlappingprinciples.
Partisanaccountsofthecommongoodwillfailtoprovidethisservice.Instead,theywill
tendtofavorsomefirst-orderviewaboutmoralityorpoliticsattheexpenseofothers.Itis
temptingtotalkaboutthecommongoodinawaythatcastsadistinctivetelicvalence.Thecommon
goodcaneasilybethoughtofasavaluethatisbothspecifiableintermsofanendstatetobe
realizedorpromoted,and“common”—inthephilosophicallyloadedsenseof“agentneutral.”But
tomakethissuppositionwouldbetoruleoutmanycontendingtheoriesaboutpoliticallife.An
especiallyprominentincludesseveralformsofdeonticegalitarianism.Relationalegalitarianism,
wewanttosuggest,isplainlyincompatiblewithagood-centeredview.Itholdsthatwhatismorally
centralisrelatingtoothersonjustifiableterms.Inequalitiesofgoods–powerorwealth–can
reflectformsofmistreatment.Itconstruesequalityasasocialandpolitical–notfundamentally
distributive–value.Onthisview,thevalueofequalityliesnotinabstractpatternsoritsimpacton
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ourwell-being.Itrests,instead,inthewebofrelationshipsthatweholdasdirectlyvaluable.A
good-orientedapproachwillmisplacethesignificanceofequality.
Third,andmostobviously,anaccountofthecommongoodshouldbeextensionally
adequate.Itshouldbeabletomakesenseofcontemporaryusesamongtheorists,aswellas
practitionersofpolitics.Extensionaladequacydoesnotruleoutthepossibilityofconceptual
revision.8Sometimes,existingpracticemaybepartisanandordistributivelybiased,andso
theoreticalrevisionmayofferthepossibilitiesforprovidingamoreusefulconcept.However,the
conceptshouldcontinuetoanswertoactualpractice.Ausefulconceptmustbeonethatis
intelligiblefromthepointofviewofthosewho,infact,invokeit.
2. ABuck-PassingAccount
Wearelookingforawayofformulatingthecommongoodinawaythatisdistributivelyneutral,
non-partisanamongcompetingconceptions,andextensionallyadequateinlightofuse.How
shouldweproceed?Letusinspecttherolethatthisnotionplaysinourfirst-personalplural
reasoning.Supposewearedeliberatingwhethertoinvestmoreinourspaceprogramor
performingarts.Argumentsthatoneoftheseprogramsis“better-for-us”wouldcomeacrossas
unusual.Itwouldseemtobeprovidingareasonofthewrongkind.Toseetheforceofthis,consider
theexperienceofindividualdecision-making.Inourpersonalchoices,itisstrikinghowrarelywe
aredirectlyguidedbytheaimofourowngood.TheindividualwhohasjustclimbedMount
Himalayawillnotbegladtorecastheraccomplishmentintermsofherwell-beingorinterest.To
her,acceptingthattheclimbwasgoodforher–onwhatevermetricyou’dlike–neednotmakethe
experiencemorevaluable.Itisinthissensethatwhatis“goodforus”is,inScanlon’slanguage,
“evaluativelytransparent.”9So,ifweoptforthepolicyofbolsteringthespaceprogram,wedosofor
reasonsthatweseeaschoiceworthyintheirownright.Wearenotmakingagood-for-usappeal–
8Cf.Godfrey-Smith,“MetaphysicsandthePhilosophicalImagination,”PhilosophicalStudies160:1
(2012):97-113.9Scanlon,WhatWeOwetoEachOther(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress),93.
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whateveraggregativeprocedurewearelikelytouse.Thisisn’ttosaythattheprogram’simpacton
thegoodofparticularindividualsisnull,orthatisgoesunregistered.Butwerecognizethatour
collectiveaimisvaluedprimarilyfornon-welfaristreasons.
HerewefollowT.M.Scanlon’sinfluentialbuck-passingaccountofthegood.Scanlonwrites:
[B]einggood,orvaluable,isnotapropertythatitselfprovidesareasontorespondtoa
thingincertainways.Rather,tobegoodorvaluableistohaveotherpropertiesthat
constitutesuchreasons.Sincetheclaimthatsomepropertyconstitutesareasonisa
normativeclaim,thisaccountalsotakesgoodnessandvaluetobenon-naturalproperties,
namelythepurelyformal,higher-orderpropertiesofhavingsomelower-orderproperties
thatprovidereasonsoftherelevantkind.10
InScanlon’soriginalversion,predicates“good”or“valuable”refer(passthebuck)toother
properties,whichprovidereasonsforadoptingvariousattitudes.11ModifyingScanlon’sidea,we
propose,
TheBuck-PassingAccountoftheCommonGood:Beinginthecommongoodconsists
inthefactthattherearereasonstoacttogethertobringitabout.
OurproposalmodifiesScanlon’sinseveralways.First,theparagraphfromScanloncitedabove
famouslycontainsatleasttwotheses:onenegativeandtheotherpositive.Thenegativethesis
claimsthatsomething’sbeinggooddoesnot,itself,providereasons.Thepositivethesisclaimsthat
something’sbeinggoodindicatesthattherearealwaysotherreasonstorespondtoitinsome
appreciativeway.12Ashasbeenpointedoutinthemeta-ethicalliterature,thesethesesare
independent.Wewillbeinterestedonlyinadaptingthepositivethesis.Thetruthofthepositive
10Scanlon,WhatWeOwetoEachOther,97.11Asarefereehelpfullypressesustoclarify,ourproposalforthecommongoodwillnotrequire
adoptinganyspecificviewoftheroleof‘thegood’incollectivedeliberation.12Butnotnecessarilythatthereareonlyotherreasonstorespondinanappreciativeway.Our
thankstoarefereeforpressingustoclarifythis.Ifthepositivethesisimpliedtherewereonlyotherreasons,thenitwouldentailthenegativethesis.
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thesisdoesnotentailthenegativethesis.13Moreover,withasufficientlycapaciousviewofreasons,
itispossibletothinkthatthegoodmightprovidereasonsevenifitmerelyreferstoother,reason-
providingproperties.InSchroeder’scase,Nate’sfriendtellsNatethatthereisareasontogointo
thelivingroom,butdoesnottellhimwhatthereasonis(unbeknownsttoNate,asurpriseparty
awaitshimthere).WhenNategoesintothelivingroom,heactsontheconsiderationthat“thereis
areasonforhimtogointothelivingroom.”Byhypothesis,though,healsoactsforareason.Butif
thisfactcan,itself,countasareason,thenitseemsthatthenegativebuck-passingthesisisfalse.
Analogouscasesareeveneasiertofindatthecollectivelevel.Inaworldofcomplex
decision-making,policymakersareoftenforcedtorely—tosomeextent,anyway—onexperts.14
Supposeanadvisortellsarepresentativethatthereisreasontovoteforaneconomicstimulus
package.Itmaywellbethattherepresentativehasneithertheexpertisetounderstandwhatthe
reasonisnorthetimetocometounderstandthereason.Nevertheless,itmayberationalforthe
representativetovoteforthepackage.Therepresentativestillvotesforareason—namely,“that
thereisareasontovoteforthestimuluspackage.”However,thenegativethesiswouldrequirethat
therepresentativeactfornoreasonatall,since,byhypothesis,shehasnoother,first-orderreasons
forvotingforthepackage.Thus,thereisananalogousdisconfirmingcaseforthenegativethesis.
Becausethenegativebuck-passingthesismighttherebyencounterproblems,wewillnowsetit
aside.(Equally,nothingwesaywillrequirethatthenegativethesisbefalse.)
Second,ourbuck-passingaccountofthecommongoodisfocusedonreasonsforaction,
ratherthanreasonsforsomeotherattitudeorsetofattitudes.Onemightworrythatthisfeature
willraiseapartisanshipobjectionagainstourownaccount,privilegingdeontologicalratherthan
consequentialistfirst-orderpoliticalviews.However,consequentialistsalsohavetheoriesofright
action,andthereisnoobstacletothinkingthatrightactionsarejustthosethatpromotedesirable
13Cf.MarkSchroeder,“TheBuck-passers’NegativeThesis,”PhilosophicalExplorations12:3(2011).14Cf.Pettit,“DepoliticizingDemocracy,”RatioJuris17:1(2004):52-65.
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statesofaffairs.Ourproposalisevencompatiblewithversionsofconsequentialismaccordingto
whichallvaluesareagent-neutral.15Morecentrally,thereasonsthatwehavetoactwilldependon
thereasonswehaveforintending,whichwillinturndependonourreasonsfordesiring.16Soit
willmatterlittle,fromthestandpointoffirst-ordernormativetheory,whetherwedescribeour
accountintermsofdesires,intentions,oractions.
Onourproposal,itismostnaturaltofocusonreasonsforacting,sinceactingissomething
thatwecandotogether.Ouraccounttherebyconnectsactiontothe“common”aspectofthe
commongood.Weneednottakeanyparticularstandonhowactingtogetherworks:whether,for
example,itinvolvesnon-reductivecollectiveagents,someagentsactingonintentionsformedby
otheragents,orthelike.17Weconsideritavirtueofouraccountthatitisaction-theoretically
lightweight.Further,weneednotarticulatenowexactlyhowrobustoursharedagencymustbe.In
somecasesofactingtogether,ourindividualactionsmaybetightlycoordinated.(Think,for
example,ofreliefworkersactingaspartofasingle,unifiedplanofaction).Onotheroccasions,our
involvementinactingwithfellowcitizensmaybelimitedtodeliberationorvotingthataimstolink
upwiththeactionsofotherstomodifypolicydownstream.18Instillothercases,itmayinvolve
incorporation,iftherelevantreasonsfavorformingacollectivebodyorinstitutionwherenone
15Suchconsequentialistsmaysimplyexpandthesetofreasonsthatapplytoall-of-ustogether,since
allvalueswould,inprinciple,warrantpromotionbyanyagent,nomattertheirposition.Ontheotherhand,somecollectionsofagentswilllikelybecontingentlybebetterplacetopromotesomevaluesthanothers,whichmayrestrictwhatisinthecommongoodforparticulargroups.Ingeneral,theonlyconsequentialiststhatmightbeconcernedwithourviewwouldbethosewhofavoreliminatingdeontictermsaltogether.Eveninthatcase,however,suchtheoristsmightretaintheconceptof“reasonsforaction,”evenwhiledischargingconceptslike“rightness”and“wrongness.”
16Fordiscussion,seeJohnSkorupski’s“bridgeprinciple,”inhisTheDomainofReasons(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2010):p.265.AsimilarpointisforwardedbyHowardNye,DavidPlunkett,andJohn,Ku,“Non-ConsequentialismDemystified,”Philosopher’sImprint15:4(2015).
17SeeMargaretGilbert,JointCommitment:HowWeMaketheSocialWorld(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2013);MichaelBratman,SharedAgency:APlanningTheoryofActingTogether(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2014);DavidVelleman,“HowtoShareanIntention?”inSelftoSelf(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2006);AbrahamRoth,“SharedAgencyandContralateralCommitments,”ThePhilosophicalReview113:3(2004).
18Foranaccountofhowourwillscanbecomeinvolvedincommonendeavors,butinawaythatalsodoesnotrequiresuigeneriscollectiveagents,seeXXX.
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existedpreviously.19Anotherrelatedpoint:takingthecommongoodtodirectustoreasonstoact
togetherdoesnotdenythatindividualssometimeshavereasontoactaloneforthecommongood.
Itmerelyentailsthatindividualsdohavereasontoactwithothersforthecommongood.Sothe
proposalcanbeneutralon,forinstance,debatesbetweenRawlsandG.A.Cohen.20Thatis,agents
mightpursuethecommongoodtogetherthroughinstitutions(likethosecomprisingRawls’s‘basic
structure’)orthroughtheactionsofindividualpersons.
Thebuck-passingaccountthusconnectsthecommongoodwithactingtogether.This
featuresupportstheideathatthatthereasonstoactforthecommongoodwillalsobereasonsfor
us,together.Inotherwords,thereasonstoadoptcertainactionsorattitudesmaybeunderstoodas
agent-relative.Becausebuck-passingaccountsofthegooddonotsuggeststatesofaffairsasthe
fundamentalbearersofvalueindependentofthenormativedeliberationofagents,theyfitmore
easilywiththephenomenonofagent-relativity.21Buck-passingaccountscanmakesenseofthe
ideaofindexedvaluesthatprovidereasonstoparticularagents.Mykeepingmypromisemaybe
goodmebutnotgoodyou.Myavoidingterriblesuffering,ontheotherhand,maybegoodmeand
goodyou.Ingeneral:
∀x(xhasreasontodowhatisgoodx)
WhenIactalone,Ioughttoactonconsiderationsofwhatisgoodrelativetome.22Whenweact
together,wemightthenexpectthatweshouldactonwhatisgoodrelativetous.Weshouldacton
reasons“attributabletous,collectively,astheirjointsubject”—or“reasons-for-us.”23Theseideas
19Onincorporationtoachievesharedgoods,seePhilipPettit,“ResponsibilityIncorporated,”Ethics
117(2007):171-201.20SeeG.A.Cohen,“WheretheActionIs:OntheSiteofDistributiveJustice,”Philosophy&PublicAffairs
26(1997):3-30.21Cf.Wallace’sdescriptionofteleologicalaccountsas“inhospitable”tothephenomenonofagent-
relativity.SeeR.JayWallace,“Reasons,ValuesandAgent-Relativity,”Dialectica64:4(2010):503-528,p.519.22AhelpfulexpositionofagentrelativevalueisgivenbyMichaelSmith,“NeutralandRelativeValue
afterMoore,”Ethics113(2003):576-598.23AndreaWestlund,“DecidingTogether,”Philosopher’sImprint9:10(2009),p.2.
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mightmakeittemptingtothinkthatforsomegroupofagents,thecommongoodisgivenbysome
functionoftheagent-relativegoodsoftheagentscomprisingthegroup.Suchas:
∀x∀y(xandyhavereasontodotogetherwhatisbothgoodxandgoody)
Inwhichcase,thecommongood(xandy)wouldbegivenasafunctionofgoodxandgoody.Thatis,the
commongood(xandy)couldbereducedtotheagent-relativegoodsofXandY.Theremightbesome
challengeinspecifyinghowthisreductionwouldwork,sinceinsomecaseswhatisgoodxmightalso
bebady.Suchcases(andperhapsothers)wouldhavetoberuledout.Butinprinciple,wemight
thinkthattheagentrelativegoodofagroupcanbe“factored”intotheagentrelativegoodsofits
members.
Yetthereareavarietyofcaseswherewehavereasons-for-usthatmaynotbereduciblein
thisway.AsWestlundpointsout,ifamarriedcoupleisplanningavacation,itmaybeimportantto
eachpersonthattheotherhasreasonsfromtheirownpointofviewforacceptingtheproposed
destination,eveniftheotheriswillingto“leaveitup”totheirpartner.24Insuchacase,tosaythata
destinationisgoodrelativetomeandgoodrelativetoyou(since,byhypothesis,myhavingahappy
vacationisgoodyou),itdoesn’tfollowthatwehavereasons-for-ustogothere.Ontheotherhand,I
maysometimesbepersuadedthatevenifsomeplanisbadme,therestillmightbereasons-for-usto
doit.Thatis,althoughIhaveanexanteagent-relativereasonagainstsomeplan,Imightfindin
deliberationwithyouthatyouragent-relativereasonsfavoringtheplanarereasonsIcan,ina
sense,sharebydecidingtoadoptyourendsasmyown.25AsWestlundputsit,“co-deliberators
24Ibid.,p.7.KasparLippert-Rassmussenpointsoutthatagent-relativityintuitivelyinvolves
assigning“differentaimstodifferentagents.”[SeeLippert-Rassmussen,Deontology,Responsibility,andEquality(Copehhagen:MuseumTusculanumPress,2005),p.16].Ifagentrelativityingeneralinvokestheperspectivesofseparateagents,thenthecommongoodintuitivelyassigningasingleperspectivetoagentsactingtogether.
25Compare,KylaEbels-Duggan,“AgainstBeneficence:ANormativeAccountofLove,”Ethics119:1(2008):142-170;ChristineKorsgaard,“TheReasonsWeCanShare,”inCreatingtheKingdomofEnds(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1996).ComparealsowithJohnFinnis,“PublicGood:TheSpecificallyCommonGoodinAquinas,”inR.P.George[ed.]NaturalLawandMoralInquiry(Washington,DC:GeorgetownUniversityPress,1998).
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behavereasonablywhentheyaredialogicallysensitivetotheinterdependenceoftheirindividual
reasonsforacceptingRasareason-for-them.”26
Resolvingsuchmattersextendsbeyondourpresentscope,butwesuggestthree
implications.First,thedifficultyoffactoringthecommongoodintoitsconstituentgoodsis
probativefortheviewthatthecommongoodmustbereachedthroughsomedeliberativeprocess
(wewillreturntothislater).Second,itmaybeanopenquestionwhethersomegroupofagentshas
acommongoodatall—this,itself,maybeanappropriatesubjectforpoliticaltheorizing.Third,the
irreducibilityofthecommongoodcountsinfavorofitstheoreticalusefulness.Itoffersareasonto
thinkthatweshouldnoteliminatetheconceptaltogetherinfavorofsimpler,lesscontested
notions.27Instead,wemightseethecommongoodasirreduciblyagent-relativetoagroup,asin:
∀x∀y(Ifxandyhaveacommongood,thenxandyhavereasontodotogetherwhatisinthe
commongood(xandy))
Thisproposalclearlydoesnotrequirethatforanysetofagents,theremustbeacommongood.
Whetherthereisacommongoodinthefirstplace—foragroupsomehowdelimited—maybea
controversialmatter.Thereisalsonosuggestionthatthecommoncouldcanbefactoredintothe
goodsofspecificmembers—althoughitalsodoesnotdenythispossibility.Forgroupsthatdohave
acommongood,theproposalanalyzesthatgoodintermsofreasonsthatmembersofthegroup
havetoacttogethertobringitabout.
3. VirtuesoftheBuck-PassingAccount
Withtheproposalnowmoreclearlyinview,wecanconsiderhowourbuck-passingaccount
managesthedistributiveandpartisanshipobjections.Thebuck-passingaccountneednotreduce
26Westlund,p.10.27Non-eliminativestrategiesareofcoursealsosupportedbythecontinuedusefulnessofthe
distinctionbetweenself-interestandamoregeneralcivicinterest.Thissortofdistinctionisdeployed,forexample,inKasparLippert-Rasmussen,“VoteBuyingandElectionPromises:ShouldDemocratsCareAbouttheDifference?”TheJournalofPoliticalPhilosophy19:2(2011):125-144,especiallyn.13.
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thecommongoodtothegoodspickedoutbythewelfarefunctionofanyperson,setofpersons,or
group.Wemayhavereasonstoacttogethertopromoteorhonorimpersonalvalues.Wemayalso
havereasonstoacttogethertopromoteorhonorgoodsconnectedtopersonsnotincludedamong
thoseacting.Inprinciple,suchactionsarejustasmuchpartofour“commongood”asthemountain
climber’squestisapartofherindividualgood.Recallthatinthemountainclimber’scase,wedo
notjudgethatshehassomeexanteinterestsatisfiedinbeingatthetopofamountain.28Rather,
sheadoptstheaimofclimbingthemountainforreasonsthatmakethisaworthyproject,anditis
thengoodforherwelfaretoachieveheraim.Inthecaseofourcommongood,wemayacttogether
forreasonsthat(morallyorotherwise)warrantouraction,andachievingourcommonaim
becomesgoodforuscollectively.29Thus,ouraccountcanremainneutralwithrespectto
distributivequestions.
Thebuck-passingaccountofthecommongoodisalsonon-partisan.Becauseittakesno
axiologicalstand,itallowsfordebatesbetweencompetingpoliticaltheoriestobedecidedontheir
substantivemerits,ratherthanconceptualfiat.Liberalegalitarian,communitarian,naturallaw,and
republicantheoriescanallbegivenintermsofreasonstoacttogether.Libertarians—sometimes
28Wallaceisalsogoodonthispoint,in“TheRightnessofActsandtheGoodnessofLives,”inSmith,
Pettit,SchefflerandWallace(eds.)ReasonandValue(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2004).29Itmaybeintuitivelyoddtoregardallactionwhichwehavereasontodotogetheraspartofthe
commongood.Forexample,supposethatasodacompanywouldgiveeveryAmericancitizenalargesumofmoneyifeachpersonpurchasedonecanofthesoda.Thecompany’sgenerouspublicitystuntwouldseemtogiveallAmericanssufficientreasontocoordinatetheiractionstogetherinresponsetothesamesetofconsiderations.Butitseemsoddtothinkthatinbuyingthesoda,Iamactingforthecommongood.(WethankAdamKernforcallingthispointtoourattentionwiththiscase.)Theissueisthatthiscaseofthecommongoodappearslikeasetofmanyindividualprivategoods,ratherthanonepublicgood.Hereitmayhelptodistinguishthecommongoodfromtherelatednotionofthepublicgood.Thecontrastbetweenpublicandprivategoodsisoftenconnectedtotheideaofexcludabilityornon-excludability.Becausethesodacasefocusesattentiononeachindividualreceivingacorrespondinglyindividuatedgoodratherthansharingasinglegood,ithasthefeelavaluethatisin-principleexcludable.Soitseemsnottobewithinthepublicgood.Foramoredetaileddiscussionoftheconceptofthepublicgoodanditshistory,seeJaneMansbridge,“OntheContestedNatureofthePublicGood,”inWalterW.PowellandElisabethS.Clemens(eds.)PrivateActionandthePublicGood(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1998).Mansbridgealsonotesthehistoricalevolutionoftheconceptofthecommongood.Foranothersignificanttreatmentofthepublicgood,seeRobertE.Goodin,"InstitutionalizingthePublicInterest:TheDefenseofDeadlockandBeyond,"TheAmericanPoliticalScienceReview90,no.2(1996).
13
waryoftheverynotionofjointaction—mightworrythattheirviewswillnotbeexpressible
throughthebuck-passingaccount.Forthatmatter,libertariansmightcontendthattheveryideaof
thecommongoodisapartisanone,smugglingincollectivistvalues.30However,evenstrict
libertariansallowthattherearesometimesreasonstoacttogetherthroughpolitics.31
Nordoesthebuck-passingaccountsmuggleinanimplicitconsequentialism.Wemayhave
reasonstoacttogetherthatfollowfromtherelationshipswecurrentlyshare,ormightrealize
throughsharedaction.Thesereasonsmightnotbegroundedfundamentallyinourwelfare
(althoughmay,asnoted,derivativelyconnecttowelfare),andtheymayalsonotbeabout
promotinganystateofaffairs.Thispointbearsemphasizing,asitmightseemthatthedifference
hereismerelyverbal.32Forexample,acriticmightarguethattheconsequentialistversionofthe
commongoodcouldalsocapturerelationalreasons(e.g.weoughttopromotethestateofaffairsin
whichwestandwithothercitizensinrelationshipsofequality).Importantly,thiskindofre-
descriptiondoesnotnecessarilycapturethesamesetofreasons.Tosaythatthemountainclimber
hasareasontoclimbthemountainisnotequivalenttosayingthatshehasareasontobringabout
thestateofaffairsinwhichshehasclimbedthemountain.Anambitiousbutself-effacingmountain
climbermighthavereasontowanttoclimbEverest(agreatachievement!),butnothavereasonto
wanttobringaboutthestateofaffairsinwhichshehadclimbedEverest(toomuchattention!).As
30Forthisversionofapartisanobjectionagainstthecommongood,seeGeoffreyBrennanandLoren
Lomasky,“AgainstRevivingRepublicanism,”Politics,Philosophy&Economics5:2(2006),especiallysectionII.31Forexample,ifthereisuniversalconsenttosomedecisionprocedureotherthanuniversalconsent
forsomedomainofcollectivedecisions,thenonemightregardthatdecisionprocedureasonewehavereasontogethertofollow.Cf.JamesBuchanan,TheCalculusofConsent:LogicalFoundationsofConstitutionalDemocracy(AnnArbor:UniversityofMichiganPress,1965).AhelpfulintroductionisprovidedinJohnThrasherandGeraldGaus,“OnTheCalculusofConsent”inJecobLevy[ed.]TheOxfordHandbookofClassicsinContemporaryPoliticalTheory(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,forthcoming).
32Nozick,forexample,allowedthatdifferencemightbeverbal,butremainedsuspiciousofconsequentialistre-descriptions.SeeAnarchyStateandUtopia(NewYork:BasicBooks,1974):29.
14
Nye,Plunkett,andKupointout,thefunctionalroleofact-directedreasonscanbequitedifferent
fromstate-directedreasons.33
Sotooforreasonsinthecommongood.Wemayhavereasontoacttobringaboutsocial
equality,notjusttobringitaboutthatweachievedsocialequality.Toseethedifference,imagine
socialequalitybeingachievedbythesamegroupofpeople,butinonecasethroughexclusively
privateactions,andinanothercasethroughtheuseofasharedstateapparatus.34Ourpresent
pointisnotthattheactionmattersbeyondthefactofrealizingthestateinwhichtheactionis
performed,butmerelythatitmaymatter,andoursoconceptualtoolsshouldnotoccludethis
possibility.Thatshouldbelefttothebusinessofsubstantivepoliticalargument.Itmaymatterthat
wehavereasontoapologizeforhistoricalinjustice,notjustthatwebringaboutthestateofaffairs
inwhichweapologized.Itmaymatterthatweprovidehumanitarianaid,notjustthatwebring
aboutastateofaffairswhereaidisprovidedbyus.
Thislastpointleadstoafinal,centralvirtueofouraccount--namely,thatitcanhelpus
understandhowtheconceptofthecommongoodisusedbypoliticaltheorists,andhowitis
connectedtootherconceptswithinpoliticaltheory.First,wewillconsidertheconcept'suse.While
wedonotwantaconceptofthecommongoodthatcallsanyclaimsmadebyactualtheoristsinor
outofbounds(asiftheycouldbedisabusedoftheirmisguidedviewofthecommongoodmerelyby
attendingmorecloselytotheconcept),wedowantaconceptthatwillexplainfeaturescommonto
alluses.35Asthefirstsectionindicated,thecommonthemetoallusesofthecommongoodisthatit
isnormative.36Thereligiousgroup,thepoliticalliberal,andthepoliticalideologuehavevery
33ThisisthecentralpointinHowardNye,DavidPlunkett,andJohnKu,“Non-Consequentialism
Demystified,”Philosopher’sImprint15:4(2015).ItisalsoanticipatedbyVelleman’sdiscussionof“actingforthesakeof”in“LoveasaMoralEmotion”inSelftoSelf(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2006).
34SeeXXX.35Wemightcallthesethecommongood’sconceptualplatitudes.SeeMichaelSmith,TheMoral
Problem(Malden,MA:Blackwell,1994).36OurproposalispresagedbyHenryRichardson’sdiscussionofthe“publicgood.”LikeRichardson,
wearemotivatedbydecouplingtheconceptofthecommongoodfromawelfaristaccountofvalue.Second,ourproposalmakesthecommongoodakindofnormativesuccessterm,similartoRichardson,whodefines“aconceptionofthepublicgood,”as“aviewabouthowpublicactionshouldberegulated”(emphasesin
15
differentviewofthecommongood,buttheyallagreethatweshouldactforitorinitsbehalf.
Moreover,theverysparsenessofdescriptiongivenbysometheoristscitedabovesuggeststhatthey
takeforgrantedthatthecommongoodisnormativeforus.Like“justice,”thecommongoodisa
kindofnormativesuccessterm.Ourbuck-passingproposalcanexplainwhythecommongoodhas
thisfeature.Thisissimplybecausethecommongoodisunderstoodintermsofreasons,and
reasonsarewhatexpressnormativity.37Ifweunderstandthecommongoodasconceptually
connectedtoreasons,wecanmakesenseoftheonefeaturethatclearlyunitesthewayinwhichthe
termisused.
Ouraccountcanalsohelpilluminatehowthecommongoodisconnectedtootherconcepts
withinpoliticaltheory.Inparticular,considertheideaofdeliberation.Assection2described,
politicaltheoristsregularlyinsistthatpoliticaldeliberationshouldbesomehowaimedator
directedtowardthecommongood.38Howeveraswedescribedabove,tyingtheconceptofthe
commongoodtoocloselytoaimsofdeliberationcanrisktyingtheconceptofthecommongoodtoo
closelytothetheorist’sothersubstantivepoliticalcommitments.Thatis,itraisestheworrythat
thecommongoodwillbecomephilosophicallypartisan.Avirtueofthebuck-passingaccountofthe
commongoodisthatitcanexplainthecloseconnectionbetweenthecommongoodand
deliberationwithoutintroducinganypartisanpoliticalvalues.Thisisbecauseitcanexplainhow
thecommongoodisconceptuallyconnectedtoadeliberativeunderstandingofevaluativefacts.
original).SeeRicharson,DemocraticAutonomy:PublicReasoningabouttheEndsofPolicy(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2002),p.40.
37Schroederpointsoutthisasavirtueofthebuck-passingpositivethesis.Butitisremainsanovelpointthatusesof“commongood”inthepoliticalliteraturesouniformlypresupposethatthecommongoodisnormativeinsomeway.
38GutmannandThompsonusethe“aimedat”languageconnectingthetwoconcepts.SeetheirWhyDeliberativeDemocracy?(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2004),p.28.JoshCohensaysthatdeliberationshouldbe“focused”onthecommongood.SeeCohen,“DeliberationandDemocraticLegitimacy,”ibid.
16
Herewefollowanexplanationofthebuck-passingaccountofgoodnessdevelopedbyR.Jay
Wallace.39WallaceobservesthatonScanlon’soriginalview,thereason-givingpropertiestowhich
thebuckispassedare,themselves,evaluativeproperties.Forexample,theclaimthatsome
experienceisgoodmightbegivenbyotherproperties--forexample,thatitwouldbepleasant.Such
propertiesarenotnaturalproperties--’pleasantness’expressesanevaluativeappraisal.
Respondingtothisproblem,Wallaceelaboratestwodifferentwaysofinterpretingthebuck-passing
account.Accordingtowhathecallsthe“deliberationindependentinterpretation,”evaluative
propertiesaremetaphysicallypriortoandepistemicallyaccessiblewithoutdeliberation.The
“deliberativeinterpretation”reversesthedirectionoffit.Onthedeliberativeinterpretation,“the
onlywaytoestablishwhetheracandidatepropertyisagenuinesubstantivevalue...isthrough
deliberativereflectionaboutthenormativesignificanceofthepropertyforagents.”40The
deliberativeinterpretationmaintainsthepriorityofthenormativetotheappreciativeway.The
responsetosuchfactsintheformofdeliberativeattentionplaysacrucialconceptualrole.Buck-
passingtiesthegoodtoanagent’sdeliberativeresponse.
Giventhatthebuck-passingaccountofthegoodrequiresadispositionofagentstorespond
deliberativelytoasetofconsiderations,itshouldbeunsurprisingthatthe“commongood”also
requiresthecollectivedeliberativeattentionofsomelargergroupofagents.Abuck-passing
accountofthecommongoodcanexplainwhythisconnectionholdssogenerally.Tosaythat
somethinginthecommongoodistogivemetaphysicalandepistemologicalprioritytothe
deliberativeattentionofagroupofpersonsonasetofconsiderations,andtheirdispositionto
respondtothoseconsiderationsinanappreciativeway.Withouttakingsidesabouthowidealized
deliberationshouldproceedorwhichvaluesitshouldfavor,wecanvindicatetheconceptual
39Wallace,“Reasons,Values,andAgent-Relativity,”ibid.40Wallace,513.
17
intuitionbehinddeliberativistaccountsofthecommongood.Thisintuition,stretchingbackto
Rousseau,seesthecommongoodasbothamatterofwill,andasidentifyingacommoninterest.41
Wewillnowsettoonesidethebuck-passingaccount’sconceptualvirtues.Totestthis
account,letusconsideritsexplanatoryvalueinimaginedandactualcases.Startwithacasewhere
ourapproachcanexplainsomethingthatislikelytopuzzlethesimplestgood-for-usaccounts.Brian
Barryputshisfingeronaparadigmuseoftheconceptofthecommongood.Henoticesthatwedo
nottendtomakeuseofthisideawhenacandidatepolicycancrediblybesaidtobegood-for-all.
“’Thecommongood’istypicallyusedinaverydifferentway,”hewrites,“namelyinthecontextof
anappealtoindividualpeopletodosomethingorotherwhichiscontrarytotheirnetinterests.”42
Soacentralcaseuseforthecommongoodispreciselywhenwearetryingtoconvinceapersonor
groupofpersonstosupportadecisionthatwilldisadvantagethempersonally.Insuchasetting,we
mightimagineaddressingthemsecond-personally,offeringreasonstoacttogether,ratherthan
takingupthethird-personalpostureofabenefactor.
InthecaseofKelov.CityofNewLondon,theSupremeCourtallowedthecityofNewLondon
totransferlandfromaprivateownertoaprivateredevelopmentproject.TheNewYorkTimes
celebratedtherulingas“awelcomevindicationofacity’sabilitytoactinthepublicinterest.”43
Onceweunderstandthepublicinterestasreflectingaimsthatprovideuswithreasonsfor
collectiveaction,wewillnotbesearchingforthemostinfinitesimalofwaysthatapolicycanbe
seenasgoodforeachmemberofacommunity.Ourclaimthateminentdomainreflectsoraffronts
thecommongoodcannowsetthetermsforadebatethatisnotprimedtowardsaggregating
individualgoods.Tosaythatasocialdecisionisinthecommongoodisnottosaythatitismerely
41Ourthankstoarefereeforthispoint.Ofcourse,addingthedeliberativecomponentdoesmakethe
accountmoremeta-ethicallypartisan.Ifonefavoredalesscommittedview,thisadditionisamodularcomponentoftheview.However,forthoseindependentlyattractedtoanidealofthecommongoodthatistiedtodeliberation,thebuck-passingaccountcanhelptoexplaintheconnectionbetweenthetwo.
42Barry,203.43“TheLimitsofPropertyRights,”TheNewYorkTimes,June24,2005.
18
appealing.Itis,onourview,awayofregisteringthattherearesharedreasonsforactingtogether
towardsaparticularend.Thisleavesopenwhetherthosereasonsaremorallydecisive–thatwill
dependonthesubstantivemoraltheoryathand.Weshouldn’texpectaconcepttosettlethiscase,
onlytoensureafairdebateamongalternativeconceptions.44
Onourtheory,thebuckthatgetspassedhereistheideaofthegood.Whileprevious
formulationsrelieduponparticularaccountsofthegood,thisapproachavoidsthisphilosophically
fraughtexerciseinaxiology.Itthuscreatesroomfordisagreementsamongamorediversesetof
moralconceptions.So,forexample,thecontractualistapproachthatwesketchedearliercan
developthisconceptintoaconceptionthattreatshumanrelationshipsasreason-giving.Norneed
oneacceptthatthereisaprotantoreasontopromotethegoodtoacceptthisreadingofthe
concept.Thosewhodenythisgood-promotingviewwouldseethe“good-for-us”variationsofthe
conceptasidentifyingaimsthataredecidedlysupererogatory.Onouraccount,thisproblemdoes
notcarryover.Thecontractualisthasasmuchevaluativeroomastheconsequentialisttodraw
uponitsdistinctivemoralvocabulary.
4. ObjectionsandResponses
Inthissectionwewillconsiderwhatwetaketobetwoofthemostpressingobjectionstoabuck-
passingaccountofthecommongood.Thefirstobjectionarguesthatourconceptofthecommon
goodimplicitlyprecludestheoriesthatwouldlimitstateactiontothepursuitofjustice.Because
plausible,well-defendedtheoriestakeexactlythisform,ourconceptofthecommongoodrulesout
44Weemphasizethatourproposalisnotintendedasaputativeconceptualanalysis.Insteaditis
somethingclosertowhatPeterGodfrey-Smithreferstoasconceptual“reform”—orspecifyingconceptswithaneyetotheoreticalvirtuesandtheoryuse,ratherthantofitwithcurrentuseinagivensocialoracademicpractice.(SeeGodfrey-Smith,MetaphysicsandthePhilosophicalImagination,”PhilosophicalStudies160(2012):97-113.)ThuswecanagreewithMansbridgethat“inpracticalpoliticallife”itis“oftennotnecessarytobeanalyticallyclearerthantheordinarylanguage”aboutthepublicgoodorthecommongood.Still,asMansbridgealsoobserves,“wemaywanttochooseonlyonefromasetofcompetingmeanings”whenengaginginphilosophy(ibid.,p.12).Weagree,andonlywanttoaddthatforsuchpurposes,somemeaningsmaybemoreusefulandexportabletoadiversityofphilosophicalcontextsthanothers.Inshort,howtospecifytheconceptmaybesomethingwortharguingabout.
19
toomuchlogicalspace.Thesecondobjectionmaintainsthatouraccounttreatsintuitivelytoo
manypublicpoliticalactionsaspursuingthecommongood.Thefirstaccusestheaccount
presentedhereofakindofpartisanship,whiletheseconddisputestheaccount’sextensional
adequacy.Forthesakeofhavinglabels,wewillrefertotheseasthepartisanobjectionandthe
over-inclusionobjection.Therestofthissectionwilldiscussthemindetail.
4.1 Partisanship
Consideratheoryoflegitimatestateactionaccordingtowhichtheonlythingthestatecan
permissiblydoisbringabouttheconditionsofjustice.Forexample,somepoliticallyliberal
theoriesofjusticeholdthatallstatecoercioncanonlybelegitimatedbypublicjustification.45By
hypothesis,onlyrequirementsofjusticecouldfulfillthisjustificatoryrole.Thus,thestateisonly
permittedtosatisfytherequirementsofjustice,butisnotpermittedtopursueothervalues.
Thislineofargumentposesaproblemforouraccount.Itseemstositintensionwithour
suppositionthatthecommongoodprovidesreasonstoactpoliticallythataresomehow“beyond
justice.”Theproblemmaybeformulatedasadilemma.Ononehorn,ouraccountallowsthe
politicallyliberaltheoryaboveasaviablecandidatetheoryofjustice.However,ifthistheoryis
correct,thenthevalueofjusticeisnecessaryandsufficienttoguideallpoliticalactivity.Butifthat
istrue,thenthecommongoodplaysnoadditionalinformativeroleaboutwhichpoliticalactions
shouldbetaken.Itiseithersilent,oritidlyaffirmstheantecedentpronouncementsofjustice.Ona
secondhorn,ouraccountcoulddenythattheorieslikethatofthepoliticalliberalabovearecorrect.
Butinthatcase,itseemsthatwehaveviolatedthepartisanshiprequirementfromsection1.
Simplybyspecifyingtheconcept,wewouldhaveruledoutalogicalavailableconceptionthat
actuallyisdefendedfrommultipledifferenttheoreticalperspectives.
45ArefereehelpfullygivesJonathanQuongasanexample.SeeQuong,LiberalismwithoutPerfection
(NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2011),especiallychs.2-3.AnotherexamplemightbeGeraldGaus,TheOrderofPublicReason:ATheoryofFreedomandMoralityinaDiverseandBoundedWorld(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2010).
20
Wewilltakethefirsthornofthedilemma.Suchanaccountcanbeallowedwithout
renderingthecommongoodeithersilentoridle.Toseewhy,itwillhelptoframe,moreprecisely,
thebasicpoliticallyliberalinsight:46
(P1)Allcoercivestateactionsmustbejustifiedbysufficientpublicreasons.
(P2)Onlyjusticecanprovidesufficientpublicreasons.
(C1)So,coercivestateactioncanonlybepermissiblydirectedatsatisfyingjustice.
(P3)Ifjusticeistheonlylegitimateendofcoercivestateaction,thenothervaluesareeither
idleorsilent.
(C2)So,thecommongoodiseitheridleorsilent.
Statedthisway,itisclearerthatpremise(P3)isvulnerable.Premises(P1)and(P2)simplygivethe
substantiveclaimsofthetheory,soitwouldbeobjectionablypartisan(forpresentpurposes)to
denyeither.Butthepoliticallyliberaltheoryisnotdisputedbydenying(P3).Andinfact,we
believethatthispremiseisincorrect.P3isonlytrueiftheonlyactionsthatcanbecollectively
takenthroughstateinstitutionsarecoerciveactions.However,thisseemslikelytobefalse.
Considerthefollowingcases:
(a) Expression.Aliberal,democraticstatetoleratesthepresenceofreligiousoreducational
institutionsthatdiscriminateonthebasisofrace.However,membersofthepolitical
communitywanttoofficiallyrepudiatetheideathatracistdiscriminationisacceptable.As
such,theydecidethroughdeliberative,democraticinstitutionstorevokethetaxexempt
statusofinstitutionsthatdiscriminate.
(b) Expertise.MembersoftheFederalReserveboarddeliberateaboutwhethertoraiseinterest
ratesbya¼point.Suppose—exhypothesi—thatnoonehasaclaimofjusticeeitherthat
46Ofcourse,politicalliberalismisabroadtent,andmanyofitsmemberswouldnotacceptthatthe
statecanonlylegitimatelypursuejustice.Wearenotconsideringthetruthofthisclaimasathesisaboutthenatureoflegitimatestateaction.
21
ratesberaised,orthatratesnotberaised.Still,membersoftheFederalReserveboard
oughttomaketheirdecisionbasedonreasons,ratherthanarbitrarily.47
(c) Refusal.Stateinstitutionsgenerallyenforcecontracts.However,thestatemaydecidethat
ithasmoralreasontodeclinetoenforcecertaincontracts.Membersofthepolitical
communitydecide,forvariousreasons,thatcertaincontractsshouldbelegally
unconscionable.48
Weproposethatineachofthesecases,thecommongoodcanfacilitatedeliberationabouthow
thestateshouldact.Thisremainstrueevenifoneacceptsthepoliticallyliberalstrictureagainst
coercionfornon-justicebasedreasons.Thisisbecausethestatecandothingsotherthanact
coercively.49Ifthistheorywerecorrect,thecommongoodcouldcontinuetoplayameaningfulrole
inwhatmoralmessagesthestateshouldnon-coercivelyexpress,orinhowtosetpoliciesthataffect
membersofthestatebutdonotaltertheextenttowhichthestateengagesincoercion.TheFederal
Reserveexampleillustratesonesuchcase.ImagineiftheFederalReservesimplyselectedan
interestratethatwasbestforFortune500executives.Eventhoughtheirdecisionmightnotaffect
theamountofcoercioninthepoliticalcommunity,itwouldstillseemtobefaulty.TheFedshould
decideinawaythatwassupportedbyreasonsofthecommongood.Finally,thestatecouldusethe
commongoodtoguideitindecidingwheretowithholdcoerciveactivity,evenifthatactivitymight
benotbeunjust(asinRefusal).
Finally,consideraweakerversionof(P3),accordingtowhich:Ifjusticeistheonly
legitimateendofcoercivestateaction,thenothervaluesareeitheridleorsilentwithrespectto
coercivestateactions.Thispremiseallowsthatthecommongoodcouldstillberelevantincasesof
47ThiscaseisadaptedfromPetit,“DepoliticizingDemocracy,”ibid.48ThiscaseisinspiredbySeannaShiffrin,“Paternalism,UnconscionabilityDoctrine,and
Accommodation,”Philosophy&PublicAffairs29:3(2000):205-250.49ThecaseofExpressionismodelledonsimilarexamplesgivenbyCoreyBrettschnieder,who
defendssuchexamplesasnon-coercive.SeeBrettschnieder,WhentheStateSpeaks,WhatShouldItSay?HowDemocraciesCanProtectExpressionandPromoteEquality(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2012).
22
stateactionthatarenon-coercive,butdeniesitcouldberelevanttoanycoerciveaction.Webelieve
thateventhisweakerpremiseisfalse.Sometimes,justicemightprovidesufficientpublicreasonin
supportofsomedisjunctionofcoerciveactions,butremainsilentaboutwhichdisjunctis
preferable.Forexample,supposethatjusticerequiresthateachchildbeprovidedwithasufficient
opportunitytoenterthepoliticalelite.50Forthesakeofspecificity,supposethisrequiresthata
publichighschoolofferanactivitythatmodelsdeliberation—say—ModelUN,Debate,orEthics
Bowl.Whilereasonsofjusticemightprovidetheweightyconsiderationssupportingcoercive
actionsnecessaryrealizetherelevantstandardofpubliceducation,thesereasonsmightleaveopen
whichoptionisbest.However,wemightstillthinkthatthechoiceshouldbemadedeliberatively—
onthebasisofreasons.Onourview,theseshouldbereasonstoacttogether,orreasonsofthe
commongood.
4.2 Over-inclusion
Thesecondobjectionwewillconsiderholdsthatourconceptistoocapacious—counting
considerationsaspartofthecommongoodthatintuitivelyissuefromsomequiteseparate
normativeconcern.Recall,forexample,thequestionfromsection2overwhethertofundaspace
programortheperformingarts.Accordingtothepresentobjection,itmightseemintuitivelyodd
toregardbothoftheseascandidateinstancesofthecommongood.Whiletheperformingarts
mightbethoughtofasacommongood(though,astheprevioussectiondescribed,notrequiredby
justice),onemightthinkthatthereasonstosupportaspaceprogramhaveasourcethatisquite
differentfromthecommongoodofanygroup.Afterall,spaceexplorationmightnotresultin
improvinganyparticularperson’swelfare.Ifitisnotsupportedbyanyperson’sparticulargood,
thenhowcoulditbepartofthecommongood?Instead,onemightthinkthatthereasonsto
50Cf.Anderson,ibid.
23
supportthespaceprogrammightbethoughtsomehowmoretranscendent.51Perhaps,forinstance,
theintrinsicvalueoftruthordiscoverymightprovidereasonsforthespaceprogram.
Inshort,theover-inclusionobjectionholds:
(1) Therearereasonsthatwehavetogethertopoliticallypursueaspaceprogram(for
example).
(2) Ifthebuck-passingaccountofthecommongoodiscorrect,thenactingtogetherto
politicallypursueaspaceprogramispartofthecommongood.
(3) However,aspaceprogramisnotpartofthecommongood.
So,thebuck-passingaccountmustbewrong.Ourresponsetothisobjectionwillbetwofold.First,
wewilltrytoshowhowactionsthatdon’tappeartoadvanceanyone’swell-beingcouldstillbepart
ofthecommongood.Second,wewillsuggestthatifouraccountdoesincludesomerevisiontothe
folkconceptofthecommongood,theassociatedtheoreticalcostisworthpaying.
First,wethinkitisimportanttodistinguishbetweentwowaysinwhichthespaceproject
mightbepursuedthroughapoliticalinstitution.Ontheonehand,consideracaseinwhichasmall
cadreofpoliticallyinsulatedelitesiscuriousaboutscientificinquiryintofarcornersofthe
universe.Toslaketheircuriosity,theyadoptandpoliticallyauthorizeaplantofundaspace
program.Inthesecondcase,apoliticalcommunityhasapublicdebate—say,inanelectionyear—
aboutwhethertoprioritizefundingaspaceprogramforthesakeofthevaluesofdiscoveryand
knowledge.Opinionelitesaswellasgrass-rootsorganizationsareinvolved.Intheelection,the
sidefavoringthespaceprogramwins,andtheytakemeasurestopoliticallyauthorizeit.
Whilethesespaceprogramsmightequallyrealizethevaluesoftruthorknowledge,we
suggestthatthelatterprogramhasbettercredentialsforrealizingthecommongood.Thisis
becauseonlyinthelattercaseisthereevidenceofreasonsthatmembersofthepolitically
communityshare,onwhichtoacttogether.Toseethispoint,recallthesimpletwo-personaction
51Wearegratefultoarefereeforhelpingustothinkmoreclearlyaboutthisobjection.
24
theorycasefromsection2.Amarriedcouplecoulddecidetogoonvacationeitherbyhavingone
partyunilaterallypickthedestination,orthroughaprocessofdeliberation.Butbecauseeach
party’sreasonsdependinpartontheother’sreasons,thereasonstheyhaveforjointactioncan
onlyemergethrough“dialogicalsensitivity”toeachother.Ifthatisright,thenwemightthinkthat
thepublicdeliberativeprocessesinthesecondversionofthespaceprogramcaseallowaccessto
reasonsformembersofthecommunitytoacttogether,andforthatreasonisintuitivelyaninstance
ofacommongood.
Toputthepointadifferentway,wedonotthinkthatthereisanythinginthenatureofthe
folkuseof“commongood”thatprecludesthespaceprogram.Onavarietyoftheories,the
realizationofgoalsorplanscancountasatleastapartofanindividual’swell-being.52Evenon
purelysubjectivetheoriesofwell-being,whatapersondesiresorvaluespartlydetermines
welfare.53Onlyonamentalstatetheoryofwell-beingwouldsuchpossibilitiesbedenied.Buthere,
itseemsthatthedifferencebetweengroupsandindividualsmakessuchtheorieslessplausiblein
thecaseofthecommongood.Whileitismetaphysicallyinnocuoustothinkthatgroupsofpersons
shareintentions,reasons,orgoals,itismorecontroversialtoattributementalstatestogroups.So
itseemsthattheoriesofanindividual’sgoodthatwoulddisallowgoal-basedprojects(analogousto
thespaceprogram)wouldbelessplausibleatthelevelofthecommongood,anyway.
Moreover,typicaluseofthecommongoodseemslessassociatedwithgoodsthatare
connecteddirectlytowell-being,asmuchastogoodsthatarepoliticallyselectedintherightway.
Politicalscientistsjuxtaposethe“commongood”withmere“partisaninterests,”orwiththe
“particularinterests”ofasubgroupofone’sconstituents.54Tosuggestthatimpersonalorother-
52Foraverynicerecentdiscussion,seeSimonKeller,“WelfareasSuccess,”Nous43:4(2009):656-
683.53AccordingtoDaleDorsey,thisisbecausesubjectivistsmustnecessarilyincludeidealizing
elements.Well-beingcannotsimplybereadofftheactualmentalstatesofanagent.SeeDorsey,“IdealizationandtheHeartofSubjectivism,”Nous(2015):1-22.
54McGhee,et.al.,ibid.,p.337;Leydet,ibid.,pp.235-236.
25
regardingvaluescouldbepartofthecommongooddoesnoviolencetotheseuses.Evenwhen
theoristsarguethatthecommongoodmustbeshapedbythe“subjectiveinterests”ofthemembers
ofasociety,theytendtohaveinmindonlythatindividualshavethe“lastword”onwhatcountsas
“goodandbadfortheircommunity.”55
Finally,consideranevenmoreextremeexample.Apoliticalcommunitydecidesthatthey
havemostreasontogethertoprovideaidtoagroupofdistantneedypersons,notwithstandingthat
membersofthisgroupwillnotbeabletoreciprocate.Couldsuchself-sacrificingbehaviorreallybe
partofthecommongood?Ouraccountwouldsuggestso.Itisnotobvioustousthatthisisatodds
withuse,giventhatthecommongoodisfrequentlyinvokedonlyinanegativesense—notpartisan,
orparochial,orselfish,etc.Butsuppose,notimplausibly,thatitisrevisionist.Itmaystillbe
importanttomaintainthisconceptualspace.Consider,forexample,PeterSinger’sargumentthatit
isinourcommongoodtoprovideaidtoothers,becausedoingsomakesourlivesmeaningful.
Weretheworldorganizedinawaythatdidnotallowforsuchactions,ourliveswouldnotbe
meaningful.56ClearlySinger’sviewisaproposalaboutthecommongood,andhisviewholdsthat
thecommongoodiscentrallyrealizedbypreciselythekindofactionbeingconsidered.Singerhas
longbeenopenabouthisdesireforrevisioninourmoralconceptualscheme.Wedonottakesides
hereabouthisproposal,butwedothinkitshouldnotruledoutasaconceptualmatter.Itwouldbe
partisantoclaimthathisproposal,contrarytohisclaims,couldn’tbethecommongood.Atsome
point,thelessonmaysimplybethattradeoffsamongourdesideratacannotbealtogetheravoided.
Conclusion
55ChristianBlumandChristinaIsabelZuber,“LiquidDemocracy:Potentials,Problems,and
Perspectives,”TheJournalofPoliticalPhilosophy24:2(2016):162-182.Seealso,ChristopherKarpowitzandJaneMansbridge,“DisagreementandConsensus:TheImportanceofDynamicUpdatinginPublicDeliberation,”pp.237-253inJ.GastilandP.Levine(eds.)TheDeliberativeDemocracyHandbook(SanFrancisco:Jossey-Bass,2005).
56Singer,PracticalEthics,3rded.(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2011)ch.12,especiallyp.294.
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Politicalphilosophershaveinsistedthatthecommongoodisa“self-evident”concept.57This
papersuggeststhatthathopeisunrealistic.Wedoneedanevaluativeterm–orperhapsaplurality
ofterms–thataddresstheterritorythatisunderdeterminedbyatheoryofdistributivejustice.
We’vesuggestedthatabuck-passingaccountofthecommongoodoffersahelpfulwayoffillingthis
role.Itcandosowithouttacitlyencouragingpoliticalpractitionerstoelidedistributive
implicationsoftheirchoices.Atthesametime,itcanavoidunnecessaryphilosophicalcontention.
Givenhoweasyitisto“slipintoutilitarianismbysheerinattention,”58nonconsequentialistsshould
beespeciallywaryaboutembracingconceptsthatcarrywiththemconsequentialistassumptions–
orevenvalences–thatrelyuponatheoryofvalue.FollowingScanlon’sindividualapproach,we
offeredabuck-passingreadingofthecommongoodthatwasdesignedtoavoidthemastervalue
assumption.The“commongood”isanotdummyconcept.Ithasthepotentialtoplayanimportant
roleinourcollectivedecision-making,solongasitbasiccontoursandcontentareworkedout.
57Inthesamesentence.AmitaiEtzionireferstoitastherightthingtodo,byitself,foritselfand
“goodsthatserveallofusandtheinstitutionsweshareandcherish.”AmitaiEtzioni,TheCommonGood(NewYork:Wiley-Blackwell,2004),1.
58RichardKraut,WhatIsGoodandWhy:TheEthicsofWell-Being(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress,2007),17.