The Basics of Nuclear Weapons · 2016-10-15 · Not just a bigger bomb… The destrucve eﬀect of...

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Hans M. Kristensen Director, Nuclear Information Project

Federation of American Scientists Phone: 202-454-4695

Email: [email protected]

Presentation to Introduction to WMD Nonproliferation Course

James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies Washington, D.C. February 8, 2016

The Basics of Nuclear Weapons: Physics, Fuel Cycles, Effects and Arsenals

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Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide 2

NuclearChainReac.ons:FissionandFusionAnuclearweaponisaexplosivedevicethatusesacontrolleduncontrollednuclearchainreac4ontoreleasehugeamountsofenergy.

Nuclearweaponsmakeuseofoneortwoformsofinterac4onsbetweenatoms:

Fission:usesaneutrontosplitanucleustoreleaseneutronsthatsplitmorenucleitocreateasupercri4calfissionprocess.

Fusion:theoppositeoffission,combines(melts)twolightnucleiintooneheaviernucleus.Thereleasedneutroncan,ifnecessary,beusedtodriveanotherfissionevent.

Anuclearweaponusesoneoracombina4onofthesetwoprocesses.

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NuclearFuelCycle

Allbombfuelcomesfromtheground(Uranium)but...

Uraniumoretypicallycontainslessthan1%uranium

Ofthat1%,only0.7%isU-235:

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NuclearFuelCycle

Nuclearweaponsfuelcycleisfocusedonprocessingthefueltothoseisotopesmosteffec4veinweapons.

Uraniumweaponsrequiresimplerandshorterfuelcyclethanplutoniumweapons.

Plutoniumweaponsrequireprocessingofspentreactorfuelandextrac4on,purifica4on,andengineeringofplutonium.

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NuclearFuelCycle

Threebasictypesofuraniumenrichment

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NuclearFuelCycle

Enrichmenteffort(energyexpenditure)ismeasuredintermsof“separa4veworkunits”(SWU):

GradesofUranium:

Depleteduranium(DU):<7%U-235Naturaluranium:7%U-235Low-enricheduranium(LEU):>7%but<20%U-235Highly-enricheduranium(HEU):>20%U-235Weapons-gradeuranium:>90%U-235

•  About4SWU!1kgofLEU(~3%)fromabout6kgofnaturaluranium*

•  About200SWU!1kgweapons-gradeHEUfromabout200kgofnaturalU*

•  About5,000SWU!1weapon(25kg)fromabout5,000kgofnaturalU*

•  About100,000SWU!fuelfor1,000MW(e)LWRfor1year’sopera4on(e.g.Iran’sBushehrreactor)

ImportanttorealizethatmuchoftheSWU/kgworktoproduceweapons-gradeHEUisalreadydoneinproducingLEUfromnaturalU;star.ngfromLEUwouldgiveaproliferatorahugeheadstart

*Assumesanominalwasteassayof0.25%uramium.

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NuclearFuelCycle

Pu-239isreadilyfissionableandmoresothanU-235.Pu-239alsohasamuchhigherrateofspontaneousfissionthanU-235.

Plutoniumcoreproduc4onmodelallegedlyphotographedbyMordechaiVanunuinsidetheIsraeliDimonareactorcomplex

GradesofPlutonium:

ForweaponspurposesthePu-239percentageshouldbeaslargeaspossible:*

•  Weapon-grade:<6%Pu-240andothernon-Pu-239isotopes;

•  Fuel-grade:from6to18%Pu-240;

•  Reactor-grade:>18%Pu-240.

•  “Super-grade”:<3%Pu-240.

•  “Weapon-usable”referstoplutoniumthatisinseparatedformandthereforerela4velyeasytofashionintoweapons.

*Butallplutoniumispoten4allyuseableforaweapon.

Plutoniumbuion(lej)allegedlyusedinNagasakibomb.Plutoniumring(right)usedforstorage.

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NuclearFuelCycle

TheIAEAdefinestheamountsoffissilematerial“requiredforasinglenucleardevice”as8kgofplutonium,8kgofU-233,and25kgofU-235.Butthatapparentlydependsontheskillsandtechnicalcapabilityoftheproducer:

ApproximateFissileMaterialRequiredforPureFissionNuclearWeapons*

Weapon-GradePlutonium(kg) Highly-EnrichedUranium(kg)

Yield TechnicalCapability TechnicalCapability

(kt) Low Medium High Low Medium High

1 3 1.5 1 8 4 2.5

5 4 2.5 1.5 11 6 3.5

10 5 3 2 13 7 4

20 6 3.5 3 16 9 5

*ReproducedfromThomasB.CochranandChristopherE.Paine,TheAmountofPlutoniumandHighly-EnrichedUraniumNeededforPureFissionNuclearWeapons,NuclearWeaponsDatabook,NaturalResourcesDefenseCouncil,RevisedApril13,1995,p.9.

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NuclearWarheadTypes

Gun-typefissionweapon:useschemicalexplosivestocombinetwosubcri4calmassesofHEUintoonesupercri4calmassofHEU.50-60kg(110-132lbs)Example:Hiroshimabomb(yield:~13.5kt).

Single-stage,fissionweapon:useschemicalexplosivestocompressHEU(12-18kg;26-39lbs)orPu(4-6kg;8-13lbs)subcri4calmassintosupercri4calmass.Example:Nagasakibomb(yield:~22kt).Canbe“boosted”bydeuterium-tri4umgasto~80kt.

Two-stage,thermonuclearweapon:combinesfissiondevice(primaryortrigger)withfusiondevice(secondaryorCannedSub-Assembly).AllUSnuclearweapondesignscurrentareofthistype.Yieldsrangefrom0.3to1,200kilotons;mostyieldcomesfromsecondary.

Abombisabombisabombisa…

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NuclearWeaponsEffectsNotjustabiggerbomb…

Thedestruc4veeffectofnuclearweaponsisunlikeanyothercreatedmyhumanbeings.

100%fissionof1kgPu-239orU-235canproduceanexplosionequivalenttomorethan18,000tonsofTNT.

DowntownHiroshimadaysajerairburstof13.5ktHEUgun-typebomb

(Above)ThemostpowerfulU.S.conven4onalbomb–theGBU-43/BMassiveOrdnanceAirBlast(MOAB)–hasanexplosiveyieldofapproximately0.011ktTNT,roughly304meslessthanthelowestyieldserng(0.3kt)ontheB61nuclearbomb(below).TheB61-12weighs850lbs(385kg),nearlythirty4meslessthattheMOAB’s22,600lbs(10,300kg).

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NuclearWeaponsEffects

•  Fireball:x-raysinstantlycreatelargespheretensofmillionsofdegreeshot

•  EMP:instantaneouslycrateselectromagne4cpulsethatcandestroyordisruptelectronicequipment

•  Heatandlightwave:causesfiresandburnsinseconds(firescansignificantlyaddtoeffects)

•  Promptradia.on:harmfultolifeanddamagingtoelectronicequipment

•  Airblastwave(loweratmosphere):hundredsofmilesperhourwinds

•  Shockwave(surfaceornear-surfaceburst):causesdamagetoundergroundstructures

•  Residualradia.on:emiiedoverextendedperiodof4me

•  Electronic:extendedinterferenceofcommunica4onsequipment

Maintypesofeffectsfromnuclearweaponsdetona4on:

Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide

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Grabletest(15kt),Opera4onUpshot-Knothole,Nevada,May25,1953

Nucleartests(atmosphericbefore1963)wereusedtostudyeffectsofnuclearweapons–andtodevelopmoreeffec4venuclearweapons.


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Strikeplanningseekstomaximizeeffec4venessofnuclearblastagainstdifferenttargetstokilltargetbydetona4ngtheweaponsattheop4mumheightofburst(HOB).

Surfacetargetsaredestroyedbycombina4onofheatandblastwave.

Fireball

Blastwave

Blastwavebouncingbackfromsurface

Tanksandtrucks

Theinterac4onbetweentheblast(incident)waveandreflectedwavecreatesaprecursorwavethatreinforcestheincidentwavetravelingalongtheground.Becauseofthis,airblastismaximizedwithalow-airburstratherthanasurfaceburst.


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Destruc4onofundergroundfacili4esrequireground-orshallowsub-surfaceburststoensureshockwavecausesanundergroundfractureor“damagezone”.

Inasub-surfacebursttheshockwavemovingupwardistrappedbythesurfacematerialandreflecteddownwardwhereitreinforcestheoriginalchockwave.This“coupling”effectenablesanearth-penetratortodestroyundergroundtargets2-54mesdeeperthangroundburstweapons.

1kt:destroystoafew10sofmeters1MT:destroystoafew100sofmeters

B61-11droptestintofrozensoil


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Withapenetra4oncapabilityinhardrock(topright)of10feet(3meters),thedamagezonefroma400-ktB61-11blastwouldextendtoaround500feet(150meters).

Inwetsoil(boiomright),thedamagezonefroma400-ktB61-11blastat25feet(8meters)wouldreach1,200feet(365meters).

Source:CounteringProliferaMonofCompoundingIt?,NRDC2003


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Radioac4vecontamina4onareaissignificantfortheyieldsrequiredtobeeffec4veagainsthardanddeeplyburiedtargets(~2,000sqkmforB61-11).

Radioac4vefalloutwouldalsocontaminateallies.

Source:CounteringProliferaMonofCompoundingIt?,NRDC2003 Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide

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NuclearWeaponsEffects:Strategies

(Very)Simplyspeaking,therearetwogeneraltypesofnuclearemploymentstrategies:

Counter-force:employsnuclearnuclearforces“todestroythemilitarycapabili4esofanenemyorrenderthemimpotent.Typicalcounterforcetargetsinclude:bomberbases,ballis.cmissilesubmarinebases,intercon.nentalballis.cmissile(ISBM)silos,an.ballis.candairdefenseinstalla.ons,commandandcontrolcenters,andweaponsofmassdestruc.onstoragefacili.es.Generally,thenuclearforcesrequiredtoimplementacounter-forcetarge.ngstrategyarelargerandmoreaccuratethanthoserequiredtoimplementacounter-valuestrategy.Counter-valuetargetsgenerallytendtobeharder,moreprotected,moredifficulttofind,andmoremobilethancounter-valuetargets.”

Counter-value:directsthe“destruc4onorneutraliza4onofselectedenemymilitaryandmilitary-relatedtargetssuchasindustries,resources,and/orins.tu.onsthatcontributetotheabilityoftheenemytowagewar.Ingeneral,weaponsrequiredtoimplementthisstrategyneednotbeasnumerousnorasaccurateasthoserequiredtoimplementacounter-forcetarge.ngstrategybecausecounter-valuetargetstendtobesojerandlessprotectedthancounter-forcetargets.”

Obamaadministra4ondidnotchangecounter-forcefocus:The2013NuclearEmploymentStrategy“requirestheUnitedStatestomaintainsignificantcounterforcecapabili4esagainstpoten4aladversaries.Thenewguidancedoesnotrelyona‘counter-value’or‘minimumdeterrence’strategy.”


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Thereisno“clean”nuclearwar.

Even“limited”counter-forceaiackswouldhavecreateextensivecollateraldamage.

Limitedcounter-forceaiacksareimportantscenariosinpost-ColdWarplanning.


Source:NuclearDeterrence,NuclearWarPlanning,andScenariosofNuclearConflict,FAS/NRDC,2014

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Large-scaleaiacks,evenpurelycounterforce,wouldhavedevasta4ngcivilianconsequencesandcauseclima4ceffectsandfamineonaglobalscale.

Source:TheNuclearWarPlan:ATimeForChange,NRDC2001


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NuclearArsenals:GlobalInventoriesMorethan125,000warheadsproducedsince1945

Peakof64,500stockpiledwarheadsin1986(70,300ifincludingre4redwarheads)

• USstockpilepeakedearly(1967)• Russianstockpilepeakedlate(1986)

Enormousreduc4onssince1986peak:

• ~54,000warheadstockpilereduc4on• ~47,000+warheadsdismantled

~10,000warheadsinstockpiles(~15,000ifcoun4ngre4redwarheadsawai4ngdismantlement)

USandRussiapossess90%ofglobalinventory(94%ifcoun4ngre4redwarheads);eachhasmorethan4.mesmorewarheadsthanrestofworldcombined;154mesmorethanthird-largeststockpile(France)

Decreasing:US,Russia,Britain,France

Increasing:China,Pakistan,India

Israelrela4velysteady;NorthKoreatrying


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NuclearArsenals:Trends Withmorethan90%ofworldinventory,USandRussiahavespecialresponsibilitytoreduce

Reduc4onofdeployedstrategicwarheadsfromsome23,000in1989to3,500in2015(NewSTARTcounts3,185)

Readinesslevelofremainingstrategicforcesishigh:about1,800warheadsonpromptalert

Noofficialde-aler4ng,butsignificantreduc4onofoverallalertnumbers:heavybombersde-alerted,USICBMsandSLBMsdownloaded,non-strategicforcesde-alerted

Trend:paceofreduc.onisslowing

UScutonly396warheadsin2010-2014,comparedwith3,457warheadscutin2005-2009

Russiacutanes4mated1,100warheadsin2010-2014,comparedwith2,600in2005-2009

Insteadofcon4nuingpaceorincreasingreduc4ons,USandRussianstockpilesappeartobelevelingoutforthelonghaul;newemphasisonmoderniza4on

Newini4a4vesneededtopreventstallingofarmscontrol

Note:re4red,buts4llintact,warheadsawai4ngdismantlementarenotshown


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NuclearArsenals:Non-Strategic•  U.S.andRussiancombinedstockpilesofnon-strategic

nuclearwarheadsreducedbyroughly90percentsince1991.Neithersidehasdisclosedactualnumbers

•  Russia:twopublicdeclara4ons:2005:Russian“non-strategicnuclearforces”havebeenreduced“byfour4mes”since1991.

2010:“theRussianarsenalofnon-strategicnuclearweaponsisreducedfour4mes[75%]*incomparisonwiththeUSSRarsenal.”Allareincentralstorage

*Note:PNIdeclara4onsdonotaddupto75%

•  UnitedStates:twopublicdeclara4ons:2010:"ThenumberofU.S.non-strategicnuclearweaponsdeclinedbyapproximately90percentfromSeptember30,1991toSeptember30,2009.”

2014:"ThenumberofU.S.non-strategicnuclearweaponshasdeclinedbyapproximately90percentsinceSeptember30,1991.”

~180USB61bombsforward-deployedinEurope

•  Some2,500warheadsremainassignedtonon-strategicforces(Russia~2,000;UnitedStates~500)

•  Severalthousandsaddi4onalre4red,buts4llrela4velyintact,warheadsinstorageareawai4ngdismantlement

•  Stockpileswilllikelycon4nuetodeclineinnextdecadewithorwithoutarmscontrolagreements


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NuclearArsenals:RussiaGradualphase-outofsoviet-erasystemsandpar4alreplacementwith“new”systemsbyearly-mid2020s

Replacementbegantwodecadesago

DiverseNuclearForces

Strategic

ICBM:3typesbeingreplacedby2in6versions

SLBM:2typesbeingplacedby1

Bombers:2typesbeingreplacedby1

Non-Strategic

Navy:SLCM,SAM,ASWmissiles,torpedoes,depthbombs

AirForce:cruisemissile,bombs

Army:short-rangeballis4cmissiles,intermediate-rangecruisemissile

Defense:ballis4cmissiledefense,air-defense,coastaldefense

OldSystem

NewSystem MIRV FirstDeployed

SS-18 Sarmat(RS-28) Yes 2020-2025?

SS-19 SS-27Mod1(TopolM)SS-27Mod2(RS-24)

NoYes

20972014

SS-25 SS-27Mod1(Topol-M)SS-27Mod2(RS-24)SS-27Mod3(RS-26)SS-27Mod4(Rail)

NoYesYesYes

200620102016?2020?

SS-N-18SS-N-23

SS-N-32(Bulava)SS-N-32(Bulava)

YesYes

2016-2018?2020-2030?

Tu-95MSTu-160

PAK-DAPAK-DA

2020-2030?2020-2030?


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ICBM•  SS-27Mod2(mobile):replacingSS-25satNovosibirsk,Tagil,Yoshkar-Ola•  SS-27Mod2(silo):replacingSS-19satKozelsk•  SS-27Mod2(rail):plannedbutuncertain•  RS-26(compactSS-27):toreplaceSS-25satIrkutskandVypolzovo•  RS-28(Sarmat):toreplaceSS-28satDombarovskyandUzhur

SSBN/SLBM•  SS-N-23SLBMlife-extension(Sineva/Layner)inDeltaIVSSBN•  BoreiSSBN:8planned(possibly10-12)•  SS-N-32(Bulava):fielding

Bombers•  UpgradesofsomeTu-160(Blackjack)andTu-95(Bear)•  Newbomber(PAKPA)indevelopment•  ALCM(Kh-102)indevelopment

Tac4cal•  Tu-22M(Backfire)upgradeunderway•  Su-34(Fullback)fielding•  Yasen(Sverodvinsk)SSGNfielding•  SLCM(SS-N-30,Kalibr)fielding•  GLCMtest-launched;notdeployed•  SSM(SS-26,Iskander)fielding•  SAM(S-400/SA-21)fielding(nuclear?)•  ABM(A-135)upgradeplanned

NuclearArsenals:Russia


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NuclearArsenals:Russia(ICBM)


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ThirdSS-27unit(39GuardsMissileDivision).

Firstregimentwith9SS-27Mod2(RS-24)placedon“experimentalcombatduty”in2013;secondin2014;thirdin2015.

SatelliteimagesshowupgradeofregimentbaseandmediaphotosshowSS-27Mod2launchers.

RemainingSS-25sarebeingphasedout.

SS-27 Mod 2 TEL under camouflage (top) and upgrade of first of several regiment bases.



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FourthSS-27unit(42MissileDivision).

Partoffirstregimentwith6SS-27Mod2(RS-24)placedon“experimentalcombatduty”in2013;secondregimentin2014;thirdin2015.

Satelliteimagesshowcompletereconstruc4onofregimentbase(boiom)with9TELgaragesfor3SS-27Mod2baialions,aswellasupgradeofwarheadstorageandnewlyarrivedcamouflagedvehiclesatsupplybase.

RemainingSS-25sbeingphasedout.

Construction of SS-27 Mod 2 base (bottom); camouflaged vehicles at supply base (top left); upgrade to warhead storage (top right). Image: 2 Jun 2014



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FijhSS-27unit(28GuardsMissileDivision).

Deploymentoffirstregimentwith10SS-27Mod2(RS-24)underway.First4becameopera4onalinDecember2014;firstregimentdonein2015.

Newsmediaphotosshowupgradeofsilos.

Plannednumbersareunknown,buttherewere60SS-19sin2006and60SS-27sweredeployedatTa4shchevo.

PreviouslywithSS-19(possiblyallgone).

Upgrade to SS-27 Mod 2 at Kozelsk missile field in 2012 (bottom) and 2013 (top).



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Moderniza4onfromDeltatoBorei:

6DeltaIV,eachwith16SS-N-23(Sinevamodifica4on)

WilllikelybereplacedbyBoreiSSBNinlate-2020s

2-3DeltaIII,eachwith16SS-N-18

BeingreplacedbyBorei,star4ngin2015

8Borei(planned),eachwith16SS-N-32(Bulava)Russia’sSSBNfleetisbasedatYagelnaya(Gadzhiyevo)ontheKolaPeninsulaintheBarentsSea(top)andRybachiyontheKamchatkaPeninsulainthePacific.

ABoreiSSBNcapturedintheKolaBayon20July2014withtheaircrajcarrierAdmiralKuznetsov.

NuclearArsenals:Russia(SSBN)


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WeaponsSystem Missiles(2014)

Warheads(2014)

Missiles(2024)

Warheads(2024)

SS-N-18 48* 144 0 0

SS-N-23(Sineva) 96** 384 32 128

SS-N-32(Bulava) - - 112*** 672

Total 144 528 144 800

*ItispossiblethatonlytwoDeltaIIIswith32SS-N-18sareopera4onal.**NotallsixDeltaIVsareopera4onalanygiven4me;normally1-2boatsareinoverhaul.***Assume7of8plannedBoreiSSBNshaveenteredservice.

Implica.onsofmoderniza.on:

SSBNfleetwillremainrela4velystablearound8-10opera4onalSSBNs.

SLBMsstableatsome144missiles.

Significantincreaseinwarheadscapacityfrom528to800.

NuclearArsenals:Russia(SSBN)


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Anewsubsonic,low-observablelong-rangebomber(PAK-DA)isunderdevelopment.ATupolevdesignapparentlywasselectedin2013.Expecteddeploymentinthemid-2020storeplace:

Tu-95MS(Bear):roughly60lejofwhichperhaps50areopera4onal.CarriesAS-15BALCMandbombs.Beingupgradedtoincreaseconven4onalcapability.

Tu-160(Blackjack):roughly15lejofwhichperhaps13areopera4onal.CarriesAS-15AALCMandbombs.Upgradetoincreaseconven4onalcapability.Reproduc4onannounced.

Su-22M3(Backfire):Intermediate-rangebutsome4mesconsideredstrategic.CarriesAS-4ALCMandbombs.Beingupgradedtoincreaseconven4onalcapability.

PAK-DAbomber(subsonic,stealthy)

AnewnuclearALCM(Kh-102)hasbeenunderdevelopmentforsome4me,possiblytoreplacetheagingAS-15ontheTu-95MSandTu-160bombers.

NuclearArsenals:Russia(Bombers)


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•  WidelydispersedforcesinfourServices:tac4calairforce,navy,defense,andarmy(seemap)

•  Warheadsnotonbasesbutincentralstorage

•  Yetsomeupgradesofnuclear-storagesitesatbases(ShaykovkaTu-22base,boiomlej;Kaliningradboiomright)

May 2007 July 2007 October 2009

NuclearArsenals:Russia(Tac.cal)

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WeaponsSystem Remarks

AirForce

AS-4ALCM 1967:47yearsold.ForTu-22M3

Bombs ForTu-22M3,Su-24M,Su-34

Navy

SS-N-9(Malakhit) 1969:45yearsold.Forships.

SS-N-12(Bazalt) 1976:38yearsold.Forsubs.

SS-N-15(Vyuga) 1969:47yearsold.Forsubs/ships.

SS-N-16(Vodopad) 1981:33yearsold.Forsubs.

SS-N-19(Granit) 1980:34yearsold.Forships.

SS-N-21(Granat) 1987:27yearsold.Forsubs.

SS-N-22(Moskit) 1981:22yearsold.Forships.

SS-N-30(Kalibr) (2015).Forsubs.ReplacingSS-N-21?

Torpedoes(550/650mm) Forsubs.

DepthBombs ForASWaircrajandhelicopters.

Army

SS-21(Tochka) 1981:33yearsold.

SS-26(Iskander-K) 2005:ReplacingSS-21.

Defense

S-300/A-135/coastal Nuclearstatusofnewersystemsuncertain.

Largelejoverwarheadinventoryofalmosten4relySoviet-eraweapons.

Reducedbyatleast75%since1991.

Mostes4matesvaryfrom1,800to2,000warheads.DODmen4onsunofficiales4matesof2,000-4,000.

Allwarheadsincentralstorage;notwith/ondeliveryvehicles.

Ofcurrentforce,onlythreetypesarebeingmodernized.Futureplansareunknown.

“The general purpose forces – to include dual-use nonstrategic nuclear forces – will continue to acquire new equipment for the near-term, but deliveries will be small and largely consist of modernized Soviet-era weapons.”

US Defense Intelligence Agency, 2013

NuclearArsenals:Russia(Tac.cal)


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Becausetheyaredual-capable,non-strategicnuclearforcesarequicklydrawnintoconflicts:RussiandeploymentofS-300air-defenseandSu-24bombersinCrimea(above);RussianTu-22bomberinterceptedoverBal4cSeabyFrenchMiragefighter(right).

NuclearArsenals:Russia(Tac.cal) OverthepastthreeyearsRussianexercises“includesimulatednuclearaiacksonNATOAllies(eg,ZAPAD)andonpartners(eg,March2013simulatedaiacksonSweden)…”

NATOSecretaryGeneralAnnualReport2015


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Stockpilepeakedin1967;deployedstrategicwarheadspeakedin1986

Stockpileanddeployedstrategicwarheadshavenotchangedsignificantlysince2009

NuclearArsenals:USA


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NuclearArsenalsICBM

•  MinutemanIIIlife-extensioncomple4ng•  Warheadfuzes/interoperablewarheadplanned•  GBSD(ICBMreplacement)indevelopment

SSBN/SLBM•  TridentIID5SLBMlife-extensiondevelopment•  SSBNreplacementdevelopment(12planned)•  W76-1warheadlife-extensiondeploying•  W88-1warheadlife-extensiondevelopment

Bombers•  UpgradeofB-2andB-52underway•  LRS-Bnext-genera4onbomberindevelopment•  B61-12guidedstandoffbombindevelopment•  LRSO(ALCM)replacementindevelopment

Tac4cal•  F-35Anuclearcapabilityindevelopment•  B61-12guidedstandoffindevelopment

Infrastructure•  UraniumProcessingFacility(secondaries)construc4on•  Plutoniumproduc4onfacili4es(primaries)construc4on•  Warheadsurveillance/simula4onfacili4esupgrade

NuclearArsenals:USA


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Next10years:

$350billionformaintainingandmodernizingnuclearforcesandinfrastructure.

Comprehensivemoderniza4on:•  Allthreelegsofstrategictriad•  Tac4caldual-capableaircraj•  Warheadproduc4oncomplex

Consolida4onandmodifica4onofwarheadtypes.

Somedelayshappening;moreexpected.

Extendingnucleardeterrentthrough2080.

NuclearArsenals:USA


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Allegedadvantages:

•  Fewerwarheadtypespermitreduc4onofhedge

•  Modifiedwarheadswithincreasedsafety,usecontrol,andperformancemargin

•  Fewerwarheadswillbecheapertomaintainanddeploy

Possiblerisks:

•  Modifiedwarheadsfurtherfromtesteddesigns;reliabilityissues?

•  Reducedstockpilediversity•  Complexandexpensiveprograms

pronetodelaysandcostoverruns•  Modifiedwarheads“new”?•  Costshighlyuncertainandes4mates

probablyunderrated

Fundamentalques4ons:

•  Whyishedgingnecessaryformissilewarheadsbutnotbomberweapons?

•  WhymustUShedgewhenBritainandFrancedonot?

•  Whyis“deployed”warheadsthesameinthefuture?

3+2strategy:reduc4onfrom12warheadversions(8basicdesigns)to5types:

3“Interoperable”or“adaptable”warheadsonICBMandSLBMIW-1(W78/W88-1),IW-2(W87/W88-1),IW-3(W76-1)

2non-interoperablewarheadsonbombersandfightersALCM(LRSO)withW80-1orW84B61-12guidedstandoffbomb

NuclearArsenals:USA


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•  180U.S.B61bombsscaieredin87undergroundvaultsunderneath87aircrajsheltersatsixbasesinfiveEuropeancountries:

•  Addi4onalbombsintheUnitedStatesforextendeddeterrencemissionselsewhere.

•  50FrenchASMPAcruisemissilesatthreebasesfor3squadrons(2airand1naval).

NuclearArsenals:USA(Tac.cal)


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NuclearArsenals:China

ICBM / MRBM •  DF-31A (CSS-10 Mod 2) fielding •  DF-5B (CSS-4 Mod 2) with MIRV •  DF-26 introduced •  New mobile ICBM test-launching •  Development of new mobile ICBM capable of

delivering MIRV

SSBN / SLBM •  Jin (Type-094) SSBN fielding (4-5 expected) •  JL-2 (CSS-N-14) SLBM in development •  Type-096 SSBN possibly in development

Cruise Missiles: •  ALCM (CJ-20 on H-6 bomber) in development* •  GLCM (DH-10/CJ-10) fielding**

Note: China is the only of the P-5 (NPT declared) nuclear-armed states that is increasing its nuclear arsenal.

* Listed in 2013 AFGSC briefing. ** Listed by NASIC as “conventional or nuclear,” the same designation as the Russian nuclear-capable AS-4 Kitchen ALCM.


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NuclearArsenals:China(ICBM)


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Approximately80nuclear(DF-21andDF-21A).

AlmostcompletelyreplacedDF-3A.

VasttrainingareainDelinghaandDaQaidam.

DF-21CandDF-21Dconven4onalversionsdeploying.

NuclearArsenals:China(MRBM)


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NuclearArsenals:China(SSBN)

Buildingclassof4-5JinSSBNsEachwith12JL-2.

Firstseenin2007oncommercialsatellitephotos.

4inservice,butJL-2notyetfullyopera4onal.

All4saidtobebasedatSouthSeaFleet.

Bigunknown:willChinabegintodeploynuclearwarheadsonlaunchersinpeace4me?


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Expansion of Hainan submarine base.

First Jin SSBN presence in 2008.

Base includes demagnetization facility, underground submarine pier, SLBM handling and transportation system.



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Important new capability, but…

Jin SSBN noisy compared with Russian SSBNs.

To target USA, a Jin SSBN would have to sail far into Pacific or Sea of Japan.

Command and control capability is limited.



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NuclearArsenals:France

SSBN/SLBM•  TNOwarheadonM51.2SLBM.•  M51.3SLBMdevelopment.

Bombers•  RafaleK3toreplaceMirage2000NatIstresAirBase.•  Next-genera4onALCMindevelopment.

Infrastructure•  MegajouleatCESTAdevelopment.•  Airix/EpurehydrodynamictestcenteratValducdevelopment(partlyJointFrench-UKwarheadsurveillancetes4ngcenter).


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NuclearArsenals:Britain

SSBN/SLBM•  SSBN(Vanguardreplacement)indevelopment(3-4planned).•  SLBM(TridentIID5LE)indevelopment(USA).•  Mk4A/W76-1typewarheadfielding.

Infrastructure•  JointUK-Frenchwarheadsurveillancetes4ngtechnologycenterdevelopment.


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NuclearArsenals:PakistanMRBM/SRBM

•  ShaheenIIIMRBM(Ha�-6)indevelopment•  ShaheenIIMRBM(Ha�-6)fielding•  NASRSRBM(Ha�-9)indevelopment•  AbdaliSRBM(Ha�-2)indevelopment*

CruiseMissiles•  GLCM(Babur/Ha�-7)indevelopment•  ALCM(Ra’ad/Ha�-8onMirage)indevelopment•  SLCM(navalversionofBabur)indevelopment?

Infrastructure•  Khushab-IVreactor#4construc4on•  Uraniumenrichmentfacilityupgrade

*ListedbyPakistaniISPRbutnotby2013NASICreport


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NuclearArsenals:Pakistan

Shaheen-IImobilelauncher.DetectedTELsfirngoutatNa4onalDefenseComplex.Notyetdeployedin2009,butprobablynowpartof110-130warheades4mate.Extended-rangeShaheen-IIIindevelopment.


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NuclearArsenals:IndiaICBM/IRBM/MRBM

•  AgniVIICBMdevelopment(MIRV?)•  AgniVICBMindevelopment•  AgniIVIRBMindevelopment•  AgniIIIIRBMfielding

SSBN/SLBM•  ArihantSSBNdevelopment(3+expected).•  K-15/K-4SLBMdevelopment.•  DhanushSLBMfielding.

CruiseMissiles•  GLCM(Nirbhay)development*

Infrastructure•  Oneplutoniumproduc4onreactordeveloping.•  Breederreactors?

*Reportedbynewsmediabutnotlistedin2013NASICreport.


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NuclearArsenals:Israel

IRBM•  JerichoIIIIRBMdevelopment?

SSG/SLBM•  DolphinSSGfielding•  SLCM(PopeyeTurbo/Harpoon)rumored*

Bomber•  F-35Aacquisi4on

*Reportedbynewsmediabutdeniedbyofficials.USpublicintelligencereportsomitreferencestoIsraelinuclearforces


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NuclearArsenals:NorthKorea

ICBM/IRBM/MRBM•  NoDongMRBMfielding•  MusudanIRBMindevelopment•  Hwasong-13(KN-08)ICBMindevelopment(fielding?)•  TaepoDong2SLV/ICBMindevelopment

SSBN/SLBM•  SSBN/SLBMinearlydevelopment•  FakedSLBMlaunch

CruiseMissiles•  KN-09coastaldefensecruisemissileindevelopment?**

Infrastructure•  Yongbyonplutoniumproduc4onreactorre-start•  Uraniumenrichmentproduc4onconstruc4on

Bigunknown:DoesNorthKoreahaveminiaturizedandweaponizedwarheadthatcanbedeliveredbyballis4cmissile?

*Despitethreeundergroundnucleartests,thereisnoknownpublicevidencethatNorthKoreahasminiaturizeditstestdevicessufficientlyfordeliverybyballis4cmissiles

**Listedby2013AFGSCbriefingbutnotin2013NASICreport.2014updateofAFGSCdoesnotlistKN-09


QUESTIONS?

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55Hans M. Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, 2016 | Slide

The Basics of Nuclear Weapons · 2016-10-15 · Not just a bigger bomb… The destrucve eﬀect of...

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