The Battle of AP Bac

8/12/2019 The Battle of AP Bac

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Battle of Ap Bac

The ARVN and The Battle of Ap Bac

With the Geneva Accords of 1954, the French agreed that Vietnam should be split

into two halves at the 1th!arallel as a temporar" measure until elections could beheld in 195# to decide whether the $ationalist%&ommunists 'of $orth Vietnam( or the

$ationalist%&apitalists 'of )outh Vietnam( should rule the reunited countr"* +he

elections never too place, and the -epublic of ')outh( Vietnam under the corrupt

leadership of $go .inh .iem established itself under /) patronage*

+here had technicall" been a 0-epublic of Vietnam and a 0Vietnamese $ational

Arm" since 1949* +his was, however, a French attempt to 2ustif" their war in

3ndochina to an international audience* +he Vietnamese $ational Arm" eventuall"

numbered around 1, men 'including air and naval forces(* 3n addition, there

were regional &ivil Guard battalions 'which were full%time, but generall" less well

euipped and trained than the regulars( and part%time 0local self%defence militias inthe villages* 6n 1st7anuar" 1954, the regular troops consisted of 45 infantr"

battalions, 4 parachute battalions, 1 reconnaissance regiment '8 armoured car

suadrons(, 4 mortar companies, 54 light infantr" battalions and 14 heav" weapons

companies* +he officers were predominantl" pro%French, and laced staff eperience

in most cases*

+here were man" factions 'including the senior officers of the Arm"( who did not

support .iem as leader* :owever, b" a miture of force and political manoeuvre

'supported b" the /)( he prevailed and the Arm" was reorganised as the Arm" of the

-epublic of Vietnam 'A-V$(*

With the changeover to direct /) support 'under French control the Vietnamese

Arm" had been paid for b" the /)A, but via France(, the new A-V$ was epected to

fight a ;orean st"le conventional war against invading $orth Vietnamese regular

soldiers* +he" were built up and trained for this st"le of warfare, which made their

units too heav" and cumbersome for the counter%insurgenc" warfare the" were forced

to undertae as resistance to the increasingl" autocratic .iem built during the late

195s*

ations % the &ivil Guard '&G( and the Village )elf .efence &orps

').&(* +he larger of these, the &ivil Guard, eisted within the @inistr" of 3nterior

and was funded and advised b" the /*)* 6perations @ission '/)6@(* 3ts 4=,

Author: Danny O'Hara


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men, therefore, were not counted against the 'Washington set( 15,%man force

level ceiling that regulated the si>e of .iems regular forces* $or were the 4,

members of the )elf .efence &orps, even though this organi>ation received limited

amounts of /*)* militar" assistance funds* 3n an" case, serious shortcomings wereevident in both the &G and the ).&* 6rgani>ed into provincial companies directl"

responsible to the various province chiefs, the &ivil Guard was entirel" separate from

the A-V$ chain of command* Furthermore, American civilians under government

contract had armed and trained the &G for police%t"pe as opposed to militar"

missions* +he ).&, essentiall" a scattering of local militia units, was even weaer,

having been organised at the village level into suads and an occasional platoon*

Although the ).& units were subordinate to the respective village chief, the A-V$

bore the responsibilit" for providing them with arms and training* @ore often than not

the A-V$ units gave their obsolete weapons to the ).& and showed little genuine

interest in training them*

3n earl" 1959, the entire A-V$ was in the final phase of a reorganisation programme

which would culminate b" mid%"ear in the formation of seven divisions of uniform

si>e '1,5 men each(, five territorial regiments, and an airborne brigade 'formed

from the old Arm" parachute regiment(* /nder the new organisation the seven

standard divisions were to be deplo"ed in or near population centres throughout the

countr" and were to be organi>ed under two corps headuarters, one '3 &orps( located

at .a $ang, and the other '33 &orps( located at !leiu in the &entral :ighlands* A

third provisional corps headuarters had also been formed in )aigon for activation in

the event of a national emergenc"*


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3n the French War, Viet @inh bases in inaccessible areas gave good securit" as, apart

from dropping paratroopers into the area, other units had long marches with man"

chances of ambush before entering the V@ stronghold* +his gave the V@ ample

opportunit" to either flee or prepare intricate ambush s"stems to defeat the attacers*With the introduction of /) helicopters to the war, A-V$ units could be transferred

in minutes to positions that were several da"s 2ourne" from their bases* +his

massivel" improved both mobilit" and surprise for the A-V$*

+he building of two mechanised companies with 15 @118 A!&s each in April 19#?

gave a similar increase in firepower and assault capabilit" to the A-V$* +hese two

units were deplo"ed in the @eong .elta region 'which was the most active at that

point( and proved themselves able to put V& units 'who apparentl" had no anti%

armour weapons( to flight*

6peration in the .elta during 19#? had shown that with their American advisors andeuipment, the A-V$ could defeat the V& guerrillas* )everal actions had resulted in

V& routs C and heav" losses from fighter%bombers dropping bombs and napalm on

the fleeing guerrillas* +here had been some disturbing 'for the /) advisors(

tendencies for the A-V$ commanders to not press combat with the V& and to leave

the wor to artiller" and air units* :owever there was still confidence that if the V&

would stand up and fight the A-V$ in a conventional manner then the technological

superiorit" of their euipment would destro" the guerrillas and give etra confidence

to A-V$ troops and commanders*

+he ideal opportunit" seemed to present itself at the end of .ecember 19#?, when

surveillance showed the presence of a main force V& unit in the hamlet of +an +hoi

fourteen miles northwest of @" +ho 'and about fort" miles southwest of )aigon(*

-adio intercepts seem to indicate that the V& was using +an +hoi as some form of

headuarters centre, and that a reinforced compan" of main force V& defended the

position 'i*e* about 1? men(* An attac b" the local A-V$ formation, the th

.ivision, was planned for the ?nd7anuar" 19#8 b" the /) advisor" team* /nits of the

th.ivision 'which had the best record for action against the V& at that point( would

be supported b" &ivil Guard battalions, together with the 4th @echani>ed -ifle

)uadron of the ?nd Armoured &avalr" -egiment in @118 A!&s, and helicopters

'both transports and the new gunships(* +he plan involved converging assaults on the

hamlet b" the ?nd

one waiting to

advance and trap the retreating V&* +wo companies of the 1 st


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At that point, the /)A had deplo"ed a few helicopter transport companies to

Vietnam, mainl" euipped with the Vertol &:%?1 )hawnee '0Fl"ing


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Battle of Ap Bac

+he battalion commander then attempted various half%hearted flaning manoeuvresfor the net two hours, until he was lightl" wounded himself and the efforts petered

out* .uring these two hours, the battalion called in repeated artiller" stries but these

all landed behind the V& positions* At around 1E, the battalion commander radioed

his superior '@a2or Dam Huang +ho, the province chief, who had his :H less than

8m to the south( reuesting support* :e reported eight dead and fourteen wounded

'including himself(* -ather than order +as Force < to support their comrades, or

moving up and taing charge himself, or attempting to sort out the artiller" problems

'which had been reported to him b" one of the American advisors(, +ho called the th

.ivision commander '&olonel


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and machine guns, and were ama>ed that the V& continued to return fire and did not

flee as had previousl" happened with helicopter attacs* +he &:%?1s had dropped

their A-V$ troops 'who dived into the mud of the padd" fields and generall" refused

to fire(, and then attempted to tae off* All of the helicopters had received multiplehits, but onl" one was unable to lift* +he pilot reported that he was shutting his engine

and that he, his co%pilot and two crewmen would tae cover with the A-V$*

+he helicopter crews had a 0code which said that downed crew should be rescued

straight awa", and that leaving them to mae the best of it with the A-V$ was not

enough* +herefore one of the other &:%?1s landed between the downed helicopter

and Ap


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+he infantr" that


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At 18E45, the first three @118s were across the canal and could advance towards


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forwards* +he dug%in V&, without an" anti%tan weaponr", should soon brea and

runK


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Battle of Ap Bac

The View From The Other Side

+he V& commander of the ?#1stV& @ain Force


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+he village guerrilla scouts had raised the alarm at about 4E 'having heard the

&ivil Guards set off(, and the troops manned their positions* +he plan b" the ?#1 st

commander was to spring a heav" ambush on the approaching A-V$, then melt awa"

before reinforcements arrived*

:owever, events unfolded differentl" and b" noon the V& commander realised that he

had no escape ecept for eastwards across open swamp where fighter%bombers would

cut his men down* +he officers and $&6s passed amongst the V& positions and told

the men that retreat was impossible until nightfall C it was 0


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$on%&ommunist struggle, and could not understand how the A-V$ didnJt tae the

opportunit" to destro" a V& regular formation* )ome of the officers C &aptain


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to stand and tae most of what comes their wa"* +he list of troops involved on both

sides isE

A-V$ ?nd

The Battle of AP Bac

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