The Brazilian Military in Post Democratic Transition.pdf

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Maria Helena de Castro Santos

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In fact, among the authoritarian legacies that most affect the quality ofdemocracy are military prerogatives. Civilian control over the military isconsidered a necessary and crucial condition for the consolidation of democracy.1

The basic reference is still Huntington,2

and with regard to Latin America, theworks of Stepan3. According to this civilian control model, Brazil was consideredthe least promising Latin American case of successful civilianization. In fact, thefirst civilian government, that of President Jos Sarney, did little to challenge theprerogatives of the Brazilian military. Those remained high even after theenactment of the democratic constitution of 1988.4

After 15 years of civilian rule, however, military power has eroded morethan the scholars of the Huntington-Stepan model of civil-military relations

anticipated.5Notwithstanding periods of military unrest, Brazil, in a series of

1 It was Terry Karl (Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America, Comparative Politics,N 27, October 1990) who first suggested the inclusion of the civilian control over themilitary in Dahls procedural minimum definition of democrary.

2 Huntington, Samuel. 1957. The Soldier and the State: T he Theory and Politics of Civil-M ilitaryRelations. Cambridge: Harvard Un. Press. For Huntington, the new democracies face thechallenge to approach the objective civilian control, which characterizes the civil-militaryrelations in industrial democracies. This pattern involves: (1) a high level of military

professionalism ; (2) the effective subordination of the military to the civilian politicalleaders who make the basis decisions on foreign and military policy; (3) the recognitionand acceptance of that civilian ledaderchip of an area of competence and autonomy forthe military; and (4) as a consequence, one should expect the minimization of militaryintervention in politics and of political intervention in the military. Those characteristicsare reproduced in another work of the author, Reforming the Civil-Military Relationsin Diamond Larry and Marc F. Plattner. 1996.Civil-M ilitary Relations and Democracy.Baltimoreand London: The Jonhs Hopkins University Press.

3 See Stepan, Alfred. 1971.The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil.Princeton: the PrincetonUniversity Press,Rethinking Military in Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone. Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress, 1988 andOs Militares: da Abertura Nova Repblica. Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Paz e Terra, 1986.

4 Cf., for instance, Agero, Felipe. 1992. The Military and the Limits to Democratizationin Mainwaring, Scott, Guillermo ODonnell and J. Samuel Valenzuela (Eds.), Issues inDemocratic Consolidation: T he New South Americann Democracies in Comparative Perspective. NotreDame: University of Notre Dame Press.

5 See, for example, the first works of Felipe Agero, op. cit, and Toward Civilian Supremacyin South America in Diamond, Larry, Marc Plattner, Yun-han Chu and Hung-mao Tien,1997.Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: T hemes and Perspectives. Baltimore; The JonhsHopkins Un. Press, 1997. But cf. Hunter, Wendy,Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: PoliticiansAgainst Soldiers. Chapel Hill and London: The Un. of North Caroline Press.

6 Agero, for instance, resorts to legal-institutional factors (characteristics of the

authoritarian constitution with which the military entered the transition) to explain theunexpected erosion of military prerogatives in Brazil. See his, Legacies of Transitions:Institutionalization, the Military, and New Democracies in South America. Paper deliveredat the conference Confronting Non-Democratic Legacies during Democratic Deepening:Latin America and Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective. Buenos Aires, Univer-sidad Torcuato Di Tella, 27-29 August, 1998.


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T he Brazilian M ilitary in Post-Democratic Transition

back and forth movements, has taken important steps toward the civilinizationof the polity. Demilitarization is in progress, although through a long, slow andpeaceful process. It did not came to a halt as expected, and scholars of the

Huntington-Stepan tradition now seek answers to this puzzle.6

I will argue here that to grasp the whole picture and solve the puzzle,it is important to analyze possible changes in the civil-military relations ofnew democracies from the perspective of both thecivilians and the military.

That is to say, in addition to the important question about the civilian con-trol over the military in the Huntington-Stepan vein, researchers must alsoinquiry about the military process of adaptation to the democratic polity aswell as their new role in the post-cold war world.7

Looking through the eyes of the military, they face multiple challenges ofadapting their behavior to the domestic democratizing milieu, of enduring theirloss of power and prestige, of accepting and operating under severe budgetarycuts on account of market oriented reforms adopted by the civilian governments,and, with the end of the cold war, of redefining their institutional role.

Therefore, from the military perspective, important research questionsmust be added. Do the military abide by democratic procedures? To what

extent? Do they accept a police role, combating drug trafficking, guardingthe coast, and eventually controlling urban riots? Do they accept theabolishment of conscription, downsizing of the Armed Forces and joiningof UN-sponsored peacekeeping missions when so requested?

What I suggest here is, then, that with a broader picture of the civil-military relations in the post-authoritarian period in mind the analyst will bebetter equipped to assess the patterns of civil-military relations in the countries

of interest and their relation to the prospects for democratic consolidation. Isthere still a coup dtat threat in Latin America? These important questionswill be addressed in this article, having Brazil as the empirical reference.

The analysis provided here covers the period 1985-2004, correspondingto the five post-transition civilian governments in Brazil: the Jos Sarney (1985-1989), the Fernando Collor de Melo (1990 - Sept. 1991), the Itamar Franco(Sept. 1992- 1993), the Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-1998 and 1999-2002) and the Luiz Incio Lula da Silva (2003-2004) administrations.

7 This issue was dealt in more detail in mine A Nova Misso das Foras Armadas Latino-Americanas no Mundo Ps-Guerra Fria: o Caso do Brasil inRevista Brasileira de CinciasSociais,Vol.19, N 54, February 2004.


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The work is divided into two parts. The first one, following theHuntington-Stepan civilian control model, deals with the demilitarizationprocess in the five civilian governments. The second part analyzes the

perspective of the military, focusing on their effort to adapt to the domesticdemocratizing environment.

THEDEMILITARIZATIONPROCESS

The implicit assumption of the civilian-control model is that the militarywill try to maintain their authoritarian prerogatives for as long as possible.

They are expected, therefore, to resist civilian efforts to exert control overtheir actions and curtail their influence in the governmental agenda. Whiththese premises in mind, a brief account of the Sarney, Collor, Franco, bothCardoso and Lula administrations follows below.

High military prerogatives: the Sarney administration

The administration of Sarney, the first civilian President after the demise

of the military regime, has been thoroughly revised by the literature.8Sarneycame to power in a rather weak position, indirectly elected Vice-Presidentof the country by an Electoral College (Colgio Electoral).9Tancredo Neves,the indirectly elected President, died before his inauguration. The transitionagenda was controlled by the military and negotiated by Tancredo Neves,with no participation whatsoever of the future Vice-President.

Sarney had previously been an important leader of the party (PDS),

created by the military to support the authoritarian regime. During hisadministration, he did not do much to strength his position vis--vis themilitary elite. In fact, his cabinet, continued to have six active-duty generals,as in the athoritarian period: the chief of the Military Cabinet (also theSecretary-General of the National Security Council), the Minister of theArmy, the Minister of the Navy, the Minister of the Air Force, the chief of

8 Cf. Stepan, Alfred, op. cit, 1986 and 1988; Hunter, Wendy, 1997; Agero, Felipe, op.

cit,1992.; Oliveira, Eliezer Rizzo de, De Geisel a Collor: Foras Armadas, Transio e Democra-cia. So Paulo, Paipirus Ed., 1994; Miguel, Luiz Felipe, A Sombra dos Generais, masterthesis, Dep. of Political Science, Un. de Brasilia.

9 The Electoral College was constituted of all members of Congress plus six representativesfrom each State Legislative. Note also that one third of the senators was appointed by themilitary President.


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the Armed Forces General Staff (EMFA), and the chief of the NationalIntelligence Service (SNI) . The SNI, the institutional symbol of repressionand torture, was left untouched. Many high-ranking positions were filled by

the military, including ministries and heads of state enterprises. As the transitionpact included the amnesty law of 1979, human rights offenders were notheld accountable for their crimes, and many of them continued to holdpositions in the state apparatus. The Minister of the Army, General LenidasPires Gonalves and the other five military ministers dutifully advocatedtheir positions on major issues of the government agenda. Congress hadlittle influence in military affairs and so had the Judiciary, which includeda especial branch for dealing with military crimes10(Justicia M ili tar).

The National Constituent Assembly (ACN), called by Sarney to craft anew democratic constitution, did not do much to revise the defense structureor to enhance civilian control over the military. Most decisions concerningmilitary affairs came favorable to the interests of the corporation, althoughin some important issues the military were not completely happy.11

The major issue at stake was the constitutional definition of the role ofthe Armed Forces. Their internal task of defending law and order was

maintained, but with an important qualification. The military could now takeaction only upon the initiative of any of the constitutional powers.12Anotherimportant point was that in previous constitutions the military was placedunder the supreme authority of the President, but only within the limits oflaw and order. This meant that the military was entitled to judge the legalityof the presidential acts and they pressed to maintain this privilege. Article 142of the 1988 democratic constitution, as indicated, eliminated this clause. Thus,a middle-of-road solution was achieved: the tutelage role was maintained

with, however, important restrictions imposed upon the Armed Forces by thepoliticians members of the National Constituent Assembly.

10 See footnote 12.11 For an account of the outcomes of the ANC concerning the military interests, see Costa,

Artur. T.M., 1998. O Lobby Militar: Um Estudo das Relaes Civis-Militares, 1985-1990 (Master thesis, Dep. of Political Science, Un. Brasilia), Miguel, Luis Felipe, op.cit,1992), Oliveira, Eliezer,, op.cit., 1994 and Hunter, Wendy, op.cit. 1997.

12 In 1991, 3 years after the enactment of the constitution, a bill was approved to regulate

the organization, training and the use of the Armed Forces in internal affairs (PLA 181-A/ 1989). The law determined that was the President prerogative to decide upon the useof the Armed Forces even if the initiative was taken by one of the others constitutionalpowers. This correction, proposed by the leftist representative Jos Genoino (PT-SP) - aformer member of the guerilla movement in the 70s -, was welcomed by the military toavoid incidents like the one in Volta Redonda, a Steel Company in Rio de Janeiro. Called


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The Constituent Assembly abolished the National Security Council(CSN), but President Sarney created the Advisory Secretariat for NationalDefense (SADEN), with attributions nearly identical to that of the CSN. The

creation of the Council of the Republic (an exclusively civilian advisorybody) and the National Defense Council (composed of six high-level civilianbureaucrats and the armed forces ministers), however, opened up space forcivilian participation in matters of security and defense. The SNI survived,but allowance was made for habeas data, which permits citizens to have accessto their personal files held by the secret service during the military regime.

The NGO Torture, Never More complained, however, that access to thisdata was still restricted. All in all, the intelligence system was kept almost

unaltered.Other requirements of the civilian-control model were not fulfilled: a

Ministry of Defense was not created, conscription was not abolished, andthe Military Justice, a court whose members are military judges, continuedto hear and try either the military or the civilians by military crimes.13

Altogether, however, although the military prerogatives remained high,analysts of the participation of the military in the ACN assess their

accomplishments as a mixed success.14

By the civilian-control model Sarneys administration rates rather poorly.However, the Armed Forces were not fully pleased with the outcomes of theissues of their interest in the final text of the 1988 Constitution. This indicatesthat the military had to bargain and negotiate over the issues that affectedthem, facing the need to get organized. As Oliveira15points out, they did itvery efficiently, establishing two combined fronts: while the military ministerswere in charge of making strong public statements in defense of their tutelary

role, they managed to organize what was known as the military lobby todefend their institutional interests in the National Constituent Assembly.

by a local Judge to put an end to the occupation of the plant by workers on strike, theArmy performed their constitutional role at the expense of three dead workers.

13 Those military crimes included, during the authoritarian regime, the crimes against nationalsecurity, a broad label that encompassed major dimensions of social, political and economiclife. Thousands of civilians that opposed the military regime were tried and prosecuted bythe Military Justice under the accusation of crimes against the national security.

14 CL. Oliveira. op. cit., Hunter. op. cit.15 Cf. Oliveira, op. cit.


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The military participation in the National Constituent Assembly was thebeginning of the Armed Forces institutional activities in the arena of the Legislative.

There, they efficiently pursued their interests following the same civilian procedures,

a theme analyzed in more detail below.

Drastic civilianization: the Collor administration

President Collor, the first president directly elected in the recent democraticperiod, took a very different stand on the military issue. Based on popularmandate, and without the support of any major political party,16Collor adopteda bonapartist style in politics. The sweeping economic measures taken at the

very first hour of his administration did not leave any doubts about his intentionsof establishing his autonomy and strong authority over society.

The military was no exception. In fact, he combined frequent statementsstressing his role of supreme chief of the Armed Forces with radical measuresto reduce the military influence in politics.

On the day of his inauguration, among the impact measures announced,was the extinction by decree of SNI and SADEN(Medida Provisria no. 150),

which was immediately ratified by Congress. To replace these agencies Collorcreated the Secretariat of Strategic Affairs (SAE), in charge of carrying outintelligence as well as strategic planning and analysis. SAE, incontrast to SNI,was not granted a ministerial status. Moreover, a civilian was appointed as thehead of the new organ. Many military officers, retired or on active duty,previously employed in the SNI and SADEN lost their jobs or were forced backto the barracks. Notwithstanding, some military enclaves persisted within thenew agency. The attack on the so-called security community also included

the dismantling of Divisions of Information and Security (DSIs), which existedin all civilian ministries for information-gathering functions. However, Collorsattempt to give the SAE monopoly over intelligence functions, thus terminatingthe information services within the military ministries, as well as his intention toenhance congressional control over defense subjects did not materialize.17

In addition to SAE, the Armed Forces General Staff (EMFA) and the MilitaryCabinet were striped of ministerial status, thus reducing to three the number ofmilitary positions in his cabinet.

16 Collor was affiliated to a small party, the PRN, created by himself to run for presidentialelections.

17 Cf. Hunter, op. cit., pp.64-65, on this respect.


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The selection of the military ministers was an important part ofCollors plan to demilitarize the government. T he ministers are theSupreme Chiefs of their Forces, and it is up to them to control military

unrest. Collor picked officers that had not been connected in the pastwith intelligence nor with repression and that unrestrictedly abided byconstitutional rules. Despite the growing and pervasive dissatisfactionwith the government policies and actions within the Armed Forces, themilitary ministers under Collor were able to prevent the fracturing of theArmed Forces and avoid coup attempts.

The main sources of military unrest were the governments attack onthe security apparatus and the severe budgetary cuts that hurt wage levels

and the operational capacity of the Armed Forces.

The security community immediately reacted strongly to the dismantlingof the SNI. The chief of the important Military Command of the SoutheastRegion and two retired generals led the reaction. The retired officers criticizedthe new government, invoking the historical participation of the ArmedForces in governmental decisions to justify the legitimacy of their statements.

They reminded society at this point that was better to speak out than resort

to guns. Collor, calling upon his position of Supreme Chief of the ArmedForces, managed to have the Minister of the Army punish the two retiredofficers, although the Minister resisted doing the same with the commanderof the southeast region.18Shortly after this episode, Collor, adopting a carrotand stick approach, paid visits to important units of the Army, Navy and AirForce, wearing military attire.19

The drastic cuts in the military budget, which hindered the military powerand social prestige, was a consequence of market-oriented reforms. In this

sense, the military and the civilian personnel, as well as the military and thecivilian ministries were treated equally. The equality of treatment dispensedto the military and civilians constitutes the novelty of the situation. The severeoverall budgetary restrictions on items rather than personnel were certainly, apolicy choice of the government, which decided not to privilege the military.

The application of the same wage policy to both civilians and the militarywas a constitutional requirement (art. no. 31), which, however, was been

18 Cf. General defende militares que atuam no setor de informaes, Folha de So Paulo, 5/05/ 90, Protesto de general irrita presidente, Jornal do Brasil, 8/05/ 90, Collor mandaprender Newton Cruz e advertir Eucliydes, Jornal do Brasil, 12/ 05/ 90, -General diz paraCollor dar tiro na cabea-, Estado de So Paulo, 12/ 05/ 90.

19 Cf. Militares apoiam, com crticas isoladas, Correio Braziliense,17/ 06/ 90.


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bypassed in the Sarney administration. As part of Collors economic policywages decreased in real terms,20equally impacting the military and civilians.

The negative impact of the stabilization policies on the operational

capacity of the Armed Forces was an issue carried out by high rankingofficers, especially those occupying the highest positions in the militaryhierarchy or in the high echelons of the government. Important projects ofthe three Forces had to be abandoned.21The high-ranking officers of thethree Forces complained at this time that their equipment consisted of second-hand items dating from the Second World War. They argued that the Braziliandefense budget was already among the lowest in the world, less than 1% ofGDP,22and that additional cuts would not let them perform their constitutional

role of defending the territory, the frontiers, and the constitutional powers.

In fact, during the Collor and Itamar Franco years, the discontinuity ofmajor projects was the least of the militarys concerns. The Army had nobullets to train conscripts. The Air Force was in shortage of fuel, and as aconsequence, senior officers could not fly airplanes to train younger officers.

The only carrier, dating from the World War II, had no planes to carry. Seniorofficers frequently reported situations like these to the press. Most of the timethey resorted to non-political, technical, and legal arguments.

Military ministers and retired officers together took on the issue of wageincreases. The Military Disciplinary Code establishes that retired officers, differentlyfrom active-duty officers, may express their opinion about political matters as wellas their philosophical and ideological thoughts. They cannot, however, criticizeacts from a hierarchical superior officer, especially the President, who is the SupremeChief of the Armed Forces. It was then up to the retired officers, with the occasional

20 There were nominal wage increases along the Collor administration, with inflation ratesreaching,7% per month at the best and between 20% and 30% per month in its worst phases.

21 Among them are the Armys Project FT-2000 (Fora Terrestre2000), for the full modernizationof the Force equipment, the Navys construction of a nuclear submarine and the Air Forcespace program.

22 There is a great number of statistical sources for military expenditure. They varied greatly interms of their definition of military expenditure and they use different formulas for inflationadjustment. Stepan, atRethinking Military in Politics, examined 5 different sources of data, concludingthat contrary to what has occurred in other military regimes, the Brazilian military expendituresdecreased in absolute terms during the 70s. Comparing the Brazilian military expenditures asa percentage of GDP with those of other countries (SIPRI data, 1976-1984), he concludes thatBrazil is the democracy with the lowest level of military expenditures as a percentage of GDPin the world, and the nation with the second-lowest level of all major nations in the world.TheMilitary Balance(the International Institute for Strategic Studies), cited in Oliveira, op. cit., indicatesthat the Brazilian defense expenditures was 0.41% of the GDP in 1989. This was the mostcommon rate cited by the military during the Franco administration. The ACDA data, however,indicates for this same year, 1.5% of GDP.


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help of the wives of the active-duty officers, to take the banner of wage increase.Voicing the demands of the military as a whole, they pressured the governmentfirmly. A traditional channel of their expression was theClube Militar,a retired

army officers association that has participated intensively in the debate overimportant national issues before the 1964 military coup. The retired officers alsoorganized in innumerous informal associations spread all over country. Theseassociations, which approached ten in number during the Itamar Francoadministration, differed substantially in the way their demands were carried out.Some of them acted in a clandestine way and even advocated a coup detat. Mostor them, however, abided by the Military Disciplinary Code.

The major task of the military ministers was to control unrest within

the Forces. They did so by voicing themselves the demand for better wagesas well as applying punishments to those officers who, breaking the MilitaryDiscipline Code, expressed political opinions or criticized the government.

The military ministers pressed for years for wages equal to those of theLegislative and the Judiciary, much higher than the wages paid by theExecutive to its personnel. This is a constitutional provision that, nevertheless,has never been fulfilled.

The impeachmentof President Collor was a crucial test for the process ofdemilitarization. The military passed the test with honor? Not only did theynot interfere in the congressional process, but they also repeatedly assuredtheir obedience to the Constitution. Vice-President Itamar Franco took officewith no difficulties whatsoever.

In summary, during the Collor administration, despite the hard economicsituation and the militarys loss of social prestige and power, the ArmedForces ministers managed to control unrest among the military. They

proclaimed strict compliance with the Constitution and acted accordingly, afact in itself extraordinarily relevant for the new democracy.

Caretaking Government: the Franco administration

During his administration Franco did not deepen the demilitarizationprocess, backsliding on some of the measures taken by Collor to reduce militaryprerogatives. In fact, the number of retired officers occupying high-level positions

in the bureaucracy substantially increased,23which was justified by the Presidentas an effective way to prevent corruption. The fight against corruption was also

23 CF Itamar e os militares, Jornal do Brasil, 14/ 01/ 94.


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the excuse used by the President to recreate the DSIs, the branches of theintelligence service within the civilian ministries. Contrary to Collor, he chose amember of the military to head the SAE, the ex-Minister of the Navy in the

Collor administration, Admiral Mario Flores, who displayed a modern andmore democratic conception of intelligence. Franco also created, as a branch ofSAE, the Sub Secretariats of Intelligence (DSTs). These facts indicate that Fran-co did not want to remove intelligence activities nor military personnel from theSAE, as Collor intended. Even more importantly, Franco gave back by decreethe status of minister to the head of EMFA, the Military Cabinet, and the SAE,which resulted in government again having six active-duty generals in the cabinet.

Despite those pro-military measures, military unrest greatly intensified

during the Franco administration. The increasing number of public statementsby high-ranking officers and the informal groups of retired military officersagreed in two basic demands: wage increases and the modernization of themilitary equipment. The economic crisis reached its peak. General, a formerPresident during the military dictatorship and still a leader among the military,reported that low-ranking officers were living in slums. The Armed Forces wasfacing increasing difficulty in recruiting youngsters from the middle class.24

The series of corruption scandals that took place in Congress combined with

critical economic circumstances created a growing feeling among the militarythat the civilians were not able to run the country. Some of the independentmilitary groups advocated the fujimorization of Brazil, a reference to therecent authoritarian movement of President Fujimori. Those groups startedto meet frequently and they attended as well a national meeting in the ClubeMilitar, in Rio de Janeiro. Reportedly, some groups of entrepreneurs, as theyhave done so many times before in the Brazilian history, started contacting themilitary, calling for their interference in the countrys political life. The military

signaled, although quietly, that they were watching the civilian mess. A high-ranking officer warned against the fury of the legions (fria das legies).25

The climate was typical of the pre-coup periods.

24 Less than 1% of the young people that joined the Forces came from households with averageincome higher than 30 minimum wages per month (aproximately 1,200 dollars per year).

25 Manifesto conquista apoio de oficiais, O Estado de So Paulo,5/ 113/ 93; Tenso nasForas Armadas,O Estado de So Paulo,5/15/ 93;Militares pedem Itamar medidas

contra crise,Jornal de Brasilia,5/18/93; Relatrios mantm Itamar avisado sobre rebeldianas Foras Armadas, Jornal de Brasilia,5/25/ 93; Cerqueira: crticas de militares sopatriticas,O Globo,6/11/ 93; Rudo de Sabres, Folha de So Paulo, 21/ 11/ 93; Os mili-tares inquietos, Jornal do Brasil,12/ 8/93;Poder militar (da reserva) paralelo,O Estado deSo Paulo,12/ 14/ 93;Guararapes, o golpe que no houve, Jornal do Brasil, 3/ 27/ 94;Militares reagem reduo de aposentadoria,Correio Braziliense, 2/ 13/ 94.


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However, the military ministers, led by the Minister of the Army, werecapable of controlling the pervasive unrest. The retired officers and theirassociations were not able to put up a concerted military action and the active-

duty officers that publicly complained against the government were punished.Again, the commitment of the military ministers to the constitutional ruleswas essential to guarantee this favorable outcome of the events.

Rescuing the military: the Cardoso administrations

Fernando Henrique Cardoso served two terms in office. Both terms,he took office enjoying a stronger political position than his predecessors. In

fact, supported by an alliance of center-rightist parties, he won elections inthe first round with 54% and 53% of the votes for the first and secondterms, respectively. Both his victories were, for the most part, due to hiscapacity to lead a successful stabilization program, the Plano Real, duringthe time he served as the Minister of Finance of the Franco administration,and to his ability to sustain it along his two administrations. This was truedespite several international financial crises that severely hit the countryduring his first term26and a major currency devaluation at the very beginning

of his second term, in January of 1999. As a consequence of these facts,wage erosion decreased significantl, although the sense of economic crisispersisted during the Cardoso years.

As for the military, since the beginning of his first administration, PresidentCardoso showed a clear intention of improving civil-military relations. He didnot follow the carrot-stick approach of Collor, whose administration ranked wellfrom the perspective of the civilian-control model. Instead, Cardoso viewed themilitary as a strategic actor whose interests and needs should be taken into serious

consideration. To show his appreciation for the military, in the beginning of hisfirst term in office, the President paid visits to important units of the Armed Forces.

This approach to the military, however, did not prevent the Presidentfrom engaging in a demilitarization process. A brief account of this processfollows below.

The military was able to revise budgetary cuts proposed by the economicstaff for the fiscal year of 1995 (first year of the Cardoso administration)

26 The crises faced by Cardoso were the so-called Mexican, Asian and Russian crises,respectively in the beginning of his first term, in January of 1995, in September andOctober of 1997, and in October of 1998.


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and were pleased with their share in the budgetary proposal for the fouryears to come (Plano Plurianual).However, the expected steady improvementin the military budget did not materialize, as severe cuts in the government

expenditure followed the sequence of the international financial crises. Thecritical budgetary situation of the Forces, therefore, remained unchanged asit had in previous civilian governments. Today, their share of the federalbudget barely covers the costs of personnel and operational activities.Resources for investment, especially in technology and modern equipment,come almost exclusively from external credit operations.27Those externalresources made possible the reactivation or acceleration of some militarypet projects as well as the purchase of much needed equipment.

Budget is then considered the crucial issue. Notwithstanding the scarcityof resources, the military received a reasonable wage increase during thefirst Cardoso term. What is more important, Congress approved anamendment to the Constitution that separates their status as public servantsfrom those of civil servants, thus allowing the government to treat themseparately from the civilians as far as wage increases and welfare areconcerned. This indicates that military pressure and their argument aboutthe special characteristics of their profession have been successful both in

the Executive and in the Legislative.28

On the other hand, Cardoso was able to put forward some civilianizationprojects that were resisted or rejected altogether by the military. Thus, in thename of increasing integration between the military and society, by the endof his first term, the President was rather active in reinforcing mutual amnesty(perdo mtuo),as part of the transition pact.

The Missing People Commission(Comisso dos Desaparecidos)was created

within the Ministry of Justice jurisdiction. Despite expressed militaryuneasiness with this issue, the State recognized its responsibility for the missingor killed people during the years of repression. Finally, nineteen years after

27 In the Army, for example, the total investment resources coming from external loansmounted to aproximately 1 billion dollars from 1993 to 2000, or an average value of 286million dollars per year. To give an idea of the importance of these external loans, it issufficient to say that operational costs and investment covered by the federal budget was

around 333 million dollars per year in 1999 and in 2000. Investmment alone comingfrom federal budget in 1999 reached less than 34 million dollars. The Army could purchasewith those external resources modern combat cars, artillery equipment in general andhelicopters (interview with officer of the Congress Liaison for the Army).

28 Interesting enough, the leader of the most radical communist party (PC do B) emphaticallyrecognizes the especial characteristics of the military profession (seeO Globo, 5/11/ 99).


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the amnesty law was enacted in 1979 the families of the desaparecidosstartedreceiving financial compensations.29

More importantly, Cardoso reorganized and civilianized the defense structure,

a process that started at the very beginning of his first term and culminated withthe creation of the Ministry of Defense (Law N 97,6/10/99 and ConstitutionalAmendment N 626/99) and the creation of the Brazilian System of Intelligence,and its central organ, the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN) (law N 9.883,12/ 07/ 99).

Steps made the building of the institutional framework for defense activities

First, in his first administration, Cardoso transferred the remaining intelligenceactivities, SNI-like, from the SAE to the Military Cabinet. SAEs Center forPersonnel Training (CEFAR) started training strategic analysts with a differentintelligence perspective. Cardoso appointed a senior diplomat to head SAE. TheSecretariat was significantly civilianized, not only as far as personnel is concernedbut also regarding its administrative procedures, profoundly militarized in thepast. In Cardosos first administration, it served as an advisory organ with regard tostrategic issues and took part in the formulation process of the defense policy.30

When Cardosos second term was inaugurated a further step was taken.SAE was abolished, and all its intelligence functions were absorbed by the MilitaryCabinet, renamed at this point, Institutional Defense Cabinet (GSI) and, in1999, they were transferred to the new intelligence organ, the ABIN. A step ofmajor importance was the change in the way the recruitment of the personnelwas made. In fact, public contestations have been taking place since 1995 toselect the new strategic analysts. They have been trained in ABIN s School of

Intelligence, which substituted for SAEs Center for Personnel Training (CEFAR).To be sure, the training of the two first classes of analysts displayed a traditional,military way of performing the job,31which clashed with the emergent, morecivilian perspective. By the time of the training of the third class, however, thecivilian procedures have already made its way. This changing of ways and

29 For a detailed account of the military position on this issue see the interview toVeja, May

27, 1998, of the chief of EMFA, general Benedito Onofre Bezerra Leonel, Machucou,sim (Yes, it hurts).30 Interview with Minister Edmundo Fujita, diplomat, Under Secretary for Analysis and

Evaluation, SAE, Brasilia, 8/ 07/ 98.31 This included a military at the head of the School, a rigid discipline and a military way

of communication.


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procedures was also taking place in ABIN as a whole. Thus, it opened up moreto TCU, the Legislative organ in charge of controlling the Executive and tovarious ministries. However, the big change was to occur in the President Lula

administration when a civilian was chosen to head ABINAs an advisory agency which directly reports to the President, the ABIN

is to gather and analyze information strategically needed in the governmentaldecision-making process in defense of the democratic State, the rule of law,the society in general and the national sovereignty. As articulated by theChief of the Institutional Defense Cabinet (former Military Cabinet), Ge-neral Alberto Cardoso, intelligence activities are to be performed rigorouslywithin the limits of law and strictly respecting individual rights. Emphasis is

put on strategic analysis of sensitive issues, like agrarian reform and socialmovements in general, or the occupation of the Amazon region.

The Intelligence Agency is in charge of the implementation of theNational Plan of Intelligence, defined by the President and supervised bythe External Affairs and National Defense Committees of the twoCongressional Houses.

The government, as a landmark of democracy, commemorated the

approval of the bill that created ABIN. General Cardoso said to the President:We followed your orientation. You wanted a State and not a governmentintelligence organ; you wanted a non-partisan, non-ideological organcommitted to democracy; you wanted information to be an activityaccountable to the Legislative.32In fact, the article N 6 of the law 9983/99 that created ABIN determined that the Agency should be accountable tothe Legislative by means of a Mixed Commission. The Commission ofIntelligence Activities ControlCCAI, composed of the majority and

minority leaders in the House and the Presidents of the External Affairs andNational Defense Committees of both the Chambers of Deputy and theSenate, was created three years later, in April 2002. Up to now, CCAI hashad three Presidents, invited three times the Minister-Chief of theInterinstitutional Cabinet and held four meetings to give information andmake clear some of ABIN s irregular activities. In general, however, theCommittees performance is not well evaluated.

The opposition leaders, moreover, fearing that the new agency couldturn into a parallel power, as it did in the past with the authoritarian

32 Cf. Jornal do Brasil, Marcos da Democracia, Rosngela Bittar, 12/08/ 99.


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Intelligence Service Organ (SNI) wanted more effective participation ofthe Legislative in all the activities of the Agency. They complained, aswell, that the project of the intelligence agency, initiated by Executive

Decree (MP 813,1/ 011/ 95), was processed too quickly being submittedas a bill to Congress (PL 3651,9/ 22/ 97) and approved as the law N9.883 (12/ 7/ 99). In fact, they said, little more than four years is a shortperiod of time to discuss such an important issue. They feared also thatthe SNI methods could prevail in the new organ.33

In May 5, 2000, as a further step to constitute the institutionalframework of the defense activities, the Subsystem of Intelligence andPublic Defense, as part of the Brazilian System of Intelligence was created

(decree N 3.448). Its objective is to integrate and coordinate all theintelligence and public defense activities of the country, including theintelligence organs of the Armed Forces and of the Federal Police, throughthe Special Council for the Subsystem of Intelligence and Public Defense,directly linked to the Institutional Security Cabinet. It remains to be seenhow well this intelligence system is going to work. Will it in fact be able tocoordinate and control the Forces intelligence services ? Will its degree ofcivilianization really improve?

As for the National Defense Policy its process of formulation developedin 1996, the second year of President Cardosos first term. In September ofthis year, a journalist wrote that (...) they [the military] are shocked with theattempt of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso to create a national defensepolicy for the three Forces, to be formulated according to the interests ofsociety and the constitutional definition that war is justified only to respondto external aggressions.34Shortly there after, however, the Brazilian National

Defense Policy (PDN), a major accomplishment in terms of the civil-militaryrelations, was presented to the nation. For the first time in the history of thecountry the defense policy was formulated at the Presidential level, moreprecisely, at the newly created Camera of External Relations and NationalDefense (CREDEN),35with the participation of military and civilian ministers

33 Cf.Correio Braziliense, Servio Secreto s Claras, 11/ 20/ 99;Correio Braziliense, Comissoaprova Projeto de Criao da ABIN, 11/ 21/ 99; Jornal do Brasil, Marcos da Democra-cia, Rosngela Bittar, 12/08/ 99; Jornal do Brasil, ABIN Ser Alvo de controle Externo,

12/ 08/ 99.34 Militares em confronto, Vanda Celia, Correio Braziliense, 9/ 09/ 96.35 CREDEN was created by President Cardoso to be an arena of discussion of issues related

to theStateinterests, not theGovernmentinterests, which seen as political. It was a product ofintense discussions between the President and General Cardoso, then Chief of the MilitaryCabinet. It had as its triggering event the killing at Carajs of rural workers, members of


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as well as invited persons, both civilians and members of the military, linkedto the issue at stake.36 Prior to that, the military ministries separately definedtheir own policy.

The process of formulation of the defense policy drawn by the Cardosoadministration started with the issue of the navy airplanes, which requires forits solution an overall National Defense Policy (PDN). This policy has twomain goals: to abolish the national security approach on the grounds thatthe internal enemy does not exist anymore and to improve civil-militaryrelations.37The National Defense Policy is, therefore, aimed at threats comingfrom abroad and based in the principle of peaceful resolution of disputes.

The defensive nature of the National Defense Policy rests both on thehigh value given to diplomatic actions as the first tool to resolve disputesand also on the existence of a sound military structure that is capable ofbeing effectively deterrent.38Diplomats and the military should then gohand in hand in the implementation of the policy. Societys involvement onthe matter was also expected. However, no progress in this direction couldbe detected. Congress, moreover, despite the fact that it has two permanentcommissions related to military affairs the Commissions for External

Relations and National Defense at the House of Representatives (CREDN)and at the Senate (CRE)-, has not participated in the formulation of TheNational Defense Policy (PDN), nor has it a role assigned to the monitoringof the defense policy implementation. The National Defense Policy is nowsolely the business of the Executive.

The critics of the PDN say that the policy is nothing but a set of generalprinciples and that the use of Armed Forces and their preparedness should be

the Landless Workers Movement (MTS), by the military police of the state of Par. GeneralCardoso referred to CREDEN as a State island embeded in a Governmental environment.Cf. interview with Gal Cardoso, Rio de Janeiro, 26 de maio de 2003.

36 The members of the Camera are: the President, the Ministers of Justice and ForeignAffairs, the Chief of the Military Cabinet (renamed Cabinet for Interinstitutional Securityin the second Cardosos s administration), the Chief of the Civilian Cabinet and theChief of the Secretariat for Strategic Affairs (abolished in the second Cardoso sgovernment), the Ministers of the Army, Navy and Air Force. In the second Cardoso sterm the newly created Ministry of Defense substituted for the three military ministries,

renamed Commands. The three commanders, however,, continued to participate inCREDEN meetings on the quality of advisers of the Minister of Defense.37 Interview with Minister Edmundo Fujita, diplomat, Under Secretary for Analysis and

Evaluation, SAE, Brasilia, 8/07/ 98. See also Rizzo, op. cit, for a thorough account of thedefense policy and their changing principles under the Cardoso administration.

38 Brazilian Defense Policy, Presidncia da Repblica, Brasilia, 1998, p. 10.


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discussed as well.39General Cardoso, however, who participated in the debatesthat took place in the CREDEN, thinks that the defense policy as it was formulatedwas the outcome of a bargaining process or, in other words, the possible agreement

that could be reached considering the different interests at stake. The PDN, hesays, was to be refined in the due course.40

In fact, the National Defense Policy was discussed in more detail in theMinistry of Defense during the administration of the second Minister, GeraldoQuinto. The Minister formed a so-called Group of Notables, composedof around 30 experts on the matter of defense and security. The suggestionsof these notables were consolidated in a document which, however, nevercame out.

As defined by the constitution, the Armed Forces have the duty of defendingthe nation, its territorial integrity and sovereignty. To accomplish this task it isessential to persevere in continuously improving the integration of the ArmedForces, in both their preparedness and employment, as well as in the rationalizationof the related activities.41This strategic guidance of the National DefensePolicy clearly calls for the creation of the Ministry of Defense.

The creation of the Ministry of Defense was a clear Cardosos objective.

In the same week of his inauguration, in the first week of January 1995, thePresident asked his military ministers to present a joint proposal for a newMinistry of Defense under the coordination of the chief of EMFA, GeneralBenedito Leonel. The mission that Gal Leonel received from the Presidentincluded the ending of the military resistance to the Ministry. Although thegovernment has agreed to discussion within each Force and among them,Generals Leonels task was not easy.

The creation of the Ministry of Defense took place in two phases.In the first one, the processes of creation of Ministries of Defense ofother countries were identified and the models compared. They weredivided in two models, which differ with regard to the degree ofsubordination of the Armed Forces to the Ministry. One showed a directlink between the Ministry and the Forces while in the other the Forceswere subordinated to the General Staff of Defense. Brazil adopted thefirst model. This phase ended in September of 1997, when General

39 See, for instance Proena Jr., Domcio and Eugenio Diniz, 1998.Poltica de Defesa no Brasil:uma Anlise Crtica. Brasilia, Ed. Universidade de Brasilia.

40 Interview with General Cardoso, Ro de Janeiro, May 26, 2003.41 Brazilian Defense Policy, p. 10.


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Leonel presented to President Cardoso the conclusions of those initialstudies and a draft of the Ministry of Defense proposal.42

The second phase of the MDs process of formulation started in October

1997, when the President included in the Group of the four military ministriesthe Secretariat of Strategic Affairs (SAE), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, theCivil House and the Military House. Ten working groups were created. TheseGroups performed a functional analysis (e.g. strategy, logistic, mobilization).

The functions of defense were gathered in categories and for each set ofcategories an organizational structure was devised in such a way as to compoundthe structure as a whole of the Ministry of Defense. This phase was completedin October 1998, when the definite Executive proposal for the Ministry of

Defense was completed, exactly one year after its start. It was coordinated atthis time by the Extraordinary Minister of Defense, Senator lcio Alvarez.President Cardoso ended his first term with a proposal in hand. In May 1999,beginning his second term in office, the Ministry of Defense was created. Thegovernment basically faced two different proposals. The EMFA wanted toprevent political appointments to the positions for the Ministry and, therefore,saved many of the highest positions to the military. It also gave a prominentrole to the Superior War College (Escola Superior de Guerra), which was to

be in charge of training civil personnel in the military affairs. The other proposalcame from the leftist opposition to the government, which wanted to limit therole of the Armed forces in internal defense and to increase the powers of theMinistry of Defense vis--vis the Forces. None of these proposals wereincorporated in the Executive project.43

While the whole process of formulation of the Ministry of Defense atthe Executive level has taken more than 4 years to be completed, it took

only 5 months to be processed in the Legislative. The opposition criticized,as it did in the case of ABIN, this fast track in Congress, given the crucialimportance of the issue. In Congress, the Executive project was confrontedwith the Constitutional Amendment Proposal N 498/97, submitted by theHouse Representative Jos Genoino, a member of the opposition workersparty, who wanted to limit the power of the Armed Forces. His proposal,however, had a short life given that as it was approved the preference for theExecutive Constitutional Amendment Proposal (N 626/98).

42 Interview with Gal Synesio, Brasilia,2003.43 F. Interviews with General Cardoso, Rio de Janeiro, May 26, 2003 and with General

Synesio, Brasilia, 2003.


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As mentioned before, a significant part of the military resented thedowngrading of the Commanders of the Forces as well as having a civilianas their hierarchal superior. But what they resented most was the fact that the

first Minister of Defense appointed, Senator lcio Alvarez, not only was acivilian, but also a politician who could not be reelected. The post of theMinister of Defense was a compensation won by a looser in the electoralcompetition, being part of the political game that ruled the building andmaintenance of the support coalition of the government.

Military resentment surfaced in an episode where the Commander ofthe Air Force voiced strong criticism of a female senior adviser of Alvarez,who used to coordinate meetings with the General Commanders in the new

Ministry of Defense. This fact upset the military because according to themilitary hierarchy, generals should sit only with their equals, i.e., the Ministerhimself. The Air Force, moreover, was to be the Force that would loosemore power and prestige with the creation of the Ministry of Defense becauseof the announced privatization of the civil airports and the creation of aregulatory agency to control commercial airlines. All the airports of thecountry and the operation of commercial airlines were historically controlledand regulated by the Air Force, through its branches INFRAERO and DAC,

respectively. The Air Force Commander strongly opposed as well the sell-off of 20% of the shares of EMBRAER44to a French company. This episodeended up with the dismissal of both the Ministry of Defense and theCommander of the Air force. The dismissal of the Commander provokedsignificant military unrest, with a series of protests of retired as well asactive-duty officers of the Air Force, which went beyond the narrow limitsof the episode. It didnt last long, however, as the new Air Force Commanderwas able to control his subordinates. The military in general was also more

pleased with the choice of a non-politician as the new Minister of Defense,Geraldo Quinto, the former Attorney General.

All in all, this episode may be interpreted as part of the process ofadaptation of both civilians and the military to the new pattern of civil-military relations.

It seems that Cardoso was on the right track. By recognizing the militaryas an strategic actor of undeniable importance and the special nature of

their profession, by dealing with the formulation of the defense policy on

44 EMBRAER was the Air Force enterprise that built middle-range aircrafts. The Air Forcegrievance was less related to the privatization of the enterprise in itself than to what theForce interpreted as its denationalization.


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an incremental basis and by carefully building the institutional frameworkfor intelligence activities he has been able to introduce important changes inthe civil-military relations.

On the right track: The Lula administration

It is fair to say that Lulas administration continued on the right track asfar as demilitarization and civil-military relations are concerned. In theselast two years,45there have been neither major backsliding movements normajor improvement in this matter. To be sure, a military crisis erupted, butLula could deal with the situation well and managed to control it. Aside

from that, usual issues have come to the fore: budget cuts, wages and welfare,replacement and modernization of the military equipment, the defense ofthe Amazon region (border trespassing, transference of troops to the region,agreement with Colombia), the new role (policing role, combat of drugtrafficking, control of urban riots), and the role of the intelligence agency-ABIN in a democratic milieu.

In all those issues a bargaining process took place at the Executivelevel, between the Commanders of the Forces and the highest echelons of

the bureaucracy, as well as with Lula himself, who directly and frequentlyinterfered in the dispute. The outcomes showed that both the military andthe government have to compromise, as it was the case in the welfare reform.

To be sure, in one issue, that of wages, the process of bargaining extendedoutside the Executive domain, with public manifestations coming from thewives of the active-duty officers and the retired-military associations.46Thesereactions, however, are the usual as far as wage issues are concerned.

Many issues have to go through the legislative process (like wages andwelfare) to be approved. As mentioned above, the Executive presents thebills (or other legislative propositions) to Congress after a hard process ofbargaining with the military chiefs. In Congress the bills are closely followedby four Congressional Liaisons (three for the Forces and the fourth for EMFA,later the Ministry of Defense), staffed by active-duty or retired officers thatinteract strongly with the Ministry of Defense.47

45 Lulas administration was inaugurated in January 2003.46 Recall that the active-duty military officers are not allowed participating in politics.47 For a more detailed analysis of the behavior of the military in Congress see below in the

section The military in politics.


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The Lula administration differentiates itself from preceding administrationsin that it brought to the fore the role the military should play. In fact, the verymoment the new administration was inaugurated Lula and his Ministers made

clear that budget priorities were to go to combat hunger (Program Hunger Zero),a distinctive mark of his electoral campaign. This was the reason to abort thebidding for the purchase of 12 FX jets to replace the old Air Force ones and thathad been taking place since Cardosos government. This was announced in thefirst moments of the Lula administration, on January 1st 2003, when it becameclear which role the new government wanted the Armed Forces to perform. Infact, in January 5th, the new Minister of Defense, Jos Viegas, stated that asidefrom the first and traditional role of defending the country, the Armed forces

should participate in the social programs of the new government.

48

On January7th, the Ministries of Transports and Defense settled an agreement by whicheleven engineering battalions are to construct and reconstruct federal roads.49

Later, Lula expressed his wish that conscription should be a mechanism of so-cial rising for the poor. The Armed Forces, the new administration thought,were to reinforce the performance of their historical role in the social-economicdevelopment of the country. This objective, however, met with the resistance ofthe military, who thought that their social role, no matter how proud they wereof it, still was a complementary role. It faded away with the poor results ofLulas social programs.

Finally, it is important to mention the military crisis that emerged recently,in October 2004, and how Lula managed it. The Correio Braziliense, animportant Brasilia newspaper, published on the front page pictures of a nakedman seated, with his the hands covering his face probably in despair. Thesepictures were part of the documents that in 1997 a lower-ranking memberof the military, who served as a secret agent in the Army, handed to the

Committee of Human Rights of Congress. At the moment, what interestedmore the congressmen was the fact that illegal hearings has been performedduring a democratic regime, the first Cardosos administration. The indivi-dual pictures was first identified as an important journalist who was torturedand killed in prison. In the end, the man in the pictures was not the journalist,but someone else.

The importance of the episode lies in the fact that the publishing of thepictures provoked a response from the Army that shocked many people. The

48 Cf.Correio Braziliense,,Viegas defende funo social das Foras Armadas, 01/05/2003.49 SeeCorreio Braziliense,, Batalhes de engenharia do Exrcito vo construir e recupera

estradas, 01/ 07/ 2003.


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Army in response, justified the imprisonment and torture of members of asubversive movement in that it was a legitimated response to the violenceof those who refused dialogue () and took the initiative to arm themselves.50

Besides justifying imprisonment and torture, the written response used oldterms, proper of the time of the military regime and its national securitydoctrine. If there was any doubt about the resilience of this group amongthe military, it ended with this event. Lula directly intervened and required anote with the signature of the commander of the Army retracting hisundemocratic statements.51The Minister of Defense, Jos Viegas, theoreticallythe hierarchal superior of the Commander of the Army, Gal Albuquerque,did not know about the Armys response. This insubordination was one in

many others that have been occurring for quite some time. Viegas, even weakerafter this episode asked for his dismissal, and he was attended by the President.The same solution was to be given to the Commander of the Army were itnot for the interference of Lulas party leader in the Senate, AlosioMercadante, son and brother of military officers. Gal Albuquerque is expectedto be dismissed together with other Ministers at the end of this year, in aplanned governmental reform. This was considered a milder attitude than theimmediate dismissal. After all, no one in the government wanted to provokea clime of revenge.

This episode, however, served as a window of opportunity for latentissues. In fact, NGOs like the Group Torture Never More, the CatholicChurch represented by the Bishop of So Paulo, D. Evaristo Arns, andAmnesty International started pressing hard to open the military-regime ar-chives52and to reopen cases of tortured and killed persons that had beenclosed, including the case of the journalist whose false pictures triggered themilitary crisis. Lulas administration decided to deal with those issues carefully

and slowly, as did the Legislative.* * *

Altogether, despite some backsliding, one can say that an undeniableprocess of demilitarization has ocurred in Brazil, beginning with the firstdirectly elected President, Fernando Collor de Mello.

50 SeeCorreio Braziliense,Questo Militar, 11/ 05/ 2004.51 Reportedly, this final note was preceded by two others refused by Lula.52 The opening of the archives has to deal with the decree n4553 signed by President

Cardoso two days before he left the government, in December , 27th 2003. This decreemodified an older one and established that ultra-secret State subjects have a 50 yearsperiod to be unclassified that can be renewed indefinitely.


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Up to the point, the analysis was performed from the civilian-controlperspective. In the next sections the perspective shifts, the inquiry proceedingfrom the military perspective. How did they adapt to democracy?

THEM ILITARYPERSPECTIVEANDTHEI RADAPTATIONTODEMOCRATICPOLITICS

In search for a new mission the militarys most difficult step is to relinquishtheir tutelage role. In fact, the Brazilian military seem to think they are entitled tothis role by historical and political traditions. From the civilian-control point of

view, this is a crucial obstacle to democratization. But arent the military progressingtoward democracy on other fronts? This section analyzes how the military adaptedtheir procedures and behavior to the new democratic environment.

The military in politics53

The military are a strategic privileged political actor. Their privileged positioncomes, in addition to the nature of their power resource - the use of force-, from

the position they hold in the Executive branch of the government. There theywere represented before the creation of the Ministry of Defense through theheads of the three military Ministries as well as the heads of the Military Cabinet(later Institutional Security Cabinet) and the Armed General Staff (EMFA), thelatter stripped from the ministerial status since the Collor administration. Colloralso abolished the SNI, the organ in charge of intelligence and security in themilitary regime, the symbol of repression. After the creation of the Ministry ofDefense, Commands substituted for the three military Ministries and started

reporting to it. However, the Commanders still have direct contact with the highestechelons of the Executive, as the Minister of Defense usually bring the threeCommanders as his advisers to the meetings to which he is invited. So, from thesix high-echelon positions the military held in the first civilian government of JosSarney they went down to only one position in the second Cardoso administration,that of the head of the Institutional, Security Cabinet. This is a very importantindicator of democratization according to the civil- control model.54

53 The sources of information of this section are, unless explicitly indicated, the interviewswith high-ranking officers from the staff of the Congressional Liaisons for EMFA and theMinistry of the Army, Brasilia, July 1998 and June 2000.

54 The number of active-duty military participation in the Cabinet is the prerogative n4 inStepan, op.cit., p. 95.


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Thus, one can say that incomparison to other strategic actors (e.g.entrepreneurs, workers), the military enjoy, even if declining, direct institutionalchannels of communication with the Presidency and the Ministries. Like other

strategic actors, however, they build up informal relations with civilian ministriesthat are in charge of policies that affect them. Even if informally, the militaryalways interact as an institutional actor. Eventually those relations becomeformalized. 55They participate in politics, therefore, as an institutional interestgroup. This means, among other things, that the military never press for indivi-dual interests, something that they are very proud of.56

If it is true that the military holds privileged access to policy formulationat the Executive level, within Congress they participate in decision-making

very much like the civilians. There they learn about democratic politics.

From the point of view of the civilian-control model, it matters how Congressmonitors and controls the military and the defense policies57. In Brazil, Congressdoes not participate in important decisions like the choice of general officers, theformulation of the defense policy and, consequentially, does not influence thedefinition of the use and preparedness of the Forces or monitor weapons initiatives.However, there exist some congressional controls like hearings and information

requests as well as two Committees on External Relations and National Defense,one in the Senate (CRE) and the other in the House of Representatives (CRDEN).Also the share of the military in the Executive budget bill is submitted to the samebargaining game as the other sectors are, taking place annually at the MixedCommission for the Budget (CMO). The effort of the military is to have theminimum possible cut in the amount proposed in the Executive budget.

The Committees on External Relations and National Defense sponsorseminars on defense and security, with the participation of both the military and

civilians, among which there are politicians, academics and representatives ofgovernment bureaucracies whose subject matters are related to defense and security.

They also invite or make convocations to the heads of the military bureaucraciesand institutions to hearings on legislative matters that are under discussion in theHouse or in the Senate. For instance, when the bill N 250/98 and the constitutional

55 When the issues are complex, like those of the administrative reform or reform of the

welfare system, the military typically make preliminary contacts with the Ministry incharge of the policy . Eventually they form a working group, thus opening up a channel ofcommunication and an arena of negotiation.

56 We never ask for a job for our relatives. We are strictly forbidden to do that (citedinterviews).

57 This corresponds to Stepans fifth prerogative, about the role of the legislature.


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amendment proposals N 498/97 and N 626/98, which were meant to createthe Ministry of Defense, were under discussion in the House, the Committee ofExternal Relations and National Defense heard, in the period between May 1998

and August 2000, the Chief-Minister of EMFA, the Ministers of the Army, Navyand Air Force, the Extraordinary Minister of Defense and the first Minister afterthe official creation of the Ministry, besides academics with an expertise in securityand defense. When ABIN was under discussion, the Chief Minister of the MilitaryCabinet was heard, and after ABIN was created, the head of the InstitutionalSecurity Cabinet was called upon three times. Also, a Joint Commission for theControl of the Intelligence Activities (CCAI), composed of senators and Houserepresentatives, was created in April 2002 following explicit directives of President

Cardoso. This Commission has convoked up to now four meetings with the headsof ABIN to monitor irregular activities of the institution.58Reportedly, however,until today the Commission has not performed well.

The Committee for External Relations and National Defense of theHouse of Representatives has also served as a channel through which themilitary on their own initiative makes their actions accountable to society.59

The guiding question of the civilian control model is the extent to

which the Legislative controls the military and their affairs. From the analysisprovided above one can conclude that while it is true that the Executive isthe predominant power, the Legislative matters and exerts some controlupon the military. Even so, by this model, Brazil ranks rather poorly in theitem role of legislature.60The civilian control model, however, missesimportant aspects of the civil-military relations when it neglects otherquestions, like: how does the military represent its interests in Congress?How does the military influence Congress and press for its interests? How

do its modes of interest representation compare with those of the civilians?Even before the coup dtat in 1964, the military created Congressional

Liaisons (Assessorias Parlamentares)for the Forces. It was, however, during theNational Constituent Assembly that those Liaisons received a great boost,being completely restructured. Very active and efficient, by all accounts, the

58 Note that one of the meetings was with the Chief-Minister of the Institutional Security

Cabinet, to which ABIN is subordinated.59 Following an explosion in the marines headquarters in Rio de Janeiro, the Minister of theNavy on his own initiative came to both the committees on environmental issues and ondefense matters to explain what has happened and why there was no longer danger offurther incidents.

60 See table of military prerogatives in Stepan, 1988, op. cit.


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Assessorias Parlamentarespursued the Armed Forces interests. Donning civilianattire, they were seen in the corridors, in the Commissions and in the floorof Congress dutifully persuading legislators to support their interests on

constitutional issues deemed to affect the Forces.They organized four Congressional Liaisons, one for each Force and

one for EMFA. Like the civilian ministries they have offices in the Congressbuilding. Retired and/ or active-duty officers, depending on the servicebranch at stake, staff those Congressional Liaisons. The Liaison for the Armyseems to be better structured and organized. There, all the members areactive-duty officers. They work with four coordinated groups: one that followsthe bills for constitutional amendments (PEC), two others that monitor the

legislative process in the House and in the Senate and the fourth, located atthe Army headquarters, that gives support to the other groups.61The Armyhas also regional offices to follow military issues in state legislatures.

The military career does not prepare for this kind of job. The members ofthe Assessorias Parlamentaresattended courses offered by the University of Brasiliafor legislative assistants. They eventually attend as well graduate courses in thesocial sciences. But, as they say, it is here, in Congress, that we really learn. So,

they basically get trained to the new job in practice, with the civilian politiciansand other legislative assistants, in the day to day activities of the legislative process.

Since the days of the National Constituent Assembly they have beenperfecting their working procedures. Until the recent creation of the Ministry ofDefense, the four Congressional Liaisons, including EMFAs, followed basicallythe samemodus operandi.The military members of the Congressional Liaisons identifyamong the bills submitted to Congress those that interfere with the Armed Forcesinterests. They send them to the evaluation of the corresponding Ministry (or

EMFA). After a short while they receive a technical and juridical assessment andan indication to work for getting the bills approved, rejected, amended, or simplymonitored along the legislative process. With this clear indication from the supe-rior ranks the members of theAssessoriasParlamentaresset up a strategy of action,somewhat different for each case, but following the same basic procedures.

They follow all the steps of the legislative process, from Committee toCommittee until the bill reaches the floor of Congress. They get to know the

greatest possible number of congressmen, no matter their party affiliation orideology, and build the most cordial relations with them. They try to persuade the

61 For a detailed account of the Congressional Liaison for the Army see Costa, op. cit.


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legislators to support their interests out of technical (never political) arguments.62

We have nothing to exchange, they say, we can only offer the credibility of ourinstitution. Many times they hand the legislator a written report, which is a very

efficient way to influence the process. They argue that their profession entailssome especial features,63and therefore they should be treated differently in someissues, like welfare and public servant status. They distribute booklets explainingthose special characteristics or their preferences on other issues at stake, likeconscription. They bring the representatives to visit their Minister or to a technicaldepartment of the Ministry so that all the information on the issue is provided.

These procedures are followed for each bill submitted to Congress that affectsthe Armed Forces interests. Sometimes only a small part of the bills affect the

military. But all of them are monitored.64The big issue for sure is the budget.Here, as indicated above, the work of theAssessorias Parlamentaresis to avoid by allmeans cuts in the budgetary items already negotiated at the Executive level. Asidefrom that they follow bills on sensitive issues - like indemnification for the familyof opponents of the military regime who disappeared, nuclear and chemicalweapons, conscription, use of the Armed Forces in the combat against drug trafficking- as well as on minor issues, like the free entrance of religious sects in hospitals orthe interference of the Regional Councils of Medicine in the military hospitals.

Thus, discipline, high esprit de corps, prompt technical and juridical back up,coordinated actions that follow one clear directive, planned follow-up of thelegislative process, the promotion of institutional (never individual) interests aretypical characteristics of the military lobby. Altogether those characteristics make itmore efficient than its civilian counterparts. Aside from that, theAssessorias Parlamentaresof the Armed Forcesenjoy greater flexibility of action vis--vis those of the civilianministries. Because the military ministers do not belong to any political party, the

members of the their lobby can freely negotiate with congressmen across theideological spectrum.65In this way, the staff of theAssessorias Parlamentarescan manageto build bridges between the political and the military world, otherwise two

62 This is the so-called corpo a corpoprocedure, very much used by civilian lobbies63 For instance, the military work full time, with no payment for extra hours or the chance to

take a complementary job. Because they move several times along their carrier from oneregion to the other, their wives cannot pursue a carrier of their own. Those facts are used

to justify separate rules for welfare and for wage increases.64 The Congress Liaison for EMFA was, at the time of the interview, July 1998, monitoring

160 bills, while the Liaison for the Army was following up about 300 bills.65 When interviewed, the military legislative assistants stress this point, emphasizing how

well they relate with the parties of the radical left: it doesnt matter if we think differentlyfrom them, we try to make our point with purely technical arguments. They like to


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completely separated domains. Working inside Congress, the military learn aboutdemocratic politics and try hard to teach the civilians about the barracks.66All thispoints to an important change in the civil-military relations.

What did change with the creation of the Ministry of Defense? EMFAdisappeared, and the Congressional Liaison of the Ministry of Defense nowprovides coordination. The procedures didnt change much. Themodus operandiis the following. TheAssessorias Parlamentaresof each Force and of the Ministry ofDefense identify the bills, constitutional amendments proposals, decrees of theirinterest and hearings, ranking them according to their priority. Every Mondaythey get together in the Ministry of Defense where they discuss, negotiate andrank the legislative proposals, deciding who should be in charge of each item

and which should be the strategy to be followed and acted upon. The legislativeproposals are selected and ranked according to the degree of conflict they raisein Congress, within the Forces or at the national level. The most important billsto be followed are still, not surprisingly, those referring to the annual budget andthe external credit operations. Other legislative proposals are related to the roleof the Armed Forces in the Amazon, amnesty and indemnification to the victimsof repression, conscription, welfare and health policies.67

In broad terms it seems that the creation of the Ministry of Defense didnot affect much the basic operational procedures of the so-called military lobbyin Congress, althought the Congressional Liaisons seem now to work lessindependently. In fact, the coordination of the Assessorias Parlamentares of thethree Forces performed by the Ministry of Defense seems now, in Lulasadministration, more effective than in Cardosos. An important reason is that inthe new government a high rank officer substituted for a civilian as head of theCongressional Liaison of the Ministry of Defense. Almost all the military

members of the Assessorias Parlamentares hold the post of colonel. The colonelswere not comfortable to report to a civilian who was considered to be in a lowerrank than them. In this respect, recall that the military crisis that was responsible

particularly stress their good relations with the communist party (PC do B) and with Dep.Jos Genono (PDT), ex-member of the guerilla movement against the military regime.Genono is one of the few representatives that show great interest in discussing the Armedforces role and the national defense policy.

66 Interviewed military members of theAssessorias Parlamentarescall the attention to that important

part of their job. The military dont know anything about the way the congressmen think andbehave. So, we come here, learn about it and translate it to our colleagues. Conversely,they think that bringing legislators to visit military units and talk to the military officers helpsthem to understand the military life and professional characteristics.

67 Interview with Colonel Gonalves, coordinator of the Congressional Liaison for theMinistry of Defense, Brasilia, May 12 and 16, 2003.


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for the dismissal of the first Minister of Defense, lcio Alvarez, was in parttriggered by the fact that the Commanders of the Forces thought that wasinadequate that they meet with an Alvarez adviser rather than with the Minister

himself. Another example is that the colonel head of theAssessoria Parlamentar ofthe Ministry of Defense left the coordination of the Mondays meetings to abrigadier who is member of the Air Force Congressional Liaison.

It is worth stressing a final point. The civilian-control model sees the lobby ofthe military in Congress as a negative point. The military would be unduly exertingpressure upon the Legislative. However, they are playing exactly the same gameas the civilian lobbies are. They abide to predictable procedures. Their tanks arenot surrounding Congress or parading in the streets every time a bill of their

interest is under consideration. This signals an impressive adaptation to thedemocratic polity by the military, with no parallel that I know of in any otherLatin American country.68

CONCLUSIONS

It is fair to say that the military in Brazil predominantly has thought of

themelves as a tutelary power. Their intervention in politics is justified onthe basis of political, historical and cultural tradition. However, the processof democratization in the domestic political milieu, the economic crises thatplagued the country in the last decade and the changing international orderput great pressures on the military. In fact, they have had to endure budgetarycuts and the loss of power and prestige, to adapt to democratic politics andto find a new mission.69

On the one hand, a clear process of demilitarization has been in progresssince the Collor administration, the second civilian government. A major indicatoris the decrease of the number of activeduty general officers in the Cabinet fromsix in the first civilian government to one in President Cardosos second term andbeyond. Other indicators are the creation of the Ministry of Defense and ABIN,

68 This point deserves more attention in future communications. In old democracies, andthis is certainly the case of the United States, the military press for their interests in

Congress through non-formalized, indirect means, like pushing former militarycongressmen or members of the Defense Committee that have a significant number ofmilitary in their district. The question to be put to the democratization literature is then:how can civilians best control the pressure of the military on Congress? Which type ofmilitary lobby pressures more?

69 See footnote n7.


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the intelligence service meant to be a non-partisan, non-ideological, non-militaryorgan committed to democracy and accountable to Congress. Moreover, themilitary commanders and ministries of the post-authoritarian administrations have

strictly abided to the constitutional rules, fact that proved crucial to control unrestduring the first and second civilian governments. They have as well passed the testposed by the impeachment of President Collor.

On the other hand, their insertion in congressional politics is surprising. Therethey learned about democracy and how to press for their interests in the same waycivilians do. They play the game that is played by civilians and abide to procedures.

This is completely new in the Brazilian history and signals an important change inthe civil-military relations. Rather than a negative indicator as interpreted by the

civilian-control model, I argue here that, on the contrary, the military behavior inCongress is a positive sign toward democratization and an impressive adaptationto the democratic politics.

Paradoxically, a further improvement of the civil-military relations is hinderedby the lack of civilian interest in defense and military affairs. This is particularlytrue in the congressional realm.

Notwithstanding, the military is still a privileged actor with privileged access

to decisionmaking. But all in all, it is fair to say that if there is no homogeneouscommitment to the democratic values among the Brazilian military, they indeedabide to democratic procedures, a fact extraordinarily important in itself.70Thereis no threat of coup dtat. And there are important signs of change in the civil-military relations.

REFERENCES

Agero, Felipe. 1998. Legacies of Transitions: Institutionalization, the Military, andNew Democracies in South America. Paper delivered at the conferenceConfronting Non-Democratic Legacies during Democratic Deepening: LatinAmerica and Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective. Buenos Aires, Uni-versidad Torcuato Di Tella, 27-29 August.

70 Agero makes a similar argument. () transitions have succeeded without the militarybecoming committed to democratic values overnight (Agero, Felipe, Toward CivilianSupremacy in Latin America in Diamond, Larry et alli (Eds.),Consolidating the Third WaveDemocracies, Themes and Perspectives,Baltimore and London: the Jonhs Hopkins Un. Press,1997,p.201, ft N .6).


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__________. 1997. Toward Civilian Supremacy in South America in Diamond,Larry, Marc Plattner, Yun-han Chu and Hung-mao Tien, Consolidating the ThirdWave Democracies: T hemes and Perspectives.Baltimore; The Jonhs Hopkins Un. Press.

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The Brazilian Military in Post Democratic Transition.pdf

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