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OBSERVING THE 2002 KENYA ELECTIONS

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OBSERVING THE

2002 KENYA ELECTIONS

FINAL REPORT

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ATLANTA, GA 30307

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W W W . C A R T E R C E N T E R . O R G

MAY 2003

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Kenya General Elections Delegation and Staff ............................................................................................... 4

Terms and Abbreviations ................................................................................................................................. 6

Foreword ............................................................................................................................................................ 8

Executive Summary .......................................................................................................................................... 10

Acknowledgments ............................................................................................................................................ 14

Background........................................................................................................................................................ 15

July-August 2002: Exploratory Assessment ..................................................................................................... 17

December 2002: Pre-election Observation ...................................................................................................... 20

December 2002: Carter Center Observer Mission .......................................................................................... 25Delegate Briefings, Observation Methodology, and DeploymentLeadership MeetingsDec. 27 Electoral ProcessObserver Reports and the Dec. 29 StatementAnnouncement of Official Results

January 2003: Postelection Observation .......................................................................................................... 37Transfer of PowerWomen’s ParticipationElection Petitions

Conclusions and Recommendations ................................................................................................................ 41

Appendices ........................................................................................................................................................ 48

The Carter Center at a Glance ........................................................................................................................ 68

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KENYA GENERAL ELECTIONS DELEGATION AND STAFF

Delegation Leadership

The Honorable Dr. Kenneth D. Kaunda, Former President of Zambia and the Balfour African President inResidence at Boston University’s African Presidential Archives and Research Center

Ambassador (ret.) Gordon L. Streeb, Ph.D., Former United States Ambassador to Zambia and AssociateExecutive Director of Peace Programs at The Carter Center

Delegation

Mr. Bodunrin Adebo (Nigeria), Senior Program Associate, National Democratic Institute for InternationalAffairs (NDI), Abuja, Nigeria

Dr. Okon Akiba (Canada), Professor, Department of International Affairs and Development, ClarkUniversity, Atlanta, Ga., USA

Mr. Jose Maria Aranaz (Spain), Legal Adviser, International IDEA, Stockholm, SwedenMr. Christopher Burke (Australia), Field Representative, Conflict Resolution Program, The Carter Center,

UgandaMr. Duncan Chaplin (USA), Senior Research Methodologist, Urban Institute, and Adjunct Faculty Member,

Georgetown Institute for Public Policy, Washington, D.C., USAMr. John Chipeta* (Malawi), Independent Consultant, Blantyre, MalawiMs. Denise Dauphinais (USA), Independent Consultant, Washington, D.C., USAMs. Annetta Flanigan (UK), Lawyer, Northern IrelandMr. Kehleboe Gongloe* (Liberia), MBA Candidate, West Chester University, West Chester, Pa., USAMs. Amy Hamelin* (USA), Graduate Student in International Affairs, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.,

USAMs. Grace Kang (USA), Visiting Researcher, Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), Seoul, KoreaMs. Shumbana Karume (Tanzania), Researcher, Democracy Development Unit, Electoral Institute of Southern

Africa (EISA), Johannesburg, South AfricaMr. Chad Lipton (USA), Graduate Student, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md., USAMs. Taona Mwanyisa* (Zimbabwe), South African Human Rights Institute (SAHRIT), Harare, ZimbabweMr. Simeon Mawanza* (Zimbabwe), Project Officer, South African Human Rights Institute (SAHRIT),

Harare, ZimbabweMr. Wole Olaleye (Nigeria), Researcher, Democracy Development, Electoral Institute of Southern Africa

(EISA), Johannesburg, South AfricaMs. Warda Rajab (Uganda), Economics Research Fellow, Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC),

Atlanta, Ga., USAMr. Nhamo Sithole* (Zimbabwe)Ms. Chris Stevenson (USA), Independent Consultant, Denver, Colo., USAMs. Shani Winterstein* (South Africa), Assistant Program Coordinator, Lawyers for Human Rights, Pretoria,

South AfricaMr. Samuel Kofi Woods II (Liberia), Regional Director, Foundation for International Dignity (FIND), Freetown,

South Africa

*Delegates serving as medium-term observers.

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Carter Center Staff

Ms. Tynesha Green (USA), Program Assistant, Democracy Program, Atlanta, Ga., USADr. David Pottie (Canada), Senior Program Associate, Democracy Program, Atlanta, Ga., USAMs. Janet Tinsley (USA), Coordinator, Peace Programs, Atlanta, Ga., USA

The Carter Center delegation included members from 13 countries.

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TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

APP African People’s Party

CDU Central Depository Unit – network of six organizations that compiles and disseminatesinformation relating to electoral violence

CJPC Catholic Justice and Peace Commission – consists of 15 groups that work for peacethrough justice

CKRC Constitution of Kenya Review Commission

Counting Center One per constituency. This is where ballots are collected and counted before being sentto the central counting site.

DC District Commissioner – a representative of the office of the president in each district

DICE-K Donor Information Center for Elections in Kenya – an information clearinghouse andWeb site sponsored by the international donors

DP (K) Democratic Party (of Kenya)

ECK Electoral Commission of Kenya – mandated with registering and educating voters anddirectly supervising elections

EU European Union

FORD Forum for the Restoration of Democracy

FORD-A Forum for the Restoration of Democracy – Asili

FORD-K Forum for the Restoration of Democracy – Kenya

FORD-P Forum for the Restoration of Democracy for the People

IED Institute for Education in Democracy – promotes democracy through programs inelectoral processes, voter education, research, and dissemination programs

IRI International Republican Institute

KANU Kenya African National Union – the ruling party in Kenya since independence untilthe 2002 elections

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KBC Kenya Broadcast Corporation

K-DOP Kenya Domestic Observation Programme – an independent, domestic electionobservation program consisting of a variety of local organizations

LDP Liberal Democratic Party

MP Member of Parliament

Mungiki Religious sect linked to politically motivated violence

NARC National Rainbow Coalition – a consortium of parties and the main opposition party inthe 2002 elections

NCCK National Council of Churches in Kenya

NCWK National Council of Women in Kenya

NDI National Democratic Institute

Party Agent Each political party was permitted two agents per polling station to observe the votingprocess.

PC Provincial Commissioner – a representative of the office of the president in eachprovince

PO Presiding Officer – administers the election process within a polling station

Polling Station A cluster of several polling streams in the same location

Polling Stream The location of a ballot box within the polling station. Each polling streamaccommodated 1,000 voters.

RO Returning Officer – electoral official who manages one of the 210 constituencies

SDP Social Democratic Party

SPK Shirikisho Party of Kenya

UfungamanoInitiative Civil society movement of religious leaders

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FOREWORD

The 2002 Kenya elections marked a milestonefor democracy in Africa, as opposition leaderMwai Kibaki defeated Uhuru Kenyatta, the

ruling Kenya African National Union’s (KANU)presidential candidate, and both accepted the results.Kenya now joins the ranks of African countries wherepower has changed hands through the conduct ofpeaceful, democratic, and multiparty elections. Theinternational observation delegation, organized byThe Carter Center, praised the electoral process andcongratulated Kenyans for managing a democratic andpeaceful transfer of power. Like many others, I hopedthat Kenya’s successful election would serve as a modelfor other democracies in Africa.

Under longtime President Daniel arap Moi, Kenyareturned to multiparty elections in 1992. Unfortu-nately, optimism about the prospects for genuinedemocratization faded quickly. Under President Moi’sruling KANU, Kenya came under sharp criticism forits failure to strengthen democratic processes andinstitutions in the 1992 and 1997 elections.

For these and other reasons, the 2002 electionsassumed great importance as another potential turningpoint. In the run-up to the elections, the constitu-tional review process dominated Kenyan politics. Thedebate revitalized Kenyan civil society groups, whichmobilized public support for a range of constitutionalamendments. The presidential candidate nominationprocess caused splits within the ruling KANU anddefections by high-profile KANU leaders who decidedto leave the party to join the recently formed opposi-tion coalition. The coalition came to be known as theNational Rainbow Coalition (NARC) and was led byMwai Kibaki of the Democratic Party (DP).

As detailed in this report, The Carter Centerconducted an observation program to assess the 2002electoral process. In the end, the Center concludedthat the government of Kenya and the ElectoralCommission of Kenya (ECK) administered a fair andtransparent election. The ECK took important steps toenhance its independence as the institution respon-sible for the conduct of the elections. Although CarterCenter observers reported some problems, particularlyregarding the voters roll, the electoral process waslegitimate.

The 2002 elections produced several other positiveoutcomes. Most importantly, Kenya’s political systemmoved from one of single-party domination to onewhere there is strong multiparty representation inParliament. The new Parliament should provide fertileground for strengthening Kenya’s democratic institu-tions and practices. President Kibaki already has takenimmediate steps to address corruption, and the newadministration is moving forward to develop morecomprehensive plans.

These are welcome developments. However, toensure progress over the long term, the new govern-ment must confront a series of important challenges.First, the government must complete the constitu-tional review process and work with civil society,political parties, and other stakeholders to implementnecessary changes. The new administration also shouldwork with Kenyans to strengthen democratic institu-tions, improve governance, and reinforce the rule oflaw. The Carter Center is willing to assist Kenyans andothers in the international community to supportefforts in these areas.

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Rosalynn and I would like to thank the co-leadersof the Carter Center’s Kenya election observer mission,former Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda andformer Ambassador Gordon Streeb, associate executivedirector of the Center’s peace programs. We also wouldlike to thank David Pottie for directing the project andall the Carter Center staff and observers for theirvaluable contributions.

Finally, we want to acknowledge the generousfinancial support for this project provided by theUnited States through the U.S. Agency for Interna-tional Development and The Charles Stewart MottFoundation. Our work would not have been possiblewithout their support.

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Kenya’s independence leader, Jomo Kenyatta, ofthe Kenya African National Union (KANU),held power from independence in June 1963

to the time of his death in August 1978. He wassucceeded by then Vice President Daniel arap Moi,who retained the presidency through Kenya’smultiparty elections in 1992 and 1997. However,both elections were marred by controversy owing topolitical violence, widespread voting irregularities,and fraud.

Human rights abuses have long cast a shadow overKenya. Although the ban on opposition parties waslifted in 1991, government critics charged that KANUembarked on a campaign of electoral-minded ethniccleansing, favoring loyal tribes over disloyal ones in anattempt to uproot communities perceived to supportother parties. Kenya’s churches, civil society organiza-tions, and many professional organizations organized tobring attention to these abuses, and a coalition of civilsociety organizations successfully observed the 1997elections.

Political debate in the first half of 2002 focused oncalls for a possible delay in the election date and evena term extension for President Moi and Parliament.Given the problem of political intimidation andpolitical violence in Kenya’s previous elections, civilsociety organizations were deeply concerned about theprospects for the 2002 elections and the uncertaintiesaround President Moi’s succession.

The voter list was closed with 10,576,616 regis-tered voters of an estimated population of 15,354,000Kenyans over the age of 18. According to the ElectoralCommission of Kenya (ECK), 78 percent of Kenyanshad national identification, one of the requirementsto register as a voter.

In July 2002, The Carter Center sent a small staffmission to Kenya to assess the current context ofKenyan politics and the extent to which the Center

could play a useful role in the elections that wereexpected in late 2002 or early 2003. At this time therewas no certainty as to when the elections would bescheduled or who would lead KANU or the newopposition coalition in the presidential race. PresidentMoi supported Uhuru Kenyatta, the elder Kenyatta’sson, as the KANU candidate for the 2002 elections.Although Kenyatta was President Moi’s preferredcandidate, he faced many challengers from withinKANU as a faction known as the Rainbow Coalitionemerged. Moreover, the work of the Constitution ofKenya Review Commission (CKRC) was not complete,and many Kenyans wanted to see the constitutionalreview process concluded prior to the elections. At thesame time, few Kenyans wanted to see President Moiand KANU extend their term of office to completethis process. The Carter Center team reported thatthere was strong interest in Carter Center involvementin the elections, from the major political parties,KANU and the official opposition Democratic Party(DP), the ECK, and civil society organizations.

Even as Moi’s support for Kenyatta sparked vigor-ous debate and conflict within KANU, the party faceda united opposition as more than a dozen parties, ledby Mwai Kibaki and the Democratic Party, joinedforces in mid-2002 to form the National RainbowCoalition (NARC). Despite the potential for violenceposed by the race between the two main contestantsfor the presidency, the election campaign period wasmore peaceful than previous elections. However, thecandidate nomination process was frequently markedby administrative chaos, double nominations, andincidents of intraparty violence as well as the intimida-tion of regional ECK officials.

Carter Center staff and an advance team of sevenmedium-term observers (MTOs) arrived in Kenya onDec. 17, 10 days before the elections. While theAtlanta staff began to prepare for the arrival of the

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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main delegation,the MTOs weredeployed to thefollowing areas:Mombassa, Eldoret,Kakamega, Kisumu,Meru, and Embu.The MTOs ob-served the finaldays of the electioncampaigns, metwith local electionofficials, representa-tives from politicalparties and civilsociety, and otherdomestic andinternationalelection observers.They also providedadvance reconnais-sance on deployment logistics for the main delegation.Liaison with domestic observers from the KenyaDomestic Observation Programme (K-DOP) wasparticularly important in this regard.

One issue that dominated the final days before theelection was whether or not voters whose name didnot appear on the 2002 voter register would be allowedto vote. The ECK released several directives on theissue following discussions with political parties,adding to public confusion about who would bepermitted to vote on election day. In the end, onlyvoters whose name appeared on the 2002 register wereto be allowed to vote.

The Center organized a 27-person delegation ofinternational observers from 13 countries for the Dec. 27elections. The delegation was co-led by former ZambiaPresident Kenneth Kaunda and former U.S. Ambassa-dor Gordon Streeb, associate executive director of theCenter’s peace programs. The delegation leaders metwith Uhuru Kenyatta and Mwai Kibaki as well as ECKchair Samuel Kivuitu, Attorney General Amos Wako,

Chief Justice Bernard Chunga, and many other seniorpolitical and government officials. Before and after theelections, the delegation leaders met with heads ofother election observation missions and representativesfrom the international community. President Kaundaalso met President Moi in a private meeting followingthe elections.

The main delegation arrived in Nairobi four daysbefore the elections. On Dec. 24, the delegationreceived a series of briefings on the elections andpolitical developments and was trained on the Center’selection observation methodology and the roles andresponsibilities of international observers. The daybefore the election, Carter Center observers in theirdeployment areas met with provincial-level candidates,local party officials, election officials, Kenyan observersgroups, and other civil society representatives.

Delegates were instructed to arrive at their pollingstation on Dec. 27 to watch the opening procedures at6 a.m. and ensure that ballot boxes were empty andproperly sealed. Throughout the day, observers were to

Kenyan citizens have vigorously asserted their right to vote.

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visit various polling stations to observe the votingprocess and complete a checklist at each stationvisited. Observers were to record information aboutthe operation of the polling station, including thepresence of polling officials, party agents, and ob-servers, and note whether there were any problems orirregularities.

At the end of the day, observers were to watch apoll closing, noting how ballot boxes were sealed.After observing the vote counting process at one ormore polling stations, observers were to record infor-mation about the results of those stations and to followthe proceedings at the constituency tabulation centers.

In the postelection delegation debriefings, observ-ers reported overwhelmingly that the voting process atthe polls visited was orderly, tranquil, and efficient,with few problems. The initial assessment of the otherobserver missions was similarly positive.

The observers also noted some general concerns.Many polling stations opened late. In some cases partyagents showed up late, whereas in others, deputypresiding officers simply took a long time to organizetheir polling station layout and materials.

A significant number of voters found that theirnames were not on the voters roll. In some cases,presiding officers could not say with certainty how todeal with those voters whose names did not appear onthe voter register. This led to different responses bypresiding officers (and hence unequal treatment acrossdifferent polling stations). Although it is difficult toquantify how many voters were affected, it appears thata considerable number of Kenyans were unable to casttheir ballots. However, Carter Center observersreported that most of these cases appeared to beresolved peacefully at the polling stations.

The delegation widely observed inconsistentapplication of the rules regarding assisted voters thatthreatened the secrecy of the vote. According tolegislative amendments to the electoral law, thepresiding officer may allow only one person of thevoter’s choice to assist in the ballot booth, and thisperson must take an oath of secrecy. The escort must

be of the age of majority but need not be a registeredvoter. In practice it was not uncommon to see severalcandidate agents as well as the presiding officer crowd-ing around the voting booth to observe the votingprocess. One Carter Center observer team noted thatnearly all women voters at one polling station wereclaiming illiteracy and received assistance from thepresiding officer, who essentially remained behind thevoting screen.

An important change in the electoral law was thedecision to move the counting process from constitu-ency counting stations to the polling stations, therebyenhancing the transparency and credibility of electionresults.

Overall, the Center’s observers visited 212 pollingstations across seven of Kenya’s eight provinces,representing about 200,000 voters. The delegation’sconsensus was that the voting process functionednormally or with only minor problems in the stationsvisited, with only a few problems of a more seriousnature.

On the basis of the debriefings and a meeting ofthe leaders of the main observer groups, a CarterCenter staff team started drafting the preliminaryassessment. On Dec. 29, President Kaunda andAmbassador Streeb delivered the preliminary state-ment on behalf of the full delegation, noting thatwhile voting had ended, the Center would continue toobserve the ongoing electoral processes before makinga final assessment.

The statement noted the historic importance ofthe elections, marking the succession to PresidentMoi. The statement cited several positive aspectsabout the process, including the peaceful atmosphereand the generally well-conducted polls. Severalconcerns about the voting process were also reported,including the late opening of polls, the high number ofvoters per polling station, and the inconsistent han-dling of assisted voters. The statement also noted thatthe counting and tabulation processes were generallywell-administered.

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By the afternoon of Dec. 28 it was clear that MwaiKibaki was headed to victory. As a result, KANUpresidential candidate Uhuru Kenyatta concededdefeat early in the afternoon of Dec. 29. Bowing topublic pressure to declare a winner, ECK announcedthat based on unofficial results, Kibaki was president-elect of Kenya. NARC leaders called for the immediateinauguration of Mwai Kibaki the following day.

The hastily organized inauguration ceremony onDec. 30 attracted a very large crowd, and thoughsomewhat chaotic, the overall mood was joyous andeuphoric.

Official results were announced on Jan. 3. Accord-ing to the electoral law, official results can only beannounced upon receipt of completed forms from all210 returning officers. These results must then begazetted for 24 hours before the president-elect may beinaugurated. Upon announcing the results, the ECKchair stated, “There was a great deal of pressure fromNARC leaders and their supporters that the declara-tion of the results be made nevertheless. Between thedemands of the law and those of the people, the ECKchose to obey the latter. It declared Hon. Mwai Kibakithe new president. It was a political rather than a legaldecision. But the final results have confirmed that thedecision was, after all, correct in law.”

Although the majority of Carter Center delegatesleft Kenya by Dec. 30, a team of 10 Carter Center staffand MTOs remained on the ground to monitor thepostelection situation at selected sites throughout thecountry and at the national headquarters of ECK inNairobi. The MTOs noted that both the electionofficials and the major parties recognized the need toimprove future elections and seemed genuinely dis-posed to work expeditiously to develop and implementrecommendations for electoral reforms.

Most respondents indicated general appreciationfor the role of the ECK in the conduct of the electionsand noted that election officials appeared to be bettertrained than in the past. However, many Kenyans alsocalled into question the overall independence of the ECK.

In a spirit of mutual respect and recognizing thatKenyans must decide what is best for their country,the Center offers a number of recommendations forimproving future elections. The Center’s recommenda-tions include, among others:

■ The Center urges the government to fulfill itspromise to the people of Kenya to complete theconstitutional review process and electoral reform.

■ Constitutional amendments should be consid-ered to set a specific date or window for elections.

■ Following the completion of electoral reforms,the ECK, in coordination with other relevant govern-ment agencies, should review Kenya’s current electoralboundaries.

■ The voter registration process should be reviewed,and clear rules and procedures for all aspects should beestablished.

■ The ECK should build upon the positiveexperience of the peaceful conduct of the 2002 elec-tions by sustaining and enhancing the operation of thecode of conduct for political parties and the activitiesof the peace committees.

The Center also suggests recommendations regard-ing the following: timing of elections, recruitment andtraining of election officials, women’s participation,media reform, conflict management, the voting processand ballot paper design, training of party agents, andthe election petition process.

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The Carter Center is grateful for the supportprovided by the U.S. Agency for InternationalDevelopment (USAID) through the

National Democratic Institute for InternationalAffairs, which enabled the Center to implement theKenya elections observation project. The CarterCenter worked closely with USAID officialsthroughout the process and would like to extendspecial thanks to Sheryl Stumbras and others atUSAID for their assistance. The Center is gratefulfor support provided by the Charles Stewart MottFoundation. The Center also thanks Kelly Callahanand the staff of the Carter Center’s Global 2000office in Nairobi for providing assistance andequipment for our field office.

The Center expresses its appreciation to thegovernment of Kenya and the Electoral Commissionof Kenya (ECK) chair Samuel Kivuitu for inviting theCenter to observe the elections. ECK is to be com-mended for its dedicated efforts to organize elections.The Center is also grateful for the collaborative effortsof Kenyan and other international groups, especiallythe international observer mission from the EuropeanUnion. Likewise, the Center acknowledges the impor-tant work of the Kenyan national observer group,K-DOP, and others, which together deployed thou-sands of observers to promote free and fair elections.We are also grateful to Simon Osborn and KarutiKanyinga of the Donor Information Center for Elec-tions in Kenya (DICE-K) for their support. TheCenter is particularly indebted to the deputy chiefobserver of the EU, Graham Elson.

Sincere thanks also go to the Carter Centerdelegates who volunteered their time, expertise, andinsights and agreed to join the Center in Kenya atextremely short notice over the December holidayperiod. The delegates accepted a range of responsibili-ties without complaint and demonstrated a strong

commitment to supporting the process of democrati-zation in Kenya. In particular, the Center wishes tothank former President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia,who co-led the election observation delegation. TheCenter also acknowledges the efforts of the medium-term observers, Amy Hamelin (USA), ShaniWinterstein (South Africa), John Chipeta (Malawi),Kehleboe Gongloe (Liberia), Taona Mwanyisa(Zimbabwe), Simeon Mawanza (Zimbabwe),and Nhamo Sithole (Zimbabwe).

The Carter Center field staff in Nairobi did anoutstanding job during the election mission. Nairobioffice assistants Joyce Masinde and Anjoy Michukiprovided useful information about logistical concernsand helped keep the office running smoothly. EdwinOmolo, who worked as a driver, and MichaelKibangendi, who provided essential logistics assistanceduring the election mission, were especially helpful tothe project.

The Carter Center’s Democracy Program inAtlanta had overall responsibility for the project,beginning with the initial assessment in July-August2002 and lasting through the final report. The projectwas managed and directed by Democracy ProgramSenior Program Associate Dr. David Pottie, withcritical assistance from Tynesha Green and JanetTinsley. Charles Costello, director of the DemocracyProgram, provided important advice and guidancethroughout the project. Brett Lacy of the Center’sDemocracy Program provided essential logistics supportfrom Atlanta during the election mission.

Dr. David Pottie drafted this report with contributionsfrom Janet Tinsley and Shani Winterstein. John Chipetaand the other MTOs provided useful postelectionreports. Sarah Fedota of the Center’s public informa-tion office compiled the report into its final version.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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Kenya’s independence leader, Jomo Kenyatta, ofthe Kenya African National Union (KANU),held power from independence in June 1963

to the time of his death in August 1978. He wassucceeded by then Vice President Daniel arap Moi.Moi was re-elected president in 1983, 1988, and undera system of multiparty elections, in 1992 and 1997.The 1997 elections sparked particular controversyowing to claims of widespread voting irregularitiesand fraud. The runner-up in the presidential election,Democratic Party (DP) candidate Mwai Kibaki, askedthe High Court to recount and examine all the re-jected, spoiled, and void ballot papers as well as tonullify Moi’s victory. The High Court dismissed hissuit in July 1999.

The constitution has been amended several times,including the 1991 abolition of the one-party state.Other important amendments include the December1986 reform that increased the power of the presidentand the September 1997 amendment that ensured freeand fair democratic elections, granted all politicalparties equal access to the media, and prohibiteddetention without trial. By September 2002, theConstitution of Kenya Review Commission (CKRC)had completed a national public consultation processand presented a revised draft constitution. However,the review process was halted when President Moidissolved Parliament and announced elections forDec. 27, 2002.

Executive power is vested in the president, thevice president, and the cabinet. The president appointsthe cabinet and vice president. The president, who alsoserves as commander in chief of the armed forces, iselected by direct popular vote to a renewable five-yearterm. A presidential candidate must receive at least 25percent of the votes in a minimum of five of Kenya’seight provinces to win an election.

The central legislative authority is the unicameralNational Assembly. It consists of 210 directly electedrepresentatives, 12 members appointed by the presi-dent, and the attorney general and the assemblyspeaker, who are ex officio members. Unless dissolvedbefore the end of its term, the National Assembly’smaximum term lasts five years. It can be dissolved atany time, either by the president or by the body itselfon the passage of a no-confidence vote, followingwhich assembly and presidential elections must beheld within 90 days.

The judiciary is represented by the High Court ofKenya, which consists of a chief justice, at least 30High Court judges, and Kenya’s Court of Appealjudges, all appointed by the president. The High Courtsupervises a system of subordinate courts, includingprovincial and district magistrates’ courts as well asMuslim district courts. The Kenya Court of Appealissues the final verdict in contested civil and criminalcases. The president can dismiss both High Court ofKenya and Court of Appeal judges.

Human rights abuses have long cast a shadow overKenya. Although the ban on opposition parties waslifted in 1991, government critics charged that KANUembarked on a campaign of electoral-minded ethniccleansing, favoring loyal tribes over disloyal ones in anattempt to uproot communities perceived to supportother parties. The creation of Kalenjin-dominated“KANU zones” and the suppression of oppositionsupport through political intimidation and internaldisplacement reinforced Moi’s control over the KANUpatronage machinery.

Due to widespread reports of threats, false accusa-tions, detentions without trial, torture, abductions,and murder, Kenya has received international criticismof its human rights records; Amnesty Internationallisted Kenya as one of five countries where there are

BACKGROUND

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“persistent, severe and systematic violations ofhuman rights.”

The 1992 multiparty elections were held againstthe immediate backdrop of these widespread humanrights abuses. Moreover, the opposition parties splitalong ethnic and regional lines, leaving KANU andPresident Moi to secure re-election with only 38percent of the vote. The 1997 elections ran alongsimilar lines, and once again, KANU and Moiwere returned to power. Notably, KANU faced areal opposition for the first time, winning only 107seats against a combined 103 for the opposition.

Both the 1992 and 1997 elections were marked byextreme violence and political intimidation. Vigilan-tism and other forms ofviolence were frequentlyexpressed in terms ofethnic or regionalclashes, but for many,these were the productsof state-sponsoredviolence. Prior to the1997 elections, therewere an estimated 2,000deaths, and thousandswere left homeless anddisplaced from opposition strongholds. These divisivestrategies served to undermine opposition support andkept KANU members in line.

Over the course of the 1990s, Kenya’s civil society,churches, and an increasingly bold independent mediasought to cast light on these and other abuses. Theircombined efforts to secure constitutional reformdemonstrated that political change was possible.Following the establishment of the Inter-PartiesParliamentary Group (IPPG), opposition partiesreceived representation on the Electoral Commissionof Kenya (ECK), the basis for more equitable mediaaccess was introduced, and all parties agreed to abideby a code of conduct for the election campaigns.

However, the 1997 elections, while an improve-ment over the conduct of the 1992 elections, wereundermined by many procedural and administrative

irregularities that necessitated a second day of votingin almost a third of the country. Moi was returned tooffice with 40 percent of the vote, against 31 percentfor Mwai Kibaki and 11 percent for Raila Odinga.

While the KANU political machinery continuedto function, even if imperfectly, international criticismof Kenya’s lack of reform increased. Rising concernsover corruption, criminality, and poor economicgrowth further tarnished Kenya’s international reputa-tion. Nevertheless, Kenya retained admiration for itscontinued stability in a region where many of itsneighbors were embroiled in civil war.

In an apparent effort to confront a united opposi-tion at home, in March 2002, KANU absorbed one of

its major oppositionparties, Raila Odinga’sNational DevelopmentParty (NDP). Odingabecame the new secretarygeneral of KANU, withall four of the party vicechair positions occupiedby members of KANU’syounger generation, whilePresident Moi remainedpresident of KANU.

Meanwhile, other opposition parties demonstratedthat they could mount an effective challenge to Moi’splans to manage his own succession. Notably, in July2001 the Democratic Party (DP) gave KANU its firstby-election defeat since 1992. Kibaki’s DP positioneditself to lead an opposition coalition against KANU.Other leading members of these discussions includedKijana Wamalwa of FORD-K and Charity Ngilu,formerly the Social Democratic Party (SDP) presiden-tial candidate in 1997, who subsequently left to formthe National Party of Kenya (NPK). These and otherpolitical actors would eventually join forces to formthe National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) in theirquest to unseat KANU. The 2002 elections thereforerepresented the first sustained challenge to KANUsince independence.

Prior to the 1997 elections, therewere an estimated 2,000 deaths,and thousands were left homeless

and displaced from oppositionstrongholds.

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The Carter Center has maintained an activeinterest and involvement in Kenya for severalyears. In light of this interest, and because of

the challenges facing the democratic consolidation inKenya, the Center viewed the 2002 general electionswith anticipation.

In July 2002, The Carter Center sent a small staffmission to Kenya to assess the current context ofKenyan politics and the extent to which the Centercould play a useful role in the elections that wereexpected in late 2002 or early 2003.1 Some observerswere concerned that President Moi and KANU mightseek an extension in his term of office to even later in2003. To explore this and other issues, the team metwith representatives from the main political parties,government officials, electoral authorities, civil societygroups, and key members of the international community.

The team reported that there was strong interest inCarter Center involvement in the elections, from themajor parties (KANU and the official oppositionDemocratic Party), the Electoral Commission of Kenya(ECK), and civil society organizations. All sideswelcomed the Center’s interest in observing theelections but noted that international observers shouldbe sure to arrive well in advance of the election andensure proper distribution throughout the entirecountry. It was also made clear that Kenyan civilsociety organizations were planning on mounting asignificant domestic observation effort through thedeployment of 20,000 monitors. The internationalcommunity, while receptive to Center involvement inthe election process, indicated that they were concen-trating their support on this domestic observationeffort.

The political climate in Kenya remained uncertainat the time of the pre-election assessment. WhereasKenya’s previous elections had been marked by wide-spread political intimidation and violence, the first sixmonths of 2002 were relatively calm. At the time, theopposition political parties were engaged in talks aboutforming an election coalition behind a single presiden-tial candidate, but it was not clear whether thiscoalition would succeed. KANU appeared to be ontheir way to confirming President Moi’s designatedsuccessor, Uhuru Kenyatta, son of Kenya’s foundingpresident, Jomo Kenyatta, and a representative of thenew generation of KANU leaders. However, othersigns indicated that all was not well within KANU asseveral other senior party members, including severalcabinet ministers and Vice President Saitoti, wereinterested in challenging for the party’s nomination.

The following major themes defined the politicallandscape as Kenyans prepared for elections:

Constitutional Reform: Constitutional reform andelections remained linked and contributed to theuncertainty of the election date. In late July 2002, abill was introduced in Parliament seeking an extensionof the work of the Constitution of Kenya ReviewCommission (CKRC). Facing a deadline of Oct. 4, 2002,for submission of a draft constitution, the 27-memberCKRC frequently lacked funds and was unable tocomplete its public hearings until the middle of 2002.Moreover, the CKRC chair, Professor Yash Pal Ghai,clashed with senior KANU party members as well asmembers of his own commission.

Nevertheless, the public submissions to the CKRCserved as an important sounding board for manynational concerns, including public sector corruption,

JULY-AUGUST 2002: EXPLORATORY ASSESSMENT

1 The team included Carter Center staff Dr. David Pottie and Jeffrey Mapendere.

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police brutality, and the need for judicial and electoralsystem reform. (For example, some wanted to see theintroduction of an additional 90 seats elected on thebasis of proportional representation.)

While the majority of Kenyans were eager to holdgeneral elections, opinion in Kenya remained dividedover how best to proceed. One camp, including somesenior members of KANU, argued that the constitu-tional reform process should be unlinked from theelections and completed after the elections. The othercamp argued that the constitution must be reformedfirst, with elections heldafterwards.

According to Ghai’sinterpretation of theconstitution, Parliamentcould sit until Feb. 2,2003, but a new Parlia-ment must meet withinthree months or by May2, 2003. Therefore elections could be held as late asmid-April, allowing civic education and politicalparties to campaign under the new constitution.While the presidential term would end on Jan. 4,2003, technically the term continues until a successoris chosen, and the election for the successor must runconcurrently with that for Parliament. Despite thesearguments, members of opposition parties and civilsociety organizations were concerned that any delayof the elections beyond the end of December 2002would be manipulated to KANU’s advantage.

Candidate Nominations: By July 2002 President Moihad confirmed that Uhuru Kenyatta was his choice asKANU’s presidential candidate. As noted above,Kenyatta, an appointed member of Moi’s cabinet,faced several other challengers, including other seniorcabinet members, and it was expected that VicePresident George Saitoti would also announce hiscandidacy.

DP leader Mwai Kibaki was also the leadingmember of the opposition party coalition, NationalAlliance for Change (NAC). NAC was confident that

a strong united opposition campaign could be launchedagainst KANU. Although NAC still had to decide onthe mechanisms to nominate a joint presidentialcandidate, it had agreed that the constituency-levelcandidate nominations were to be conducted throughsecret ballot.

Electoral Preparations: The Electoral Commissionof Kenya (ECK) was preparing for the event thatelections would be held before the end of 2002. Thevoters list was closed in March 2002 with 10,576,616registered voters of an estimated population of

15,354,000 Kenyans overthe age of 18. Accordingto the ECK, 78 percent ofKenyans had nationalidentification, one of therequirements to register asa voter. Kenya has movedto a system of continuousvoter registration, but this

system was not introduced prior to the 2002 elections.According to the constitution, the ECK is com-

prised of between four and 22 members. The 2002ECK consisted of a chair, vice chair, 10 membersappointed by the president, and an additional 10representing opposition parties and civil society.(Their terms of appointment are not clearly defined inlaw.) The chair of the ECK, Mr. Samuel Kivuitu,acknowledged that while preparations were underway,the absence of a clearly defined election date made itdifficult for the commission to plan adequately. Theresult was that it was difficult for the ECK to beproactive in such areas as enforcement of a code ofconduct for the elections. The ECK acknowledgedthat the reliance on the police and court system, ratherthan alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, was aslow, expensive, and cumbersome process. Otherproposed reforms to the electoral process, such as thecounting of ballots inside the polling stations, had notyet received final parliamentary approval (though thisamendment was subsequently approved). The ECK didnot undertake a demarcation exercise prior to the 2002

A new opposition coalitionpromised to challenge ruling party

KANU for popular support inthe 2002 elections.

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elections, even though many of Kenya’s constituenciesare dramatically skewed in terms of population size.The least populous constituency has 8,977 registeredvoters, and the most populous has 152,906 voters.Fourteen constituencies have fewer than 20,000registered voters whereas nine have more than100,000.

Violence and Intimidation: In the context of theviolence and intimidation in Kenya’s previous elec-tions, public confidence in Kenya’s police forceremained low. The operation of informal militias andvigilante groups such as the Mungiki sect in Kenya’sinformal settlements added to this sense of insecurity.Although the police did not appear to have engaged inany special training for election security, they didmaintain an ad hoc liaison with the ECK and politicalparties. On election day, the police were to operate

under the supervision of the presiding officer andprovide security for the polling stations and trans-port of ballot boxes.

Transfer of Power: Opposition parties and civilsociety expressed concern over the likely behavior ofthe police and senior government officials in the eventof an opposition victory, since Kenya lacked clearlydefined rules to govern the transfer of power. Althoughthe election outcome could not be predicted at thetime, there was already widespread confidence on thepart of the opposition that they would defeat theruling KANU. Thus, as the majority of Kenyansprepared for the elections with eagerness, the relativecalm of 2002 continued to operate under the shadowof past troubles.

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Carter Center staff and an advance team ofseven medium-term observers (MTOs)arrived in Kenya on Dec. 17, 10 days before

the elections. While the Atlanta staff began to preparefor the arrival of the main delegation, the MTOs weredeployed throughout Kenya.

BRIEFING AND OBSERVATION

METHODOLOGYPrior to deployment, the MTOs received a briefing

on the current state of campaigns and election prepara-tions from Dr. Karuti Kanyinga of the Donor Informa-tion Center for Elections in Kenya (DICE-K). Theyalso received instructions on logistics and reportingprocedures during their pre-election deployment.

The MTOs were deployed in two-person teams to

the following areas: Mombassa, Eldoret, Kakamega,Kisumu, Meru, and Embu. The purpose of the MTOdeployment was twofold. Firstly, the MTOs observedthe final days of the election campaigns, met withlocal election officials, representatives from politicalparties and civil society, and other domestic andinternational election observers. Secondly, the MTOsprovided advance reconnaissance on deploymentlogistics for the main delegation. Liaison with domes-tic observers from the Kenya Domestic ObservationProgramme (K-DOP) was particularly important inthis regard.

Daily reports from the MTOs, as well as theirdebriefing upon their return to Nairobi on Dec. 23,assisted with the final preparations for observation ofthe elections themselves. The MTOs conducted morethan 50 interviews with election officials, candidates

and representa-tives frompolitical parties,civil societygroups, andothers. Theirobservationscovered electoralpreparations,campaignfunding issues,campaignactivities andviolence, andmedia coverage.

The report’sconclusion wasthat the campaignand electoralprocess wereprogressing

DECEMBER 2002: PRE-ELECTION OBSERVATION

A campaign billboard for opposition presidential candidate Mwai Kibaki was posted on a street inNairobi.

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satisfactorily, given the context of Kenya’s previouselections. Although several problems were identified asdetailed below, the Center’s general assessment wasthat the electoral process was on track.

ELECTORAL PREPARATIONSA total of 10.4 million Kenyans were registered to

vote in the 2002 elections. (See Appendix 2 for thevoter roll.)1 The 2002 voter registration process wasinitially slated to end March 5, but ECK extended thevoter registration period by two weeksto March 19. A total of 77,862 peoplewere struck from the voters roll forregistering more than once. A civilsociety organization audit of the voterregistration process concluded that thevoters roll had a “satisfactory degree ofaccuracy.”

The voters roll became an issue inthe week before Dec. 27 when ECKannounced that presiding officers would have thediscretionary power to allow voters not appearing onthe 2002 roll to vote. However, two days before theelection ECK reversed this decision and stated thatonly voters on the 2002 roll would be permitted to casttheir ballots, even if their name appeared on an earliervoters roll.

Eligible voters without ID cards complained ofdifficulties in collecting their cards from districtoffices. In the week prior to the elections, the ECKappeared to be largely prepared for the conduct of thepolls. Following media reports of the possible latedelivery of the printed ballot papers from the printingcompany in the UK, these fears were unrealized eventhough uncertainty over the final ECK distribution ofballot papers remained until the last days before theelections.

Kenya is divided into eight provinces, 70 districts, 210constituencies, and 2,112 wards. The ECK established

18, 366 polling streams at more than 14,000 pollingstations nationwide. By Dec. 23, ECK had dispatchedelection materials, including ballot papers, to thedistrict centers for collection by the presiding officersof each polling location. In total, the ECK recruitedapproximately 145,000 polling staff for the conduct ofthe elections.

An important change in the electoral law was thedecision to move the counting process from constitu-ency counting stations to the polling stations. In thefinal days before the elections, ECK engaged in a last

round of training for polling officials. Carter Centerobservers reported, however, that officials appeared tobe unclear about the exact provisions for counting atthe polling stations as well as the procedures forassisted voters. This lack of information was matchedby, or helped to fuel, suspicions on the part of opposi-tion supporters that KANU election rigging was likely.

Candidate nominations: The presidential candidatenomination marked the final splintering of KANUprior to the elections. Following Uhuru Kenyatta’snomination as KANU presidential candidate, leadingmembers of KANU, including former Vice PresidentGeorge Saitoti, Raila Odinga, and Kalonzo Musyoka,left the ruling party to join the opposition NationalAlliance for Change (NAC). These and other mem-bers had formed the Rainbow Alliance, a group withinKANU opposed to President Moi’s decision to supportKenyatta as his successor. In order to compete for the

Presidential candidate Political party

Uhuru Kenyatta Kenya African National Union (KANU)Mwai Kibaki National Rainbow Coalition (NARC)Simeon Nyachae FORD-PeopleJames A. Orengo Social Democratic Party (SDP)David Ng’ethe Waweru Chama cha Uma Party (CCU)

1 There are an estimated 14.8 million eligible voters but an estimated 2.2 million lack national identity cards and are thereforeunable to register as voters.

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elections, the NAC members established a newpolitical party known as the National Alliance (Party)of Kenya (NAK). Following a very intense period ofintraparty competition and public name-callingthroughout the party, during which Moi fired VicePresident Saitoti and several other cabinet members,Kenyatta secured the KANU presidential nomination.The Rainbow Alliance members joined NAK on aparty-to-party basis by taking over a smaller party,the Liberal Democratic Party. The new alliance wasfinalized in late October and was subsequently knownas the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC).

DP leader Mwai Kibaki emerged as the NARCpresidential candidate. Both Kenyatta and Kibakipresented their credentials to ECK on Nov. 18. Intotal, five presidential candidates qualified to standfor election.

In order to manage its alliance of 14 politicalparties and two pressuregroups, NARC estab-lished an 18-memberinterparty board to guidethe conduct of its partyprimaries for parliamen-tary candidate nomina-tions. However, NARCand the other parties,including KANU, didnot appear to havesufficient resources or a well-planned approach to theparty primaries.

The ECK received party nominations for parlia-mentary and civic candidates on Nov. 24, with formalnominations of candidates presented to returningofficers on Nov. 25 and 26. Parliamentary candidatespaid a fee of Ksh 30,000, while civic candidates paidKsh 5,000. Overall, the parliamentary candidatenomination process was marred by intense intrapartycompetition, defections, complaints, protests, and insome places, violence. The process sometimes resultedin double allocation of nomination certificates. Forexample, in Meru North, NARC supporters fought

with riot police after the ECK cleared a rival NARCcandidate who had failed to be nominated by theparty. Elsewhere, a rival group stabbed one aspirantduring the nomination process. In other places severalrivals for nomination from the same parties raced tohand in their nomination papers, and in one notableincident, attacked the returning officer and destroyedelection documents. ECK responded by ruling on afirst-come-first-served basis, though this rule does notappear to have been applied uniformly. Missingpaperwork and contradictory claims held up manyother submissions. In total, 34 political parties nomi-nated candidates for Parliament, ranging from as fewas a single candidate each from two parties to 209for KANU.

In Carter Center pre-election meetings, severalrespondents complained about the relative exclusionof women aspirants from the candidate nomination

process. Of a total of 1,035candidates from 34 partiesfor the 210 seats in Parlia-ment, only 44 werewomen. A total of 7,009candidates (but only 381women) were nominatedfor election in Kenya’s2,128 elective civic seats.

Election campaigns:President Moi dissolved

Parliament on Oct. 25, and several days later, theECK announced that the elections would be held onDec. 27. While KANU candidate Uhuru Kenyattasaid he was happy with the date, NARC candidateMwai Kibaki described the election date as “mostinconvenient” since a majority of Kenyan voters wholive in towns would have gone to their rural homes forChristmas holidays. He preferred the date of Dec. 30as more appropriate. However, ECK chair SamuelKivuitu stated that the date had been chosen followingconsultations with religious leaders who accepted thedate as convenient.

Transparency was enhancedby the decision to conduct

the counting process atpolling stations following

the close of polls.

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At the national level, the election campaignsfocused on the presidential race between Kenyattaand Kibaki. During the KANU campaign, Kenyattaemphasized the party’s experience in government andthe party’s ability to hold the country together. TheKibaki campaign countered with the need for changein Kenya, criticizing KANU’s record on fightingcorruption, addressing poverty, and efficient manage-ment of government. NARC promised reform ofgovernment programs, including free primary education.

Perhaps the most notable aspect of the NARCcampaign was a Dec. 3 car crash in which two peopledied and Mwai Kibaki sustained multiple injuries.Kibaki’s health during his subsequent recovery remaineda topic of widespread speculation throughout the lastthree weeks of the campaign. At the same time,NARC’s spirits were lifted when an opinion pollconducted in early December placed Kibaki in thelead with nearly 70 percent support and the partywith 65 percent support in the parliamentary elections.

Partisan and incomplete reporting marked much ofthe media coverage of the campaign. The high degreeof state-owned or -controlled media meant that much

of the Kenya Broadcast Corporation (KBC) coveragefavored KANU and Kenyatta. Consequently, themedia failed to respect the spirit of the electoral lawand/or the norms of rigor and impartiality in theircoverage. In early September, the ECK accused KBCof biased political reporting in favor of Kenyatta.Meanwhile the independent Nation Media Group wastypically more sympathetic towards the opposition andMwai Kibaki.

Conflict and political intimidation: Whereas previouselections in Kenya were marked by widespread vio-lence and intimidation, the 2002 elections wererelatively calm. A series of small, but related, effortsappeared to have played some role in stemming theviolence. For example, the ECK enforced a code ofconduct, issuing fines and reprimands to both KANUand NARC candidates for campaign violence. A totalof 16 candidates were found guilty of various electionoffences. The Kenya police, while not engaged informal conflict management, trained a special electionviolence unit, and the commissioner of police issued apublic appeal to all officers to conduct themselvesimpartially. Also, civil society engaged in conflict

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Uhuru Kenyattasupporters canvas votes

for the ruling KANUpresidential candidate.

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monitoring and long-term pre-election observation,improving the flow of information on election offenses.

Despite this good news, there were widespreadreports of the general use of money in the campaigns,various forms of petty bribery, and most worrying, thepurchase of voter cards to disenfranchise voters.However, although domestic observers frequentlyreported the purchase of voter cards and other forms ofpetty bribery, these allegations were loosely supportedby evidence, and it was not possible to confirm if oneparty or another was more responsible for these prac-tices. Moreover, neither the police nor the ECK couldconfirm the extent of this problem.

There were also incidents of political intoleranceand violence, such as a group of KANU youth whothrew stones at those gathered for a NARC rally,injuring six supporters. This action was apparently inresponse to NARC disruption of a KANU rallyattended by President Moi the previous day.

K-DOP complained to the ECK that it shouldrespond to the ongoing activities of vigilante groupssuch as the Mungiki sect. K-DOP claimed they werebeing used by political parties to engage in violence.

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DELEGATE BRIEFINGS, OBSERVATION

METHODOLOGY, AND DEPLOYMENT

For the December elections, the Center organizeda 27-person delegation of international observersfrom 13 countries. The delegation was co-led by

former Zambia President Kenneth Kaunda and formerU.S. ambassador and associate executive director ofthe Center’s peace programs, Gordon Streeb.

The main delegation arrived in Nairobi four daysbefore the elections. On Dec. 24, the delegationreceived a series of briefings on the elections as wellas political developments and was trained on theCenter’s election observation methodology, includingthe roles and responsibilities of international observers.

The delegation received briefings on electoralpreparation from the ECK, on the political campaigns,on the activities of other international observers, and

on the general security situation in Kenya. Thedelegation also heard presentations by the KenyaDomestic Observation Programme (K-DOP) on theirobservation efforts and plans.

In addition, the Carter Center’s medium-termobservers provided regional briefings, summarizingtheir assessment of the campaign period and theirobservation experiences in the field.

A final briefing session covered the Center’sobservation methodology, logistics, and security issues.Observers were also provided with observation forms,or “checklists,” which detailed the procedures and/orirregularities that delegates should observe and record.In collaboration with the European Union (EU) andseveral other delegations, the Center agreed to usecommon observation forms in order to enhance thecombined observation capacity of internationalobservers. (See Appendices 4-8 for sample forms.)

DECEMBER 2002:CARTER CENTER OBSERVATION MISSION

Carter Center delegationco-leader, formerZambia PresidentKenneth Kaunda, anddelegation missiondirector Dr. David Pottiemeet the day before theelection.

OKON AKIBA

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Delegateswere instructedto arrive at theirpolling stationon Dec. 27 towatch theopening proce-dures at 6 a.m.and ensure thatballot boxes wereempty andproperly sealed.Throughout theday, observerswere asked tovisit variouspolling stationsto observe thevoting processand complete achecklist at eachstation visited.Observers wereto record information about the operation of thepolling station, including the presence of pollingofficials, party agents, and observers, and to notewhether there were any problems or irregularities.

At the end of the day, observers were to watch apoll closing, noting how ballot boxes were sealed.After observing the vote counting process at one ormore polling stations, observers were to record infor-mation about the results of those stations.

Following the briefings in Nairobi, Carter Centerobservers were deployed on Dec. 25 in teams of two tovarious sites. In total, 12 teams were deployed through-out Kenya. (See Appendix 3.)

The Carter Center consulted with other interna-tional observer groups, including the EU and theCommonwealth, to coordinate deployment within andacross provinces. This allowed the various missions tomaximize their collective coverage of polling stationsand ensure that relevant information was shared

among groups. The Donor Information Center forElections in Kenya (DICE-K) and the EU both playeda positive role in serving as effective clearinghouses ofinformation for the various international observermissions.

The day before the election, Carter Center observ-ers met with provincial-level candidates, local partyofficials, election officials, Kenyan observers groups,and other civil society representatives. These meetingsprovided information about the political context, thecampaign period, the preparedness of parties and partyagents, road conditions, and communications in thedeployment areas. In addition, the meetings alertedparties and officials and civil society to the presence ofinternational observers, which facilitated observers’work and helped deter any possible wrongdoing.

A presiding officer collects his polling station materials in the early morning before the opening ofpolls on Dec. 27.

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LEADERSHIP MEETINGSOn Dec. 23, President Kaunda and Ambassador

Streeb met with the chairman of the ECK and arepresentative of DICE-K.

In their meeting with the ECK, Samuel Kivuituwelcomed the Center delegation co-leaders andreported that all training of election officials hadbeen completed and election materials were in thefinal stages of delivery.

On Dec. 24, leadership met with LucasMakhubela, South African high commissioner toKenya; Bethuel Kiplagat, former permanent secretaryof the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Amos Wako,attorney general of Kenya; Commissioner of PoliceAbongo; Chief Justice Bernard Chunga; and the mainopposition presidential candidate, Mwai Kibaki, of theNational Rainbow Coalition (NARC).

The attorney general reported that he was pleasedwith the work of the ECK and that there was nointerference in its work either by his office or thepolice. President Kaunda indicated that The CarterCenter had heardconcerns about theuncertain arrangementsfor a transfer of power inthe event of an opposi-tion victory. The attor-ney general respondedthat the media hadincorrectly reported theexistence of a transitional committee and that theECK remained in charge of declaring the winner, whocould then be inaugurated as soon as the results weregazetted. The attorney general encouraged PresidentKaunda to contact President Moi to share his thoughtson the acceptance of results.

The commissioner of police noted that the policewere committed to peaceful elections and was upset bya widely reported statement by a leading oppositioncandidate that his supporters would storm State Houseif they felt the elections were rigged. He felt that the

presence of The Carter Center and President Kaundasent a strong signal to Kenyans that the electionswould be transparent. The chief justice stated that thecourt played no direct role in the conduct of theelections and that the ECK was responsible for enforc-ing the code of conduct. The court stood ready to rulein the event of complaints but had thus far not receivedany. The chief justice stated that he would swear inthe newly elected president but otherwise played norole in the transfer of power.

On Dec. 25, meetings were conducted withJohnnie Carson, U.S. ambassador to Kenya; Yash PalGhai, chairman of the Constitution of Kenya ReviewCommission (CKRC); and Enock Chikamba, Zambianambassador to Kenya.

The U.S. ambassador, Johnnie Carson, expressedhis confidence in the people of Kenya to conduct agood election but noted that there were many chal-lenges facing whoever assumed office. Foremost amonghis concerns was the role of corruption in underminingpublic confidence in the state and investor confidence

in the economy. Yash PalGhai, chairman of theCKRC, raised similarthemes. Ghai maintainedthat the constitutionalreview process hadrevealed a public that waswidely disenchanted withPresident Moi and hisgovernment and that

corruption was viewed as a major concern. Ghai saidthat the review process was not supported by KANUand that only a NARC victory would secure theneeded constitutional reform.

On Dec. 26, private meetings were held withUhuru Kenyatta, the KANU presidential candidate,and the British high commissioner, and the Centerhosted a dinner meeting with the heads of otherinternational election observation delegations.

Carter Center delegation co-leaderssought assurances that both KANUand NARC supporters would accept

the election results.

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THE DEC. 27 ELECTORAL PROCESSOn Dec. 27, Kenyans went to the polls to select

leaders and representatives at three levels of govern-ment: national president, national assembly, and localgovernment councils. The complexities involved inconducting three elections simultaneously posedconsiderable technical, administrative, and politicalchallenges for the ECK.

Voting was scheduled to take place from 6:00 a.m.to 6:00 p.m. Each polling stream in a polling stationprovided for a maximum of 1,000 voters. Uponentering the polling stream, voters presented theirvoter cards and another form of acceptable identifica-tion (passport, driver’s licence, etc.). Their names werethen checked against the voters roll, and their hands

were checked for indelible ink. Voters then faced acumbersome process that required them to complete aseparate circuit for each of the three elections unlessthey requested to receive all three ballot papers atonce. This complicated process extended the time ittook to complete the voting process.

At the close of balloting, votes were counted ateach polling station. Upon completion of the count,poll results were transported to returning officers ateach of the 210 constituency centers for tabulation toproduce a constituency result. As part of this process,returning officers would review any rejected or dis-puted ballots from polling streams to confirm or rejectthe decision of the deputy presiding officers. Uponcompletion of the tabulation process, the returningofficer would declare the winning candidate for theNational Assembly and local council elections. The

constituency results for the presidential race wereprovisional, and though announced, they were subjectto confirmation by the ECK. The constituency resultswere then communicated to electoral commissionheadquarters in Nairobi where national results wouldbe released.

Party agents from the major political parties weredeployed to the polling stations. In addition, K-DOPplayed a critical monitoring role and ensured thatevery polling station had civil society monitorspresent.

The main international observer groups, includingdiplomatic missions, the EU, the Commonwealth, theAfrican Union (AU), and The Carter Center plannedcoordinated but independent assessments of theelectoral process. Although much smaller in size andscope than the domestic civil society observers, thepresence of international observer groups was importantbecause of their international profile and reputation. Tothe extent that their assessment was consistent with theKenyan observers, international observers supported thework of Kenyan actors by amplifying and reinforcingtheir reports. To this end, most of the heads of interna-tional delegations met with K-DOP the evening ofDec. 28 to discuss findings and to coordinate pressconference times for the following day’s release ofpreliminary statements.

CARTER CENTER OBSERVER

REPORTS AND THE DEC. 29PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

On election day, Carter Center observers movedfrom poll to poll to monitor the voting process in theirdeployment area. At every polling station visited,Center observers recorded information on theirchecklists.

Two initial points emerged from observers’ earlyreporting from the field on election day. The first wasthat many polling stations opened late although therewas no general pattern of reasons. In some cases party

The polling stations were generallywell-managed and the election day

was peaceful.

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agents showedup late, and inothers, deputypresiding officerssimply took along time toorganize theirpolling stationlayout andmaterials. Thesecond was thatonce votingcommenced, asignificantnumber of votersfound that theirnames were noton the votersroll. In somecases, presidingofficers could notsay with cer-tainty how todeal with those voters whose names did not appear onthe voters roll. This led to different responses bypresiding officers and unequal treatment across differ-ent polling stations. Although it is difficult to quantifyhow many voters were affected by this decision, itappears that a considerable number of Kenyans wereunable to cast their ballots. The last-minute policychanges with regards to the voters roll threatened toundermine the confidence of the electorate in theECK. However, Carter Center observers reported thatmost of these cases appeared to be resolved peacefullyat the polling stations.

On the evening of Dec. 27, observer teams calledinto the Carter Center office in Nairobi and reportedthat most of the day’s voting had been orderly, effi-cient, and peaceful. Carter Center observers noted thateach polling stream had to process up to 1,000 voters,and officials had to page through the voters register

for the entire center. In places where there were upto 21 polling streams, the result was a very slowprocess of checking for voters’ names.

The delegation widely observed inconsistentapplication of the rules regarding assisted voters. Theseviolations threatened the secrecy of the vote. Accord-ing to legislative amendments to the electoral law, thepresiding officer may allow only one person of thevoter’s choice to assist in the ballot booth, and thisperson must take an oath of secrecy. The escort mustbe of the age of majority but need not be a registeredvoter. Unfortunately, a newspaper insert on the votingprocess quoted an earlier version of an ECK manual inwhich party agents were permitted to observe thevoting process. In practice it was not uncommon to seeseveral party agents as well as the presiding officercrowding around the voting booth to observe thevoting process. In one polling station observed by

The Carter Center delegation leaders, Ambassador Gordon Streeb of the Center’s peace programsand President Kenneth Kaunda, arrive to observe the opening of the polls.

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Carter Center delegates, nearly all women votersclaimed illiteracy, requested assistance, and receivedassistance from the presiding officer.

In the Dec. 28 delegation debriefings, observersreported overwhelmingly that the voting process at thepolls visited was orderly,tranquil, and efficient,with few problems. Theinitial assessment of theother observer missionswas similarly positive. Forexample, K-DOP con-cluded that “the electionprocess, while fraught with a range of logistical andother hitches, was a process of which the Kenyanpeople can be proud and which is broadly reflective oftheir democratic will.” The EU largely concurred andfound that the elections marked an important stepforward for democracy in Kenya and that problemswith the voters roll on election day did not adverselyaffect the overall election results.

Some of the problems observed by the Centerinvolved the actual voting process. For example, there

was considerable crossing of lines by voters insidethe polling stations as they cast their ballots for thevarious elections. There was also apparent confusionon the part of voters over which ballot paper wentto which box. Although each ballot box was marked

with a color correspond-ing to each ballot paper,the potential remainedfor mistakes and, there-fore, a high number ofrejected ballots duringthe counting process.Moreover, the deputy

presiding officers were often distracted by problemswith voters whose names did not appear on thevoters roll and were, therefore, unable to adequatelysupervise this aspect of the voting.

Outside the polling stations the peaceful atmospherewas conducive to the free flow of people in the pollingstreams, and there were only minor instances ofintimidation or excessive crowding observed. CarterCenter observers were generally positive about thepresence and behavior of police at polling stations.

Overall, election day problemsdid not appear to affect the results

adversely.

Kenyans lined up outsidemultiple voting stations atmany locations such asthis Nairobi school.

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In a limited number of instances, observers felt thatthe police appeared to do little to control people atcrowded polling stations. Of a more serious naturewere reports of vote buying at several polling stations,but these incidents could not be adequately investigated.

In accordance with ECK regulations, those stationsthat opened late remained open to make up the losttime from the morning. The counting process wasgenerally well-conducted and proceeded relativelysmoothly, quickly, and transparently, especially consid-ering that this was the first time that the process wasconducted at polling stations. In several countingstations it was noted that counting officials had tomake many references to their training manuals on thecounting procedures. Another notable observation wasthe absence of calculators from the materials suppliedto each polling station; their provision would haveexpedited the process.

Overall, the Center’s observers visited 212 pollingstations across seven of Kenya’s eight provinces,representing about 200,000 voters. The delegation’s

consensus was thatthe voting processfunctioned normallyor with only minorproblems in thestations visited, withonly a few problemsof a more seriousnature. (See Appen-dix 9 for a summaryreport of the observerchecklists.)

On the basis ofthe debriefings and ameeting of theleaders of the mainobserver groups, aCarter Center staffteam started draftingthe preliminaryassessment. On

Dec. 29, President Kaunda and Ambassador Streebdelivered the preliminary statement on behalf of thefull delegation, noting that while voting had ended,the Center would continue to observe the ongoingelectoral processes before making a final assessment.(See Appendix 10.)

The statement noted the historic importance ofthe elections, marking the succession to PresidentMoi. The statement noted several positive aspectsabout the process, including the peaceful atmosphereand the generally well-conducted polls. Severalconcerns about the voting process were also reported,including the late opening of polls, the high number ofvoters per polling station, and the inconsistent han-dling of assisted voters. The statement also noted thatthe counting and tabulation processes were generallywell-administered. The main points in the statementare discussed in more detail below.

Turnout and conduct. The statement commendedthe people of Kenya for their conduct on election dayand the generally calm atmosphere in which polling

President Kaunda speaks with voters outside a polling station.

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took place. The Center also noted the enthusiasticresponse of Kenyans and the positive voter turnout(subsequently numbered at 57 percent). The Centerpraised the professionalism and impartiality displayedby the commission and its staff. Likewise, the Centernoted the strong presence of party agents and non-partisan observers at nearly all polling stations, most ofwhom performed their tasks with careful attention tothe voting procedures. The statement also remarkedhow pleased the Center was with the positive rapportthat existed among party agents, observers, electionofficials, and voters.

The statement also recorded several positiveaspects that contributed to peaceful elections, such asthe electoral commission’s commitment to enforce-ment of the electoral code of conduct and handingdown judgments in several cases involving bribery,attempted rigging, and political intimidation. TheCenter also recognized that despite the fears of elec-tion day violence, security officials maintained a lowprofile yet helped to facilitate the right to vote withoutfear of intimidation or harassment. In the end there

were few reported security problems on election day.Voting process. The statement noted logistical and

administrative problems. While many polling stationsopened on time, about one-third of the stations visitedopened late, even though most of them had their fullstaff complement and necessary election materials. Inaddition, although polling officials were generallycompetent, they had difficulty processing votersquickly. Consequently, many voters were forced toendure long lines and extremely long waits in order tocast their ballots. Once inside the polling station,voters faced a cumbersome voting process, furtherslowed by the tripartite elections.

The statement suggested that better planningmight have helped to avoid some election day prob-lems. For example, it was noted that polling streams ateach polling station had to process up to 1,000 voters,and officials had to page through the voters register forthe entire center. In places where there were up to 21polling streams, the result was a very slow process ofchecking for voters’ names. The statement advised theECK to consider reducing the number of voters per

Carter center observersJose Maria Aranaz (left)and Okon Akiba (right)

listen to voters whosenames did not appear on

the voters roll.

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polling stream and dividing the voters register intoappropriate and manageable segments to enhance theefficiency of the polling process.

An additional example of a failure to plan properlywas the ECK’s last-minute changes concerning thevoters register. While the overall number of affectedvoters appears to have been minimal and of no conse-quence to the overall result, more attention to thevoter registration process before the elections wouldhave ensured that as few Kenyans as possible weredisenfranchised on election day. In a more positivevein, Carter Center observers reported that manypresiding officers sought to resolve problems as impar-tially and efficiently as possible.

Carter Center observers were particularly con-cerned about the lack of voter secrecy for assistedvoters and the inconsistent application of electionprocedures in this regard. The statement noted that inseveral cases assisted voting was conducted in full viewof party agents, observers, and other voters in thepolling station. In other cases, it appears that theprovision of assisted voting for illiterate voters mayhave been abused, with an unusually high number

of voters demanding such assistance in some stationsand few or none in others. It is not immediately clearif these instances of high numbers of assisted votersreflected an attempt to commit voter fraud. However,the Center advised the electoral commission to reviewthis aspect of the electoral law.

Finally, the statement concluded that more civiceducation on all aspects of the voting process, as wellas more intensive training for polling officials, couldimprove the overall quality of elections in Kenya.

Counting and tabulation. The statement recordedthe Center’s approval of the decision to amend theelectoral law to enable counting at polling stations andthereby to enhance the transparency of the electoralprocess. Owing to the late opening of many pollingstations, the Center observers indicated that manystations closed later than 6:00 p.m., and counting,therefore, got underway late in the evening. Despitethe challenges of fatigue on the part of electionofficials, party agents, and observers, Carter Centerdelegates observed only minor irregularities during thecounting process. For example, in some places theprocess did not allow party agents and nonpartisan

Party agents anddomestic observers keptwatch on the votingprocess.

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observers to inspect the ballot papers adequately.However, these problems did not raise any concernsabout the fairness and accuracy of the results, and thestatement reported that the counting was conducted ina sufficiently transparent manner. The statementconcluded that these difficulties could be avoided withmore hands-on training for polling officials and partyagents.

The Center’s observers reported that the tabula-tion process was well-managed and conducted in thepresence of enthusiastic but disciplined candidates,

party agents, and observers. The statement alsonoted that the results announced at the constitu-ency tally centers were received without acrimonyor violence. However, the transparency of theprocess could be improved with more visible postingof results in the tally centers and the use of publicaddress systems to ensure that all participants mayfollow the process accordingly.

Other observer statements from the EU, theCommonwealth, and K-DOP generally concurredwith the Carter Center’s preliminary statement.K-DOP deplored the role of violence during theparty primaries and the use of state resources, such asKBC, to the advantage of KANU. However, thedomestic monitors praised the generally peacefuland well-organized conduct of the elections.

ANNOUNCEMENT OF OFFICIAL

RESULTS

Subsequent to the release of the Center’s preliminary statement, events surrounding

the final results moved very rapidly.Charter Hall in downtown Nairobi was to serve as acentralized ECK results center, but in practice thisdid not happen, as events overtook the resultsprocess. The Kenyan media tracked results as theywere tabulated at the constituency tally centers andreported these to the public. By the afternoon ofDec. 28, it was already clear that Mwai Kibaki washeaded to victory. As a result, KANU presidentialcandidate Uhuru Kenyatta conceded defeat early inthe afternoon of Dec. 29 and publicly accepted therole as leader of the official opposition.

However, when ECK called a press conference onthe afternoon of Dec. 29 to announce that it did notyet have sufficient official results, the commission waspressured by the large crowd of NARC supporters todeclare Mwai Kibaki as president. Bowing to thispublic pressure, several hours later ECK announcedthat based on unofficial results, Kibaki was indeed thewinner and president-elect of Kenya. NARC leaders

A Kenyan voter casts his ballot at an outdoor pollingstation.

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called for the immediate inauguration of MwaiKibaki the following day.

On Dec. 30, President Kaunda paid a privatecourtesy call on President Moi prior to Mwai Kibaki’sinauguration. Carter Center observers attending theinauguration reported that the very large crowdassembled was joyous and euphoric. The ceremonywas quite chaotic and disorganized, owing to thedecision to hold the event at such short notice.

Official resultswere announcedon Jan. 3. Accord-ing to the electorallaw, official resultscan only be an-nounced uponreceipt of completedforms from all 210returning officers.These results mustthen be gazettedfor 24 hours before

the president-elect may be inaugurated. Upon announc-ing the results, the ECK chair stated, “There was agreat deal of pressure from NARC leaders and theirsupporters that the declaration of the results bemade nevertheless. Between the demands of the lawand those of the people, the ECK chose to obey thelatter. It declared Hon. Mwai Kibaki the new presi-dent. It was a political rather than a legal decision. Butthe final results have confirmed that the decision was,after all, correct in law.”

Political party No. of seats No. of women elected MPs

National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) 125 8Kenya African National Union (KANU) 64 1FORD-People 14 0Safina 2 0FORD-Asili 2 0Sisi Kwa Sisi 2 0Shirikisho 1 0

Source: Electoral Commission of Kenya

Carter Centerobserver Amy

Hamelin takes noteof the voting processin a tent serving as a

polling station.

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According to official results, Kibaki received3,646,277 votes to Kenyatta’s 1,835,890. Kibakireceived the necessary 25 percent of the vote in alleight provinces. (A minimum of five is required. SeeAppendix 11 for full results.) Voter turnout for thepresidential election was 57 percent.

In the parliamentary elections, NARC won 125seats against KANU’s 64, and other parties shared theremaining 21 seats. The LDP won the largest share ofNARC seats with 59, followed by the DP with 39,FORD-Kenya with 21, and National Party of Kenya(NPK) with six. While this distribution of seats gaveformer KANU members the largest single share ofseats, National Alliance of Kenya members (NAK –the original opposition coalition) still total morewith 66.

A total of nine women were elected to Parliament,the most ever for Kenya. (See Appendix 12 for fullresults.)

Presidential candidate Total votes received

Mwai Kibaki 3,646,277Uhuru Kenyatta 1,835,890Simeon Nyachae 345,152James A. Orengo 24,524David N. Waweru 10,061Total valid votes 5,975,809Voter turnout 57.178%

Source: Electoral Commission of Kenya

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Although the majority of Carter Centerdelegates left Kenya by Dec. 30, a team of 10Carter Center staff and MTOs remained on

the ground to monitor the postelection situation atselected sites throughout the country and at thenational headquarters of the ECK in Nairobi. TheMTOs were coordinated initially by the Center’smission director in Nairobi, David Pottie, withassistance from Tynesha Green and Janet Tinsley ofthe Center, Amy Hamelin, and later by John Chipeta,a former electoral commissioner from Malawi.

John Chipeta and four other MTOs remainedin Kenya until the end of January 2003. The MTOswere deployed to Nairobi, Embu, Nanyuki, Nakuru,Mombassa, Kwale, Eldoret, Kitale, Nyanza, Kisii,and Kakamega for varying lengths of time.

Prior to the elections it was feared that a closeelection result or a contested process might erupt inpostelection conflict. Therefore, the Center planned

to retain a presence in Kenya until well after theconclusion of the polling process. As it happened, theimmediate postelection period in Kenya was peaceful,and all contestants accepted the overall results.

Over the course of January, the MTOs reviewedissues that had been prominent throughout the entireelectoral process. The MTOs noted that both theelection officials and the major parties recognized theneed to improve future elections, and both seemedgenuinely disposed to work expeditiously to developand implement recommendations for electoral reforms.

JANUARY 2003: POSTELECTION OBSERVATION

Many Kenyans also called intoquestion the overall independence of

the ECK.

Delegation co-leaderGordon Streeb sharedthe Center’s preliminaryobservations with themedia on election day.

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Most respondents indicated general appreciationfor the role of the ECK in the conduct of the electionsand noted that election officials appeared to be bettertrained than in the past. However, some womencandidates and civil society organizations indicatedthat men had been favored in ECK recruitment ofelection officials and called for improved recruitmentguidelines.

Many Kenyans alsocalled into question theoverall independence ofthe ECK. For example, thecommission had relied onthe district commissioners(DCs) to disburse commis-sion funds because the ECK lacked capacity at districtlevel. Since the president of Kenya appointed theDCs, the ECK recognized that this arrangementpotentially undermines the independence of the ECK.However, until the ECK budget is increased to enhanceits capacity, ECK officials felt they had no alternativebut to rely on the DCs.

A number of other recommendations suggested tothe Center MTOs are included in a subsequent sectionof this report.

TRANSFER OF POWEROverall, the transfer of power in Kenya was

conducted peacefully, and on balance, cautiously, withPresident Kibaki seeking to mix old and new faces.

Mwai Kibaki named his new Cabinet on Jan. 3,just days after his inauguration. He reduced the overallsize of the Cabinet from Moi’s 39 to 24. In anothersignificant departure from past practices, Kibakiannounced his Cabinet at an open press conferenceon the State House grounds, rather than having hisappointments announced on the KBC news.

The Cabinet is comprised of 12 members ofKibaki’s Democratic Party (DP), nine from the LiberalDemocratic Party (LDP), three from FORD Kenya,and one from the National Party of Kenya (NPK).

The Cabinet included several former senior KANUmembers who held Cabinet positions in PresidentMoi’s government. Former Vice President GeorgeSaitoti became minister of education, KalonzoMusyoka was appointed minister of foreign affairs, andRaila Odinga was assigned to roads and public works.FORD Kenya leader Kijana Walmalwa was appointed

vice president. Threewomen, including 1997SDP presidential candi-date Charity Ngiluappointed as minister ofhealth, were appointedto Cabinet as fullministers, and an addi-

tional three women were named deputy ministers. Inregional terms, Cabinet members were appointed fromall eight provinces.

Despite this balancing act, several members of theLDP publicly expressed their dissatisfaction about theirparty not receiving more Cabinet positions. Within hisfirst two months in office, Kibaki’s new governmentestablished a steady pace of reform, with significantchanges in senior positions in government, military,and the judiciary.

By the end of February, Kibaki had replaced thehead of the public service and 10 other permanentsecretaries; the head of the army had resigned; a newpolice commissioner was appointed; and 37 districtcommissioners were transferred or redeployed.

Pressure also mounted over the course of Januaryfor the resignation of Chief Justice Bernard Chunga forhis failure to fight corruption in the judiciary. The LawSociety of Kenya and others led a public campaign forhis resignation. They petitioned President Kibakiunder sec. 62 of the constitution that calls for theappointment of a tribunal if a question arises over theconduct of the chief justice. Finally, on Feb. 25,President Kibaki formally accepted the chief justice’sresignation.

In policy terms, the new government movedrapidly to fulfill its promise of free primary education,

Women candidates routinely facedharassment from male counterparts

during campaigning.

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attention to anti-graft and anti-corruption initiatives,and the revival of the constitutional review process.

WOMEN’S PARTICIPATIONThe representation of women in the political

arena is consistently low in Kenya. It took six yearsafter independence for the first woman to break intothe national political arena and become a member ofParliament. With the introduction of multipartydemocracy in 1992, women had great hopes of secur-ing political positions. However, between 1992 and2002, there were never more than eight women MPsout of 220 total.

The 2002 elections marginally advanced women’sparticipation in the political arena, but women’sexperiences from past elections were not significantlydifferent in this election. It was not uncommon tohear Kenyans comment during this election periodthat female candidates had little support from eitherwomen ormen. Reasonsgiven for thisincludedattitudes thatwomen arenot able tolead, womencannotmaintain theirfamilies andhold publicoffice simulta-neously, andsome womencandidatescome fromtroubledfamilies,which reflectedpoorly on theirreputation. At

the same time, women candidates routinely facedharassment from male counterparts during campaign-ing. Although the media reported no substantialincidents of mudslinging, women candidates in factreported this as being a problem, although mudslingingwas never officially recognized in relation to femalecandidates. This led to some women dropping out ofraces altogether.

The participation of women voters was said to beencouraging; however, it was observed in some areasthat a significant number of these women were assistedvoters. Since assistance of voters was problematic dueto compromised voter secrecy, women’s privacy mayhave been disproportionately breeched in some partsof the country. In some polling stations, assistance towomen voters was overwhelming, and observerssuspected that parties might have preyed upon illiteratefemale populations by persuading them to sell their votes.

The positive impact that this election had onwomen’s participation was a marked increase in the

Ambassador Streeb, President Kaunda, and David Pottie present the delegation’s preliminarystatement to the media at a Dec. 29 press conference.

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number of women in Parliament and women appointedto ministerial positions. Despite the unique challengesthat female candidates faced, a total of nine womenwere elected to Parliament (4.5 percent). Althoughwomen enjoy only a small percentage of the seatsin Parliament, their showing in 2002 is a record inKenya. Additionally, the new president appointedan unprecedented number of female ministers (six).Political parties responded to calls for more womenin Parliament by assigning seven of the 12 nominatedseats to women (five from NARC, two from KANU).These appointments bring the total number of womenin Parliament to 16, the highest ever for Kenya. Atthe local level, 97 women were elected to civic seats,only 4.6 percent of the total 2,093 seats.

ELECTION PETITIONSIn the days following the elections, the Kenyan

media reported a significant number of potentialelection petitions, most of them from NARC.

Any elector or candidate can file an electionpetition if he or she thinks there has been malpracticeduring the election. An election petition is not anordinary civil suit, but rather treated as a contest inwhich the whole constituency is involved. Electionpetitions are tried by the High Court of the state

involved and, if upheld, may lead to the restaging ofthe election in that constituency. Election petitionsmust be filed within 28 days of the publication of finalresults. The deadline for submission of election peti-tions was Jan. 31, 2003, with a total of 27 electionpetition cases filed in the courts. Of these 27 cases,NARC has initiated 15; KANU six; Umma PatrioticParty of Kenya one; FORD People one; and privateindividuals four.

While it is notable that the complainants havesought to use the proper channel of the courts toaddress their concerns, there are several areas ofconcern with regards to Kenya’s petition process. First,election petitions impose a very high financial thresh-old, with petitioners facing a security charge for costsof Ksh 250,000. Second, the MTOs reported that theylacked confidence in the ability of most party agents topresent systematic and tangible evidence to strengthenthe grounds for election petitions. Third, the courtshave taken a very long time to rule on previouselection petitions. Following the 1997 elections, manyof the 27 election petitions lingered in the courts untillate 1998, and at least five did not receive rulings untillate 1999. Mwai Kibaki’s own petition against Danielarap Moi’s election as president was among the last toreceive a ruling and was dismissed in December 1999.

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Akey challenge of democratization in Kenyais to balance the ongoing need for politicalreconciliation and accommodation with the

divisive tendencies of electoral competition. The 2002elections were an important benchmark in Kenya’spolitical history, and the country showed positive signsof a maturing political system. These elections werethe first time that a united opposition mounted asuccessful campaign in support of a single presidentialcandidate. Although there were problems during thecampaign period, the political parties campaignedwidely, and largely peacefully. The elections were alsogenerally well-conducted, and withvoter turnout of 57percent, the majority ofKenyans demonstratedtheir confidence in theprocess through theirparticipation.

Although Center observers did not report anymajor systematic irregularities, there were technicalproblems with preparations for the elections, includingconfusion over the regulations for the voter registra-tion requirements on election day. Election day itselfwas peaceful and orderly.

The Center was also impressed with the efforts ofthe domestic observers, particularly the Kenya Domes-tic Observers Programme (K-DOP) that deployed19,000 observers, enough to cover all 18,000 stations.K-DOP was able to assign three observers per con-stituency in the months before the elections andmaintained these observers in the postelection period.K-DOP was an impressive faith-based and NGOeffort, calling on Catholic and Protestant churchesand Muslim and Hindu associations. The presenceof international observers from the EU, the Common-wealth, and the African Union demonstrated

international interest in and support for Kenya’sdemocratic process.

While there were concerns about how the transferof power would be handled, as Kenya had never had todo so before, in the end there was no crisis and allgovernment activities were handed over smoothly.Despite this relatively smooth succession, there aremany challenging issues facing President Kibaki andhis new government. The Center’s MTOs were alertedto some of the following concerns:

Constitutional reform. The constitutional reviewprocess was stalled by thedissolution of Parliamentprior to the elections. TheNARC government haspledged to continue theconstitutional reviewprocess, chaired by Profes-sor Yash Pal Ghai of the

Constitution of Kenya Review Commission (CKRC).However, the review process was plagued by controversyand frequent infighting among the commissioners,and it now must be handled by a new coalitiongovernment.

Election promises. The new government must alsofind the means to satisfy the raised expectations ofKenyans that the election promises of free primaryeducation, judicial reform, and tough anti-corruptionlegislation will be enacted. Although NARC deliveredon its education promises immediately in January2003, paying for them over the long run will requirethe committed reform of the public service and receiverof revenue. With many members of the former rulingKANU now in the new NARC government, it maynot be easy to deliver on the anti-corruption promises.However, if NARC fails to deliver on this broad anti-corruption and public sector reform agenda, then

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The people of Kenya clearly votedfor change in 2002.

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Kenyans may turn their frustration not only againstthe coalition government but also against electoralparticipation itself.

Political parties. The Kenyan party system has beendramatically reshaped by the 2002 elections. UhuruKenyatta and KANU find themselves in oppositionafter 40 years in power. While the NARC coalitionhas arrived in office with great promise, maintaining acoalition, especially in the context of a very high rateof party defections during the 2002 party primaries,will be very difficult for President Kibaki. Kenyanvoters expressed their will for change, and this shouldbe respected. The parties themselves have much workto do in the coming years if they are to redress theweaknesses observed during the candidate nominationprocess. Kenyan political parties can meet the needs oftheir supporters if they commit themselves to improvedintraparty democracy and party primaries and enhancethe opportunity for the participation of women inelections.

Economic development. Poverty alleviation remainsKenya’s primary challenge as the country faces a highlevel of total external debt, low rate of GDP growth,and a lack of international donor support. Delivery onthe domestic agenda may improve relations on theinternational front, and both the international com-munity and Kenyans appear to have a renewed sense ofconfidence that political change can lead to nationalrenewal.

The conclusions and recommendations below arenot comprehensive but reflect observations madeduring the Center’s engagement with the 2002 elec-tions during December 2002 and January 2003. Inorder to facilitate electoral reform, the Center offersthe following conclusions and recommendations:

CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND

ELECTORAL FRAMEWORKConstitutional review remains a key priority for

the new government of Kenya. The Center urges thegovernment to fulfill its promise to the people ofKenya to complete this process that was begun by the

Kenyans celebrateat PresidentKibaki’sinaugurationceremony inNairobi.

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previous KANU administration. A change of electoralsystem from the current single-member constituency toa multimember proportional system has been proposedby the CKRC. Whatever the choice of electoralsystem, it is the responsibility of the government ofKenya and the electoral authorities to communicateadequately this system and its operation to the peopleof Kenya.

DEMARCATIONThe constitution of Kenya has set the minimum

number of constituencies between 188 and 210. Acommon concern expressed during Kenya’s 2002constitutional review process is that constituencies areexcessively varied in size and population, often to theadvantage of the then ruling party. Moreover, thecurrent constituency demarcation has tended toexacerbate the politics of region and ethnicity, suchthat the political parties now seek to mobilize voters inthese terms. The ECK, in coordination with otherrelevant government agencies, should initiate athorough review of the legislative basis for demarca-tion and establish the appropriate structures for areassessment of Kenya’s current electoral boundaries.

INDEPENDENCE OF ECKMany Kenyans felt that the ECK performed its

responsibilities in a more nonpartisan manner than inprevious elections. However, some feel that with morethan 20 members the ECK is too large and that not allof the members behaved in a nonpartisan manner. Atpresent, the system of presidential appointment to theECK leaves out key stakeholders in the electionprocess, such as members of civil society and theprivate sector. The terms of appointment should beclarified, and a consultative mechanism that enablesParliament to play a meaningful role in the nomina-tion process should be considered.

ECK administrative independence would befurther enhanced were it to report directly to Parlia-ment for budget support. Moreover, the current ECK

administration relies on the district commissioneroffices to manage its finances at the district levelrather than the offices of its own returning officers. Itis particularly worrisome to have such an arrangementin a country where public administrators at the provin-cial and district levels are appointees of the presidentand commonly involved in partisan activities favoringthe president’s political party. ECK capacity should bebuilt to ensure that the commission may fulfill itsconstitutional mandate in an impartial and indepen-dent manner.

TIMING OF ELECTIONSMany Kenyans expressed the view that December

is inappropriate for holding elections since the countryexperiences one of its rainy seasons at this time. Therains present logistical challenges to the ECK, limitaccessibility to remote areas, and may negatively affectvoter turnout.

A number of alternatives may be considered. Themandate to determine the date for polling could restwith the ECK or be incorporated in the constitution.In any case, the election date should be outside therainy season.

RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING OF

ELECTION OFFICIALSThe recruitment of poll workers is the responsibil-

ity of district-level ECK personnel. The Center heardreports from across the country alleging that in somedistricts the recruitment was seriously affected bybribery and corruption to the extent that trainedofficials in some cases were dropped in favor of thosewho bribed those conducting the recruitment.

The ECK is commended for the training manualsit produced for the elections. However, the training ofpresiding officers and their deputies at the district levelwas reportedly a cause for concern. The training roomswere overcrowded, with poor or no public addressfacilities and little or no individual attention paid toparticipants.

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Furthermore, following the elections there werecomplaints by many ad hoc staff of late payment ornonpayment of their wages for work completed before,during, and after election day. Most election officialsworked many long and hard hours, often under diffi-cult circumstances, and are to be congratulated fortheir efforts. The ECK should review its arrangementsto ensure efficient disbursement of payments to ad hocofficials.

The ECK should review its recruitment andtraining procedures to ensure that its staff is recruitedthrough a transparent, accountable, and nonpartisanprocess and that they receive timely and adequatetraining. Special consideration should be given toensuring that women are adequately represented aselection officials.

CANDIDATE NOMINATIONSThe Center heard several reports about the often

chaotic, and sometimes conflictive, nature of the partyprimaries. The process was also characterized by partydefections and double nominations. While the Centerrecognizes the unique character of aspects of Kenya’s2002 elections, particularly the challenges posed by theformation of a multiparty coalition, the principles ofintraparty democracy must also be maintained. Allparties should review their internal candidate nomina-tion procedures to ensure maximum opportunity forcompetitive and fair intraparty democracy.

VOTER REGISTRATIONThe Center is encouraged that the electoral law

has been amended to allow for continuous registrationof voters. In order to facilitate this process, the govern-ment of Kenya must ensure that all Kenyan citizens areable to acquire a national identity card. Moreover, theECK must be adequately funded in order to implementcontinuous voter registration.

VOTER EDUCATIONThe ECK should be properly funded in order to

implement voter education. Where possible, ECKshould examine how it may work in partnership withcivil society organizations and political parties inter-ested in undertaking voter education.

WOMEN’S PARTICIPATIONThe participation of women in all aspects of the

polling process is an important goal of all democracies.Some countries have introduced special thresholds orquotas to encourage more women candidates to comeforward or to raise the overall number of women inelected office. The current level of women’s participa-tion in Kenya’s electoral process is poor, and measuresshould be taken to build on the efforts of those womenwho have succeeded in winning elected office.

These measures should include provision ofcampaign training to aspiring and elected women;inclusion of gender dynamics in general civic educa-tion to raise awareness of the barriers to women’sparticipation and the means to overcome them;creation of a women’s caucus in Parliament to raiseawareness of women’s issues among elected members;encouragement of media institutions to raise theprofile of women’s issues during elections; andincreased reporting on women candidates andtheir platforms.

CORRUPTION IN THE

ELECTORAL PROCESSThe Center heard many reports of the misuse of

state resources during the election campaigns as well asthe general use of money to solicit votes and/or topurchase voter cards. While the electoral law currentlyprohibits these and other forms of electoral miscon-duct, all parties and candidates must work with theelectoral authorities to ensure the effective enforce-ment of these prohibitions.

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At present, political parties do not receive publicfunding nor is party finance in general subject toregulation. As in other countries, regulation of partyfinance through clearly articulated regulations oncampaign spending limits, disclosure of campaigncontributions, and proper accounting of party andcandidate expenditure helps to build confidence in theintegrity of political parties and the electoral process.Kenya should undertake a legislative review to redressthese inadequacies.

MEDIA REFORMBalanced media coverage and equitable access for

political party advertisements are important aspects ofa level playing field during election campaigns. Mediamonitor reports indicate that news coverage wasstrongly biased in favor of the ruling KANU. Althoughcurrent regulations seek to balance the coverage ofcontesting parties on the public electronic media suchas the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation, the ECK isunable to adequately rule on the content of newsbroadcasts that may be of a partisan nature. A thor-ough review of the broadcast regulations duringelections as well as the introduction of an independentbroadcast authority would lay the foundation for moreequitable and nonpartisan election coverage.

CONFLICT MANAGEMENTThe Carter Center was pleased to note that for the

first time the ECK enforced a code of conduct for thepolitical parties during the 2002 elections. Severalcandidates from the ruling party and the oppositionwere publicly reprimanded, and fines were handeddown for violations of the electoral law. This experi-ence should serve as the basis for more systematic andearlier monitoring and intervention by ECK in futureelections.

The Center also commends the ECK’s introductionof “peace committees” to serve as conflict managementbodies. Although the Center was unable to evaluatethe functioning of these bodies, they are a welcome

beginning and they should be introduced nationwidein subsequent elections. There is growing experiencein several African countries with similar bodiescomprised of trained representatives from the electoralauthorities, civil society, police, and political partieswho serve to enhance communication and conflictmanagement.

The ECK should also improve liaison and commu-nication with political parties, police, and civil societythrough the establishment of committees that meetregularly at the national, provincial, and district levelsduring the election period.

OBSERVERS AND PARTY AGENTSThe Center commends the efforts of all Kenyan

civil society organizations that participated in the 2002elections. In particular, the Center was impressed bythe level of effort and organization of those groupsinvolved in the Kenya Domestic Observers Programme(K-DOP). This capacity should be sustained so thatcivil society may continue to play an active role inKenyan political life.

The recruitment and training of party agents tomonitor the polls are the responsibility of politicalparties and candidates. However, the uneven caliber ofthose deployed to conduct this most important jobundermines the ability of parties to make a compre-hensive assessment of polling day. Political partiesshould take advantage of the opportunity to identifyand train agents well in advance of the elections andensure that they have the appropriate referencematerials on hand. While the parties should retain theresponsibility to recruit their agents, the ECK shouldassist parties to train the agents and provide them withreference materials.

VOTING PROCESSBallot paper design – The differently colored ballot

papers for the presidential and parliamentary ballotshould clearly match the colors on the correspondingballot boxes to avoid confusion for the voters and

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reduce the potential number of spoiled ballots. Thesymbols and overall size of the ballot paper should bereviewed to ensure maximum comprehension for allvoters, including the illiterate. Ballot papers shouldalso include the name of the political party.

Ballot boxes – The use of transparent ballot boxeswould increase confidence in the electoral process.

Voters roll– There were many observed cases ofpeople being turned away at a polling station onpolling day because their names were not on the roll.Although the Center was unable to determine howmany voters were affected, these problems do notappear to have adversely affected the overall electionresult. The ECK must ensure that its voter registrationprocedures are clearly communicated to voters, parties,and election officials well in advance of election day soas to avoid possible disenfranchisement of voters orpossible election day conflicts. A copy of the votersroll should be posted at each polling station to enablevoters to determine if they are at the correct pollinglocation. A well-publicized period of public inspectionof the voters roll and consistent regulations for theadmission of eligible voters on election day are neces-sary steps to achieve this goal.

Voters per station – With 1,000 voters per pollingstation, and often with multiple stations per location,the potential number of people at some places could bevery large, creating potential queues, bottlenecks, anda slow voting process. The voters roll should bedivided into the relevant segments of 1,000 voters toenable polling officials to quickly identify each voteron the roll.

Assisted voting – Carter Center observers wereconcerned about the large number of voters, particu-larly women in some places, who received assistedvoting. Also, in some cases, voters received assistancefrom party agents while in other cases, due to mistrustfor those chosen to assist, voters were made to announcetheir choice in the presence of party agents. Thesepractices failed to protect the secrecy of the ballot.

The electoral law should be amended to allow only thephysically impaired to seek assistance during voting.ECK should ensure that all election officials and partyagents understand that in accordance with the currentregulations, only one person of the voter’s choice, whois of the age of majority, may assist the voter uponswearing an oath.

COUNTING, TABULATION, AND

ANNOUNCEMENT OF RESULTSIn a significant improvement, ECK officials

counted ballot papers in the polling stations followingthe completion of polling, thereby enhancing confi-dence in the overall process. In an additional measurethat boosted confidence in the results, all party agentswere able to sign and receive a copy of the preliminaryresults from the polling station. These results were alsoposted outside the station. However, although judgednot to have affected the overall results, the Centerobserved considerable variation in the overall handlingof the counting process and therefore recommends thatthe ECK place renewed emphasis on the countingprocess in its training of election officials.

The tabulation process at constituency level wasalso handled efficiently. But while conducted in thefull view of party agents, candidates, other observers,and security forces, this aspect of the process remainsinsufficiently transparent. The tabulation processtypically occurred in large halls where it was difficultfor candidates, agents, or observers to review adequatelythose ballots marked disputed or rejected for consider-ation by the returning officer. Even though a publicannouncement of the results was made followingcompletion of the process, greater opportunity could beafforded to those gathered. All results should be postedat the tabulation centers.

The ECK should also establish a process for thefastest possible delivery of the declaration of resultsfrom returning officers. In 2002 the president wasinaugurated prior to ECK receipt of all constituencyresults, in clear contravention of the electoral law.

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PETITIONSThe Center is pleased that those political parties

with concerns about the electoral process have takentheir concerns to the properly constituted authoritiesin the form of election petitions. However, the elec-tion petition process in Kenya is marked by a highthreshold that may pose excessive barriers to anaccessible review process that is conducted in a timelymanner. Security costs remain high, and previouselection petitions have taken years to work their waythrough the courts. Kenya should review how toimprove the access and speed with which it deals withelection petitions and other forms of electoral disputes.

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APPENDICES

1. ECK Invitation to Observe Elections2. Voter Registration Roll3. Election Deployment Plan4. Observation of Opening Form5. Observation of Polling Form6. Observation of Closing/Counting Form7. Observation of Tally Form8. Special Report Form9. Summary of Carter Center Observations10. December 29 Statement11. Presidential Election Results12. Parliamentary Election Results13. Selected News Articles

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APPENDIX 1

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APPENDIX 2

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APPENDIX 3

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APPENDIX 4

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APPENDIX 5

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APPENDIX 6

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APPENDIX 7

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APPENDIX 8

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APPENDIX 9

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APPENDIX 10

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APPENDIX 11

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APPENDIX 12

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APPENDIX 13

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Overview: The Carter Center was founded in1982 by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and hiswife, Rosalynn, in partnership with Emory University,to advance peace and health worldwide. A nongovern-mental organization, the Center has helped to improvelife for people in more than 65 countries by resolvingconflicts; advancing democracy, human rights, andeconomic opportunity; preventing diseases; improvingmental health care; and teaching farmers to increasecrop production.

Accomplishments: The Center has observed 45elections in 23 countries; helped farmers double ortriple grain production in 15 African countries;mediated or worked to prevent civil and internationalconflicts worldwide; intervened to prevent unnecessarydiseases in Latin America and Africa, including thenear eradication of Guinea worm disease; and strivedto diminish the stigma against mental illness.

Budget: $33.9 million 2001-2002 operatingbudget.

Donations: The Center is a 501 (c)(3) charitableorganization, financed by private donations fromindividuals, foundations, corporations, and interna-tional development assistance agencies. Contributionsby U.S. citizens and companies are tax-deductible asallowed by law.

Facilities: The nondenominational Cecil B. DayChapel and other facilities are available for weddings,corporate retreats and meetings, and other specialevents. For information, (404) 420-5112.

Internships: The Center’s internship program hasbeen rated one of America’s best by the PrincetonReview.

Location: In a 35-acre park, about 1.5 miles east ofdowntown Atlanta. The Jimmy Carter Library andMuseum, which adjoins the Center, is owned andoperated by the National Archives and Records Ad-ministration and is open to the public. (404) 331-3942.

Staff: 150 employees, based primarily in Atlanta.

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ONE COPENHILL

453 FREEDOM PARKWAY

ATLANTA, GA 30307

(404) 420-5100 ◆ FAX (404) 420-5145W W W . C A RT E R C E N T E R . O R G

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