The Changing Face of the American Electorate and the Possible Effects on USA Immigration Policy

8/8/2019 The Changing Face of the American Electorate and the Possible Effects on USA Immigration Policy

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TheChangingFaceoftheAmericanE rateandthePossibleEffectsonUSAIm lectomigrationPolicy

By

De d

Henry Flores, PhD

an l an

Prof nce

of the Graduate Schoo

es ieSt. Mary y

sor of Political Scs Universit

San Antonio, TX

IntroductionThe 2009 General Election was a benchmark election for various reasons

including American voters electing their first Black African American president.

Another reason that this election will prove to be a special, landmark election, if

you will, is because it is the first national election where Latino voters directly

contributed to the election of the president. There are still other reasons for the

significance of this election including the wide use of new technologies in fund

raising and get out the vote (GOTV) efforts and the substantial role played by the

1824 year old voter. The focus of this paper, however, is the role played by the

Latino electorate in the election of Barack Obama to the presidency and the

potential significance of this influence on the immigration policy of the new

administration. Most importantly, however, is the role immigration policy has

played as a coalescing force among all Latino national origin groups.

T tinoElectorateinPastElectionsTo better understand why the Latino electorates role was so important to

the election of President Obama in the 2008 General Election it is important to take

a brief look first at the participatory history of Latinos nationally. Data available for

Latino voters are sparse and have been gathered by a broad array of institutions and

media outlets whose methodologies are so diverse that interpretation is difficult at

heLa

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best1. There have been only three systematic academic attempts to understand the

Latino electorate and all have had various methodological difficulties given how

various behavioral variables have undergone operationalization changes over the

last forty years2, funding for such projects has been difficult to obtain, and

organizing scholars with the appropriate skills to perform the necessary research

are among many reasons why such few attempts have occurred. The latter reason

was caused by the lack of young faculty who were properly trained to conduct such

research coupled with the stresses of obtaining tenure. These twin stressors left a

void of faculty interested and capable of conducting this important research. This

situation has been remedied so there should be more systematic attempts in the

future. Regardless, the data produced about the Latino voter to date is the best

available and so these will be used throughout this paper. Lack of funding for

conducting sophisticated elections research was due generally to the fact that the

study of Latino politics has been marginalized by traditional funding agencies and

academic disciplines. This marginalization mitigated against consideration of the

upport.study of Latino voting behavior as a serious endeavor deserving of financial s

The first attempt to understand the impact Latino voters have had on

American national elections was made by Grebler, Moore and Guzman in a study

1Early

studies

in

the

1970s

depended

principally

on

descriptive

statistics

while

later

studiesincorporatedmoresophisticatedtechniquessuchasordinaryleastsquares.2ForinstancetheoperationalizationofLatinoidentityterminologyovertheyearshasincludedMexican,MexicanAmerican,SpanishSurnamedindividuals,Hispanic,andLatino. Also,howthedatawasgatheredforLatinosvariedgreatlyfromcensustocensus.

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that was initiated in 1963 and culminated in 1968 providing the data for their

seminal study entitled The Mexican American People: The Nations Second Largest

Minority (1970). As the title of this study indicates it focused solely on the MexicanAmerican population of the United States and only a brief allusion to other Latino

groups was made in the final report. Additionally,the authors failed to discuss thedirect effects of Mexican Americans on national politics speaking instead to their

effectiveness at the state and local levels. The principle reasons the authors gave

for a lack of political effectiveness on the part of Mexican Americans were their

recent urbanization and the great number of barriers that had been erected by the

political system against their participation such as poll taxes, gerrymandering, and

so forth (pp. 526572).

The next major attempt to discern the effects of the Latino vote on American

elections was set forth by de la Garza and DeSipio in their 1992 study entitled From

Rhetoric to Reality: Latino Politics in the 1988 Elections. The authors spoke to theinclusion of Latino politicos within the Dukakis campaign including the intention to

appoint Willie Velasquez, the founder and president of the Southwest Voter

Registration Project, to the campaign organization. Unfortunately, Mr. Velasquez

passed away before his presence could be felt on the campaign organization and no

other Latino leader replaced him. Regardless, the Dukakis campaign infused a great

deal of money and effort into organizing the Latino electorate in hopes of increasing

3

turnout.

Unlike their predecessors De la Garza and DeSipio generated data in their

study that discussed the political behavior of all national origin Latino groups


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participation in the 1988 presidential elections but came to a similar conclusion as

Grebler, Moore and Guzman concerning the level of influence Latino voters

possessed at the national level. The major difference, beyond increased

methodological sophistication, between the two studies was de la Garza and DeSipio

saw the barriers that required overcoming as imposed by the Democratic Party

rather than the government or state. De la Garza and DeSipio noted that Latinos

were not swing voters but have been an essential part of the Democratic Party

electorate for decades and it would behoove the party to do more to increase Latino

turnout. The authors felt that the Latino electorate was and would become very

important to Democrats winning general elections in the future.

The third scholarly attempt to understand the Latino electorate was led by

John Garcia but included a large number of other leading Latino political scientists

including Luis Fraga, Gary Segura, Michael JonesCorrea, Valerie MartinezEbers,

and Rodney Hero who conducted 15 focus groups in 2003 and surveys of over 8,000

Latinos in 2006. Unlike the earlier two studies this project focused on Latino

identity3. The first volume of this latter study, Latino Lives in America: Making It

Home (2010), however did not discuss the political effectiveness of Latinos nor did

the study address any barriers to the political participation of Latinos. The 2010

study also did not discuss the partisan affiliation of Latinos or how they had voted in

any general election. Essentially, the third academic study was more a study of

3TodatetheirfindingshaveproducedonevolumethatfocusesonLatinoidentity,however,thereareindicationsthatadditionalbookswillbeforthcomingsomeofwhichwillincludemoreonLatinovotingbehavior.

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contemporary Latino identity in the face of contemporary issues, pressures and

prevailing opinions concerning the community.

In fact, the 2010 study filled a void in the sociological literature and made

two important contributions to the study of Latino politics. The first contribution

was methodological; this is the first research endeavor utilizing a mixedmethod

approach combining qualitative (focus groups) with quantitative (survey research)

approaches. Mixedmethods allows for both the creation of aggregated data leading

to the systematic search for relations among variables while at the same time

provides the depth of analysis that results in overcoming the aggregation issues

surrounding ecological inference problems (King, 1997). The second contribution

is that the authors provide the first evidence that Latinos are beginning to coalesce

politically specifically around the need for comprehensive immigration reform

(CIR).

5

Political cohesiveness has, to date, been tested statistically by principally

observing how individuals of specific racial or ethnic groups vote continuously as a

block over a number of elections. The authors of the 2010 study, however, have

added depth to this level of discussion; their focus group research has uncovered

what appears to be a greater understanding of how public policy affects the Latino

community as opposed to individual national origin groups. According to the

authors, there appears to be the development of a Latino sameness that may have

political consequences in future elections because this phenomenon may lead to

greater political and electoral cohesiveness. The increasing evolution of identity

from national origin to an awareness of sameness among all Latinos seems to be


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arising around how important comprehensive immigration reform is and how

Latinos are viewing this in relationship to their ability to affect public policy. The

massive 2006 marches and demonstrations in support of CIR proved to the Latino

community and the nation that they were and will be a political force in the future

and immigration is an important wedge issue for the community. Nevertheless,

whether Latinos coalesce into a viable voting bloc around the immigration issue and

hold politicians accountable for positions they take on this crucial policy remains to

be seen.

Beyond these three scholarly attempts at understanding the political

behavior of Latinos there have been many efforts at gathering voting data since

1960 in an effort at understanding the patterns, turnout levels and effectiveness of

the Latino vote. Different individuals, agencies, institutes, and media outlets

utilizing a variety of techniques and methodologies derived data available on these

topics. Like all polls the instruments were worded differently, sampling frames

were designed differently, weighting was performed using different variables and

weights, sample sizes were different, and stratification was different from one

survey/poll to another. In short, one cannot utilize these data for scholarly research

because of the significant methodological divide separating each of these efforts

nevertheless one can, given that these data are the only available, compare and

contrast their results and reach some general conclusions concerning general

historical trends of the Latino vote that can be tested later utilizing appropriate

techniques.

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HistoricalTrendsoftheLatinoVoteThe earliest available data indicating how Latinos vote were provided by CBS

News/NewYorkTimesexit polls in the 1976 general election. The other majornetworks began gathering, haphazardly it appears, data on Latino political

participation with the 1984 general election. The William C. Velasquez Institute

(WCVI) conducted the first polls of any kind that specifically targeted Latino voters

in 1988 albeit these early polls only surveyed voters in Texas and California so

cannot be used to understand any national Latino voting patterns even though

almost 50% of all Latino voters reside in these two states. In 2002 WCVI and

MirRam Group conducted a national Latino telephone poll on the political behavior

and ideology of Latino voters nationally but the methodological notes discussing

sample size, margin of error and so forth are missing so the accuracy of these data

7

cannot be properly assessed.

The next attempt by WCVI to conduct an exit poll of Latino voters nationally

was in 2004. This was the first exit poll of any methodological sophistication but the

findings created controversy because they contradicted those thatNBCNewspublicized for the same election (PSOnline,Jan. 2005). The large differences in thepolls, WCVI indicated that only 31.4% of Latinos voted for George W. Bush while

EdisonMitofskys poll for the National Election Pool(the NBCNewspoll) indicatedthat 44% of Latinos had supported President Bush was attributed to differences in

weighting schemes. The differences, however, went further. WCVI constructed a

poll that elicited the opinions of Latinos only, stratified geographically, while the

Mitofsky poll did not attempt to stratify for Latinos. As a result, the Latinos that


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appeared in the Mitofsky sample appeared as a result of a haphazard occurrence.

When Mitofsky looked at where the Latinos in his sample resided he realized he had

oversampled the Cuban community in the MiamiDade County area to a great

degree explaining the high support levels for President Bush4. The WCVI findings

were substantiated later by two postelection polls conducted by Zogby

International and theMiamiHeraldwho had both found that only 33% of Latinoshad supported Mr. Bush. WCVI replicated their efforts in the 2008 election and

found support levels for the Republican and Democratic Party Presidential

candidates comparable to those of 2004. In 2008, as in other polling efforts, the

methodologies changed dramatically. The WCVI conducted its 2008 poll using the

internet and labeled it a flash poll. Emailing 160,000 Latinos across eleven states

WCVI found that Latinos supported the Republican presidential ticket 28.7% and

the Democratic slate 68.6%.

Below in Table 1 are the partisan support levels for Latinos gathered from

both academic and nonacademic surveys and polls from 1972 to the present. The

data in Table 1 were gathered from a broad array of sources but were originally

collected and put in tabular form by Dr. Lorenzo Cano of the University of Houston.

The sources for the 1996 and 2000 data were missing from his original table. This

author added the data for 2004 and 2008 only. These data are interesting in several

respects. The ranges of support for Democratic candidates are from 85 to 53% and

for Republicans 44 to 15%. The mean support levels for both parties is 65.7% for

4ThiswasdisclosedduringaconversationbetweenthisauthorandWarrenMitofskyinNovember,2004.

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Table1LatinoVotingTrends

19722008Year Source Democratic Republican Other

1972 Garcia andGarza, 1977;

Gann andDuignan, 1986

de la 64

85

36

15

1976 CBSNews/NewYorkTimes 82 18

1980 CBSNews/NewYorkTimes 56 37

1984 CBSNBCABC

66

6856

34

3244

1988 CBSandABCNBCLATimes

70

6962

30

3138

1992 VNSLATimes 6253 2431

1996 Unkown 72 21

2000 Unknown 62 35

2004 NEPWCVIZogbyInterntl.MiamiHerald

54

6765

65

44

31.433

33

2008 WCVICNN 68.667 28.731

the Democrats and 31.7% for the Republicans; there appears to be no trend in the

data so one cannot say that Latinos are becoming more Republican or Democrat;

and, the support levels vary from election to election although the support levels

appear to be more stable since 2000. One can safely conclude that in any given

General Election Democrats can expect to receive between 60 and 65% support

and Republicans can expect between 35 to 40% support from Latinos. Just given

eir

9

this variably gathered data, then, Latinos appear to be relatively stable in th

partisan preference generally supporting De la Garzas and DeSipios 1988

conclusion of Democratic Party loyalty. Finally, preliminarily at least, one can say


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that Latinos do not fit the characteristics of swing voters in that the patterns of party

support are relatively stable over time and do not fluctuate between both parties.

RegistrationandLatinoTurnoutNow that we have a general understanding of Latino voting patterns we turn

to a discussion of registration and turnout to further assess the potential voting

strength or influence of Latino voters. Essentially, registration and turnout among

Latino voters has been relatively low compared to that of nonHispanic Whites and

black African Americans since these data have been collected. The data presented in

Table 2 below were gathered by the Southwest Voter Registration and Educational

Project (SWVREP) which is an organization dedicated to the registration of Latino

otersv and has been doing so since 1977.

The data in Table 2 reflects voter registration numbers (reported in

thousands) for nonHispanic whites, all Latinos, and black African Americans from

1980 through 2008. The data were gathered from Census Bureau data by the

SWVREP and reported on their website. Assuming that these data are accurate they

do appear to substantiate conventional wisdom. White nonHispanics have

higher voting registration numbers than do black African Americans or Latinos;

black African Americans have higher registration rates than Latinos; and, the Latino

voting age population has increased significantly over the last decade. Additionally,

the citizen voting age population for Latinos is much lower than that of the other

two groups identified in Table 2 placing them at a clear numerical disadvantage.

Clearly there needs to be increased effort by those organizations who register voters

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to increase the numbers of Latino registered voters for future elections if they are to

be considered politically influential.

Table2VoterRegistrationby

Race

ar1980

, g Ag la nd nVAVotin ePopu tion,a CitizeR

1

PYe Race VAP

1

1

CVAP1

1

EG0

9

REG%TOT 57085

3

50742

3

5035 0.697

White 7676 2914 4112 0.708

Black 16423 15951 9849 0.617

Latino 8210

1

1

5565

1

1

2984

1

1

0.536

1984 TOT 69963

4

62627

4

16106

0

0.714

White 6761 1827 2211 0.721

Black 18432 17809 12223 0.686

Latino 9471

1

1

6444

1

1

3794

1

1

0.589

1988 TOT 78098 68495

4

18589

0

0.704

White 52848 5999 3830 0.711

Black 19692 18692 12700 0.679

0Latino 12893

1

1

8078

1

1

4573

1

1

.566

1992 TOT 85684 73784

4

26578

1

0.728

White 57637 9553 0684 0.74

Black 21039 19995 13442 0.672

0Latino 14688

1

1

8778

1

1

5132

1

1

.585

1996 TOT 93651 79935 27661

1

0.709

White 62779 53057 0259 0.72

Black 22483 21486 14267 0.664

Latino 18426

2

1

11209

1

1

6573

1

1

0.586

2000 TOT 02609 86366 29549

1

0.695

White 68733 57291 0773 0.704

Black 24132 22753 15348 0.675

Latino 21598

2

1

13159

1

1

7546

1

1

0.573

2004 TOT 15694 97006 42070

1

0.721

White 76618 62958 9929 0.736

0

0

Black 24910 23346 16035 .687

Latino 27129

21

16088

21

9308

11

.579

2008 TOT 25499 0 6072 4 6311 0.71White

Black

Latino

83169

26528

30852

69438

24930

19537

22020

17375

11608

0.72

0.697

0.594

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Generally, Table 2 indicates that white nonHispanics have approximately a

4% registration advantage over black African Americans and a 14% advantage over

Latinos. The nonHispanic White voter is the dominant voter in the country taking

absolute numbers into consideration. As I said earlier this simply substantiates

conventional wisdom. How registration rates for each group translate into turnout

may be discerned from the data in Table 3 below. These data were gathered by the

SWVREP from Census Bureau data as well so we can assume that they are relatively

accurate depictions of the actual turnout for the years specified. Again, the data in

Table 3 substantiate conventional wisdom; white nonHispanics have higher turnout

rates than either black African Americans or Latinos during the reporting period

with the exception of the 2008 election; and, in absolute numbers white

nonHispanic voters outvote both black African Americans and Latinos combined.

Generally, Latinos have a turnout rate that is approximately 6.4% less than that of

nonHispanic white voters and approximately 3.5 % less than that of black African

Americans. Although in comparing the turnout rates of the three groups one

discovers an interesting pattern. The absolute number of Latino voters continues to

increase from year to year while those of the other two groups appear to fluctuate

with both experiencing decreases in turnout in 1988 for Blacks and 1996 for Whites

respectively. Additionally, the absolute number of Latino voters has risen 74.8%

during the reporting period in Table 3 while those of Blacks rose 48.6% and White

voters 23.1% during the same time frame. Regardless, on a national level non

Hispanic white voters are still and will remain the dominant voting force for quite

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some time given their advantage in terms of absolute numbers of voters who can

and do participate in general elections.

Table3TurnoutRatesinPresidentialElectionsbyRace

Year1980

Race TO9

8

TO%TOT 3066 0.886

White 3855 0.891

Black 8287

1

0.841

Latino 2453 0.821

1984 TOT 01878

9

0.877

White 0152 0.882

Black 10293

1

0.842

0Latino 3092 .8151988 TOT 02224

9

0.862

White 0357 0.87

0.7Black 10144 99

Latino 3710

1

1

0.811

1992 TOT 13866

0

0.9

White 0405 0.907

Black 11371

1

0.846

Latino 4238 0.825

1996 TOT 05017

9

0.823

0

White 1208 .827

Black 11386

1

0.798

Latino 4928 0.75

2000 TOT 10826

9

0.855

White 5098 0.858

Black 12917 0.842

Latino 5934

1

1

0.786

2004 TOT 25736

0

0.885

White 6588 0.889

Black 14016 0.874

Latino 7587

11

0.815

2008 TOT 311440

1

0.8960

0

White

Black

Latino

9100

6133

9745

.894

.929

0.84

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Latinos,RegionalandStateVotingandtheElectoralCollegeAdding a twist to this discussion, however, is the unique political presidential

electoral structure of the United States allowing Latinos to be in an unusually

strategic political position, the position to influence who will win the presidency in

all elections in the future regardless of the absolute numbers they can muster at the

national level. When one takes into account the structure of the Electoral College

where electors are allocated proportionally by population and the fact that the vast

majority of Latinos reside in those states having large numbers of electoral college

votes the picture of the extent of political influence that Latinos can wield becomes

more clear. The first suspicions that Latinos resided in strategically important

election states were uncovered during the preparations that MALDEF and WCVI

were undertaking to participate in the 2001 Texas redistricting rounds. What I

discovered was that 89.1% of Latino voters resided in states that accounted for 295

Electoral College votes. Underlying the unique residential patterns of Latinos are

the data in Table 1 indicate that Latinos support levels for both major parties has

been relatively consistent over the last 30 years with Democrats receiving more

than 65% support and Republicans less than 32% support among Latino voters on

average

14

.

The political position Latinos find themselves relative to the Electoral College

vote is based in the fact that, even though they remain a small proportion of the

overall national vote, they do comprise a significant voting block in those states

having large numbers of electoral votes. The substantiation of the unique political

position of Latinos is borne out by the fact that while only 270 Electoral College


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votes are required to win the presidency fully 89.1% of Latino voters reside in states

possessing 295 electoral votes.

Table4ElectoralCollegeandLatinoVotes

State ElectoralCollege

VotesLatino

RegisteredVoters

%ofLatinoRegistered

VotersCumulative

%ofLatino

Reg edV isteroters

ElectoralVotes

Cumulative

Ca aliforni 55 3,263 28.1 28.1 55

Texas 34 2,441 21 49.1 89

Florida 27 1,380 11.9 61 116

New York 31 836 7.2 68.2 147

Arizona 10 410 3.5 71.7 157

Ne yw Jerse 15 388 3.3 75 172

Illinois 21 385 3.3 78.3 193

New Mexico 5 346 3 81.3 198

Colorado 9 225 1.9 83.2 207

Pen iansylvan 21 189 1.6 84.8 228

Nevada 5 131 1.1 85.9 233

Massachusetts 12 103 .9 86.8 245

Ohio 20 85 .7 87.5 265

Michigan 17 85 .7 88.2 2 82

Virginia 13 74 .6 88.8 295

Tot lsa 295 10,341 88.8 88.8 295

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In the perception of some, specifically the William C. Velasquez Research

Institute, Latinos were responsible for delivering some of the states that President

Obama required to secure his victory in 2008. Specifically, the report (WCVI,

undated)5 insinuated that the states of Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Nevada,

New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio and Virginia were decided by margins provided

by Latino voters. Methodologically, the WCVI assertions were lacking,

impressionistically however their assertions were intriguing particularly in light of

the data in Table 4. Table 4 sets forth the strategic information that the WCVI report

was partially based on. Some interesting observations about these data are that

President Obama won all but two states, Arizona and Texas, in the 2008 General

Election. As the data show all states with the exception of Indiana, Iowa and North

Carolina identified in the WCVI report are depicted in Table 4. Presumably the loss

of Texas and Arizona, 44 electoral votes, was made up by the three states missing

from the table that represented 33 votes. Essentially, following the WCVI logic and

the potential Latino voting power displayed in Table 4 it is conceivable that Latinos

delivered or played a significant role in the election of the current president.

The data in Table 4 sets forth the 15 states where 89.1% of Latino

registered voters reside. Although the 4th and 5th columns indicate 88.8% of Latino

voters reside in the states the difference is found in rounding. According to the

United States Bureau of the Census in November 2008 there were 11,609,000

5IsuspectthisreportwaspublishedinJanuaryorFebruary2009giventhatitwasbasedontheNovember2008GeneralElectionResults.

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registered Latino voters while the total number of Latino registered voters in the

fifteen states identified in Table 4 is 10,341,000 which represents 89.1% of the total

number in the country. The data in column 4 presupposes that Latinos comprise an

effective set of voters, some may call them a block, that possesses the potential of

being a determining collection of voters in a closely contested statewide election.

This may also be true of certain congressional or state assembly elections within

each state.

Of the fifteen states in Table 4 President Obama won 13 losing only Texas

and Arizona. In all Obama garnered 251 Electoral College votes from those states

having Latinos as an important group of voters. Given reapportionment in 2011 the

landscape will not change. The same fifteen states in Table 4 still will account for

295 Electoral College votes and the states having been won by President Obama

again will account for 251 EC votes. Speculation is always to be avoided in these

types of presentations, however, if Latino voters vote their partisan preference in

their historical percentages in the states where they represent an important bloc of

voters in future general elections then one can conclude that Democrats have

somewhat of a potential advantage in winning control of the White House in years

to come. This would hold true particularly if the turnout trend identified in Table 3

is, in fact, a trend that holds steady during presidential elections and there is a

steady and continuing increase in Latino registered voters over time.

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LatinosandPublicPolicy,SpecificallyImmigrationReformDeveloping a direct linkage between voting turnout and their effects on a

public policy decision by a president is a very difficult if not impossible proposition

because of the broad array of diverse variables involved in the development of

public policy (Stone, 2002). Nevertheless, in the area of immigration policy the task

is a bit easier, still difficult just easier, because of the more clear relationship

between Latinos generally and immigration policy and the specific politicians

involved who champion such a policy. This latter group will become evident as this

discussion progresses. For the time being it is simply important to note the voting

and residential patterns of Latinos in the United States and the relation to the

Electoral College as being potentially strong variables in this linkage. The next

phase of this discussion involves presenting a narrative of the relationship between

immigration policy, the Latino communities, elected officials at the national levels

nd presidential election campaigns.a

18

LatinosandImmigrationPolicyThe fundamental relationship between Latinos and immigration policy is

based in a long history of the relationship between Latinos and the United States

generally. The current Southwestern part of the United States was part of Mexico

until 1848 when the USMexican War concluded with the ceding of California,

Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado, Nevada and parts of Utah and Wyoming to the

United States as an outcome of the conflict. What became the southwestern

boundary of the United States split a culture, familial, and various types of social

relationships. Between 1848 and the creation of the Immigration and


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Naturalization Service (INS), precursor of the current Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (ICE), there was a free flow of human beings across the border

involved in trade, familial visits, and work. When the southern border was closed

in the early 1920s it disrupted a long standing tradition of crossborder commuting

so persons on both sides of the border sought other means to continue their north

south movements. To this day there are still more legal and undocumented

immigrants coming into the United States from Mexico than any other country and

by one congressional estimate (Gutierrez, Jan, 2010) this migration north will

continue to the tune of 3.5 million persons a year into the indefinite future.

Currently, according to the Department of Homeland Security undocumented

persons from Mexico account for anywhere from 50% to 60% of all undocumented

persons in the United States. In real numbers this translates into 6.6 million in 2009

and 4.7 million in 2008 (Homeland Security, January, 2010). According to the same

report approximately 80% of all unauthorized residents in the United States hale

from Latin American Countries. Essentially, then, in the general immigration policy

of the United States is aimed at immigration streams from Latin America regardless

of all of the provisions on immigration quotas for various countries, special

19

occupations, or national security issues.

The Latino community, regardless of national origin has been calling for

comprehensive immigration policy reform for quite some time culminating with the

dramatic street demonstrations of 2006 that saw millions of persons rally in cities

across the United States protesting House Resolution 4437, The Border Protection,

AntiTerrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005. This passed the


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Republican controlled house but was voted against by 80% of the Democratic

congresspersons and failed to pass the Senate. HR 4437, among many provisions,

included building a fence between the US and Mexico and increased penalties for

hiring and housing undocumented residents. In short, many of the bills central

rovisions appeared to be aimed directly at Latin America.p

TheRoleofCongressandExecutiveBranchinImmigrationReformUnited States Representative Luis Gutierrez (DIL) proposed in the closing

moments of the First Session of the 111th Congress (December 15, 2009) new

comprehensive immigration legislation entitled Comprehensive Immigration

Reform for Americas Security and Prosperity Act of 2009 (CIR ASAP) that included

among provisions for increased border security one that allowed for the legalization

of many unregistered residents including a refined version of the DREAM Act that

would have allowed for persons who arrived in the United States as children to

achieve legal resident status and eventually naturalization upon completion of a

certain level of education or a number of years in the military. At this very moment,

however, it is unclear whether Congressman Gutierrezs legislation will ever

become law given congressional gridlock that appears to have set in during the

Second Session of the 111th Congress. However, if the political rhetoric of Senators

Harry Reid (DNV) and Dick Durbin (DIL) are to be believed then CIR will be at the

20

top of the Senates agenda beginning in May 2010 (NewYorkTimes,April11,2010)As far as the executive branch is concerned President Obama has yet to take

on immigration reform given the trials and tribulations he has faced in righting the

economy, reorienting the war in Afghanistan and passage of health care reform.


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During President Obamas political maneuverings culminating in the passage of

health care reform he met with a group of Latino legislators who had indicated they

would not support his health care reform package unless he placed immigration

reform high on his policy agenda. Exactly what the outcome of the meeting was is

still to be determined upon completion of interviews with members of the congress

who met with the president. The media, however, reported that the Latino

congressmen agreed to support health care reform and the president, in turn,

agreed to give CIR policy priority after the midterm 2010 elections. If this tradeoff

is indeed the case then the president has acknowledged that Latinos are an essential

part of his voting constituents and this constituency has voting strength potential

mportant enough to influence his policy positions.i

21

TheRelationshipBetweenLatinosandPresidentObamaThe final piece of this puzzle lies in the strange and evolving relationship

between President Obama and the Latino community. This relationship is

characterized as strange because of the manner in which the Obama campaign

interacted with the Latino community during the 2008 presidential campaign.

Interviews with several Latino leaders and a person inside the Obama campaign

revealed that the traditional Latino leadership had been sidestepped by the

campaign as Obama tried to restructure the orientation of his organization.

President Obamas strategy centered on getting out the young and new voters

building his own networks utilizing newer technologies and techniques that had

never been brought to bear in a presidential election. What this meant, however,

was that he would have to bypass the leadership and organizations that traditionally


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supported Democratic Party candidates in order to create his own organizational

structure meaning that his reorganization efforts required bypassing the leadership

of traditional Latino community organizations who normally worked with the

Democratic Party structure during elections. He felt that his election was a

transitional election in many ways and he needed a different organizational

orientation to insure victory. Several Latino leaders felt that they had been slighted

due to their support for the Hillary Clinton candidacy during the primary and

indicated that they thought that Obama would not place Latino issues at the

forefront of his administration in retaliation. These same leaders indicated that they

felt that one of the policy areas that would fail to receive his support would be

immigration policy. This picture appears to be changing as the midterm elections

near and the president incorporates the support of the Latino community into the

ranks of his staunch supporters.

Obama,theLatinoVoteandtheFutureofImmigrationPolicyNow that all the pieces of the puzzle have been identified let us put them all

together.

Latinos are an integral part of the Democratic Partys voting block this hasbeen confirmed by both scholarly research and popular polls.

Latinos form significantly important percentages of voters in states ofstrategic Electoral College value.

Latinos form significantly important percentages of voters in states requiredWhite House.

22

by Democratic Party candidates to win and keep the

US immigration policy is aimed primarily at Latinos.


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President Obama seems ambivalent to immigration policy reform in light ofhis other policy priorities.

President Obama appears ambivalent to Latino voters and their policies.Superficially, at least, one can conclude that the relationship between all of the

above variables is tangential at best and spurious at least. President Obama and

Democratic Party leaders may not see CIR as important simply given that the

presidential agenda is top heavy with domestic and international economic issues

and have two official wars and various unofficial ones to deal with. Immigration

reform would appear to be too soft of an issue to find an important place on the

White Houses policy agenda.

Latino leadership can argue for pulling electoral support from President Obama

and other future Democratic Party presidential candidates but to what avail? With

only two party preferences Latinos are caught between a party who cannot listen to

the immigration reform petition because of other seemingly more pressing issues

and a party who only wishes to build more, higher, stronger and sophisticated walls

between the United States and Latin America. Obama and the Democratic Party

understand that Latinos have no choice but support them so they do not feel

thre

23

atened by a Latino boycott.

There appear only a few possibilities for immigration policy reform. One is a

piecemeal legislative approach by Latino congresspersons adding riders here and

there or composing extremely narrow legislation focusing on one or only safe

immigration issues. Or, brokering a deal with the Obama administration to support

legislation that the Obama administration can only marginally win or lose requiring


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Latino support in order to be successful such as health care or a jobs bill in exchange

for his support of CIR. Another possibility, less likely than the previous two is based

upon Obama winning reelection and then supporting CIR as a lame duck

president. Regardless, unless Latinos become a much more important voting block

that, in fact, delivers states to the presidential winner they will not be taken

seriously as far as public policy issues are concerned, let alone being able to

influence CIR. This requires both increasing voter registration numbers and turnout

rates in the strategic Electoral College states.

A ontheCurrentSituationAlthough the previous section of this paper discusses various variables and

possibilities of how CIR could come about what it does not include is the turmoil

engendered by the passage of a law by the state of Arizona that would require local

ies

Note

policing agenc

24


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List of Works Cited

elaGad rza, Rodolfo and Louis DeSipio. (1992). From Rhetoric to Reality:

Latino Politics in the 1988 Elections. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

lation

Department of Homeland Security. Office of Immigration Statistics.

(Jan., 2010). Estimates of the Unauthorized Immigrant PopuResiding in the United States: January 2009. www.dhs.gov.

zalarie Martine

erica: Making

Garcia, John, Luis Fraga, Gary Segura, Michael JonesCorrea, V

Ebbers, and Rodney Hero. (2010). Latino Lives in Am

It Home. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.

onzal :o and Steven Ochoa. (2009). The Latino Vote in 2008

d Characteristics. Los Angeles: William C. Velasquez

G ez, Antoni

Trends an

Institute.

rebler

oore, and Ralph C. Guzman. (1970).G , Leo, Joan W. M The Mexicane: The Nations Second Largest MinorityAmerican Peopl . New York:

The Free Press.

utierr Jan., 2010). Speech at the National Latino Congreso. ElG ez, Luis. (

Paso, TX.

cological Inference Problem:King, Gary. (1997). A Solution to the E

ior from Aggregate DataReconstructing Individual Behav . Princeton,

NJ: Princeton University Press.

Latino tistics. (2009). Webpage of the William C. VelasquezVoter StaInstitute.

Garza.Leal, David, Matt A. Baretto, Jongho Lee, and Rodolfo O. de la

(Jan., 2005). The Latino Vote in the 2004 Election. PSOnline.

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Stone, Deborah. (2002). Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision

Making. Revised Edition. New York: W.W. Norton and Company.


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The Changing Face of the American Electorate and the Possible Effects on USA Immigration Policy

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