The Challenge of Our Declining Big Cities€¦ · The Challenge of Our Declining Big Cities 361...
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Housing Policy Debate • Volume 8, Issue 2 359 © Fannie Mae Foundation 1997. All Rights Reserved. The Challenge of Our Declining Big Cities Anthony Downs The Brookings Institution Abstract This article describes the population forces that caused U.S. metropolitan areas to grow rapidly after 1940 but caused falling population in many large older cities. It shows why the basic processes that generated the spatial growth and development of American metropolitan areas have also under- mined the fiscal strength of many older central cities and inner-ring suburbs. By concentrating low-income households in inner-core neighborhoods, these processes create undesirable conditions that motivate economically viable households and firms to move to surrounding suburbs and not move back. Three strategies have been suggested for improving these conditions: major structural reform of metropolitan institutions, limited reform of big-city governments, and community development of inner-core areas. The first is the most capable of changing the dynamics causing decline, but it lacks political support because it would require the majority of metropolitan residents to sacrifice some benefits they gain from existing arrangements. Keywords: Development/revitalization; Urban planning; Populations Introduction This article presents a brief historical perspective and a policy overview concerning the current decline of many American big cities and inner-ring suburbs. It emphasizes the challenge of attracting middle-class households to live in those communities. 1 A basic perspective on changes in metropolitan structures Population trends can best be understood if American cities are viewed as continuous dynamic social processes occurring in 1 The term core area as used in this article refers to the central city and the inner-ring suburbs of a metropolitan area. Inner-ring suburbs are those legally separate communities immediately adjacent to, and contiguous with, the central city of a metropolitan area. Outer-ring suburbs are those legally separate communities on the outer periphery of the metropolitan area, usually not adjacent to or contiguous with the central city, and often some distance away from that city.
Transcript of The Challenge of Our Declining Big Cities€¦ · The Challenge of Our Declining Big Cities 361...
The Challenge of Our Declining Big Cities 359Housing Policy Debate • Volume 8, Issue 2 359© Fannie Mae Foundation 1997. All Rights Reserved.
The Challenge of Our Declining Big Cities
Anthony DownsThe Brookings Institution
Abstract
This article describes the population forces that caused U.S. metropolitanareas to grow rapidly after 1940 but caused falling population in many largeolder cities. It shows why the basic processes that generated the spatialgrowth and development of American metropolitan areas have also under-mined the fiscal strength of many older central cities and inner-ring suburbs.By concentrating low-income households in inner-core neighborhoods, theseprocesses create undesirable conditions that motivate economically viablehouseholds and firms to move to surrounding suburbs and not move back.
Three strategies have been suggested for improving these conditions: majorstructural reform of metropolitan institutions, limited reform of big-citygovernments, and community development of inner-core areas. The first is themost capable of changing the dynamics causing decline, but it lacks politicalsupport because it would require the majority of metropolitan residents tosacrifice some benefits they gain from existing arrangements.
Keywords: Development/revitalization; Urban planning; Populations
Introduction
This article presents a brief historical perspective and a policyoverview concerning the current decline of many American bigcities and inner-ring suburbs. It emphasizes the challenge ofattracting middle-class households to live in those communities.1
A basic perspective on changes in metropolitanstructures
Population trends can best be understood if American cities areviewed as continuous dynamic social processes occurring in
1 The term core area as used in this article refers to the central city and theinner-ring suburbs of a metropolitan area. Inner-ring suburbs are those legallyseparate communities immediately adjacent to, and contiguous with, thecentral city of a metropolitan area. Outer-ring suburbs are those legallyseparate communities on the outer periphery of the metropolitan area, usuallynot adjacent to or contiguous with the central city, and often some distanceaway from that city.
360 Anthony Downs
defined locations, not as locations or places per se. At any givenmoment, describing a city is analogous to taking a snapshot ofmany ongoing and constantly changing flows of people, goods,and services. This is particularly true because of the highrates of household mobility in the United States. About 16 to17 percent of Americans move each year, including more than30 percent of renters and around 10 percent of homeowners(Downs 1981, chap. 3; U.S. Bureau of the Census 1996 [Statisti-cal Abstract]). About three-fifths of those movers remain in thesame county, many in the same city.
Private firms are also quite mobile. Each year, many new firmsare born and many existing ones die. In addition, existingfirms often move from one place to another or establish newbranches, thereby reallocating their overall resources in space.Thus, in any particular neighborhood, the local population andeconomy can remain the same or grow only if at least as manynewcomers move in (or are born there, net of local deaths) asinitial residents and firms move out. So every city is really thelocus of constant movements of people and firms into, out of,around, and within its boundaries.
Historically, many American cities have been the locations for—and provided the means of—achieving upward mobility over timefor large populations arriving from elsewhere with few economicresources, and sometimes with relatively few social and humanresources. These influxes have come both from abroad and fromrural parts of the United States at different times. Certainneighborhoods have performed the vital function of helping thesepeople improve their social and economic status and move tobetter locations. This function is still crucial in most U.S. metro-politan areas. From 1990 through 1995, 29 percent of net U.S.population growth stemmed from net immigration from abroad—not counting illegal immigration (U.S. Bureau of the Census1996 [Statistical Abstract]).
Viewing cities dynamically has several crucial implications.First, it is impossible to eliminate poverty from large metropoli-tan areas, each of which will always contain many poor people aslong as it continues receiving poor immigrants.
Second, large metropolitan areas necessarily contain thousandsof low-quality dwelling units—“slum dwellings”—needed tohouse many of their poor households, unless the public sectorspends huge sums on housing subsidies for the very poor. If poorhouseholds are required to pay fully for their own upkeep, manycannot afford to occupy dwellings that are of “decent quality” by
The Challenge of Our Declining Big Cities 361
middle-class standards. Therefore, many poor households mustlive in what are considered substandard dwellings, unless thepublic sector provides large housing subsidies for them. Mostsocieties cannot afford the subsidies needed to house all theirlow-income households at middle-class standards. Even theUnited States—which might be able to afford that outcome—hasnever chosen to do so. Thus, slums perform the absolutely essen-tial social function of providing housing that many poor peoplecan afford.
Third, at least some concentrated-poverty neighborhoods arenecessary functional parts of every large metropolitan area. Noteveryone succeeds in rising in social and economic status. At anygiven moment, a large metropolitan area contains thousands ofhouseholds still at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder be-cause they have not yet moved up. Moreover, newly arrivingimmigrants tend to enter a metropolitan area through a fewspecific neighborhoods—those where housing is less costly orwhere they can find others of their own ethnic group. Theseneighborhoods contain disproportionate concentrations of rela-tively poor households. As households that entered at the bottomof the ladder move up, they tend to move to other neighborhoodswith higher average incomes and status. In fact, many affluentimmigrants, often from Asia, move directly to the suburbs. Thisprocess leaves urban entrepôt neighborhoods with long-termabove-average percentages of very low income and low-statushouseholds. No doubt, this condition makes it harder for personsliving in those areas to improve their lots. Yet such concentrated-poverty areas are essential to the overall functioning of themetropolitan area. Over time, the particular neighborhoodsserving this function often change, especially when the largestimmigration flows shift from one ethnic group to another.
This conclusion does not mean that all concentrated-povertyneighborhoods in cities are necessary parts of the upward mobil-ity process. More than one type of concentrated-poverty areaexists in every large city. Many neighborhoods contain mostlypoor people who have not recently immigrated and have fewprospects for improving their situations. These concentrated-poverty areas are often socially and economically isolated fromfruitful opportunities for upward mobility and plagued by nega-tive conditions stemming from poverty; they are dysfunctionalenclaves of the so-called underclass.2 It would therefore be
2 For a discussion of the underclass, see Jencks and Peterson (1991). For adiscussion of the process by which destitute households get “left behind” insuch areas when better-off households move out, see Wilson (1987).
362 Anthony Downs
desirable to transform them radically into a less destructivecondition.
Unfortunately, the three implications presented above are rarelystated publicly by elected officials or city planners. Politicalpressures make it impossible for officials to admit these truths.If they did, residents of the areas concerned would claim thattheir right to live better lives was being ignored or abandoned.
The dynamics of changes in total population and inpopulation composition in declining cities from 1950to 1980
Introduction
Among the 189 U.S. cities with 1990 populations over 105,000,53 lost population in the 1980s. Together, they contained18.5 million residents in 1990, 16.5 percent fewer than in 1950.Tables 1, 2, and 3 provide some basic data on these 53 decliningcities, their metropolitan areas, and their suburbs from 1950 tothe 1990s. Fifteen lost more than 20 percent of their populationbetween 1950 and 1990, including 13 that lost population in allfour decades. These 15 acutely declining cities have presumablyexperienced the biggest net outflows of middle-class households(U.S. Bureau of the Census 1995 [Statistical Abstract]).
It is useful to divide the population changes in declining citiessince 1950 into two sets: those occurring from 1950 to 1980 andthose subsequent to 1980. In both eras, what happened in each ofthese cities should be viewed within the context of the overallmovement of population within its metropolitan area, includingimmigration.
Initial population conditions in 1950
From 1941 to 1945, millions of households moved into thesemetropolitan areas to work in war production. Yet virtually nonew housing had been constructed in the United States duringeither the 1930s, because of the Great Depression, or the 1940s,because of the war. By 1950, much of the housing in these citieswas old and severely overcrowded. Overcrowding was particu-larly acute in neighborhoods occupied by African Americans.They had been confined to a small number of older areas by
The Challenge of Our Declining Big Cities 363
Tab
le 1
. P
op
ula
tio
n C
ha
ng
es f
rom
195
0 to
199
2 in
All
53
La
rge
U.S
. Cit
ies
Th
at
Dec
lin
ed i
n P
op
ula
tio
nfr
om
198
0 to
199
0
Tota
l Cit
y P
opu
lati
on o
n A
pril
1(T
hou
san
ds)
% C
han
ge in
Pop
ula
tion
Cit
yR
egio
n19
5019
60 1
970
198
0 1
990
1992
1950
–60
1960
–70
1970
–80
1980
–90
1990
–92
Akr
on, O
HM
W27
529
027
523
722
322
45.
45–5
.17
–13.
82–5
.91
0.45
Atl
anta
, GA
S33
148
749
542
539
439
547
.13
1.64
–14.
14–7
.29
0.25
Bal
tim
ore,
MD
S95
093
990
578
773
672
6–1
.16
–3.6
2–1
3.04
–6.4
8–1
.36
Bea
um
ont,
TX
SW
9411
911
811
811
411
526
.60
–0.8
40.
00–3
.39
0.88
Bir
min
gham
, AL
S32
634
130
128
426
626
54.
60–1
1.73
–5.6
5–6
.34
–0.3
8B
ridg
epor
t, C
TN
E15
915
715
714
314
213
7–1
.26
0.00
–8.9
2–0
.70
–3.5
2B
uff
alo,
NY
NE
580
533
463
358
328
323
–8.1
0–1
3.13
–22.
68–8
.38
–1.5
2C
edar
Rap
ids,
IA
MW
7292
111
110
109
112
27.7
820
.65
–0.9
0–0
.91
2.75
Ch
atta
noo
ga, T
NS
131
130
120
170
152
153
–0.7
6–7
.69
41.6
7–1
0.59
0.66
Ch
icag
o, I
LM
W3,
621
3,55
03,
369
3,00
52,
784
2,76
8–1
.96
–5.1
0–1
0.80
–7.3
5–0
.57
Cin
cin
nat
i, O
HM
W50
450
345
438
536
436
4–0
.20
–9.7
4–1
5.20
–5.4
50.
00C
leve
lan
d, O
HM
W91
587
675
157
450
650
3–4
.26
–14.
27–2
3.57
–11.
85–0
.59
Day
ton
, OH
MW
244
262
243
194
182
183
7.38
–7.2
5–2
0.16
–6.1
90.
55D
enve
r, C
OW
416
494
515
493
468
484
18.7
54.
25–4
.27
–5.0
73.
42D
etro
it, M
IM
W1,
850
1,67
01,
514
1,20
31,
028
1,01
2–9
.73
–9.3
4–2
0.54
–14.
55–1
.56
Eri
e, P
AN
E13
113
812
911
910
910
95.
34–6
.52
–7.7
5–8
.40
0.00
Eva
nsv
ille
, IN
MW
129
149
139
130
126
128
15.5
0–6
.71
–6.4
7–3
.08
1.59
Fli
nt,
MI
MW
163
197
193
160
141
139
20.8
6–2
.03
–17.
10–1
1.88
–1.4
2F
t. L
aude
rdal
e, F
LS
3684
140
153
149
149
133.
3366
.67
9.29
–2.6
10.
00G
ary,
IN
MW
134
178
175
152
117
117
32.8
4–1
.69
–13.
14–2
3.03
0.00
Hon
olu
lu, H
IW
248
294
325
365
365
371
18.5
510
.54
12.3
10.
001.
64Ja
ckso
n, M
SS
9814
415
420
319
719
646
.94
6.94
31.8
2–2
.96
–0.5
1K
ansa
s C
ity,
KS
MW
130
122
168
161
150
147
–6.1
537
.70
–4.1
7–6
.83
–2.0
0K
ansa
s C
ity,
MO
MW
457
476
507
448
435
432
4.16
6.51
–11.
64–2
.90
–0.6
9K
nox
vill
e, T
NS
125
112
175
175
165
167
–10.
4056
.25
0.00
–5.7
11.
21L
ansi
ng,
MI
MW
9210
813
113
012
712
717
.39
21.3
0–0
.76
–2.3
10.
00L
ouis
vill
e, K
YS
369
391
362
299
269
271
5.96
–7.4
2–1
7.40
–10.
030.
74M
acon
, GA
S70
7012
211
710
710
70.
0074
.29
–4.1
0–8
.55
0.00
Mem
phis
, TN
S39
649
862
464
661
061
025
.76
25.3
03.
53–5
.57
0.00
Met
airi
e, L
AS
NA
NA
136
164
149
NA
NA
N
A20
.59
–9.1
5
N
A
364 Anthony DownsT
able
1.
Po
pu
lati
on
Ch
an
ges
fro
m 1
950
to 1
992
in A
ll 5
3 L
arg
e U
.S. C
itie
s T
ha
t D
ecli
ned
in
Po
pu
lati
on
fro
m 1
980
to 1
990
(con
tin
ued
)
Tota
l Cit
y P
opu
lati
on o
n A
pril
1(T
hou
san
ds)
% C
han
ge in
Pop
ula
tion
Cit
yR
egio
n19
5019
60 1
970
198
0 1
990
1992
1950
–60
1960
–70
1970
–80
1980
–90
1990
–92
Mil
wau
kee,
WI
MW
637
741
717
636
628
617
16.3
3–3
.24
–11.
30–1
.26
–1.7
5M
inn
eapo
lis,
MN
MW
522
483
434
371
368
363
–7.4
7–1
0.14
–14.
52–0
.81
–1.3
6M
obil
e, A
LS
129
203
190
200
196
202
57.3
6–6
.40
5.26
–2.0
03.
06N
ew O
rlea
ns,
LA
S57
062
859
355
849
749
010
.18
–5.5
7–5
.90
–10.
93–1
.41
New
ark,
NJ
NE
439
405
382
329
275
268
–7.7
4–5
.68
–13.
87–1
6.41
–2.5
5N
orfo
lk, V
AS
214
306
308
267
261
254
42.9
90.
65–1
3.31
–2.2
5–2
.68
Peo
ria,
IL
MW
112
103
127
124
114
114
–8.0
423
.30
–2.3
6–8
.06
0.00
Ph
ilad
elph
ia, P
AN
E2,
071
2,00
31,
949
1,68
81,
586
1,55
3–3
.28
–2.7
0–1
3.39
–6.0
4–2
.08
Pit
tsbu
rgh
, PA
NE
677
604
520
424
370
367
–10.
78–1
3.91
–18.
46–1
2.74
–0.8
1R
ich
mon
d, V
AS
230
220
249
219
203
202
–4.3
513
.18
–12.
05–7
.31
–0.4
9R
och
este
r, N
YN
E33
231
929
524
223
223
4–3
.92
–7.5
2–1
7.97
–4.1
30.
86R
ockf
ord,
IL
MW
9312
714
714
013
914
236
.56
15.7
5–4
.76
–0.7
12.
16S
alt
Lak
e C
ity,
UT
W18
218
917
616
316
016
63.
85–6
.88
–7.3
9–1
.84
3.75
Sav
ann
ah, G
AS
120
149
118
142
138
139
24.1
7–2
0.81
20.3
4–2
.82
0.72
Sh
reve
port
, LA
S12
716
418
220
619
919
729
.13
10.9
813
.19
–3.4
0–1
.01
Sou
th B
end,
IN
MW
116
132
126
110
106
106
13.7
9–4
.55
–12.
70–3
.64
0.00
St.
Lou
is, M
OM
W85
775
062
245
339
738
4–1
2.49
–17.
07–2
7.17
–12.
36–3
.27
St.
Pet
ersb
urg
, FL
S97
181
216
239
239
235
86.6
019
.34
10.6
50.
00–1
.67
Syr
acu
se, N
YN
E22
121
619
717
016
416
3–2
.26
–8.8
0–1
3.71
–3.5
3–0
.61
Tole
do, O
HM
W30
431
838
335
533
332
94.
6120
.44
–7.3
1–6
.20
–1.2
0W
arre
n, M
IM
W1
8917
916
114
514
28,
800.
0010
1.12
–10.
06–9
.94
–2.0
7W
ash
ingt
on, D
CS
802
764
757
638
607
585
–4.7
4–0
.92
–15.
72–4
.86
–3.6
2Yo
nke
rs, N
YN
E15
319
120
419
518
818
624
.84
6.81
–4.4
1–3
.59
–1.0
6
Tot
al p
opu
lati
on22
,052
22,6
8922
,342
19,9
3818
,557
18,2
722.
89–1
.53
–10.
76–6
.93
–1.5
4N
um
ber
of c
itie
s52
5253
5353
52P
erce
nt
chan
ge in
adj
ust
ed t
otal
pop
ula
tion
:To
tal a
dju
sted
to
sam
e n
um
ber
of c
itie
s (5
2)22
,052
22,6
8922
,206
19,7
7418
,408
18,2
722.
89–2
.13
–10.
95–6
.91
–0.7
4N
um
eric
al c
han
ge in
adj
ust
ed t
otal
pop
ula
tion
(00
0)s:
637
(483
)(2
,432
)(1
,366
)(1
36)
Not
e : I
nc l
ude
s on
ly c
itie
s w
ith
mor
e th
an 1
00,0
00 r
esid
ents
in
199
0. M
W =
Mid
wes
t; N
E =
Nor
thea
st;
S =
Sou
th;
W =
Wes
t; N
A =
not
ava
ilab
le.
The Challenge of Our Declining Big Cities 365T
able
2. P
op
ula
tio
n C
ha
ng
es f
rom
195
0 to
199
4 in
Met
rop
oli
tan
Are
as
wit
h C
entr
al
Cit
ies
Th
at
Dec
lin
edin
Po
pu
lati
on
fro
m 1
980
to 1
990
Tota
l Met
ropo
lita
n A
rea
Pop
ula
tion
on
Apr
il 1
(Th
ousa
nds
)%
Ch
ange
in P
opu
lati
on
1950
1950
Met
ropo
lita
n A
rea
Ori
gin
alE
stim
ated
1960
197
0 1
980
199
019
9419
50–6
019
60–7
019
70–8
019
80–9
019
90–9
4
Akr
on, O
H41
0.0
482.
860
5.0
679.
066
0.0
658.
067
7.0
25.3
112
.23
–2.8
0–0
.30
2.89
Atl
anta
, GA
671.
872
7.1
1,01
7.2
1,39
0.0
2,23
3.0
2,96
0.0
3,33
1.0
39.9
036
.65
60.6
532
.56
12.5
3B
alti
mor
e, M
D1,
337.
41,
467.
81,
804.
02,
071.
02,
199.
02,
383.
02,
458.
022
.91
14.8
06.
188.
373.
15B
eau
mon
t, T
X19
5.1
235.
630
6.0
316.
037
3.0
361.
037
3.0
29.8
83.
2718
.04
–3.2
23.
32B
irm
ingh
am, A
L55
8.9
657.
574
7.0
767.
081
5.0
840.
087
2.0
13.6
12.
686.
263.
073.
81B
ridg
epor
t, C
T25
8.1
273.
335
0.0
402.
043
9.0
444.
0N
A28
.06
14.8
69.
201.
14N
AB
uff
alo,
NY
1,08
9.2
1,08
9.2
1,30
7.0
1,34
9.0
1,24
3.0
1,18
9.0
1,18
9.0
20.0
03.
21–7
.86
–4.3
40.
00C
edar
Rap
ids,
IA
104.
310
4.3
136.
9N
AN
AN
AN
A31
.26
NA
NA
NA
NA
Ch
atta
noo
ga, T
N24
6.5
295.
934
0.0
371.
041
8.0
424.
043
9.0
14.9
09.
1212
.67
1.44
3.54
Ch
icag
o, I
L5,
495.
45,
179.
86,
221.
06,
979.
07,
246.
07,
411.
07,
668.
020
.10
12.1
83.
832.
283.
47C
inci
nn
ati,
OH
904.
41,
070.
01,
268.
01,
385.
01,
468.
01,
526.
01,
581.
018
.50
9.23
5.99
3.95
3.60
Cle
vela
nd,
OH
1,46
5.5
1,55
7.0
1,90
9.0
2,06
4.0
2,27
8.0
2,20
2.0
2,22
2.0
22.6
18.
1210
.37
–3.3
40.
91D
ayto
n, O
H45
7.3
542.
972
7.0
850.
094
2.0
951.
095
6.0
33.9
116
.92
10.8
20.
960.
53D
enve
r, C
O56
3.8
615.
993
5.0
1,22
8.0
1,42
9.0
1,62
3.0
1,79
6.0
51.8
131
.34
16.3
713
.58
10.6
6D
etro
it, M
I3,
016.
23,
167.
63,
950.
04,
435.
04,
388.
04,
267.
04,
307.
024
.70
12.2
8–1
.06
–2.7
60.
94E
rie,
PA
219.
421
9.6
251.
026
4.0
280.
027
6.0
280.
014
.30
5.18
6.06
–1.4
31.
45E
van
svil
le, I
N16
0.4
260.
727
2.0
285.
027
6.0
279.
028
7.0
4.33
4.78
–3.1
61.
092.
87F
lin
t, M
I27
1.0
309.
042
8.0
497.
045
0.0
430.
043
3.0
38.5
116
.12
–9.4
6–4
.44
0.70
Ft.
Lau
derd
ale,
FL
NA
83.9
334.
062
0.0
1,01
8.0
1,25
6.0
1,38
3.0
298.
0985
.63
64.1
923
.38
10.1
1G
ary,
IN
NA
408.
557
4.0
633.
064
3.0
605.
062
0.0
40.5
110
.28
1.58
–5.9
12.
48H
onol
ulu
, HI
353.
035
2.9
500.
463
1.0
763.
083
6.0
874.
041
.80
26.1
020
.92
9.57
4.55
Jack
son
, MS
142.
216
7.9
221.
025
9.0
362.
039
5.0
412.
031
.63
17.1
939
.77
9.12
4.30
Kan
sas
Cit
y, K
S —
Th
is c
ity
is in
clu
ded
in t
he
Kan
sas
Cit
y, M
O, m
etro
poli
tan
are
a. —
Kan
sas
Cit
y, M
O81
4.4
869.
11,
109.
01,
274.
01,
449.
01,
583.
01,
647.
027
.60
14.8
813
.74
9.25
4.04
Kn
oxvi
lle,
TN
337.
134
5.2
377.
040
9.0
546.
058
6.0
631.
09.
218.
4933
.50
7.33
7.68
Lan
sin
g, M
I17
2.9
279.
434
2.0
424.
042
0.0
433.
043
6.0
22.4
123
.98
–0.9
43.
100.
69L
ouis
vill
e, K
Y57
6.9
599.
875
4.0
867.
095
4.0
949.
098
1.0
25.7
114
.99
10.0
3–0
.52
3.37
Mac
on, G
A13
5.0
147.
519
7.0
227.
027
3.0
291.
030
7.0
33.5
615
.23
20.2
66.
595.
50M
emph
is, T
N48
2.4
559.
272
7.0
834.
093
9.0
1,00
7.0
1,05
6.0
30.0
114
.72
12.5
97.
244.
87M
etai
rie,
LA
—T
his
cit
y is
incl
ude
d in
th
e N
ew O
rlea
ns
met
ropo
lita
n a
rea.
—
366 Anthony Downs
Tab
le 2
. Po
pu
lati
on
Ch
an
ges
fro
m 1
950
to 1
994
in M
etro
po
lita
n A
rea
s w
ith
Cen
tra
l C
itie
s T
ha
t D
ecli
ned
in P
op
ula
tio
n f
rom
198
0 to
199
0 (
con
tin
ued
)
Tota
l Met
ropo
lita
n A
rea
Pop
ula
tion
on
Apr
il 1
(Th
ousa
nds
)%
Ch
ange
in P
opu
lati
on
1950
1950
Met
ropo
lita
n A
rea
Ori
gin
alE
stim
ated
1960
197
0 1
980
199
019
9419
50–6
019
60–7
019
70–8
019
80–9
019
90–9
4
Mil
wau
kee,
WI
871.
01,
024.
81,
279.
01,
404.
01,
397.
01,
452.
01,
456.
024
.80
9.77
–0.5
03.
940.
28M
inn
eapo
lis,
MN
1,11
6.5
1,24
0.7
1,59
8.0
1,96
5.0
2,19
8.0
2,53
9.0
2,68
8.0
28.8
022
.97
11.8
615
.51
5.87
Mob
ile,
AL
231.
126
6.9
363.
037
7.0
444.
047
7.0
512.
036
.01
3.86
17.7
77.
437.
34N
ew O
rlea
ns,
LA
685.
471
5.8
907.
01,
046.
01,
304.
01,
285.
01,
309.
026
.71
15.3
324
.67
–1.4
61.
87N
ewar
k, N
JN
A1,
593.
91,
833.
02,
057.
01,
964.
01,
919.
01,
934.
015
.00
12.2
2–4
.52
–2.2
90.
78N
orfo
lk, V
A44
6.2
484.
962
9.0
733.
01,
201.
01,
445.
01,
529.
029
.72
16.5
363
.85
20.3
25.
81P
eori
a, I
L25
0.5
271.
431
3.0
342.
036
6.0
339.
034
4.0
15.3
39.
277.
02–7
.38
1.47
Ph
ilad
elph
ia, P
A3,
671.
03,
671.
04,
343.
04,
824.
04,
781.
04,
922.
04,
949.
018
.31
11.0
8–0
.89
2.95
0.55
Pit
tsbu
rgh
, PA
2,21
3.2
2,21
3.2
2,40
5.0
2,40
1.0
2,57
1.0
2,39
5.0
2,40
2.0
8.67
–0.1
77.
08–6
.85
0.29
Ric
hm
ond,
VA
328.
136
7.0
457.
054
2.0
761.
086
6.0
917.
024
.52
18.6
040
.41
13.8
05.
89R
och
este
r, N
Y48
7.6
665.
880
1.0
962.
01,
031.
01,
062.
01,
090.
020
.31
20.1
07.
173.
012.
64R
ockf
ord,
IL
152.
416
7.0
230.
027
2.0
326.
033
0.0
347.
037
.72
18.2
619
.85
1.23
5.15
Sal
t L
ake
Cit
y, U
T27
4.9
413.
457
6.0
705.
091
0.0
1,07
2.0
1,17
8.0
39.3
322
.40
29.0
817
.80
9.89
Sav
ann
ah, G
A15
1.5
151.
518
8.3
N
A23
1.0
258.
027
6.0
24.2
9
NA
N
A11
.69
6.98
Sh
reve
port
, LA
216.
727
0.2
321.
033
4.0
377.
037
6.0
378.
018
.80
4.05
12.8
7–0
.27
0.53
Sou
th B
end,
IN
205.
123
2.8
271.
028
0.0
242.
024
7.0
255.
016
.41
3.32
–13.
572.
073.
24S
t. L
ouis
, MO
1,68
1.3
1,78
9.6
2,14
4.0
2,41
1.0
2,41
4.0
2,49
2.0
2,53
6.0
19.8
012
.45
0.12
3.23
1.77
St.
Pet
ersb
urg
, FL
409.
142
8.5
809.
01,
089.
01,
614.
02,
068.
02,
157.
088
.80
34.6
148
.21
28.1
34.
30S
yrac
use
, NY
314.
746
5.3
564.
063
6.0
723.
074
2.0
754.
021
.21
12.7
713
.68
2.63
1.62
Tole
do, O
H39
5.6
601.
069
5.0
763.
061
7.0
614.
061
4.0
15.6
49.
78–1
9.13
–0.4
90.
00W
arre
n, M
IT
his
cit
y is
incl
ude
d in
th
e D
etro
it, M
I, m
etro
poli
tan
are
a.W
ash
ingt
on, D
C1,
404.
11,
534.
02,
097.
02,
910.
03,
478.
04,
223.
04,
474.
036
.70
38.7
719
.52
21.4
25.
94Yo
nke
rs, N
YT
his
cit
y is
incl
ude
d in
th
e N
ew Y
ork
Cit
y m
etro
poli
tan
are
a.
Tot
alp
opu
lati
on35
,945
40,6
3850
,533
57,5
6363
,454
67,2
8869
,315
Per
cen
t ch
ange
in a
dju
sted
tot
al p
opu
lati
on:
Nu
mbe
r of
are
as52
.049
4949
4949
5124
.33
14.6
49.
836.
043.
01To
tal a
dju
sted
to s
ame
nu
mbe
r35
,840
.340
,533
.850
,395
.957
,772
.763
,454
.067
,288
.069
,315
.0N
um
eric
al c
han
ge in
adj
ust
ed t
otal
pop
ula
tion
:of
are
as (
48)
9,86
2.1
7,37
6.7
5,68
1.4
3,83
4.0
2,02
7.0
Not
e: I
ncl
ude
s on
ly m
etro
poli
tan
are
as w
ith
cen
tral
cit
ies
con
tain
ing
mor
e th
an 1
00,0
00 r
esid
ents
in
199
0. N
A =
not
ava
ilab
le.
The Challenge of Our Declining Big Cities 367
Tab
le 3
. Su
bu
rba
n P
op
ula
tio
n C
ha
ng
es f
rom
195
0 to
199
0 in
Met
rop
oli
tan
Are
as
wit
h C
entr
al
Cit
ies
Th
at
Dec
lin
edin
Po
pu
lati
on
fro
m 1
980
to 1
990
Tota
l Su
burb
an P
opu
lati
on o
n A
pril
1(T
hou
san
ds)
% C
han
ge in
Pop
ula
tion
Met
ropo
lita
n A
rea
1950
Est
imat
ed19
60 1
970
198
0 1
990
1950
–60
1960
–70
1970
–80
1980
–90
Akr
on, O
H20
831
540
442
343
551
.59
28.2
54.
702.
84A
tlan
ta, G
A39
653
089
51,
808
2,56
633
.86
68.8
010
2.01
41.9
2B
alti
mor
e, M
D51
886
51,
166
1,41
21,
647
67.0
534
.80
21.1
016
.64
Bea
um
ont,
TX
142
187
198
255
247
32.0
65.
8828
.79
–3.1
4B
irm
ingh
am, A
L33
240
646
653
157
422
.47
14.7
813
.95
8.10
Bri
dgep
ort,
CT
114
193
245
296
302
68.8
526
.94
20.8
22.
03B
uff
alo,
NY
509
774
886
885
861
52.0
014
.47
–0.1
1–2
.71
Ced
ar R
apid
s, I
A—
——
——
NA
——
——
—–—
——
— N
A —
——
——
Ch
atta
noo
ga, T
N16
521
025
124
827
227
.35
19.5
2–1
.20
9.68
Ch
icag
o, I
L1,
559
2,67
13,
610
4,24
14,
627
71.3
535
.16
17.4
89.
10C
inci
nn
ati,
OH
566
765
931
1,08
31,
162
35.1
621
.70
16.3
37.
29C
leve
lan
d, O
H64
21,
033
1,31
31,
704
1,69
660
.90
27.1
129
.78
–0.4
7D
ayto
n, O
H29
946
560
774
876
955
.57
30.5
423
.23
2.81
Den
ver,
CO
200
441
713
936
1,15
512
0.61
61.6
831
.28
23.4
0D
etro
it, M
I1,
318
2,28
02,
921
3,18
53,
239
73.0
428
.11
9.04
1.70
Eri
e, P
A89
113
135
161
167
27.5
419
.47
19.2
63.
73E
van
svil
le, I
N13
212
314
614
615
3–6
.61
18.7
00.
004.
79F
lin
t, M
I14
623
130
429
028
958
.22
31.6
0–4
.61
–0.3
4F
t. L
aude
rdal
e, F
L48
250
480
865
1,10
742
1.92
92.0
080
.21
27.9
8G
ary,
IN
275
396
458
491
488
44.2
615
.66
7.21
–0.6
1H
onol
ulu
, HI
105
206
306
398
471
96.7
648
.26
30.0
718
.34
Jack
son
, MS
7077
105
159
198
10.1
636
.36
51.4
324
.53
Kan
sas
Cit
y, K
S –
––P
art
of a
not
her
cit
y’s
met
ropo
lita
n a
rea
–––
–––
Par
t of
an
oth
er c
ity’
s m
etro
poli
tan
are
a ––
–K
ansa
s C
ity,
MO
412
633
767
1,00
11,
148
53.6
021
.17
30.5
114
.69
Kn
oxvi
lle,
TN
220
265
234
371
421
20.3
5–1
1.70
58.5
513
.48
Lan
sin
g, M
I18
723
429
329
030
624
.87
25.2
1–1
.02
5.52
Lou
isvi
lle,
KY
231
363
505
655
680
57.2
839
.12
29.7
03.
82M
acon
, GA
7812
710
515
618
463
.87
–17.
3248
.57
17.9
5M
emph
is, T
N16
322
921
029
339
740
.32
–8.3
039
.52
35.4
9
368 Anthony Downs
Tab
le 3
. Su
bu
rba
n P
op
ula
tio
n C
ha
ng
es f
rom
195
0 to
199
0 in
Met
rop
oli
tan
Are
as
wit
h C
entr
al
Cit
ies
Th
at
Dec
lin
edin
Po
pu
lati
on
fro
m 1
980
to 1
990
(co
nti
nu
ed)
Tota
l Su
burb
an P
opu
lati
on o
n A
pril
1(T
hou
san
ds)
% C
han
ge in
Pop
ula
tion
Met
ropo
lita
n A
rea
1950
Est
imat
ed19
60 1
970
198
0 1
990
1950
–60
1960
–70
1970
–80
1980
–90
Met
airi
e, L
A –
––P
art
of a
not
her
cit
y’s
met
ropo
lita
n a
rea
–––
–––
Par
t of
an
oth
er c
ity’
s m
etro
poli
tan
are
a ––
–M
ilw
auke
e, W
I38
853
868
776
182
438
.73
27.7
010
.77
8.28
Min
nea
poli
s, M
N71
91,
115
1,53
11,
827
2,17
155
.14
37.3
119
.33
18.8
3M
obil
e, A
L13
816
018
724
428
116
.03
16.8
830
.48
15.1
6N
ew O
rlea
ns,
LA
146
279
453
746
788
91.3
662
.37
64.6
85.
63N
ewar
k, N
J1,
155
1,42
81,
675
1,63
51,
644
23.6
517
.30
–2.3
90.
55N
orfo
lk, V
A27
132
342
593
41,
184
19.2
331
.58
119.
7626
.77
Peo
ria,
IL
159
210
215
242
225
31.7
42.
3812
.56
–7.0
2P
hil
adel
phia
, PA
1,60
02,
340
2,87
53,
093
3,33
646
.25
22.8
67.
587.
86P
itts
burg
h, P
A1,
536
1,80
11,
881
2,14
72,
025
17.2
44.
4414
.14
–5.6
8R
ich
mon
d, V
A13
723
729
354
266
372
.99
23.6
384
.98
22.3
2R
och
este
r, N
Y33
448
266
778
983
044
.40
38.3
818
.29
5.20
Roc
kfor
d, I
L74
103
125
186
191
39.1
921
.36
48.8
02.
69S
alt
Lak
e C
ity,
UT
231
387
529
747
912
67.2
436
.69
41.2
122
.09
Sav
ann
ah, G
A32
3964
8912
024
.76
63.2
338
.74
34.8
3S
hre
vepo
rt, L
A14
315
715
217
117
79.
64–3
.18
12.5
03.
51S
outh
Ben
d, I
N11
713
915
413
214
119
.01
10.7
9–1
4.29
6.82
St.
Lou
is, M
O93
31,
394
1,78
91,
961
2,09
549
.47
28.3
49.
616.
83S
t. P
eter
sbu
rg, F
L33
262
887
31,
375
1,82
989
.44
39.0
157
.50
33.0
2S
yrac
use
, NY
244
348
439
553
578
42.4
526
.15
25.9
74.
52To
ledo
, OH
297
377
380
262
281
26.9
40.
80–3
1.05
7.25
War
ren
, MI
–––
Par
t of
an
oth
er c
ity’
s m
etro
poli
tan
are
a ––
–––
–P
art
of a
not
her
cit
y’s
met
ropo
lita
n a
rea
–––
Was
hin
gton
, DC
732
1,33
32,
153
2,84
03,
616
82.1
061
.52
31.9
127
.32
Yon
kers
, NY
–––
Par
t of
an
oth
er c
ity’
s m
etro
poli
tan
are
a ––
–––
–P
art
of a
not
her
cit
y’s
met
ropo
lita
n a
rea
–––
Tot
al p
opu
lati
on18
,838
28,2
0136
,201
44,3
0749
,472
49.7
028
.37
22.3
911
.66
Nu
mbe
r of
are
as48
4848
4848
4848
4848
Nu
mer
ical
ch
ange
in t
otal
su
burb
an p
opu
lati
on:
9,36
38,
000
8,10
65,
165
Not
e: I
ncl
ude
s on
ly m
etro
poli
tan
are
as w
ith
cen
tral
cit
ies
con
tain
ing
mor
e th
an 1
00,0
00 r
esid
ents
in
199
0. N
A =
not
ava
ilab
le.
The Challenge of Our Declining Big Cities 369
racially restrictive covenants prohibiting occupancy by non-whites in most newer parts of these cities and their suburbs.Hundreds of thousands of African-American households movedinto these neighborhoods from 1941 to 1945 to aid in war produc-tion and from 1945 to 1950 because mechanization displacedthem from southern cotton harvesting. In 1948, the U.S. Su-preme Court ruled that racially restrictive covenants were notlegally enforceable. Almost immediately, severely overcrowdedblack households began moving out of the “ghettos” where theyhad been confined and into surrounding neighborhoods.
The triple population “explosion” from 1950 to 1980
The decades from 1950 to 1980 were characterized by threemajor flows of population into large metropolitan areas. The firstconsisted of low-income African Americans migrating into majorU.S. metropolitan areas, as noted above. This flow reached itspeak in the 1950s but remained high in the 1960s (Farley andAllen 1987).
The second flow was a large-scale movement of white youngpeople out of rural areas throughout the Northeast, South, andMidwest. They entered metropolitan areas seeking better eco-nomic opportunities than were available in their initial farm-oriented communities.
The third flow was a virtual explosion of births throughout thenation to more than 4.0 million per year in the so-called babyboom period, from the mid-1950s to the early 1960s. Since thedeath rate did not rise in this period, the rate of natural increaseshot upward, especially among African Americans and Hispanics(U.S. Bureau of the Census 1996 [Statistical Abstract]).
These three major population flows hugely expanded the totalpopulations of the nation’s major metropolitan areas from 1950through 1980. Figure 1 shows the gains by decade from 1950 to1990 in the combined population of the 49 U.S. metropolitanareas with central cities that lost population from 1980 to1990.3 The biggest gain both absolutely and in percentage terms(24.3 percent) occurred in the 1950s, with subsequent decadesexperiencing gains that declined in both absolute and relativesize. In these metropolitan areas as wholes, the number of
3 Although 53 cities containing more than 100,000 residents in 1990 lostresidents from 1980 to 1990, they were located in only 49 metropolitan areasbecause some of the cities were suburbs in those areas.
370 Anthony Downs
Fig
ure
1. S
ub
urb
an
an
d C
ity
Po
pu
lati
on
Ch
an
ges
fro
m 1
950
to 1
990
in 4
9 M
etro
po
lita
n A
rea
s w
ith
Cen
tra
l C
itie
sT
ha
t D
ecli
ned
in
Po
pu
lati
on
fro
m 1
980
to 1
990
Mil
lion
s of
Per
sons
Cit
ies
lost
in a
ll d
ecad
esaf
ter
1960
.
–4
1950
s
1960
s
1970
s
1980
s
–20
24
68
10
gain
ed in
tot
al p
opul
atio
n in
all
dec
ades
.
Yet
all 4
9 m
etro
are
as c
ombi
ned
also
but
gain
s gr
adua
lly
slow
ed.
Sub
urbs
gai
ned
in a
ll d
ecad
es
The Challenge of Our Declining Big Cities 371
middle-class households increased tremendously from 1950 to1990. Any losses of middle-class households within their centralcities therefore occurred because of changes in the spatial distri-bution of households within these areas.
Other factors influencing spatial settlement patterns from1950 to 1980
One key factor was a sizable increase in the average real in-comes of most households from 1950 to 1973. The median incomeof families in constant dollars rose 96.6 percent in those 23years, or about 2.9 percent per year compounded—comparedwith an overall increase of only 7.1 percent in the 23 years from1970 to 1993, or 0.3 percent per year compounded (U.S. Bureauof the Census various years [Statistical Abstract]). This riseintensified the desire of many households to occupy bigger homeson larger lots. Higher real incomes also enabled more householdsto purchase and use private automobiles.4 At the same time,major networks of high-speed expressways, including the inter-state highway system, were built in all U.S. metropolitan areas.
These trends made possible a gigantic peripheral expansion ofthe territory within these metropolitan areas occupied by built-up settlements, including residences, shopping centers, indus-trial districts, office parks, and other places of employment.Millions of new housing units and other urban structures werecreated on vacant land around the edges of these metropolitanareas, which therefore expanded in all possible directions. Thesenew peripheral settlements had much lower average gross densi-ties (persons per square mile) than the older settlements aroundwhich they were constructed. This caused a peripheral popula-tion explosion in the total number of persons residing in thesuburbs of these metropolitan areas. By the mid-1950s, the totalsuburban population of these metropolitan areas combined hadsurpassed their total central-city population, which declined ineach decade after 1960.
By the mid-1960s, the immense boom in housing and otherconstruction that built these burgeoning suburbs had created farmore dwelling units in each metropolitan area since 1950 thanadditional households that had moved or been formed there, inspite of huge population increases (table 4). This outcome is
4 The number of motor vehicles registered per 100 U.S. residents increasedfrom 32.2 in 1950 to 63.2 in 1980 (Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association1991; U.S. Bureau of the Census 1996 [Statistical Abstract]).
372 Anthony Downs
Table 4. Average Annual Housing Increases in Metropolitan Areas
Added Surplus of HousingNew Housing Households Units over
Decade Starts per Year per Year Added Households
1950s 1,596,522 1,016,400 580,1221960s 1,646,333 1,060,200 586,1331970s 2,129,600 1,737,500 392,100
Note: Figures include the average number of new housing units started each year(including new mobile homes), the average number of new households added each year,and the surplus of new units over added households. Some of the surpluses wereabsorbed by losses of existing housing, but a large fraction made net additions to theusable inventory, gradually overcoming the shortages that initially existed in 1950.
evidenced by the appearance of abandoned housing units inmany older parts of central cities after about 1965. Abandon-ment can usually occur only if even the most destitute house-holds have somewhere else to live. Thanks to this massivebuilding of new housing units, the initial overcrowded conditionsin these central cities were no longer necessary.5 So withinexisting central cities as well as in new suburbs, households ofall income groups spread out at much lower densities than in1950.
Thus, it was almost inevitable, and surely desirable, that most ofthese central cities experienced some declines in population from1950 to the mid-1960s. These declines were not necessarily amark of urban decay but resulted from the elimination of initialovercrowding and a shift to lower residential densities associatedwith higher household incomes, lower movement costs, greaterhousehold mobility, and massive new housing construction.
The impact of racial discrimination and segregation
The spatial arrangement of households within these metropoli-tan areas was decisively influenced by racial segregation anddiscrimination by whites against nonwhites, especially AfricanAmericans. Although many African-American households movedinto these metropolitan areas from 1950 to 1965, three factorsprevented them from occupying newly constructed housing onthe fringes.
5 This was not true in all large cities. New York City in particular did notexperience large-scale new rental housing construction within the city becauseof continued stringent rent controls. New York City also gained many low-income immigrants from abroad, whose arrival offset outflows of middle-classhouseholds to the surrounding suburbs, where the latter occupied the manynew suburban homes built in the 1950s and especially the 1960s and 1970s.
The Challenge of Our Declining Big Cities 373
One factor was the maintenance of high quality standards fornew housing by almost all legal jurisdictions. Such standardsprevented newly arrived poor households from constructing theirown inexpensive but low-quality housing—shacks—on vacantperipheral land, as occurred in migrations of poor people tourban areas in most of the rest of the world. In addition, manysuburban exclusionary laws prohibited manufactured housing,minimized the amount of land available for multifamily housing,and prohibited small detached single-family units. Consequently,most new housing was too costly for poor households to occupy.
The second factor was the almost universal prevalence of racialdiscrimination by white real estate agents, mortgage lenders,and homeowners against occupancy of housing in all-white areasby black households—with one exception. The exception wasblack occupancy in all-white neighborhoods immediately adjoin-ing enclaves already occupied mainly by blacks. The strongexpansion pressures of the overcrowded African-American popu-lations built up in racially restricted neighborhoods by 1950could not be resisted by owner-occupants or landlords in adjacentall-white blocks. Therefore, after racially restrictive covenantswere outlawed, most all-black areas rapidly expanded into ad-joining initially all-white neighborhoods through a process ofmassive racial transition (Massey and Denton 1993). No stableintegration resulted because many whites would not remain in,and most would not move into, neighborhoods occupied by morethan about one-third African Americans.6 Consequently, oncemany African Americans had moved into a mainly white area, allother whites refused to move in, and the normal process of about16 percent neighborhood turnover per year then involved onlyAfrican Americans moving in.7 That soon converted the entireneighborhood to almost wholly African-American occupancy.
Except in these neighborhoods adjacent to all-black areas, racialdiscrimination by whites prevented black households from enter-ing mainly white areas in any significant numbers. Those fewAfrican Americans who tried to move in found it hard to locateunits that were available to them or financing for those units.
6 A 1976 survey in Detroit showed that, once a neighborhood contained36 percent black residents, 57 percent of white survey respondents would feeluncomfortable living there, 41 percent would try to move out if they alreadylived there, and 73 percent would be unwilling to move in if they were notliving there (Massey and Denton 1993).
7 For discussions of this “automatic resegregation” process and the overallprocess of massive neighborhood racial transition, see Schelling (1971) andDowns (1981, chap. 7).
374 Anthony Downs
And if they did move in, they were often threatened with vio-lence or greeted with such hostility that most soon departed.This behavior by the white population in effect eliminated anypossibility of relieving the expansion pressure of all-black inner-city neighborhoods by having additional African-Americanhouseholds move into the same new suburban housing develop-ments then being occupied by whites.
The third factor was a “natural” tendency of newly arrivingAfrican Americans to move into neighborhoods where they al-ready had relatives or friends, rather than into areas occupiedmainly by whites. This tendency has been observed throughoutthe world among new urban residents of all ethnic groups.
The resulting out-movement of middle-class whites
The process of massive neighborhood racial transition describedabove contributed to a huge movement of white middle-classhouseholds out of central cities. As the African-American popula-tions of these metropolitan areas continued to grow, throughboth natural increase and further in-migration, African Ameri-cans displaced whites in ever-larger parts of these central cities,and of many inner-ring suburbs. These displaced white house-holds were by no means all members of the middle class; manywere working class or poor. But they included many middle-classhouseholds, too. Some would have chosen to move to the suburbsfor reasons other than racial displacement, as discussed furtherbelow. There can be no doubt, however, that the rapid expansionof segregated African-American neighborhoods motivated manythousands of white households who had lived in those sameareas to move out of central cities.8
This process is clearly reflected in population data (figure 2).From 1960 to 1970, the African-American population of the52 cities that lost population in the 1980s soared by 623,600, or10 percent, whereas the nonblack population fell by 1.107
8 “Although whites were still highly resistant to racial integration in housing,withdrawal to the suburbs provided a more attractive alternative to thedefense of threatened neighborhoods and led to a prevalence of flight overfight among whites in racially changing areas. The combination of rapid whitesuburbanization and extensive black in-migration led to an unprecedentedincrease in the physical size of the ghetto during the 1950s and 1960s…. In afew short years, the population of vast areas of Chicago’s south and west sidesbecame virtually all black, as occurred on Cleveland’s east side, Philadelphia’snorth and west sides, and in most of central city Newark, Detroit, Baltimore,and Washington, D.C.” (Massey and Denton 1993, 45–46).
The Challenge of Our Declining Big Cities 375
Fig
ure
2. P
op
ula
tio
n C
ha
ng
es b
y R
aci
al
Gro
up
in
52
Dec
lin
ing
Cit
ies,
196
0 to
199
0
Wh
ite
loss
es g
reat
ly e
xcee
ded
blac
k ga
ins
in t
he
1960
s an
d19
70s;
bot
h g
rou
ps s
how
edlo
sses
in t
he
1980
s.
PO
PU
LA
TIO
N L
OS
SE
SP
OP
UL
AT
ION
GA
INS
–13,
960
1970
s
1980
s
–3–2
–1M
illi
ons
of P
erso
ns
Non
blac
ks
Bla
cks
Tota
l
01
1960
s
376 Anthony Downs
million, or 6.7 percent.9 In the 1970s, the ethnic displacementprocess slowed down, but the loss of whites accelerated. TheAfrican-American population of all 52 cities rose by 486,900, or7.1 percent, whereas the nonblack population fell by 2.919million, or 19.1 percent—even though the Hispanic population ofthese cities, here included as part of the nonblack population,increased somewhat. In the 1980s, the black population of thesecities fell by 13,960, or 0.2 percent, whereas the nonblack popu-lation continued declining by 1.352 million, or 10.9 percent.10
The above population data lead to two clear conclusions.First, from 1950 to 1980, a major cause of the loss of whitemiddle-class households in these central cities was physicaldisplacement by the numerical and spatial expansion of theAfrican-American population. True, that displacement was alsomade possible by large-scale construction of suburban housingoccurring at the same time. But whites withdrew from cities intothe new suburban housing partly because racial segregation insuburbs prevented the rapidly growing black populations incentral cities from expanding into surrounding suburbs. Thus,the displacement of white households from central cities byblacks occurred under metropolitan housing market conditionsdominated by the racial discrimination and segregation practicesof whites.
The second conclusion is that the large-scale out-movement ofwhites from central cities was not caused solely by such racialdisplacement. This is shown by the fact that nonblack populationlosses in these central cities greatly exceeded African-Americanpopulation gains, often by a factor of two, three, or more (seefigure 2). Clearly, some forces other than the spatial expansionof the African-American population within these cities were alsocausing nonblacks—mostly non-Hispanic whites—to move to thesuburbs in large numbers.
9 Figure 2 includes data for 52 such cities; data for Metairie, LA, a suburb ofNew Orleans, are not available for earlier years, so this city has been excludedfrom these calculations. Some of the black population data are for the category“nonwhite,” as used by the Census Bureau in earlier years. The category“nonblack” includes other minority groups, such as Hispanics and Asians, so itis not equivalent to the non-Hispanic white population, but it is used here toillustrate a basic point, for which it is sufficiently accurate.
10 Data from tables on large-city population are from the U.S. Bureau of theCensus (various years [Statistical Abstract]).
The Challenge of Our Declining Big Cities 377
Nonracial causes of white outflows from these cities
Several alternative causes of such movements—not mutuallyexclusive—have been suggested by various observers, as follows(some were discussed earlier):
Mainly exogenous or technological factors
1. Rising real incomes among all groups of householdsfrom 1950 to 1973, and among middle- and upper-incomehouseholds after 1973, caused many households to move outof older homes and neighborhoods in central cities in orderto enjoy more spacious and modern dwellings and neighbor-hood designs in newly built suburbs.
2. Increased use of motor vehicles within cities with streetsbuilt in earlier eras intensified traffic congestion and ineffi-ciencies of movement. This led many business firms to moveto less congested suburban locations, where they could alsooperate on larger sites with more efficient one-floor layouts.Many employees of such firms then found it convenient tolive in the suburbs near their relocated jobs.
3. Improved highways linking central cities and outlyingsuburbs, heavily financed with federal funds, plus increasedownership and use of private automotive vehicles, made iteasier for households to live in the suburbs and remainemployed in central cities. It also became easier for manybusiness firms to relocate from high-density central-citylocations to lower-density suburban locations where theycould use more efficient physical layouts. (This cause waspartly a result of public policies, too.)
Results of public policies
1. The home-purchase financing arrangements offered, withfederal help, by savings and loans and banks to householdsmoving into the suburbs were superior to those available forhouseholds wishing to stay in the city and rehabilitate olderunits or build new ones there.
2. Hundreds of thousands of households and businesses weredisplaced from locations in central cities by federally fi-nanced urban renewal and highway construction programs.Many displaced persons and firms discovered that it was
378 Anthony Downs
easier and more efficient to move to suburban locations—often along the same highways—than to remain in thecentral city.11
3. As large central cities struggled to cope with increasingdemands for public services, they often raised their propertytax rates above those found in surrounding suburbs lessburdened with significant fractions of poor households. Thisincreased the incentives for some households and businessfirms to move to suburbs with lower tax rates.
Social factors
1. As the percentages of minority-group households withincentral cities increased, the fractions of central-city publicschool enrollments composed of children from minority-group homes rose even faster, partly because of higher birthrates among major minority groups than among whites. Butonce many white households found their children attendingschools with more than 25 to 33 percent minority students—especially more than 50 percent—they decided to move tosuburbs where schools remained almost entirely populatedby white students. This movement was greatly acceleratedin cities where courts ordered widespread busing of studentsto achieve more racially balanced enrollments.
2. Rising crime rates within many parts of large central citiescreated an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty about thesafety and security of remaining residents of these cities.12
This atmosphere was—and still is—aggravated by constantemphasis in the mass media on lurid reports of violent localcrimes in daily newspapers and TV broadcasts and littlenote of the positive aspects of city life. Consequently, manyhouseholds moved to suburban locations to escape big-cityinsecurities.
11 For an analysis of the impact of urban renewal and highway clearance oncities, see the National Commission on Urban Problems (1969, chap. 6). Themagnitude of displacement can be judged partly from the following quotationfrom that report: “By the end of 1967, no less than 1.1 million dwelling unitsin the urban renewal areas of the country had been identified as needingeither demolition (760,000 units) or rehabilitation (350,000 units)…. 404,000[demolitions] … had already been carried out” (p. 160).
12 For data on crimes in cities, see Downs (1994) and DiIulio (1992). For ageneral discussion of the history of crime rates in cities, see Wilson andHerrnstein (1985).
The Challenge of Our Declining Big Cities 379
It is not possible here to evaluate how much each of these forcescontributed to large-scale withdrawal of the white populationfrom these cities, beyond that clearly associated with spatialdisplacement by black population expansion. However, all thesehypotheses can be incorporated into a broader explanation ofmetropolitan-area dynamics, explained below.
How the American metropolitan growth processsystematically redistributes viable households andfirms and taxable resources away from central cities
Some basic aspects of all metropolitan-area growth processes
Almost every U.S. metropolitan area has been founded on ariver, ocean, lake, or other transportation mode transfer pointand has expanded outward from that origin as its population hasgrown. This means that the central point at first contained thehighest concentration of economic activities and jobs. Moreover,transportation networks are initially constructed to converge onthat point of origin, making it more widely accessible than mostother points in the same metropolitan area.
The resulting established agglomeration of facilities in andaround the central business district initially creates monopolisticlocational advantages for that core. These advantages cannot befully duplicated at outlying locations, at least in the short run,because no one location has such an accessible site as theestablished core area, or such an agglomeration of facilities andactivities.
As a metropolitan area’s total population grows, its settledportions must expand outward from the center unless its averagepopulation density continuously rises. The density almost neverrises enough to preclude outward peripheral expansion. Whentransportation was costly and inefficient, the center maintainedhigh density because it was so hard to move to far-out locations.But the development of inexpensive automotive transportationchanged that situation radically.
In fact, all urban areas throughout the world expand outwardmore than upward because it is nearly always cheaper to buildon vacant land than to tear down existing structures and replacethem with higher-density structures. Since transportationhas steadily become more efficient over time, this inside-outexpansion has been further encouraged by technological change.
380 Anthony Downs
Improved transportation and communications technologiesreduce the monopolistic cost advantage of locating close to thecore, thereby stimulating outward movement and peripheraldevelopment. Increasing central densities rather than growingoutward would also go against the historical tide of rising realincomes—which generate desires for more space per householdand therefore lower densities.13
As population continues to grow and the built-up area expands,outlying centers of jobs and retail activity grow up in addition tothe original downtown. This development is further encouragedby improved transportation and communications and by risingreal incomes.
Some crucial and nearly unique aspects of the Americanmetropolitan growth process
A crucial, nearly universal, but not inevitable aspect of Americanperipheral growth was the division of the edges of metropolitanareas into many small legal jurisdictions separate from theoriginal central city. That division resulted from political andlegal decisions made by state legislators, local citizens, and localpoliticians. Other governance arrangements concerning land usecould have been adopted—as in other developed nations—butwere not.
Fragmented government involved creation of legally separatesuburbs, instead of growth within a single legal jurisdiction—though the latter has happened in a few U.S. metropolitan areaswhere the central city can annex surrounding communities(Rusk 1993). The development of separate suburbs occurred forseveral reasons. Builders creating new peripheral subdivisionsoften wanted to control the rules governing their operations inways different from those prevailing in the dominant city. Resi-dents of areas lying outside the central city’s original boundariesoften wanted to distance themselves from the problems of the
13 Real incomes have historically risen over long periods in the United Statesfor nearly all social groups in all segments of the overall income distribution.However, this was not true throughout the period covered by this analysis—1950 to 1990. From 1950 to 1973, real household incomes rose rapidly fornearly all such groups, as noted later in the text. From 1973 to 1990, realhousehold incomes rose for the upper quintiles in the overall distribution butdeclined for the lower quintiles. This produced a very slow net increase for thedistribution as a whole. However, during the 1950s and 1960s, when some ofthe largest population movements affecting declining cities took place, realincomes were rising for nearly all groups. See Levy (1987, chap. 4).
The Challenge of Our Declining Big Cities 381
city by creating separate jurisdictions in which they could con-trol densities and tax rates. Local residents often wanted toestablish higher building, economic, and social standards thanthey thought were possible under the rules of the central city, sothey incorporated separately and adopted more stringent—andbetter-enforced—housing codes and rules.
Another key feature of American metropolitan growth concernsthe high quality standards required for new housing and otherconstruction, as noted earlier. In the United States, local regula-tions in peripheral communities—and even central ones—almostuniversally prevent the creation of new very low cost housingunits, such as the shacks built in barrios in less developed na-tions. The resulting high-quality new structures are inherentlymore modern and up-to-date than older ones, so they attracthouseholds and firms with relatively high incomes. Moreover,only households with incomes in the upper two-thirds of theincome distribution can afford to occupy such new dwelling unitswithout large public subsidies.
Maintaining high quality standards in new-growth areas has adual impact on the spatial distribution of households. First, itcauses a disproportionate concentration of affluent households innew-growth suburbs. Second, it leads to a disproportionateconcentration of poor households in the central city and olderinner-ring suburbs where deterioration and obsolescence havereduced the quality—and hence the costs—of older housing.
This situation also results in differential de facto housing qualitystandards within each metropolitan area. Inside much of thecentral city and other older parts of the core, standards of hous-ing quality are not maintained among existing units at the highlevel legally required for newly built units. Such a lowering ofstandards is necessary to push the actual cost of occupancy downto where low-income households can afford it. If housing codeswere stringently enforced at high quality levels, thousands ofhouseholds would be thrown out on the streets. Moreover, citybudgets for code enforcement have often been cut back so greatlythat strict enforcement could not be achieved even if it weredesired. And many cities did not—and do not—have enoughfunds for rehabilitating those deteriorated units that the citygovernment has taken over through tax delinquencies or aban-donment. In contrast, high quality standards are maintained forall new housing built, most of which is located at the suburbanperiphery. This de facto dual set of housing quality standards israrely recognized explicitly because it would seem undemocratic
382 Anthony Downs
to admit that lower quality standards are maintained in poorerneighborhoods.
Thus, the disproportionate concentration of poor householdswithin central cities arises from the fundamental institutionalstructure of U.S. metropolitan areas and of their growth pro-cesses. This structure may seem to be natural or a result of free-market forces, but it is neither. In fact, other structures prevailin most of the world (Downs 1969). In very poor nations, the poorbuild their own brand-new units of very low quality and locatethem at all distances from the center, even on the new-growthperiphery. In many other developed nations, especially in West-ern Europe, national governments have subsidized much higherfractions of all new units, permitting poor households to live innew units also on the periphery. This has been true during muchof the post–World War II period in Sweden, France, West Ger-many, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. So the Ameri-can pattern is unusual.
That pattern has come to be called “suburban sprawl,” and it hasdominated American metropolitan growth for the past 50 years.Sprawl is really a particular form of suburbanization with sev-eral characteristics that differentiate it from other conceivableforms of suburbanization:14
1. It has no limits on the outward expansion of additionalurban settlements.
2. It divides legal control over land uses, property taxes, andlocal services among many different bodies, each controllinga relatively small area, with no single body having anyresponsibility for the entire area.
3. It involves “leapfrog” settlements, in which some new sub-divisions are located far from the edges of already–built-upareas.
4. There is no centralized control or planning over how thearea develops.
5. Land ownership is relatively fragmented.
6. Different land uses are spatially segregated into separateneighborhoods.
14 This definition of suburban sprawl was taken largely from the remarks ofHenry Richmond at the conference “Alternatives to Sprawl” held at theBrookings Institution in May 1995 (see Richmond 1996).
The Challenge of Our Declining Big Cities 383
7. There is no unified or centralized allocation of public fiscalresources.
8. There is extensive strip commercial development alongmajor suburban arteries.
Why American metropolitan growth disproportionatelyconcentrates poverty in core areas
The dominant growth pattern of American metropolitan areassets in motion a major process of spatial resource reallocationthat drains fiscal and human resources from older core areasand weakens the ability of governments there to provide keyservices.15
As an American metropolitan area’s population grows larger, theabsolute number of low-income and poor households within itrises. This occurs because since 1969 the poor (as defined byfederal standards) have formed a relatively constant proportionof the nation’s total population, ranging from 11.4 to 15.2 per-cent in different parts of the general business cycle (U.S. Bureauof the Census 1996 [Statistical Abstract]). Yet the percentage ofall poor households in the metropolitan area that live in the corearea normally increases because of the concentration processdescribed above. In that case, the absolute number of poor house-holds in the core area must rise as the area grows. But the localgovernments serving the core area normally have fixed bound-aries. Moreover, the average population density usually declinesover time for reasons already discussed, plus local resistance tohigher densities. Therefore, increases in the absolute number ofpoor households living in the core usually result in a risingpercentage of poor households in the total population of that corearea.
From 1980 to 1990, this chain of events caused both absolutelyand relatively larger concentrations of very poor householdswithin the core areas of most large metropolitan areas. In 1990,there were about 10 million persons living in census tracts where40 percent or more of the total population was poor—twice asmany as lived in such tracts in 1980 (Jargowsky and Bane 1991;Kasarda 1993; Mincy and Wiener 1993). About 7.5 million ofthese people lived in central cities, where they constituted about10 percent of the total central-city population. However, they
15 This process was described and analyzed at length by Bradbury, Downs, andSmall (1982).
384 Anthony Downs
were concentrated disproportionately in a small number ofvery large cities. New York, Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles, andPhiladelphia combined contained 2.13 million persons living inextreme-poverty census tracts, or about 28 percent of all suchresidents of central cities in 1990, compared with 20.8 percent ofthe nation’s total central-city population.16
The problem of increasing concentrations of very poor house-holds within the core area is aggravated by the differentialability of various firms, households, and other resources to move.Financial capital, most jobs, economically viable firms, andnonpoor households are resources that can freely flow betweenthe core and outlying locations. Therefore, they seek the loca-tions most favorable to their welfare. These resources not onlygenerate economic activity where they are located, but also forma taxable base there. If they move to outlying areas, they bothcreate a large economic and taxable base in those areas andreduce the economic and taxable bases available to the govern-ments responsible for the core (Ladd 1993).
In contrast, poor households, capital sunk in physical structures,and government institutions cannot move freely in and out ofthe core because of (1) the immobility of existing physical capi-tal, (2) fragmented governance structures, and (3) exclusionaryzoning by governments outside the core. The first of these im-pediments is inherent; the second and third are nonmarketfactors created by deliberate public policies.
Negative consequences of the concentration of poverty withincore areas
The result of higher and higher concentrations of poverty withinthe core area is rising social and technical obsolescence in thatarea, compared with the newer settlements on the outer periph-ery. Social obsolescence includes poor-quality public schools,badly trained school graduates, and high crime rates and secu-rity costs. Another manifestation of social obsolescence is theincreasing ineffectiveness of various public bureaucracies sup-posedly created to help people cope with poverty, includingpublic schools, welfare systems, public housing agencies,police, city administrators, and health care systems. Thesebureaucracies are basically monopolies, so their members—like
16 Data on central-city extreme-poverty tract populations are from Kasarda(1993). Data on central-city populations for the entire nation were obtainedby the author by telephone in 1990 from Don Starsinik of the U.S. CensusBureau.
The Challenge of Our Declining Big Cities 385
all monopolists—come to focus on maintaining their own powersat the expense of the welfare of their clients. The behavior ofthese bureaucracies tends to reinforce the dependence of theirclients rather than liberate their clients’ capabilities (Kretzmannand McKnight 1993).17 Technical obsolescence includes con-gested streets, obsolete electrical wiring and communicationssystems, decaying and obsolete water and sewer systems, anddeteriorated structures poorly designed for rehabilitation intomodern status.
As a metropolitan area grows larger, its core area’s intrinsiclocational advantages become heavily—often completely—offsetby increasing costs from rising social and technical obsolescence.As a result, more and more financial capital, viable firms, andnonpoor households move out of the central core and into theouter periphery. They remove viable resources with them, leav-ing the core area with lower taxable resources and higher percapita service requirements (Pack 1994).
This process is aggravated by presumed or de facto desiresamong many white households for segregation from AfricanAmericans. Since the percentage of poor persons is much higheramong African Americans and Hispanics than among Asians ornon-Hispanic whites, the concentration of poverty describedabove is often accompanied by a concentration of minority-grouphouseholds in high-poverty areas. This accelerates the with-drawal of nonpoor white households into peripheral areas andincreases their desire to erect barriers against the entry ofminority-group households into their suburban communities.
The racial aspects of concentrated poverty are likely to becomemuch worse because of future changes in the American popula-tion. Between 1995 and 2020, the total U.S. population will riseby 60 million persons, of whom 47 million, or 79 percent, will beAfrican Americans, Hispanics, and Asians.18 The first two ofthese groups are now spatially concentrated in central cities andhave much higher fractions of poverty than either non-Hispanicwhites or Asians. Thus, future demographic changes will inten-sify the concentration of poverty within the core portions ofmetropolitan areas—and spread it outward from there—unlessthe nation succeeds in notably improving the average lot ofAfrican Americans and Hispanics. Such increased concentration
17 This view is based on the earlier work of Ivan Illich, such as Toward aHistory of Needs (Illich 1980).
18 These estimates are from the middle-series projections in Current Popula-tion Reports (U.S. Bureau of the Census various years).
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is likely even though greater numbers of nonpoor members ofthese minority groups have recently been moving from centralcities into suburbs.
The resulting self-aggravating downward spiral of core-areafiscal and social viability
The departure of many viable firms and nonpoor householdsfrom the core area creates a self-aggravating downward spiral infiscal, economic, and social strength there. The percentage ofnonviable firms and poor households rises, and the amount offinancial capital willing to invest there declines. Since poorhouseholds generate more costly needs for social services percapita than nonpoor households—including police, fire fighting,education, and other social services—this change in the composi-tion of the core-area population raises the per capita cost ofdelivering adequate services to that population (Pack 1994). Atthe same time, the departure of many financially viable firmsand households reduces the per capita tax base of the govern-ments serving the core area, thereby decreasing their ability topay for these increasingly costly social services.
In contrast, the movement of many nonpoor households andviable firms from the core area into the suburban peripheryincreases the overall economic viability of many communities onthat periphery, partly by raising their per capita tax bases inrelation to those of the core area. In essence, both financialcapital and human resources flow in a continuously acceleratingprocess from the core area, with its high costs and severe prob-lems, into the suburban periphery, with its lower costs andlesser problems.
This process of spatial resource reallocation creates anever-greater inequality of opportunities among residents ofconcentrated-poverty core areas and certain low-resource sub-urbs on the one hand and residents of high-resource suburbs onthe other. Thus, the growth process created by the structure ofAmerican metropolitan areas is fundamentally inequitable andunjust. It inherently reduces the welfare of many poor house-holds to benefit nonpoor ones.
Differential impacts on metropolitan suburbs
However, the results of this process are not uniformly beneficialto suburbs, because the process has several quite varied impacts
The Challenge of Our Declining Big Cities 387
on suburbs with different characteristics.19 Many older inner-ring suburbs find themselves experiencing the same self-aggravating downward spiral as the central city itself. Theschools in these suburbs become loaded with children from verypoor homes, local crime rates rise, many middle-income house-holds and viable businesses withdraw to farther-out suburbs,and the local governments concerned become fiscally strapped.Farther out, many low-commercial-tax-base suburbs with grow-ing populations also become fiscally strapped, but for a differentreason. Many young households with children are moving intothese communities, partly in flight from the core area. Educatingtheir children imposes high tax costs on these suburbs, but thesuburbs have very few commercial or industrial properties towhich to shift those tax burdens. Consequently, their residentialtax rates soar, and local citizens resist further improvements inschool quality or other public services (Orfield 1997).
In contrast to these fiscally strapped suburbs are the high-commercial-tax-base suburbs in economically favored quarters.Almost every metropolitan area has one suburban corridor orquarter currently capturing most new commercial and industrialactivity.20 This “favored quarter” is also usually the location ofthe highest-quality and highest-price executive homes. That factis by no means a coincidence, since the executives living thereusually determine where their firms will locate. In Atlanta, thisis the north-northeast quarter; in Minneapolis, the southeastquarter; in Chicago, the west-northwest quarter; and so on.These rapidly growing suburbs have such high commercial taxbases that they can raise spending on schools and other publicservices while limiting residential tax rates. They also tend tocapture disproportionate shares of overall metropolitan-areapublic spending on such items as roads, schools, and sewersystems.
19 This analysis of types of suburbs has been taken from the work of MyronOrfield, a member of the Minnesota State Legislature. His book Metropolitics(Orfield 1997) has just been published by the Brookings Institution and theLincoln Institute of Land Policy.
20 I am indebted to Christopher Leinberger of Robert Charles Lesser Associ-ates for the concept of the favored quarter (Leinberger 1995). This idea alsohas its roots in the work of Homer Hoyt (1939), an economist with the FederalHousing Administration during the 1930s. Hoyt found that high-incomehousing could radiate from the core in one wedge—often from the corner of thecentral business district that contained the financial services industry. Hoyt’stheory was based on the movement of high-rent districts in 142 Americancities in 1900, 1915, and 1936.
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The absence of incentives for key actors in this process tocounteract its negative results
Although the serious negative impacts of this process on societycan be perceived when the process is viewed as a whole, noimportant actors in either the public or private sector are moti-vated to react to these overall consequences. Each is faced withincentives that are based on its serving the welfare of only asmall, parochial part of the entire area. Therefore, it remains inthe interest of all groups that enjoy mobility to continue with-drawing from the core area, further weakening its viability.21
In fact, certain characteristics of sprawl aggravate this processmore than would occur with other forms of suburbanization.Unlike suburbanization within limited boundaries, as now prac-ticed in Oregon, sprawl encourages firms and households tomove far out from the core areas of the metropolitan region(Downs 1994, chap. 1; Richmond 1995). Because the new jobs areso far from inner-city areas that workers there neither hearabout such jobs nor would be able to travel to them if they heardabout them, inner-city unemployment worsens.
This separation also encourages residents of outlying suburbanareas to believe that their welfare is totally independent of thewelfare of inner-city neighborhoods and residents. Such a mis-conception makes many suburbanites unwilling to devote anytax resources to inner-city problems.22
Unlike peripheral growth within some type of overarching fiscalstructure, growth in sprawl totally separates the fiscal resourcesof the new suburban areas from those of the older core areas.The core areas then slowly decline in relation to the serviceneeds of the growing concentration of poor people there.
Unlike growth in the immediate vicinity of already–built-upareas, sprawl requires building more costly infrastructures—especially longer trunk lines—to service a given amount of popu-lation because new growth leapfrogs to sites far from existinginfrastructure services. The infrastructure costs raise the total
21 Myron Orfield has proposed a political coalition strategy discussed later inthis article that could be used to counteract some aspects of this outward flowprocess. However, such a strategy would have to be initiated by a politicalentrepreneur and would have uncertain prospects of success.
22 For a discussion of why suburbanites’ welfare is still closely linked to theability of central cities to perform their social functions, see Downs (1994,chap. 4).
The Challenge of Our Declining Big Cities 389
costs of providing urban living to a population, reducing re-sources for improving the lot of the poorest residents, most ofwhom remain in areas not served by this new infrastructure(Burchell et al. 1992).
Major obstacles within declining cities to reversingpast middle-class outflows
Mayors and other officials in declining American cities, and mostresidents thereof, would dearly love to reverse the systematicoutflows of viable resources described above. Within decliningcities themselves, however, four major obstacles to achieving thisgoal must be overcome before the overall processes of resourcewithdrawal can be effectively addressed. These obstacles arehigh rates of crime and insecurity, poor-quality public schools,white resistance to living in racially mixed neighborhoods, andineffective public bureaucracies.
High rates of crime and insecurity
Crime rates in concentrated-poverty neighborhoods are muchhigher than in middle- and upper-income neighborhoods. This istrue of both crimes reported to the police and crimes reported insurveys of neighborhood residents. And crime rates in primarilyAfrican-American neighborhoods are somewhat higher than inprimarily white neighborhoods, other things being equal (Jencks1991; Kelling 1993; see also Wilson and Herrnstein 1985). Thesefacts are widely known among middle-class households of allethnic groups. As a result, households seeking to escape fromcrime and personal insecurity—including many African-American households—move away from neighborhoods withconcentrated poverty as rapidly as possible (Rosenbaum 1991).
True, reported crime rates have recently fallen somewhat inmany large declining cities and risen in many nearby suburbs.Nevertheless, crime rates in big cities—especially in very poorneighborhoods—remain much higher than in most middle-income suburbs.23
23 It is not within the scope of this article to analyze in detail why crime rateshave fallen recently in some big cities. Possible causes include smaller agecohorts of city teenagers, more intensive community policing and other lawenforcement efforts, and the incarceration of larger numbers of criminals. Forone comprehensive view, see Kelling and Coles (1996).
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Fear of crime is also closely related to middle-class antipathy tobig-city public schools. Children attending those schools areoften physically threatened or bullied by their classmates orlocal gangs, and subject to being shot or stabbed at school or ontheir way to and from school. Fear of crime is also related towhite reluctance to live in racially mixed neighborhoods becausemany whites associate high crime rates with the presence oflarge numbers of black or Hispanic households.
Fear of crime is therefore probably the biggest obstacle to at-tracting middle-class households back into declining cities orretaining those that are there now. But fear of crime in cities isjust as powerful among minority-group households (Rosenbaum1991) and is a major reason why so many have moved out of thecities since 1980.
I do not know what effective steps can be undertaken to reducecrime. One possibility is deliberately deconcentrating poorhouseholds by enabling many of them to move to scattered dwell-ings in outlying suburban communities.24 That might reducecrime rates in big-city neighborhoods by decreasing the concen-tration of poverty there. But this “moving to opportunity” strat-egy is certain to encounter huge resistance from residents of theoutlying suburban communities. Moreover, such a strategywould require large-scale public subsidies to enable poor house-holds to occupy relatively costly suburban dwellings. In thepresent climate of federal funding cutbacks, that ingredientseems extremely unlikely.
Perhaps more community policing and other big-city strategiescould reduce crime in concentrated-poverty areas. Promisingprogress in reducing crime rates has recently been achieved inNew York City by focusing police efforts on maintaining publicorder, not just on arresting criminals (Kelling and Coles 1996).However, in at least some such areas, the proportion of localresidents who habitually use drugs reaches 20 to 35 percent,especially because of crack addiction. It seems extremely difficultto greatly reduce drug-related crimes where a significant propor-tion of the clientele for local drug dealers consists of local resi-dents themselves.25
24 For detailed discussion of this strategy, see Downs (1973). The basic argu-ments advanced in that book remain relevant in the 1990s. This strategy isalso the basis of the Gautreaux decision and the Moving to Opportunityprogram initiated by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Developmentin 1993.
25 The estimate that as many as 20 to 35 percent of the residents of someconcentrated-poverty neighborhoods are habitual drug users comes from field
The Challenge of Our Declining Big Cities 391
Poor-quality public schools
In general, big-city public school systems provide much lowerquality educations for their students than suburban publicschool systems. This conclusion is supported by higher dropoutrates, lower test scores, lower college placement rates, andgreater social disorders in most big-city public school systems.This outcome does not result primarily from lower spending perpupil; some big-city school systems spend far more per pupilthan surrounding suburban school systems or city parochialsystems that produce much better results. There appear to bethree major causes for the poor performance of big-city publicschools.
The first is the concentration in these schools of students fromextremely poor and distressed households in which children arenot exposed to positive reinforcements for their education.26 Thisdrawback probably cannot be overcome without a major decon-centration of poverty in certain neighborhoods within decliningcities.
The second cause is existing regulations that require publicschools to “mainstream” children suffering from various distur-bances or handicaps (i.e., to place them in regular classes withnonhandicapped students) and prevent those schools from expel-ling disruptive students. Requiring the mainstreaming of a smallminority of students whose presence in classrooms disruptsthe education of the vast majority is a foolish and inefficientpractice unfair to the majority of students. If public schools areto compete effectively with each other and with private schools,they must be able to operate under rules conducive to goodeducational practices. That may require establishing specialschools for disruptive students and providing separate trainingfor severely handicapped students.
The third cause is that most big-city public schools are monopo-listic bureaucracies dominated by a combination of teachers’unions and school administrators (Chubb and Moe 1990). In alleras, monopolistic bureaucracies of all types become controlled
workers in a specific Baltimore neighborhood I visited in 1996. Over30 percent of the babies born to mothers living in that neighborhood wereaddicted at birth. The specific identity of the neighborhood is not revealedhere to avoid placing those field workers in an unfavorable light from theviewpoint of the local residents with whom they work every day.
26 For a discussion of the impact of concentrated poverty on big-city education,see Orfield (1985).
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by the interests of the bureaucrats themselves rather than theinterests of their clients. In nearly all other phases of life,Americans encourage competition as the most effective way toelicit maximum performance and maximum attention to theneeds and desires of clients and customers. A similar approachneeds to be taken in regard to big-city public schools. Describingexactly how that should be done—whether through charterschools, vouchers, competition with private schools, or othermeans—is not within the scope of this article.
The fact that good educations can be provided to poor minority-group children living in concentrated-poverty areas has beenproved by the superior performance of hundreds of Catholicparochial schools serving such areas in declining cities. More-over, those parochial schools operate with per-student spendingmuch lower than that of nearby, ineffective public schools. True,parochial schools elicit stronger parental support and participa-tion than most public schools, since parents must pay at leastsomething to enroll their children. And parochial schools canexercise disciplines and expulsions not possible under presentpublic school regulations. But parochial schools at leastdemonstrate that concentrated poverty need not lead to pooreducation.27
Changing the structure of most big-city public school systemswill not be easy because unionized teachers form a large andwell-organized voting bloc within every declining city. They cangenerate immense political pressure resisting any changes thatupset their present dominance. Teachers’ unions have almostuniversally opposed using vouchers (especially those applicablein private schools), adopting merit pay for teachers, or fundingcharter or other alternative schools with public money—alltactics that would increase competitive pressure on publicschools and their teachers to perform better. But without majorchanges in existing big-city school systems, the tremendousinequality of educational experiences that now handicaps mil-lions of children living in declining cities will continue to make amockery of the American value of equal educational opportunity.
27 Caroline Minter Hoxby (1996) calculated that making a $1,000 per-pupilvoucher available on a means-tested basis to all U.S. students and permittingthat voucher to be used in private schools—including parochial schools—wouldsubstantially improve the student achievement levels of both private schoolstudents and the remaining public school students by motivating publicschools to become more competitive with private schools (80 percent of whichare Catholic). This voucher would attract about 4 percent more students toprivate schools than go there now (raising their overall share from 10 percentto 14 percent) because private schools now deliver higher student achievementlevels than public schools, on average.
The Challenge of Our Declining Big Cities 393
White resistance to living in racially mixed neighborhoods
White resistance to living in racially mixed areas—and to send-ing children to predominantly minority schools—is a majorobstacle to attracting white middle-class families back intodeclining cities or retaining those now living there. Yet the vastmajority of middle-class households living in American suburbstoday are non-Hispanic whites. Research done in 1976 byReynolds Farley showed that most white households werewilling to live in neighborhoods with a significant fraction ofblacks or other minorities—but only if that fraction was wellbelow 50 percent. And only about one-fourth of white householdswould move into a neighborhood containing 33 percent blackhouseholds (Farley et al. 1978). Similar surveys conducted byFarley and William H. Frey in 1992 indicated that less than halfof the 636 households interviewed would “feel uncomfortable” ina neighborhood containing 33 percent African-American resi-dents. Nevertheless, only 41 percent were willing to move intosuch a neighborhood, and only 27 percent were willing to moveinto a neighborhood containing 60 percent African-Americanresidents (compared with only 16 percent of white respondents inthe 1976 survey) (Farley and Frey 1994).
Yet in the 53 declining cities combined, the overall proportion ofminority-group residents in 1990 was 50.2 percent, and theoverall proportion of African-American residents was 39.4 per-cent. Nineteen of these cities have predominantly minoritypopulations, and 13 have predominantly African-Americanpopulations. Even more important, the public school systems inthese cities are overwhelmingly attended by minority students.In the 23 of these cities for which 1990 data were available, theaverage proportion of minority students was 61.8 percent, and6 cities had more than 85 percent minority students (NationalCenter for Education Statistics 1992). Such dominance of publicschool enrollments by minority students is typical in most largeAmerican cities, not just those with declining populations.
It might appear to be a logical goal for any of these cities toattract white middle-class households back into the city, bothbecause there are so many more white middle-class householdsin the suburbs and because the arrival of such households mightcreate a more even ethnic balance within many of these cities. Ofcourse, few—if any—public officials would publicly avow such agoal, because they would immediately be accused of being racist.And even if city officials adopted such a goal implicitly, theywould have a hard time achieving it unless they focused on
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attracting white middle-class households into primarily whiteneighborhoods within their cities. Even in such neighborhoods,the dominance of public schools there by minority-group stu-dents might discourage white middle-class households withchildren from moving in.
This analysis implies three conclusions. First, white middle-classhouseholds are likely to move into, or remain in, declining citiesin significant numbers only if they can live in predominantlywhite neighborhoods. Most declining cities still have some sec-tions that are predominantly white. Second, the white middle-class households most likely to live in declining cities are thosewith no school-age children: “empty nesters,” elderly households,singles, gays, or young married households without children.28
Third, white middle-class households with school-age childrenare not likely to move into declining cities, even into primarilywhite neighborhoods, unless those neighborhoods are servedeither by relatively inexpensive private schools or by publicschools with ethnically balanced enrollments like those found insome so-called magnet schools.
From the viewpoint of declining cities and of American societygenerally, it would be desirable if white middle-class householdswere not prejudiced against moving into neighborhoods withsubstantial proportions of African-American or other minorityresidents and did not mind sending their children to predomi-nantly minority schools. But it would be highly unrealistic tosuppose that this is now the case. Nor do I know of any cogentmeans of changing existing white racial and ethnic attitudes onthese subjects. Therefore, this obstacle to attracting middle-classhouseholds into declining cities is likely to remain formidable.
Ineffective public bureaucracies
Big-city governments are run by individual agencies that inher-ently become bureaucratic because of their sheer size, their lackof competition, and the nonmarketable nature of many of theiroutputs (Downs 1967). As noted above concerning public schoolsystems, monopolistic bureaucracies almost inevitably shift theirbehavior to best serve those who run them rather than theirclients or customers. That helps explain such anomalies aspublic housing authorities keeping thousands of units vacantdespite long waiting lists of applicants, or public schools that can
28 Note that two other articles in this issue of Housing Policy Debate, Lang,Hughes, and Danielsen (1997) and Moss (1997), reach this same conclusion.
The Challenge of Our Declining Big Cities 395
be opened only when determined by members of their janitors’union—regardless of what their principals want. City govern-ments are notorious for imposing complex rules and regulationson businesses that want to expand or locate within the city, oftenmotivating those businesses to move elsewhere. City buildingcodes often require obsolete technical ingredients or processes toprotect the jobs of plasterers, plumbers, or other tradespeoplewhose unions exercise powerful political influence (AdvisoryCommission on Regulatory Barriers to Affordable Housing 1991,chap. 3).
Several tactics could increase the effectiveness of many suchagencies. One is privatizing some or all of their functions, or atleast introducing some competition from the private sector forportions of their activities. Another is leadership from the mayoror city council designed to review and reform existing proceduresfrom the viewpoints of the clients or customers, such as busi-nesses considering expansion or relocation. A third is pressurefrom organized business interests within the city who want tohelp maintain the city’s tax base so that their taxes do not riseas other firms move out.
There is no simple or permanent remedy for ineffective perfor-mance by city bureaucracies. But progress can surely be madethrough vigorous leadership and sustained pressure from privateinterests within the city. Therefore, this obstacle is more suscep-tible to improvement than the other three.29
Conclusions
Prospects for overcoming three of these four obstacles to attract-ing more middle-class households into declining cities seembleak. Therefore, declining cities cannot realistically count onany significant near-future increases in their middle-class popu-lations (of any ethnic group) as major means of improving theirsituations. Even retaining the middle-class households thatalready live there will be difficult. It will require an all-out as-sault on crime, a major reform of the cities’ public school sys-tems, and continuous pressure on other municipal bureaucracies
29 An innovative public-private partnership in Washington, DC recentlyresulted in establishment of the George Washington University Center forExcellence in Municipal Management, which will help develop the leadershipcapacity and management skills of the District of Columbia governmentworkforce. The DC business community has provided private funding for theCenter and is an equal partner in the effort with the university and theDistrict government.
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to improve their services to their true clients and customers.Whether the elected officials in these cities have the energy, theguts, the willpower, and the persistence to undertake thesepolicy initiatives with diminishing fiscal resources remainsto be seen.
How could the systematic outflow of viable resourcesfrom declining cities be stopped, counteracted, orslowed?
What strategies might be adopted to alter this dynamic processor at least ameliorate its results? There are at least three funda-mental approaches: major structural change, reform of big-citygovernment behavior, and community development.
Major structural change
This approach involves trying to alter the basic structure of thegrowth process in American metropolitan areas. In its full-blownform, the structural changes it pursues include the following:
1. Counteracting the fragmentation of governmental controlover land uses. The most logical way to do this would be byadopting a single metropolitan-area-wide government thatreplaced all existing local governments.30 However, thattactic has no political support from either suburban or cityresidents or officials; hence it will never happen in mostmetropolitan areas. A more feasible approach is having thestate government require all existing local governments toprepare comprehensive land use plans using a standardizedplanning process that pursues common goals set by thestate. Then the state creates an overarching body to coordi-nate these individual plans—a body that has substantialpowers to pressure local governments into revising theirplans. This body can be regionwide (as in the Twin Citiesarea of Minnesota) or statewide (as in Oregon). Theimportance of this body is enhanced further if it also hasoperational control over all regional sewer, water, andtransportation systems (as in the Twin Cities and Portland).
30 Unified metropolitan government is the solution suggested by David Rusk(1993). However, I believe this arrangement does not have enough politicalsupport to be adopted in many more American metropolitan areas than thefew that have already adopted it, for reasons stated in the text.
The Challenge of Our Declining Big Cities 397
2. Creating some method for all cities in a metropolitan area toshare in all the taxable resources therein. To counteract thelosses of central-city and inner-ring suburban taxable re-sources that arise from the constant out-movement of firmsand households, there must be some mechanism for all citiesto tap into all taxable resources, no matter where they arelocated within the region. The most comprehensive existingexample is the property-tax-base-sharing scheme employedin the Twin Cities area of Minnesota. But even that schemeinvolves only further increases in commercial real estateproperties. A broader scheme would place at least someportion of real estate assessed values and sales taxes into apool to be shared among all communities by some basicformula related to population, poverty levels, or otherfactors.
3. Placing limits on the outward spatial expansion of newdevelopment. To keep new job growth within a reasonablecommuting distance from inner-city neighborhoods, and tolimit excessive costs of creating trunk lines to far-out subdi-visions, a metropolitan region could adopt an “urban growthboundary” within which most, or all, future developmentwithin a planning period must be located. This tactic alsohas the advantage of reducing the rate at which peripheralopen space is swallowed up by further urban development—a goal that probably has widespread suburban support.Urban growth boundaries have been used most cogently inOregon. However, this tactic also requires preventing newurban developments from arising immediately outside themetropolitan area by adopting statewide bans on new ruraldevelopment except at very low densities.31
4. Requiring all suburbs to zone a certain proportion of theirdevelopable land for affordable housing—including multi-family units—and creating incentives and penalties de-signed to encourage those communities to remove otherregulatory barriers to such housing.32
5. Developing means of helping low-income householdsfrom inner-city neighborhoods move into housing in
31 The Oregon experience is evaluated by Knaap and Nelson (1992). Also seeLang and Hornburg (1997) and Abbott (1997) for a discussion of the politicsbehind the urban growth boundary in Portland, OR.
32 An earlier analysis of inclusionary zoning that is still relevant is that byMallach (1984). For an update and comparison on inclusionary housing inCalifornia and New Jersey, see Calavita, Grimes, and Mallach (1997).
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middle-income suburban communities they otherwise couldnot afford. This could be done by converting public housingassistance into portable vouchers, using existing federalhousing vouchers, requiring inclusionary zoning for a cer-tain number of affordable units in every new suburbansubdivision, or creating special state taxes, such as a realestate transfer tax with receipts devoted to subsidizing suchhousing. This tactic has been successfully demonstrated inthe Chicago area for 20 years in the Gautreaux decisionprocess, though only at a relatively small scale per year.33
6. Creating private, nonprofit regionwide organizations to helpenforce existing laws against racial discrimination in hous-ing and lending markets. These organizations can usetesters and bring lawsuits against real estate agents, lend-ers, and homeowners who engage in illegal discrimination.They can also help minority home seekers find financing forhome purchases.
7. Creating private, nonprofit job information and placementcenters located in or near inner-city areas with high unem-ployment rates, but also closely linked to major suburbanfirms. Such centers could provide information about avail-able jobs to inner-city residents and screen potential appli-cants for suburban employers.
8. Providing subsidized transportation for inner-city workersemployed in suburban jobs to assist them in reaching jobs atscattered or far-out locations.34
9. Continuing and expanding so-called enterprise or empower-ment zones within distressed portions of central cities andinner-ring suburbs. Tax incentives and other aids would beprovided to firms that located in these zones and furnishednew jobs to residents thereof.
One look at these elements indicates how radically their com-bined adoption would change the existing metropolitan growthprocess. A crucial part of such change would be creating institu-tions responsible for the operation of the metropolitan area as a
33 For an evaluation of the Gautreaux project, see Rosenbaum (1991).
34 Hughes and Sternberg (1992) link such transportation subsidies to the jobplacement centers described in the preceding point, as well as to the provisionof day-care centers in inner-city neighborhoods for mothers who work outsidetheir homes.
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whole, not just for the prosperity of one small part. The basicidea is not to eliminate local governments, but to place themwithin some broader framework with two key traits: (1) desig-nating certain persons as responsible for the combined outcomesof all local government decisions in the metropolitan area and(2) equipping those persons with sufficient power and authorityto achieve effective results.
Unfortunately, even such radical reforms would not necessarilyeliminate the four major obstacles to returning the middle classto the declining cities discussed above. Hence, these structuralreforms can be regarded as necessary but not sufficient remediesto the problems of declining cities.
The structural change approach is popular with intellectualsbecause they regard revising the underlying structure as essen-tial to reversing its results. I have advocated this approachmyself in New Visions for Metropolitan America (Downs 1994).But it is unpopular with most metropolitan citizens because theybenefit notably from the current structure. That is also true ofnearly all existing politicians, city and suburban. So this ap-proach is mostly untried and has had little impact on the realworld.
Modified version of structural change
Myron Orfield (1997) has both proposed and helped achieve amodified version of the structural change approach in the TwinCities metropolitan area in Minnesota. He believes that thesame approach could be followed in other major metropolitanareas with declining central cities. He advocates forming apolitical coalition in the state legislature among representativesof three areas: the declining central city, inner-ring suburbs alsoexperiencing decline, and outer-ring suburbs with very lowcommercial property tax bases and high populations of school-age children.
If representatives of these three areas form a majority in thestate’s legislature, they could pass state laws creating a tax-base-sharing plan for all communities within the entire metro-politan area. The plan would place some portion of all futureincreases in commercial and industrial assessed property valuesinto a pool to be shared by all communities within the metropoli-tan area by means of a standard formula. Most commercial andindustrial properties are concentrated in a single corridor or
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quarter within each metropolitan area, so communities in therest of the area do not now benefit much from the area’s eco-nomic and population growth, insofar as their tax bases areconcerned. Under this arrangement, they would share in at leastsome of the fiscal growth of the favored quarter.
Traditional local fiscal arrangements involve fragmentation oftaxable property resources among communities solely in accor-dance with where those properties are located. Orfield has shownthat tax-base sharing could produce a much more equitabledistribution of fiscal resources among metropolitan-area commu-nities than the present system. It is also fairer, because thecommercial and industrial facilities now concentrated in thefavored quarter are usually patronized or staffed by many per-sons living in other communities, which must bear the publiccosts of housing those persons (such as school costs) withoutbenefiting from the taxes generated by the shopping or jobs thosepersons support. Of course, those communities in the favoredquarter vehemently oppose this strategy, since it forces them toshare the added assessed values they gain from growth. But theycan be outvoted in the state legislature by representatives ofcommunities that would be net gainers from tax-base sharing.
For such a coalition to be formed, however, some political entre-preneur must first marshal enough statistical evidence to con-vince representatives of the potentially gaining communities tostop regarding each other as enemies and start working to-gether. That is an especially difficult transition for representa-tives from the central city and those from the suburbs, who nowregard themselves as having very few common interests. Oncesuch a political coalition has been formed and has successfullypassed tax-base sharing of the type described above, it could alsoinitiate other elements of the metropolitanwide structuralchange strategy described earlier.
Orfield’s proposed strategy has the huge political advantage ofchanging the support base for structural reform from a minorityof citizens and politicians within a metropolitan area—those inthe central city and especially in inner-city distressed areas—into a majority by bringing in those in suburbs suffering fromfiscal difficulties. He has conducted statistical analyses of condi-tions in several large metropolitan areas proving that communi-ties containing a majority of both residents and state legislatorswould benefit from this approach; hence, it is not just applicablein Minnesota.
The Challenge of Our Declining Big Cities 401
Reform of big-city government behavior
A second basic approach is ignoring the regional nature of theproblem and focusing on dismantling or radically reforming thepublic bureaucracies within declining cities. This strategy isadvocated by the Cato Institute and other proponents of slashingbig-city tax rates and local government payrolls.35 There isundoubtedly merit in this approach because most big cities docontain dysfunctional bureaucracies that need reform or replace-ment, as noted earlier. Their behavior often constitutes a seriousobstacle to the attraction or retention of viable business in de-clining cities.
However, the main political advantage of this approach is that itdoes not upset the nonpoor majority—mostly suburban resi-dents—who believe they benefit from the present structure ofregional inequalities, since this remedy costs them nothing. Itdoes not require them to pay higher taxes to help big-city govern-ments or to accept more low-income neighbors or to make anyother apparent sacrifices. Therefore, this city government reformstrategy readily gains their political approval. That is one reasonmany conservatives in particular advocate this strategy as analternative to what they view as costly and most likely ineffec-tive government spending programs—to which they would haveto contribute.
This approach has three weaknesses. It does little to offset thesocial and technical obsolescence of central-city and inner-suburban neighborhoods. Also, it does not stop the outflow ofresources into the surrounding periphery. Finally, it does notreduce the gross inequalities of public sector resources emanat-ing from the growth process.
Community development
A third approach stresses the resources intrinsic to concentrated-poverty areas, such as their central locations, the untapped ener-gies and talents of their residents, and the possible collectiveresults of community efforts. This is the approach of the commu-nity development movement. The most recent version is set forth inthe handbook Building Communities from the Inside Out by JohnP. Kretzmann and John L. McKnight of Northwestern University
35 This viewpoint is advanced by Moore and Stansel (1993). However, thestatistical analysis underlying their conclusions is seriously flawed, as pointedout in detail by Downs (1994, app. B).
402 Anthony Downs
(Kretzmann and McKnight 1993). They advocate emphasizing thepositive characteristics of each community and its individual andgroup residents rather than emphasizing problems and needs.However, other advocates of the community development ap-proach call for significant additional public expenditures in low-income neighborhoods financed by the federal governmentinstead of just relying on self-help or “bootstrap” improvements.
The self-help-oriented community development approach alsohas the political advantage of not upsetting the majority ofmetropolitan-area residents, since it does not require them tocontribute much, if anything, of their own resources to helpingsolve core-area problems. Perhaps there are some locationaladvantages of inner-city sites for which purely profit-orientedbusiness firms may find it worthwhile to endure the insecuritiesand other disadvantages of such sites. This is the contention thatProfessor Michael Porter of the Harvard Business School iscurrently advancing (Porter 1997). However, the version of thecommunity development approach based on major additionalpublic spending in core areas would require contributions fromsuburbanites and others because such spending would have to befinanced by higher taxes on people living elsewhere.
Like the preceding strategy, this approach has the weakness of notoffsetting the outflow of resources from the core. It also downplaysthe destructive behavior of many residents in concentrated-povertyareas, such as male sexual hostility toward women, evasion of theresponsibilities of parenthood, and disregard of personal andproperty rights. Furthermore, experience shows that effectivecommunity development rarely occurs without at least some helpfrom outside catalysts, such as the Enterprise Foundation, oroutside resource contributors, such as the Local InitiativesSupport Corporation. Moreover, this approach has great diffi-culty in reaching a sufficient scale to affect conditions in morethan one or a few distressed neighborhoods within a city. And itspractitioners—in spite of heroic and time-consuming efforts—canrarely pull together enough economic resources to affect allaspects of life even in those few neighborhoods, in contrast tofocusing on housing alone, schools alone, or some other singleaspect.
The need for multiple remedies undertaken simultaneously
The extremely brief summaries and critiques of the threemajor approaches set forth above hardly do justice to either theintentions or the reasonable expectations of their advocates.
The Challenge of Our Declining Big Cities 403
Moreover, the presentation is admittedly biased in favor of thestructural change approach that I happen to favor. However,more detailed consideration of the advantages and drawbacks ofthese approaches is not within the scope of this article.
In reality, none of these approaches can work alone. All three areprobably necessary to make real progress in improving life inconcentrated-poverty areas. The process of decline cannot bereversed if outlying areas can freely drain resources from thecore without sharing their tax bases. Core cities cannot workwell if dysfunctional public bureaucracies are not dismantled orreformed. And community development cannot work well with-out some outside economic resources from the periphery to aidlocal residents in poor areas.
Which approach, if any, is most likely to be adopted?
Unfortunately, the vested interests of the majority ofmetropolitan-area residents, and of nearly all public officials,would be upset by such a combined strategy because it wouldreduce their ability to gain benefits from the present institu-tional structure and growth process.
Even adopting the structural change approach alone would upsetthe politically dominant majority. It would require members ofthat majority to contribute resources to attack inner-city prob-lems, and it would rearrange the power structure in each metro-politan area. Moreover, if the structural change approach wereto be carried out to its fullest extent, it would require significantfederal funding of affordable housing subsidies and major aid toinner-city neighborhoods. But the likelihood of such federalassistance seems remote in this era of federal budget cuts andthe devolution of federal policy making to state and local govern-ments. Thus, the structural change approach appears very un-likely to be tried soon in any significant number of metropolitanareas containing declining cities.
This pessimistic conclusion need not apply to the version ofthe structural change approach advocated by Myron Orfield,however. In those metropolitan areas where representatives inthe state legislature from the central city, fiscally distressedinner-ring suburbs, and fiscally distressed outer-ring suburbscombined form a majority of all legislators, a coalition couldbe formed to adopt tax-base sharing and other regional
404 Anthony Downs
arrangements—assuming the governor does not veto such laws.36
The biggest difficulty with this approach is that it requires astrong, well-informed, persuasive, and incredibly persistentpolitical entrepreneur to overcome the entrenched hostilitybetween central-city and suburban legislators in most states.
Adopting only the approach of reforming big-city public bureau-cracies would upset most of the incumbent officials who controland manage those entrenched institutions. True, they are only asmall part of each city electorate. But they wield disproportion-ate political power because of their control of these institutionsand the benefits these institutions can confer on others, theirhigh degree of organization, and the intensity of their interest incity policies relative to the apathy of most big-city citizens.Political competition against incumbent officials from conserva-tive mayoral candidates might nevertheless generate this ap-proach in a few declining cities, as it has in Jersey City, NJ. Butthat is not likely to happen on a large scale.
That leaves the community development approach as the mostlikely to occur, because it would arouse the least opposition frompowerful vested interests. But the community developmentapproach itself usually requires initial catalysts and seed moneyfrom outside the neighborhoods involved. Also, it can reach onlya very limited scale and comprehensiveness within any one city.These limitations make it a weak instrument even for improvingconditions within concentrated-poverty neighborhoods. And itdoes almost nothing to stop the long-range outflow of resourcesfrom declining cities generated by the American metropolitan-area growth process.
Conclusions
In modern democracies, the majority of citizens and public offi-cials are willing to sacrifice their own immediate advantagesonly if they believe that some crisis threatens the continuation ofthose advantages. The decline of cities and inner suburbs wherepoverty is concentrated has not yet created a sufficiently visibleor severe crisis to stimulate residents of outer-ring suburbs totake effective action. It appears that only after our society has
36 The governor of Minnesota has twice vetoed changes in the Twin Cities tax-base-sharing program passed by the state legislature that would increase thepercentage of new commercial and industrial assessed values from eachcommunity put into the pool and shared throughout the metropolitan area orotherwise strengthen the ability of the entire process to equalize fiscal re-sources throughout the area.
The Challenge of Our Declining Big Cities 405
moved much farther toward even higher fractions of poorlyeducated, untrained, unskilled, and often dangerous low-incomeresidents will the sense of crisis become really acute. That mightcreate majority political support for an approach to counteract-ing urban decline that would actually work. The only other waysupport could be generated would be through the formation of amajority political coalition in certain state legislatures withjurisdiction over entire metropolitan areas. Meanwhile, it iswishful thinking to believe middle-class households of any ethnicgroups now residing in suburbs will return to declining cities inlarge numbers. Hence their resources will not offset continuationof the systematic outflow of resources from those cities alreadybuilt into the metropolitan-area growth process.
Author
Anthony Downs is a Senior Fellow in Economic Studies at The BrookingsInstitution.
The views stated in this article are solely those of the author and not necessar-ily those of The Brookings Institution, its trustees, or other staff members.
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