The Battle of Bastogne

7/31/2019 The Battle of Bastogne

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The Battle of Bastogne

The Initial Deployment East of Bastogne

The one standing order that General Middleton gave General McAuliffe before leaving

Bastogne on the morning of 19 December was: "Hold Bastogne"*Both generals felt that theenem! needed Bastogne and the entrance it afforded to a wider comle# of roads leading

west $Map VI% During the night of the 1&th the two commanders met in the '((( )ors

command ost to confer on the uncertain tactical situation and to give )olonel *well+ whose

regiment would first be committed+ his instructions The ma sread out before *well showed

a few blue,enciled mar-s east of Bastogne where the American armored grous were

believed to be fighting at their original roadbloc- ositions General Middleton told *well that

his .ob would be to ma-e contact with these endangered forward osts *well+ however+ was

interested in the red,enciled lines and circles which showed the enem! between Bastogne

and the armored roadbloc-s (n view of the uncertain situation+ he suggested that he be given

"mission,t!e orders" which would ermit his /01st arachute (nfantr! some fle#ibilit! ofaction McAuliffe agreed+ as did Middleton+ but the latter still hoed that the roadbloc-

defenders at Allerborn+ eight miles to the east on the Bastogne road+ would somehow survive

until the /01st reached them McAuliffe2s order+ then+ was for *well to move out at 0300+

attac- eastward+ and develo the situation

At the aointed hour on 19 December *well2s /01st arachute (nfantr! marched out of the

assembl! area in column of battalions *well -new that this was no time to engage in the all,

out+ full,bodied assault tactics to which the aratrooers were accustomed He told

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BA4T5G6*
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[446-447]

his officers to "ta-e it eas!+" avoid commitment to an action which would involve their whole

force+ and delo! to right and left as soon as the! hit resistance so that the! would not be

easil! cut off and surrounded1

Hindsight+ of course+ bestows a view of the American and German disositions at 0300+ when

the 101st advance guard marched out+ which was denied *well and the cors and division

staffs in Bastogne The battles alread! described were now coming to a close on the roads+ in

the villages+ and through the woods east of the town as the 101st was ta-ing its stance During

the night of 1& December the three small tas- forces of ))7+ 9th Armored Division+ which

Middleton had ordered )olonel Gilbreth to osition on and overwatching the Allerborn,

Bastogne road $6 18%+ were cut to ieces 4ome men and vehicles would escae to ta-e a art

in the fight for Bastogne+ although some of )olonel Booth2s command too- si# da!s of

dodging the enem! before the! reached the American lines At ongvill!+ ne#t+ and to the

west+ on the Bastogne road+ Gilbreth had gathered what was left of ))7 and its attachedtroos to fight a rear guard action until the 19th dawned and an orderl! withdrawal might be

effected

Gilbreth started his guns dislacing to the rear some time before da!brea-+ but the main force

commenced to defile through the western e#it from ongvill! about 0&00+ onl! to be

ambushed and thrown into disorder when aroaching Mageret+ midwa! between ongvill!

and Bastogne Team )herr! $t )ol Henr! T )herr!% of ))B+ 10th Armored Division+

which had been sent along the road toward ongvill! the revious evening+ found itself

involved in a series of dis.ointed actions as enem! troos cut the highwa! Team H!du-e $1st

t *dward H!du-e% was caught u in the fight east of Mageret+ subseuentl! losing all itsvehicles in a shar and aggressive armored action which the 2d Panzercommander dignified

as an American "counterattac-" $ate on the afternoon of the 19th ieutenant H!du-e led his

men on foot out of the melee under orders to re.oin ))B He was afterward -illed at

Bastogne%

Team 7!erson $)at ;illiam some hours later )herr!2s detachment would ull bac- to Mont8
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5n the morning of 19 December+ therefore+ the .ob confronting the /01st was that of

develoing+ fi#ing+ and fighting the German detachments+ now in strength+ which stood to the

rear of the erstwhile American bloc-ing ositions and resaged the coming main effort to

crash the an?er columns through or around Bastogne

The German High )ommand was aware that the two American airborne divisions had ordersto enter the battle> in the late afternoon of 1& December interceted radio messages to this

effect reached OB WEST German intelligence -new that the Americans were moving b!

truc- and so estimated that none of these new troos would aear in the line before noon on

the 19th The German staffs believed that the two divisions would be delo!ed along a front

e#tending from Bastogne to the northeast (n an! case the German attac- lan was unfolding

about as scheduled and three German divisions were bearing down on Bastogne The 2d

PanzerDivision2s successes during the night of 1& December against the outost ositions

east of ongvill! had netted fort! American tan-s+ and the aarent crumbling of the last

defenses east of Bastogne romised uic- entr! to that cit! on the 9th

Actuall! the three German divisions moving toward Bastogne were not all maneuvering toattac- the cit! auchert2s 2d Panzer Divisionhad other fish to fr!,its ob.ective was the Meuse

bridges,and when da!light came on the 19th the division advance guard was wor-ing its wa!

to b!ass Bastogne in the north The 2d Panzer2s end run+ across countr! and on miserable

third,class roads+ collided with Ma. ;illiam 7 Desobr!2s tas- force from ))B at 6oville

$four miles north of Bastogne%+ then blundered into a series of shar actions reaching bac- to

ongvill!

5n the left thePanzer Lehr+ having sei?ed Mageret during the night+ began an attac- about

0/00 on the 19th designed to ta-e Bastogne> it was a art of this forward detachment of

Panzer Lehrwhich hit )herr!2s headuarters at 6effe )lose on the heels of Panzer Lehr+ two

regiments of the 26th ol!s "renadier Divisionhad made a right wheel with the intention of

circling through ongvill! and u?er! so as to enter Bastogne from the north via the 6oville

road @o-ott2s grenadiers+ who had accomlished a trul! remar-able feat in -eeing ace with

the mechani?ed columns of thePanzer Lehr+ b! now were sent The regimental trains were

far to the rear and resul! had to be made


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5n the revious evening the '((( )ors commander had sent the 1/&th *ngineer )ombat

Battalion $t )ol 4am Tabets% to establish a line east of Bastogne between erhas the

German infantr! were waiting for their tan-s to brea- through at Mageret The fight had

slac-ened to a small arms duel when *well2s aratrooers came on the scene he got the

gun+ then was cut down the! had

inflicted thirt!,nine casualties on )oman! (+ all of whose officers were hit+ and -illed )at

)laude D ;allace+ r+ the coman! commander

To the west+ near the hamlet of Marvie+ la! the tan-s and armored infantr! of Team 52Hara

$t )ol ames 52Hara% holding the right of the three bloc-ing ositions set u b! ))B+ 10th

Armored+ the da! before 52Hara thus far had seen no Germans His first warning that the

fight was e#anding in his direction was the "stragglers of airborne around us" and highvelocit! shellfire directed at his left tan- latoon


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with 52Hara+ erhas because of the low+ clinging fog which had reduced visibilit! to about

sevent!,five feet 5rdered to do so b! )olonel 7oberts+ the ))B commander+ 52Hara sent

tan-s bac- into ;ardin+ but the village was emt! The tan-s retired to the Marvie osition as

dar- came on+ and late in the eveningPanzer Lehroccuied ;ardin

A message from McAuliffe ended this initial da! of battle for the /01st and the regiment dugin where it stood *well now had a fair icture of the enem! to his front but no clear idea of

the fate or location of Team )herr!2s main force+ not to mention the ))7 roadbloc-

detachments

Although the /01st had delo!ed successfull! astride the main road east of Bastogne and had

develoed a s-etch! outline of the most advanced German ositions+ it had not at an! time

confronted the main German forces These+ the bul- ofPanzer Lehrand the two forward

regiments of the 26th ol!s "renadier Division+ sent most of the da! choing down the

American column traed between Mageret and ongvill! @o-ott aarentl! had e#ected to

ush his two grenadier regiments unoosed through ongvill!+ as soon as the! were rested+

in a circling march to

[451]

enter Bastogne from the north+ but the German cors commander+ General uettwit?+ himself

too- these regiments out of @o-ott2s hand and thrust them into the battle with the American

rear guard at ongvill!,which held there longer than e#ected,and against the retreating

column en route to Mageret 4uffice it to sa! that the /01st had been effectivel! debarred

from the ongvill! arena b! thePanzer Lehrtroos holding 6effe+ Hill /10+ and the stoer

osition at Mageret B! the evening of the 19th the American troos east of Mageret were invar!ing stages of tactical dissolution,all but Team 7!erson+ still clutching its iece of Mageret

village uettwit? was elated b! this victor! over the American armor $which as an old tan-er

he attributed in large art to the sueriorit! of the anther tan- gun%+ but he reali?ed that a

recious da! had been lost and with it the chance of an armored #o$p de mainat Bastogne

At 6oville+ the left of the three bloc-ing ositions+ Middleton had assigned )olonel 7oberts

and ))B Here Team Desobr!+ organi?ed around fifteen medium tan-s+ stood athwart the

main aved highwa! running north from Bastogne to Houffali?e This force had been in

osition about five hours+ reorting all uiet+ when at 080 on the 19th German half,trac-s hit

the American roadbloc-s Americans and Germans itched grenades at each other in the fog

and one or two an?ers reached the village itself The enem!,robabl! a atrol feeling a wa!in front of auchert2s 2d Panzer,soon ulled out+ and the noise of battle died awa!

The '((( )ors commander+ much concerned b! the ga which he -new e#isted between his

southern troos and those of his cors somewhere to the north+ ordered Desobr! to investigate

the town of Houffali?e $During the night+ a atrol Desobr! had sent in that direction reorted

the road oen% Before an!thing could be done about the Houffali?e mission+ the Germans

unleashed their artiller! against 6oville auchert+ intent on regaining the momentum which

the 2d Panzerhad lost in the night fighting around Allerborn and ongvill!+ and determined

to get off the miserable side roads which he had chosen as a uic- wa! around Bastogne+ ut

all the guns that had -et ace with the forward elements into a shoot to blast a wa! through

to the west At 1000 the fog curtain suddenl! arted revealing a landscae dotted withGerman tan-s,at least thirt! of them


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for 6oville+ coming in from the north 4everal bogged down in a vain attemt to maneuver off

the road> others were sloed b! Desobr!2s coman! of 4herman tan-s and b! tan- destro!er

fire 5n the east the enem! had started an infantr! assault+ but the fog lifted before the first

waves reached the village and+ suddenl! divested of cover+ most of the attac-ers turned and

ran

Desobr! could not -now that 6oville was the focus of the entire 2d Panzermaneuver+ but he

did as- for ermission to withdraw 7oberts relied that Desobr! should use his own

.udgment+ then added that more tan- destro!ers were on the wa! from Bastogne $Desobr! had

onl! a latoon from the 309th% and that the 101st was sending a rifle battalion within the half

hour )oincident with 7oberts2 message the last of the German assault force ulled bac-

auchert had decided that the ground was too oor

[452]

for tan- maneuver+ that reinforcements must be brought u for a headlong lunge Meanwhilethe German cannoneers continued to ummel 6oville Desobr! had man! casualties+ but

several ambulances had been wrec-ed b! shellfire and it was difficult to get the wounded out

The reinforcements reaching Desobr! consisted of a latoon from the 0/th Tan- Destro!er

Battalion $three comanies of which constituted the onl! cors reserve Middleton had to give

the 101st Airborne% and the 1st Battalion $t )ol ames arade% of the /03th arachute

(nfantr! Although McAuliffe assigned the /03th the mission of covering the northern

aroaches to Bastogne+ the remaining two battalions had a string attached as the division

reserve+ and the regimental commander+ )olonel 4in-+ was under strict orders not to move

them from their ositions .ust north of Bastogne As the aratrooers aroached 6oville+the! came under heav!+ well,aimed artiller! fire+ twent! to thirt! rounds e#loding on the

village ever! ten minutes 'ehicles and buildings were aflame,this was indeed a hot corner+

the village itself racticall! bare of life Desobr!2s detachment was delo!ed south and west

of the village> the Germans were firing from the north and east+ a more comfortable osition

since the higher ground encircling 6oville tilted u on the enem! side of the dish

B! 1=0 the 1st Battalion was read! to begin the assault against the enem!,held high ground

The center coman! wal-ed almost immediatel! into a rain of barrage fire and was stoed

with heav! losses The two remaining comanies were met with intense small arms fire but in

fifteen minutes wor-ed their wa! forward in short surts to a oint where one last dash would

ut them on the crest As the aratrooers la! here+ a mass of green,clad figures suddenl!eruted over the hill ater the 1st Battalion estimated this attac- was carried b! a rifle

battalion bac-ed b! si#teen tan-s The American assault had smac-ed headlong into the attac-

the 2d Panzerhad been read!ing since mid,morning As the fight sread+ nearl! thirt!,two

an?ers were counted on the field The two antagonists each reorted subseuentl! that "the

enem! counterattac- halted" Both robabl! were correct,although both continued to suffer

heav! casualties The German tan-s might have decided the issue+ but for over half an hour

the! sta!ed well bac- of the rifle line+ erhas fearful lest ba?oo-a teams would reach them in

the smo-e and fog billowing u the hill+ erhas fearful of the bite in the few 4hermans left

;hen a few of the enem! tan-s finall! ventured to aroach+ the American tan- destro!ers

south of the village got on the flan- of the an?ers and ut awa! five of them at 1+/00,!ards

range


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6ow as the smo-e and fog increased+ onl! small eddies bro-e the all to give a few minutes

of aimed fire Two of the airborne comanies fell bac- to the outs-irts of 6oville while the

third+ on the hill to the east+ waited for dar-ness to cover its withdrawal At one .uncture the

1st Battalion was under orders to leave 6oville+ but Brig Gen Gerald Higgins+ the assistant

division commander who was acting alter egofor McAuliffe+ told the aratrooers to sta! ut

and romised assault gun and tan- destro!er suort for the morrow

To the 6oville garrison the dar-

[453]

hours were a nightmare *ver! half hour a gust of enem! artiller! fire shoo- the town> one

shell crashed near the American command ost+ -illing arade and wounding Desobr! Ma.

7obert nonetheless there remained two

indentations in the fast,forming German line: the thumb stic-ing out at 6oville and Team

7!erson2s little enclave on the east edge of Mageret The latter+ however+ disaeared during

the night hours+ for 7!erson+ on orders+ circled the enem! troos in Mageret and brought his

deleted command into the lines of the /01st at Bi?or! $7!erson later was -illed at

Bastogne%

General uettwit? lac-ed the full German cors he craved to throw against Bastogne on the

80th The 26th ol!s "renadier Divisioncould count on onl! two of its regimentsPanzer

Lehrhad a substantial art of the division immediatel! east of Bastogne+ but at least one

infantr! regiment+ much of its artiller!+ and the bul- of the division trains were still toilingalong the gumm! little roads ,hardl! more than trails,climbing west out of the ;ilt? valle!


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armored assault auchert therefore told his an?er grenadiers to carr! the battle in coman!

with small tan- ac-ets

;hile the German guns lastered the village the grenadiers moved in about 0/=0 on three

sides 4mo-e and swirling fog veiled the attac-ers but the 80th Armored


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[455]

and erhas half a regiment of foot At least the first art of this estimate ma! be close to the

fact+ for it is -nown that one battalion of the %d Panzer &egimentwas badl! criled at

6oville

There is an eilogue (n late afternoon+ as his soldiers o-ed about the ruins of 6oville+

auchert radioed theLIII Panzer +orpscommander for ermission to wheel the 2d Panzer

into Bastogne @rueger2s answer was romt and astringent: "


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area through Bastogne to relieve )oman! A of the engineers3

The engineers had .ust climbed out of their fo#hole line west of Marvie and turned the

osition over to the 8d Battalion when one of 52Hara2s outosts saw a German column

streaming into Marvie This was the advance guard of the .)/st &egimentwhich had finall!e#tricated itself from the ;ilt? valle! ;ith onl! a single rifle coman! and four tan-s+ the

Germans never had a chance (n an hour2s time 52Hara2s mediums had accounted for the

an?ers and the 8d Battalion had beaten the attac-ers bac- in disorder and occuied Marvie

The aratrooers waited through the da! for the main attac- to come+ but the onl! evidences

of the enem! were a smo-e screen drifting in from the east and occasional tan-s in the

distance n-nown to the Americans a shift in thePanzer Lehr2s stance before Bastogne was

ta-ing lace

The inchoate American defense forming at Bastogne was conditioned b! a set of otimistic

remises The first of these was the romised arrival of the th Armored Division from

atton2s Third Arm! in the south During the night of December the '((( )ors commander+acting on word from atton+ told McAuliffe that one combat command from the th Armored

was on its wa! to Bastogne and would be attached to the 101st At noon McAuliffe and

7oberts $who had been romised this initial th Armored force% learned that the entire

division was to be added to the Bastogne defense The certaint! of the th Armored2s

aearance e#lains in art the routine and rather cavalier treatment accorded )at Bert *?ell

and his little team from ))B+ th Armored+ when it arrived in Bastogne shortl! after noon

Iuite obviousl! McAuliffe and Middleton anticiated the earl! aearance of the entire

armored division

A second remise,acceted in most of the 101st lanning efforts on 80 December,was that the'((( )ors still had viable forces in and around Bastogne which could be emlo!ed in

common with the airborne divisions This idea+ of course+ went hand in hand with the ver!

real ignorance of enem! forces and locations which obtained both in Bastogne and at

Middleton2s new headuarters in 6eufchCteau *arlier McAuliffe and his staff had counted on

7oberts2 10th Armored combat command to reinforce a counterattac- east b! the 101st,a vain

e#ectation+ as it turned out There remained the 8&th (nfantr! Division,or at least some art

thereof (n midafternoon McAuliffe sent a liaison officer to General )ota+ whose headuarters

was now at 4ibret southwest of Bastogne+ with instructions to find out the German

disositions and to as- the uestion: ")ould the 8&th attac- towards ;ilt? in con.unction with

the 101st Airborne tomorrowJ"

)ota2s rel! is not even recorded in the 101st Airborne log After all he could give onl! one

answer: the 8&th (nfantr! Division no longer e#isted as a division $although two of its

regiments would continue in stubborn battle

[457]

under other commands% The fall of ;ilt? on the night of 19 December had written finisto the

stor! of the 110th (nfantr!+ )ota2s single remaining regiment 5n the morning of the 80th

)ota had gone into Bastogne+ finding its streets .ammed with vehicles+ cors artiller! tr!ing to

bull a wa! through+ and a host of stragglers+ including man! of the survivors of the 110th(nfantr! General Middleton gave )ota ermission to get his eole out of Bastogne and the
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latter ordered them out on foot+ abandoning to the traffic .am those vehicles still in their

ossession $4o imressed was General )ota b! the traffic cho-ing the streets and alle!s of

Bastogne+ that he advised the '((( )ors commander to -ee all contingents of the th

Armored Division out of the town%

Desite McAuliffe2s failure to secure the immediate assistance which would ma-e a full,bodied counterattac- feasible+ it seemed that the tactical roblem facing the 101st on the

evening of 80 December remained linear+ that is+ the creation of a homogeneous and

defensible line barring entrance to Bastogne from the north and east The cors letter of

instructions reaching McAuliffe at noon on the 80th was rather more sweeing in its

definition of mission "There will be no withdrawal"this was clear enough to all concerned

"The E101st AirborneF Division will stabili?e their front lines on the front 9&9/ Ethat is+

7echtF to 4t 'ith+ south along a general line east of EHighwa!F 61/ to connect with the

th (nfantr! Division at Breitweiler" (t ma! be assumed that neither Middleton nor McAuliffe

too- this art of the order either literall! or seriousl! There had been a few indications+ and

rumors+ of enem! activit! west of Bastogne,indeed the 101st had lost some of its trains in the

division assembl! area during the revious night,but thus far all this could be charged toraiding arties roaming on the loose under cover of night in a fluid and changing battle (n

earl! evening a reort reached Bastogne that the road northwest to a 7oche and 5rtheuville

$where two latoons of the 0/th Tan- Destro!er Battalion now attached to the 101st were

oerating% was free of the enem! The roads south to 6eufchCteau and Arlon were still oen,

and waiting for traverse b! the th Armored 4o the situation loo-ed in McAuliffe2s Bastogne

headuarters at 1900 on 80 December

Across the lines the German commander+ uettwit?+ was none too leased b! the rather

dilator! oerations of his cors He -new b! this time that the American front east of

Bastogne had stiffened and that his troos had been able to find no holes 5n the other hand

the strength of his cors was increasing b! the hour as the two divisions hauled their tails u

on the mudd! roads,it loo-ed as though he had the forces needed for maneuver As a last flic-

of the hand uettwit? ordered Ba!erlein to throw the 908d into the night attac- against 6effe

This was at most a diversion+ for uettwit? had decided to enveloe Bastogne from the south

and west He intended to use the bul- of thePanzer Lehr+ leaving onl! one of its grenadier

regiments to flesh out the eastern front with the foot elements of @o-ott2s 26th ol!s

"renadier Division+ but in addition he had in hand the %.th ol!s "renadier &egimentof the

26thwhich had .ust come u behind the cors2

[458]

south flan- All told there was a si?able motori?ed force for this venture: the reinforced

reconnaissance battalion+ the engineer battalion+ and the .)2d$as soon as it could be

disengaged% from thePanzer Lehr> lus the reconnaissance battalion and %.thfrom the 26th

ol!s "renadier Division

The immediate ob.ectives seem to have been clearl! stated The Panzer Lehrsearheads were

to advance via HomrK and 4ibret to 4t Hubert+ while the units of the 26thwould start the

attac- from an assembl! oint at 7emonfosse on the Bastogne,Arlon road with the intention

of stabbing into Bastogne from the southwest (n fact this night oeration develoed into a

mad scramble in which the troos from the two divisions .oc-e!ed for the lead as if the! werein a flat race for high sta-es


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Trul! the sta-es were high Throughout this maneuver uettwit? and his suerior+ General

Manteuffel+ had an e!e single to sha-ing the armored columns of the0LII Panzer +orpsfree

for the dash to the Meuse bridges Bastogne+ sitting in the center of the web of hard,surfaced

roads+ was imortant,but onl! as a means to a geograhicall! distant end Bastogne had failed

to fall li-e an overrie lum when the bough was sha-en+ but it could be clied off the

branch,or so the German High )ommand still reasoned,and without using Ba!erlein2s armor

The enem! drive across the south face of Bastogne and on to the west during the night of 80

December did not immediatel! .olt McAuliffe2s command> it was rather a disarate series of

clashes with scattered and unsusecting units of the '((( )ors )entral to the stor! at this

oint is the fact that b! da!light on the 81st the German infantr! following the armored troos

were ensconced on both the main roads running from Bastogne south+ while light forces were

running u and down the western reaches of the Bastogne,4t Hubert highwa! (n the north

the circle had been clamed shut during the night when the 2d Panzersei?ed 5rtheuville on

the Marche road

Bastogne Is En#ir#led

4ome of the Bastogne defenders recall in the saga of the 101st Airborne Division that their

lone fight began on 80 December "(t was on this da!+ 80 December+" reads the war diar! of

the =8th Glider (nfantr!+ "that all roads were cut b! the enem! and we were comletel!

surrounded" This is onl! hindsight The icture of comlete encirclement was built u in

McAuliffe2s headuarters onl! slowl! on the 81st+ nor did the ring at first seem to be hermetic

and contracting Doubtless the word assed among the regiments ver! raidl!,the /01st

.ournal notes at 10=0 that the last road is cut,but it was late afternoon before an armored

atrol sent out b! ))B affirmed that the wa! south certainl! was closed

;hat were the means available for defense of the Bastogne erimeterJ The 101st Airborne

was an elite+ veteran outfit at nearl! full strength+ and well acuainted with isolation as a

combat formation 5nl! five battalions from McAuliffe2s four regiments had been seriousl!

engaged in the fight thus far (ts four artiller! battalions were reinforced b! the 939th and

//th


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heading west 7eali?ing this fact+ )olonel 7obert2s got ermission to gather all stragglers into

his command 7oberts2 force came to be -nown as Team 46A ))B

ma! have had an eual number> General )ota culled two or three hundred men from Team

46A and one ma! guess there were another two or three

hundred stragglers whose identit! has been lost Man! of these men+ given a hot meal and

fort!,eight hours2 rest+ could be used and were used+ but the! aear as anon!mous figures in

the combat record $thus: "100 infantr! left for Team Browne"%

McAuliffe now had the advantage of a clearl! defined command structure Before the 80th he

and )olonel 7oberts had commanded indeendentl!+ but on that date Middleton gave

McAuliffe the "sa!" $as General )ota had advised after his visit% over all the troos in the

Bastogne sector10The resence of 7oberts would rove articularl! valuable *arl! in thewar he had been the armored instructor at the Arm! )ommand and General 4taff 4chool+

where his humorousl! illustrated "Do2s" and "Don2ts" of tan- warfare showed a -een

areciation of the roblems osed b! armor and infantr! cooeration The aratrooers were

in articular need of this advice for the! seldom wor-ed with armor+ -new little of its

caabilit!+ and even less of its limitations+ and,as befitted troos who .umed into thin air,

were a little contemtuous of men who fought behind late steel $During the Bastogne battle

7oberts develoed a formal memorandum on the roer emlo!ment of armor+ but this was

not

[460]

distributed to the 101st until 8& December% 5n the other hand the tan-ers had much to learn

from commanders and troos who were used to fighting "surrounded"

McAuliffe2s logistic means were less substantial than the tactical The airborne division

normall! carried less sul! than conventional divisions and the 101st had been hurried into

Belgium with ammunition and grenade ouches not uite full+ much individual euiment

missing $overshoes+ helmets+ sleeing bags+ and the li-e%+ and onl! a few truc-loads of 10/,

mm howit?er shells (n fact some of the first aratrooers into line had to be sulied with

ammunition from the ))B trains


14/32

(n addition+ 7oberts had sent the ))B truc-s bac- for resul! .ust before the roads were

closed There was+ of course+ a considerable uantit! of ammunition+ food+ and other sulies

inside Bastogne which the '((( )ors had been unable to evacuate $5fficers of Middleton2s

staff bitterl! regretted the loss of the wine and liuors which had been carefull! husbanded for

consumtion at )hristmas and 6ew Lear% Bastogne was si?able enough to have some reserve

civilian stoc-s+ and the melange of armor+ engineers+ and artiller! units around the cit! had,sulies and ammunition in their own vehicles $anca-es would aear regularl! in the

rations served during the siege+ these concocted from the doughnut flour left in a huge

American 7ed )ross dum%

Through assiduous scrounging+ reuisitioning+ and an enforced ooling of unit resources+ the

G, of the 101st would be able to wor- minor logistic miracles,but these alone would not

have insured the survival of the Bastogne garrison The airborne division had been sulied

b! air during the Holland oeration+ and when+ on the 81st+ McAuliffe -new that his

command was isolated he as-ed for aerial resul! nfortunatel! no lans had been wor-ed

out in advance for airlift suort and the sul! records of the Holland camaign,which

would have made logistic calculation and rocedure easier,were bac- in so Middleton and McAuliffe had

two,wa! hone and telet!e at their disosal throughout the siege (nside Bastogne

[461]

there were enough armored and artiller! units,comarativel! rich in signal euiment,to flesh

out a seed! and fairl! reliable command and artiller! net Tactical communication be!ond

the Bastogne erimeter+ however+ as for e#amle with the th Armored+ had to be couched in

ambiguous,sometimes uite meaningless,terms

Mobile forces racing cross,countr!+ shooting u isolated osts and convo!s+ do not

necessaril! ma-e a battle The German dash around Bastogne was reeminentl! designed to

encircle+ not constrict The German commanders+ well aware of the fragmenti?ation of their

enveloing forces+ did not consider that Bastogne had been surrounded until the evening of

the 81st The ma.or enem! imact on this date+ therefore+ came as in revious da!s against the

east face of Bastogne The American erimeter+ then ta-ing form+ reresents basicall! areaction to the original German intentions with onl! slight concessions to the aearance of

the enem! in the south and west The /08d held the northern sector of the American line in

the ongchams and 4onne,


15/32

west $The airborne engineers were not well euied with demolition matKriel and this road

had to be bloc-ed> McAuliffe honed the '((( )ors for assistance and in the earl! dar- a

detachment from the =/th *ngineer )ombat Battalion came north and did the .ob%

Directl! west of Bastogne la! the remnants of the division trains and service comanies

Defense here would devolve initiall! on the 80th Armored


16/32

records of this battalion were lost in later fighting+ but articiants in the action sea- of a

"determined" attac- b! two German rifle battalions and "vicious close,in fighting" Although

)olonel *well e#ected a second all,out assault when da!light ended+ this never came The

.)2dhad its orders to catch u with thePanzer Lehrvan in the west and during the night

assembled for the march to re.oin General Ba!erlein

4outh of the /01st ositions the enem! seemed content to sit bac- and shell the headuarters

of the 8d Battalion+ =8th+ at Marvie The 8d Battalion records no other action than the

aearance of some tan-s and infantr! along the Arlon road forcing a flan- e#tension across

the road German evidence+ however+ sea-s of attac-s b! the .)/stin this sector which

"miscarried" 11(f discretion in this articular instance roved the better art of valor+ it

robabl! was induced b! the ))B tan-s which had ta-en osition on the Arlon road


17/32

Battalion+ whose /0,caliber "meat choers" uic-l! ended this threat @un-el decided to

dela! an attemt for conclusion until the morrow

6orth and northwest of Bastogne the da! assed uietl!+ although small German detachments

did ma-e a few sorties on the Marche road The coman! of the =d Battalion+ =8th+ which

had been sent on a lone mission to aid the survivors of the division medical coman!+ wasattac-ed and momentaril! cut off but succeeded in re.oining the battalion

The Enemy Begins a +on#entri# (tta#!

The evening situation reort that reached OB WESTon the 81st made good reading

7undstedt was convinced that the time was rie for a concentric attac- to crush Bastogne and

ma-e this road center available for the build,u reuired

[464]

to suort the'ifth Panzer (rmyat or over the Meuse His order to Manteuffel made the

sei?ure of Bastogne a must+ but at the same time stressed the aramount necessit! of retaining

momentum in the drive west Manteuffel had anticiated the OB WESTcommand and during

the evening visited the0LII Panzer +orps2 command ost to ma-e certain that uettwit?

would start the suee?e on Bastogne the ne#t da!,but without involving the mobile armored

columns of thePanzer Lehr

Manteuffel+ uettwit?+ and @o-ott+ who was now made directl! resonsible for the conduct of

the Bastogne oeration+ were otimistic


18/32

The battle on the 88d+ therefore+ largel! centered along an arc rather roughl! delimited b!

'illerou# and the 6eufchCteau highwa! at one end and Mande,4t *tienne+ .ust north of the

Marche highwa!+ at the other 5ne cannot sea- of battle lines in this sector: the two

antagonists were mi#ed higgled!,iggled! and for much of the time with no certain

-nowledge of who was in what village or at what crossroads (t is indicative of the confusion

revailing that the /01st tried to evacuate its regimental baggage train,which had sufferedfrom enem! shelling,through 4ibret after1ampfgr$ppe 1$n!elhad cut the road north of the

town b! the dash into 'illerou# $The /01st lost fifteen truc-s and nearl! all its bed rolls%

The arena in uestion earlier had been the 101st service area and contained in addition a good

deal of the

[465]

'((( )ors2 artiller! and trains Much of the fighting on the 88d revolved around two

battalions of armored field artiller!: )olonel aton2s /&th Armored and

Browne2s 80th+ now oerating as a combined arms team on a +000,!ard erimeter in the

neighborhood of 4enonchams Tillet la! about si# miles west of 4enonchams Much of the

intervening countr!side was in the hands of roving atrols fromPanzer Lehr+ one of which

had erected a strong roadbloc- midwa! between the two villages

5n the night of the 81st the Germans encircled Tillet+ where aton+ hard ressed+ radioed the

'((( )ors for hel Middleton rela!ed this 454 to Bastogne but Browne+ himself under

attac- b! @un-el2s 26th ol!s "renadier Divisionreconnaissance battalion+ was forced to sa!

that the /&th would have to get bac- to 4enonchams under its own ower 6evertheless+Team Lantis $one medium tan-+ two light tan-s+ and a coule of rifle suads% moved forward

to the German roadbloc-+ e#ecting to give the /&th a hand when da! bro-e18

aton and his gunners never reached Team Browne+ 1=which had had its hands full Browne2s

force not onl! had to defend a section of the Bastogne erimeter and bar the 4enonchams

entr!+ but also had to serve the eighteen 10/,mm howit?ers which+ from batter! ositions east

and south of 4enonchams+ rovided round,the,cloc- fire suort for friendl! infantr! five to

eight miles distant )lose,in defense was rovided b! a latoon of thirt! stragglers who had

been rounded u b! an airborne officer and delo!ed three hundred !ards south of the gun

ositions $This latoon held for two da!s until all were -illed or catured% Browne2s main

weaon against the German tan-s and self,roelled guns was not his howit?ers but theseventeen 4herman tan-s brought u b! Team !le and Team 'an @leef the da! before

These were disosed with nine tan-s facing a series of wood lots west of the batter! ositions+

four firing south+ and the remaining four laced on the road to 'illerou#

At da!brea- the first tas- was to clear the enem! from the woods which la! uncomfortabl!

near the firing batteries !le2s scratch force of riflemen entered the woods but found onl! a

few Germans 5ff to the northwest came the sound of firing from the area -nown to be

occuied b! a battalion of the =8th Glider (nfantr!> so Browne reorted to )olonel 7oberts

that his team would .oin this fight as soon as the woods were clear Before the sortie could be

organi?ed+ a detachment from1ampfgr$ppe 1$n!elstruc- out from 'illerou# against the

American flan- Direct tan- fire chased the enem! awa!+ but this was onl! the oener Duringthe afternoon the enem! made three searate assaults from the woods that earlier had been
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19/32


20/32

Armored andthe th Armored $so vague was information inside the erimeter% were on their

wa! to Bastogne> to the men in the line this was heartening news

;hat ma! have been the biggest morale booster came with a reverse twist,the enem!

"ultimatum" About noon four Germans under a white flag entered the lines of the 8dBattalion+ =8th The terms of the announcement the! carried were simle: "the honorable

surrender of the encircled town+" this to be accomlished in two hours on threat of

"annihilation" b! the massed fires of the German artiller! The rest of the stor! has become

legend: how General McAuliffe disdainfull! answered "6uts"> and how )olonel Harer+

commander of the =8th+ hard ressed to translate the idiom+ comromised on "Go to Hell"

The ultimatum had been signed rather ambiguousl! b! "The German )ommander+" and none

of the German generals then in the Bastogne sector seem to have been an#ious to claim

authorshi1t )ol aul A Danah!+ G,8 of the 101st+ saw to it that the stor! was circulated,

and aroriatel! embellished,in the dail! eriodic reort: "The )ommanding General2s

answer was+ with a sarcastic air of humorous tolerance+ emhaticall! negative" 6onetheless

the 101st e#ected that the coming da!,the 8=d,would be rough

The morning of 8= December bro-e clear and cold "'isibilit! unlimited+" the air,control

osts hail! reorted all the wa! from the nited @ingdom to the fo#holes on the Ardennes

front To most of the American soldier! this would be a red,letter da!,long remembered,

because of the bombers and fighter,bombers once more streaming overhead li-e shoals of

silver minnows in the bright winter sun+ their sharl! etched contrails ma-ing a wa-e behind

them in the cold air

(n Bastogne+ however+ all e!es loo-ed for the suat lanes of the Troo )arrier )ommand

About 0900 a athfinder team droed inside the erimeter and set u the aaratus to guidethe ),2s over a dro ?one between 4enonchams and Bastogne The first of the carriers

droed its si# araac-s at 11/0+ and in little more than four hours 81 lanes had been

vectored to Bastogne *ach lane carried some twelve hundred ounds+ but not all reached the

dro ?one nor did all the araac-s fall where the Americans could recover them

6evertheless this da!2s dro lessened the inch,as the records of the 101st gratefull!

ac-nowledge 5n 8 December a total of 130 lanes would ta-e art in the dro> oor fl!ing

weather on )hristmas Da! virtuall! scrubbed all cargo missions,although eleven gliders did

bring in a team of four surgeons and some 5 badl! needed b! 7oberts2 tan-s The biggest

airlift da! of the siege would come on the 83th with 8&9 lanes fl!ing the Bastogne run1/

The bul- of the air cargo brought to Bastogne during the siege was artiller! ammunition B!the 8th the airborne batteries were down to ten rounds er tube and the wor- horse 80th

Armored


21/32

4L BL A(7Pathfinder $nit 5aove7 sets $p radar e8$ipment4 9edi#al s$pplies 5elo:7

are

draggedy hand from drop zone4

[469]


22/32

ver! lucrative targets This battalion+ covering a =30,degree front+ would in fact be forced to

ma-e its original 1+00 rounds last for five da!s The two 1//,mm howit?er battalions were

reall! awing at the bottom of the barrel The 939th fired thirt!,nine rounds on 8 December

and two da!s later could allow its gunners onl! twent!,seven rounds+ one,si#th the number of

rounds e#ended er da! when the battle began

The airdro on the 8=d brought a dividend for the troos defending Bastogne The cargo

lanes were all overwatched b! fighters who+ their rotective mission accomlished+ turned to

hammer the Germans in the Bastogne ring During the da! eight!,two ,2s lashed out at this

enem! with general,urose and fragmentation bombs+ naalm+ and machine gun fire The

101st reorted to Middleton+ whose staff was handling these air stri-es for the division+ that

"air and artiller! is having a field da! around Bastogne"

The German attac- on the 8=d was mounted b! the 26th ol!s "renadier Divisionand the

attached regiment left behind b!Panzer Lehr ac-ing the men and tan-s for an assault

around the entire erimeter+ General @o-ott elected to continue the fight at 4enonchams

while attac-ing in two sectors diametricall! oosite each other+ the Marvie area in thesoutheast and the


23/32

the =d Battalion+ however+ ulled bac- closer to Bastogne This enem! effort

also e#tended to embrace Team Browne More infantr! were hurried to 4enonchams on lighttan-s+ and at 1&=0 McAuliffe sent one half of his mobile reserve $Team )herr!% to give a

hand against the German tan-s But the American tan-s+ tan- destro!ers+ and artiller! alread!

on the scene were able to handle the an?ers without additional hel,and even while this fight

was on the cannoneers around 4enonchams turned their ieces to lob shells across the

erimeter in suort of the hard,driven aratrooers and tan-ers at Marvie

During the hours of light the .)/stmade no move to carr! out its scheduled attac- between

Marvie and the Arlon road Iuite ossibl! the activit! of the American fighter,bombers+ once

more in the s-ies+ made it necessar! to wait for nightfall Through the afternoon the enem!

shelled the 8d Battalion+ =8th+ and its command ost in Marvie As night came on the

barrage increased in intensit!+ sweeing along the battalion front and onto its northern flan-,be!ond Marvie,where Team 52Hara stood with its tan-s

At 1&/ the .)/st$with at least two tan- comanies in suort% commenced a co,ordinated

attac- delivered b! latoons and comanies against the front manned b! the 8d Battalion and

Team 52Hara135ne uic- rush ut an enem! detachment on a hill south of Marvie which

overloo-ed this village The latoon of aratrooers on the hill was surrounded and destro!ed+

but when a half,trac- and a brace of tan-s tried to move down the hill into Marvie a luc-!

shot or a mine disabled the half,trac-+ leaving no wa! ast for the tan-s 5n the Bastogne,

Arlon road a grou of tan-s $twelve were counted% started north toward the right flan- of the

8d Battalion Here )oman! < later reorted that the tan-s "made reeated attemts to

overrun our ositions but were halted" (t is robable that the three medium tan-s from Team

52Hara and the three tan- destro!ers from the 309th Tan- Destro!er Battalion which stood

astride the road $not to mention the dar-ness and artiller! fire% had a more chastening effect

on the an?ers than the small arms fire of the aratrooers

The Germans seem to have had the village of Marvie as their main ob.ective for b! midnight

the fight had died down all along the line e#cet at Marvie+ where it burst out with fresh

virulence (t is estimated that at least one rifle battalion and some fifteen tan-s were thrown

against )oman! * $now reinforced b! an understrength coman! of airborne engineers% and

Team 52Hara

[471]

sing the hill which earlier had been wrested from )oman! G as a mounting bloc-+ three

German tan-s made their wa! into the south edge of Marvie+ but 52Hara2s tan-s and assault

guns stoed a ma.or enetration from the east b! gunning down the an?ers silhouetted in

the glare of burning buildings+ thus enabling the Americans to hold on in the north half of the

village The threat of a breach here imelled McAuliffe to send the remaining half of Team

)herr! to Marvie Because this switch stried Bastogne of its last counterattac- force+

)herr!2s detachment+ which had gone west to assist Team Browne+ was recalled to Bastogne

An hour before dawn on the 8th the battle ended and uiet came to Marvie 52Hara2s troos
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24/32

had accounted for eight an?ers in this fight+ but the village was still clutched b! both

antagonists

The battle on the 8=d had been viewed in a somewhat somber light inside Bastogne That

evening+ onl! a few minutes after the German attac- began in the Marvie sector+ t )ol

Harr! ; 5 @innard $the 101st Airborne Division G,=% telehoned his oosite number atthe '((( )ors command ost The gist of his reort+ as recorded in the cors G,= .ournal+ was

this: "(n regard to our situation it is getting rett! stic-! around here The! Ethe th Armored

DivisionF must -ee coming The enem! has attac-ed all along the south and some tan-s are

through and running around in our area 7euest !ou inform th Armored Division of our

situation and as- them to ut on all ossible ressure"

The events of the ast hours had shown that the force under McAuliffe2s command was

overe#tended at a number of oints The artiller! groument west of Bastogne was

articularl! e#osed+ and the =8th Glider (nfantr! had alread! been forced to shorten its

lines Then too the segments of the erimeter defense were not as well coordinated as the!

might be The tan-ers of ))B comlained that the! had no idea of the airborne ositions+ anduite robabl! the regiments of the 101st were ha?! as to the location of the small tan- and

tan- destro!er detachments on their flan-s

)olonel @innard+ whose shar tactical sense was rated highl! b! all the commanders who

wor-ed with him during the siege+ drew u on 8 December a lan to regrou the Bastogne

forces The lan was ut into oeration that same evening @innard2s scheme laced all four

regiments of the 101st Airborne on the line as combined arms teams Team 52Hara and a

latoon of the 0/th Tan- Destro!er Battalion were attached to the /01st The /03th+ whose

sector had been uiet+ got two latoons of the 0/th but no tan-s The /08d was given two

latoons from the 0/th and Team Anderson $it is s!mtomatic of the shoestring defense

which erforce had evolved at the erimeter that )atain Anderson2s "team" consisted of two

cavalr! assault guns+ one tan- destro!er+ and two .ees% The =8th too- over the =83th

Airborne *ngineer Battalion+ two latoons of the 9th Armored *ngineer Battalion $which had

won distinction in the 6oville fight%+ and four latoons of the 0/th Also attached to the

=8th was the amalgam of infantr!+ tan- destro!ers+ and tan-s which had grown u around

Browne2s 80th Armored


25/32

MA

7oberts $)olonel Browne was wounded b! a shell fragment on the 8th and died the ne#t

da!% 1

This read.ustment of the 101st ositions resulted in a taut and tenuous line aro#imatel!

si#teen miles $Map 4% That it could not be defended in eual strength at all oints was not

onl! a militar! ahorism but a simle fact dictated b! the troos available and the accidents of

the ground )reation of a tactical reserve was therefore mandator!+ albeit difficult of

accomlishment with the limited mechani?ed force at McAuliffe2s disosal The 101st

reserve+ as now organi?ed+ consisted of 7oberts2 ))B> that is Teams )herr! and Arnsdorf

$with erhas nine medium and five light tan-s oerational at an! given time% lus a art of

the original Team 46A


26/32

woefull! limited,as shown b! the commitment of Team )herr! on oosite sides of the

erimeter during 8=,8 December

General uettwit?+ with onl! a reinforced division to use against Bastogne+ was worse off

than McAuliffe He had been given rather vague romises of reinforcement+ but no decision

was rendered b! the High )ommand until the 8=d when Hitler agreed to release two freshdivisions $the .th Panzerand /th Panzer "renadier% from the O1Wreserve 5nce these

troos were handed over to(rmy "ro$p B+


27/32

the troos had in each other> a lesson for future commanders ma! be read in the considerable

effort ut forth b! McAuliffe+ 7oberts+ and the regimental commanders to arise all the

troos of the "situation"

)hristmas *ve in the German headuarters brought forth some cognac and a few "Prosits" but

in the main was devoted to rearations for a ma.or attac- on )hristmas Da! As late as theevening of the 8th uettwit? hoed to obtain more troos from the /th Panzer "renadier

Division+ but the


28/32

A BA4T5G6*4T7**TA


29/32

The original time schedule was e#ceedingl! otimistic: to ut in the infantr! assault at 000>

to brea- through the American rifle line b! 0300+ at which time the artiller! could see to fire

on targets of oortunit! and the tan-s would be able to move with seed> and to rush an

armored grou from the /th Panzer "renadierinto Bastogne between 0&00 and 0900 hours

before the American fighter,bombers too- to the air

The otimism breathed b! this schedule must have e#ired shortl! after it was ut on aer

although the lan remained @o-ott has recorded his shoc- and surrise at the wea- state of

the reinforcements brought in b! Dec-ert: the //th &egiment$three battalions of fusiliers%+

the reconnaissance battalion and two armored field artiller! battalions of the /th Panzer

"renadier Division+ a coman! of tan- destro!ers+ and seventeen tan-s belonging to the

//th Panzer Battalion Hitler2s failure to name Bastogne as the rimar! ob.ective had been

reflected in the dilator! and contradictor! orders issued b! the higher commanders for the

emlo!ment of Dec-ert2s division True+ the second of Dec-ert2s regiments $the /)*th% finall!

had been given to the0LII Panzer +orps+ but on )hristmas *ve it was toiling slowl! toward

the east side of Bastogne and would not arrive in time to .oin the battle )ol ;olfgang

Mauc-e+ commander of the //th+ ob.ected,as strongl! as a colonel would dare,when hereceived his orders toward dus- on the 8th He had been given no time for reconnaissance>

no coordination had been arranged with the tan-s suosed to suort the //th Mauc-e2s

sueriors siml! ointed out the tremendous advantage that would accrue to a surrise attac-

on )hristmas Da!,he had his orders19

The main assault+ handed the elements of the /th Panzer "renadier+ was to be a straight

thrust over


30/32

/08d was delo!ed on the northwest edge of the village+ its right flan- .oining the 8d

Battalion in a large wood lot midwa! between )hams and ongchams )lad in white snow

suits the first German assault art!+ some fift! grenadiers from the ,,th+ cret forward under

the waning moon toward )hams At 000 this grou dashed into the village and the German

attac- began More of the enem! moved through the woods against the left flan- of the 8d

Battalion+ and within the hour a full German battalion had .oined the fight )oman! Bmoved u as a bac-sto if its sister coman! should be engulfed or ushed aside+ but the

confused melee around )hams in the redawn dar-ness inned the Germans down

Meanwhile the two assault battalions of the /th Panzer "renadier Divisionwere moving

against the =d Battalion of the =8th The tan- grou on the right of the German line drew

ahead of its marching artner and an hour and a uarter after the advance began reorted to

@o-ott that the onl! evidence of American reaction was some tan- or tan- destro!er fire

coming in from the south Thirt! minutes later a brief and otimistic radio message flashed to

the rear: the tan-s and the infantr! battalion festooned thereon had reached the western edge

of Bastogne But elation at the German command ost was short lived> word that the German

tan-s were in the streets of Bastogne never came The commander of the //thsent a liaisonofficer forward to find the battalion or its tan-s+ but without success German forward

observers were alerted to listen for the sound of German tan- fire,but all the! could hear was

the crash of artiller! fire and the crum of e#loding mortar shells

The stor! of the lost tan- grou is soon told The eighteen Mar- ('2s and the riding grenadiers

had bro-en through the ositions held b! )omanies A and B of the =8th Glider (nfantr!

before dawn and got as far as the battalion command ost 4everal of the enem! tan-s assed

straight through batter! ositions of the //th the aratrooers2 ba?oo-as accounted for

two more

The half of the enem! tan-,infantr! formation which had -et on toward Hemroulle after-nifing through the =8th fo#hole line received its #o$p de gr;#ein a fur! of cross fire laid
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31/32

down b! four of the 0/th tan- destro!ers+ tan-s from Team 7oberts+ the 3=d arachute

so the! la! in the snow and too- their losses The regimentalcommander+ )olonel Mauc-e+ began in midmorning to re,form his remaining troos+ ulling

what was left of the /st Battalionbac- to a hill southeast of


32/32

faced arts of the .)/stand %.thawa! from Bastogne in suort of the aratrooers 6ow

word came that the th Para#h$te Divisionhad bro-en and that the %.th &egimentwas under

attac- @o-ott had little to give the %.th+ onl! five or si# tan-s which had .ust been reaired+

and he did not dare ut these on the road until dar-ness sent the American fighter,bombers

home Both @o-ott and the cors commander+ uettwit?+ still e#ected the main battle to be

fought on the Arlon or 6eufchCteau road+ but in the late afternoon the commander of the %.thradioed that American tan-s had bro-en through farther to the west at Assenois @o-ott as-ed

uettwit? for hel+ but the latter had emt! hands ate that night new orders came from

The Battle of Bastogne

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Transcript of The Battle of Bastogne