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2011-17384

Dela Cruz Alexis Dy

Philo 195

Prof. Lee

The Challenge of False Proposition: Revisited

To refer to a true proposition in a crude sense, is for it to have a correlation to the

material world1. For example, the statement “John is in the classroom” would be a true

proposition if there was indeed an existing John in the classroom, and it would be made false if it

is verified otherwise. Following from this definition, we may regard false proposition, as that

which does not mirror a reality in the world. Going back to our sample proposition, if there was

no John in the classroom it would be the case that the proposition is false. This explanation

seems satisfying at first glance, then again a dilemma surfaces; as what was raised by Garver and

Lee on chapter 2. If false propositions are false because there are no existing reality that

correlates to them, why is it that we are still able to understand the meaning behind them (Garver

& Lee, 1994:16)? If there is no John in the classroom, why is it that we are still able to come up

with a corresponding meaning, such as the informant lying or is ignorant of the fact that there is

no John in the classroom? From what I understand from the challenge of false proposition is it

brings about the necessity to come up with criteria of truth and meaning because the challenge

seems to imply that false proposition could also elicit the characteristic of having meaning.

                                                                                                               1  What  I  mean  by  this  is  the  material  world  as  opposed  to  the  intellectual  world.    

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Hence, to not blur the line between true and false propositions, it is necessary to distinguish truth

from meaning.

Although it was not discussed in class, there are notable philosophers who made a

response to false propositions, which can be reviewed in chapter 2. I would be enumerating these

and evaluate if they were effective in addressing the problem. The first one to address false

propositions is Cratylus2, through a dialogue written by Plato. Cratylus argues that there is no

such thing as false propositions. He inferred this argument from the definition of a name as that

which points to its object; hence, a name without an object3 is meaningless for it is not a name at

all (Garver & Lee, 1994:16). However, I find this account a little bit unsatisfying for one: there

are names that does not have objects such as “nothing”, “hollow” and so on4. Moreover, I can

name nonexistent objects in my imaginations such as a Cyclops guarding my bathroom. If false

propositions are just meaningless utterance, then why is it that I can form a picture in my mind of

a nonexistent object and very much understand what it meant? Nonetheless, it can be argued that

I can form a picture of such nonexistent object because there is a cultural reference to such a

thing. This enables us to form an image in our mind making the name true for it corresponds to

something. Another example would be a unicorn, although there is no such thing, we have a

reference of a horse and a horn in our minds which makes it possible for us to imagine a unicorn.

Yet again, this line of thoughts does not settle our problem in regard to the criteria of truth and

meaning because this explanation is interchanging meaning and true propositions. We have

already established that meaning is not what separates true from false propositions and that false

propositions must be different from a meaningless proposition because having meaning is not

                                                                                                               2  I  would  like  to  clarify  that  I  am  not  implying  that  Cratylus  purposely  address  the  problem  of  false  proposition  because  it  is  a  problem  that  has  yet  to  be  raised  during  his  time.  His  view  however  has  a  relation  regarding  the  matter.    3  A  point  of  reference  4  Whether  it  is  a  name  or  not  is  for  another  discussion.  

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entirely an unfamiliar realm to false propositions. Therefore, we can say that this account on

false proposition lacks the characteristic to solve the challenge of false propositions.

Another philosopher by the name of Leibniz tried to clear the problem with a different

approach. He attempted to come up with a ‘universal language’ by embodying all human

concepts into scientific symbols, which it would perfectly represent (Garver & Lee, 1994:17).

Through this, if it were to be successful, we would be able to segregate true from false

proposition by the process of calculation. I am not quite sure, unfortunately, how he would

attempt to materialize this project for there are too many human concepts, varying from culture

to culture, to be able to embody in one language. Moreover, there are concepts, which even in

the ordinary language is yet to be defined or are still debatable. Even if we suppose that all

concepts are clear, it would take centuries to gather all human concepts and put a symbol to it;

for even one language took a lot of time to evolve (and is still evolving) to what it is today. Then

again, to have such an ideal language must be a very comfortable place to live in (although it

would rid philosophers of their jobs) for it would minimize conflicts; however, being able to

materialize such language is beyond me.

Garver and Lee also mentioned the correspondence theory of truth that also has a

distinction of false propositions, that which lacks coherence or involves contradiction among the

sentences themselves (Garver & Lee, 1994:17). This however faces the same problem as the

others for it brings us back into making truth and meaning interchangeable.

In Tractatus, Wittgenstein tried to settle the problem by proposing a metaphysical

dualism  namely  facts  (what  determines  truth  and  falsity  of  a  proposition)  and  objects  (The  

‘substance’  of  the  world  determines  meaning).  Hence,  if  a  well-­‐formed  sentence  cannot  be  

comprehended   it   only   implies   that   a   portion   of   that   sentence   has   not   been   assigned   a  

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meaning,  or  a  correlate  ‘object’  (Garver & Lee, 1994:18). In other words, what separates truth

from meaning is that truth can be empirically verified whereas meaning is a transcendental

question. However, the later Wittgenstein move into another perspective which is the “naturalist

view”; wherein, rather than transcendental, meaning is part of the natural world and is known

through “rules”. The two content of the world therefore, are ‘facts’, that which determines the

truth-value of a proposition, and ‘rules’, that which determines the meaning. This solution seems

to be the most promising, for it gives a clearer distinction between truth and meaning. Then

again, we will find ‘facts’ and ‘rules’ problematic in themselves. The problem with facts is that it

brings us to a circular reasoning; or rather it is hard to reason out why we call a fact, fact. The

problem with rule on the other hand, is stated in Wittgenstein’s Paradox wherein an action

cannot be determined by a rule, for any action can be aligned in accordance to the rule. This

problem can be associated with the theorem of analytic geometry in which there is an infinite

number of formulas for every shape. As to which, “if there is a rule for every phonological

string then, then no set of sounds can be distinctively rule governed” (Garver & Lee, 1994:19-

20). However, if all phonological string can be morphed to fit in the rule, then even those that are

not sensible can be aligned with it. In other words, rules cannot distinguish sense from nonsense.

To cover up this loophole the distinction between relevant and irrelevant rules were introduced;

wherein the relevant rules are those that are honored and practiced imbibed by human customs

and culture (Garver & Lee, 1994:20). If that is the case, would that not make meaning, merely a

matter of culture? It seems that, that’s what was implied but I have yet to answer that question.

Although I agree to the proposition that meaning and truth are two different concepts,

they are not entirely separate from each other. I believe that meaning is a necessary characteristic

found in both true and false propositions and that meaninglessness is a completely different

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realm. It is the case since, to be able to segregate true propositions from what is not, there must

be an extent of understanding towards the proposition. If I was able to label the proposition

“John is in the classroom” as a true or false proposition there must be a degree of understanding

present when I was making the judgment, what I meant by this is that I was able to understand

what are the implications and expected scenarios for the proposition “John is in the classroom”

to be true or false. Understanding is possible, only because there is an intended meaning behind

the proposition. What I am implying in this account is that meaninglessness is not a characteristic

of a proposition. When I say “John is in the classroom” is a true proposition, I am saying so

because there is a corresponding reality to it, if I say “John is not in the classroom” is a true

proposition that is also because that there is a corresponding reality to it which is the absence of a

john in the classroom. As to what are true propositions, I am satisfied with the definition that it is

that which mirrors a reality in the world and false propositions are that which does not; and

having no corresponding reality to it does not follow meaninglessness.

Bibliography    Garver,  Newton  and  Seung-­‐Chong  Lee.  Derrida  &  Wittgenstein.  Philadephia  19122:  Temple  University,  1994.