THE CHINESE UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG ON THE RELATION BETWEEN HEGEL… · 2016. 12. 30. · than...
Transcript of THE CHINESE UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG ON THE RELATION BETWEEN HEGEL… · 2016. 12. 30. · than...
THE CHINESE UNIVERSITY
OF HONG KONG
ON THE RELATION BETWEEN HEGEL'S ABSOLUTE KNOWLEDGE
AND
HIS MISSION OF SOCIALIZATION AND HISTORICALIZATION OF KNOWLEDGE
IN THE
PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND
A Thesis Submitted to
the Graduate School
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for
The Degree of Master of Philosophy
by
SZE MAN-HUNG, STEPHEN
HONG KONG, MAY 1979..
CONTENT :
Preface
Introduction
1. Hegel v.s. Kant -- The Unity of Form and Content.
2. Positivity in Hegel's early Thought.
3. The Problem of Externalization.
4. Subjective Spirit -- Consciousness for-itself.
5. Objective Spirit -- Life in-itself.
6. The Living-form -- Socialization and Historicalizationof Absolute Spirit.
7. True Speculation and Negativity in Hegel.
8. The Task of Logos-metaphysics -exemplifiedby Hegel.
9. Negativity or Positivity ? -- a final word.
Footnotes
Bibliography
p.1
p.4
p.6
p.12
p.20
p.28
p.35
p,45
p.50
p.53
p.58
p.63
p.68
For the Remembrance of Goethe's Fanst I.
Was bin ich denn, wenn es nicht m'dglich ist.
Der Menschhei t Krone zu erringen.
Nach der sich alle Sinne dringen?
(Faust 1803-1805)
(What am I, if I can never hope
to hold the crown of my humanity
which is the aim of all my senses?)
1Preface
If a preface cannot be a better introduction or a polemic
than Hegel' s 'Phenomenology of Mind,,. it can only serve as
an apology for a young obtrusion in the field of philosophy.
To write on Hegel' s 'Phenomenology' after nearly two cen-
turies of incessant toils of our fore-runners seems an un-
requited task in serveral aspects: Can anyone contribute more
still, after the publication of Jean Hyppoli te' s' Genese et
structure de la phenom4nologie de l' esprit d'Hegel'? More
still is the fact .that Hyppoli te' s work is rivalled by G.
Lukacs' 'Der junge Hegel,, H, Marcuse' s 'Reason and Revolution,
J. Habermas' 'Knowledge and Interest' and 'Theory and Practice',
and yet many more great commentators and re-interpretators.
Amidst this profusion of immense scholarship, however, one
easily deplores at the obscuratism of the present. age in
cajoling away Hegel as obscure and Teutonic, pledging a
world of excuses to refrain from understanding and thus
acknowledging his philosophical contribution to the world.
lorse still are scoffers that stand on their dogmatic po-
3i ti ons where the 'cunning' or 'storm' of reason has long
ago ravaged and annihilated. Time and again reason has to
saint 'its grey in grey', to remind of the vale of death
2where these pedagogic scoffers rest content with their me-
diocre complacency.
These people, on further reflexion, are as excusable as
they are pitiable; for the view-points, emphases, and in-
terpretations of the immense scholarship leave one con-
founded and astounded. To emerge with total mastery of the
schools of thoughts is a Herculean task, and is far beyond
our scope here. Yet a thorough study of the system of Hegel
has several pre-requisites. Here lies the traffic of our
toil
The 'Phenomenology' is the first mature system of Hegel
which he retained and clung onto for the rest of his life.
It was intended to be the first part to a 'System der Wissen-
schaft'. In his 'Science of Logic'. he mentioned that:
'In the Phenomenology of Spirit I have exhibited conscious-
ness in its movement onwards from the first immediate op-
position of itself and the object to absolute knowing. The
path of this movement goes through every form of the rela-
tion of consciousness to the object and has the notion of
science for its result. The notion therefore needs no justi-fication here because it has received it in that work and
it cannot be justified in any other way than by this emer-
gence in con-sciousness, all the forms of yhich are resol-ved into this notion as into their truth.'
Thus, Hegel's system presupposes a process of development.
This development is no less historical than it is epist-
emological, and here rests the furthest development of
German Idealism. The 'Phenomenology', unlike the works of
Kant and Fichte, presupposes no 'transcendental deduction'.
For Hegel, the necessary development of the reality is as
p.3
much method as it is Truth. Truth in its ultimacy is the
consummation of Being and thought in One. And it is the task
in this thesis to expose fully 'the Relation between Hegel' s
Absolute Knowledge and his mission of Socialization and His-
torization of Knowledge in the Phenomenology of Mind.'
It is my hope that the exposition can render more clear
the deep insight of Hegel, and to convince ourselves that
his philosophy not only transcends the former German Idea-
lists but is in many aspects the central problem, or rather,
acknowledged contribution in eternal philosophical activi-
ties.
4Introduction:-
It is an undeniable fact that German Idealism has,since
its appearance, exerted great influence upon philosophical
thought. It has 'brought under principles not only the utmost
possibilities of human knowledge but also, and above all,
the utmost possibilities of human morality, and presented them
in such a way that they were teachable and learnable for all
of humanity.' 2 Yet authors like Werner Marx still per-
haps fails to acknowledge the fact that the Idealism of He-
gel aims further-not so much to teach as to relate theory
and praxis. If Kant and Fichte succeeded in laying down prin-
ciples of human knowledge and morality, it was just the rever-
se that Hegel claimed his victory-- namely, the destruction
of all presuppositional principles, and to sublate (aufheben)
all pre-established positions and principles. Through this
Hegel arrived at his own conclusion, whereby the past philo-
sophical systems were transcended.
How did the hitherto philosophical systems err? We may say
that all philosophical systems up to Hegel have erred in their
initial positions of posing the opposition of subject and ob-
ject, thought and being, value and fact, mind and matter, as
well as reason and world. (In fact, this phenomenon is still
prevalent in philosophical circles today, to the changrin of
Hegel, who naturally would think that this has since him been
destroyed once and for all.)
5This error had been acknowledged by Schiller and Schelling.
The former expressed it quite unconsciously in his search for
a new genre of activity that unites in overcoming the opposi-
tion between the 'sensuous drive (der si nnli the Trieb)' and
the 'formal drive(der Formtrieb)', the latter overtly express-
ed that:
'... the separation arose originally in that man posited
himself as standing in contradiction to the external world.
... As in the creation story, Schelling sees the fall of man
in the fact that man ate of the tree of knowledge. What se-
=duced him was not the snake, however, but the spirit of know-l edge and the freedom intrinsic to it., 3
Thus Schelling posed a new outlook to transcend the old
dogma of the past philosophical systems, a new intellectual
intuition:
'If this higher term is only the principle of the identity
of the absolutely subjective and the absolutely objective, of
the conscious and the unconscious, which separate in free act-
ion in order to manifest themselves., then this higher term can-
not itself be either subject or object or both at once: it is
only the absolute identity, in which there is no duality and
which can never reach consciousness precisely because dualityis the condition of all conscious. 4
Thus the question emerges as: What justifications can we
put forward in supposing an absolute position whereby the
fundamental question in philosophy is always a subl ati on
of duality?
6
1. Hegel v. s. Kant-- The unity of Form and Content.
Western philosophy since Plato and Aristotle has been
occupied in accounting for the correlation of Being and
Becoming, Form and Content, Mind and Matter. The philoso-
phy of subjectivity developed since Descartes as a con-
tinuation of the problematic raises the problem of 'the
thinking subject' and 'that which is thought'. The Empi-
ricists likewise, transform the question into the relation
of 'Understanding, and 'Knowledge', and this is the cen-
tral theme of G.Berkeley in demarcating 'mind' from *ideas',
Both idealistic attempts of Descartes and Berkeley aim at
resolving the opposition of 'subject' and 'object'. Des-
cartes through his hyperbolic doubt re-establishes the
subject as the ultimate arbitrator of 'Truth's and Berke-
ley resorts to mind as the perceiver of reality as ideas.
Eventually, both have recourse to God as the 'transcend-
ental ground' of the possibility of knowledge.
Kant surpasses this two forerunners first through a cri-
tique of both trends. In the investigation into the 'Sy-
stem of the principles of Pure Understanding' in his first
critique, he comes to a refutation of Descartes as problem-
atic and Berkeley as dogmatic in their justification of
the possibility of reality-- the ground of empirical
thought.
7
Kant' s refutation of idealism examines the two routes to
establish the concept of 'object', that of Descartes and
that of Berkeley. 'Idealism-- meaning thereby material id-
ealism-- is the theory which declares the existence of ob-
jects in space outside us either to be merely doubtful and
indemostrable (Descartes) or to be false and impossible
(Berkeley). 5 Thus Kant regards their attempts as both fail-
ures. The 'problematic idealism' of the former 'merely pleadE
incapacity to prove, through immediate experience, any exist-
ence except our own,...'' and object or reality as such can
only.be asserted problematically and never possibly proved.
Thus the unity of subject and object, or the identity in
difference, 'cannot be achieved', and Descartes cannot up-
hold experience with the mere retention of 'imagination of
outer things'. This leaves Descartes with a problematic
subject, still abstractly an arbitrator of truth, yet with-
out reality.
Berkeley's subjective idealism places him in a no less
awkward position. The nature of ideas as givenness to the
mind furnishes the reality as such, but this reality is
always reality for the mind. Besides, both Berkeley and
Hume have drawn no distinction of levels between 'ideas
of sensation' (impressions) and 'ideas of ref l exi on' (ideas),
they consider them to be different only in 'the degrees of
force and liveliness,...' 7 Thus, knowledge for the Empiri-
cists is reduced all to a matter of content, of the givenness
as such.
8
Kant approaches this problem from a critical point of view.
He observes the need of a 'call to reason to undertake anew
the most difficult of all its task, namely, that of self--knowr-
l edge,...' 8 Thus, in the eyes of Kant, skepticism has failed
in its task to negate reason while likewise in 'despising
all (to Kant) settled modes of life, (and) broke up from time to
time all civil society.' 9 Nor has rationalists succeeded in
employing' principles which it (reason) has no option save to
employ in the course of experience,...' 10 4Rising with their
aid (since it is determined to this also by its own nature)
to ever higher, ever more remote conditions,... it therefore
finds itself compelled to resort to principles which overstep
all possible empirical employment,... ,11
Critical philosophy emerges with the need to overcome all
the past difficulties, and the task is the setting up 'a tri-
bunal which will assure to reason its lawful claims, and dis-
miss all groundless pretenti ons, not by despotic decrees, but
in accordance with its own eternal and unalterable laws,, This
tribunal is no other than the critique of pure reason.' 12
The Copernican revolution of philosophy undertaken by Kant
finally arrives at the conclusion that 'experience is itself
a species of knowledge which involves understanding and un-
derstanding has rules which I must presuppose as being in me
prior to objects being given to me,... 913
9
The full force of the critical philosophy of Kant emerges
when the' a priori concepts' of understanding and that of ex-
perience are established as the two fundamental and i ndi spen-
sible conditions of knowledge, and it rests in the 'Transcend-
ental Apperception, which is the 'highest principle in the
whole sphere of human knowledge.' It is through this synthetic
unity of apperception that the totality of the objective real-
ity is given to us as the 'object', which of course is never
the thing-in-itself, but rather the givenness to consciousness,
the objectivity to subjectivity. Kant makes this point clear-
ly:
'The synthetic unity of consciousness is, therefore, an ob-
jective condition of all knowledge. It is not merely a condition
that I myself require in knowing an object, but is a condition
under which every intuition must stand in order to become an
object for me. For otherwise, in the absence of this synthesis,
the manifold would not be united in one consciouness. 014
Here, Kant has established the true root to the future tran-
scendental phenomenology, the unity of subjectivity and object-
ivity in the unity of consciousness and that which is being con-
scious of. It is this identity in difference of reason and re-
ality that furnishes the ground to Hegel' s idealism. Here, a
remark must be added that German Idealism since Kant with his
transcendental apperception has transcended the problematic
(and to Kant mere empirical conciousness of Descartes) ego of
consciousness and the mere factuality of experience.
10
Hegel upholds that transcendental apperception as the great-
est contribution of Kant's critical philosophy to true 'specu-
lative thought'. He stated explicitly that:
'This view has at least the merit of giving a correct express-
ion to the nature of all consciousness. The tendency of all man's
endeavours is to understand the world, to appropriate and sub-
due it to himself: and to this end the positive reality of the
world must be as it were crushed and pounded, in other words,
idealized. At the same time we must note that it is not the
mere act of our personal self-consciousness which introduces
an absolute unity into the variety of sense. Rather, this id-
entity is itself the absolute. The absolute is, as it were, so
kind as to leave individual things to their own enjoyment, andit again drives them back to the absolute unity.'14
This passage from the Lesser Logic of Hegel exposes the whole
development of thought of Hegel, from his early theological con-
cern in his Berne (1793-6) and Frankfurt (1797-1800) periods
to his development of his first mature system in the Phenomeno-
logy. One thing we have to comment on before we start with the
concept of 'positivity' of Hegel is that we can never belittle
the development of German Idealism in the final synthesis of
the subject and the object, the particular and the universal.
The passage quoted above indicates the route taken by Hegel,
which has been opened up by Kant, is that of the sublation
(Aufhebung) of the particular to the absolute. I f Kant has
11succeeded in establishing' subjectivity' that transcends the
particular and empirical ego, he still has not contrived to
overcome the difference (Different) between Reason and history,
theory and praxis, form and life in concrete that is to say,
Kant has subsumed successfully experience under concept, but
the particular, or reality in its givenness is never a living
form, it is never the developing Idea or Notion (Begriff), it
is mere the abstraction of living thought. The task of objective
idealism is to explicate the dialectical development of the 'No-
tion.'
12
2. Positivity in Hegel Is early Thoughts
The development of a social and historical notion of spirit
of Hegel begins at his earliest stage in Berne and Frankfurt.
His earliest concern is that of the 'positivity' of the Christ-
ian religion. 'Positivity, then, means primarily the suspens-
ion of the moral autonomy of the subject.' 15 It was the tran-
sition from the Greco-Roman world of classical antiquity to
medieval and modern world that-brought about a 'positive'
religion in which the religious tenets are posited by the
religious authority. These tenets claimed eternal truth ir-
respective of our concrete situations and cannot be held up to
any of our rational reflections. Hegel is, particularly nos-
talgic of the classical antiquity where explicitly religion
is as much art, belief is as much reality, devotion is as
much happiness, gods are as much nature, and fate of the nation
is as much individual adventure. The obssession of Hegel with
the noble calm and tranquil simplicity of classical antiquity
strongly contrasts that of his uneasiness with 'positivity'
of modern chri sti ani ty, and also that of the ethics of sub-
jective idealism. Furthermore, Hegel is highly conscious of
social and historical background of the era that provided
the possibility for the development of the noble and also
highly anthropomorphic religion which embraced reason with
beauty, mind and the senses. He stated rightly that:
13
'As free men the Greeks and Romans obeyed laws laid down
by themselves, obeyed men whom they had themselves appointed
to office, waged wars on which they had themselves decided,
gave their property, exhausted their passions, and sacrificed
their own lives by thousands for an end which was their own.
They neither learned nor taught (a moral system) but evinced
by their own actions the moral maxims which they could call
their very own.... His will was free and obeyed its own laws
...the command was given nowhere in words but ruled him in-16
visibly.
The social reality created in Medieval period a dismal re-
ligion, making all subjects subservient under the Almighty,
blindly obedient to the decrees of the Divine, and the tran-
sition was really momentous, shocking to the acknowledgement
of Hegel. The decline of classical antiquity from the 'adequa-
cy of the deeds to the soul's inner demand for greatness, for
unfolding, for wholeness...: (It is the age when) Being and
destiny, adventure and accomplishment, life and essence are
then identical concepts.' to the Middle Ages and Modern Era
was a total split of Man and his World.
'All activity and every purpose now had a bearing on some-
thing individual activity was no longer for the sake of a
whole or an ideal. Either every one worked for himself or else
he was compelled to work for some other individual. Freedom
to obey self-given laws, to follow self-chosen leaders in
peacetime and self-chosen generals in war, to carry out plans
in whose formulation one had had one's share-- all this van-
ished. All political freedom vanished also the citizen's
right gave him only a right to the security of that property
which now filled his entire world.... But since all his aims
and all his activities were directed on something individual,
since he no longer found as their object any universal ideal
14
for which he might live or die, he also found no refuge in
his gods.... Greeks and Romans were satisfied with (their)
gods so poorly equipped, with gods possessed of human weak-
ness, only because they had the eternal and the self-subsis-tent within their own hearts.' 17
Here Hegel echoes exactly what Schiller exclaimed of,Class-
i.cal Antiquity in its simple and great humanity
'Da die GOotter menschlicher noch waxen
Waren Menschen gottlicher.'
(There when the gods still more man-like were
Were men more god-like.)
Here we are reminded by Hegel of the sad plight of the
Christians:
'Without a country of his own, the citizen lived in a poli-
ty with which nojoy could be associated, and all he felt
was its pressure. He had a worship to whose celebration and
festivals he could no longer bring a cheerful heart, becausecheerfulness had flown away out of life.' 18
To trace the cause of this sad plight of Christians necess-
arily-arrives at the concept of 'positivity', whereby the
Christians escaped from the former unity of essence and exist-
ence:
'They had not attained truth and freedom by their own exert-
ions only by laborious learning had they acquired a dim sense
of them and certain formulas about them. Their ambition was to
grasp and keep this doctrine faithfully and to transmit it
equally faithfully to others without any addition without
letting it acquire any variations in detail by working on it
themselves.
15
Hegel deplores at the present situation as moral degradation.
Like the other German Idealists, he considered the greatest
fault of man as the 'inability to use one's own understand-
ing without the guidance of another.' So moral degradation
here exhibited by 'positive' Christianity is a function to
the loss of freedom. This despair of the present situation,
which in the phenomenology later is further developed into
a system of passages from despair to new transcendence, opens
up philosophical enquiry. Hegel questions the causes of such
a drastic change of world-views and poses urgent questions
of great relevance to modern man:
'How could a religion have been supplanted after it had been
established in states for centuries and intimately connected
with their constitutions (that of Greco-Roman religion)?
What can have caused the cessation of a belief in gods to
whom cities and empires ascribed their origin, to whom the
people made daily offerings, whose blessings were invoked
on every enterprise, under whose banners alone the armies had
conquered, who had been thanked for victories, who received
joyful songs and earnest prayers, whose temples and altars,
wealth and status, were the pride of the people and the glory
of the arts, and whose worship and festivals were but occa-
sions for universal joy? How could the faith in the gods
have been reft from the web of human life with which it had
been interwoven by a thousand threads? A habit of body can be
opposed by other physical capacities operating together with
the will the habitual exercise of one psychical capacity
(fixity of will excepted) can be opposed by other psychical
16capacities. But 'how strong must be the counterweight have been
to overcome the power of a .psychical habit which was not iso-
lated, as our religion frequently is today, but was intertw-
ined in every direction with all men's capacities and most
intimately interwoven even with the most spontaneously active of
them. 20
The deep insight of Hegel is revealed in his remark that
the phenomena are not enough, despite their startling changes
and great upheaval of the reality. He wants to go deeper into
the underlying roots which is true philosophical 12,bour. For
him•
The supplanting of paganism by Christianity is one of those
remarkable revolutions whose causes the thoughtful historians
must labor to discover. Great revolutions which strike the
eyes at a glance must have been preceeded by a still and
secret revolution in the spirit of the age, a revolution not
visible to every eye, especially imperceptible to contempora-
ries, and as hard to discern as to describe in words. It is a
lack of acquaintance with this spiritual revolution which
makes the resulting changes astonishing. The supersession of
a native and immemorial religion by a foreign one is a revo-
lution which occurs in the spiritual realm itself, and it is
thus of a kind whose causes must be found all the more direct-
ly in the spirit of the times. 1 21
Here we can trace the two roots to the future phenomenology.
Hegel's dissatisfaction with the apparent change of the reli-
gious phenomenon as somethina self-contained. He rather would
17want to see the change as structured in the development of the
spirit of the age as a whole. Further, the correlation of the
religious phenomenon with that of the spirit of the age re-
sembles that-of the development of the phenomenology from
particular to totality, the phenomenal to the absolute.
Besides, there is also one particularly important aspect
that is shown by Hegel's careful investigation, namely, that
he is dissatisfied with his contemporaries in acknowledging
the necessary conflict of morals with reality, religion of
mere individuals with human secular happiness. Here rests
his accusal of his contemporaries not just in their inability
to discern but also to formulate such a question. A philoso-
phy that uphold a definite human nature can never account for
the concrete revertion of human living reality exemplified
by the transformation of religion from Classical Antiquity
that once flourished for centuries into that of a sickly
and enslaving Christianity of the modern world. Hegel open-
ly states his oppositions to those that assign a fixed human
nature to mankind. For him 'the general concept of human na-
ture admits of infinite modifications (and) ...the living na-
ture of man is always other than the concept of the same, and
hence what for the concept is a bare modification a pure ac-
cident, a superfluity, becomes a necessity, something living,
perhaps the only thing which is natural and beautiful.' 22
18
In rejecting the abstractions of traditional philosophies
in assigning mankind a nature, Hegel can proceed to develop
a system that can account for the transformation dynamically.
The former scales or metaphysical criteria cannot adequately
affix values to living human life at all. To Hegel, even
Kantian ethics sounds hollow in its attempt to conduct hu-
man lives. 'The (concept of the) freedom of the will is a
one-sided standard, because human manners and characteristics
together with the accompanying religion cannot be determined
by concepts at all.' 23 Hegel even go further to pose a trans-
cending consciousness (spirit) that is demanded by Nature
(i.e. Life) above understanding and reason. He argues that
religion in Classical Antiquity is natural to the demand of
naturalism. The loss of socio-historical setting with the
totality of the spirit of the age thus accounts for the posi-
tivity of Christianity. But Hegel further points out the fact
that the positivity of Christianity is not particular in it-
self, but rather, it reflects the 'nature of its time'. With
this Hegel arrives at the concept of 'alienation' (Entfremdung)
whereby the self in its impotence subjects itself to an uncon-
trollable reality which he fails to acknowledge to be his own
creation. The 'higher Being' seems the only recourse for
self-relief. Hegel succeeds in this way to contrast the two
19aspects of the human consciousness, the in-itself in Classical
Antiquity and the for-itself in Modern Era. The most signifi-
canct step is his positing a transcendance of the two, a sub-
lation (Aufhebung) when 'another mood awakens, when this natur
(human spirit)begins to have asense of itself, and thereby to
demand freedom in and for itself instead of placing it in its
supreme Being, .,,#24 then are all the previous contradictions
overcome. The early theological reflections of Hegel has al-
ready paved the way of a dialectical thought,
20
3. The Problem of Externalization.
If Hegel has realized the drastic change of the totality
of human living reality from Classical Antiquity to the Mo-
dern Era in the course of history which all previous essen-
tialistic philosophical systems (including the formalistic
or subjectivistic idealism of Kant) have failed to account
for, his only possibility of furnishing a solution can only
rest in attributing to new scheme of philosophical system in
which essence and existence, ideal and reality are never of
two permanent realms, whereby 'essence and existence are
actually interrelated in philosophy, and the process of prov-
ing the truth there has to do with the existing object itself.
The essence arises in the process of existence, and converse-
ly, the process of existence is a 'return' to the essence.25
However, Hegel is careful enough from falling into the opti-
mism of Leibniz with his 'the best of all possible worlds'
and the' pre-established harmony' of divine decree. His
pan-logism, instead, walks hand in hand with his pan-tragism,
and it is through mediation that the immediacy of the unity
of the individual with his world is lost. The loss is a new
starting point through which again the new identity in diffe-
rence is retrieved. This mediation is made possible through
'externalization' of the subject.
Hegel employs the term 'externalization' (Entausserung) in
21several levels of meaning in the course of the development
of his thought from the earliest stage. Hegel first makes
a distinction between 'externalization' (Entausserung) with
the more sombre 'alienation' (Entf rerndung). The first is of
a more general indication in the deprivation of the objects
of work (of the slaves) from the actual possession of the
producer. Hegel traces this development as the institution
of property in his 'Philosophy of Right'. 'The institution
of property Hegel here related to the fact that man had come
to live in a world that, though molded by his own knowledge
and labor, was no longer his, but rather stood opposed to his
inner needs-- a strange world governed by inexorable laws,
a dead world in which human life is frustrated.' 26 Alienation
is of a more specific use. It bears a strong sense of value
judgment and is used by Hegel in marking out the estrange-
ment (another way of translating 'Entfremdung') of the individ-
ual from culture, or that of the estrangement of actual life
from moral principles. It was during the Jena period that
the pan-logical notion of historical development also emer-
ged amidst the pan-tragical. Hegel observes the historical
necessity of human spirit to transcend the immediacy of the
identity of consciousness with the living reality. The natur-
al aspect of the ancient Greeks, of being immediately in har-
mony with 'nature' (undi f f errenti ated, meaning nature and so-
ciety at once), must be overcome, to be estranged before be-
ing re-identified.
22
It is through externalization that history and society in
their different stages of transformation are relevant to
thought, and the development of the human spirit is only
possible in and through the process of historicalization
and socialization of 'Experience' (Erfahrung). 'Experience'
in Hegel is more concrete than in Kant. In fact, Hegel has
the critique of the positivism of Kant in mind when he re-
marks that matter, or sensation is something abstract, and
Kant has failed to deal concretely with the' ob ject' (of course
a concept in German Idealism), which is manifested on several
different levels of 'Experience', save only (for Kant) in the
epistemological realm. With the positive residue of the gi-
venness of sense experience and the thing-in-itself behind,
the 'transcendental object x` in the first edition, at least,
of Kant's first critique, Kant has stated his refusal to pro-
ceed beyond the mere given, that which is representated.
This is precisely the point of departure of Hegel' s cri-
tique and construction:
'To consider a thing rationally means not to bring reason
to bear on the object from the outside and so to tamper with
it, but to find that the object is rational on its own account
here it is mind in its freedom, the culmination of self-cons-
ciousness reason, which gives itself actuality and engenders
itself as an existing world. The sole task of philosophic
science is to bring into consciousness this proper work of
the reason of the thing itself. 27
23
For Hegel, there is no givenness but only that-which-is-
posited by human activity (of different levels) as object.
So Hegel proceeds to criticize the abstraction of sense ex-
perience still further:
'Matter offers resistance to me-- and matter is nothing ex-
cept the resistance it offers to me.-- that is, it presents
itself' to my mind as something abstractly independent only
when my mind is taken abstractly as sensation. (Sense-per-
ception perversely takes mind as sensation for the concrete
and mind as reason as the abstract.) In relation to the will
and property, however, this independence of matter has notruth.' 28
In Hegel' s phenomenology, he first develops his mature
system what the philosophy-system of Hegel is based on, and
the course of the phenomenology is that of externalization
on the each and every stage of the whole ascension of the
spirit. This is the idea of Hegel's 'Logic' of historicalization
and socialization of thought, and he has nowhere explained this
more clearly than in the later added preface to the 'Phenome-
nology of Spirit:
'... our epoch is a birth-time, and a period of transition.
The spirit of man has broken with-the old order of things hi-
therto prevailing, and with the old ways of thinking, and is
in the mind to let them all sink into the depths of the past
and to set about its own transformation.... But this new world
... comes on the stage to begin with in its immediacy.... In
the same way, the crowning glory of a spiritual world, is not
found complete in its initial stages. The beginning of the new
24spirit is the outcome of a widespread revolution in manifold
forms of spiritual culture it is the reward which comes afte
a chequered and devious course of development, and after much
struggle and effort. It is a whole which, after running its
course and laying bare all its content, returns again to it-
self it is the resultant abstract notion of the whole. But
the actual realization of this abstract whole is only found
when those previous shapes and forms, which are developed
anew again, but developed and shaped within this new medium,
and with the meaning they have thereby acquired. 29
That Hegel has deliberately contrasted his phenomenological
development of the Absolute with the immediate identity of
self and the Absolute in Fichte and Schelling is obvious,
and Hegel transcends all his forerunners because of his in-
troduction of the mediation between 'subject' and 'object',
'mind' and 'reality', through 'externalization'. Since the
period of Jena (1801-1803), Hegel has introduced the cate-
gory of 'labour'(Arbeit) as the root of externalization.
'The labour process is responsible for various types of so-
cial integrations, conditioning all the subsequent forms of
community that correspond to these types: the family, civil
society, and the state., 30 We may so conclude that even the
'Philosophy of Right'. as the late system of Hegel, is still
founded upon social labour, for the first instance of extern-
alization of mind in the book is that of property-- socially
appropriated labour.
25
It is social labour that creates human society in its va-
rious stages of transformation, and it is the historicity of
the finished products of labour that forms human history. The
totality of human reality is the creation of labour, in Hegel's
mind reflected. We must, however, prevent ourselves from draw-
ing over-sweeping conclusions of condemning Hegel as an idea-
list (this is what the coarse Marxists often do, and that I
agree with J.Hyppblite that G.Lukacs has successfully avoid-
ed in his 'Der junge Hegel'),. for Hegel has never forsaken
the intimate dialectical relationships of mind and its po-
sited reality. He never stops reminding his readers in his
'Phenomenology' of the entirety,or self-enclosedness, of the
structure of each stage in the whole course of development.
'The society (created by social labour) is, however, a com-
munal effort, a transaction of each and all, the object itself
but in this object the individual becomes alien to himself.
This aliecation, which Hegel identifies with objectification
or the externalization of man through his labour, is a new
concept., 31 This externalization is where history, which ac-
cording to Hegel is 'never the place of good fortune' begins.
This history, we must note clearly, is not natural history,
nor that of history of mankind as a nature being, but it is
the history of the development of human civilization-- em-
bracing all the aspects of cultural activities of mankind.
26This history is the over-coming of the naturalness of man-
kind, of his being conditioned by nature. This is made pos-
sible by the organized social labour of mankind, and thus the
emerging of the human society, but here the subsumption of
the individual under the category of collectivity has meant
for mankind the oppression of the society, and this is ex-
plicated by the master and slave relationship of Hegel. The
great Hegel commentator A. Ko j've explains:
'...Man who works transforms given nature.... Where there is
work, then, there is necessary change, progress, historical
evolution.... Work is Bildung,... on the one hand, it forms,
transforms the World, humanizes it by making it more adapted
to Man on the other, it transforms, forms, educates man, it
humanizes him by bringing him into greater conformity with
the idea that he has of himself., an idea that-- in the be-ginning-- is only an abstract idea, an ideal.* 32
Hegel is a philosopher of the concrete in his development
of the, historicalization and socialization of humanity, he is
no idealist of abstraction like Kant, Fichte and Schelling.
If we want to label him still as a idealist following or
consummating German Idealism, then he is an idealist of a
very special kind. We have to let Hegel speak for himself:
'Consciousness knows and comprehends nothing but what falls
within its experience for what is found in experience is mere-
ly spiritual substance, and, moreover, object of its self.
Mind, however, becomes object, for it consists in the process
27
of becoming an other to itself, i.e. an object for its own
self, and in transcending this otherness. And experience is
called by this process by which the element that is immedia-
te, unexperience, i. e. abstract-- whether it be in the form
of sense or of a bare thought-- externalizes itself, and then
comes back to itself from this state of estrangement, and by
so doing is at length set forth in its concrete nature and
real truth, and becomes too a "possession of consciousness'32
The consummation of Hegel' s 'Phenomenology' is the consum-
mation of the whole 'logos-metaphysics, but the fundament
is the historicalization and socialization of human spirit
as 'experience'.
28
4. Subjective Spirit-- Consciousness for-itself.
The point of departure for Kant in his first critique was
the primacy of sensuous experience which had been asserted
since the 'idealism' of Berkerley. Despite the discontent
of Kant with the consequent possible skepticism engendered
by pushing empiricism to an extreme in David Hume., neverthe-
less, the givenness of sensuous experience is never doubted.
The acceptance of the primacy of sensuous experience which
with the power of intuition and understanding whereby the
world of 'objects' i.e. objectivity, is formed, renders the
idealism of Kant an epistemology. It is a critical epistem-
ology, a philosophical anthropology also, since strictly
speaking to elucidate the limit and scope of human know-
ledge is also to know man, to understand what man is, and
it is therefore no great surprise that Kant has always been
considered as a humanist, inheriting the tradition of Renai-
ssance and Enlightenment humanism,
The idealism of Kant and Fichte, in the eyes of Hegel, con-
stitutes only a very static and subjectivistic aspect, and there-
fore very limited view, of man. Subjective idealism not only
confines human activity in the mere speculative one on epistem-
ology-- the passive activity of sensuous experience and under-
standing the mere world of givenness (although it is the world
of givenness to man), it further conceives man as the perman-
ent knowing subject only, and never the creating subject in
29history. Even the moral subject of Kant is no creator of a
objective realm of human living reality, but only the ulti-
mate ground for the justification of the actions of a moral
subject. So it is not so appalling as it is to the Kantians
that when Kant talked of politics, he immediately shift to
utilitarianism, taking politics as a means to achieve an end
which can fulfill both the moral and the volitional needs
of man and history is only thought with a possible end
at which all actions aim but is never reached, the solemn
infinite progress in history of Kant can mean as well the
infinite scourge of man in history. Worse still, Kant can
but think of the future as hypothetical and the course of
development of human history as based on certain postulates. 34
The defects of Kant's idea of history cannot ebe more clear-
ly attributed but to his epistemological philosophy of man,
or his philosophical anthropology which is only confined
to the subject as knowing subject, and is knowing only of
what is given. This has always been what Hegel criticizes
as the limitation of subjective idealism, and it is to over-
come the limitation of a epistemologico_philosophical anthro-
pology that Hegel begins in the first part of his 'Phenomeno-
logy of Mind'-- the Subjective Spirit.
The subjective spirit is what-Hegel refers to as the levels
of human mind or consciousness. This investigation into the
structure of human understanding and the transcendental na-
ture of human subjectivity has been opened up by the British
30empiricists and the earlier German idealists. The only and
which is also the essential difference between Hegel and his
fore-runners is that Hegel not only relates the different le-
vels of consciousness, but also distinguishes them as the
outcome of the different levels of activity. A rough scheme
can be presented
A. Consciousness as such-- (epistemological)
1. Senuous Certainty-- passive sensation.
2. Perception-- the object as 'force' in the
philosophy of Aristotle and
T.Pini
3. Understanding-- the object as' ob j ectivity°.
B. Self-consciousness-- (of social labour)
1. Master and slave 4
2. Stoicism and Skepticism.
3. Unhappy Consciousness in Judaeism and Christ-
ianity.
C. Reason-- The first identity of objectivity and
subjectivity,
1. In the observation of Nature.
2. In the actuality of human praxical action.
31
The first step towards a development of the system-
atic science in Hegel is different from that of Kant
and Fichte, who begin with that of the transcendental
analytic in the former and self-certainty of the Ego
in the latter for Hegel, as Jean Hyppolite most aptly
comments 'One must begin with naive consciousness,which
knows its object immediately or, rather, thinks that
it knows it, and show that in the knowledge of its ob-
ject it is in fact self-consciousness, knowledge of it-
self.' 35 In fact, the course taken by the dialectic from
the immediate sensous certainty to the idea of 'object'
and then finally that of understanding, the faculty of
human knowledge is that natural development from the
Heraclitean flux to that of realism in Plato, Aristotle,
Locke and Leibniz, and finally the idea of objectivity
in the understanding of idealism in Kant. It is that coit-
tinuous negation of the mere givenness to that of the
correlation of 'objectivity with subjectivity', But here
the objectivity, together with the subjectivi ty are given-
ness in abstract, that is, they are still objectivity
and subjectivity for the mere thinking mind. The human
subject or spirit is still nod totally certain of itself,
not yet certain of itself as creator of the world where-
by mind and the world is one. This is the limitation of
32Kantian idealism which is merely epistemological. It
can never but be imnmedi at- e, of being immediately cer-
tain of its being one with the world, that is, the world
as objectivity, as knowledge, is possible only with res-
pect to the human mind, to reason, to the transcendental
apperception which renders unity to the form and content
of knowledge. This cognitive subjectivity of German ideal
ism has to be further 'transcended, although it is already
the consummation of all the past philosophical systems.
The greatness of Hegelian philosophy is due to his
insight into the levels of human activity in which the
cognitive aspect is one. The introduction of the cate-
gory of social labour of Hegel surpasses all previous
speculative philosophical systems in that Hegel takes
into consideration of organized knowledge and praxis
as transcending mere speculative knowledge. Further,
the consciousness of the self must be attained by the
process of social organized labour, must be mediated in
order to become certain of it truth. Knowledge and labour
are phenomena particular to human beings it is only th-
rough them that the we-consciousness is attained. As He-
gel relates:
'Self-consciousness exists in itself and for itself,
33
in that, and by the fact that it exists for another self-
consciousness, that is to say, it is only by being acknow-
ledged or recognized.... Self-consciousness has before it
another self-consciousness it has come out of itself.' 36
The Master-and-Slave relationship for Hegel is thus the
struggle for recognition between consciousness, and it is
through: sod'.'domination that human society and history
progress. Here we may go so far as to claim that Hegel' s
philosophy is no mere epistemology, it is a philosophy
of the concrete activity of man, which is no mere com-
prehensive but also creative, the creativity is no mere
morality (which Hegel values highly and is discussed in
objective spirit), but in actual development in history.
The section of Subjective Spirit is concerned only in
elucidating the levels of human consciousness or human
mind which are not merely interrelated in knowledge, but
further differentiated on the different levels of human
activity. Consciousness is for itself only insofar as it
is self-externalizing through its di f ferents of activi-
ties, and for Hegel the socialization and historicaliza-
tion of 'Experience' of man is made possible only through
Master-and-Slave relationship. It is an extreme form of
externalization through which the slave has to alienate
his world created by his work from his immediate recog-
34
nition and satisfaction to that of the master. The over-
coming of this externalization is the mission for Hegel 's
'phenomenology' to attain absolute self-certainty of Truth
and Reality created by the Spirit.
In the last part of the Subjective Spirit, Hegel poses
the activity of reason in two aspects, in the activity of
comprehending Nature-- in the various enquiries (intell-
ectual activities) of natural sciences, and that of the
actual activities in the civil society. With the reflex-
ion of self-consciousness in German idealism, Nature and
society are asserted to be that of the product of human
activities, and mind or spirit thus recognizes itself in
its activities. Nevertheless, the spirit remains a subject-
ive spirit in that it recognizes itself as for itself, that
is, it knows itself only as the mind, the spirit, despite
its own progress or development from consciousness to
self-consciousness and then reason -through activities,
it has never known itself as correlated with the actual
course of history or the actual 'life' of the spirit, and
this task is undertaken by Hegel in the second part, name-
ly, the objective Spirit.
35
5. Objective Spirit-- Life in-itself.
The great German poet, Friedrich Schiller, has most beau-
tifully expressed his knowledge of the ancient Greeks in
their Classical Age that:
'If one recalls the beautiful nature that surrounded
the ancient Greeks if one ponders how familiarly this
people could live with free nature beneath their fort-
unate skies, how very much closer their mode of concept-
ion, their manner of perception, their morals, were to
simple nature, and. what a faithful copy of this their
poetry is, then the observation must be displeasing that
one finds so little trace among them of the sentimental
interest with which we moderns are attached to the scenes
and characters of nature. The Greeks is indeed to the high-
est degree precise, faithful, and circumstantial in des-
cribing them, yet simply no more so and with no more pre-
ferential involvement of his heart than he displays in the
description of a tunic, a shield, asuit of armour, some
domestic articles, or any mechanical product. In his love
of an object, he does not seem to make any distinction bet-
ween those which appear of themselves, and those which
arise as a result of art or the human will.... With
them civilization did not manifest itself to such an ex-
tent that nature was abandoned in consequence. The whole
structure of their social life was founded on perceptions,
not on a contrivance of art their theology itself was the
inspiration of a naive feeling, the child of a joyous
imaginative power,... At one with himself and happy in
the sense of his humanity he was obliged to remain with
it as his maximun and assimilate all else to it.' 37
Can there possibly be a more expressive and philosophical
36description and probing of the Classical Antiquity than
that of the scholarly and talented Schiller? This is life
of the Greeks, it is also the concept of 'life'- of German
idealism. Marcuse expresses the concept of life most re-
vealingly that:
'Dans la Pheriomenol ogi e de 1 'Esprit, le concept de Vie,
conformement au pro jet de 1' ouvrage qui est de d4velopper
l es differents modes de l 'esprit comme modes de 1' E spri t
dans son apparition, est centre expresse'ment sur la Vie
comme Esprit, sur la vie comme titre sachant et conscient,
comme 9tre se connaissant lui-meme.,38
(My attempted translation:) 'In the Phenomenology of Mind,
the concept of Life, in compliance with the project of the
work that develops the different modes of the spirit as
modes of spirit in its appearance, is centered overtly
in the life as spirit, in the life as knowing and con-
scious, as knowing itself as such.'
Hegel, in his theological writings, has already grasped
the concept of life as the 'naive' and 'sentimental' in
different epochs of history reminiscent of Schiller.
The Greek life in the eyes of Hegel is the in-itself
it is the immediate manifestation of the unity of the
individual with the reality, universal in the object.
37Objective Spirit is the externalization of the Subjective
Soirit. Spirit is no longer latent in the mind but is po-
sited and universalized as culture, as the living reality
of human world, as history. Being is self-actualizing th-
rough its own activity into the concrete universal, the
essence of the different periods of civilization.' It
is no longer the subjective certainty of discovering
itself immediately in being or of posing itself through
negating that being it knows itself as this world, as
the world of human history, and, conversely, it knows
this world to be the self.' 39 Thus, in Hegel 's philoso-
phical system, history is not something empirical and
contingent historicity is not originated through blind
forces, but is the result of organized effort of men in
the living reality. Mind and Reality are structured to-
gether as the totality, the entire universe of human
action and discourse. We can correlate the subjective
side with the objective side of human spirit as follows:
1. Consciousness-- The Greco-Roman world-- Immediate
Spirit
2. Self-consciousness-- Late Roman and-- Alienated
Medieval world Spirit
3. Self-certainty of-- Modern world-- Self-certain
Reason Spirit,
38
Here we can realize the full force of Hegel's idealism
which not just embraces the knowing subject, but also the
world as becoming with the knowing subject. This Becoming
of the spirit through its own historicity is history, not
just of a particular aspect, but universal history. The
being or better, becoming of this Spirit is' not distinct
from the action through which it poses itself.'
The first moment of life is manifested in the immediacy
of Greco-Roman world in which, as we have quoted Schiller
and Hegel, consciousness as such is life. Man is one with
Nature society is in harmony with the universe. Conscious-
ness makes no difference between self and the world. However,
this certainty is not yet Truth, it has not yet realized
its positing of a world that is the self. The immediacy
has to be overcome through externalization whereby the
self-certainty is lost. This is executed by the total
alienation in Master-and-Slave relationship. We may con-
clude that the Greeks were still unaware of the fact
that their greatness was built upon the subjugation of
the slaves under them, their glorious mastery of the state
and their unity of their humanity with nature were built
upon the negation of the reality of slaves. With the in-
39
c ess ant crises of wars and the ultimate decline of the
race and the rise of a universal empire in the period
of Imperium Romanum, culture was no longer indegenous
but foreign and subduing individual expressions. The
grandeur of the Imperium destroyed the unity of the ci-
tizen with the city state.
What followed was the universal state, which is an ab-
stract universal, as opposed to the individuals, in wh-
ich the individuals were self-conscious but only of their
negativity, only of their nothingness compared with the
state and the former essence of humanity the Greeks had
entertained was lost to man, the private individual, but
it is preserved as an ideal, as the omnipotent Christian
God. The former concern and unity of the citizen with the
city state was lost. Jean Hyppolite elucidates this new
moment most clearly:
'The citizen as such disappeared, and in his place the
private person appeared. The individual turned in on him-
self (since the in-itself with the former state was lost
and transformed only to the man for-itself)..o. The ab-
stract domination of the state and the individual's in-
terest, limited to his own preservation, replaced the beau-
tiful living relation between the individual and the whole,
... Private property is the goal of the individual, and
each individual can consider the state only as as alien
power which he tries to bend to his own interests., 40
40
The outcome of the new alienating state could main-
tain its abstract universality by 'Laws', with the de-
cline of the Roman Empire, these secular laws were re-
placed by divine laws of the Christian Church. The loss
of the naive freedom and autonomy is deemed necessary by
Hegel. For to him:
'... man's societal existence cannot be anything natu-
ral or immediate. The beautiful incarnation of such a na-
tural immediacy in Greek democracy, therefore, contains
within it the seeds of its own seeds of destruction. The
subject must steadily increase its own externalization,
estrangement, since it continually enters into new, rich-
er social relations and since its labour, its individual
efforts and activities turn it into the identical subject
object of these social relations.... Here then the ex-
ternalization of the human subject appears as the social
activities of the human race thanks to which a self-
created objective society comes into being drawing
its vital energy from the social activities of the
subject, grows steadily in complexity, richness and
scope, so that eventually it displaces what has been
lifeless substance and occupies it on behalf of the sub-
ject. In a word, by wholly estranging itself, the sub-
1I -e c.oct.11i.z.e.s. Inset f IE6ry ..a.rnd practice to be iden--
'tical with the substance o
The effort exerted by labour resulted in alienation of
the individual in post-classical era, and the incessant
labour that follows since the Renaissance and Enlighten-
41
ment is the effort to retrieve the lost identity. Culture
in German is' Bil dung', which also means 'formation'. To
Hegel, culture is alienation and its transformation.
'Culture and alienation are akin in meaning: the determi-
nate individual cultivates himself, and forms himself to es-
sentiality, through the alienation of his natural being....
To cultivate oneself is not to develop harmoniously, as in
organic growth, but to oppose oneself and rediscover oneselfthrough a rending and a separation.' 42
However, this retrieval of the self, the spirit, is only
possible first by the externalization through social labour
of the slave, and through history recognized, and this is
the meaning of the 'Phenomenology', the mission of Hegel in
his socialization and historicalization of Experience in
order to elucidate the stages through with the immediate
consciousness becomes spirit, the subject of Reason becomes
the World. Schiller also described the alienation of modern
culture and the consequent 'sentimental (sentimental is the)'
world that tempestuously yearns for the reunion of man with
Nature. To him it is because nature in us has disappeared
from humanity and we rediscover her in her truth only out-
side it, in the inanimate world. Not in our greater accord
with nature, but quite the contrary, the unnaturalness of
our situation, conditions,. and moods forces us to procure a
42satisfaction in the physical world, since none is to be hoped
for in the moral., 43 Here I must refer to the great Frankfurt
school philosopher and art critic T.W.Adorno who attributes
the most delicate analysis to lyric poetry in Modern Era.
For him, even the most lyrical poetry of modern times cannot
be but sentimental, and sentimental in a very uncontaminated
nature, that
'lyric expression, released from the heaviness of material
things, should evoke images of a life free of the impositions
of the everyday world, of usefulness, of the dumb drive for
self-preservation. This demand... is in itself social in na-
ture. It implies a protest against a social condition which
every individual experiences as hostile, distant, cold, and
oppressive(and).., protesting against these conditions, the
poem proclaims the dream of a world in which things would be
different.(But it is).,, only after a transformation into
human form can nature regain anew that which man's rule over
her has taken away. 144
We observe that Schiller, Hegel and Adorno all conceive
the pervertion of former unity of man and nature which pre-
dominated in Classical Antiquity by modern civilization of
a new way of social domination. Sentimental poetry yearns
for a re-union with nature, preoccupies itself with the pr-
aise of nature simply because nature is lost to man. How
J.W. von Goethe beautifully expressed this sense of nostal-
gia that is exemplified in his Faust I
43Wodurch bewegt er (der Dichter) alle Herzen?
Wodurch besiegt er jedes Element?
Ist er der Einklang nicht, der aus dem Busen dringt
Und in sein Herz die Welt zurucke schlingt?
Wenn die Natur des Fadens ew' ge Lange,
GleichgUltig drehend, auf die Sindel zwingt,
Wenn al l er Wes en unharmon'sche Menge
Verdriesslich durcheinander klingt,
Wer teilt die fliessend immer gleiche Reihe
Belebend ab, dass sie sick rhythmisch regt?
Wer ruft das Eizelne zur allgemeinen Weihe,
Wo es in herrlichen Akkorden schlagt?
Wer lasst den Sturm zu Leidenschaften wuten?
Das Abendrot im ernsten Sinne gluhn?
Wer s chuttet alle s chdnen Fruhl i ngsbl uten
Auf der Geliebten 'fade hin?
Wer flicht die unbedeuten grunen Blotter
Zum Ehrenkranz Verdiensten jeder Art?
Wer sichert den Olymp?vereinet Getter?
Des Menschen Kraft, im Dichter offenbart,
(Faust I,138-157)
(How-does the poet stir all hearts?
How does he conquer every element?
Is it not that music welling from his heart
Draws the world into his breast again?
When Nature spins with unconcern
The endless thread and winds it on the spindle,
When discordent masses of existing things
Sound their sullen dark cacophony,
Who divides the flowing changeless line,
Infusing life, and gives it pulse and rhythm?
44
Who summons each to common consecration
Where each will sound in glorious harmony?
Who bids the storm accompany the passions,
The sunset cast its glow on solemn thought?
Who scatters every fairest April blossom
Along the path of his beloved maid?
Who braids from undistinguished verdant leaves
A wreath of honor as a mark of merit?
Who safeguards Mount Olympus, who unites the gods?
Man's power which in the poet stands revealed.)
The greatness of Goethe rests not in his imagination of
pairing Nature with the sentiments of the poet, of linking
up the discordant spindle of life with harmonious rhythm,
of conducting individual voices into a heavenly chorus, of
binding storm with passions, thought with sunset, flowers
and beloved, verdant leaves with wreath of honour, and at
last Mount Olympus with the gods, but rather, in his des-
cribing a world that is indifferent to human imaginations
and poetical sentiments, in his accusal of a world of apathy
towards the discrepancy of human ideal and the despicable
human living reality. And it has always been the greatest
concern of Goethe and Schiller in recreating a new world,
not by political revolution, but by aesthetic education.
For to them, '...it is only through Beauty that man makes
his way to freedom.' 45 For Hegel, the task is achieved only
through philosophy, the absolute knowledge.
45
6. The Living-form --Socialization and Historicalization
of Absolute Spirit,
Schiller, in his Letters on the Aesthetic Education, has
mentioned a two-fold task that is needed to bring together
the phenomenal diversity of thought and reality--- of giv-
ing reality to the necessity within, and subjecting to the
law of necessity of the reality without.' 46 Jean Hyppolite
has maintained most persuasively that the task of Hegel 's
-Phenomenology is the de-objectification of the object, and
the de-subjectification of the subject. Truly Hegel's Phen-
omenology has exposed dialectically that the mind is only
knowable as the world, and the world is likewise only know-
able as the mind. To employ the terminology 'Structure' of
Structuralism can be very illuminating, and we can say that
mind and reality are a structured totality. It is through
the self-creating activities of man in various fields that
the essence and existence of man are manifested. Hegel thus
criticizes Classical and Modern philosophies like this:
'The manner of study in ancient times is distinct from that
of the modern world, in that the former consisted in the cul-
tivation and perfecting of the natural. mind. Testing life
carefully at all points, philosophizing about everything it
came across, the former created an experience permeated th-
46
rough and through by universals.// In modern times, however,
an individual finds the abstract form ready made. In straininc
to grasp it and make it his own, he rather strives to bring
forward the inner meaning alone, without any process of media-
tion, the production of the universal is abridged, instead of
the universal arising out of the manifold detail of concrete
existence.// Hence nowadays the task before us consists not
so much in getting the individual clear of the stage of sen-
suous immediacy, and making him a substance that thinks and
is grasped in terms of thought, but rather the very opposite:
it consist in actualizing the universal, and giving it spirit-
ual vitality, by the process of breaking down and supersed-ing fixed and determinate thoughts.' 47
Hegel forcefully contrasts his philosophy with that of his
fore-runners, the Platonic and Aristotelean systems that id-
entified being immediately with essence, and also that of
Kantianism which separated noumena from phenomena, form and
content. His philosophical system aims at the construction
of the 'Concrete Universal', the Living-form that Schiller
also aims at reconstructing. Thus what for Kant as 'essence'
which the ancients upheld as ultimate reality is but empi-
rical constructions based on the theorizing or epistemological
faculty of man, here Hegel transforms this into the 'Notion'
that develops through history. It is the living substance
that Hegel is concerned:
'The living substance, further, is that being which is
truly subject, or, what is the same thing, is truly realiz-
ed and actual solely in the process of positing itself, or in
mediating with its own self its transitions from one state
47
or position to its opposite. As subject it is pure and simple
negativity, and just on that account a process of splitting
up what is simple and undifferentiated, a process of duplica-
ting and setting factors in opposition, which in turn is the
negation of this indifferent diversity and of the oppositionof factors that it entails., 48
If the coming into being of the externalized world is po-
sited, it is only with intention to re-integrate it into a
final identity that externalization is meant. 'For if the
objectivity of the world of objects is the product of a pro-
visional disunity in the identical subject-object, then in-
evitably, the criterion of the validity of the total process
can lie only in the demonstration that subject and object are
identical, in the self-realization of the identical subject-
object.' 49 And Hegel, in fact, has always presupposed the ul-
timate identity of subject-object well from the beginning:
'This transformation process is -a cycle that returns-into
it-self, a cycle that presupposes its beginning, and reaches
its beginning only at the end. So far as spirit, then, is of
necessity this self-distinction, it appears as a single whole,
intuitively apprehended, over against its simple conscious-
ness.1 50 We have earlier mentioned that Hegel has transcended
all his forerunners in developing social labour and history
as particularly pertaining to the' formation' (Bildunc5) of
48
man, and through this he has widen the concept of experience
which for Kant is only confined within theorectical exper-
ience, the course of socialization and historicalization of
knowledge embraces theory as well as social praxis, of theo-
rectical knowledge, of morality, of art and religion, and fi-
nally of speculative thought. The comprehension of the totality
of this experience and the attainment of the total conciousness
of being one with the world is the highest peak of speculative
thought-- of what Hegel calls the philosophical science as
such. The consummation is where:
'Spirit is alone Reality. It is the inner being of the world,
that which essentially is, and is per se it assumes objective,
determinate form, and enters into relations with itself-- it
is externality (otherness), and exists for self yet, in this
determination, and in this otherness, it is still one with it-
self.... This self-containedness, however, is first something
known by us, it is implicit in its nature it is substance
spiritual. It has to become self-contained for itself, on its
own account it must be knowledge of spirit, and must be con-
sciousness of itself as spirit. This means, it must be presente
to itself as an object, but at the same time straightway an-
nul and transcend this objective form it must be its own ob-
,, tin whirh J :L finds i tsel f r. 1ected. So far as its spi-
ritual content is produced by its own activity, it is only
we (the thinkers) who knows spirit to be for itself, to be
objective to itself but in so far as spirit knows itself to
be for itself, then this self-production, the pure notion,
is the sphere and element in which its objectification takes
49effect, and where it gets its existential form. In this way
it is in its existences aware of itself as an object in which
its own self is reflected. Mind, which, when thus developed,
knows itself to be mind, is science. Science is its realiza-
tion, and the kingdom it sets up for itself in its own nativeelement.' 51
One cannot help quoting the commentary of Kojc%ve in this
aspect that:
'Hegel was a microcosm, who incorporated in his particular
being the complete totality of the spatial-temporal realiza-
tion of universal being.... Hegel caused the complete whole
of the universal real process to penetrate into his individ-
ual consciousness, and then he penetrated this consciousness.
Thus this consciousness became just as total, as universal,
as the process that it revealed by understanding itself arid
this fully self-conscious consciousness is absolute Knowledge,
152...
To conclude, we can remark that the system of Hegel pre-
supposes the Phenomenology as much as the Phenomenology is
assumed through the first principle of identity of the subject
with the object. It is so and only so that we can claim Hegel' s
Phenomenology is structured with absolute knowledge that both
are indispensible to the other.
50
7. True Speculation and Negativity in Hegel.
Hegel openly claims that his philosophical system is true
speculation, and it differs from critical philosophy of that
of Kant. It is speculation in which reality is thought, and
it exposes a development which is dialectical of 'Experience'
in the various aspects of human activity. Unlike Kiantianism
which withdraws itself into a meta-theorectical enquiry, or
the question 'how knowledge is possible?', the concern which
'maintains thinking to be merely subjective thinking, abstract
universality as such, is exactly the same bare uniformity, is
undifferentiated, unmoved substantialityo..' S3 speculative
philosophy or 'the speculative' which in Classical Antiquity
thinks of 'Reality' as such, as the given, now' expressly rises
above such oppositions as that between subjective and object-
ive, which the understanding cannot get over, and absorbing
them in i t sedi f, evinces its own concrete and all-embracing
nature.' 54 Contrasting all previous systems of philosophy,
the Hegelian system negates all pre-established entities of
any system. For Hegel:
'Subjects and object, and so on, God, nature, understanding,
sensibility, etc., are uncritically presupposed as familiar
and something valid, and become fixed points from which to start
and to which to return. The process of knowing flits between
these secure points, and in consequence goes on merely along
the surface. Apprehending and proving consist similarly in see-
ing whether every one finds what is said corresponding to his
idea too, whether it is familiar and seems to him so and so or
51
55not'
The attempt of Hegel to criticize his forerunners is very
characteristic, for he mentions a little before that: 'Knowledge
is directed against this ideal presentation (of the totality)
which has hereby arisen, against this being-familiar and
well-known it is an action of universal mind, the concern
of thought.' 56 This attempt by 'defamiliarization' echoes that
of the later Russian Formalists in their development of the
theory of literrary criticism. This defamiliarization manifests
the characteristic of Hegelian philosophy as rendering a com-
letely new vision of the world to us-- as a totality, and
further indicates the break of Hegelian philosophical system
from all previous reified systems, which pose a presupposed
and never mediated entity as the starting point. 57
But this defamiliarization is in actual fact 'negativity',
it is the negation of any assumed entity, any primacy above
the actual course of development, and prior to 'Experience'.
Negativity is the power of 'Mind':
'But the life of mind is not one that shuns death, and keeps
clear of destruction it endures death and in death maintains
its being. It only wins to its truth when it finds itself utter-
Ly torn asunder. It is this mighty power, not by being a positive
qhich turns away from the negative, as when we say of anything
it is nothing or it is false, and, being then done with it, pass
Dff to something else: on the contrary, mind is this power only
Dy looking the negative in the face, and dwelling with it. This
1welling beside it is the magic power that converts the negative
_nto being. That power is just what we spoke of above as sub-
52ject, which by giving determinateness a place in its substance,
cancels abstract immediacy, i.e immediacy which merely is, and,
by so doing, becomes the true substance, becomes being or imme-
diacy that does not have mediation outside it, but is this me-
diation itself.' 58
Negativity in Hegelian system means not refutation, but like-
wise also-,conservation of that which is deemed only one-sided.
The dialectical development in the Phenomenology exemplifies
the power of negativity in overcoming all movements in their
concrete relations with one another.
53
8. The Task of Logos-metaphysics exemplified by Hegel,
'What mind prepares for itself in the course of its pheno-
menology is the element of true knowledge. In this element the
moments of mind are now set out in the form of thought pure
and simple, which knows its object to be itself. They no long-
er involve the opposition between being and knowing they remain
within the undivided simplicity of the knowing function they
are the truth in the form of truth, and their diversity is mere-
ly diversity of the content of truth. The process by which they
are developed into an organically connected whole is Logic orspeculative philosophy.' 59
The effort exerted by Hegel in the 'Phenomenology' is to at-
tain one thing, which has always been the concern of philosophy
since Classical Antiquity, the reflection upon the ultimate un-
ity of self-consciousness and objectivity, thus the other deter-
minations such as the aforementioned disparity between thought
and being, value and fact, essence and existence,, The consumma-
tion of these differences is that of 'logos'. the speaking sub-
ject of' the word. What the Philosopher, Aristotle, has achieved
in Classical Antiquity is renewed, tasted in a new light by
Hegel. For to the Philosopher:
'Now thinking according to itself is of the best according
to itself, and thinking in the highest degree is of that which
is best in the highest degree. Thus, in partaking of the intel-
ligible, it is of Himself that the Intellect is thinking for
by apprehending and thinking it is He (the Divine, God or Voi•)
Himself who becomes intelligible, and so the Intellect and itsintelligible object are the same. 60
54However, what for Aristotle as Ultimate is achieved by the
'Divine, by Voiig is comprehended and consummated in the subject,
what for Aristotle that 'Thinking is the thinking of Thinking' 61
and that 'Thinking is the thinking of Himself through all eter-
nity., 2, what to Aritotle as object meant only 'Nature', is
in Hegel totally transformed. Mind is(or Spirit is) self-
reflecting only through history and living social reality.
Despite Aristotle has pointed to the concept of 'life' and that:
'Life belongs to God, for the actuality of the intellect is
life, and He is actuality and his actuality is in virtue ofitself a life which is the best and is eternal.' 63
Unfortunately, Aristotle in his static society could never
conceive life as historicity, and Divine as Spirit, and know-
ledge as speculative philosophy achieved only in the£human mind
by the philosopher. These are fully actualized by Hegel' s thou-
ght. The Absolute is not the immediate identity of 'life' and
'intellect', as Aristotle in his 'Naturalism' has achieved.
The Divine is the identity achieved by the 'Bildung' of the
individual and' the particular to the acknowledgement of the
totality and the universal. This is possible only by going
through the journey of the 'Phenomenology', by an 'an abs of ut-
izing of historicity or histbricizing of the absolute.' 64
This' B it dung' has always been the concern of the humanistic
tradition since the Renaissance. Hegel obviously has in mind
this tradition when he argues that the 'phenomenology' is a
55'ladder' for naive consciousness to achieve its status of self-
conscious' spirit, and that:
'The task of conducting the individual mind from its unscien-
tific standpoint to that of science had to be taken in its gen-
eral sense (the sense of the humanistic tradition since the Re-
naissance) we had to contemplate the formative development
(Bildung) of the universal or general individual, of self-con-
scious spirit. As to the relation between this two, the part-
icular and general individual, every moment, as it gains con-
crete form and its own proper shape and appearance, finds a
place in the life of the universal individual.' 65
The concern of Hegel' s phenomenology is cultural, unlike the
natural aspect of Aristotle's Metaphysics, the 'logos' is no
longer the identity of 'Nature' and 'Mind', and Neo-Spinozists
have wrongly boasted of having Hegel in their ranks, but 'logos'
is the toil of humanity in self-redemption after extefnalization
through the development of the phenomenology in order to ach-
ieve the.unity of 'History' and 'Mind'. Koj?ve is right in
saying that Aristotle has identified the 'eternal' as in time,
as telos, and Hegel transforms the 'eternal' as 'temporality', 66
So, Man is known not through any eternal 'essence', not through
any transcendental functions but only through his dialectical
development in history. Each step of his development is essen-
tial and indispensible in his coming to himself in existence
and in knowledge. Hegel remarks clearly that:
'Science lays before us the morphogenetic (structural) pro-
56
cess of this cultural development in all its detailed fullness
and necessity, and at the same time shows it to be something
that has already sunk into the mind as a moment of its being
and become a possession of the mind.... The length of the jour-
ney has to be borne with, for every moment is necessary and
again we must halt at every stage, for each is a complete indiv-
idual form, and is fully and finally considered only so far as
its determinate character is taken and dealt with as a rounded
and concrete whole '67
The 'logos-metaphysics' of Hegel is specific in its onto-
logic character: 'it reconciles being (hence its ontic charact-
er) and logos (hence its logical character) it is being as lo-
gos and logos as being.' 68 It renders life as rational. and the
rational as life. This is the true teleology which not just
poses an essence as the goal of life as in the philosophy of
Classical Antiquity, but-it is the comprehension or reflection
of the self-creation of humanity, the goal and the necessity
that are at once freedom. The impressive end of the 'Phenomeno-
logy' draws the correlation of consciousness and life into a
close, a consummation in Absolute Knowledge:
'The goal, which is Absolute Knowledge or Spirit knowing it-
as Spirit, finds its pathway in the recollection of spiritual
forms as they are in themselves and as they accomplish the or-
ganization of their spiritual kingdom. Their conservation, look-
ed at from the side of their free existence appearing in the form
of contingency, is History looked at from the side of their in-
tellectually comprehended organization, it is the Science of the
ways in which knowledge appears. Both together, or History com-
prehended, form at once the recollelction and the Golgotha of
Absolute Spirit, the reality, the truth, the certainty of itsthrone, without which it were lifeless, solitary, and alone.' 69
57The Absolute Idealism of Hegel has not only surpassed the
abstract principles of Kantianism, the non-conforming sensuous
experience and abstract reasoning of Empiricism and Rationalism,
all being one-sided abstractions, but further incorporated mind
with life. It is the most comprehensive and all-embracing system
of human thought.
58
9. Negativity or Positivity?-- a final word.
To suppose Hegel in his identifying being and thought as
pertaining only to tradition while posing a Heideggerian
mysticism as a new beginning is an over-simplication in the
former and blatant error in the latter. We have already point,
ed out the fact that the mission of Hegel's socialization
and historicalization of knowledge is to render life thinking
and thought living. It is itself a new philosophical depart-
ure. The great force of the Hegelian system is manifested in
its negativity against positivity.
'The dissimilarity which obtains in consciousness between
the ego and the substance constituting its object, is their
inner distinction, the factor of negativity in general., 70 In
other words, the moving force of the dialectic is the dia-
lectical reversal from the subjective to the objective and
vice versa in order to progress to the ultimate concrete
universal, the living form. J. Hyppolite further explicates
the movement of the dialectical negativity:
'Consciousness is consciousness of an object which consti-
tutes the truth of consciousness and which appears to it as
alien, as other than itself. But consciousness is also cons-
cious of itt-t own knowledge of this truth. The knowledge that
consciousness has is overlaid with a knowledge of its own
knowledge, with a subjective reflection--- that of the self
with respect to being or to substance. The disparity between
59these two moments is the motive force of phenomenological
development it is the mainspring of what is called exper-71
ience.'
When formerly all philosophical systems has taken man or
reality as something, as being of a particular essence, it is
the greatness of Hegel and his new dimension of posing man
as 'nothingness', as the 'desire of desire' and human his-
tory as the 'history of desired Desire.' 72 The. insight into
man as 'nothingness' renders possible human history which
is neither contingent as the Empiricists uphold, nor ever
recurring as the essentialistic traditions cling on, but
rather history is the development of man through constant
negation of the reality, of that which is reified and esta-
blished as such, Hegel has done a great sere i, ice in underst-
anding history as the sublation (Aufhebung) of particular in-
stances or moments of history and the established reality,
and consequently development in history is always understood
as praxis, as the result of human creative social. labour.
But in, the last instance Hegel is an Idealist, his aim is, too,
more to render the real rational through thought than the ra-
tioal real. This is best exemplified in his late system of
'Philosophy of Right', which is 'the endeavour to apprehend
a. Rd protray the. state. as something inherently rational,,...
60
it must be poles apart from an attempt to construct a state
as it ought to be (this, of course, has Hegel rightly crit-
icized the subjective idealists that always start from the
mere ought).... It can only show how the state, the ethi-
cal universe, is to be understood.
Hic Rhodus, hic saltus.
To comprehend what is, this is the task of philosophy, be-
cause what is, is. reason. Whatever happens, every individual
is a child of his time so philosophy too is its own time ap-
prehended in thoughts. It is just as absurd to fancy that a
philosophy can transcend its contemporary world as it is
to fancy that an individual can overleap his own age, jumpover Rhodes.' 72
The determination in the last instance in Hegel's system
is still that of mind, it is the consummation of logos-
metaphysics in reconciliation of all externalization and
estrangement of history, of social labour, of negativity in
general by thought it is the 'overcoming in the final inst-
ance of praxis by theory it is the negation of the negati-
vity by a positivity and Hegel becomes the greatest slave
of thought, and his final positing of 'Absolute Spirit' mere
abstract labour of the mind, and his system in the last in-
stance uncritical positivism, by upholding all contradictions
as comprehended historicity in the mind, and transformed in-
to harmony through efforts of the mind.
In fact, we can trace that the fault of Hegel is his attri-
buting differences as pertaining to the discrepancy between
61
the objective and the subjective (both being one-sided) and
are sublated possibly by recollection (Erinnerung), the re-
turn to the first presupposition of an immediate identity.
The last step of re-identification in concrete of the pre-
vious immediate identity are likewise intuitive, and this
has nothing to do with dialectics. For dialectics is nega-
tivity, it is pre-suppositionless, W. Marx is wrong in at-
tributing the supremacy of self-consciousness, an idealistic
principl e, to critical theory of Frankfurt school, for in
actual fact, 'dialectics is the ontology of the wrong stgtte
of things. The right state of things would be free of it:
(it is)- neither a system nor a contradiction.' 74 True
dialectics, as pure negativity, is operative in contrasting
the ideal of a system of established reality (ideological
aspect) with the actually manifested reality, it is the im-
manent negation of a system itself. Thus, the Absolute in
Hegel' s philosophy is its own negation in face of it pheno-
menological development, for if he claims phenomenological
development as the ladder to scientific knowledge, he has to
foresake the insistence of immediate identity, or else, with
the presupposition of absolute identity in mind, phenomenolo-
gy becomes superfluous, likewise then is its function of
'Bildung', and Hegel is no less right in pushing his latter
position to an extreme by upholding his philosophy of iden-
62titys
'one word more about giving instruction as to what the
world ought to be. Philosophy in any case always comes on
the scene too late to give it. As the thought of the world,
it appears only when actuality is already there cut and dried
after its process of formation has been completed. The teach-
ing of the concept, which is also history's inescapable lesson,
is that it is only when actuality is mature that the ideal
first appears over against the real and that the ideal ap-
prehends this same real world in its substance and builds it
up for itself into the shape of an intellectual realm. When
philosophy paints its grey in grey, then has a shape of life
grown old. By philosophy's grey in grey it cannot be reju-
venated but only understood. The-owl of Minerva spreads itswings only with the falling of the dusk.' 75
Nothing is more impotent that a philosophy whose task is
to justify the established reality: Yet no greater philoso-
phical insight is more invaluable than the concept of the
'negativity' in dialectics: The relation drawn by Hegel bet-
ween his Absolute Knowledge and his mission of socialization
and historicalization of knowledge rests in his idealism,
and the consequent dilemma or contradition of his system
is due to the new spirit of dialectics in the old wine-skin
of logos-metaphysics.
63FOOTNOTES
1. Hegel, G.W.F.: The Science of Logic. 'Trans. by A. V.Miller
(George Allen Unwin, London.1969)p.48.
2. Ma -X, Werner: Reason .and. .Worl-d..-- between Tradition and
another Beginning. (Martinus Ni jhoff, The
Hague.1971) p.l.
3. Marx,Werner: Op. cit., p.4.
4. Marx,Werner: Op. cit.,p.4.
5. Kant, I. Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. by ICI. K. Smith
(MacMillen, London and Basingstoke.1973.) p.2440
6. Kant, I.: Op. cit.,p.244.
7. Hume, D.: A Treatise of Human Nature. (Penguin, Middlesex.
1969) p.49.
8. Kant, I.: Op. ci t.,p.9.
9. Ibid., p.8.
10. Ibid.,p.7.
11-.. Ibid., p.7.
12. Ibid., p.9.
13. Ibid., p.22-23.
14. Hegel, G.W.F. Logic-- being Part One of the Encyclopae-
dia of Philosophical Sciences. Trans. by
William Wallace (OUP, London. 3rd ed. 1975)
p.69-70.
15. LukScs, Georg: The Young Hegel. Trans. by R. Livingstone
(The Merlin Press, London. 19750) p.18.
16. Hegel,G.W.F.: Early Theological Writings, Trans. by T.M.
Knox (Univ. of Penn. Pr., Philadelphia, 1977)
p.154-5.
17. Ibid., p.156-7.
18. Ibid., p.157-8.
199 Ibid., p.81.
20. Ibido, p.152-3.
64
21. Ibid., p.152.
22. Ibid.,p.169o
23. Ibid., p.169.
24. Ibid., p.170.
25. Marcuse, HerbertReason and R.erol.utio.n.-- Hegel and the
Rise of Social Theory. (RKP, London
Henley. 2nd ed. 1977 rep.) p.99
26. Ibid., p.34.
27. Hegel, G. W. F.Philosophy of Right. Trans. by T. M. Knox(OUP, London. 1973.) p. 35.
28. Ibid., p.45.
29. Hegel- G.W.F.The Phenomenology of Mind. Trans. by
J. B. Baillie (Harper Torchbooks, New YorkEvanston. 1967.) p.75-60
30. Marcuse, HerbertReason and Revolution. p. 75 a
31. Hyppolite, JeanStudies i.n Marx and Hegel. Trans. by
J.O'Neill (Heinern. Ed. Bks., London.
1969.) p.79.
32. Koj've, A.: Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. Trans.by James H. Nichols, Jr. (Basic Books, N. Y.1969.) p.51-2.
33. Hegel, G.W.F.The Phenomenology of Mind. D.96.
34. Here I refer without quoting the articles written on
history by Kant, trans. L.W.Beck.(Library of LiberalArts, N.Y.)
..............35. Hyppolite, Jean
Genesis and Structure of He ells Pheno-
menol ogy-, of-- Spi ri --Trans:- by- S. Cherni ak
J: Heckman. (Northwestern U. Pr., Evan-
ston. 1974) p.77.
36. Hegel, G. W. F.: The Ph enomenol oay o f Mind, p. 229.
37. S chiller, F.: Naive and Sentimental Poetry/ On the Sublime.
Trans: -by--3 A -Elias -(Ungar, -N.Y. 1975) p. 102
65
3 8. Marcuse, Herbert: L' Ontolo. ie de He el et la Theorie
de 1' Hi stori ci to. Tradui t de 1 'All e-
mand par G. Raulet et H.A. Baatsch.
(Les editions de Minuit, Paris. 1972)
p.235.
39. Hyppolitoy J.: Ge.nesis and Structure of He el's Phenomeno-
loay- of -Spirit: p.326.
40. Ibid., p.367-8.
41. Lu cacs, G.: The Young Hegel. P.490-1.
42. Hyppolite, J.: Genesis and Structure. D.42.
43. Schiller, F.: Naive and Sentimental Poetry/ On the Sublime.,-, If)
44. Adorno, T. W.: Lyric Poetry and Society. (Telos: a Journal
of Theory and Society, St.Louis. Vol.20, 1974)
p.58-9.
45. Schiller, F. On the Aesthetic Education of Man. Trans. by
E.M. Wilkinson L. A. Willoughby (OUP, London.
1967) p.9.
46. Ibid., p. 79.
47. Hegel, G.W.F.: The Phenomenology of Mind. p.94.
48. Ibid., p.80.
49. Luk6cs, G.: The Young Hegel. p.532-3.
50. Hegel, G. W, F.: The Phenomenology of Mind. p.801
51. Ibid.., p.86.
52. Ko jive, A.: Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. p.35.
66
53. Hegel, G. W. F.: The Phenomenology of Mind. p. 80
54. Hegel, G., W. F.: Hegel's Logic. (Lesser Logic) p.120.
55. Hegel, G.W.F.: The Phenomenology of Mind. p,,92.
56, Ibid., p.92.
57, I refer to Victor Shklovsky's famous essay on 'Art
as Technique' in Russian Formalist Criticism: 4 essays.
Trans. and ed. by L. T. Lemon M. J. Reis. (Univ. of
Nebraska Pr.) and F. Jameson: The Prison House of Lan-
quage, (Princeton U. Pr., N. J. 1972).
58. Hegel, G. W. F.: The Phenomenology of Mind. p.93-4,
59, Ibid., p.97.
60. Aristotle: Metaphysics. 1072b.
61. Ibid., 1074b.
62. Ibid., 1075a.
63. Ibid., 1072b.
64. Marcus e, Herbert: On the Problem of the Dialectic.
(Telos: a Journal of Theory and
Society, St, Louis, Vo127, 1976) p.210
65. Hegel, U.W.F.: The Phenomenology of Mind. p.89
66. Ko jive, A.: Introduction to the Reading of Hegel.
I refer to ch.5 'A Note on Eternity, Time
and the Concept.' p.100-149
67. Hegel, G.W.F.: The Phenomenology of Mind. p.90.
68. Hyppolite, J.: Genesis and Structure, p.583.
69. Hegel, G.W.F.: The Phenomenology of Mind. p.808,
70. Ibid., p.96o
67
71. Hyppolite, J.: Genesis and Structure, p.575-6
72. Kojeve, A.: Introduction to the Reading of Heck. ems., p. 6.
73. Hegel, G.W.F.: The Philosophy of Rights p.ll.
74, Adorno, T. W. Negative Dialectics, Trans. by E. B. Ashton.
(RKP, London. 1973.) p.11.
75. Hiegel, G.W.F.: The Philosophy of Right., P.12-3.
68Bibliography:
A. Hegel' s works concerned-
1. The Phenomenology of Mind. Trans. by J.. Baillie
(Harper Torchbooks, N. Y. Evanston. 1967)
2. Early Theological Writings. Trans. by T. M. Knox
(Univ. of Penn. Pr., Phil adel. 1977.)
3. Science of LoTrans. by A. V. Miller
(George Allen Unwin, London. 1969.)
4, Hegel 's Logic (Lesser Logic), Trans. by W. Wallace
(OUP, London. '3rd ed. 19x15.)
5. The Philosophy of History. Trans. by J. Sibree
(Dover Publi. Inc... N. Y. 1956.)
6. Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Trans. by F.S.
Haldane F.H. Simson
(RKP, London, 1896, rep. 1968.)
69
B. Related works to the study r-
1. Adorno, T. W.: Negative Dialectics. Trans. by E. B. Ashton
(RKP, London. 1973.)
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