The Battle Against Phishing: Dynamic Security Skins Rachna Dhamija and J.D. Tygar U.C. Berkeley.

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The Battle Against Phishing: Dynamic Security Skins Rachna Dhamija and J.D. Tygar U.C. Berkeley

Transcript of The Battle Against Phishing: Dynamic Security Skins Rachna Dhamija and J.D. Tygar U.C. Berkeley.

Page 1: The Battle Against Phishing: Dynamic Security Skins Rachna Dhamija and J.D. Tygar U.C. Berkeley.

The Battle Against Phishing:Dynamic Security Skins

Rachna Dhamija

and J.D. Tygar

U.C. Berkeley

Page 2: The Battle Against Phishing: Dynamic Security Skins Rachna Dhamija and J.D. Tygar U.C. Berkeley.

Security Properties for Usability

1. Limited human skills property

2. Unmotivated users property

3. General purpose graphics property

4. Golden arches property

5. Barn door property

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Security Properties for Usability

1. Limited human skills property

2. Unmotivated users property

3. General purpose graphics property

4. Golden arches property

5. Barn door property

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Limited Human Skills Property

• Limited password recall • Hard to parse domain names

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Security Properties for Usability

1. Limited human skills property

2. Unmotivated users property1. Security is often the secondary goal

3. General purpose graphics property

4. Golden arches property

5. Barn door property

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Users Don’t Check Certificates

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Security Properties for Usability

1. Limited human skills property

2. Unmotivated users property

3. General purpose graphics property

4. Golden arches property

5. Barn door property

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Firefox Browser: 4 SSL indicators

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Firefox browser - No unsecure indicators

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Security Properties for Usability

1. Limited human skills property

2. Unmotivated users property

3. General purpose graphics property

4. Golden arches property1. Train users not to automatically trust a logo or brand

5. Barn door property

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The golden arches property

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Security Properties for Usability

1. Limited human skills property

2. Unmotivated users property

3. General purpose graphics property

4. Golden arches property

5. Barn door property

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Strong Password Protocols

• Stanford Web PwdHash

• Password Authenticated Key Agreement– EKE, SPEKE, SNAPI, AuthA, PAK, SRP, etc…

H(password, siteID)Password

ProtocolPassword

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Password Authenticated Key Agreement

• Advantages:– preserve familiar use of passwords

• user doesn’t need a trusted device• secret stored in memory of the user

– server doesn’t store password– no passwords sent over the network– user authentication (& mutual authentication)

• But how to enter the password?

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Our Solution: Usability Goals

• User must be able to verify password prompt, before entering password

• Rely on human skills– To login, recognize 1 image & recall 1 password– To verify server, compare 2 images

• Hard to spoof security indicators

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Trusted Password Window

• Dedicated window

• Trusted path customization

• Random photo assigned or chosen

• Image stored in browser, do not have to go through server

• Image overlaid across window

• User recognizes image first– then enters password

• Password not sent to server

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Security Indicators

• How can user distinguish secure windows?– Static indicators (SSL)

• Can be spoofed• User do not really examine it

– User customized indicators (Passmark/Petnames)• Require extra efforts from the user

– Automated customized indicators

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Our Solution: Dynamic Security Skins

Automatically customize secure windows

Visual hashes– Random Art - visual hash algorithm – Generate unique abstract image for each authentication– Use the image to “skin” windows or web content– Browser generated or server generated

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Browser Generated Images

Browser chooses random number and generates image

Can be used to modify border or web elements

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Server Generated Images

Server & browser independently generate same image

Server can customize its own page

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Conclusions

• Benefits:– Achieves mutual authentication– Resistant to phishing and spoofing– Relies on human skills

• Weaknesses:– Users must check images

• easier than checking a cert– Local storage of personal image reduces

portability, requires security– Doesn’t address spyware, keyloggers

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Status and Future Work

• Iterative design & “lo-fi” testing of interface

• Formal user study

• DSS Mozilla extension

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Customized Indicators: Petname Toolbar

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Automated Indicators:Secure Random Dynamic Boundaries