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The Carter Center 2004Indonesia Election Report

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THE CARTER CENTER 2004INDONESIA ELECTION REPORT

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THE CARTER CENTER

THE CARTER CENTER 2004 INDONESIA ELECTION REPORT

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Carter Center Election Observation Delegations and Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3

Terms and Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8

Foreword by Jimmy Carter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10

Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13

Background to the 2004 Indonesian Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18

Carter Center Election Observation Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23

General Election Issues: Carter Center Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27

Legislative Elections: April 5, 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47

First-round Presidential Election: July 5, 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50

Coalition-building for the Second Round . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .59

Second-round Presidential Election: Sept. 20, 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .61

The New Governing Coalition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67

Regional Issues and Special Circumstances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .69

Conclusions and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75

Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .79

The Carter Center at a Glance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .97

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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CARTER CENTER ELECTION OBSERVATIONDELEGATIONS AND STAFF

JULY 5, 2004

DELEGATION LEADERSHIP

Jimmy Carter, Former President of the United States of AmericaRosalynn Carter, Former First Lady of the United States of AmericaChuan Leekpai, Former Prime Minister of Thailand

DELEGATION

Amb. (ret.) Robert Barry (United States), Former U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia and Consultant on Election IssuesMr. Shane Barter (Canada), Long-term Observer, The Carter CenterMs. Ellen Bork (United States), Deputy Director, Project for the New American CenturyMs. Allison Bridges (United States), Long-term Observer, The Carter CenterMs. Cecilia Bylesjö (Sweden), Long-term Observer, The Carter CenterMr. Jeff Carter (United States), Assistant Project Director, The Carter CenterMs. Joanne Cheah (Australia), Long-term Observer, The Carter CenterMr. Edward Chesky (United States), International Economist and Consultant on Government PolicyMr. Kevin Colborne (Canada), ConsultantMr. James Combe (Australia), Development ConsultantMr. Robert Delfs (United States), Consultant on Government RelationsMr. Dana Robert Dillon (United States), Senior Policy Analyst, The Heritage FoundationMr. Chris Felley (United States), Long-term Observer, The Carter CenterMr. Scott Flipse (United States), Senior Policy Adviser, U.S. Commission on International Religious FreedomMr. Dan Getz (United States), Professional Staff for Representative Dan Burton, R-Ind.Mr. Johan Grundberg (Sweden), Long-term Observer, The Carter CenterDr. John Hardman (United States), Executive Director, The Carter CenterMrs. Laura Hardman (United States)Mr. Chris Harris (United States)Mr. Yongqin He (China), Program Officer, Cathay Institute of Public AffairsRepresentative Michael Honda, (United States) U.S. House of Representatives, D-Calif.Ms. Susan Hyde (United States), Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at the University of California, San DiegoMs. Patricia Kendall (United States), Consultant on Legal and Judicial ReformDr. Dwight King (United States), Professor of Political Science, Northern Illinois UniversityMr. T. Kumar (United States), Asia Specialist Mr. Jacob Kurtzer (United States), Professional Staff for Representative Robert Wexler, D-Fla.Amb. (ret.) Alphonse La Porta (United States), Former Ambassador to Mongolia, President of the United StatesIndonesia Society (USINDO)Ms. Lou Ann Linehan (United States), Chief of Staff for Senator Chuck Hagel, R-Neb.Mr. Paolo Maligaya (Philippines), Long-term Observer, The Carter CenterDr. Peter Mather (United States), Director, Education Program, The Carter Center

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Mr. John MacDougall (United States)Mr. Patrick McInnis (United States), Long-term Observer, The Carter CenterMr. Gabriel Morris (United States), Long-term Observer, The Carter CenterDr. Ann Marie Murphy (United States), Research Scholar, Weatherhead East Asian Institute, ColumbiaUniversity, New YorkMr. Dan Ostrander (United States), Butte CollegeMr. Yi Peizhuang (China), Director, No. 1 Division, Department of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Civil Affairs forthe People’s Republic of ChinaMs. Megan Reif (United States), Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science, University of MichiganMr. Kiat Sitthi-Amorn (Thailand), Former Senior Adviser to Prime Minister Chuan LeekpaiMr. Buranaj Smutharaks (Thailand), Chief of Staff to Prime Minister Chuan LeekpaiMs. Laddawan Tantivitayapitak (Thailand), Specialist, Department of Public Participation, Election Commissionof ThailandMr. Robin Taudevin (Australia), Long-term Observer, The Carter CenterMr. Russell Vogel (United States), Johns Hopkins UniversityMr. Brian C. Vogt (United States), Program Coordinator, Safer Together ’04Ms. Miriam Young (United States), Program Officer, Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights

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The Carter Center’sinternational electionobserver delegation forthe July 5 election wascomprised of 60 people.

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THE CARTER CENTER STAFF – ATLANTADr. John Hardman (United States), Executive DirectorDr. David Carroll (United States), Acting Director, Democracy ProgramMr. Matthew Cirillo (United States), Accounting Manager, Finance DepartmentMs. Avery Davis-Roberts (United States), Assistant Program Coordinator, Democracy ProgramMr. Bob Ellzey (United States), Advance SpecialistMs. Tynesha Green (United States), Program Assistant, Democracy ProgramMr. Adrian Kisai (Malaysia), Intern, Democracy ProgramMs. Nancy Konigsmark (United States), Director, SchedulingMs. Allyson Phelps (United States), Intern, Democracy ProgramDr. David Pottie (Canada), Senior Program Associate, Democracy ProgramMs. Kay Torrance (United States), Assistant Director, Public Information

THE CARTER CENTER STAFF – JAKARTAMr. Eric Bjornlund (United States), DirectorMs. Sophie Khan (Canada), Deputy DirectorMs. Fernanda Lopes (Portugal), Assistant to the DirectorsMs. Florentina Madar (Indonesia), Finance OfficerMs. Natalia Warat (Indonesia), Office Manager

SEPTEMBER 20, 2004

DELEGATION LEADERSHIP

Douglas Peterson (United States), Former Ambassador to Vietnam and Former Member of the U.S. House ofRepresentatives

DELEGATION

Ms. Zahabia Adamaly (Sri Lanka), Asia SpecialistMs. Samantha Aucock (South Africa), Civic Education Officer, U.N. Joint Election Management Body inAfghanistanDr. Alasdair Bowie (New Zealand), Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, The GeorgeWashington UniversityMs. Allison Bridges (United States), Long-term Observer, The Carter CenterMr. Peter Brookes (United States), Senior Fellow, The Heritage FoundationMr. Jeffrey Carter (United States), Assistant Project Director, The Carter CenterMs. Rindai Chipfunde (Zimbabwe), National Director, Zimbabwe Election Support NetworkMr. Frederic Coffey (United States), Foreign Service Officer (ret.), U.S. Department of StateMr. James Combe (United Kingdom), Long-term Observer, The Carter CenterMr. Robert Dahl (United States), Consultant, International Foundation for Electoral Systems Mr. Robert Delfs (United States), Long-term Observer, The Carter CenterMr. Matthew Easton (United States), Senior Associate, Human Rights FirstMs. Hannah Feinberg (United States), Program Assistant, The Carter Center

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Mr. Chris Felley (United States), Long-term Observer, The Carter CenterDr. James Fox (United States), Director, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, The Australian NationalUniversityMr. Brigham Golden (United States), Ph.D. Candidate at Columbia UniversityDr. Barbara Grimes (United States), Arafura Training and Consulting ServicesMr. Johan Grundberg (Sweden), Long-term Observer, The Carter CenterDr. Patricia Henry (United States), Associate Professor, Northern Illinois UniversityMs. Susan Hyde (United States), Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at the University of California, San DiegoDr. Omar Kader (United States), President and CEO, PaL-Tech Inc.Ms. Patricia Kendall (United States), Consultant on Legal and Judicial Reform IssuesMr. Amon Killeen (United States), Senior Analyst, DFI InternationalMr. Adrian Kisai (Malaysia), Long-term Observer, The Carter CenterMr. Samuel Kivuitu (Kenya), Chairman, Electoral Commission of KenyaMr. T. Kumar (United States), Asia SpecialistMs. Brett Lacy (United States), MIA Candidate, University of DenverMs. Ann Lewis (United States), International Consultant, George and Ann Lewis ConsultantsMr. George Lewis (United States), International Consultant, George and Ann Lewis ConsultantsMs. Gabrielle Low (Malaysia), Long-term Observer, The Carter CenterMr. Christopher Lundry (United States), Ph.D. Candidate, Arizona State UniversityMr. John MacDougall (United States), ConsultantMr. Paolo Maligaya (Philippines), Long-term Observer, The Carter CenterMr. James McNaughton (United States), Vice President and Partner, Asia Investment ConsultantsMr. David McRae (Australia), Long-term Observer, The Carter CenterMs. Charmain Mohamed (United Kingdom), East Timor Researcher, Human Rights WatchAmb. John Cameron Monjo (United States), Senior Inspector, U.S. Department of StateMr. Christopher Morris (Australia), Long-term Observer, The Carter CenterMr. Simon Morfit (United States), Long-term Observer, The Carter CenterDr. Fida Nasrallah (United Kingdom), Independent ConsultantMs. Joyce Pitso (South Africa), Regional Program Manager, African Center for Constructive Resolution ofDisputesMs. Megan Reif (United States), Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at the University of MichiganMs. Teresa Reimers (United States), Long-term Observer, The Carter CenterMr. Alexander Shakow (United States), Executive Secretary (ret.), Joint Bank/Fund Development Committee,World BankMr. Colin Stewart (Canada), ConsultantMr. Robin Taudevin (Australia), Long-term Observer, The Carter Center.Mr. Dieudonné Ngalamulume Tshiyoyo (Democratic Republic of Congo), Program Officer, Electoral Institute ofSouthern AfricaDr. Andrew Turton (United Kingdom), ConsultantMr. Brian C. Vogt (United States), Program Coordinator, Safer Together ’04Ms. Miriam Young (United States), Program Officer, Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights

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THE CARTER CENTER STAFF – ATLANTADr. David Carroll (United States), Acting Director, The Democracy ProgramMs. Avery Davis-Roberts (United States), Assistant Program Coordinator, The Democracy ProgramMs. Tynesha Green (United States), Program Assistant, The Democracy ProgramMs. Kristin Michelitch (United States), Intern, The Democracy ProgramDr. David Pottie (Canada), Senior Program Associate, The Democracy ProgramMs. Allyson Quijano (United States), Intern, The Democracy Program

THE CARTER CENTER STAFF – JAKARTAMr. Eric Bjornlund (United States), DirectorMs. Sophie Khan (Canada), Deputy DirectorMs. Fernanda Lopes (Portugal), Assistant to the Directors and Long-term ObserverMs. Monalisa MacDougall (Indonesia), Office ManagerMs. Florentina Madar (Indonesia), Finance Officer

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The Carter Center’s delegation to observe theSeptember 20 second roundof the presidential electionwas comprised of 57 membersfrom 13 countries.

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BIN Indonesian State Intelligence AgencyBPS Indonesian government Statistics BoardCETRO The Center for Electoral ReformDPD Regional Representative AssemblyDPR House of Representatives DPRD People’s Representative Council (provincial/city/regency legislature)ELSAM Institute for Policy Research and AdvocacyEUEOM European Union Election Observation MissionFRI The Indonesian Rectors’ ForumICG International Crisis GroupICW Indonesia Corruption WatchIDP Internally displaced personJAMPPI The People’s Election Observation Network of IndonesiaJI Jemaah IslamiahJPPR The People’s Voter Education NetworkKabupaten DistrictKecamatan SubdistrictKelurahan VillageKIPP The Independent Elections Observer CommitteeKPPS Polling Station CommitteesKPU General Election CommissionLP3ES Institute of Research, Education, and Information of Social and Economic AffairsMPR People’s Consultative AssemblyNationhood Coalition consisting of Golkar, PDI-P, the Prosperous Peace PartyCoalition (PDS), and the Reform Star Party (PBR)NDI The National Democratic InstituteNGO Nongovernmental OrganizationNKRI Unitary Republic of IndonesiaNTB West Nusa TenggaraNTT East Nusa TenggaraNU Nadhlatul Ulama (Muslim organization)PAN National Mandate PartyPanwaslu Election Supervisory CommitteePBB Crescent and Star PartyPBR Reform Star PartyPD Democratic PartyPDI-P The Indonesian Democratic Party of StrugglePDS Prosperous Peace Party

TERMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

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PDSD Aceh Civil Emergency AuthorityPeople’s Coalition mainly consisting of PPP, PD, PAN, and PKSCoalitionPepabri Indonesian Armed Forces Veterans AssociationPKB National Awakening PartyPKPI Indonesian Justice and Unity PartyPKS Prosperous Justice PartyPNBK Freedom Bull National PartyPPK Subdistrict election committeePPP United Development PartyPPS Village-level election committeePTFI PT Freeport Indonesia (mining company on Papua)Satgas Party security groupsSBY Susilo Bambang YudhoyonoSEAPA Southeast Asia Press AllianceTII Transparency International IndonesiaTIPP Team Independent Election ObserversTVRI State-owned television stationUNDP United Nations Development ProgramWIJ West Irian Jaya

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Iwas pleased to return to Indonesia to witness the historic 2004 presidential election, whenIndonesian voters for the first time directly chose

their president. The Carter Center has been commit-ted to advancing democracy in Indonesia ever since itobserved the country’s first post-Suharto national elec-tions in 1999. We were pleased to help emphasize thedramatic course of Indonesia’s transition from militaryrule to democracy. Indonesia is the world’s most popu-lous Muslim nation, and its people have embraceddemocracy with a commitment that is as strong as that of any other nation or culture.

The proof of this commitment was evident in thesuccessful conduct of the world’s largest single-day elec-tion. The people of Indonesia, the political parties, the

election authorities, and its supervisory body (Panwaslu)ensured that the country’s first direct presidential elec-tion resulted in Indonesia’s most democratic elections.Voters were able to cast their ballots in a generalatmosphere of calm and order. The high voter partici-pation, averaging 70 percent, reflects popular supportfor Indonesia’s democratic progress. I congratulatePresident Susilo Bambang Yudhyono for his victory atthe polls and trust he will work for the benefit of allIndonesians.

The establishment of a Constitutional Courtahead of the legislative and presidential electionmarked another important milestone in Indonesia’sjourney toward open democracy. I was very encour-aged by the fact that individual challenges to results

FOREWORD BY JIMMY CARTER

Mrs. Carter completes a polling station observation form with the assistance of Jeff Carter as President Carter looks on.

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and other election-related disputes were channeledthrough the Constitutional Court and that all partiesabided by its rulings. Despite facing severe time andresource constraints, the supervisory body Panwasluplayed an active role at the national, provincial, andlocal level, successfully mediating election-related disputes. Domestic observers also played a vital roleduring the elections, and an Indonesian research institute conducted a quick count following both presidential elections, which helped retain voter confi-dence at a time when tabulation delays easily couldhave led to voter suspicion.

There is still need for further improvement ofIndonesia’s electoral system and administrative struc-tures. We objected to the education and physicalrequirements imposed on presidential candidates,because these restrictions take decision-making poweraway from voters. We also felt that a longer campaignperiod between the first and second presidentialrounds, currently limited to three days, would be fairer to candidates as well as their supporters.

Election day procedures are equally important.Checking for indelible ink and comparing a voter’sidentity against the voter register are necessary to helpmaintain voter confidence in the election process andreduce election fraud. Unfortunately, The CarterCenter found that some election officials were negli-gent in their application of such basic procedures.During the July 5 election, many officials initiallyrejected ballot papers that were double-punched, butthe KPU reacted quickly to ensure that ballots werecounted where the voter’s intent was clear.

The country still faces additional challenges: Itneeds to consolidate democratic institutions, buildresponsive local government, work toward the resolu-tion of regional conflicts in Aceh and Papua, deal with

the terrible destruction and psychological damagecaused by the December 2004 tsunami, and build aframework for human rights and sustainable develop-ment. We are hopeful that the confidence Indonesianshave placed in democratic processes and institutions ismatched by the dedication of the new government andthe continued support of the international community.

My wife, Rosalynn, and I would like to thank theformer Prime Minister of Thailand, Chuan Leekpai,for co-leading the Center’s observation delegation tothe first round presidential election in July. We alsoare very grateful to former U.S. Ambassador PetePeterson for heading a second Carter Center delega-tion to observe the September runoff. The directors ofour Jakarta office, Eric Bjornlund and Sophie Khan,and their office staff were outstanding, and we thankthem for their hard work. We are especially thankfulto the long-term observers who worked for nearly sixmonths in very demanding conditions as they movedthroughout Indonesia. We appreciate the many indi-viduals who volunteered their time and talents to serveas observers. As always, we thank the Carter Centerstaff in Atlanta who made this project possible.

Finally, we wish to acknowledge the generousfinancial support provided by the United StatesAgency for International Development, Mr. PhilipKnight, and HRH Prince Alwaleed bin Talal binAbdulaziz Alsaud. The Carter Center’s Indonesia elec-tion observation project would not have been possiblewithout this vital support and belief in the importanceof democracy.

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The Carter Center is grateful for the support pro-vided by the U.S. Agency for InternationalDevelopment (USAID), which enabled the

Center to implement the Indonesia presidential election2004 observation project. The Carter Center workedclosely with USAID officials throughout the process andwould like to extend special thanks to Mr. PhilipSchwem of USAID for his assistance. The Center alsothanks Mr. Philip Knight and HRH Prince Alwaleedbin Talal bin Abdulaziz Alsaud for their support.

The Center expresses its appreciation to the gov-ernment of Indonesia, former President Megawati, andGeneral Election Commission (KPU) for inviting theCenter to observe the elections. The Center also isgrateful for the collaborative efforts of the many inter-national groups that actively supported the electionprocess, especially the international observer missionfrom the European Union. Likewise, the Centeracknowledges the important work of the Indonesiannational observers, who together deployed thousandsof observers to promote free and fair elections.

Sincere thanks go to the Carter Center delegateswho volunteered their time, expertise, and insights andagreed to join the Center in Indonesia. The delegatesaccepted a range of responsibilities without complaintand demonstrated a strong commitment to supportingthe process of democratization in Indonesia. In partic-ular, the Center wishes to thank former PrimeMinister Chuan Leekpai, who served as co-leader withPresident and Mrs. Carter during the July first roundelection, and former U.S. Ambassador Pete Peterson,who led the delegation for the second round in

September. The Center was pleased to includeRepresentative Michael Honda, D-Calif. as a delegatealong with several congressional staff members, U.S.Indonesia Society (USINDO) President Alphonse LaPorta and other USINDO members, leaders fromnumerous American nongovernmental organizationswith an interest in Indonesia as well as others with relevant expertise.

The Center also acknowledges the efforts of thelong-term observers: Shane Barter, Allison Bridges,Cecilia Bylesjö, Joanne Cheah, James Combe, RobertDelfs, Chris Felley, Johan Grundberg, Adrian Kisai,Gabrielle Low, Paolo Maligaya, Patrick McInnis, DavidMcRae, Christopher Morris, Simon Morfit, GabrielMorris, Teresa Reimers, and Robin Taudevin. Theseindividuals worked for many months throughoutIndonesia, often in very difficult circumstances, to provide political and logistics reports.

The Center’s field office staff in Jakarta did anoutstanding job: Eric Bjornlund, director, and SophieKhan, deputy director, managed a full-time observationeffort over nearly seven months in a vastly challengingenvironment with the support of Tina Madar, NataliaWarat, and Mona MacDougall.

The Carter Center’s Democracy Program inAtlanta had overall responsibility for the project, begin-ning with the initial assessment in July-August 2002and lasting through the final report. The project wasdirected by Democracy Program Acting Director Dr.David Carroll and managed by Senior ProgramAssociate Dr. David Pottie, with critical assistance from Avery Davis Moore and Tynesha Green.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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In the summer of 2004, Indonesia held the coun-try’s first direct presidential elections since the fallof long-time authoritarian President Soeharto in

1998. As such, these elections represent an importantmilestone in the consolidation of Indonesia’s democra-tization process. Indonesia followed an ambitiouselectoral timetable in 2004, starting with the legislativeelections on April 5, followed by the first round of thepresidential elections on July 5, and culminating inthe election of the president on Sept. 20. The legisla-tive elections and the two rounds of the presidentialelections were the largest set of single-day elections inthe world, with 70 percent of 155 million eligible voters going to the polls. The management of the elections posed logistical and administrative challengesthat, on the whole, were adequately tackled by theauthorities. As outlined below, The Carter Centerobserved a number of irregularities —many typical oftransitional democracies — but, overall, voters were ableto exercise their democratic rights in a peaceful atmos-phere and without significant hindrance. SusiloBambang Yudhoyono (also known by his acronymSBY) emerged as the clear winner of both rounds ofthe presidential elections, obtaining 61 percent of thepopular vote in the runoff election against the incum-bent, Megawati Soekarnoputri.

CARTER CENTER ROLEThe Carter Center was invited to observe the elec-

toral process in Indonesia by the Indonesian GeneralElection Commission (KPU) and all of the majorpolitical parties. Even though staff members were notfully deployed for the legislative elections in April, anumber of long-term observers surveyed the electionson an informal basis so as to glean some lessons forthe presidential elections. Long-term observersassessed voter education, voter registration, electoralpreparation, national and local political activity,human rights, and campaign finance. The Center

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

established a field office in May and helped organizeshort-term observation missions for the two presidentialballots. Observers of the presidential elections visited31 out of 32 provinces, meeting with representatives ofpolitical parties, individual candidates, governmentand election officials, civil society groups, journalists,domestic observers, members of the police, and reli-gious organizations. Former U.S. President JimmyCarter, former First Lady Rosalynn Carter, and formerPrime Minister of Thailand Chuan Leekpai led a 60-member international delegation to observe the firstround of Indonesia’s presidential elections on July 5.Ambassador Douglas Peterson and a delegation of 57observers, some of whom had also been involved inobserving the first round, monitored the runoff elec-tion in September.

OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONSOn the whole, the authorities did a commendable

job staging the elections, which were predominantlyheld in a peaceful atmosphere. Nonetheless, TheCarter Center observed a number of irregularitiesthroughout the campaign periods and on all threepolling days.

Former Prime Minister of Thailand Chuan Leekpai was theco-leader of the Center’s delegation to observe the July presi-dential election.

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PlanningThe Center believes that more careful and timely

planning could have prevented some of these irregulari-ties. Inadequate time and resources were allocated tothe training of polling and tabulation center officials.Consequently, a number of officials were careless whenapplying administrative procedures. While proceduralerrors noticeably decreased from one election to thenext, administrative negligence remained a feature of allthree elections. Not all necessary voter identificationdocuments were inspected, fingers were not alwaysmarked or checked for indelible ink and, in some cases,the layout of voting stations was such that privacy inthe polling booth was not always guaranteed. Lack oftraining also led to a high incidence of incorrectly com-pleted tabulation forms, especially during the legislativeelections. The need for subsequent corrections createdgratuitous opportunities for fraud. In one village, mem-bers of the election committee blatantly changed votetallies from 15 of 18 polling stations.

Moreover, the distribution of I.D. cards and invita-tion letters, both of which had to be produced to casta ballot, was not always reliable. In order to allowthose affected to vote, nonlaminated voter cards wereissued for the legislative and for both rounds of thepresidential elections. However, these paper cardscould easily have been duplicated and exploited forfraudulent purposes. Furthermore, internally displacedpersons (IDPs), particularly in conflict areas such asAceh, Papua, West Irian Jaya, and North Maluku, wereeither under-represented, or, in more remote regions,the extent of their participation could not be verified.The Carter Center particularly regretted that it wasonly granted limited access to Ambon. It considersthat these technical problems and the under-represen-tation of IDPs need to be addressed. Ignoring theseissues could potentially lead to voter disenfranchise-ment and even become a source of local discontentthat could result in violence in close-run elections.

The Carter Center was also concerned by theshort opening hours (7a.m.-1p.m.) of polling stations,with some of them closing and starting their count asearly as 10:30 a.m. during the first presidential electionround. This caused confusion and disenfranchisedsome voters. It also made it difficult for the limitednumber of international and domestic observers tomonitor elections in disparate locations on electionday — a difficulty compounded by the fact that officiallists of polling stations were only available regionallyand on an ad hoc basis. For the second round, theKPU issued a decree allowing for early closures if allregistered voters had cast their ballots or it was clearthat nobody else was going to vote. However, somelocal KPU officials consented to unconditional earlyclosures, which once again triggered some confusionand resentment.

Election lawThe Legislative Elections Law (Law No. 12/2003)

provides for the partial opening of party lists to encour-age voter participation and better reflect the choice ofthe people. Yet because the law also introduced an

A voter deposits her ballot paper in the ballot box.

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insurmountable quota, it largely failed in this task. Nonational-level candidate was elected solely on the basisof the restricted open-list system. Ultimately, the quotasystem allowed parties to retain control over who waselected. This sometimes prompted voter disappoint-ment, as expectations raised by a partially open list werenot met. Media reports went so far as to attribute thedeath of one candidate in East Java to voter discontent.The Carter Center has recommended that the quota belowered.

Observers also identified a loophole in the elec-tions law that allows candidates to withholdinformation on the origin of their campaign funds bysimply not reporting their campaign finances to theKPU. Of the 128 members of the RegionalRepresentative Assembly (DPD), only one submittedhis finances for review before the media exposed wide-spread noncompliance in October. In the interest ofgreater transparency, the eradication of corruption,and Indonesia’s progress toward an open, multipartydemocracy, The Carter Center recommends that thelaw be revised to close that legal loophole.

The imposition of educational and physicalrequirements to determine the suitability of presiden-tial candidates represented another source of concernfor The Carter Center. Candidates had to demon-strate they had at least completed their education tohigh-school level (or equivalent) and prove they didnot suffer from a serious physical disability. The edu-cational requirements are particularly discriminatingtoward women and those in religious education — acommon, and often only, option for people living inremote areas, such as Papua. As far as the physical

requirements are concerned, former PresidentAbdurrahman Wahid’s blindness was cited as justifica-tion for excluding him from the presidential race.

The Legislative Elections Law also instructed theKPU to fund and create a supervisory committee(Panwaslu) to oversee all aspects of the election process.However, in doing so, it made Panwaslu dependent onthe body it was instructed to supervise. Yet the mainproblem for Panwaslu stemmed from a lack of funding,which placed limitations on its ability to prosecute anyviolations. Given its limitations, The Carter Centerconcluded that the impact of Panwaslu was generallypositive. It was particularly successful in mediatingbetween rival campaign teams and succeeded in per-suading these to sign codes of good conduct, thuscontributing to a peaceful atmosphere on and aroundthe different polling days.

Corruption and money politicsCorruption and money politics are endemic in

Indonesia and will have to be tackled by future govern-ments if they want to retain their credibility and notalienate the general population from the country’spolitical processes. Throughout their stay in Indonesia,the Carter Center staff received several reports of elec-tion-related corruption, which nonetheless proveddifficult to substantiate. However, in one case, anobserver obtained hard evidence of a district-level KPUhead abusing his position and accepting a US$500bribe to secure a candidate’s seat. To deter similaractions in the future, The Carter Center recommendsthat more serious efforts be undertaken to apprehendthe perpetrators of such violations.

Anecdotal evidence collected by the Center sug-gests that individual candidates, rather than parties,were responsible for money politics, which mostlytook on the form of “travel money” and food dis-bursements as inducements to attend campaign rallies.In Bijai, North Sumatra, Megawati’s Success Teampromised cheap credit to a number of workers if theyagreed to attend rallies and vote for Megawati. AmienRais’ Success Team allegedly provided donations to a

The legislative elections and the two roundsof the presidential elections were the largestset of single-day elections in the world, with70 percent of 155 million eligible votersgoing to the polls.

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university in Banda Aceh prior to the first round ofpresidential elections in July.

Partisan behaviorThe Carter Center observed a number of isolated

cases of partisan behavior among KPU members, thepolice, and the media. The KPU head of West NusaTenggara, for instance, used his influence as a localreligious leader to promote SBY. The Carter Centerconsiders that such displays of partiality could be mini-mized by encouraging officials to sign an internal codeof ethics and by opening the KPU to external review.

Overall, the police did a commendable job.Nonetheless, the Center noted a number of instancesthat called into question the police’s neutrality. InYogyakarta, officers distributed campaign materials onbehalf of the PDI-P, and in Central Java, a regionalcommander instructed a group of police officers tosupport Megawati. Observers also received reports ofPanwaslu’s dissatisfaction with the quality of somepolice investigations into election-related violations.Moreover, at a significant number of polling stations,Carter Center staff observed inappropriate “data gath-ering” of election results by police officers — ostensiblyfor internal police purposes. Finally, in certain areas,mainly those affected by separatist conflicts, the pres-ence of police at polling stations was potentiallyintimidating to some voters. If the police is to rebuildits trust among the population, it needs to improve itsprofessionalism.

Since the fall of Soeharto, Indonesia’s media havebecome increasingly diversified. On the whole, report-ing during the election period was neutral in tone.However, there were two notable exceptions.Government-owned TVRI used its programming topromote incumbent President Megawati Soekarnoputri—its positive reporting increasing dramatically after thefirst round of the presidential elections in July. MetroTV and the Media Indonesia newspaper overtly sup-ported their owner, Golkar presidential candidate SuryaPaloh. The Indonesian Broadcasting Commission even-

tually reprimanded Metro TV for its biased coverage.

Domestic observersThe Carter Center deems the presence of inde-

pendent domestic observers a crucial component of acountry’s democratic process. They make an invaluablecontribution to the transparency of the electoralprocess, provide a check on the work of polling officials,build confidence among political parties, and lendlegitimacy to the electoral process as well as to the finalresults. The KPU accredited 34 nonpartisan domesticobserver groups. Unfortunately, the relationshipbetween these groups and the electoral authorities wasmarred by tensions. The KPU refused to accredit TheIndependent Elections Observer Committee (KIPP) forthe presidential elections because KIPP published itsfindings on the legislative elections without previouslydisclosing them to the KPU. LP3ES, another localNGO, was threatened with a similar fate when itallegedly released the results of its quick count for thefirst-round presidential elections before informing theelectoral commission. LP3ES’ promise to inform theKPU of any projected results ahead of publicationenabled it to retain its accreditation for the runoff election. The Carter Center believes that a more constructive approach should be adopted toward independent domestic observers. Moreover, their con-tribution could be greatly enhanced if they were givenaccess to sufficient resources to increase their localactivities. Lack of funding meant that the number ofobservers declined significantly after the legislativeelections.

Double-punched ballots and limits on campaign freedoms

Double-punched ballots represented the mainproblem during the July presidential election. The bal-lots were folded in such a way that voters were able topunch the ballot without opening it, which resulted inballots being punched on two sides. The KPU issued adecree that allowed officials to count double-punchedballots whenever the voter’s intent was unambiguous.

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However, not all polling stations abided by that deci-sion. Changing the design of the ballots would preventsuch a problem from recurring in future elections.

Prior to the runoff election, campaigning was limited by the KPU. It accorded candidates no morethan three days to present their case to the public, andcampaigning was only to be conducted in a formatspecified by the KPU. The Carter Center stronglyobjects to such limitations. They infringe on the rightsof free speech and assembly of candidates and theirsupporters. The Center therefore urges the Indonesianauthorities to consider revising the legal restrictionsimposed on campaigning, especially in the light of thesuccessful conduct of the three 2004 elections.

CONCLUSIONSBased on its observations all across the country

and in spite of the above irregularities, The CarterCenter considers Indonesia’s 2004 polls a success. Theelections took place in a general atmosphere of calm,order, and open participation. To encourage increas-ingly meaningful public participation in political life,The Carter Center urges Indonesia’s leaders tostrengthen and increase the effectiveness of politicalinstitutions by ensuring that those responsible forirregularities in the 2004 elections are held account-able and by tightening legal loopholes to promotegreater transparency within those institutions.Reforming the election laws in such a way that legisla-tive seats better reflect the choice of the people shouldalso be a top priority for the present government.Having said that, the 2004 elections represent a majorstep in the country’s ongoing democratic transition,and the authorities and public should be congratulatedfor their commitment to democratic progress.

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Presidential candidate Susilo Bambang Yudhyono releases adove at a presidential campaign rally.

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On Oct. 20, 2004, Indonesia inaugurated itsfirst directly elected president. This historicevent marks a major step toward the consoli-

dation of democracy in the world’s largest Muslim-majority country. One month earlier, Indonesia successfully conducted the last of three democraticelections in six months, following the legislative elec-tions in April and the first round of the presidentialelection in July. During all three rounds, a peacefulatmosphere prevailed, and more than 70 percent ofthe 155 million eligible Indonesians went to the polls.

These elections – the largest single-day elections inthe world – were both a remarkable logistical accom-plishment and an important political milestone. Thedirect presidential election is just one of a number ofwide-ranging, fundamental constitutional reforms inIndonesia since the country’s transition began with the resignation of longtime authoritarian presidentSoeharto in May 1998. These reforms have creatednew checks and balances and have recognized funda-mental human rights. The revised constitution hasestablished a second house of the national legislatureto represent the interests of the provinces, created anew court to judge the constitutionality of laws andreferee election disputes, and eliminated the legislativeseats previously set aside for the nation’s military.Since 1999, Indonesia has also embarked on an ambi-tious decentralization program. Direct election ofprovincial governors and district heads is set to beginin 2005.

Indonesia’s new president is Susilo BambangYudhoyono (known as SBY), who won a plurality inthe first round of voting and gained 61 percent againstincumbent Megawati Soekarnoputri in the runoff tobecome the country’s fourth president since the fall ofSoeharto. A retired military general, SBY had served ascoordinating minister for security for former President

Megawati until his resignation in March. Running onan anti-corruption and pro-reform platform, SBY’sDemocratic Party (PD), founded only in 2001, won asurprising 7.5 percent of the vote in the April legisla-tive elections. In addition to giving the party thefourth largest number of seats in the new national legislature, the showing made the party eligible tonominate its own candidate for president. SBY’s mete-oric ascent to the pinnacle of Indonesian politics hasbeen stunning, and his election offers new hope forthe cause of democracy and genuine reform.

Nevertheless, some have questioned SBY’s commit-ment to fundamental reform. Many of his advisers hailfrom the military establishment or from the Soeharto-era political elite. Moreover, SBY’s ability to advancereforms may be tempered by a legislature in which thegovernment does not command a majority. Althoughin the election SBY was able to overcome a coalition ofthe country’s two largest political parties (theIndonesian Democratic Party–Struggle (PDI-P) ofincumbent President Megawati and Golkar, the politi-cal machine established by Soeharto), those partiesand their allies in the so-called Nationhood Coalitionstill have a legislative majority and control key legisla-tive positions. Under the new institutionalarrangements, the rules governing party discipline inthe legislature and the relationship between a directlyelected president and the legislature remain unclearand untested.

FROM AUTHORITARIAN TO DEMOCRATICGOVERNMENT

In the months before Indonesia’s longtime author-itarian president, Soeharto, resigned in May 1998, thecountry was facing mounting troubles. Mountingdebts, a failing currency, and skyrocketing prices fueledpublic demand for immediate improvement and

BACKGROUND TO THE 2004INDONESIAN ELECTIONS

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pushed Indonesia into crisis. As the reformist movementgrew in universities and cities throughout the country,the fatal shooting of four students at a demonstrationat Trisakti University in Jakarta on May 12 led to riotsin Jakarta and Solo in which more than 1,000 peopledied. Less than a week later, Soeharto stepped down.

Soeharto’s regime bequeathed a host of undemo-cratic institutions to Indonesia. Seats in the national,provincial, and local legislatures were reserved for mem-bers of the armed forces. Five hundred appointedrepresentatives of functional groups and representativesof the provinces, together with the 500 members of thenational legislature, formed the nation’s highest govern-ing body, the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR),which, among other things, regularly “re-elected” thepresident.

Even those legislators who were nominally electeddid not gain their seats through free or fair elections.Indonesia’s constitution, drafted in a short time aheadof a 1945 declaration of independence, placed greatpower in the hands of the president and did little to

establish rules for democraticpolitical competition. UnderSoeharto, only two otherpolitical parties wereallowed to contest “elec-tions” against the rulingparty, Golkar, whose victorywas virtually assured. Thetwo rival political partieswere not allowed to estab-lish offices below the districtlevel, civil servants wereexpected to become mem-bers of Golkar and werecoerced into voting for theruling party, the distribu-tion of governmentdevelopment funds stronglyfavored areas with a Golkarmajority, and there werewidespread allegations of

fraud in the patently flawed election system. The gov-ernment screened candidate lists from all parties toeliminate individuals it did not like, and the regimeinterfered in the running of parties to remove leadersit perceived as a threat.

Civil society institutions and the courts were alsoweak under Soeharto, and the media operated underpermanent threat of having their licenses arbitrarilyrevoked. The military exerted a strong influence overpolitics, both through its appointees in the legislatureand bureaucracy and through its territorial commandstructure that placed soldiers down to village level,where they were heavily involved in local affairs.Soeharto himself was a former general.

When Soeharto stepped down, he handed thereins of power to his vice president and longtime closeassociate, Habibie. While this transition was heraldedas the end of an era, Habibie was widely perceivedmerely as a transitional figure until free elections couldbe held. Popular expectations of fundamental changetherefore remained high.

Campaign teams competed vigorously with colorful displays of posters throughout Indonesia.

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President Habibie, who hoped to become the firstdemocratically elected president, did preside overmany steps aimed at democratic change. MPR resolu-tions limited the president to two terms anddetermined that fresh elections would be held in1999. Habibie revoked some of the more draconianSoeharto-era political laws as well as the requirementfor press licenses and began the release of politicalprisoners. New laws allowed political parties to form,established a new election system, and changed thestructure of the legislative bodies, including reducingthe number of military representatives in the Houseof Representatives (the DPR) and the number ofappointed representatives in the MPR. Habibie alsoenacted regional autonomy legislation and agreed toallow a referendum in East Timor.

There were also setbacks. The referendum in EastTimor, which The Carter Center monitored, was dulyheld in August 1999, but the Indonesian military

recruited auxiliary militia in an attempt to intimidatethe populace into opting for Indonesia’s autonomypackage. After voters favored independence, EastTimor was laid to ruin, more than 1,000 people werekilled, and hundreds of thousands of East Timoresewere forced across the border into West Timor.Moreover, almost a year after Soeharto stepped down,active military officers still made up four of 21 Cabinetministers, 10 of 27 governors, and 128 of 306 mayors.1

The June 1999 elections, Indonesia’s first competi-tive elections since 1955, were clear evidence of atransition that was underway but that still had far togo. These elections were organized in a short amountof time and conducted under a new, complicated, andstill imperfect legal framework that was drafted andenacted with little meaningful public input.

Indonesia is the world’s most populous Muslim nation.

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1. Harold Crouch, “Indonesia: Democratisation and the Threat ofDisintegration,” Southeast Asian Affairs 2000, Singapore: ISEAS,2000, p127.

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Nonetheless, the 1999 legislation was significantlyimproved from previous electoral legislation. Amongother things, the new election law separated theGeneral Election Commission (KPU) from the govern-ment by giving all parties representation, establishedquasi-judicial oversight committees, and attempted tointroduce an element of a district system into the elec-tion of legislators.

In stark contrast to Soeharto-era elections, 48 parties contested the 1999 elections in a genuine democratic competition. The evident press freedomprovided a tangible example of democratic reform and stimulated public enthusiasm for the elections.

The Carter Center-National Democratic Institute(NDI) observation mission in 1999 found that thoseelections were peaceful and well-organized. Ninety-twopercent of the country’s eligible voters came to thepolls. Political wrangling on the KPU, however, delayedcertification of the final results. The party ofMegawati Soekarnoputri, PDI-P, won the most votes(33.7 percent), well ahead of former ruling partyGolkar (22.3 percent) and the National AwakeningParty, PKB, (12.6 percent) established by the nation’slargest Muslim organization, Nadhlatul Ulama (NU),and its leader, Abdurrahman Wahid. These electionsestablished a legitimate government and heralded anew era of democratic transformation in Indonesia.

In October 1999, the MPR chose AbdurrahmanWahid (popularly known as Gus Dur) as the new presi-dent and Megawati Soekarnoputri as vice president.When Megawati missed out on the presidency, hersupporters in Bali, Jakarta, Solo, and Medan rioted.

At the same MPR session, Indonesia’s 1945 con-stitution was amended for the first time, providingconstitutional support to the limit imposed on theterm of the president and vice president as well asstrengthening the position of the DPR as a legislativebody, relative to the president. The MPR also voted torescind the 1976 annexation of East Timor.

President Wahid introduced many reforms. Heappointed the first civilian defense minister in morethan three decades, for example, and, for the first

time, a commander of the armed forces who camefrom the navy rather than the army. Some of his mostsignificant achievements as president were his attemptsto reform discriminatory Soeharto-era policies. Hestrived to reduce the political stigma attached to sup-posed communist sympathizers and their families andattempted to bring ethnic Chinese into the nationalfold. His efforts were not entirely successful, due tocriticism by nationalist and anti-communist Islamicgroups, but he did repeal legislation forbidding the dissemination of communist, Marxist, or Leninist ideology. He also struck down legislation forbiddingthe display of Chinese religion, belief, or cultural traditions and disbanded Soeharto’s Department ofInformation.

However, Wahid also attracted much criticism foralleged erratic behavior, blunt and sometimes contra-dictory statements, and seemingly arbitrary removal ofseveral Cabinet ministers. After a long, drawn-outprocess involving allegations of corruption and generat-ing strenuous resistance from the president, Wahid’s presidency ended in impeachment on July 23, 2001.Though the manner of his departure was unsettling,the episode highlighted flaws in the constitution’simpeachment procedures. A subsequent constitutionalamendment made it more difficult for the DPR to ini-tiate impeachment proceedings.

By this time, when Vice President Megawati tookover as president, the sense of momentum of thereform movement had already begun to wane.Megawati’s government took a harder line in dealingwith separatist movements than its immediate prede-cessors. She approved the imposition of a military

Indonesia’s new president, Susilo BambangYudhoyono (known as SBY), won a pluralityin the first round of voting and gained 61percent against incumbent MegawatiSoekarnoputri in the runoff election.

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emergency in Aceh after the collapse of mediatedpeace talks and issued a Presidential Instruction inJanuary 2003 to hasten the unpopular partition ofPapua into three new provinces. She was also publiclycriticized, from within and beyond her party, for inter-vening in the election of several governors.

There were several setbacks for freedom of expres-sion as well. Megawati condoned the prosecution ofseveral activists and a newspaper editor under a clausein the Criminal Code that criminalizes the denigrationof the president and vice president. In the finalmonths of Megawati’s administration, the director ofthe Jakarta office of the International Crisis Group,which had issued several reports critical of governmentpolicy on security issues including Aceh and Papua,was forced to leave the country, sending a chillthrough the more vulnerable domestic NGO commu-nity. As her administration ended, controversial draftlegislation to grant powers of arrest to the StateIntelligence Agency (BIN) was still being discussed.After three years, Megawati’s most tangible accomplish-ment appears to be stabilizing the country, and as the

2004 elections approached, Megawati’s reputation asaloof and unresponsive began to be reflected in lowpopular opinion ratings.

Since Soeharto stepped down in 1998, the MPRhas enacted four sets of constitutional amendmentsthat have substantially altered the institutions that gov-ern Indonesia. A directly elected president, supportedby a vice president and a Cabinet, now serves as thehead of state. The national legislature, the House ofRepresentatives (DPR), has been reconstituted with theelimination of appointed seats for representatives ofthe military, and a new Regional RepresentativeAssembly (DPD) has been created. The amendmentsalso eliminated seats representing functional groups inthe MPR, which now consists of a joint sitting of theDPR and DPD. The MPR retained its power to amendthe constitution and under extraordinary circumstancesto appoint or impeach a president and vice president,but it no longer elects the president or constitutes thenation’s highest political body.

Corresponding to the president and DPR at thenational level, each province has a governor (and vicegovernor) and a provincial legislature (DPRD). Eachprovince is afforded a degree of autonomy to conductits own affairs, but foreign affairs, defense, security, jus-tice, religion, and national fiscal and monetary mattersremain under central government control. An execu-tive and legislative structure at district/city levelmirrors the provincial structure.

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Corruption and money politics are endemicin Indonesia and will have to be tackled byfuture governments.

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In 2004, the Indonesian General ElectionCommission and all of the major political partiesinvited The Carter Center to act as an independ-

ent observer of the electoral process in Indonesia. Forthe first time in the world’s fourth most populouscountry, citizens would directly elect the entire legisla-ture and the president. These elections would also bethe first test of Indonesia’s new political institutionsand processes developed since the transitional elec-tions in 1999.

In January 2004, representatives of The CarterCenter visited Indonesia to assess the potential contri-bution of a comprehensive international observationprogram. The team met with representatives of theKPU, political parties, civil society, domestic observergroups, international NGOs, the donor community,and others. All the groups the team met with encour-aged The Carter Center to send international observersto monitor the election period and help build confi-dence in a process vulnerable to administrative andother problems.

The 2004 elections were to be carried out in thecontext of significant constitutional and electoralreforms enacted since 1999, which produced new andcomplicated electoral processes for the legislature andpresidency. Given these reforms, The Carter Centerconcluded that a long-term international observationprogram would be useful because of the likelihoodthat the ambitious election schedule involving threeelection dates between April and September wouldstretch the capacity of the electoral authorities, andperhaps the patience of the public, and the concernthat fierce competition could lead to violence andfraud. Although representatives of the Center observedthe April legislative election, the program did notbegin formally until May, about two months before the first round of the presidential election.

Experience around the world has shown that credible

and impartial observers can strengthen an electoralprocess by reassuring voters that they can safely andsecretly cast their ballots and that any electoral fraud willbe detected. Given the complicated and drawn-outnature of the 2004 election calendar, the Center estab-lished an office in Jakarta in May 2004, deployed a teamof long-term observers throughout Indonesia for fivemonths, and organized short-term observation missionsfor the July and September presidential elections.

The Center recruited a talented group of long-term observers from Australia, Canada, Malaysia,Portugal, Sweden, the Philippines, and the UnitedStates with extensive research experience, countryexpertise, and language skills. Between April andOctober, the Center’s observers visited 31 of the country’s 32 provinces and met with representatives of political parties and candidates, government andelection officials, journalists, police, domestic electionmonitoring groups, religious organizations, and othercivil society groups. Of the provinces observed, thegovernment designated Aceh, Papua, and Maluku asareas that required visitors to apply for special permis-sion to travel there. The Ministry of Foreign Affairsworking committee for the 2004 elections managedthe procedure for obtaining permission to observe inthese areas. Though the process was at times bureau-cratic and complicated, Center observers wereeventually granted permission to travel to all threelocations.

Through these meetings and their own observa-tions, long-term observers monitored voter education,voter registration, electoral preparations, and thenational and local political environment. Long-termobservers were also asked to monitor a range of relatedissues, including human rights, the potential for elec-tion-related conflict, and campaign finance. Long-termobservers produced regular weekly internal reports,and based on these field reports and on observation at

CARTER CENTERELECTION OBSERVATION PROGRAM

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the national level, the Center released a series of public statements.

Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, former FirstLady Rosalynn Carter, and former Prime Minister ofThailand Chuan Leekpai led a 60-member internationaldelegation to observe the first round of Indonesia’spresidential elections on July 5. The delegation hadmembers from eight countries, including a bipartisangroup from the United States, including U.S.Representative Michael Honda, D-Calif., congressionalstaff members, experts from the U.S. foreign policycommunity, and others with an interest in Indonesia.The main delegation arrived in Jakarta on July 1 and,after receiving briefings on the elections and politicaldevelopments in the country and training on theCenter’s election observation methodology, weredeployed to their observation areas July 3-6.

President Carter and Prime Minister ChuanLeekpai met in Jakarta with four of the five presidentialcandidates, President Megawati Soekarnoputri, SusiloBambang Yudhoyono, Wiranto and Amien Rais, andwith vice presidential candidate Agum Gumelar. Inaddition, they met with members of the KPU and the

Constitutional Court, leaders of nonpartisandomestic election monitoring organizations,and international NGOs and agencies involvedin election-related programs. The Centerreleased a preliminary statement on July 7summarizing the delegation’s observations.

Some of the Center’s long-term observerscontinued to observe the full counting and tab-ulation process before returning to the Jakartaheadquarters to share their findings. After thefirst and second rounds, the Center monitoredthe vote tabulation process in selected locationsat the village (kelurahan), subdistrict (keca-matan), district (kabupaten), provincial, andnational levels. Observers investigated election

complaints around the country and continued to meetwith KPU and Panwas officials, candidate representa-tives, nongovernmental organizations, and others.

Because no presidential ticket won a majority inJuly, The Carter Center remained in Indonesia toobserve the runoff election. Between election dates,the long-term observation efforts continued as usual,with observers reporting on conditions and issuesfrom across the country.

Fifty-seven observers from 13 countries weredeployed to observe the runoff election on Sept. 20.Ambassador Douglas "Pete" Peterson, who served asthe first postwar U.S. ambassador to Vietnam afterthree terms as representative of Florida's 2ndCongressional District in the U.S. House, led the dele-gation Some observers who were part of the Center’smission in July returned in September. Arriving inJakarta on Sept. 15, the delegation received briefingsand training over two days and then deployed to 21provinces Sept. 18-21. Following a delegation debriefing,the Center released a preliminary statement of observa-tions on Sept. 22.

The delegation leadership met in Jakarta withPresident Megawati Soekarnoputri, candidate SusiloBambang Yudhoyono, and other campaign representa-tives as well as the chairman and members of the KPU,leaders of nonpartisan domestic election monitoring

Leaders of the Carter Center observation delegation to theJuly 5 presidential election (from L-R, Chuan Leekpai,Rosalynn Carter, and Jimmy Carter) meet with PresidentMegawati at the presidential palace.

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organizations, political observers, journalists, and others.As it did in July, The Carter Center coordinated itsefforts with the European Union Election ObservationMission (EUEOM) and other international observersand domestic observers.

DEPLOYMENT METHODOLOGY AND SITESDespite many substantial improvements in

methodology and approach over the years, includinggreater focus on pre-election and political factors, inter-national election observers still struggle in manycountries to evaluate the extent and significance ofproblems observed on election day. Having found seri-ous problems, observers often have confronted thedilemma of whether they should question the overallquality or, indeed, legitimacy of an election. More generally, observers have faced the continuing challengeof how to make their findings less anecdotal andimpressionistic.

Accordingly, as part of a longer-term effort toimprove election monitoring methodology, the Center

instructed its observers to visit polling locations chosenin a statistically random manner. In theory, this wouldallow for greater confidence in drawing inferencesfrom existing observations. While logistics and numbersdid not permit the Center to deploy observers accord-ing to one national sample, organizers endeavored tochoose polling stations locally in statistically randommanner. In addition, the Center added some additionalquestions to the standard checklist, both to ensureobservers made a judgment of the overall quality ofeach polling station they visited and to attempt tomeasure the effect of presence of observers.

Indonesia did not present a perfect place to runsuch an experiment. The large size of the country andhuge number of polling stations made it infeasible fora group of international observers to deploy randomlyacross the country. Some areas of the country, includ-ing remote locations on small islands and inmountainous areas, were virtually inaccessible to inter-national observers. Moreover, the very short polling

Chuan Leekpai and Jimmy Carter share a joke with presidential candidate SBY (far right) and his aides. JOSH

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hours of 7:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. limited the number of polling stations each team of observers could visit.Official lists of polling stations were only availableregionally on an ad hoc basis, and no centralized list ofpolling station addresses existed before the elections.Although in the second round, polling stations couldbe uniquely identified by their province, region, city,neighborhood or village, and number, the lack of phys-ical addresses made it logistically impossible to directobservers to travel to specific polling stations.

Organizers, therefore, chose regions to sendobservers based on traditional criteria. They sought tospread observers throughout the country and selectdemographically diverse areas. They also tried to sendobservers to locations that appeared particularly com-petitive or interesting and attempted to avoid undueoverlap with other international observer groups, mostnotably the European Union observation mission,which was the largest international group in the country.

Within each general area where a Carter Centerobserver team was deployed, typically a city or othersubregion of a province, organizers applied principlesof random assignment to generate a list of neighbor-hoods and villages from a complete list of allneighborhoods and villages within the preselected area.Despite the lack of lists of specific polling stationsfrom which to draw random samples, random assign-ment of observers was still possible because of theavailability of complete lists of neighborhoods and villages as well as the high density and sheer numberof polling stations. This assignment prevented observerteams from using such strategies as going to as manypolling stations as possible (which are often next doorto each other and do not represent a random sample)or going to polling stations that they heard might be“interesting” (which also is not random). In particular,choosing polling stations that are reported to haveproblems or be interesting is likely to bias the overallobservations. Even under the logistically difficult cir-cumstances presented in Indonesia, observers wereable to visit a significant number of randomly selectedpolling stations.

Although the Center could not use this approachto generalize the findings of its observers in a statisti-cally valid manner to the entire country, it could drawmore robust, statistically valid inferences about eachgeographical area in which it used random assignmentof observers. The Center hopes its efforts on July 5and Sept. 20 will contribute to further refinement ofdeployment methodology.

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The Center’s observers complete specific forms for eachpolling station visited. These forms allow the delegation staffto compile a record of consistently applied criteria.

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INSTITUTIONAL REFORMAlthough Indonesia has had five presidents since

1998, the same MPR remained in office from 1999 to2004 and gradually but steadily implemented a seriesof important constitutional changes, which haveimproved the framework for governance. The 1999and 2000 MPR sessions made important changes tostrengthen the legislative power of the DPR and intro-duced provisions recognizing regional autonomy andhuman rights to the constitution.

The turning point in the reform of Indonesia’sgovernmental structure, however, occurred during the2001 session, when the MPR adopted far-reaching con-stitutional reforms establishing the direct election ofthe president and vice president, creating a newConstitutional Court (perhaps the single most impor-tant new institution of the transition), reducing thepower of the MPR and eliminating representation forfunctional groups, and establishing the GeneralElection Commission as an independent body. Alongwith a further set of amendments in 2002, the consti-tutional foundations were laid for a radically new set ofinstitutions compared to what had existed only a fewyears earlier. The 2004 legislative and presidential elec-tions were the first steps in the process of bringinginto being this new set of democratic institutions.

INDONESIA’S ELECTORAL SYSTEMThe amended constitution provides a broad outline

of the method to be used to elect legislative bodies. In2003, the DPR enacted two new laws governing theprocess of conducting elections for Indonesia’s presi-dent and its legislative bodies: These were the Law onthe General Election of the DPR, DPRDs and theDPD (No. 12/2003 - the Legislative Elections Law)and the Law on the General Election of the Presidentand Vice President (No. 23/2003 - the PresidentialElections Law).

GENERAL ELECTION ISSUES–CARTER CENTER OBSERVATIONS

SUMMARY OF TRANSITIONIN KEY INSTITUTIONS

Legislature■ All appointees were phased out of legislativebodies (DPR & MPR) in 2004■ Constitutional amendments strengthened legislative powers of DPR relative to president,removed all legislative power from MPR■ Decentralization institutionalized in theRegional Representative Assembly, an advisorylegislation oversight body

Courts■ The courts were separated administrativelyfrom Department of Justice and Human Rights■ The impeachment of national and local gov-ernment heads requires a Constitutional Courtor Supreme Court decision■ Constitutional Court to provide judicial over-sight of legislation

Press■ Press licenses abolished■ Greater freedoms for reporting■ Libel remains a criminal offense, and there isno Freedom of Information Act

Military■ Police and military became two distinct institutions■ Each relinquished positions in the govern-ment and bureaucracy for active officers■ Measured legislative steps toward reform, but implementation remains a challenge

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In the first set of elections, Indonesians wouldelect the DPR and DPD at the national level andDPRDs at the provincial and district/city level. For theDPR and DPRDs, these elections used a version of anopen-list proportional system (see below). The DPDwas elected in a first-past-the-post ballot. All these elec-tions were held on the same day, April 5, 2004, whichmeant that each voter that day voted on four separateballots (except those in the provinces of Jakarta andYogyajakarta, which do not have separate governmentsor councils at the district level).

In accordance with the election law, the KPUdivided the country into more than 2,000 electoral districts. Depending on population, each districtwould have between three and 12 representatives inthe 550-seat DPR.

Under the “restricted open-list proportional repre-sentation system,” parties submitted a ranked list ofcandidates for each electoral district. Voters wererequired to choose one party but also had the optionof voting for a particular candidate from that party.Seats were allotted to each party in proportion to theshare of the total vote that party received. Candidateswon seats in the order in which they appeared on the

party’s list unless a lower-ranked candidate reached aquota. (The quota was the total number of registeredvoters in an electoral district divided by the number ofseats allocated to that district, the same number ofvotes required for a party to obtain a seat.) In practice,this “opening” of the lists proved to be largely a failure,since very few candidates in provincial and district/cityelections succeeded in meeting the quota, and not asingle national-level candidate was elected solely onthis basis.

The April elections were followed by direct presi-dential elections in July. The presidential election waslinked to the result of the legislative election in thatonly political parties that had won 3 percent of theseats in the DPR or received 5 percent of the validvotes in that election qualified to nominate a ticket of presidential and vice presidential candidates.

The constitution and election law provide that ifno ticket wins more than 50 percent of valid votes inthe first round as well as 20 percent of the vote inmore than half of Indonesia’s provinces, there must bea runoff between the top two vote getters. The firstround of the presidential election was held on July 5,2004. As there was no majority winner, the two ticketsthat received the most votes took part in a secondround runoff on Sept. 20.

For both the legislative and presidential elections,the election law stated that there should be no morethan 300 people registered at each polling station.Before polling day, each registered voter received aninvitation to vote informing him/her of which pollingstation to vote at. According to the prescribed proce-dures, on polling day a voter arrived at the pollingstation, showed his/her voter’s card and letter of invi-tation to vote, received a ballot from the pollingstation committee chair, punched the ballot using aspike provided by the polling station, dropped the ballot in the ballot box, and then had his/her fingermarked with indelible ink (to prevent double-voting)before leaving the polling station.

After voting concluded, polling station officialsimmediately conducted a manual count at the polling

The majority of polling stations were established under tentsand other open structures to enhance public access and trans-parency in the voting process.

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station itself before all electoral materials (including theballot boxes, ballots, voting equipment, tally sheets, reca-pitulation forms, and other documents) were taken to avillage-level tally center (PPS). From this point onward,only the recapitulation forms were referred to for thetabulation process; there was no further counting of theballots themselves unless a re-count was ordered. Whenall polling stations delivered their ballot boxes, the villageelection committee completed a tabulation to determinethe tally for the village. The resulting tabulation formswere then taken to the subdistrict tabulation center,where the process was repeated. This process was thenreplicated through district/city, province, and nationallevel to determine the final, official results. In practice, this meant that although all ballots were counted quickly —usually on polling day itself— the tabulation process tookweeks to complete.

GENERAL ELECTION COMMISSION (KPU)The General Election Commission (KPU) was

formed by presidential decree in 2001 after the previouscommission had been disbanded a year earlier. The

commissioners were drawnlargely from political parties(48 party representativestotal) with five membersappointed by the govern-ment. The tasks of the KPUwere then set out in detailin the two election lawsenacted in 2003. The presi-dent appoints members ofthe national-level KPU aftera selection process conductedby a special committee ofthe Department of HomeAffairs. The national-levelKPU has 11 members whoserve a five-year term ofoffice. The current national-level KPU members willserve until mid-2006.

The extensive hierarchical structure of the electionadministration headed by the KPU mirrors that of thecivil administration. The national KPU appoints KPUsin each province (with seven members each) and ineach district (five members). In turn, the district-levelKPU appoints subdistrict and village-level electioncommittees (PPK and PPS respectively). The PPS thenappoints the polling station committees (KPPS).

Under Indonesia’s election laws, the KPU’s task isto implement these laws, including:

■ Coordinating, implementing, and controlling allstages of the election;

■ Determining the electoral participants; ■ Determining electoral districts, the number of

seats, and candidates for membership of the DPR,DPD, provincial DPRD and district/city DPRD;

■ Establishing the time and date of the vote andcampaign and voting procedures;

■ Determining the results of the elections andannouncing the elected members of the DPR, DPD,provincial DPRD, and district/city DPRD and thepresident/vice president;

Ballots were counted at polling stations after the close of polls. The presiding officer mustinspect carefully each ballot paper to ensure the voter’s intent is clearly indicated.

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■ Evaluating and giving a report on the implemen-tation of the elections.

The KPU is funded both from the national budgetand from the budgets of regional governments.

The KPU’s successful conduct of the world’slargest and most challenging single-day elections,repeated three times within six months, was a remark-able achievement. An average of 122 million voterswent to 580,000 polling stations in each of the threeelections, electing more than 17,000 representatives.(About the same number of voters, 122 million,turned out for the U.S. elections in November 2004,which represented an unusually high turnout of 60.7percent.)

That these extremely complex elections were car-ried out in such an orderly and successful fashion is atribute to the hard work of the millions of electionofficials and the participation of more than 120 millionvoters. The vast majority of voters were able to exercisetheir democratic rights without significant hindrance.In its statements, The Carter Center congratulated thepeople and leaders of Indonesia for the successful con-duct of the presidential election and for the peacefulatmosphere that has prevailed throughout all threerounds of elections in 2004.

Nevertheless, the Center’s monitoring efforts high-lighted a number of concerns that should be addressedto improve elections in Indonesia in the future.Concerns include:

Planning: Planning omissions and inadequate pri-oritization of foreseeable problems made some of thedifficulties worse than they needed to be. Last-minutecrisis management, including the issuance of a numberof policy and procedural changes just before, or evenon, Election Day, managed to address many of theproblems but also resulted in poor implementation ofthese changes. For example, a variety of contradictorystatements shortly before the second round of the pres-idential vote regarding the role of the police in thecollection of election results created confusion.

Training of officials: Throughout the process, TheCarter Center found that inadequate resources were

allocated to the training of polling and tabulation cen-ter officials. This appears to reflect neglect in bothplanning and budgeting for this fundamental part ofthe election operation, a gap that international donorsattempted, late and inadequately, to fill. Lack of train-ing led to a high incidence of incorrectly completedtabulation forms, particularly during the legislativeelections, which created a need for widespread reviewand correction of tabulation forms and in turn evi-dently created opportunities for vote markup in somelocations. While they were not, in the end, systematicor significant enough to call into question the overallresults, many acts of tabulation fraud were in factdetected during the legislative election.

Corruption among officials: There were alsoexamples of KPU officials abusing their positions.During the April legislative elections in Sintang, WestKalimantan, for example, four KPU officials werefound guilty of accepting bribes to falsify vote countsduring tabulation. Investigations of bribery, however,focused almost entirely on the recipients of the bribes,with almost no effort given to charging the perpetrators

President Jimmy Carter addresses the media following a meet-ing with Indonesian General Election Commission chairmanNazaruddin Sjamsuddin (standing to President Carter’s left).

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of the bribery itself. KPU members at provincial anddistrict levels told Carter Center representatives thatthey were regularly offered bribes ranging from Rp 50-100 million (US$ 5,500-11,000). Addressing thequestion of bribery will require more serious efforts to apprehend the perpetrators.

Partisan behavior: Election officials in some loca-tions displayed partisanship. In Lombok, for example,the head of KPU West Nusa Tenggara (NTB) was alsoa “tuan guru,” a local religious leader who can exertstrong influence over his constituency merely bydemonstrating support for one candidate. This officialgave the keynote speech at the launch of presidentialcandidate SBY’s biography in NTB but later asserted toCarter Center observers that his presence at the func-tion did not indicate support for SBY. He did,however, take the Election Supervisory Committee’s(Panwaslu) advice not to attend any further functions.

Policy review: The Center is pleased the KPU hasreviewed the experience of the 2004 elections andoffered a number of recommendations to assist thedesign of future elections. Since the third round of theelections, KPU members have commented on proposedchanges in the media and elsewhere. They have recom-mended, among other things, that the election law for2009 be completed at least two years in advance of thepoll and that the law for 2009 provide more details onthe allocation of seats to each electoral district. TheKPU announced plans to submit a list of proposedchanges to both the DPR and the government.

Although the Regional Government Law seversthe hierarchy between the national KPU and its officesat the provincial and district/city levels (see below), theKPU has offered to contribute to the drafting of regu-lations necessary to finalize the details for theimplementation of the local elections that commencein 2005. The KPU has also offered guidance to itslower-level offices on the comprehensive process ofimplementing a local election, while its humanresources department has prepared a draft trainingprogram for poll workers. However, in accordance withLaw 32/2004 on Regional Autonomy, authority for

conducting the direct local elections is invested in theregional branch of the KPU, answerable only to locallegislatures and not to central government or thenational KPU.

ELECTION SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE(PANWASLU)

The Legislative Election Law instructed the KPUto create and provide funding for a National ElectionSupervisory Committee (Panwaslu), with a mandate tosupervise all aspects of the election process. To fulfillits supervisory role, the nine-member national Panwaslu,supported by a 22-person secretariat, appointed com-mittees at the provincial level, which in turnestablished committees at district/city level, whichthen formed committees at subdistrict level. Membersof Panwaslu were drawn from the police, the attorneygeneral’s office, tertiary education institutions, themedia, and “societal figures” (often NGO activists).

The role of the Panwaslu was to supervise eachstage of election implementation as well as to monitorcampaigns, campaign finances, and party activities.When it received a report of an alleged violation,Panwaslu had 14 days to decide whether to take further action. Panwaslu officials were to report admin-istrative violations to the KPU and criminal violationsto the police. Where possible, Panwaslu was itself supposed to mediate disputes.

Panwaslu had difficulty responding to all com-plaints, especially within the prescribed 14-day period.Political party members, civil society activists, and oth-ers frequently expressed their frustration at Panwaslu’sperceived ineffectiveness. At least in part, this wasbecause the organization faced a number of constraints.

Funding was the most serious of these constraints.Panwaslu funds were part of the larger KPU budgetand, as a result, were under the control of the KPU.The KPU allocated these funds at the national andprovincial levels according to the population and terri-tory of the areas in question. Panwaslu membersthemselves consistently expressed a need for morefunding, additional staff, and greater resources to

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recruit volunteers. Even for such basic resources suchas office space, local committees often had to rely onindividual Panwaslu members or partner institutions, asituation often confirmed by the Carter Center’s ownobservers. Panwaslu’s funding problems were exacerbatedby a formal structure which only extended to the sub-district level. Faced with the same massive territoryand geographic challenges as the KPU, Panwaslu onlyhad a fraction of the personnel with which to fulfill itsmandate. In order to stretch its resources, Panwasluhoped to generate substantial public support to assist it at the lower levels during voting and recapitulation.But these plans turned out to be overly optimistic inthe view of some of its members.

Lack of secure funding put Panwaslu in the poten-tially compromising situation of having to lobby formore funding from the very organization they weresupposed to be supervising as well as from other gov-ernment sources. Some NGOs criticized a provision to allow each provincial administration to supplementthe corresponding Panwaslu budget because they wereconcerned that any external control over the Panwaslu’sbudget could erode its independence. Panwaslu officialsalready complained that they lacked sufficient authorityto tackle violations, particularly as a subordinate bodyto KPU.

Other constraints hindered Panwaslu’s role. Thefrequent reluctance of witnesses posed a challenge forPanwaslu’s stage of the investigations. This certainlycontributed to the weak evidence and generally poorquality of many of Panwaslu’s investigations. As aresult, the KPU, the police, and the courts rejected aconsiderable proportion of cases brought by Panwaslu.Several Panwaslus, as in East Java, also criticized theelection law for its inadequate definitions of electoralviolations.

Nevertheless, The Carter Center concluded thatPanwaslu did, on the whole, fulfill its supervisory rolewithin the limits of its constraints. Panwaslu was espe-cially effective, for example, in uncovering fraudulentcredentials on the part of legislative candidates,although, as explained below, The Carter Center

recommends loosening these requirements in futureelections. Panwaslu also played a largely constructiverole in resolving disputes. To prevent campaign violence,a major concern in the lead-up to these elections,Panwaslu arranged interparty meetings where rivalcampaign teams were encouraged to sign codes of con-duct and statements denouncing politically motivatedviolence. At the same time, Panwaslu sometimes dealtwith cases involving influential people through suchmediation when more serious prosecution was war-ranted. In some places there were allegations of biasagainst local Panwaslu officials, and some criticsargued that Panwaslu should not have included members of the bureaucracy. But observers also heardpraise for the courage of local Panwaslu committees,even acting in the face of considerable intimidation.Furthermore, observers witnessed Panwaslu officialstaking active steps to prevent local problems in theelectoral process. Panwaslu East Java, for example, afterconsultations, proposed a new local regulation to cor-rect perceived weaknesses in the legislation regardingelectoral violations.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN KPU AND PANWASLU

Tensions between the KPU and Panwaslu wereapparent before the April legislative elections whenPanwaslu demanded that the KPU grant it a greater rolein the investigation of legislative candidates. Panwaslualso demanded that the KPU give it access to KPU’sadministrative information on all candidates and parties.The KPU rejected Panwaslu’s various efforts to increaseits authority and independence and justified this stancelargely on the basis of the election laws, which give theKPU ultimate authority over Panwaslu, including itsestablishment and dissolution. On July 8, after the firstround of the presidential election, the KPU further lim-ited Panwaslu’s oversight role when it issued Decree 42requiring that the Panwaslu communicate alleged viola-tions to KPU officials before reporting them to thepolice. In response to public criticism of this decree, theKPU softened it to require only consultation with,

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rather than prior approval of, the KPU before Panwaslureferred complaints to the police.

Nevertheless, Panwaslu rejected the KPU decreeon the grounds that it severely hindered its independ-ence and significantly interfered with the disputeresolution process. Panwaslu unsuccessfully requestedthat the Supreme Court invalidate the new decree,which it claimed contradicted the election law.

Tensions between KPU and Panwaslu dissipatedsomewhat during the second round of the presidentialelections when the KPU issued a decree grantingPanwaslu access to recapitulation figures at subdistrictlevel aggregation centers (PPK). Although there wassome confusion regarding cooperation between thepolice and Panwaslu on election day, it did not affectPanwaslu’s ability to access and analyze recapitulationfigures as required.

The tension between the national KPU andPanwaslu was regrettable since both institutions, in theview of many political observers, functioned reasonablywell despite their apparent competition in many loca-tions. In the Carter Center’s view, it is important tohave an effective, neutral oversight capability and atimely mechanism for resolution of disputes, includingthose between candidates and the KPU. The disputebetween the KPU and Panwaslu and the many com-plaints of lack of cooperation between them hamperedpublic confidence in the handling and resolution ofelection-related complaints.

CONSTITUTIONAL COURTThe Constitutional Court was established in

August 2003 to provide both a judicial check on thelegislature and, in regards to election matters, the adju-dication of disputes in the ballot counting process.

Parties that wished to dispute the election resultshad three days from the time the official results wereannounced to file a case with the ConstitutionalCourt. However, many complaining parties, especiallythe smaller ones, were not able to support their claimsto the necessary standard, often because they did nothave competent party witnesses and had not carefully

collected the relevant evidence during the tabulationprocess. Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court over-turned the results in three of 15 DPD claims and 44of 273 national or regional legislative cases it heardarising out of the April elections.

Many commentators observed that party com-plaints from the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS),Golkar, and the National Mandate Party (PAN) madeeffective use of their party witnesses, presented generallywell-prepared petitions to the court, and were oftensuccessful. On the other hand, even though it is alarge, well-established party, PDI-P did not make effective use of the Constitutional Court. Politicalobservers found that PDI-P, which had neglected infor-mation sessions about court requirements before thelegislative elections, presented poorly supported petitions to the court and lost most of its cases.

The most high-profile case considered by theConstitutional Court was a challenge by presidentialcandidate Wiranto. Following his defeat in the firstround of the presidential election, Wiranto claimedthat he had been the victim of electoral fraud. His casedid not, on the surface, fulfill the basic requirementsfor evidence, but the court agreed to hear the casebecause of its importance. In the end, Wiranto’slawyers failed utterly to present any compelling evidence,and the court unanimously rejected the claim. Thisdecision, despite its potential to have disappointedWiranto supporters, was accepted without protest, andits transparency helped seal the Constitutional Court’sreputation as a crucial and credible part of the electoral process.

THE POLICEThe national police force plays an important role

The National Election SupervisoryCommittee (Panwaslu) and ConstitutionalCourt provided important oversight of theelection process.

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in the implementation of elections. It is responsible forproviding security as well as investigating cases of crimi-nal election violations. In fulfilling these responsibilities,its neutrality and professionalism are of vital importance.

Two scandals in Java during the elections promptedquestions regarding police neutrality and fueled suspi-cions of police bias in favor of Megawati. One of theseoccurred in Yogyakarta during the legislative electioncampaign period, where police were accused of distrib-uting campaign materials on behalf of PDI-P. Noprosecution or sanction resulted, however. A moreprominent case in Banyumas, Central Java, before thesecond round of the presidential elections featured avideo recording of a meeting of retired police officersand their spouses. The recording showed the regionalpolice commander instructing the group in thinlyveiled language to support Megawati. Panwaslu investi-gated the case but did not identify any violation that itfelt would result in criminal sanctions. The policethemselves concentrated their investigations on findingthose who obtained and duplicated the recording ofthe meeting, although the police chief was subsequentlyrotated to a different post. When Carter Centerobservers visited the local police in Banjarnegara, twodeputies denied police wrongdoing and stated that thepolice chief had been rotated for routine administrativereasons and not in connection with the case.

Carter Center observers also became aware of dis-satisfaction in the quality of some police investigations.Police had the responsibility for investigating any allegedcriminal electoral violations referred to them byPanwaslu and, if required, preparing the cases for prose-cution. Despite a number of obstacles, including verylimited time for investigation and difficulty in findingwilling witnesses, police investigators investigated andprosecuted a large number of cases. But The CarterCenter also received reports from Panwaslu representa-tives describing instances of serious lack of cooperationon the part of the police and unwillingness to investigate.

The presence and behavior of the police at pollingstations sometimes raised questions. A large number of police were deployed to provide security at polling

stations, focusing on potential trouble spots. Despite awell-conceived regulation prohibiting police fromentering the polling stations unless invited by pollingstation officials, Carter Center observers in a numberof provinces found police in polling stations evidentlyin the absence of a request from election officials.Even if unobtrusive, their presence might be perceivedas inconsistent with the principle of keeping thepolling station neutral and free of any potential intimi-dation, which is especially important in a countrywhere the police have not always been seen as actingwith integrity and professionalism. Inappropriate “datagathering” of election results at polling stations, report-edly for internal police purposes, was also observed ata significant number of polling stations.

In a small number of cases, Carter Centerobservers found the police presence to be intrusive. InPalangkaraya, Central Kalimantan, for example, CarterCenter observers witnessed a policeman enter thepolling station and ask that polling station officialsand candidate witnesses sign an attendance sheet forinternal police purposes. There were other indicationsof inappropriate police interference with the affairs ofthe KPU. While The Carter Center did not find thatsuch cases were either widespread or systematic, effortson the part of the police to continue improving theprofessionalism of their role in elections wouldnonetheless strengthen the process as a whole.

On the whole, the police did a commendable jobin the 2004 elections. The votes took place in anatmosphere of peace and calm, and a number of high-profile election violators were brought to justice. Policeneutrality in all aspects of its activities, however, andprofessionalism in conducting its investigations willremain of paramount importance to the integrity ofelections and to establishing a credible deterrence forcriminal electoral violations.

DOMESTIC OBSERVERSIndependent domestic election monitoring organi-

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political parties and the public in the legitimacy of theprocess and the results. If disputes regarding electionresults arise, the role of neutral observers is crucial toseeing that the interests of all parties and of the demo-cratic process in general are upheld.

The KPU initially accredited 34 nonpartisan domes-tic observer groups to monitor the 2004 elections. Thelarger among these groups had typically also monitoredthe 1999 legislative elections. The most prominentgroups were the following:

■ The People’s Voter Education Network (JPPR) wasfounded for the 1999 elections as a consortium of civilsociety organizations affiliated with Indonesia’s twolargest Islamic organizations, Nadhatul Ulama (NU)and Muhammadiyah. In 2004, the network of 38organizations also included non-Muslim and secularorganizations.

■ The Center for Electoral Reform (CETRO) grew froma large university-based network that monitored theelections in 1999. Subsequently, CETRO led a nation-al campaign for direct presidential elections and otherconstitutional reforms.

■ The People’s Election Observation Network of

Indonesia (JAMPPI) was a pre-dominately student-basednetwork, supported and advisedby academics, politicians, andcommunity leaders.

■ The Independent ElectionsObserver Committee (KIPP)gained prominence as a collec-tion of organizations thatmonitored the last election heldunder Soeharto in 1997 andmobilized in much larger num-bers in 1999.

■ The Indonesian Rectors’ Forum(FRI), a consortium of universi-ties across the country, in 1999conducted Indonesia’s first, high-ly successful, parallel votetabulation (quick count), based

on random samples in all of the country’s provinces. Although voter education and polling day moni-

toring peaked for the April legislative elections,CETRO, JPPR, JAMPPI, the Rectors’ Forum, andother groups maintained a presence for the presidentialelections. The precise number of domestic observerswho were present at polling stations on each pollingday was difficult to ascertain. The largest of the domes-tic monitoring groups claimed a combined total ofmore than 300,000 observers for the legislative elections.The JPPR claimed to have mobilized 140,000 observersfor the April legislative ballot. After initially deciding itwas no longer a monitoring organization, CETROeventually decided to implement a targeted electionmonitoring program in 2004. The group reportedfielding about 7,500 observers in the legislative elec-tions. During the two rounds of the presidentialelections, it deployed about 13,000 and 18,000observers, respectively, in 11 provinces and focusedmany of them at village and subdistrict-level recapitula-tion centers. Relying largely on student networks,JAMPPI fielded about 13,000 observers in April,12,000 in July, and 17,000 in September. More than

John Hardman and Jimmy Carter met with European Union chief observer Glyn Ford.The EU had the largest international observer delegation in Indonesia with 230 observers.

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8,000 KIPP observers were accredited for the legislativeelections. The KPU withdrew KIPP’s accreditation forthe presidential elections, but, despite this, many KIPPmembers continued as unaccredited observers for bothrounds of the presidential elections. Rectors’ Forumclaimed about 160,000 observers for the April legisla-tive elections. Their deployment dropped sharply bythe second round of the presidential election whenthey had 10,000 observers.

The Carter Center frequently consulted withdomestic observers at the national and local levels, andits observers benefited substantially from their exper-tise. However, Center observers found that mutualdistrust often hampered the working relationshipbetween domestic observer groups and electoralauthorities, limiting opportunities for informationsharing. For example, the KPU briefly threatened tostrip the LP3ES (Indonesia’s Institute of Research,Education, and Information of Social and EconomicAffairs) of its accreditation after the group allegedlyreleased its quick count of the first round of the presi-dential election before informing the electoralcommission.

At the first round of the presidential poll, CarterCenter observers noted the presence of domestic moni-tors at 24 percent of the polling stations visited. Forthe second round in September, this figure dropped to12 percent. Some domestic observer groups reportedto the Center that they had curtailed their activitiesfor the presidential elections due to a marked reduc-tion in available funds. In 1999 and in the Aprilround in 2004, principally using donor funds, mostIndonesian monitoring organizations paid anallowance to each observer as well as covering transportation and communications costs.

Several domestic observer groups have stated thatthey are planning observation activities for the directlocal elections that begin in 2005. The vital contribu-tion that domestic observer groups can make to thetransparency of this process will be greatly enhanced ifthey have access to sufficient resources to increase theirlocal activities.

VOTER REGISTRATIONThe main registration of voters for the 2004

elections took place in April and May 2003 and wasconducted by the Statistics Bureau with guidance fromthe KPU. The official roll produced at that time had148,000,369 voters.

In the lead-up to the legislative election, it becameapparent that many people had not been registered atall while others had not received their voter cards. TheKPU did take some steps to accommodate voters. Forinstance, approximately 2 million voters were added tothe roll after December 2003, when registrationshould have concluded. Those who were registered butlacked cards were also accommodated. KPU chair-person Nazaruddin Syamsuddin announced that voterscould use their citizen’s identity card to verify theiridentity against the electoral roll. Potential voters whohad missed out on registration altogether were, however,warned not to attempt to vote and were asked to waitfor their chance to vote in the presidential elections.There was substantial criticism of the shortcomings ofthe voter registration process.

The process of correcting the electoral roll for thepresidential election began in mid-April, soon after thelegislative vote, and was scheduled to conclude on May25, after which a month was reserved for the distribu-tion of voter cards to additional voters.

More than 7 million people were added to theelectoral roll as a part of this update process, bringingthe total number of voters registered for the presiden-tial election to 155,048,945. Because of the great sizeof this logistical exercise and the lack of clear institu-tional responsibility (in fact it was dependent uponlocal governments for funding support), the processappears to have been at times disorganized, leading torenewed problems with unregistered, double-registered,and fictive voters. Local officials reported to CarterCenter observers that the KPU did not always act oncorrections made at the PPS level. Weaknesses in thecomputerization of data also meant that cross-checking,to weed out multiple entries, such as persons with dualresidences, was extremely difficult.

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The election system was, however, designed withenough flexibility to allow for inadequacies in thevoter list. In addition to being listed on a voter register,a voter required a voter ID card and a letter from thePPS as proof of the right to vote. The Carter Centerfound, however, that the distribution of these ID cardsand invitation letters was not always reliable nor wasthe regulation consistently enforced. In some cases,local officials improvised. Carter Center observersreported, for example, that some newly registered votersin Southeast Sulawesi received nonlaminated votercards photocopied on blue cardboard.

A March 2004 audit of voter registration conductedby LP3ES found a relatively high level of voter registra-tion at 91 percent. The audit found that registrationaccuracy and completeness varied among regions anddemographic groups and identified trends that coin-cided with the Carter Center’s observations. Amongthese were the issue of “ghost voters” and indicationsthat vulnerable groups such as internally displaced persons were under-registered.

Carter Center observers across Indonesia foundthat both NGOs and electoral authorities raised theissue of voter registration shortfalls. Although theshortcomings in registration did not create overly seri-ous problems for the presidential elections, such flawswill have greater impact, proportionately, on the smaller,local constituencies, and in the long run, they cancause disenfranchisement of voters and leave theprocess vulnerable to fraud.

VOTER EDUCATIONDramatic changes in the electoral process since

1999 resulted in complicated ballot papers and wouldhave normally suggested the need for an intensivevoter education program. The KPU, which was respon-sible under the election laws for voter education, didnot, however, accord this fundamental activity dueattention in its planning and, as a result, allocated verylittle funding for it. As with staff training, the interna-tional community had to step into the breech, and soresources came late and in inadequate supply.

NGOs and political parties as well as the KPUitself conducted voter education activities mostlyfocused on the legislative elections, the first and by farthe most complex of the three polling days in 2004.

The KPU used television ads and radio programsas well as conventional training programs to dissemi-nate voter education information. KPU votereducation messages emphasized the importance ofvoting according to one’s conscience and the secrecyof the ballot. It was hoped that this would counterattempts to coerce voters.

In addition to the KPU training sessions, there

A poster advertises the election date and displays the five pres-idential candidate pairs who will appear on the ballot paper.

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was a great deal of public enthusiasm for NGO-runvoter education activities. NGOs targeted women andfirst-time voters in activities designed both to sharetechnical information about the election and to raisegeneral democracy awareness. NGOs also participatedin broadcast programs that discussed a combination ofsocial issues and information regarding voting proce-dures. These activities, too, were severely restricted bylimited funding, and, as a result, most of the NGOstended to focus on urban voting populations ratherthan rural areas.

Ultimately, voter education was not a crucial factorfor the presidential election, which was much simplerand came within months of the legislative electionwhere voters had already had the experience of markingfour complicated ballots each.

TRAINING OF ELECTION OFFICIALSAs mentioned above, the KPU’s budget did not

provide adequately for the training of electoral workers,and thus the KPU relied heavily on funds and technicalassistance provided by donors. Overall, the KPUreported that almost Rp 57 billion (US$6.3 million)was spent on training for the three elections.

For the legislative elections, training was conductedusing a “cascade” approach, where the first level ofKPU and electoral staff was directly trained, and theneach level trained the level below it. Given the lack ofresources, this initial training was done in large hallswith hundreds of participants, and so there was littlequality assurance before the first level of newly trainedstaff was sent off to train lower-level officials. And eventhese mass trainings only reached some 5,000 KPUstaff members, less than one-tenth of 1 percent of thealmost 6 million electoral workers, and were concen-trated in areas that did not have electricity or wereotherwise of lower socio-economic status. It helped,though, that 60 to 70 percent of polling station staff,according to the KPU’s estimate, had been involved inthe 1999 election.

This “cascade” style of training was supplemented by“self-training,” where polling staff were either asked to

watch an instructional video, which was distributednationally and aired on television shortly before eachelection, or provided with a leaflet describing their tasks.

For the presidential election, donors each focusedtheir training assistance on provinces and districtswhere the need was thought to be the greatest ratherthan attempting to cover the entire country as theyhad done in preparation for the legislative elections.Changes were also made to the way donor funds werechanneled to the regions because of indications thatsome regional KPUs had not spent donor-contributedfunds responsibly. The KPU responded by demandinga full accounting of all funds, including donor funds,from regional offices. Donor funds covered most training

Indonesia office director Eric Bjornlund and Carter CenterExecutive Director John Hardman review polling proceduresdepicted in the training manual for election officers.

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costs, other than honoraria for personnel.For the second round of the presidential elections,

the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)produced a training booklet about election procedures.This was a positive but overdue initiative. CarterCenter observers noted that the UNDP booklet waswidely in evidence at polling and tabulation centers.

The overall weakness of election-worker trainingbecame apparent during the tabulation process, espe-cially during the legislative election. Incorrectlycompleted tabulation forms (many of which wereimprovised locally due to distribution problems) andfurther errors in tabulation created considerable confusion and delays in tallying the results.

CANDIDATE REQUIREMENTSThe new election laws imposed substantial educa-

tional requirements for candidates. The generalelection law raised the educational requirements forlegislative candidates from junior high school to “highschool or equivalent” qualifications. This issue causeda storm of controversy, both from prospective candi-dates who saw their credentials challenged and fromthe public, frustrated at those who fraudulently slippedthrough.

On the one hand, there were some legitimategrievances from people with education from outsidethe formal, public education system. Religious educa-tion is common in Indonesia, and in some isolatedareas, such as parts of Papua, it is the only option.Because the legislation does not clearly define thenature of the “equivalencies” which are to be accepted,this was the source of numerous disputes. More funda-mentally, these requirements prevent large numbers ofindividuals from having the right to run for office,including a disproportionate number of women.

On the other hand, there were also a number ofcases of outright fraud. Panwaslu brought court pro-ceedings to disqualify 405 elected members, most ofthem for having allegedly falsified education certifica-tion. (This seemingly large number is actually a tinypercentage of the 17,000 representatives elected in

April.) The KPU was roundly criticized in the mediafor failing to complete candidate screenings before theelection or even before the swearing-in ceremonies.During some of the ceremonies, large protest ralliestook place, with people demanding that the unre-solved accusations be dealt with promptly. Thepolitical parties also came in for their share of criticismfor continuing to put forward disreputable candidates.

Despite the KPU’s attempts to address those cases,some lingering disputes remained, delaying the swearing-in of a number of new representatives and postponingthe inauguration of the entire legislatures in WestKalimantan and Nias, North Sumatra. In the end, 213of the 405 challenges were heard. Only three nationaland 18 regional legislative candidates were disqualifiedfor not fulfilling the educational requirements.

Rejection of candidacy based on disability. Healthrequirements for the presidency were introduced intothe constitution in November 2001, shortly after for-mer President Abdurrahman Wahid, who is nearlyblind as a result of a stroke, was impeached. On May22, 2004, the KPU rejected Wahid’s candidacy forpresident after he failed a medical examination con-ducted by the Indonesian Doctors’ Association.

Wahid filed a civil case with the Central JakartaDistrict Court seeking damages from the KPU, theIndonesian Doctors’ Association, and the Department

GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS – 1999PARTY TOTAL VOTESPDI-P . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35,689,073Golkar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23,741,749PPP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11,329,905PKB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13,336,982PAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7,528,956PBB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2,049,708PK (now PKS) . . . . . . . . 1,436,565PKP (now PKPI) . . . . . . 1,065,686

Source: KPU

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of Health. After initial mediation failed, the courteventually found against Wahid in mid-October. Hisparty, PKB, unsuccessfully requested a judicial reviewfrom the Constitutional Court and Supreme Courtand also took the issue to the Election SupervisoryCommittee (Panwaslu). Wahid’s disqualification neverdeveloped into a significant public controversy, however,and following his elimination, Wahid announced hisintention to boycott the election, although herefrained from urging others to do so.

The Carter Center raised its concern about a regulation that takes judgments about presidential candidates’ qualifications out of the hands of votersand appears to discriminate on the basis of physicaldisability. International standards suggest that anyrestrictions on candidacy based on health requirementsshould be interpreted narrowly.

CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIESCampaigning throughout the three elections was

overwhelmingly peaceful, quieting one of the mainanxieties about the electoral process in Indonesia.Clashes between rival party supporters in October2003 in Buleleng, Bali, had heightened concerns about the possibility of campaign violence.

The legislative campaign started and finished withgala events, during which all parties participated in ajoint parade. This activity was in part designed toreduce the potential for violence and send a messageto all party supporters. During the campaign perioditself, the KPU imposed a strict timetable on differentparties so that their mass rallies did not coincide.

Panwaslu received reports of parties paying “travelmoney” for people to attend their rallies. The mediaeven reported some cases of rally participants com-

Indonesia has a thriving media sector. Here, presidential candidate SusiloBambang Yudhyono stands before a wall of cameras at a campaign rally. JO

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plaining that they had not received the money thathad been promised to them.

Electoral officials, NGOs, and even some localcampaign teams described the presidential electioncampaign as more “low-key” than its legislative equiva-lent. During the first-round campaign — which ran for30 days — each candidate was allowed to conduct his orher campaign through the media, public rallies, closedmeetings, and door-to-door visits. On the first morning

of the campaign, all five sets of candidates met to signa charter stating their commitment to accepting theresults of the election.

The candidates themselves traveled the country formedia spots and public rallies. A strict timetable wasimposed to avoid scheduling clashes that might lead toviolence. Campaign rallies that The Carter Centerobserved were only moderately attended and were typi-cally well within the capacity of their venues. The largenumber of provinces to be covered in 30 days meantthat candidates often adopted a “fly in, fly out”approach to rallies. In one instance, Carter Centerobservers noted that the particular brevity of one can-didate’s stay became the focus of local press reports onthe event. Although campaign speeches at the ralliesobserved focused on broadly defined national issuessuch as corruption, poverty, and law and order, candi-dates also took pains to pay respect to local tradition.For instance, Megawati spoke of her Balinese heritageat a rally in the province, while SBY held one of hispublic meetings in West Kalimantan in a traditionalhouse.

Transparency International Indonesia (TII) esti-mated that the candidates and parties Rp 155 billion(US$17,050,000) was spent on campaign advertising inthe broadcast, electronic, and print media. Parties andcandidates also spent heavily on T-shirts and othercampaign paraphernalia to distribute as well as onbusiness cards, printing, and transportation costs.

Candidate debates. Because of the sheer scale ofthe country and the importance in a direct election ofprojecting an image, candidates focused their resourceson media campaigning, especially television, to reachvoters. Television provided the broadest reach.Televised debates for the first round were organized onJune 30 and July 1 between sets of presidential candi-dates, split into two groups. On the first night, AmienRais and Megawati Soekarnoputri and their runningmates participated. The remainder of the candidatesparticipated the following evening. A panel of academ-ics directed questions to the candidates, and a formertelevision presenter served as moderator. Some

A CASE OF MONEY POLITICSCarter Center observers frequently received

reports of money politics, which were invariablyimpossible to substantiate. When pressed fordetails, those who reported the cases would oftenprofess to lack evidence or claim that it would notbe “ethical” to disclose the identities of thoseinvolved. One observer did, however, obtain documentary evidence of money politics.

In the course of a meeting with a district-levelPanwaslu, the observer inquired about an allegedcase involving the bribery of a local KPU head by aparticular party. The Panwaslu head, apparentlybelieving that The Carter Center already knewabout the case, explained that the candidate hadpaid a Rp 4.5 million (US$500) bribe to the headof a district-level KPU to guarantee her a seat.When the candidate did not win the promisedseat, she demanded repayment of her bribe, alongwith another Rp 5.5 (US$611) million in “interest.”

The district-level Panwaslu, using its disputeresolution mandate in a curious fashion, brokereda deal for repayment of a sum of Rp 6 (US$667)million. A contract was drawn up between thehead of the district-level KPU and the candidateand then signed by all the members of the localPanwaslu, as witnesses. The matter was then con-sidered resolved and was never reported to thepolice (although the local police chief was a signa-tory in his capacity as a member of Panwaslu).

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Indonesian observers criticized the debates for the lackof direct interaction between different sets of candidates.An earlier attempt in June to assemble all five sets ofcandidates at the University of Indonesia had failed,when only Amien Rais appeared.

Misuse of state resources. One significant concernregarding campaigning was the misuse of state resourcesand funds. Five of the 10 candidates were members of

Megawati’s Cabinet and thus had ready access to stateresources. For example, a local Panwaslu documentedapparent violations involving the cooperatives minister,Ali Marwan Hanan. The minister took leave on June12-13 to campaign for Hamzah Haz and AgumGumelar but scheduled an official working visit toNorth Maluku from June 11-13. The Panwaslu allegedthat the minister used this official visit on June 12 tocampaign in several subdistricts in Tidore, thereby misappropriating local government resources for apolitical campaign.

A more serious abuse was the use of bureaucratichierarchy to coerce voters to elect a particular candi-date. One case that gained media attention involvedstate plantation workers in Banyuwangi who allegedthe plantation manager threatened that they wouldlose their jobs if they did not vote for Megawati-Hasyim.At several polling stations in the area, Megawati-Hasyimreceived either every vote cast or all but one. The localPanwaslu informed Carter Center observers that thecase had been dropped for lack of evidence andbecause the plantation manager had been repentant.The Wiranto-Wahid campaign also reportedly com-plained to Panwaslu of cases of intimidation on stateplantations in East Java.

CAMPAIGN FINANCEThere are two key laws that govern the lawful allo-

cation of funds for legislative election party campaigns:the 2002 Political Party Law, which regulates validsources of funds for parties, and the 2003 LegislativeElection Law, which further regulates campaign con-tributions and reporting of campaign income andexpenditure.

The Political Party Law specifies three sources offunds for political parties: membership fees, donations,and state-provided subsidies. The latter subsidies for2004 were based on the 1999 Political Parties Law andamount to Rp 1000 (US$0.11) per 1999 vote. This wasa significant source of funds available to establishedparties, particularly PDI-P and Golkar.

Because of a loophole in the election laws, the

A campaign banner for President Megawati Soekarnoputriflutters in the Jakarta breeze.

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Free and Fair Election reported that Golkar requiredits number-one-ranked candidate in each area to con-tribute Rp 100 million (US$11,000) to the party.Another report from the small town of Jepara claimedsome parties required candidates to promise a portionof their salary should they be elected. Such practices,of course, have the effect of creating financial barriersto political office, even at the local level, a problem notuncommon in many other countries.

MONEY POLITICSThe Carter Center heard many concerns from

representatives of political parties, campaign teams,electoral officials, and civil society throughout thecountry about the illegitimate use and influence ofmoney in the campaign, including vote buying, andabout the inappropriate use of government resources.But there appeared to be no common understandingof what “money politics” meant, and there was muchconfusion about what uses of funds were illegal.Nevertheless, these suspicions were widespread.

Although it was difficult to obtain specific infor-mation on how widespread this practice was, Panwaslurecorded 31 cases of money politics throughout thecountry in the March-April campaign, mostly relatingto distribution of “travel money” or staple food prod-ucts as inducement to attend campaign rallies. Theactual number of cases was presumably much higher,covering a range of practices including making dona-tions to local places of worship or religious figures,promising contracts or development projects if elected,or simply distributing money to voters.

Carter Center observers were also informed of partiesdistributing small- and medium-enterprise funds, oftenloans with minimal or no interest, to party supporters notlong before elections. For example, Carter Centerobservers in Binjai, North Sumatra, encountered reportsthat Megawati’s Success Team promised cheap credit toworkers at a certain corporation. These schemes, as a partof longer-term social assistance programs, appear to gobeyond standard campaign promises to possible manipula-tion. Another form of donation involved providing

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majority of Indonesia’s politicians and parties avoidedreporting their campaign finances to the government.All parties and candidates were required to submit areport of campaign funds received and spent within 60 days after polling day. Although there were criminalsanctions for illegitimately giving or receiving donationsand for falsely reporting donations, the election lawdid not specify any sanction for not reporting cam-paign finances at all. (In mid-October, long after thedeadline had passed, the KPU complained that onlyone of the 128 members of the DPD had submittedhis report and only 13 of 24 political parties had com-plied. That number only increased after the mediaexposed widespread noncompliance later in October.)Even for those political parties that did submit theirfinancial reports, local watchdog groups such asIndonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) and TransparencyInternational Indonesia (TII) cast doubt on the figuresprovided.

According to the data the presidential campaignteams submitted to the KPU, approximately Rp 238 billion (US$26,400,000) of funds were donated for campaign purposes for the first round. The amountsdeclared ranged from Rp 2,750,000,000 (US$305,000)for Hamzah Haz-Agum Gumelar to Rp 103,096,200,000(US$11,400,000) for Megawati-Hasyim. Checking bylocal NGOs, however, raised questions about the figurescampaign teams quoted to the KPU. TransparencyInternational and Indonesia Corruption Watch, forexample, uncovered several “fictive” donors to the SBY-Kalla campaign team in Palu, Central Sulawesi, findingno company in existence at the stated address of severalcorporate donors. Jusuf Kalla himself admitted that Rp600 million (US$67,000) of donations had been incor-rectly attributed but identified the cause as misprints ordonor error. No sanctions were imposed. The electionlaw only required campaign teams to declare donationsover Rp 5,000,000 (US$555), making it impossible totrack smaller amounts.

One source of party financing was from candidatesthemselves. The Southeast Asia Press Alliance ofJakarta (SEAPA-Jakarta) and the Media Coalition for a

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financial aid to religious organizations. Panwaslu Acehreported that the Amien Rais Success Team was said tohave donated Rp 100 million (US$11,000) to a universityin Banda Aceh shortly before the first round of the presi-dential elections.

Many political commentators have noted thatIndonesia’s system for regulating and disclosing politicalexpenditures is poorly enforced and therefore ignoredby most electoral participants. Accordingly, thePanwaslu and the KPU have argued they need legalaccess to the Bank of Indonesia transfer records to successfully investigate “money politics.”

Three finance-related issues that emerged duringthe legislative election were particularly relevant for thepresidential election. The first was the impossibility ofaccurately determining exactly how parties raised andspent money, making it easy for presidential candidatesto raise funds outside the letter of the election law.The second was the anecdotal impression that candi-dates, rather than parties, were responsible for most“money politics” violations, because candidates forlocal election could more easily affect the outcome byinfluencing the votes in a small area. This suggestedthat financial improprieties might be less of an issue in a presidential election with a small number of can-didates. The third, which was a possible exception tothe suggestion that “money politics” was more of aproblem in the legislative and local elections, was thesmall- and medium-enterprise funds schemes of parties,which were aimed more at long-term voter affiliation.These funds raised the question, discussed below, ofthe extent to which parties could hope to deliver sup-port to presidential candidates.

ROLE OF THE MEDIA2

In general, the media in Indonesia played a sup-portive and relatively neutral role in disseminatinginformation about the elections to the public. Butthere were two major exceptions to this general pattern:

the use of state television (TVRI) to promote theincumbent president, Megawati Soekarnoputri, andthe use of the private Metro TV and Media Indonesianewspaper to promote their owner, Surya Paloh, con-tender for the Golkar presidential candidacy.

All parties and candidates in these elections hadaccess to the media. Unlike previous elections, a largeportion of campaign budgets went to media advertising,particularly during the direct presidential elections.According to data compiled by the EU ElectionObservation Mission (EUEOM), incumbent presiden-tial candidate Megawati spent the most money onadvertising.

Both national and regional newspapers were active in covering the elections, with many papers having special daily sections on the elections. Thesesections would typically cover a variety of electionissues in addition to the candidates.

In the lead-up to the legislative elections in April,the media overall took a fairly balanced and neutralstance, although the larger parties and the most well-known candidates were predictably more prominent inthe news. SBY’s decision to quit the Cabinet duringthis period made him a major newsmaker, and someof the private television stations and print media, inparticular, accorded him considerable coverage. SuryaPaloh, a candidate for the Golkar presidential nomina-tion, blatantly used the media he owns (Metro TV andMedia Indonesia) to raise his profile. He received 10percent more coverage on Metro TV than the incum-bent president and had a similar prominence in thepages of his Media Indonesia daily. Metro was also theonly network to broadcast the entire Golkar conven-tion live. The Indonesian Broadcasting Commissionreprimanded Metro TV for devoting an excessiveamount of coverage to Paloh.

There were other examples of print media accord-ing more prominence to candidates and parties whosestance coincided with the editorial slant of the paper,but none of these amounted to outright bias, and coverage overall was varied and inclusive.

TVRI’s efforts to promote Megawati’s candidacy

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2 This analysis draws on data collected systematically by theEuropean Union’s Election Observer Mission, supplemented bythe Carter Center’s own observations.

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increased after the legislative elections and becamemore pronounced in the run-up to the second-roundpresidential elections. Megawati was allotted nearlythree times the news coverage of any other candidateduring the first round, and the tone of this coveragewas noticeably more positive than the coverage of othercandidates. Prior to the second round, that amountincreased even further, with Megawati receiving overfive times as much coverage as Yudhoyono. By contrast,the private television stations were not overtly biased.However, they all tended to devote twice as much cover-age overall to Megawati as to any other candidate —although this was mainly the result of advertising ratherthan a systematic display of partiality.

Interestingly, across the media, there appeared tobe no correlation between the amount of advertising

bought by a candidate and the amount or tone of thenews coverage. One exception to this general rule wasRRI Radio, which gave unusually prominent coverageto PAN, Amien Rais, and Hidayat Nur Wahid, whichmirrored the pattern of advertising revenues. Kompasalso seemed to favor PDI-P, coincidentally its biggestadvertiser, with disproportionately more coverage andmore favorable/less negative coverage, but this maysimply have reflected an editorial predispositiontoward PDI-P.

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSIONCivil society and the media continue to flourish in

post-Soeharto Indonesia, but some of their criticisms,activities, and reporting drew sharp reactions fromparts of the government and political elite. Well-known

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Supporters cheer at a campaign rally for Susilo Bambang Yudhyono and Yusuf Kalla.

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people are able to publicly engage in constructivedebate over the course of the nation, but members ofthe general public sometimes feel less free to do so. The2004 elections provided several examples of the limita-tions that remain on free speech.

Threats to freedom of the press during 2004 arosemore from questionable legal cases brought by privatecitizens and physical attacks on press offices than fromstate censorship. A series of high-profile court casesinvolved allegations of libel brought by a powerful businessman against Tempo, a leading national newsmagazine, and its reports and editor.

Two district courts awarded civil damages of $1million and $55,000, respectively, against Tempo forlibel. The Jakarta high court, however, overturned theverdicts under the 1999 Press Law, which providesbasic protections in order to guarantee a free press.Despite this high court decision, in a third related case brought under the Criminal Code rather than the Press Law, a district court subsequently found theeditor of Tempo, Bambang Harymurti, criminallyresponsible for libel and sentenced him to one year inprison. Many worried that the precedent set by thiscase would intimidate less high-profile media organiza-tions. Subsequently, the editor of regional daily PosKupang was named as a suspect in a libel case involvinga former police chief.

In June, Indonesia expelled Sidney Jones of theInternational Crisis Group (ICG), a well-respectedresearcher and commentator on Indonesian security andhuman rights, from the country. It was widely believedthat she was targeted because of her frank reporting onthe Indonesian military operation in Aceh, the conflictsin Papua and Ambon, and Jemaah Islamiah (JI). Thehead of the national intelligence agency suggested that at least 20 organizations had engaged in activities thatcould threaten national security.

Such heavy-handed government actions necessarilyconstrain the freedom of expression of civil society. Allparts of the government need to recognize the value ofhealthy debate and multiple viewpoints in a maturedemocracy.

A February decision of the Constitutional Courtannulled an archaic component of the LegislativeElection Law and restored the right of former mem-bers of the Indonesian Communist Party to participatein electoral politics, but only beginning in 2009. Thelaw, however, still prohibits political parties from“spreading communism,” and the court decision doesnot apply to the presidential elections.

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On April 5, 2004, Indonesians took part in thelargest, most complex single-day election everheld in any country. Eighty-four percent of

the 148 million registered voters turned up to selectrepresentatives for national, provincial, and district/city councils. Two thousand and fifty-two different ballot papers were printed and distributed for the occasion, some with as many as 400 candidate nameson them.

Although the Carter Center observers were not yetfully deployed to directly observe the April 5 election,they spent the months of May and June in the fieldspeaking to a wide range of interlocutors, attemptingto glean the lessons of the legislative elections anddevelop an understanding of the context for the com-ing presidential vote.

ELECTION PREPARATIONSWhen the Legislative Election Law was passed in

March 2003, there was barely a year left to organize thevote. Significant changes to the system — such as reduc-ing the number of voters per polling station from1,000 to 300 and the radically different ballot system —meant that, even for officials who had been involvedin previous elections, 2004 was a very new experience.The KPU therefore faced major challenges in designingand distributing election materials, in training pollworkers, and in informing the electorate of complicatedvoting procedures.

For many candidates, voters, and lower-level elec-toral officials, the complexity of the ballots, the newproportional system, and the recapitulation processwere sources of much confusion. Confusion caused bythe ballots themselves, which were wider than the vot-ing screens and featured hundreds of candidate names,was reflected in the high rate of invalid ballots, 9 per-cent nationally.

The procurement and distribution of electionmaterials were one of the most serious problems. In

particular, the production of voter cards and ballots,centralized in Java because the bidding process favoredlarge consortiums, was impractical for national distri-bution. Although production costs were low, the resultwas a delay in the distribution of voter cards and bal-lots. One KPU official explained to the Center that,for example, the ballots for the easternmost provincesof Papua were produced in landlocked Solo, CentralJava. Incorrect labeling and other problems also resultedin some ballots being delivered to the wrong locations.These logistical problems caused delayed or repeat bal-lots at small numbers of polling stations in variousprovinces. For example, according to KPU press state-ments, the legislative elections were delayed at variouspolling stations in seven districts in Papua, 78 pollingstations in eight districts of Central Java, 10 pollingstations in East Nusa Tenggara, and five polling sta-tions in West Sumatra.

There were also allegations that corruption hadinfluenced the bidding process with illegal markups inproduction costs for the personal benefit of KPUmembers. The majority of these alleged markups werein election material production and distribution costs.

Because of delays in the delivery of training mate-rials before the legislative elections, polling stationofficials often reported that they were given insufficienttime to read and understand complicated polling andrecapitulation procedures. Some polling station officialstold the Center that although they were able to com-plete the tabulation process much more quickly thanin 1999, additional training would have helped themto do so more efficiently and professionally.

After the logistical problems faced during the legisla-tive elections, the KPU decided during the presidentialelections to print voter cards locally. They did continueto have ballots produced centrally, but the simpler ballotformat helped avoid delays in distribution.

LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS: APRIL 5, 2004

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PROBLEMS WITH RECAPITULATIONCarter Center observers heard of many allegations

of fraud at the subdistrict (PPK) recapitulation levelduring the legislative elections. Several cases wereproved in the end, but very often complaints at thislevel faltered for lack of conclusive evidence. Party wit-nesses, often ill-trained, faced many constraints indocumenting their claims. They were not generally ableto obtain copies of the recapitulation form from thepolling stations they attended and were often forced toattempt to write down complex recapitulation data onscraps of paper. Polling stations themselves did notalways use the official tabulation forms.

In Jatibaru village in Bima, East Nusa Tenggara(NTT), members of the election committee (PPK)apparently changed vote tallies from 15 of 18 pollingstations. The changes were meant to favor PKB butwere sufficiently blatant that the number of votesostensibly cast exceeded the number of voters on theelectoral roll. The case was reported to the police, butthe public prosecutor’s office declined to pursue it ongrounds of insufficient evidence. When local NGOTIPP planned a protest over the inaction, its office wasburned down. TIPP reported to Carter Centerobservers that the two dismissed election officials hadadmitted being offered a bribe of Rp 30 million toalter the results, of which Rp 1.5 million had beenpaid. Ultimately, the KPU chairman and one othermember of the committee were dismissed.

LEGISLATIVE ELECTORAL SYSTEMThe changes made in the method of electing repre-

sentatives for the 2004 legislatures came about as theresult of a political compromise and as such were onlya modest step in the direction of putting choice in thehands of the people. Growing public frustration overthe quality and integrity of the legislators, traditionallychosen by central party executives with little outsideinput, had created pressure on party leaders and legis-lators from both the public and party members alike tocome up with a process that increased the connectionbetween legislators and their constituents. For theirpart, some party executives preferred to retain centralparty control of candidate selection.

The end result was a “restricted open list propor-tional representation system” whereby partiesnominated candidate lists and representatives wereelected in order of their ranking on the lists accordingto the party’s proportional share of the total vote, butthe voters had the theoretical (i.e. restricted) option ofelecting candidates further down the list if those candi-dates reached a certain threshold. As discussed earlier,the restrictions were so significant that the voters’ abilityto choose individual candidates remained almost whollytheoretical. The threshold written into the legislation(calculated by dividing the total number of registeredvoters by the number of seats allocated to that electoraldistrict) was so high as to be virtually unattainable, atleast in the elections for the DPR, the national legislature.

The Carter Center joined other foreign observersand advisers working with the KPU in worrying thatthe high thresholds in the open-list proportional repre-sentation system could lead to problems if the public,unaware of how insurmountable the quotas were, sawcandidates elected who received fewer votes than othercandidates who did not get seats. The ballots, whichfor the first time featured candidate names or photo-graphs as well as political party logos, strengthened theimpression that voters had some meaningful controlover which individuals would be elected to representeach party.

Screens protected the secrecy of the ballot as voters markedtheir choice by the use of asteel punch.

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In the end, only two out of 550 DPR members(Hidayat Nur Wahid of PKS and Saleh Djasit ofGolkar) received the quota of votes necessary to beelected as individuals, but both were, in any case, firston their party lists.

Some voters indeed felt cheated when candidateswith smaller vote totals were elected over candidateswho were more popular. Candidates who had receivedmore individual votes than others who were higher onthe same party lists but short of the quota reacted withfrustration at not being elected. In one well-publicizedcase in East Java, media accounts attributed the mur-der of a candidate to such resentment.

In some cases, creative compromises were attemptedto balance out the rules and the public’s sense of pro-priety. In January, Amien Rais announced to agathering of PAN candidates that the party intendedto install any lower-ranked candidate who was notelected but achieved over 50 percent of the quota. A “time-share” of the seat was floated as a solution to two disputes between candidates for the provinciallegislature in Papua.

The number of voters opting to mark their ballotsin support of an individual candidate varied fromprovince to province. In Papua, where it was highest,almost every party that had a candidate elected to thenational legislature also had a lower-ranked candidate

who received more votes but was not elected. Three ofthese failed candidates received more votes than anycandidate in Papua who was elected.3

The experience in Papua demonstrates how theprohibitively high quotas allowed parties to retain con-trol over who was elected, sometimes in clear contrastto the wishes of the electorate. The disappointment ofpopular failed candidates and the voters who wanted toelect them may have had a negative impact upon partymobilization during the presidential election and maybe a factor in explaining the apparent lack of loyalty toparties and coalitions in the presidential elections.

The new system did provide some incentive forparties to recruit representatives with popular appeal.If the public’s expectations about the relationshipbetween votes cast and candidates elected are to be metin the future, however, the highly restrictive quota willhave to be revised.

ELECTION RESULTSTwenty-four parties ran candidates for legislative

seats in the April elections, but only seven parties wonstrong percentages across the country:

RESULTS OF LEGISLATIVE ELECTION - APRIL 5, 2004POLITICAL PARTY % OF TOTAL SEATS

VOTES RECEIVEDGolkar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21.6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .128Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (PDI-P) . . . . . . . . . . 18.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .109United Development Party (PPP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .58Democratic Party (PD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .57National Awakening Party (PKB) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .52National Mandate Party (PAN) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .52Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45Others . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19.9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .100.0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .550

3 Provincial trends drawn from Kevin Evans, Hasil PemilihanUmum 2002, Analysis CSIS, 33(2), June 2004. Papua informationfrom KPU.

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PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATESAfter the results of the April legislative elections

were announced, several smaller parties met to coordi-nate their support of presidential candidates. Largeparties such as Golkar and PDI-P put forward theirown candidates without developing coalitions. Instead,both Golkar and PDI-P chose running mates fromNadhlatul Ulama (NU), Indonesia’s largest Islamicorganization, which claims as many as 40 million members. NU itself had fragmented, and it was easyfor PDI-P and Golkar to choose leaders from opposingNU factions. Given the lack of any united positionemanating from the NU leadership, it was predictablethat NU members would not necessarily choose to support either of these parties.

Six sets of candidates were nominated before anamended May deadline: Megawati Soekarnoputri-Hasyim Muzadi, Wiranto-Salahuddin Wahid, SusiloBambang Yudhoyono-Jusuf Kalla, Amien Rais-SiswonoYudhohusodo, Hamzah Haz-Agum Gumelar, andAbdurrahman Wahid-Marwah Daud Ibrahim. TheKPU then screened candidates to ensure that they met the requirements in the election law. The generalexpectation that the KPU would reject AbdurrahmanWahid’s candidacy on health grounds proved well-founded when, on May 22, the KPU eliminated theformer president from the race.

Golkar. The Golkar Party won the largest share ofvotes and seats in the legislative elections in April 2004.This victory empowered Golkar to develop strong votingblocks and coalitions at both the national and provinciallevels. Despite Golkar’s legacy as Soeharto’s politicalvehicle throughout his New Order regime, the partyimproved its 1999 performance. This was partly due tothe leadership of party leader Akbar Tandjung, who,with some success, tried to reform Golkar’s image anddissociate it from its unpopular past. Tandjung’schances as a presidential candidate in 2004 diminished,however, when he was found guilty in 2002 of misap-propriating state funds for the party’s campaign in1999. In February 2004, he won a controversial appealto the Supreme Court and was acquitted of thecharges, paving the way for him to run for the Golkarpresidential candidacy.

In May 2004, Tandjung won a plurality over fourother candidates in the first round of the Golkar con-vention vote but lost out to former General Wirantoin the second. The stigma surrounding Tandjung’s cor-ruption charges had clearly not disappeared, and sopolitical analysts were startled when Golkar’s nationalconvention chose Wiranto, who many viewed as aSoeharto loyalist, opponent of reform, and even a warcriminal — a U.N.-supported court in East Timor hadindicted Wiranto for crimes against humanity — to beits nominee for the 2004 presidential elections.

Both to improve his image and to win the NUvote, Wiranto chose Salahuddin Wahid, the son ofNU’s founding father and brother to former PresidentAbdurahman Wahid, as his running mate. SalahuddinWahid was chairman of the NU board and deputychair of the National Human Rights Commission. Hedrew strong criticism for joining the Wiranto ticketand thus resigned from the Human RightsCommission as well as the board of NU.

FIRST-ROUND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: JULY 5, 2004

Five candidate pairs (president and vice president)competed in the July 5 presidential election:

■ Wiranto and Salahuddin Wahid■ Megawati Soekarnoputri and Hasyim Muzadi■ Amien Rais and Siswono Yudhohusodo■ Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla■ Hamzah Haz and Agum Gumelar

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PDI-P. PDI-P suffered a dramatic decline in itselectoral fortunes in the 2004 legislative elections,receiving just over half the proportion of the vote it gotin 1999, and finishing second overall to Golkar, bothnationally and in the provincial legislatures. LikeGolkar, PDI-P may have assumed that its strong sup-port base and party machinery would guarantee it aneasy victory and initially appeared to rely on mass ral-lies to gauge the strength of its support in Indonesia’scities and districts. PDI-P also had the advantages ofincumbency and the support of government officialsappointed during Megawati’s presidency.

The PDI-P’s decline in support was a reflection of the declining popularity of President MegawatiSoekarnoputri. After three years in office, she hadgained a reputation as ineffectual and aloof and neededto find a strong running mate. When Megawatibecame president in 2001, she had supported HamzahHaz in the MPR election for vice president in part toshore up her Islamic credentials. Haz did not enjoywidespread popularity with the electorate, and for the2004 election, Megawati secured Hasyim Muzadi, thegeneral chairman for Nadhlatul Ulama, as his replace-ment. Like Wiranto, Megawati chose an NU politicalleader as her running mate based on the old paradigmof elections, which assumed that leaders of mass organ-izations could count on support based on traditionalloyalties.

SMALLER PARTIESThe Democratic Party (PD), National Mandate

Party (PAN), Development Party (PPP), and theProsperous Justice Party (PKS) all qualified to nomi-nate presidential candidates, although PKS chose notto. PD nominated Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono,whose popularity was already soaring. PAN nominatedits founder and party leader, Amien Rais, while PPPcontinued to support its chair, the incumbent VicePresident Hamzah Haz, by nominating him for president.

Amien Rais was speaker of the People’sConsultative Assembly (MPR) from 1999 to 2004.Before establishing PAN in 1998, Rais was chairman of

Muhammadiyah, the second of the two huge Muslimorganizations in Indonesia, and a lecturer at the presti-gious Gadjah Mada University. His running mate,Siswono Yudhohusodo, was a member of the MPR as a functional group representative and had been acandidate for the vice presidency in 2001.

Vice President Hamzah Haz had initially appearedeager to remain paired with Megawati, but PDI-P nom-inated Hasyim Muzadi instead. Haz’s Islamic-orientedUnited Development Party (PPP) then proposed himas their own presidential candidate, with retired Gen.Agum Gumelar, the incumbent transport minister, ashis running mate.

Drawing on its base among urban religious voters,PKS registered a strong improvement in comparisonwith its 1999 results through a campaign based ongood governance and opposition to corruption. In lateApril, the head of PKS, Hidayat Nur Wahid, explainedthat the party had decided before the election that itwould only nominate a candidate if it received 20 per-cent of the vote. Five days before the July poll, theparty declared its support for Amien Rais, joining theCrescent and Star Party (PBB) as a supporter of hispresidency.

Building a coalition of Islamic parties was a famil-iar tactic for Amien Rais. In 1999, he had spearheadedthe Central Axis (Poros Tengah), which supported GusDur for the presidency. The support of PAN and PKS,which both represented a reformist and educated con-stituency, boosted Rais’ candidacy, whereas PPPfoundered on Hamzah Haz’s poor record as vice president. PPP provided Haz with a strong party infrastructure, but it had a staid and conservative reputation.

The Democratic Party, a small party formed in2001, began to rise in popularity on the coattails of itsstar candidate, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (oftenshortened to SBY). PD posted an impressive showingin the April elections, even though it was new andlacked a traditional constituency. The party won 57seats in the national legislature, spread across mostprovinces, although it polled particularly strongly in

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Jakarta. Despite being nominated by a small party,Yudhoyono, a retired three-star general whose highestpost in the military was head of the territorial com-mand (sixth in command overall), was thefront-runner. Yudhoyono, who served as coordinatingminister for socio-political affairs and security underboth Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati, had longbeen identified as a potential presidential candidate.Yudhoyono chose Jusuf Kalla, a businessman fromMakassar in Sulawesi and a powerful official inGolkar, as his running mate. Kalla had gained a highprofile as Megawati’s coordinating minister for welfarewhen he spearheaded peace accords for Poso andMaluku. Many political analysts believed that Kallawould be able to attract votes in eastern Indonesia.

Yudhoyono’s candidacy for president received anunintended boost from Megawati’s husband, TaufikKiemas, who in March publicly chided SBY for actinglike “a childish four-star general” in complaining to thepress about being left out of Cabinet decisions.Yudhoyono resigned and his popularity soared. SBY’sparty base was tiny, but, over his years as a prominentCabinet minister, he had developed an image thatmade many Indonesians believe he could institutechange and reform, even though he had never clearlycommitted himself to such agendas in the past.

PARTY SECURITY GROUPSParty security groups (satgas) have been fixtures of

Indonesian elections since the 1980s. These groupsacquired a new prominence during the 1999 elections,when the newfound freedom to assemble led to themass mobilization of party supporters. Unfortunately,their role was often coercive and sometimes violent.After 1999, the roles of satgas diversified further, whenparties outsourced these groups to become unofficialsecurity guards for illicit businesses and enterprises.Most satgas are not a part of the formal party struc-tures (the satgas of Golkar and PAN are exceptions).Consequently, it is difficult to hold parties legallyresponsible for their activities.

In late 2003, violent conflict between rival satgas

erupted in North Bali, triggering widespread fears of arenewal of interparty violence in the lead-up to the2004 elections. In reaction to the Bali violence, gover-nors and mayors in several provinces throughoutIndonesia established subdistrict-level security panelsto coordinate campaign schedules and, ultimately, toavoid conflict between rival satgas. Although the elec-tion laws did mention the need for coordinationbetween party security groups and the police, the lawswere vague and gave legitimacy to party security groupsthat had no binding or legal relationship to formalparty structures. In early 2004, the KPU issued decreesto restrict the roles of the satgas, including regulationsforbidding the use of military-style uniforms and pro-hibiting the establishment of noncampaign teamcommand posts.

To the great relief of many, these and other effortshad effect, and the 2004 campaigns were largely peaceful.

ELECTION PREPARATIONSWith only five candidates campaigning for the

presidency, preparing for and conducting the presiden-tial elections were far less complex than for thelegislative elections. The presidential ballot was muchsmaller and was identical throughout the country. InApril, the KPU had to arrange for 2,052 separate bal-lots to be printed and then distribute the correct fourof these ballots in the appropriate quantities to eachpolling station. Many election materials, particularlyballot boxes, voting booths, and the spike for punchingthe ballots, had been stored locally and could be re-used, greatly reducing the design, procurement, andlogistical challenges. In addition, many personnel hadalready received training for the legislative elections. Asa result, Carter Center observers found electoral staffmembers enjoying a relative respite from the intensityof the legislative period.

There were two obstacles that nonetheless short-ened the time available to the KPU. The first was thelonger-than-anticipated time taken to complete the leg-islative election tabulation, which ate into the tightpreparation time for the presidential vote. There was

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also the need to revise the voter registration lists,which, as discussed earlier, had been prepared byanother government agency the year before, as well asto provide cards to the many voters who had registeredbut not yet received them.

In the end, the delivery of necessary election mate-rials for the July ballot was generally much smootherthan for the April 5 elections. Problems, however,arose again in more remote regions. For example,Carter Center observers reported problems with thedistribution of voter registration cards in some areas.In parts of Kendari, Sulawesi, the official blue votercards were not produced, and the makeshift cards thatwere used in the end could have easily been duplicat-ed, leaving the process open to fraud.

There were also problems with delayed dispersal offunds for setting up polling stations and late paymentsto polling station committees. In North Sulawesi, forexample, local election officials blamed the insufficiencyand late delivery of funds as the reason for the simple,makeshift polling stations.

CONDUCT OF THE ELECTIONExactly three months after the April legislative

election, Indonesians returned to polling stations tobegin the process of directly electing a president andvice president. On July 5, Indonesia’s 155 million reg-istered voters were eligible to vote at 575,000 pollingstations, making this election the largest single-day election in the world. Nationally, 79.6 percent of votersexercised their right to elect the president and vicepresident, a decrease from 84 percent voter turnout for the legislative election.

Compared to the legislative election, the presiden-tial election was a much simpler poll, both for votersand for those organizing it. In contrast to April’s com-plicated vote, with multiple large ballots, for the firstpresidential election, voters needed only to punch thepicture of one of five pairs of candidates. Likewise, thecounting process was also much simpler.

For the July 5 presidential election, The CarterCenter deployed 60 international observers, led by former

President Jimmy Carter and former Prime Minister ofThailand Chuan Leekpai, to 17 provinces. Observersmet with local officials, campaign teams, and domesticobservers and observed the voting, counting, and ini-tial tabulation. In his preliminary assessment of theelection, President Carter congratulated the peopleand leaders of Indonesia for the conduct of the July 5presidential elections and the peaceful atmosphere thatprevailed during the election. Observers on electionday, however, as discussed below, did note a number ofserious procedural errors and widespread problemswith what became known as “double-punched ballots.”

Center observers generally found polling stationsvisited to be well-organized and functioning effectively,usually with their full staff complement and necessaryelection materials. Polling station officials in somelocations, however, were lax in applying administrativeprocedures. Center observers reported, for example, aconsistent failure to check fingers for ink before votingand the use of poor quality ink on voters’ fingers after

Chuan Leekpai; executive director of The Carter Center,John Hardman; and President and Mrs. Carter listen to the president of a polling station explain the voting procedureprior to the opening of polls.

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they had cast their ballots.Officials sometimes failed tocheck voter documentation orthe voter register. In somelocations, the polling stationlayout did not ensure privacyin the polling booth. Severalpolling stations closed well inadvance of 1 p.m., and somebegan an early count.

COUNTING ANDTABULATION: DOUBLE-PUNCHEDBALLOTS

Although theoretically thesmall number of voters perpolling station meant that thecounting and tabulationprocess at individual pollingstations could take place rela-tively quickly, serious difficulties with double-punchedballots slowed the process. This was the most signifi-cant problem with the July 5, 2004, election.

As polling stations closed and began their counton July 5, the KPU began receiving an alarming num-ber of reports of ballots that were invalid because theyhad been marked more than once. It turned out thatmany ballots had been folded in such a way as to allowvoters to “punch” their votes on one side withoutopening the entire ballot sheet. Therefore, many votershad unwittingly punctured both sides of their ballots.

The KPU issued three separate directives toaddress the problem of the large number of technicallyinvalid ballots. On election day, after initial reports ofthe problem came in, the KPU issued an initial direc-tive to polling station officials to count double-punched ballots where the voter’s intent was clear. AsCarter Center observers found, not all polling stationsreceived or followed the KPU’s initial directive on elec-tion day to review and reclassify double-punchedballots. The following day, the KPU issued additional

directives explaining the process at village- and sub-district-level aggregation centers for rechecking andre-counting ballots previously ruled invalid and empha-sizing the importance of ensuring transparency in thetabulation process by having witnesses present.

Observers reported initial resistance to recheckinginvalid ballots in some locations, because village andsubdistrict election officials were being asked to doadditional work without additional compensation.Although some polling stations still had high percent-ages of invalid votes, suggesting that officials had notactually conducted the mandated review, in most loca-tions, officials ultimately followed KPU instructions.

According to Carter Center observers, the pres-ence of candidate witnesses and nonpartisan domesticobservers during the rechecking at the village level wasuneven. Often only one or two witnesses were present,and sometimes there were none. Candidate witnessesand domestic observers often may not have been awareof the time and place for the rechecking and recapitu-lation. In some cases, the KPU directive on the need

President Jimmy Carter examines the polling booth layout prior to the opening of polls.

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Carter Center observers noted that election officials insome provinces were aware of the potential for problemswith the ballot, and there were some local attempts atsolving the problem. For example, after the KPU inSouth Sulawesi conducted their own vote simulationsand found that as many as 30 percent of the ballotswere double-punched, they printed and distributedroughly 100,000 posters showing how to avoidinvalid/double-punched ballots.

ELECTION-DAY MANIPULATIONThere were serious election-day attempts at fraud

in at least three locations: a polling station for expatri-ate Indonesians in Tawao, East Malaysia; a remotepolling center in Mimika, West Papua; and in andaround the Al-Zaytun Islamic school complex ofIndramayu, West Java (see text box). In addition, therewere reports of “fictive polling stations” from variousplaces in Java.

In Tawao, East Malaysia, an Indonesian consularofficial illegally punched about 8,000 votes in favor ofSBY. In late 2004, the official was fined Rp 1 million(US$111) for his crime and sentenced to three monthsin prison, which was suspended. Domestic observers crit-icized the sentence as too lenient to deter future abuses.

ELECTION-DAY MANIPULATION: THE AL-ZAYTUN CASE

The Al-Zaytun case was the most remarkableof election-day violations because it involved themilitary, mass mobilization, and a radical Islamicboarding school, Al-Zaytun.

Before the legislative elections, the number ofregistered voters at the Al-Zaytun polling stationsswelled from 4,674 to 13,253, raising suspicions ofpotential voter mobilization on behalf of particularparties. (Ultimately, this was not investigatedbecause, in the KPU’s view, the divided results —between the Freedom Bull National Party (PNBK)and Golkar — made vote manipulation difficult toprove.) On July 5, 2004, the number of voters thatparticipated in the legislative election at Al-Zaytunnearly doubled when approximately 20,000 voterswere bused in from Jakarta. About 99.8 percent ofvotes cast favored Golkar presidential candidateWiranto. After a lengthy debate involving nationaland provincial Panwaslu officials, the KPU agreedto invalidate votes cast by nonresidents and tohold a repeat election for the 4,674 valid residentvoters on July 25 at the Al-Zaytun polling stations.

On July 25, however, all of the school’s 4,674residents boycotted the election, and it was strong-ly suspected that the head of the school, SheikPanji Gumilang, had discouraged residents fromparticipating.

In the end, three officials from Al-Zaytun’ssubdistrict KPU were found guilty of administra-tive violations and sentenced to one yearprobation, and the military stripped the rank ofthe army officer responsible for arranging thetransport of nonresident voters.

to have party witnesses present during the recheck didnot arrive in time to be publicized.

Reportedly, some limited field tests of the ballothad provided evidence that double-punching could bea problem, but the KPU failed to change the design.

Delegation members Dwight King and Allyson Phelps conferwith Mrs. Carter and Jeff Carter outside a polling station.

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In four polling stations in Kwamki Lama, Mimika,West Papua, KPU officials illegally punched more than3,200 ballots in favor of SBY. The perpetrators werediscovered, the votes cancelled, and a re-vote wasarranged. The officials involved were also tried and

sentenced to a three-month suspended sentence. In East Java and Madura, Carter Center observers

received reports of so-called “fictive polling stations.”In Jelgung village in Sampang, for instance, one politi-cal party alleged that of 14 polling stations for thelegislative election, only six opened in July. The partyclaimed that votes were still recorded for the eightpolling stations that did not open, benefiting one ofthe candidate tickets that did not make the secondround. Though denied by local KPU officials, therewere also allegations that some polling stations in EastJava did not open because funds allocated to them hadbeen embezzled.

DOMESTIC OBSERVERS ANDCANDIDATE WITNESSES

The number of domestic election observersaround the country declined significantly from Aprilto July and further still by September. Domesticobservers were present at only 52 of the 297 pollingstations observed (18 percent) by Carter Center

RESULTS OF FIRST-ROUND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION – JULY 5, 2004Candidate pairs in order they appeared on ballot paper Total votes received (percentage)

Candidate Pair 1 26,286,788Wiranto / Salahuddin Wahid (22.2%)

Candidate Pair 2 31,569,104Megawati Soekarnoputri / Hasyim Muzadi (26.6%)

Candidate Pair 3 17,392,931Amien Rais / Siswono Yudo Husodo (14.7%)

Candidate Pair 4 39,838,184Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono / Muhammad Jusuf Kalla (33.6%)

Candidate Pair 5 3,569,861Hamzah Haz / Agum Gumelar (3.0%)

Invalid votes 2,636,976(2.17%)

Source: KPU

Democracy Program Acting Director David Carroll, PresidentCarter, Chuan Leekpai, and Indonesia office director EricBjornlund at the Center’s July 7 press conference.

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observers in July. Other international observers madesimilar findings. Several domestic election monitoringorganizations blamed shortfalls in funding.

Campaign teams for each of the candidates, partic-ularly for SBY and Megawati, put much effort intomobilizing their own witnesses. Carter Center observersfound more than one candidate witness present at 253of 297 polling stations observed (85 percent).

As with domestic observers, funding appeared tobe one of the main constraints to mobilizing witnesses.Given the enormous number of polling stations andthe fact that each witness could cost a campaign teamfrom Rp 20,000 to Rp 50,000 (US$2-5), training andmobilizing witnesses were expensive and organization-ally daunting tasks.

FIRST-ROUND RESULTSAfter surviving a potential storm of controversy

over a significant number of inadvertently spoiled bal-lots in the first round of the presidential elections, theKPU released the official results of the vote on July 26.As was widely expected, based on pre-election polls andthe quick count, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono took the

top spot with 33.6 percent ofthe vote, and incumbentPresident MegawatiSoekarnoputri hung on to aplace in the runoff election bybeating Wiranto 26.2 to 22.2percent.

Among the importantdevelopments in the periodafter the first round were thechallenge launched by theWiranto-Wahid team of theofficial results, debate overinternational involvement inthe elections, and criticismsof the KPU and its deteriorat-ing relationship with thePanwaslu (discussed above).During this period, large and

small political parties also engaged in important effortsto build coalitions to support one or the other of theremaining presidential candidates. In the lead-up tothe second round, the restricted campaign period andthe use of state media to support the incumbent werealso causes of concern.

After the KPU completed its official count, candi-dates had three days to lodge a challenge with theConstitutional Court. Golkar’s ticket, Wiranto andSalahuddin Wahid, chose to lodge such a challenge onJuly 29, 2004. Wiranto and Wahid claimed to havebeen denied 5,434,660 votes across 26 provinces.Presuming that other candidates’ vote tallies remainedunchanged, Wiranto-Wahid would have finished secondhad they received these votes. They based their claim ondifferences between the number of voters anticipated inKPU Decision No. 39/2004 and the number of voterswho eventually voted according to the KPU’s tabulation.They also requested that the Constitutional Courtreview a KPU circular that declared double-punched ballots valid. Wiranto’s legal counsel conceded in courtthat they could not demonstrate how the differencesthey highlighted could have caused them to lose votes

Before leaving the polling station, each voter must dip his or her finger into indelible ink toprevent double-voting.

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and also could not explain how they arrived at the pre-cise number of votes they claimed to have lost. On Aug.9, the court found against Wiranto-Wahid. Wirantohimself accepted the decision and appealed for his supporters to do the same.

OBSERVERS CRITICIZEDAfter the election, controversy emerged over the

involvement of foreign groups and individuals in theelection process and the credibility of the domesticobservers conducting a parallel vote tabulation orquick count as an independent verification of the official tabulation.

On its Web site, the Wiranto campaign team circu-lated a document on July 7, two days after election day,suggesting that foreigners, including The CarterCenter, were involved in “suspicious, silent operations”around the polling stations before, during, and afterthe election. On July 9, PDI-P’s Kwik Kian Gie, ministerfor state planning and head of the powerful nationalplanning board, was quoted in Kompas, one of thecountry’s leading newspapers, as saying that Cabinetministers had agreed that “foreign observers were tooinvolved in forming public opinion in the run-up tothe presidential elections.” He cited President Carter,the public analysis of American academic WilliamLiddle, and the NDI quick count. The following day,Kwik Kian Gie backpedaled, claiming he had beenmisunderstood.

Although the election confirmed the reliability of the quick count as a means of providing accurateresults long before the completion of the manualcount, it also generated a significant amount of contro-versy and suspicion. A quick count draws on astatistically significant sample of actual polling stationresults to predict the result of an election very soonafter the polls close. The Institute for Social andEconomic Research, Education, and Information(LP3ES), with technical assistance from NDI and supportfrom USAID and other donors, conducted the mostwell-known, controversial, and accurate of these counts.The LP3ES quick count involved approximately half a

million votes from 2,000 randomly selected polling sta-tions. Before midnight on election day, July 5, 20 daysbefore the KPU announced the official results, LP3ESand NDI released the results of their quick count.According to these results, SBY was in the lead with33.1 percent, Megawati was in second place with 26percent, Wiranto came in third with 23.3 percent, andAmien Rais and Hamzah Haz finished last with 14.4and 3.1 percent respectively.

According to the organizers, the quick count wasaccurate to plus or minus one percentage point with a95 percent confidence interval. On average, the LP3ESresults differed from the final result by 0.49 percentagepoints, with the largest variation being 1.15 percentagepoints. As was seen on July 26, these results were com-pletely consistent with the official count.

The announcement of the LP3ES-NDI results onelection night upset the chairman of the KPU, whofelt that LP3ES and NDI had failed to provide therequired prior notice to the KPU. After much discus-sion, LP3ES and NDI promised to give the KPU morenotice in the future.

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The executive director of The Carter Center, John Hardman,and President and Mrs. Carter observed polling at variouslocations throughout Jakarta.

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In preparation for the second round, political parties began building coalitions that would servetwo distinct goals: to win the support of voters

who had supported one of the candidates eliminatedin the first round and to begin establishing a powerbase to support or oppose the next president’s admin-istration. By early August 2004, both candidates wereholding meetings with Indonesia’s various power brokers with the goal of creating multiparty coalitionswithout losing control over their own specific politicalprograms and objectives and the makeup of the futuregovernment.

After Wiranto failed to lead Golkar to the secondround, party chief Akbar Tandjung was able to reasserthis control over the party. By early August, Tandjunghad developed alliances with PDI-P, the UnitedDevelopment Party (PPP), the Reformist Star Party(PBR), and the Prosperous Peace Party (PDS) to formthe Nationhood Coalition to support MegawatiSoekarnoputri’s candidacy against SBY. This partner-ship constituted an impressive political front thatwould bind the executive branch to a majority in thelegislature if Megawati won in the second round. IfMegawati lost, it would serve as a strong opposition toSBY’s minority support in both national and provin-cial legislatures. PDI-P had already proven itself to be a significant political force during the July ballot eventhough it trailed far behind SBY in polls for the sec-ond round. By joining with Akbar Tandjung to formthe Nationhood Coalition, PDI-P sought to strengthenMegawati’s candidacy and potentially win Golkar loyal-ists to her side.

Although SBY was leading in polls by more than20 percentage points, in the face of the stepped-upcompetition from the Nationhood Coalition, SBYworked to expand his support base beyond his ownparty’s new, small, and virtually undefined structure.In mid-August, SBY invited the explicitly Islamist

COALITION-BUILDING FOR THE SECOND ROUND

Prosperous Justice Party to form an alliance with PD.SBY’s coalition with PKS strengthened his standingwith some religious voters unsure of SBY’s stance onIslamic issues. By mid-August, there were already initialsigns that PKS was preparing to build its own coalitionof minority Islamic parties called the People’s Coalition(Koalisi Kerakyatan). They would never have the powerof the Nationhood Coalition, but they could give SBYsome unexpected support in the legislature.

Meanwhile, parties that had not fully committed toSBY or the Nationhood Coalition took a neutralstance. Amien Rais stepped down as PAN party leaderand said he would not run in 2009. Hamzah Haz, theincumbent vice president, announced he was quittingpolitics. Wiranto, reportedly still bitter from Golkar’slack of support, declared himself neutral. PKB’s dis-qualified candidate, former President AbdurrahmanWahid, opposed Megawati and PDI-P for forcing himfrom office in 2001, and many in PKB appeared tolean toward SBY. However, many others remained loyalto Megawati’s running mate, Muzadi, chair of NU. Inthe end, PKB decided to remain neutral.

The rules governing the campaign for the runoffremained unclear even as the two presidential ticketsprepared for the second round of voting. ThePresidential Election Law stated that in the event of asecond round, the two remaining candidate pairs “mayimprove their vision, mission, and program, under theregulation and facilitation of the KPU.” The officialelucidation of the law directed the KPU to regulatethat this process “be no longer than 3 (three) days, for which funding is given by the KPU.” Amid debateamong the KPU and both presidential candidates, thecommission set the campaign period for Sept. 14 -16,during which time each candidate could campaign onlyaccording to a debate format specified by the KPU.

Such a highly restricted and structured campaignappeared to infringe the rights of free speech and

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assembly of the candidates and their supporters andwas inconsistent with international practice and stan-dards. Consistent with the goal of encouragingcandidates to “improve their vision, mission, and pro-gram,” The Carter Center urged in August that theelection law be interpreted as broadly as possible toallow freedom to campaign, along with a full and openpolitical debate.

In the lead-up to the second-round election,according to the EUEOM, the volume of TVRI’s programming that supported President Megawati’s candidacy increased again over the already dispropor-tionate attention she received before the previousvotes. TVRI gave the incumbent president five times as much coverage as her opponent between July 15 andSept. 20, about 3,400 minutes in total. This took theform not only of double the news coverage (over 800minutes) of the president but also a vast quantity ofextra airtime (well over 35 hours) devoted to ostensiblepublic affairs programming that highlighted her gov-ernment’s policies in positive light. SBY did notreceive comparable airtime.

SBY, now officially the front-runner, was featuredin a number of special programs and profiles through-out the rest of the media, though his total coveragethere did not exceed that of the president. EU analystsfound the coverage of SBY to be generally neutral intone.

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Carter Center observers monitored voting dayprocesses at nearly 300 polling stations, mostof which were well-organized. Disturbances,

violations, and attempts at manipulation were relativelyrare, and the overall conduct of the poll was orderlyand peaceful. As this was the third election in lessthan six months, voters and polling station officialswere naturally more familiar with the procedures, andprocedural glitches, such as the double-punching ofballots that had caused major headaches in the firstround, were virtually nonexistent this time around. Asimple, two-candidate ballot also helped reduce theincidence of invalid votes and made tabulation at village- and subdistrict-level aggregation centers muchsimpler than before. Nevertheless, Carter Centerobservers across the country noted a significant num-ber of incorrectly completed recapitulation forms,particularly at village-level aggregation centers (PPS). Infact, election officials were often forced to correct mis-calculated figures on subsidiary recapitulation sheets,which once again left open the potential for votemanipulation. As in the first round, party witnesseswere rarely present at the village (PPS) and subdistrict(PPK) aggregation centers.

Although the problems that were observed werenot significant enough to affect the overall result of theelections, as discussed in the following paragraphs,Carter Center monitoring efforts did highlight a num-ber of important issues that should be addressed tofurther improve elections in Indonesia in the future.

CONDUCT OF THE ELECTIONOn election day, Sept. 20, 116 million of 150

million registered voters turned out for the second andfinal round of the presidential election, a turnout of77.5 percent. Though lower than in the previous twoelections of 2004, the turnout was still strong. A combination of voter fatigue, the relatively greaterengagement in local politics as compared to national

politics, the fact that several popular candidates hadbeen eliminated from the race, and lower voter aware-ness due to constraints imposed on campaigning allprobably contributed to the relative decrease in partici-pation. As discussed earlier, there remain significantflaws in the registration process, but the vast majorityof eligible voters were duly registered to vote in this second round and exercised their right to do so.

SECOND-ROUND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION:SEPTEMBER 20, 2004

Most polling places established a seating area outside thepolling area for voters to await their name being called bypolling officials. Each polling station could receive a maxi-mum of 300 voters.

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The conduct of the vote was overwhelminglyorderly and peaceful, with few incidents of violencereported and very few incidents of disruption to thevoting process. (Police quickly quelled one small butunruly protest by Megawati supporters in Bali duringthe counting process.) As reported in the CarterCenter’s preliminary statement of Sept. 22, “The second round of Indonesia’s historic first direct presidential election has taken place successfully in ageneral atmosphere of calm, order, and open partici-pation.” The findings of all other international andnational observer groups as well as the Panwaslu support this overall conclusion.

There were nonetheless a number of weaknessesand inconsistencies in the administration of the vote,which, if not addressed in planning future elections,could ultimately undermine the public’s confidence in the process.

Carter Center observers noted that the KPU tooksteps to try to address problems identified during theApril and July elections. Many polling stations hadreceived and used the training booklet published bythe KPU with UNDP support. Nonetheless, Center

observers reported that polling station officials insome locations did not consistently apply administra-tive procedures, including several standard proceduresto prevent multiple voting and other malpractices. Forexample, many officials did not check voters’ fingersfor ink, did not ask for voter cards, or failed to crossnames off the voter roll. In many polling stations, KPUinvitation letters were used as the only document forvoter identification.

There was also confusion on polling day about theuse of the police in helping the Panwaslu to obtainelection results. Panwaslu initially requested policehelp at polling stations before retracting this request afew days later. The issue was resolved when the KPUissued a decree allowing Panwaslu to collect data fromthe subdistrict (PPK) level, formally providing it withofficial recapitulation forms for the first time. Althoughthe exchange did suggest continued Panwaslu-KPUrivalry, it resulted in improved access to election resultsfor Panwaslu.

A polling officer at the entrance to the polling station checkseach voter’s name against the voter register.

Pete Peterson and Eric Bjornlund observe polling officials at work.

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EARLY CLOSURE OF POLLSAs noted earlier, a number of polling stations

closed early in the July round of the presidential elec-tion. Before the second round, the KPU issued DecreeNo. 46 of 2004, which permitted polling stations toclose as early as 11:30 a.m. in certain circumstances.KPU members explained they wanted to facilitate ahead start on counting, but one national KPU memberadmitted privately they believed it would continue tohappen in any case. Carter Center observers found thatthe decree was not uniformly communicated orapplied. It created significant confusion and disenfran-chised at least some voters. One of the conditions inthe directive — that all eligible voters had voted — couldalmost never be literally met. Nevertheless, many

polling stations closed early even though all eligible voters had not voted as required. Many polling stationcommittees evidently interpreted the provision as per-mitting early closing as long as there were no morevoters present and candidate witnesses agreed. Pollingofficials showed Carter Center representatives a direc-tive from at least one provincial KPU that permittedearly closing of polling stations without any mention ofpreconditions. Moreover, several polling stations closedwell in advance even of the early closing time of 11:30a.m. As a result, some voters who arrived after the closeof polls in certain locations found they could not vote.

In at least one case, a poll had to reopen Sept. 21 toallow additional time for voting. The Carter Center recommended that authorities adopt and enforce a consistent closing time for all polling stations.

COUNTING AND CONSOLIDATIONOF RESULTS

Few complaints arose in the counting and consoli-dation of results for the second round. Because thequick count results were announced on television dur-ing the afternoon of election day, in many locations,village and particularly subdistrict tabulations were tak-ing place after the public was already convinced thatSBY had won with a significant margin of victory. Inthis atmosphere, Carter Center observers reported thatofficials often did not follow up local problems withthe conduct of the count, as such problems did notseem relevant to the national result. Despite her campaign

RESULTS OF SECOND-ROUND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION – SEPTEMBER 20, 2004Candidate Pair Total votes (percentage)Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono / Jusuf Kalla 69,266,350 (60.7%)Megawati Soekarnoputri / Hasyim Muzadi 44,990,704 (39.4%)Total 114,257,054 (100%)

The presiding officer displays each ballot paper to those present at the polling station.

Revised rules allowed polls to close as earlyas 11:30 a.m., causing confusion and disen-franchisement of voters in some places.

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team’s claim, without presenting evidence, that viola-tions in 12 provinces may have cost her 5 to 10 millionvotes, Megawati eventually chose not to challenge theresult through the Constitutional Court.

Nevertheless, the vote tally report form, which isimportant in ensuring transparency and confidence,had a serious design flaw. The page that polling stationofficials and candidate witnesses were supposed to signto acknowledge the results was a separate page fromthe results themselves. These signatures could thereforebe easily separated from the main form, providing aserious opportunity for fraud. The KPU’s supplementaldirective that officials and witnesses should initial theresults on the first page was not systematically followed.Flaws such as this, while not having serious consequencesduring this particular vote, must nonetheless be

addressed in the future, since the effects of such weak-nesses during another, closer vote could threaten thecredibility of the entire exercise.

CANDIDATE WITNESSES AND ELECTIONOBSERVERS

Carter Center observers reported that more thanone candidate witness was present at two-thirds ofpolling stations monitored, but they also noted thatmany witnesses did not appear well-trained orinformed about the balloting and counting processes.Both candidates failed to organize sufficient numbersof qualified witnesses despite their stated commitmentsto recruiting and better training them and eventhough they recognized that the more effective, widespread participation of party witnesses could have mitigated some of the problems seen in July.

Regrettably, as noted above, domestic observerswere present in relatively few polling stations.Accredited international and domestic observers weresupposed to have access to the tabulation process, butit appears that domestic observers lacked either theresources or the commitment to be able to effectivelymonitor the tabulation process at the village and higher levels.

As with the previous round, LP3ES produced asame-day quick count, which projected the final out-come. Despite public criticisms after the first round,the accuracy of the quick count results as compared tothe final official results seemed to prove its value, andthe quick count results were even more eagerly antici-pated the second time around. One of the majorprivate sponsors, Metro TV, even broke confidentialityagreements by reporting the results in midafternoonbefore the quick count itself was completed and hoursbefore the scheduled announcement. Even thoughonly a portion of the quick count results were in, itturned out that the early results held firm and theearly and accurate announcement may actually havefurther enhanced the quick count’s reputation. Thefinal quick count results showed SBY with 60.9 per-cent of the vote to Megawati’s 39.1 percent, almost

Former U.S. Ambassador Pete Peterson led the Center’s dele-gation in September.

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exactly predicting the finalofficial results of 60.7 per-cent and 39.4 percent.

As a result, the quickcount technique will nodoubt be highly respectedand sought-after in futureelections in Indonesia.Other forms of statisticallyvalid polling and surveyresearch, which became commonplace during theseelections, may also enjoygreater credibility. This elec-tion marked a watershed inthe use of statistical tech-niques to predict voterintentions and verify actualresults and should open thedoor to political parties andcandidates as well as the government seeking and usingsuch information. Public opinion polling is also likelyto play a greater role in keeping political leaders intune with the views and aspirations of the people.

SECOND-ROUND RESULTSOn Oct. 4, the KPU officially announced that

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla had wonthe presidency and vice presidency with 69,266,350votes (60.7 percent), compared to incumbent PresidentMegawati Soekarnoputri and her running mateHasyim Muzadi who obtained 39.4 percent. This con-firmed what had long been apparent, since partialreturns had consistently suggested such a ratio for theprevious two weeks. The official results also vindicatedthe LP3ES quick count, which, as discussed above, hadpredicted this outcome with impressive accuracy bylate afternoon on voting day.

In view of the early clear indications, the publicexpectation that the president would concede beganshortly after polling day. SBY delayed a planned victoryspeech in anticipation of such a concession, but it

never came. Even after the official results wereannounced two weeks later and plans began to bemade for SBY’s inauguration, Megawati did notacknowledge defeat, although she had publicly calledon supporters of both sides to accept the eventualresults. Her advisers indicated that they would be chal-lenging the results in court, citing some irregularities

in West Java, but in the end they simply let the appealperiod expire.

These circumstances led to a storm of criticismagainst the incumbent president for failing to followappropriate protocol and graciously acknowledge thewill of the people. In fact, the media reported that several attempts on the part of SBY’s team to arrangehand-over meetings with the incumbent president’soffice were unsuccessful.

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As one election official calls out the voter’s choice, another official records the count on alarge tabulation form.

The domestic observers conducted an independent quick count that confirmed the final election results.

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Akbar Tandjung declared that none of hisNationhood Coalition members would be allowed tohold positions in SBY’s Cabinet. SBY’s running mateand former high-ranking Golkar official Jusuf Kallamade statements in response to the effect thatNationhood Coalition members would not be offeredpositions in SBY’s Cabinet. Due to infighting, thecoalition lost the support of the United DevelopmentParty (PPP), but Golkar (128 seats) and PDI-P (109seats) together with the Christian PDS party (10 seats)still have 247 members of the 550-member legislature.Depending on developments inside Golkar and PDI-P,the coalition can present significant legislative obstaclesto SBY over the next five years.

Without Megawati in the executive branch, manyobservers believe PDI-P’s weaknesses will become moreevident. To address this problem, PDI-P held a nationalconvention shortly after the second round of the presi-dential elections. On Sept. 30, 2004, PDI-P announcedthe re-election of Megawati as head of the party for thenext five years. While nearly all of Indonesia’s partieshave fragmented into various factions, Akbar Tandjung’sNationhood Coalition may help PDI-P to avoid an exo-dus of party elite to SBY’s smaller, though increasinglysignificant, People’s Coalition. It remains to be seenwhether Golkar will be able genuinely to join forces withPDI-P or whether either party will ultimately reach anarrangement with SBY.

SBY’s second-round victory also forced PKB’s twofactions to choose between two opposed political coali-tions: SBY’s People’s Coalition or the more powerfulNationhood Coalition led, at the time, by Golkar andPDI-P. By mid-October, PKB’s strongest faction underAlwi Shihab had decided to side with SBY (withShihab joining the government as coordinating minister for people’s welfare), while Muhaimin Yahya’sfaction had associated itself with the NationhoodCoalition.

The PPP’s crisis of leadership was apparent whenits presidential candidate and sitting vice president,Hamzah Haz, finished a distant last in the first roundof the 2004 elections. PPP appeared to attempt tostrengthen its position in August 2004 when it joinedAkbar Tandjung’s Nationhood Coalition. Nevertheless,PPP left the Nationhood Coalition in early October2004 when Golkar refused PPP’s request that the coali-tion’s candidate for head of legislature be from PDI-Pand not Golkar. In protest, PPP, with its 58 seats,joined SBY’s People’s Coalition.

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The emergence of the People’s Coalition inprovincial and national legislatures in earlyOctober bolstered SBY’s power.

Nationhood CoalitionGolkar, PDI-P, PBR,PDS

People’s CoalitionPPP, DP, PAN, PKS,Other

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Even though the coalition between PD and PKShelped SBY win the presidency, the two partiesremain relatively powerless. This was plainly

evident during the election of the head of Jakarta’sprovincial legislature in late September 2004. WhilePKS had the largest number of seats in Jakarta’s legisla-ture, its candidate lost to a minority Golkar leader.The PKS candidate lost the position because four ofSBY’s PD seats voted for the Golkar candidate. Thisepisode cast some initial doubt on SBY and his abilityto counter the Nationhood Coalition’s overwhelmingpower in the national and provincial legislatures.

SBY was elected because he promised reform. Thismeans that he will have to deliver some progressive leg-islation or make a meaningful effort to countercorruption during the first several months of his presi-dency. The sudden emergence of the pro-SBY People’sCoalition in both provincial and national legislaturesin early October bolstered SBY’s power. The People’sCoalition consists almost entirely of SBY supportersand relatively small Islamicparties. The National MandateParty (PAN), with 52 seats inthe DPR, and the Crescentand Star Party (PBB), with 11seats, are both People’sCoalition members. Justbefore the election of the chairof the People’s ConsultativeAssembly, it was reported thatAbdurahman Wahid and hisNational Awakening Party(PKB) also voiced support forthe People’s Coalition’s candi-date, Hidayat Nur Wahid.Shortly thereafter it wasannounced that Hidayat, headof PKS, was elected MPR chairover the Nationhood

Coalition’s candidate. PPP and various underdogsamong the smaller Islamic parties have acquired new-found strength in their support of SBY’s populistcoalition.

SBY’s government will be stronger if he controls asignificant block of votes in the national legislature. Inorder to maintain such a coalition, however, SBY mustbe willing to make certain adjustments in his ownadministration. On Oct. 18, 2004, for example, boththe PKS and the PBB threatened to leave the People’sCoalition when they saw that SBY planned to appointto his Cabinet Indonesian economists with strong con-nections to the International Monetary Fund. SBY willhave to work hard to keep both of these relatively largeIslamist parties within his coalition.

SBY’s government received a boost in December2004 when Vice President Jusuf Kalla was electedleader of the Golkar Party. This signaled a shift in thelegislature toward the People’s Coalition. Golkar’smajority, as opposed to only one faction headed by the

THE NEW GOVERNING COALITION

Representatives from the Carter Center and European Union observer delegations met withPresident-elect Susilo Bambang Yudhyono to congratulate him on his victory. C

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many analysts wondering whether these officers willremain loyal to their political parties or whether theywill feel more profound allegiance to their fellow retiredofficer, SBY. An early sign that retired military officersmay feel some transcending loyalty to SBY was evidentwhen the Armed Forces Veterans Association (Pepabri)openly declared its support for SBY. If SBY can counton the support of retired “political” generals, he may beable to influence his rivals from within their own par-ties. By doing so, SBY could introduce a new form ofmilitary politics where retired military officers influencepolicy through a mixture of military connections andloyalties and party-based maneuvering.

SBY won the election because he promised tobring change, integrity, and discipline to the office ofpresident. SBY’s ability to maintain the true loyalty ofthe active military to his presidency may partly dependon whether he can implement reforms without damag-ing the integrity of the institution.

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vice president, has moved out of the NationhoodCoalition and become a major source of support forthe government. However, this harbors the danger thatJusuf Kalla, with the backing of the powerful Golkarpolitical machinery, may seek to usurp SBY’s position.

SBY also possesses significant support withinIndonesia’s military. He has held several high-rankingmilitary positions in both New Order and post-NewOrder administrations. In fact, SBY’s presidency mightbe seen as part of a recent trend among retired generalsto enter into party politics. In recent years, severalretired military officers have begun to seek positions inpolitical parties, perhaps in part as a reaction to themilitary’s decision to give up its automatically allottedseats in national and provincial legislatures by 2004.With or without appointed seats in government, themilitary remains a powerful force in local and nationalaffairs. In fact, the presence of powerful retired generalsin political parties and government departments leaves

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The Carter Center deployed observers across the Indonesian archipelago, enabling a broadassessment of the conduct of the elections

nationwide as well as of some regional variations.Provinces with remote districts and poor infrastructure,for example, faced considerable logistical problemswhen preparing for the elections that sometime resultedin delays or other problems with the vote. Fundingproblems were more acute in the newly partitionedregencies and provinces created over the past five years,where poor infrastructure necessitated KPU requestsfor extra financial support from local governments.And in areas of single-party legislative and executivedominance, there was a greater tendency toward localgovernment bias and manipulation. Although the general conduct of the elections was relatively uniformand local discrepancies did not normally affect theintegrity of the process, greater consistency is still neededin certain areas such as election finance, ensuring theindependence of electoral authorities and voter accessamong internally displaced populations.

From May to September 2004, The Carter Centermonitored the process in Indonesia’s conflict and post-conflict regions. Having held discussions with a widevariety of stakeholders in Aceh, North Maluku, Papua,and West Irian Jaya, the Center believes that the con-flict and special circumstances facing these provincessignificantly affected the conduct of the elections inthese areas. The following sections describe election-related concerns in these provinces.

ACEH: ELECTIONS UNDER A STATE OFEMERGENCY

In response to a strong separatist movement in theprovince of Aceh Nanggroe Darussalam (Aceh), theIndonesian government and legislature enacted a newspecial autonomy law in 2001. This special autonomy,among other things, allowed the province to keep upto 70 percent of its oil and gas revenues and implement

REGIONAL ISSUES AND SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES

The gap betweenrich and poor crossesIndonesia's regions.

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Islamic law. The same year, after almost two years ofnegotiation, the government and separatists signed aninternationally brokered peace deal in Geneva. Peacetalks collapsed in May 2003, however, and martial lawwas declared. The biggest military operations inIndonesia since the invasion of East Timor in 1975commenced. In May 2004, a few weeks after the leg-islative elections, martial law was lifted and replacedwith a civil emergency administration transferring over-all responsibility of security operations to the police.

It was important to observe the election process inAceh because of the unique circumstances facing theprovince. Having made four observation visits duringthe elections of 2004 to the capital city of Aceh, BandaAceh, including both presidential elections, CarterCenter observers noted several election-related prob-lems that were the direct result of the conflict.

The conduct of elections in conflict and post-conflict areas is understandably difficult. The presenceof military and police can reassure voters about theirsecurity, but it can also be intimidating to some citi-zens. The state of civil emergency and ongoing conflictin Aceh hindered the freedom of movement andassembly necessary for open, competitive elections.Although Carter Center observers reported that thepolls in Banda Aceh were well-conducted, they did notobserve outside of the capital city. Center observersreceived reports that the military’s assistance in trans-porting voters may have intimidated some citizens.Information gathered in Aceh indicated that the leg-islative elections there were conducted smoothly andthat few violations were reported. The same could besaid of the process The Carter Center observed directly

in Aceh during both rounds of the presidential elec-tion. Despite some procedural errors at pollingstations, the voting process mostly ran smoothly. Voterturnout in Aceh — 88 percent for round one and 83percent for round two — exceeded the national average.

Many Acehnese expressed the concern they feltpressure to participate in the 2004 elections. Therewere reports from local groups that the Aceh CivilEmergency Authority (PDSD) launched an unofficialcampaign to ensure that the low voter turnout seen in1999 was not repeated in 2004. Local journalistsshowed Carter Center observers photographs of ban-ners, which were said to have been prepared by thePDSD, that read, “Voting is proof of being part ofNKRI (Unitary Republic of Indonesia).” While notdirect intimidation, these efforts may have been someevidence of the climate of coercion that local NGOsdescribed and may help explain why voter participa-tion was so high when compared to the boycott of1999. A local People’s Voter Education Network(JPPR) observer described a situation in West Acehwhere villagers who had traveled to the polling stationthe night before reported that they were afraid not tovote. This fear was in the context of a highly politicizedconflict, with pressure on voters from both sides of thepolitical spectrum; to vote allegedly showed your sup-port for integration with Indonesia and to abstain wasto show sympathy for the separatist movement.

In Banda Aceh, polling stations located in conflictzones were set up in centralized clusters. This practicerequired the mobilization of villagers from more isolatedregions to centralized polling stations by securityforces. The fact that the military was involved in thetransport of civilians to polling stations was cause forconcern. The Center did observe soldiers within 20meters of at least one polling station in Aceh Besarsubdistrict during the second round, contravening the200-meter limit.

Domestic groups deployed some 500 observers forthe first round and 100 for the second in North,South, and South West Aceh as well as in

The state of civil emergency and ongoing conflict in Aceh hindered the freedom ofmovement and assembly necessary for open,competitive elections.

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Lhokseumawe and Sabang. The conclusions of theseobservers largely mirrored the findings of the Centerand the EU.

PAPUA AND WEST IRIAN JAYA: SPECIAL PROBLEMS

Between May and September 2004, Carter Centerlong-term observers monitored the election process inJayapura and Mimika, Papua, and Manokwari andBiak, West Irian Jaya (WIJ).

Conduct of the elections in Papua and WIJ was consistently poorer than the national standard.Though the Carter Center team found no indicationsin Papua of widespread irregularities that could haveaffected the outcome of the presidential elections,shortcomings such the prevailing absence of voter listsand the disregard for voter identification cards at pollsremoved major safeguards against multiple voting and,if not addressed, could lead to questions about thelegitimacy of future elections in the region.

The failure to implement the 1999 SpecialAutonomy Law and the implementation of the nation-ally driven policy of partition, which has divided Papuainto two provinces (and calls for the establishment of athird), complicated the administration of elections inPapua and led to some confusion and delays. (InFebruary 2005, the government floated proposals todivide Papua into five provinces.) The policy of parti-tion hurt the performance of election authorities inPapua and particularly in the newly establishedprovince of West Irian Jaya. The disputed legal statusof newly partitioned WIJ resulted in the delayed for-mation of the provincial KPU there. Particularly inWIJ, qualified personnel were difficult to find,Panwaslu did not exist in some subdistricts, and there was no police presence.

Holding elections in Papua was not a simple affair.In Mimika, for example, five of the eight subdistrictshad polling stations that required boats, planes, and,in a few instances, helicopters to get to. In the Balliemvalley, election commissions for three of the four newdistricts in what used to be Jayawijaya district operated

from the old district capital because of inadequateinfrastructure elsewhere.

Many logistical failures marred the elections inboth Papuan provinces. For example, there was report-edly a shortage of 30,000 voter registration cards aweek before the election in Mimika, forcing a quickreprint ordered by the KPU and implemented by localprivate firms. Major failures were reported in the areasof voter card distribution, to the extent that in manycases voters were allowed to use their official identitycards to vote. Voter lists were not available to manypolling officials below the subdistrict level, leading tothe loss of a crucial safeguard and to some confusionamong voters.

These problems, which appeared to be worstamong largely ethnic Papuan communities, seemed tohave been mainly a result of insufficient funds. Theeffect was that a great number of local election officialshad to conduct elections with woefully insufficient sup-port. Although most did the best they could under thecircumstances, it was clear that the lack of funds in par-ticular had a strongly adverse effect upon the electionprocess.4 In some areas of Papua such as Mimika, asidefrom the failure to produce and distribute the lists,cards, and invitations, money shortages also led to adrastic reduction of the number of polling stations toonly 201 for 107,000 voters. At many of Mimika’spolling stations during the second round, the numberof expected voters swelled from 300 to 600 to 1,000 ormore. Besides taxing the polling station committees(KPPS) and contravening the election law, this meantthat in some cases officials took shortcuts, such as notcounting the blank ballots at the opening of the pollsbecause it would have taken too long.

Provincial governors, mayors, and district headsacross the country often provided critical funds andlogistical support to fill these gaps. In Biak, West Irian

4 Carter Center observers noted the irony that funding constraintsshould adversely affect the elections in areas such as the newlyautonomous and wealthy district of Mimika where the local econo-my is driven directly or indirectly by the operations of the largestgold and copper mine in the world.

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Jaya, for example, the KPU and parties praised themayor for his support of the elections, including hisadministration’s provision of extra funding to theKPPS when necessary. The role of these local leaderswas not always positive, however. Center observersfound, for example, that their role in the selection ofKPU and Panwaslu personnel and in the control ofbudgets for these bodies often led to suspicions aboutthe independence and neutrality of those officials.Local leaders were responsible for preparing lists of

candidates for local KPU positions for final selectionby the higher-level election commissions. This meantlocal leaders had control over who was considered forthese posts. In many cases, local party and NGO lead-ers complained that governors or district heads had anagenda when selecting candidates for provincial KPUoffices, as was the case in West Irian Jaya. Such suspi-cions hurt the reputation of the KPU and the conductof their work in some places.

Insufficient funds also affected poll worker train-ing programs and voter education initiatives. TheHuman Resources Section of KPU identified Papuaand West Irian Jaya as having faced particularly chal-lenging funding problems when it came to trainingstaff, primarily because of the high cost of transportingparticipants to training sessions. Because there was nocoordinated or widespread voter education effort inPapua, voter awareness of the election process was verylow in many of the areas observed, particularly in themore remote areas.

Certainly, the elections in Papua and West IrianJaya, as elsewhere, were peaceful and marked the end ofa largely nonviolent campaign season. This in itself wasno small feat in some regions. Mimika district, for exam-ple, had been the site of local conflict fueled by nationalpolitics many times in the past — and as recently as 2003.Instead, the major troubles in areas observed through-out Papua were administrative, both in planning andadministering the process on election day.

In both July and September, Carter Centerobservers saw very few domestic observers at pollingstations in Papua and WIJ. In Timika, The CarterCenter encountered no domestic observers at all. InPapua and WIJ, as elsewhere in the country, candidate

An Indonesian voter waits her turn to cast a ballot inIndonesia’s first direct presidential election. More than 155million voters were registered for the elections.

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Because there was no coordinated or wide-spread voter education effort in Papua, voterawareness of the election process was verylow in remote areas.

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witnesses were much more visible during both roundsthan domestic observers.

Officials of the mining company PT FreeportIndonesia repeatedly denied Carter Center observersaccess to Tembagapura subdistrict. Local observers andpolitical parties reported that they also faced seriousrestrictions on access to this area. Restrictions uponfreedom of movement and access to certain geographicalareas for international observers, domestic observers,and candidate witnesses are unacceptable and inconsis-tent with the election law.

NORTH MALUKU: COMMUNAL CONFLICTIn August 1999, communal conflict broke out in

North Maluku, only weeks before it became a newprovince. It is estimated more than 3,000 people losttheir lives, approximately 250,000 people were dis-placed, and some 18,000 houses and 200 places ofworship were destroyed.5 The state of civil emergencyin North Maluku was repealed in May 2003, and bylate 2004, the province had undergone a dramaticrehabilitation. In Ternate, where the provincial capitalis temporarily located, many, though by no means all,of the destroyed dwellings have been rebuilt, and thepresence of security forces is no longer intrusive.

The Carter Center deployed short-term observationteams in Ternate for both rounds of the presidentialelection and also sent long-term observer teams inAugust and September. The Center felt that it wasimportant to monitor the capacity of this postconflictprovince to organize elections and to observe whetherthe community in North Maluku could safely exercisetheir democratic rights.

Each election in North Maluku was conductedpeacefully, with polling day procedures consistent withother parts of the country. This was no small accom-plishment in a province that was still under civilemergency when voter registration commenced. The

enduring impact of the conflict upon the 2004 elec-tions was reflected in problems in voter registration ofthe many internally displaced persons (IDPs).

Several groups in North Maluku expressed con-cern that IDPs had not been properly registered, atleast for the legislative elections. There are two strongindications that these concerns were well-placed. Thefirst was the high rate of new registrations across theprovince, and in North Halmahera district particularly,between April and July. In North Halmahera, 16 per-cent of registered voters for the first round of thepresidential election had registered only after the leg-islative election; across the province, the figure was 9.5percent. The second was the low turnout in specificsubdistricts (kelurahan) in the city where many IDPswere living. In Gamalama, for instance, only 1,224votes were recorded even though there were 2,440 on the permanent electoral roll.

A range of local officials who had been involved in conducting voter registration told Carter Centerobservers that problems with registration were caused,in part, by an accident of the voter registrationtimetable. As elsewhere in Indonesia, the initial phaseof voter registration was conducted in April-May 2003,just before the civil emergency in North Maluku waslifted. As conditions improved and the provincial gov-ernment pursued a program of assisting IDPs to returnhome, more than 55,000 IDPs moved between July2003 and February 2004. Almost 20,000 of these werepeople returning to North Maluku, mostly from NorthSulawesi; the rest were migrations within the province.

These movements created problems both of peoplebeing registered in one location but then moving onbefore collecting their voter cards and of people notbeing registered at all, if they arrived after the correc-tion of the temporary roll produced from theApril-May data had taken place. Some political partiesexpressed concern that their supporters had not beenable to vote for them because of registration shortfalls.

Local officials, however, also believed that registrationcould have been better conducted had there been clearerinstitutional responsibility both for voter registration itself

5 Thanks to Chris Wilson (Ph.D. candidate, Australia NationalUniversity) for allowing citation of figures from his forthcomingpaper, “The Ethnic Origins of Religious War in North MalukuProvince, Indonesia 1999-2000.”

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and for IDPs more generally. Civilian coordinators hadinitially collected data on IDPs before the militaryreceived responsibility for coordinating the government-sponsored return program. The government StatisticsBoard (BPS) then conducted voter registration. The BPSreceived the funds to conduct the program but in practicedelegated substantial responsibility to subdistrict (kelura-han) staff members. Neighborhood administrators, localelection committees, and the KPU handled subsequentcorrections to the roll. The lack of one agency consistent-ly collecting data for IDPs compounded inherentproblems in registering them, such as crowded temporarydwellings and a perceived lack of enthusiasm for the elec-toral process. A straw poll of IDPs at several city barracks,an international nongovernmental organization workingwith IDPs, and local officials all indicated that IDPs werefar more concerned with the chance to return home thanwith electoral participation.

Errors in registration of IDPs in North Maluku,and indeed across the country, could not have influ-enced the result of the presidential election. Thispopulation is especially vulnerable, however, to disen-franchisement and manipulation in the local electionsthat will begin in 2005. Local officials expressed con-cern that IDPs could be mobilized to vote in morethan one district. More mundanely, IDPs may miss thechance to vote for their local heads of government ifthey are not able to return to their districts in advanceof the election. Renewed participation in the politicalprocess would be a welcome side effect of the core taskof assisting North Maluku’s remaining IDPs to resettlein permanent housing.

AMBONThe conflict in Ambon began in January 1999

and subsequently spread to other parts of Malukuprovince, costing perhaps as many as 10,000 lives, dis-placing tens of thousands of people, and segregatingthe island into mono-religious zones. The situation inAmbon had improved markedly before an outbreak ofviolence on April 25, less than three weeks after thelegislative elections. The International Crisis Groupreported that 38 people — mostly Muslims — were killedbetween April 25 and May 5, in large part by sniperfire. The organization estimated 10,000 additional people fled their homes.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs denied The CarterCenter permission to send observers to Ambon beforeand during the first round of the presidential electionbut granted the Center permission to deploy short-term observers for the second round.

Local observers, electoral officials, and communityleaders told the Carter Center representatives that theelections had been peaceful. However, a small bombexploded in Ambon several days before the secondround of the presidential election, without causing anycasualties, and there were reportedly bomb threatsshortly before the election. Carter Center observersfound that the conduct of the election on polling daywas peaceful, and their observations at polling stationswere consistent with observations from other parts ofthe country. The turnout was not significantly lowerthan in other provinces, although observers could notgauge how many IDPs may have voted.

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On Oct. 20, 2004, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyonowas inaugurated as Indonesia’s first directlyelected president. His election reflected the

will of the people, and, as such, it symbolizes an impor-tant milestone in Indonesia’s progress toward a moreopen and pluralistic-democratic political system. Highvoter turnout, averaging more than 70 percent, reflectspopular support for Indonesia’s democratic process.Within a broader context, Mr. Yudhoyono became thefirst directly and freely elected president of a Muslim-majority country. Even though his rival, incumbentMegawati Soekarnoputri, failed to publicly concededefeat, the power transfer took place in an orderly,peaceful, and constitutional fashion. The CarterCenter hopes that the local government elections commencing in June 2005 will build on the accom-plishments of the 2004 polls and consolidateIndonesia’s democratization process through the direct election of local leaders.

Based on the findings of the observer delegationsand in the spirit of encouraging democratic progress in Indonesia, The Carter Center wishes to make anumber of recommendations, which it hopes will contribute to the improvement of Indonesia’s electoralprocess.

ACCOUNTABILITY AND ENFORCEMENTTo prevent Indonesia’s transition toward open

democracy from stagnating, the government needs towork toward greater transparency and accountabilitywithin Indonesia’s financial and political structures.Observation of the 2004 elections has highlighted theinadequacy of the system of checks currently in placeto guarantee that those who violate the electoral codeof conduct and the election laws are held accountable.Time constraints, a lack of adequate funding, anddependency on the KPU meant that Panwaslu — thebody instructed to oversee all aspects of the electionprocess – faced severe restrictions and possessed a weak

mandate to prosecute alleged violations. On occasions,Panwaslu reported dissatisfaction with the quality ofpolice investigations. The Carter Center also lamentsthat prosecutors did not always focus on the perpetra-tors of violations. When a video emerged of a policeofficer instructing his subordinates to vote forMegawati, investigators concentrated on apprehendingthose who had shot and distributed the video ratherthan on the police officer, who had clearly been inbreach of the law. Furthermore, to ensure greater fiscaltransparency and increase public confidence in thepolitical process, legal loopholes that allow candidatesto withhold information on their campaign financesneed to be tightened.

INSTITUTIONAL REFORMSThe Carter Center strongly encourages the

Indonesian government to press ahead with institu-tional reform. Since the downfall of Soeharto’smilitary dictatorship in 1998, Indonesia has movedtoward a greater separation and dissemination of statepowers. The post of defense minister is now held by acivilian, the legislature no longer has reserved seats formilitary appointees, the courts have been severedadministratively from the executive branch, a newConstitutional Court has been established, the policeand military are now two separate institutions, anddecentralization policies have increased the powers oflocal governments, which are now allowed to keep therevenues derived from the exploitation of their region’snatural resources. Nonetheless, there remains muchscope for improvement. Reform within the militaryhas been limited, and it continues to exert excessiveinfluence in regions such as Aceh and Papua. Thecourts continue to be dogged by corruption and havebeen largely unsuccessful in holding high-level officialsaccused of human rights abuses accountable. The cre-ation of an independent Constitutional Court tooversee election matters has been a positive development

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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in institutional terms. It gained widespread respectduring the 2004 elections, making judgments thatwere accepted by all parties. Better familiarization withappeal procedures would help bestow legitimacy onfuture election outcomes, particularly in close-run elec-tions, and strengthen the reputation of theConstitutional Court. The success of the ConstitutionalCourt during the 2004 election period should beregarded as a source of motivation for further institu-tional reform in Indonesia.

The Carter Center considers the oversight commit-tee’s (Panwaslu) institutional setup deeply flawed. Itsindependence was severely compromised by making itfinancially reliant on the KPU. This also createdunnecessary tensions between the election commissionand Panwaslu. The Carter Center therefore proposesthat the links between the KPU and the election over-sight committee be loosened. Even though tensionsdissipated during the second round of the presidentialelections when the KPU granted Panwaslu access torecapitulation figures at the subdistrict level, the rela-tionship between the national KPU and Panwasluremained strained. A more constructive approach bythe KPU toward Panwaslu would greatly contributetoward the promotion of a transparent electoralprocess. The Carter Center strongly believes that neutral oversight mechanisms are essential for theestablishment of a fair and democratic electoralprocess. A well-functioning Panwaslu that swiftly andeffectively deals with election-related complaints wouldalso strengthen the public’s confidence in any futureelections. The Carter Center would also like to takethis opportunity to suggest that KPU decrees be formu-lated with greater clarity to avoid confusion amongelection officials. Better advance planning would haveobviated the need for many of the decrees issued dur-ing the 2004 election period, which in turn wouldhave minimized the number of administrative errors.The Carter Center considers that the KPU took thecorrect decision when, during the first round of thepresidential elections, it permitted the counting ofdouble-punched ballots whenever a voter’s intent was

clear. The fact that not all voting stations abided bythe KPU’s decision is more a reflection of the logisticalproblems inherent in a country as diverse and dispersedas Indonesia than the result of ambiguous language.Nonetheless, more careful planning may have led tothe detection of the design flaw in the presidential ballotthat allowed for the punching of candidate pairs with-out opening the entire ballot paper.

ELECTORAL SYSTEM REFORMS

Change system of electing DPRMembers of the House of Representatives (DPR)

were elected according to a restricted open-list propor-tional system. According to that system, seats wereallotted to each party in proportion to the share of thetotal vote that party received. Individual candidateswere ranked by the party, yet could also receive onepopular vote. Candidates who reached a particularnumber of votes were able to move up the party list.However, the benchmark was set so high that nonational-level candidate was elected solely on the basisof the restricted open-list system. Ultimately, the quotasystem allowed parties to retain control over who waselected. This sometimes prompted voter disappoint-ment, as expectations raised by the partially open-listsystem were not met. Media reports even attributed the death of one candidate in East Java to voter dis-content. For the DPR to better reflect the will of thepeople, The Carter Center recommends that the quota be lowered for future elections.

ELECTORAL ADMINISTRATION REFORMS

Discrimination against candidates The imposition of educational and physical

requirements to determine the suitability of presiden-tial candidates represented another source of concernfor The Carter Center. Candidates had to demonstratethey had at least completed their education to high-school level (or equivalent) and prove they did notsuffer from a serious physical disability. The education-al requirements are particularly discriminating towardwomen and those in religious education — a common,

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and often only, option for people living in remoteareas, such as Papua. As far as the physical require-ments are concerned, former President AbdurrahmanWahid’s blindness was cited as justification for exclud-ing him from the presidential race. The Carter Centerobjects to any regulation that takes judgments about acandidate’s qualifications out of the hands of votersand discriminates on the basis of physical disability.

Campaign scheduleThe KPU imposed restrictions on campaigning

ahead of the runoff election in September. It accordedcandidates no more than three days to present theircase to the public, and the actual campaigning was tobe conducted in a format specified by the KPU. TheCarter Center strongly objects to such limitations.They infringe on the rights of free speech and assemblyof candidates and their supporters. The Center there-fore urges the Indonesian authorities to considerrevising the legal restrictions imposed on campaigning,especially in the light of the successful conduct of thethree 2004 elections.

Voter registrationDuring the legislative elections, the official voter

lists contained a number of errors that could havebeen exploited for fraudulent purposes. Moreover, thedistribution of ID cards and invitation letters was notalways reliable prior to all three elections nor were vot-ing requirements always consistently enforced.Observers also found that internally displaced persons(IDPs) were under-represented. The Carter Centerwould like to advise the Indonesian government towork toward greater inclusiveness and promote the registration of IDPs.

Polling staff trainingThe KPU failed to allocate sufficient funds for

the adequate training of election workers, which hadadverse repercussions for all three election rounds. The lack of direct training of middle- and lower-levelofficials meant that procedural errors continued to beprevalent in the second round of the presidential

elections. Even though the incidence of those errorsnoticeably decreased from one election to the next,negligence remained a feature of all three elections:Not all necessary voter identification documents wereinspected, fingers were not always marked or checkedfor indelible ink, and, in some cases, the layout ofvoting stations was such that privacy in the pollingbooth was not always guaranteed. Lack of trainingalso led to a high incidence of incorrectly completedtabulation forms — especially during the legislativeelections. The need for subsequent corrections creat-ed gratuitous opportunities for fraud. In one village,members of the election committee blatantly changedvote tallies from 15 of 18 polling stations. The CarterCenter recommends that the KPU and theIndonesian government allocate more resources tothe training of electoral and tabulation officials infuture elections.

Voter education effortsVoter education represented another area that was

underfunded. Television and radio played an invalu-able role in disseminating information but failed toprevent the problem of double-punched ballots during

Under the supervision of the polling station president, each voterdeposits his or her folded ballot paper into a sealed ballot box.

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the first-round presidential elections. Funding restric-tions also resulted in training initiatives being mainlydirected at urban populations at the expense ofIndonesia’s rural electorate. Voter education programsfor the rural sector would help reduce the incidence ofadministrative errors and invalid ballots.

MONEY POLITICSCorruption and money politics are endemic in

Indonesia and will have to be tackled by future govern-ments if they want to retain their credibility and notalienate the general population from the country’spolitical processes. Throughout their stay in Indonesia,the Carter Center staff received several reports of election-related corruption. In one case, an observerobtained hard evidence of a district-level KPU head

abusing his position and accepting a US$500 bribe tosecure a candidate’s seat. To deter similar actions inthe future, The Carter Center recommends that moreserious efforts be undertaken to apprehend and finethe perpetrators of such violations. More decisiveaction as well as clearer messages from the central gov-ernment and investigating bodies about what exactlyconstitutes money politics would significantly con-tribute to the reduction of the impact of moneypolitics in the electoral process.

Citizens react to announcement of polling station results.

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ATLANTA…The Carter Center opened an office lastweek in Jakarta to begin a long-term observation ofelectoral conditions leading up to Indonesia’s July 5presidential elections. This observation will continuethrough to early October should a Sept. 20 runoffprove necessary.

“The 2004 elections will be the first electoral testof Indonesia’s democratic political institutions andprocesses since the transitional elections in 1999 and acritical opportunity to demonstrate that the democraticprocess can yield effective leaders and accountable government,” said Dr. David Pottie, senior programassociate of the Center’s Democracy Program.

After 40 years of military-backed governments,Indonesia began a democratic transition in 1998. InJune 1999, Indonesia held its first genuinely democraticelections, for the legislature, a process that was moni-tored by The Carter Center. The Center and otherinternational organizations that observed the electionsconcluded the elections were credible and representedthe will of the people.

Although Indonesians have gained new politicalfreedoms during the last six years, recent public opin-ion polls have found that most Indonesians aredisillusioned with government and the country’s economic decline.

A Carter Center assessment team in January metwith political parties, election officials, civil society,and observer groups, all of whom encouraged interna-tional observers from the Center to help buildconfidence in the elections.

Carter Center Jakarta Field Office Director EricBjornlund and Deputy Director Sophie Khan willoversee pre-election observation activities, includingthe deployment of 10 long-term observers, who willtravel across Indonesia to report on technical prepara-tions for the vote.

The Center will publish periodic statements on itsfindings and recommendations on its Web site,www.cartercenter.org.

The Carter Center was founded in 1982 by formerU.S. President Jimmy Carter and his wife, Rosalynn, inpartnership with Emory University, to advance peaceand health worldwide. A not-for-profit, nongovernmen-tal organization, the Center has helped to improve lifefor people in more than 65 countries by resolving con-flicts; advancing democracy, human rights, andeconomic opportunity; preventing diseases; improvingmental health care; and teaching farmers to increasecrop production. To learn more about The CarterCenter, please visit: www.cartercenter.org.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASEMonday, May 3, 2004

CONTACT: Kay TorranceIn Atlanta, 404-420-5129

Sophie KhanIn Jakarta, 0812-818-8842

CARTER CENTER OPENS OFFICE IN JAKARTA IN PREPARATION

TO OBSERVE THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

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ATLANTA…. Former U.S. President Jimmy Carterand his wife, Rosalynn, will lead a 60-member interna-tional delegation to observe Indonesia’s presidentialelections. The Carter Center, which observed the 1999national elections, was invited by the General ElectionCommission and welcomed by all major political par-ties to observe the July 5 elections.

“Indonesians for the first time in this new democ-racy will choose their president through directelections, ” said President Carter. “They have voiced aclear commitment to the democratic process, and asinternational observers, we will support them. As voterscast their ballots, they should do so with confidencethat the international community is watching thisprocess with interest.”

President and Mrs. Carter, Dr. David Carroll ofthe Center’s Democracy Program, and Mr. EricBjornlund, Indonesia field office director, hope tomeet with all the candidates, the election commission,domestic observers, and other international observers.

Ten long-term observers were deployed over thecourse of May to observe campaigns and electionpreparations. The Center will issue a pre-election state-ment this week, detailing their findings.

The remainder of the delegation, representing sixcountries, will arrive July 1 and then receive briefingsin Jakarta before deployment throughout Indonesia.On election day, they will witness poll openings, voting,vote counting at polling stations, and transportation ofthe ballot boxes to the village organizing election committee.

A Carter Center assessment team in January metwith political parties, election officials, civil society,and observer groups, all of whom encouraged interna-tional observers from the Center to help buildconfidence in the elections.

The Carter Center was founded in 1982 by formerU.S. President Jimmy Carter and his wife, Rosalynn, inpartnership with Emory University, to advance peaceand health worldwide. A not-for-profit, nongovernmen-tal organization, the Center has helped to improve lifefor people in more than 65 countries by resolving con-flicts; advancing democracy, human rights, andeconomic opportunity; preventing diseases; improvingmental health care; and teaching farmers to increasecrop production. To learn more about The CarterCenter, please visit: www.cartercenter.org.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASEMonday, June 21, 2004

CONTACT: Kay TorranceIn Atlanta, 404-420-5129

CARTER CENTER DELEGATES ARRIVE TO OBSERVE INDONESIAN ELECTIONS

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In support of Indonesia’s ongoing process of democra-tization and political reform, The Carter Center ispleased to witness the historic 2004 election, whenIndonesian voters for the first time will directly choosetheir president. The Carter Center, which observedthe 1999 national elections, was invited by theElection Commission (KPU) and welcomed by allmajor political parties. In late April, the Centerdeployed 10 long-term observers across the country tomonitor the electoral process. For the July 5 presiden-tial elections, the Center is bringing 50 additionalshort-term observers to join the mission, which will beled by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, his wife,Rosalynn, and former Prime Minister of ThailandChuan Leekpai.

We congratulate Indonesia on the successful leg-islative elections held on April 5, 2004. We note thepeaceful atmosphere that prevailed during those elec-tions has continued into presidential campaigning,which began June 1. Carter Center long-term observersheard relatively few concerns about administrativepreparations and found that the registration processgenerally worked well and that the KPU is on track todistribute materials on schedule. The Carter Centermission expresses its support to all Indonesians as theyexercise their democratic rights in the July 5 election.

While the Center is encouraged by its observations

so far, the mission heard concerns from Indonesiansabout the following issues:

KPU and PanwasluAs in previous elections, the Elections Supervisory

Committee, or Panwas, has been appointed to super-vise elections, receive complaints, resolve disputes, andrefer complaints as appropriate to the KPU, police, orother government departments.

The public dispute in recent weeks between theKPU and Panwas over the extent of Panwas’ powers isunfortunate. We understand that Panwas reportedhaving difficulty during the April elections in obtain-ing important information from lower-level KPUs.Panwas also reportedly has criticized KPU’s failure toact on alleged administrative violations of the electionlaw referred by Panwas. We also understand that KPUhas sometimes criticized the performance of Panwasand that the election law gives the KPU ultimateauthority over Panwas, including its establishment anddissolution.

KPU has proposed substantial changes to itsdecree on Panwas’ role and responsibilities. Therevised decree would empower Panwas only to resolvedisputes between electoral contestants; it would haveno authority to handle issues between KPU and thecandidates.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASEFriday, June 25, 2004

CONTACT: Eric BjornlundIn Jakarta, (62-21) 383-5153

Kay TorranceIn Atlanta, 404-420-5129

PRE-ELECTION STATEMENT BY THE CARTER CENTER

ON THE 2004 INDONESIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

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While it is not the Center’s role to assess conflict-ing interpretations of the law, we believe it is importantto have an effective, timely mechanism for resolution ofdisputes, including those between candidates and theKPU. We hope the KPU and Panwaslu will resolvetheir differences without hampering public confidencein the handling and resolving of election-related complaints.

Perceptions of “Money Politics”We have heard concerns from representatives of

political parties, campaign teams, Panwas, and civilsociety throughout the country about “money politics,”or the illegitimate use and influence of money in thecampaign. Our observers report that there appears tobe no common understanding of what “money politics”means, and there is much confusion about what usesof funds are illegal. Nevertheless, suspicions about votebuying and improper use of money in the campaignare widespread.

Threats to Freedom of Expression of Civil SocietyOrganizations

We are concerned about the implications of state-ments by the heads of the national Intelligence Agencyand the national police that they are monitoring some20 local and international nongovernmental organiza-tions they believe threaten Indonesia’s security. Suchstatements, together with the expulsion of SidneyJones, Indonesia director of the International CrisisGroup and a prominent human rights researcher, areinconsistent with rights of free expression that are fundamental in a democratic society and could have a chilling effect on civil society.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION ANDCAMPAIGNING IN CERTAIN REGIONS

Given the current state of civil emergency in Acehand the recent violence in certain other parts of thecountry, we urge the responsible authorities to main-tain security and promote a peaceful environment inwhich all candidates, campaign teams, and citizens arefree to exercise their democratic rights. We hope that

national and international election observers, diplo-mats, and journalists will be able to travel to andreport on the election process in all regions of thecountry.

The Carter Center Election Observation Mission In late April, a team of 10 long-term Carter Center

observers began monitoring the political environment,election preparations, and the political party campaigns.They have observed in 23 provinces in Sumatra,Sulawesi, Java, Bali, and Kalimantan. In addition, the Center has a core team in Jakarta. In Jakarta andthroughout the country, observers met with representa-tives of the political parties, the KPU, the Panwas,domestic and international election observers, civilsociety organizations, media, and the internationalcommunity at large.

For the July 5 election, 60 international observersrepresenting eight countries will be deployed to 20provinces, both in urban and rural areas. They will wit-ness poll openings, balloting, and initial stages of votecounting. President Carter and Prime Minister ChuanLeekpai will offer a preliminary assessment of the elec-tion process on behalf of the delegation. The CarterCenter’s long-term observers will continue their assess-ments after election day through the Sept. 20 runoffelection, if one is held.

The Carter Center was founded in 1982 by formerU.S. President Jimmy Carter and his wife, Rosalynn, inpartnership with Emory University, to advance peaceand health worldwide. A not-for-profit, nongovernmen-tal organization, the Center has helped to improve lifefor people in more than 65 countries by resolving con-flicts; advancing democracy, human rights, andeconomic opportunity; preventing diseases; improvingmental health care; and teaching farmers to increasecrop production. Visit www.cartercenter.org to learnmore about The Carter Center.

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In support of Indonesia’s ongoing democratization andpolitical reform, The Carter Center is pleased toobserve this historic election, as Indonesian voters forthe first time directly choose their president. TheCarter Center, which observed the 1999 national elec-tions, was invited by the Election Commission (KPU)and welcomed by all major political parties. In lateApril, the Center established a field office inIndonesia and deployed 10 long-term observers acrossthe country to monitor the electoral process. Sincethen, the Center’s observers have visited 25 provincesand have met with representatives of political partiesand candidates, government and election officials,journalists, election officials, police, domestic electionmonitoring groups, religious organizations, and othercivil society groups. On June 25, the Center issued apre-election statement that commented on several pre-election issues and the conduct of the campaign.

Under the leadership of former U.S. PresidentJimmy Carter, Rosalynn Carter, and former PrimeMinister of Thailand Chuan Leekpai, the Centerdeployed 60 international observers, representing forthe July 5 presidential election (eight countries, to 17provinces). The observers met with local officials, cam-paign teams, and domestic observers and observed thevoting, counting, and initial tabulation. The delegationleadership met in Jakarta with President Megawati

Soekarnoputri, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Wiranto,Amien Rais, and Agum Gumelar as well as membersof the KPU and Constitutional Court, leaders of non-partisan domestic election monitoring organizations,and others. We appreciate the important opportunitieswe have had for effective coordination with theEuropean Union Election Observation Mission andother international observers and the assistance pro-vided by the International Observer Resource Center.We would like to extend our thanks to all of the manyindividuals and organizations who welcomed ourobservation efforts and took the time to facilitate ourunderstanding of Indonesia’s politics and electoralprocess.

ASSESSMENT OF THE ELECTIONWe congratulate the people and leaders of

Indonesia for the conduct of the July 5 presidentialelections. To date, our delegation’s assessment of theIndonesian election is positive. We are especiallypleased the peaceful atmosphere that prevailed duringIndonesia’s legislative elections in April has continuedin the July 5 presidential election. At the same time,we are concerned about the large number of invalidballots in many polling stations across the country andthe need for effective, timely, transparent steps toaddress this problem.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASEWednesday, July 7, 2004


THE CARTER CENTER’S SECOND STATEMENT ON

THE 2004 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION IN INDONESIA

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This election marks another important step inIndonesia’s democratic consolidation. Because the tab-ulation and verification of final results are ongoing, itis too early to evaluate the election as a whole. TheCenter will continue to observe these processes in thedays and weeks ahead and will maintain its long-termmonitoring program through the second round. Afterthe conclusion of the electoral process, the Center willissue a more comprehensive report.

THE POLLING PROCESSOur observers generally found the polling stations

they visited were well-organized, functioned effectively,and usually had their full staff complement and neces-sary election materials. This is a credit to the KPU. Wenote that Indonesia’s 155 million registered voters and575,000 polling stations make the Indonesian electionthe largest single-day election in the world.

Polling station officials in some locations, however,were lax in applying administrative procedures. Ourobservers reported, for example, a consistent failure tocheck fingers for ink prior to voting and the use ofpoor quality ink on voters’ fingers after they had casttheir ballots. Officials sometimes failed to check voterdocumentation or the voter register. In some locations,the polling station layout did not ensure privacy in thepolling booth. Several polling stations closed well inadvance of 1 p.m., and some began an early count.

INVALID BALLOTS AND THECONSOLIDATION OF RESULTS

Of concern to Carter Center and other observerswas the high percentage of ballots classified as invalidacross the country because many voters did not unfoldballots completely before indicating their choice. Thisballot problem could have been avoided with betterplanning and more timely training of polling officialsand voters.

The KPU decision to classify these ballots as validseems appropriate, but it is unclear how well this elec-tion day announcement was communicatedthroughout the country. Our observers reported vary-ing applications of the instruction to recheck those

ballots. Although not all polling stations conducted areview, we understand that in many cases this is beingrectified at the village election committee (PPS) level.

It is critically important the KPU implements auniform, transparent process to handle the invalid ballots. The KPU should ensure village election com-mittees conduct rechecks that are open to candidatewitnesses, domestic and international election observers,and the public. It is essential they be completed withinthe prescribed time periods for consolidation and certi-fication of results.

During verification of the final result, it is impor-tant that candidate representatives and observers havefull access to monitor the entire process to ensure thatit is transparent and credible.

RESOLUTION OF DISPUTESIt is important to have an effective, timely mechan-

ism for resolution of election-related disputes. We notethe significant role the Election Supervisory Committee(Panwaslu) has played at the national, provincial, andlocal levels.

We are pleased to learn the Constitutional Court,a new institution with authority to hear cases involvingelection results, has quickly established its credibilityand gained public confidence. It is essential that allcandidates follow appropriate legal channels to resolveelectoral disputes. The Constitutional Court shouldwork expeditiously to resolve any challenges in time toallow sufficient opportunity for careful preparationsfor the second round. Upon resolution of any com-plaints by the Constitutional Court, we encourage allcandidates and their supporters to accept the results asthey have agreed to do. We call upon the appropriateauthorities and other stakeholders to follow up on thedecisions of the court.

ELECTION OBSERVERS ANDCANDIDATE WITNESSES

Past experience in Indonesia and elsewhere hasdemonstrated the significant contribution that nonpar-tisan domestic observers and effective candidatewitnesses can make to the credibility and integrity of

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the election process. We commend the importantwork and commitment of the People’s VoterEducation Network (JPPR), the Center for ElectoralReform (CETRO), the People’s Election ObservationNetwork of Indonesia (JAMPPI), and other domesticelection monitoring organizations. In light of the con-troversies about the ballot counting and consolidationof results in 1999 and in April 2004, domesticobservers have correctly placed additional emphasis onthe process of counting and consolidating the resultsin this election. The quick count conducted by theInstitute of Research, Education, and Information ofSocial and Economic Affairs (LP3ES), an Indonesianresearch institute, provides an independent check oftabulation and results, enhancing transparency of thisaspect of the electoral process.

Our observers reported that more than one candi-date witness was present at most polling stations. Somecandidate witnesses, however, did not appear to beknowledgeable about the polling process.

We are disappointed that the government ofIndonesia prevented The Carter Center from observ-ing the election in Ambon and limited our activities in

other regions. We urge the responsible authorities toprovide domestic and international observers fullaccess to all aspects of the election process throughoutthe country.

CONCLUSIONIndonesians are fully committed to democracy and

secular government. In just a few years, Indonesia hasmade a dramatic transition from authoritarian rule todemocracy. The Carter Center offers its support to thecontinuing consolidation of democracy in Indonesia.

The Carter Center was founded in 1982 by formerU.S. President Jimmy Carter and his wife, Rosalynn, inpartnership with Emory University, to advance peaceand health worldwide. A not-for-profit, nongovernmen-tal organization, the Center has helped to improve lifefor people in more than 65 countries by resolving con-flicts; advancing democracy, human rights, andeconomic opportunity; preventing diseases; improvingmental health care; and teaching farmers to increasecrop production. Visit: www.cartercenter.org to learnmore about The Carter Center.

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In support of Indonesia’s ongoing democratization andpolitical reform, The Carter Center is continuing tomonitor this election, as Indonesian voters for the firsttime directly choose their president. The CarterCenter was invited by the Election Commission (KPU)and welcomed by all major political parties.

Since April, the Center has maintained an officein Indonesia and deployed long-term observers acrossthe country. In Jakarta and 25 provinces around thecountry, the Center’s observers have met with repre-sentatives of political parties and candidates,government and election officials, journalists, police,domestic election monitoring groups, religious organi-zations, and other civil society groups. The Centerissued June 25 a statement that commented on pre-election issues and the conduct of the campaign. OnJuly 5, under the leadership of former U.S. PresidentJimmy Carter, Rosalynn Carter, and former PrimeMinister of Thailand Chuan Leekpai, the Centerdeployed 60 international observers. The delegationissued its statement, the Center’s second statement,July 7. Since the first round of the election, the Centerhas monitored the vote tabulation process at the village,subdistrict (kecamatan), district (kabupaten/kota),provincial, and national levels. They have investigatedelection complaints around the country and have con-tinued to meet with KPU and Panwaslu officials,

candidate representatives, nongovernmental organiza-tions, and others.

VOTE TABULATIONThe KPU announced July 26 the official vote tabu-

lation. As had been expected — based on the KPU’sunofficial results reported at the national tabulationcenter and the quick count of several nongovernmen-tal groups — the ticket of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyonoand Jusuf Kalla won the most votes, and MegawatiSoekarnoputri and Hasyim Muzadi came in second.Unless the Constitutional Court overturns theseresults, these two tickets will compete in a runoff elec-tion Sept. 20.

We commend both the winners and losers of thefirst round of the presidential election for fostering apeaceful environment and, for those with complaints,indicating their intention to access the ConstitutionalCourt. We have not heard of any significant conflictsbetween supporters of different parties in Jakarta or inthe provinces. Our observers have noted in someplaces around the country that losing parties, ratherthan complaining of manipulation or accusing theiropponents of foul play, have been reflective abouttheir losses.

Unfortunately, on July 26, a small explosion in theKPU headquarters in Jakarta marred the final national

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASEMonday, Aug. 2, 2004


Kay TorranceIn Atlanta, 404-420-5129

POSTELECTION STATEMENT ON INDONESIAN ELECTIONS, AUG. 2, 2004

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tabulation. While no one was injured, the explosionserved as a reminder of the threat of violence that hascontinued to plague the country.

RECHECKING INVALID BALLOTSAs is now well known, many voters did not unfold

ballot papers completely and in casting their votes,inadvertently punched their ballots twice. The KPUattempted on election day to address the large numberof ballots initially classified as invalid, but this problemcould have been avoided with better planning andmore timely training of polling officials and voters.

In response, the KPU issued three separate direc-tives. Not all polling stations received or followed theKPU’s initial directive on election day to review andvalidate certain double-punched ballots. In a secondinstruction, the KPU directed village election commit-tees (PPS) to recheck invalid ballots. Although therewas initial resistance in some locations, in some casesbecause PPS officials were being asked to do additionalwork without additional compensation, it appears PPSofficials in most locations ultimately did conduct suchreviews. Only the ballot papers determined to beinvalid from each polling station were supposed to bere-counted.

Judging from the Center’s observations and inter-views with electoral officials and other observers,tabulations in most locations were well-organized andconducted openly. Unfortunately, the presence of candi-date witnesses and domestic observers was uneven duringthe rechecking of ballots at the village level and above.

ELECTORAL COMMISSION CHANGESRULES GOVERNING ELECTIONSSUPERVISORY COMMITTEE

Pre-existing tensions between the KPU and theElections Supervisory Committee (Panwaslu) intensifiedafter the election when the KPU enacted new restric-tions on Panwaslu. On July 8, the KPU issued Decree42, establishing new procedures for investigating andreporting violations, including a new requirement toreport alleged violations to local KPU officials prior toreview for further investigation. The new decree also

prohibits Panwaslu from considering disputes betweenthe KPU and third parties. In response to criticism,the KPU softened the decree to require only consulta-tion with, rather than prior approval of, the KPUbefore Panwas refers complaints to the police.

Nevertheless, Panwas has rejected the KPU decreeon the grounds it will severely hinder its independenceand significantly interfere with the dispute resolutionprocess. On July 12, pending judicial review of the newdecree, Panwas instructed its field offices to ignore thenew decree and continue to apply the pre-existingrules. Panwas has requested that the Supreme Courtinvalidate the new decree on the grounds it contradictsthe election law because it unlawfully restricts Panwas’ability to quickly respond to and report on electoralcomplaints The election law, though, gives the KPUultimate authority over Panwas, including its establish-ment and dissolution. The tension between thenational KPU and Panwas is regrettable since bothinstitutions, in the view of many political observers,have functioned reasonably well.

While it is not the Center’s role to assess interpre-tations of the law, it is important to have an effective,timely mechanism for resolution of disputes, includingthose between candidates and the KPU. We hope theKPU and Panwaslu will resolve their differences with-out hampering public confidence in the handling andresolution of election-related complaints.

REJECTION OF CANDIDACYBASED ON PHYSICAL ABILITY

The KPU rejected the candidacy of formerPresident Abdurrahman Wahid on the grounds thathe is medically unfit, as he has suffered a series ofstrokes and is nearly blind. While the Center does notquestion the legality or factual basis of the KPU deci-sion, we are concerned about any provision or policythat takes judgments about presidential candidates’qualifications out of the hands of the voters or thatdiscriminates on the basis of a physical disability.International standards stipulate such provisionsshould be interpreted narrowly.

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PROBLEMS WITH ELECTION-DAYMANIPULATION IN PARTICULARLOCATIONS

There were significant problems with manipulationof the election process on election day in a few specificlocations.

Shortly after election day, Panwaslu reported a dra-matic increase in the number of voters since the Aprillegislative elections at polling stations surrounding Al-Zaytun, a large Islamic boarding school located inIndramayu in the province of West Java. More than20,000 new voters reportedly arrived from SouthJakarta, some in buses from Jakarta’s military head-quarters driven by active members of the military.Almost all of the votes from the school’s 83 polling stations favored Golkar candidate Wiranto.

After a lengthy debate between KPU and Panwasluofficials at the national and provincial levels, the KPUon July 16 found the mobilization of voters to be inviolation of election laws. The KPU ordered a repeatelection for the Al-Zaytun polling stations with the participation of only the 4,674 registered voters whoreside in the area. This decision demonstrated thecommitment of the KPU and Panwas to protecting theintegrity of the electoral process. The military command-er stripped the rank of the lieutenant colonel responsiblefor transporting the voters. As of yet, no charges havebeen brought against anyone for the violation.

The KPU held the repeat election July 25, but nota single person voted. This means all 24,000-plus votescast July 5 have officially been considered invalid. Wehope the authorities will be able to determinewhether local voters were intimidated into boycottingthe re-vote.

Other significant violations occurred in Tawao,Malaysia, one of a number of polling stations estab-lished for Indonesians abroad, and in Mimika, Papua.In Tawao, media reports claimed that a consular official,

who served as a local election official, prepunchedapproximately 8,000 votes. In Mimika, election officialsare suspected of prepunching approximately 4,000votes. In both cases, the fraudulent ballots were castfor Yudhoyono. According to KPU officials, repeatelections have been held in both locations.

CAMPAIGN PERIOD FOR SECOND ROUNDAs the two presidential tickets prepare for the

second round of voting, an important aspect of thepresidential election law regarding the campaign peri-od remains unclear. The law states that in the event ofa second round, the two remaining candidate pairs“may improve their vision, mission, and program,under the regulation and facilitation of the KPU” (LawNo. 23/2003, Art. 35(9)). The official elucidation ofthe law directs the KPU to regulate that this process“be no longer than 3 (three) days, for which funding isgiven by the KPU.” The KPU has set the campaignperiod for Sept. 14-16, during which each candidatewill campaign according to a debate format specifiedby the KPU. Although the KPU plans to meet withrepresentatives of both campaigns to discuss rules forthe campaign period, KPU officials so far have deniedthe two candidates the right to conduct public ralliesor to advertise in the media.

Such a highly restricted and structured campaignwould appear to infringe the rights of free speech ofthe candidates and their supporters and is inconsistentwith international practice and standards. Consistentwith the goal of encouraging candidates to “improvetheir vision, mission, and program,” the election lawshould be interpreted as broadly as possible to allowfreedom to campaign, along with a full and open polit-ical debate.

The Carter Center will continue to observe devel-opments as Indonesia prepares for the Septemberelection.

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JAKARTA, INDONESIA…. The Carter Center willdeploy 57 observers Sunday in preparation to observethe Indonesian presidential runoff Sept. 20. TheCenter, which observed the 1999 and the 2004 presi-dential elections, was invited by the General ElectionCommission and welcomed by all major political parties to observe the runoff.

U.S. Ambassador Douglas “Pete” Peterson will leadthe delegation, which will be deployed to 21 provinces.On election day, they will witness poll openings, voting,vote counting at polling stations, and transportation of the ballot boxes to the village organizing electioncommittee.

Ambassador Peterson served as the first postwarU.S. ambassador to Vietnam after serving three termsas representative of Florida’s 2nd CongressionalDistrict in the U.S. House. The Center’s observer teamalso includes Dr. David Carroll, acting director of theCenter’s Democracy Program, and Carter CenterJakarta Field Office Director Eric Bjornlund.

“The Sept. 20 runoff is the last in a series ofimportant elections in Indonesia this year, providingIndonesian citizens with their first opportunity to

directly elect the president,” said Dr. Carroll. “Thepresence of international observers is an importantdemonstration of the interest of the international com-munity in supporting Indonesia’s democratization.”

The Carter Center deployed 10 long-termobservers in May to monitor and assess the electoralprocess following the April legislative elections andbefore and after the first-round presidential election inJuly. The Center’s field office and long-term observerswill continue to monitor postelection processes follow-ing the Sept. 20 runoff.

The Carter Center was founded in 1982 by formerU.S. President Jimmy Carter and his wife, Rosalynn, inpartnership with Emory University, to advance peaceand health worldwide. A not-for-profit, nongovernmentalorganization, the Center has helped to improve life forpeople in more than 65 countries by resolving conflicts;advancing democracy, human rights, and economicopportunity; preventing diseases; improving mentalhealth care; and teaching farmers to increase crop production. To learn more about The Carter Center,please visit: www.cartercenter.org.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASEWednesday, Sept. 15, 2004

CONTACT: Airina NusyirwanCell 0815-614-0409

CARTER CENTER TO OBSERVE INDONESIAN PRESIDENTIAL RUNOFF

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARYThe second round of Indonesia’s historic first

direct presidential election has taken place successfully,in a general atmosphere of calm, order, and open par-ticipation. The Carter Center congratulates the peopleand leaders of Indonesia for the successful conduct ofthe presidential election and for the peaceful atmos-phere that has prevailed throughout Indonesia’s threerounds of elections in 2004. This represents a majorstep in the country’s ongoing democratic transition.

The Center’s preliminary assessment is stronglypositive. In order to support the continued strengthen-ing of Indonesia’s electoral processes, our monitoringefforts have highlighted a number of concerns thatshould be addressed to further improve elections inIndonesia in the future. These include the length andsubstance of the political campaign, the standardiza-tion and effective communication of pollingprocedures, and the capacity of candidate witnesses.

CARTER CENTER MONITORING ININDONESIA

As part of its program to promote genuine elec-tions and support democratic development inIndonesia, The Carter Center has observed the Sept.20 second-round presidential election. As the firstdirect presidential election in Indonesia’s history, this

election is historic. The Center was invited by theIndonesian Election Commission (KPU) to observethe 2004 legislative and presidential electoral process-es, and all major political parties have welcomed theCenter’s role.

The Carter Center established a field office inIndonesia in April of this year and has deployed 15long-term observers across the country to monitor election preparations, voter education efforts, theopenness of the campaign, national and local politics,and related issues. The Center’s observers have visited31 provinces. For the July 5 first-round presidentialelections, the Center deployed a 60-member delegationled by former U.S. President Carter and former PrimeMinister Chuan Leekpai of Thailand.

The Center’s current 57-member delegation is ledby Douglas “Pete” Peterson, former U.S. ambassador toVietnam and member of the U.S. Congress, andincludes international observers from 13 countries.The Center’s observers met with local officials, cam-paign teams, and domestic observers and observed thevoting, counting, and initial tabulation in 21provinces. The delegation leadership met in Jakartawith President Megawati Soekarnoputri and represent-atives of both campaigns as well as the chairman andmembers of the KPU, leaders of nonpartisan domesticelection monitoring organizations, political observers,

SEPTEMBER 22, 2004, PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ON THE

PRESIDENTIAL RUNOFF ELECTION IN INDONESIA

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASEWednesday, September 22, 2004


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journalists, and others. We have coordinated ourefforts with the European Union Election ObservationMission and other international observers, and weappreciate the assistance provided by the InternationalObserver Resource Center. We have also coordinatedclosely with a number of domestic election monitoringorganizations. We would like to extend our thanks toall of the many individuals and organizations that havefacilitated our understanding of Indonesia’s politicsand electoral process.

ASSESSMENT OF THE ELECTIONAs in July, the Center’s preliminary assessment of

the final round of the Indonesian election is positive.That these extremely complex elections were carriedout in such an orderly and successful fashion is a trib-ute to the hard work of the millions of electionofficials and the participation of more than 120 millionvoters. Although the process is not yet complete, weare confident the vast majority of voters were able toexercise their democratic rights without significant hindrance. We congratulate the people and leaders ofIndonesia for the successful conduct of the presiden-tial election and for the peaceful atmosphere that hasprevailed throughout Indonesia’s three rounds of elec-tions in 2004.

Because the tabulation and verification of finalresults are ongoing, however, it is too early to conclu-sively evaluate the election process as a whole. TheCenter will maintain a long-term monitoring programthrough the inauguration and beyond and will issue acomprehensive report on the entire election process ata later date.

Although the Center’s preliminary assessment ispositive, our monitoring efforts have highlighted anumber of important concerns that should beaddressed to further improve elections in Indonesia in the future. In the spirit of making a constructivecontribution, we offer the following comments thatmay be helpful in developing plans and improving procedures for future elections. The problems we didobserve are not significant enough to affect the overallresult of this election process.

RESTRICTIONS ON CAMPAIGNIN SECOND ROUND

The considerable restrictions on the campaign inthe second round of the presidential election areinconsistent with international norms for politicalcompetition in democratic elections, including normsof freedom of assembly and freedom of speech. Theelection law states that in the event of a second round,the two remaining candidate pairs “may improve theirvision, mission, and program, under the regulationand facilitation of the KPU.” The official elucidationof the law directs the KPU to regulate that this process“be no longer than 3 (three) days, for which funding isgiven by the KPU.” The provision of only three daysfor candidates to expand on their mission, vision, andprogram is insufficient to ensure that candidates havea reasonable opportunity to communicate their mes-sages and compete for votes. Furthermore, by limitingthe activities of candidates even during the three-daycampaign, including banning campaign rallies and out-door campaign activities, the KPU’s interpretation ofthis provision was unduly restrictive, regardless ofwhether both campaign teams had agreed. Althoughwe are aware that the KPU and others have defendedthese restrictions on the ground that they mitigate thethreat of violence, we urge Indonesian authorities torevisit this issue, especially in light of the successfulconduct of three electoral events in 2004.

“MONEY POLITICS”The Carter Center has heard many concerns from

representatives of political parties, campaign teams,electoral officials, and civil society throughout thecountry about the illegitimate use and influence ofmoney in the campaign, including vote buying, andthe inappropriate use of government resources.

THE POLLING PROCESSCarter Center observers monitored voting day

processes at nearly 300 polling stations, most of whichwere reported to be well-organized. Our observers rated81 percent of the polling stations they visited as “verygood” or “good.”

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The successful conduct of this year’s elections inIndonesia is a significant accomplishment. With 155million eligible voters and approximately 575,000polling stations, Indonesia’s elections are the largestsingle-day election in the world. We applaud the com-mitment and dedication of the millions of electionofficials throughout the country.

The ballot. We note that, unlike in July whenthere were significant numbers of ballots initially ruledinvalid because of double-punching, there were fewerproblems in the second round with invalid ballots.The KPU took steps to avoid a repeat of the problem,and with only two candidates in the runoff, the ballotpaper was substantially simplified.

Early closing of polling stations. The KPU’s direc-tive for the second round that permitted an earlyclosing of polling stations in certain circumstances wasnot uniformly communicated and applied and createdconfusion. One of the conditions in the directive — thatall eligible voters had voted — could almost never be literally met. Nevertheless, many polling stations closedearly even though all eligible voters had not voted asrequired. Many polling station committees evidentlyinterpreted the provision as permitting early closing aslong as there were no more voters present and candidatewitnesses agreed. Polling officials showed us a directivefrom at least one provincial KPU that permitted earlyclosing of polling stations without any mention of pre-conditions. Moreover, several polling stations closedwell in advance even of the early closing time of 11:30a.m. As a result, some voters who arrived after the closeof polls in certain locations found they could not vote.In at least one case, a poll had to re-open Sept. 21 toallow additional time for voting. We recommend thatauthorities adopt and enforce a consistent closing timefor all polling stations.

Administrative procedures at polling stations.Carter Center observers noted that the KPU tooksteps to try to address problems identified during theApril and July elections. Many polling stations hadreceived and used the training booklet published bythe KPU with UNDP support. Nonetheless, Center

observers reported that polling station officials insome locations did not consistently apply administra-tive procedures, including several standard proceduresto prevent multiple voting and other malpractices. Forexample, many officials did not check voters’ fingersfor ink before voting, did not ask for voter cards, orfailed to cross names off the voter roll. In many pollingstations, KPU invitation letters were used as the onlydocument for voter identification. In addition, somepolling stations were located in places that were notopen or accessible to election observers or the generalpublic. Although these lapses did not appear to affectthe integrity of the vote, KPU election officials shouldreview these procedures and attempt to ensure strictadherence to procedures in future elections.

Carter Center observers in the provinces of Papuaand West Irian Jaya noted a lack of funding andadministrative failures that exceeded those observedelsewhere. In addition, while the participation of ethnicPapuans increased significantly from the 1999 elections,there continues to be a lack of informed engagementin the democratic process.

Counting and consolidation of results. We notethat the vote tally report form (Form C1) was not well-designed, because the page where polling station offi-cials and candidate witnesses were supposed to sign toacknowledge their assent to the results was on a sepa-rate page from the results. These signatures could beeasily separated from the main form, and this allowsfor potential falsification of results. The KPU’s supple-mental directive that officials and witnesses shouldinitial the results on the first page was not followed in every location.

CANDIDATE WITNESSESAND ELECTION OBSERVERS

Past experience in Indonesia and elsewhere hasdemonstrated the significant contribution that effec-tive candidate witnesses and nonpartisan domesticelection observers can make to the credibility andintegrity of the election process. Our observers report-ed that more than one candidate witness was present

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at most polling stations, but they also noted that thepresence of witnesses varied widely and that many wit-nesses did not appear well-trained or informed aboutthe balloting and counting process.

The Center was disappointed that we encountereddomestic observers in relatively few polling stations.Accredited international and domestic observers weresupposed to have access to the tabulation process, butit remains unclear whether domestic observers havebeen able to effectively monitor the tabulation processat the village and higher levels. On the other hand, thequick counts conducted by several Indonesian researchorganizations, including the Institute of Research,Education, and Information of Social and EconomicAffairs (LP3ES), provide an independent check of tab-ulation and results and thus enhance the transparencyof the vote counting process.

RESOLUTION OF DISPUTESIn the days before the September election, we note

the confusion about the use of the police in helpingthe Election Supervisory Committee (Panwas) toobtain election results. The Carter Center has previ-ously expressed concern about the friction between theKPU and Panwas. We continue to believe it is impor-tant to have an institutional check on the KPU and aneffective, timely mechanism for resolution of disputes,including those between candidates and the KPU.

ELECTIONS UNDER A STATE OF CIVILEMERGENCY

The conduct of elections in conflict and postcon-flict areas is understandably difficult.

The presence of military and police can provide areassuring environment of security but can also beintimidating to some citizens. The state of civil emer-gency and ongoing conflict in Aceh hinder thefreedom of movement and assembly necessary foropen, competitive elections. Although our observersreported that the polls in Banda Aceh were well-con-ducted, they did not observe outside of the capital city.Center observers received reports that the military’s

assistance in transporting voters may have intimidatedsome citizens.

MEDIA FREEDOMThe dramatic emergence of a free and dynamic

press since the fall of the Soeharto regime has bothreflected and contributed to the emergence of democ-racy in Indonesia. However, restrictions on the presscan have a chilling effect on political coverage and theopen exchange of information. While the professional-ism of some media is still developing, the use ofcriminal prosecutions against journalists violates uni-versal norms of freedom of the press and threatens tointimidate the press community. In particular, we arevery concerned about the criminal prosecution andsentencing of the chief editor of a highly regarded magazine, for alleged libel. We urge Indonesia’s courtsto respect the freedom of the press.

CONCLUSIONThe successful conclusion of Indonesia’s presiden-

tial elections represents a major step in the country’songoing democratic transition. Continuing efforts tobuild accountable, effective political institutions and toensure that citizens can meaningfully participate in thepolitical life of their country are essential to the con-solidation of democracy. The Center encouragesIndonesia’s political leaders, government officials, andelection authorities to ensure accountability for prob-lems in this and previous rounds of elections and toconsider further electoral and institutional reforms.We also urge attention to the upcoming series of elections of governors and other local government officials.

This election marks a watershed in Indonesia’sdemocratic consolidation. In just a few years,Indonesia has made a dramatic transition from author-itarian rule to democracy. The Carter Centercongratulates Indonesia for the series of successful elec-tions in 2004 and offers its support to the continuingconsolidation of democracy in Indonesia.

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Province:

City/District (Kota/Kabupaten):

Village/Neighborhood (Desa/Kelurahan):

:

:

Yes No

Yes No

Yes No

Arrival Time

Departure Time

In-Sample Polling Station?

2. Were the ballot boxes shown empty to all present, then locked and properly sealed?

1. Were the ballots counted and the number recorded in the opening report?

13 digit ID number from ballot box:

3. Did the TPS open on time (7:00 am local time)? List time:

General - Complete for each Polling Station (TPS) visited:

17. Were there any interruptions or delays of the voting process?

18. Were you able to adequately observe all aspects of the voting process?

9. Were domestic monitors (e.g, JPPR, JAMPPI, CETRO, Rectors Forum, KIPP) present? If yes, please specify.

10. Was the process free of formal complaints to the TPS officals? If no, please specify

11. Were other international observers (e.g., EU, embassies) present, or, had they visited the polling statioIf yes, please specify

The Voting Process - Complete for each TPS.

5. Was the polling station free of intimidation, vote buying, disruption of the voting/counting process, or restrictions to voter access (roadblocks, mobs, etc)? If no, please specify

7. Did TPS officials appear to be adequately trained and knowledgeable about their role?

19. Did the TPS close on time (1:00 pm local time)?

16. Were voters’ fingers inked before they left the TPS?

6. Were all required materials, the voters’ list, official ink and ballot papers available?

Poor – Incidents or irregularities that significantly affected the integrity of the process.

Average – Many incidents or irregularities that may have had a significant effect on the integrity of the process.

Good – A few incidents or irregularities that had no significant effect on the integrity of the process.

Very Good – No significant incidents or irregularities.

Overall Assessment of the Polling Station

14. Did the Chair sign all ballots before they were given to the voters?

15. Were all voters able to keep their vote secret during the entire voting process?

8. Were political party agents (poll monitors) or candidate witnesses from more than one party present?

Direct Observations

Direct Observations

12. Were voters’ fingers checked for signs of ink as they entered the TPS?

13. Were voter IDs checked against the voters' list and the voter's name crossed off?

4. Was the polling station clear of campaign materials, campaigning, or other attempts to influence voters in or around the TPS? If no, please specify

Direct Observations

Put a “ ” next to the statement that best describes your assessment of the election environment and voting process for the

area you observed. If your response is “poor” or “very poor”, please provide further explanation in the comment section.

Very Poor – Incidents or irregularities occurred that so affected the integrity of the process as to render the results from one or more TPS objectionable.

Indonesian Presidential Election 2004 Polling Station Observation Form FORM A

Direct ObservationsOpening Procedures - Complete for each TPS in which the opening was witnessed:

Instructions: Read the questions carefully. Put an “X” in the appropriate box. If you cannot answer the question, or it is not relevant, write N/A. If you answered “No” to any question, or violations or irregularities occurred, please provide details on the back of the form. When possible, ask domestic observers and/or political party agents for their observations during the period prior to your arrival. Record this information at the bottom of the form.

Observer Names / Team

Number:Polling Station (TPS) ID No.

Location (sub-district/kecematan)

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Yes No

Comments

E. Record the total number of ballots in each ballot box

C. Record the total number of unused ballots

Note: Candidates retained the ballot order and ballot number from the first round.

Mega is #2 and SBY is #4.

Does the reconciliation of number of voters (D.), spoiled (B.) and unused (C.) ballots match the opening report (A.)? (Does

D + B + C = A? Please “ ” Yes or No)

B. Record the total number of spoiled ballots (those that were damaged prior to being deposited in the ballot box).

Provide details of any violations, complaints, unusual occurrences, or irregularities that occurred at the polling station.

If more space is required attach additional sheets of paper to the report form.

23. Did the TPS officials seal the ballot boxes before transporting them to the PPS?

24. Did all party agents present sign the Official Vote Count Result Certificate?

2. Soekarnoputri/Muzadi (Mega)

President/Vice President Vote Tally

Vote Total

4. Yudhoyono/Kalla (SBY)

Complete this section only for the TPS at which counting was witnessed.

25. Were you able to adequately observe all aspects of the counting process?

D. Record the total number of actual voters (from voter lists)

Direct Observations

%

F. Total number of ballots determined invalid (those that were deposited in the ballot box).

___Yes ___No

A. Record the total number of ballots received from the PPS

Vote Counting Process

20. Were valid and invalid votes correctly and consistently assessed?

21. Were votes accurately and transparently counted and recorded?

22. Did the reconciliation of valid, spoiled and unused ballots match the opening report?

Does the total number of ballots used (E.) equal the total number of actual voters (D.)? (Does E=D?) ___Yes ___No

G. Percent of invalid ballots (F / E) x 100.

Ballot Reconciliation Process

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Yes No

Indonesian Presidential Election 2004

Comments

Did you observe the completion of the entire tabulation of the results?

Aggregation of the Results from Polling Stations

Did you observe a portion of the tabulation? If yes, please complete the following questions.

Is the tabulation center in a secure location?

Were political party agents from more than one party present? Please specify.

Tabulation Center Name and level of aggregation:

Was tabulation free of any significant delays? If no, please specify length of delay and the cause

of the delay.

Tabulation Center Observation Form FORM B

Was the official report completed properly and in its entirety?

Did you observe results (and ballot boxes) arriving at the tabulation center?

Were there domestic observers present at the tabulation center? (e.g, JPPR, JAMPPI, CETRO, Rectors Forum, KIPP)

If yes, please indicate which groups were present.

Team Number and Observer Names:

Tabulation Center Numeric ID number:

Instruction for this Section: In the box below, give details of any violations, complaints, unusual occurrences, or irregularities that occurred at the

polling stations you observed. If more space is required, attach additional sheets of paper to the report.

Was a copy of the certificate of the tabulation displayed on the notice board of the tabulation center?

Was a copy of the official report given to the appropriate election officials and one copy to the witnesses present?

Use this form for all observations at tabulation centers larger than polling stations (TPS). This process may be referred to as the vote tabulation

process or the vote recapitulation process. The act of tabulating the votes may be referred to as a "vote counting meeting". This form is suitable for

use at all levels of aggregation greater than the TPS including at the village level (PPS), the kecamatan/sub-district level (PPK), the

regency/municipality level, the provincial level and the national level. If you have questions about the process, please see the Decree of the National

Election Commission Number 38 in your briefing book. Throughout this form, all of these levels will be called tabulation centers.

Did the chairperson of the election committee allow witnesses with the appropriate authorization

to observe the tabulation?

Did the chairperson open the ballot boxes in front of the witnesses present?

Did the chairperson take out the offical reports and the attachments received from the TPS?

During this process, did any witnesses lodge any objection to the process of tabulation? If yes,

please specify.

Did the election officials make any revisions to the tabulated results based on any of the above

mentioned objections?

THE CARTER CENTER


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Overview: The Carter Center was founded in 1982 byformer U.S. President Jimmy Carter and his wife,Rosalynn, in partnership with Emory University, toadvance peace and health worldwide. A nongovern-mental organization, the Center has helped to improvelife for people in more than 65 countries by resolvingconflicts; advancing democracy, human rights, andeconomic opportunity; preventing diseases; improvingmental health care; and teaching farmers to increasecrop production.

Accomplishments: The Center has observed 53 elec-tions in 24 countries, helped farmers double or triplegrain production in 15 African countries, mediated orworked to prevent civil and international conflictsworldwide, intervened to prevent unnecessary diseasesin Latin America and Africa, and strived to diminishthe stigma against mental illnesses.

THE CARTER CENTER AT A GLANCE

Budget: $38 million 2003-2004 operating budget.

Donations: The Center is a 501(c)(3) charitable organi-zation, financed by private donations from individuals,foundations, corporations, and international develop-ment assistance agencies. Contributions by U.S. citizensand companies are tax-deductible as allowed by law.

Facilities: The nondenominational Cecil B. DayChapel and other facilities are available for weddings,corporate retreats and meetings, and other specialevents. For information, 404-420-5112.

Location: In a 35-acre park, about 1.5 miles east of downtown Atlanta. The Jimmy Carter Library and Museum, which adjoins the Center, is owned and operated by the National Archives and RecordsAdministration and is open to the public. 404-865-7101.

Staff: 150 employees, based primarily in Atlanta.

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The Carter Center, in partnership with EmoryUniversity, is guided by a fundamental com-mitment to human rights and the alleviation

of human suffering; it seeks to prevent and resolveconflicts, enhance freedom and democracy, andimprove health.

While the program agenda may change, TheCarter Center is guided by five principles:

■ The Center emphasizes action and results.Based on careful research and analysis, it is preparedto take timely action on important and pressing issues.

■ The Center does not duplicate the effectiveefforts of others.

■ The Center addresses difficult problems andrecognizes the possibility of failure as an acceptablerisk.

■ The Center is nonpartisan and acts as a neutralin dispute resolution activities.

■ The Center believes that people can improvetheir lives when provided with the necessary skills,knowledge, and access to resources.

The Carter Center collaborates with other organi-zations, public or private, in carrying out its mission.

MISSION STATEMENT

THE CARTER CENTER


ONE COPENHILL

453 FREEDOM PARKWAY

ATLANTA, GA 30307

404-420-5100 ◆ FAX 404-420-5145

WWW.CARTERCENTER.ORG

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