The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II

7/21/2019 The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II

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The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II

A Collection of Primary Sources

Updated National Security Archive Posting Marks 70th Anniversary of the Atomic

Bombings of apan and the !nd of "orld "ar ##!$tensive %ompilation of Primary Source &ocuments !$plores Manhattan Pro'ect(Petitions Against Military Use of Atomic "eapons( &ebates over apaneseSurrender )erms( Atomic )argeting&ecisions( and *agging A+areness of,adiation !-ects

Ne+ #nformation Spotlights .eneral &+ight&/ !isenho+ers !arly Misgivings about 1irstNuclear Use

.eneral %urtis *emay2s ,eport on the1irebombing of )okyo( March 3456

August 5( 0368 A fe+ months after theatomic bombings of 9iroshima andNagasaki( .eneral &+ight &/ !isenho+ercommentedduring a social occasion :ho+he had hoped that the +ar might haveended +ithout our having to use the atomicbomb/; )his virtually unkno+n evidence

from the diary of ,obert P/ Miekle'ohn( anassistant to Ambassador "/ Averell9arriman( published for the


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)he original 006 posting included a +ide range of material( including formerlytop secret HMagicH summaries of intercepted apanese communications and the


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!ver since the atomic bombs +ere e$plodedover apanese cities( historians( social scientists(

'ournalists( "orld "ar ## veterans( and ordinarycitiIens have engaged in intense controversyabout the events of August 3456/ ohn

9erseys 9iroshima( %opy fromU/S/ National Archives( ,. 778A!%?

)aken at )inian #sland on theafternoon of August 6( 3456(this sho+s the tail of the !nola.ay being edged over the pit

and into position to load H*ittleBoyH into the bomb bay/ )he+eapon is in the pit covered+ith canvas/ Qarious personneland guards are standingaround the loading area/>Photo from U/S/ NationalArchives( ,. 778B)?
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#f ending the +ar uickly +as the most important motivation of )ruman and hisadvisers to +hat e$tent did they see an :atomic diplomacy; capability as a:bonus;

)o +hat e$tent did subseuent 'usti


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broad range of U/S/ and apanese documents( mainly from the spring andsummer of 3456( interested readers can see for themselves the crucial sourcematerial that scholars have used to shape narrative accounts of the historicaldevelopments and to frame their arguments about the uestions that haveprovoked controversy over the years/ )o help readers +ho are less familiar +ith

the debates( commentary on some of the documents +ill point out( although farfrom comprehensively( some of the +ays in +hich they have been interpreted/"ith direct access to the documents( readers may develop their o+n ans+ers tothe uestions raised above/ )he documents may even provoke ne+ uestions/

%ontributors to the historical controversy have deployed the documents selectedhere to support their arguments about the


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been included in addition to entries from the ,obert P/ Miekle'ohn diaries andtranslations of a fe+ Soviet documents( among other items/ Moreover( recentsigni


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3B/ ,eport to the President of the National Academy of Sciences by the Academy%ommittee on Uranium( November 3453( Secret

3%/ Qannevar Bush( &irector( @=ce of Scienti


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AF Qannevar Bush to President ,oosevelt( 4 March 345( +ith memo from,oosevelt attached( 33 March 345( Secret

BF Qannevar Bush to President ,oosevelt( 3 &ecember 345( Secret >report notattached?

SourcesF AF ,. 7( Bush8%onant papersmicro34538345?F BFBush8%onant papers( S83 9istorical 1ile( ,eportsto and %onferences +ith the President >34583455?

)he Manhattan Pro'ect never had an o=cialcharter establishing it and dePhoto fromU/S/ National Archives( ,.778B)?
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Before the Manhattan Pro'ect had produced any +eapons( senior U/S/government o=cials had apanese targets in mind/ Besides discussingprogrammatic matters >e/g/( status of gaseous di-usion plants( heavy +aterproduction for reactors( and sta=ng at *as Alamos?( the participants agreed thatthe 3 out of every60 people in the country at that time?/ "hatthese people +ere laboring to construct(directly or indirectly( +ere t+o types of+eaponsTa gun8type +eapon using U86and an implosion +eapon using plutonium>although the possibility of U86 +as alsounder consideration?/ As the scientists hadlearned( a gun8type +eapon based onplutonium +as :impossible; because that element had an :une$pected

property;F spontaneous neutron emissions +ould cause the +eapon to:


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implications of these enormously po+erful +eapons and the dangers of a globalnuclear arms race/ %oncerned that President ,oosevelt had an overly :cavalier;belief about the possibility of maintaining a post8+ar Anglo8American atomicmonopoly( Bush and %onant recogniIed the limits of secrecy and +anted todisabuse senior o=cials of the notion that an atomic monopoly +as possible/ )o

suggest alternatives( they drafted this memorandum about the importance of theinternational e$change of information and international inspection to stemdangerous nuclear competition/J33K

&ocuments A8&F President )ruman *earns the SecretF

AF Memorandum for the Secretary of "ar from .eneral */ ,/ .roves( :Atomic1ission Bombs(; April ( 3456

BF Memorandum discussed +ith the President(April 6( 3456

%F JUntitled memorandum by .eneral */,/.roves( April 6( 3456

&F &iary !ntry( April 6( 3456

SourcesF AF ,. 77( %ommanding .enerals micromicro


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controversial one/ AlperovitI and Sher+in have argued that )ruman made :a realdecision; to use the bomb on apan by choosing :bet+een various forms ofdiplomacy and +arfare/; #n contrast( Bernstein found that )ruman :neveruestioned JtheK assumption; that the bomb +ould and should be used/ Norrisalso noted that :)rumans decision +as a decision not to override previous

plans to use the bomb/;J3K

##/ )argeting apan

&ocument 7F %ommander 1/ */ Ash+orth to Ma'or .eneral */,/ .roves( :)he Baseof @perations of the 604th %omposite .roup(; 1ebruary 5( 3456( )op Secret

SourceF ,. 77( M!& ,ecords( )op Secret &ocuments( 1ile no/ 6g

)he force of B84 nuclear delivery vehicles that +as being readied for as he +as +ith atomic targeting?/J35K

1irebombing raids on other cities follo+ed )okyo( including @saka( Oobe(Dokahama( and Nagoya( but +ith fe+er casualties >many civilians had ed thecities?/ 1or some historians( the urban


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SourceF ,. 77( M!& ,ecords( )op Secret &ocuments( 1ile no/ 6d >copy frommicronorthern Oyushu?( Dokohama( and )okyo>even though it +as practically :rubble/;? )he problem +as that the Air 1orce hada policy of :laying +aste; to apans cities +hich created tension +ith theob'ective of reserving some urban targets for nuclear destruction/ J3K

&ocument 30F Memorandum from / ,/ @ppenheimer to Brigadier .eneral 1arrell(May 33( 3456

SourceF ,. 77( M!& ,ecords( )op Secret&ocuments( 1ile no/ 6g >copy from micro


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targets for incendiary bombings and he +ould successfully ob'ect to the atomicbombing of that city/ J3LK

&ocument 3F Stimson &iary !ntries( May 35 and 36( 3456

SourceF 9enry Stimson &iary( Sterling *ibrary( Dale University >microthe atomicbomb?C during a talk +ith Assistant Secretary of "ar ohn / Mc%loy( he estimatedthat possession of the bomb gave "ashington a tremendous advantageT:heldall the cards(; a :royal straight ush;88 in dealing +ith Mosco+ on post8+arproblemsF :)hey cant get along +ithout our help and industries and +e havecoming into action a +eapon +hich +ill be uniue/; )he ne$t day a discussion ofdivergences +ith Mosco+ over the 1ar !ast made Stimson +onder +hether theatomic bomb +ould be ready +hen )ruman met +ith Stalin in uly/ #f it +as( hebelieved that the bomb +ould be the :master card; in U/S/ diplomacy/ )his and

other entries from the Stimson diary >as +ell as the entry from the &avies diarythat follo+s? are important to arguments developed by .ar AlperovitI and Barton/ Bernstein( among others( although +ith signi


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present day civiliIation/; @nce the U/S/ had used the bomb in combat other greatpo+ers +ould not tolerate a monopoly by any nation and the sole possessor+ould be :be the most hated and feared nation on earth/; !ven the U/S/s closestallies +ould +ant the bomb because :ho+ could they kno+ +here our friendshipmight be :Safe 1ile;?( uly 34508September3456( bo$ 3( S83

)acitly dissenting from the )argeting %ommittees recommendations( Army %hiefof Sta- .eorge Marshall argued for initial nuclear use against a clear8cut militarytarget such as a :large naval installation/; #f that did not +ork( manufacturingareas could be targeted( but only after +arning their inhabitants/ Marshall notedthe :opprobrium +hich might follo+ from an ill considered employment of such

force/; )his document has played a role in arguments developed by Barton /Bernstein that


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older morality that opposed the intentional killing of noncombatants and a ne+erone that stressed virtually total +ar/;JK

&ocument 3LF :Notes of the #nterim %ommittee Meeting )hursday( 3 May 3456(30F00 A/M/ to 3F36 P/M/ R F36 P/M/ to 5F36 P/M/( ; n/d/( )op Secret

SourceF ,. 77( M!& ,ecords( 98B copy from micro


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&ocument 0F Memorandum from ,/ .ordon Arneson( #nterim %ommitteeSecretary( to Mr/ 9arrison( une ( 3456( )op Secret



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shock the ,ussians;88but dre+ entirely di-erent conclusions about the import ofsuch a shock/ JK

&ocument F Memorandum from Acting Secretary of State oseph .re+ to thePresident( :Analysis of Memorandum Presented by Mr/ 9oover(; une 3( 3456

SourceF ,ecord .roup 307( @=ce of the Secretary of "ar( 1ormerly )op Secret%orrespondence of Secretary of "ar Stimson >:Safe 1ile;?( uly 34508September3456( bo$ L( apan >After &ecember 7E53?

A former ambassador to apan( oseph .re+s e$tensive kno+ledge of apanesepolitics and culture informed his stance to+ard the concept of unconditionalsurrender/ 9e believed it essential that the United States declare its intention topreserve the institution of the emperor/ As he argued in this memorandum toPresident )ruman( :failure on our part to clarify our intentions; on the status ofthe emperor :+ill insure prolongation of the +ar and cost a large number ofhuman lives/; &ocuments like this have played a role in arguments developed by

AlperovitI that )ruman and his advisers had alternatives to using the bomb suchas modifying unconditional surrender and that anti8Soviet considerations+eighed most heavily in their thinking/ By contrast( 9erbert P/ Bi$ has suggestedthat the apanese leadership +ould :probably not; have surrendered if the

)ruman administration had spelled out the status of the emperor/J7K

&ocument 5F Memorandum from %hief of Sta- Marshall to the Secretary of "ar(36 une 3456( enclosing :Memorandum of %omments on !nding the apanese"ar(; prepared by .eorge A/ *incoln( une 35( 3456( )op Secret

SourceF ,ecord .roup 307( @=ce of the Secretary of "ar( 1ormerly )op Secret%orrespondence of Secretary of "ar Stimson >:Safe 1ile;?( uly 34508September

3456( bo$ L( apan >After &ecember 7E53?

%ommenting on another memorandum by 9erbert 9oover( .eorge A/ *incolndiscussed +ar aims( face8saving proposals for apan( and the nature of theproposed declaration to the apanese government( including the problem ofde


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SourceF ,ecord .roup 3L( ,ecords of the oint %hiefs of Sta-( %entral &ecimal1iles( 34583456( bo$ 34L 5 %S >8856? Mtg 3Lth8345th

"ith the devastating battle for @kina+a +inding up( )ruman and the oint %hiefsstepped back and considered +hat it +ould take to secure apans surrender/ )hediscussion depicted a apan that( by 3 November( +ould be close to defeat( +ithgreat destruction and economic losses produced by aerial bombing and navalblockade( but not ready to capitulate/ Marshall believed that the latter reuiredSoviet entry and an invasion of Oyushu( even suggesting that Soviet entry mightbe the :decisive action levering them into capitulation/; )ruman and the %hiefsrevie+ed plans to land troops on Oyushu on 3 November( +hich Marshall believed+as essential because air po+er +as not decisive/ 9e believed that casualties+ould not be more than those produced by the battle for *uIon( some 3(000/

)his account hints at discussion of the atomic bomb >:certain other matters;?(but no documents disclose that part of the meeting/

)he record of this meeting has


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,eminding Stimson about the ob'ections of some Manhattan pro'ect scientists tomilitary use of the bomb( 9arrison summariIed the basic arguments of the1ranck report/ @ne recommendation shared by many of the scientists( +hetherthey supported the report or not( +as that the United States inform Stalin of thebomb before it +as used/ )his proposal had been the sub'ect of positive

discussion by the #nterim %ommittee on the grounds that Soviet con


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SourceF ,ecord .roup 307( @=ce of the Secretary of "ar( 1ormerly )op Secret%orrespondence of Secretary of "ar Stimson >:Safe 1ile;?( uly 34508September3456( bo$ L( apan >After &ecember 7E53?

Probably the +ork of .eneral .eorge A/ *incoln at Army @perations( thisdocument +as prepared a fe+ +eeks before the Potsdam conference +hensenior o=cials +ere starting to


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)he possibility of modifying the concept of unconditional surrender so that itguaranteed the continuation of the emperor remained hotly contested +ithin theU/S/ government/ 9ere senior State &epartment o=cials( Under Secretary oseph.re+ on one side( and Assistant Secretary &ean Acheson and Archibald Mac*eishon the other( engaged in hot debate/

&ocument 6F %ombined %hiefs of Sta-( :!stimate of the !nemy Situation >as of uly 3456( %/%/S 5E( uly L( 3456( Secret >Appendices Not #ncluded?

SourceF ,. 3L( %entral &ecimal 1iles( 34583456( %%S L3 >85856?( Sec/ Pt/ 6

)his revie+ of apanese capabilities and intentions portrays an economy andsociety under :tremendous strain;C nevertheless( :the ground component of the

apanese armed forces remains apans greatest military asset/; AlperovitI seesstatements in this estimate about the impact of Soviet entry into the +ar and thepossibility of a conditional surrender involving survival of the emperor as aninstitution as more evidence that the policymakers sa+ alternatives to nuclear

+eapons use/ By contrast( ,ichard 1rank takes note of the estimates depiction ofthe apanese armys terms for peaceF :for surrender to be acceptable to theapanese army it +ould be necessary for the military leaders to believe that it+ould not entail discrediting the +arrior tradition and that it +ould permit theultimate resurgence of a military in apan/; )hat( 1rank argues( +ould have been:unacceptable to any Allied policy maker/;JK

&ocument F %able to Secretary of State from Acting Secretary oseph .re+(uly 3( 3456( )op Secret

SourceF ,ecord .roup 64( &ecimal 1iles 345683454( 750/0033 P" >P!?E78356

@n the eve of the Potsdam %onference( a State &epartment draft of theproclamation to apan contained language +hich modiMS 56?( Sterling *ibrary( Dale University >reel

33? >micro


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civilians and cities( but his latest proposal +ould meet resistance at Potsdamfrom Byrnes and other/J5K

&ocument LF ,/ !/ *app( *eo SIilard et al/( :A Petition to the President of theUnited States(; uly 37( 3456



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declare +ar on apan( )okyo fruitlessly pursued this option for several +eeks/ )he:Magic; intercepts from mid8uly have


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SourceF )akashi #toh( ed/( Sokichi )akagiF Nikki to oho JSokichi )akagiF &iary and&ocumentsK >)okyo( apanF MisuIu8Shobo( 000?( 438437 J)ranslation by 9ikaru

)a'imaK

#n 3455 Navy minister Mitsumasa Donai ordered rear admiral Sokichi )akagi to goon sick leave so that he could undertake a secret mission to @SS? in S+itIerland/ )he reference to :our contact; may referto Bank of #nternational Settlements economist Pers acobbson +ho +as in touch+ith apanese representatives to the Bank as +ell as .ero von .ZvernitI( then onthe sta-( but +ith non8o=cial cover( of @SS station chief Allen &ulles/ )hecontacts never +ent far and &ulles never received encouragement to pursuethem/J50K

Q/ )he )rinity )est

&ocument 55F *etter from %ommissar of State Security 1irst ,ank( Q/ Merkulov( toPeoples %ommissar for #nternal A-airs */ P/ Beria( 30 uly 3456( Number 506Em(

)op Secret >translation by Anna Melyaskova?

SourceF */&/ ,iabev( ed/( Atomnyi Proekt SSS, >Mosco+F iId M1)#( 00?( Qolume3( Part ( 68

)his 30 uly 3456 letter from NO.B director Q/ N/ Merkulov to Beria is an e$ampleof Soviet e-orts to collect inside information on the Manhattan Pro'ect( althoughnot all the detail +as accurate/ Merkulov reported that the United States hadscheduled the test of a nuclear device for that same day( although the actualtest took place days later/ According to Merkulov( t+o plutonium?( and U86C the test device +as fueledby plutonium/ )he Soviet source reported that the +eight of the device +as

tons >+hich +as in the ball park? and forecast an e$plosive yield of 6 kilotons/)hat


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An elated message from 9arrison to Stimson reported the success of the)rinity)estof a plutonium implosion +eapon/ )he light from the e$plosion could beenseen :from here J"ashington( &/%/K to :high hold; JStimsons estate on *ong#slandT60 miles a+ayK; and it +as so loud that 9arrison could have heard the:screams; from "ashington( &/%/ to :my farm; Jin Upperville( QA( 60 miles a+ayK

J5K

&ocument 5F Memorandum from .eneral */ ,/ .roves to Secretary of "ar( :)he)est(; uly 3L( 3456( )op Secret( !$cised %opy

SourceF ,. 77( M!& ,ecords( )op Secret &ocuments( 1ile no/ 5 >copy frommicrofor 3 ulyand 3780uly?/

)he diary entries cover uly 3( 37( 3L( 0( 6( ( and 0 and include )rumans

thinking about a number of issues and developments( including his reactions to%hurchill and Stalin( the atomic bomb and ho+ it should be targeted( the possibleimpact of the bomb and a Soviet declaration of +ar on apan( and his decision totell Stalin about the bomb/ ,eceptive to pressure from Stimson( )ruman recordedhis decision to take apans :old capital; >Oyoto? o- the atomic bomb target list/Barton Bernstein and ,ichard 1rank( among others( have argued that )rumansassertion that the atomic targets +ere :military ob'ectives; suggested that eitherhe did not understand the po+er of the ne+ +eapons or had simply deceivedhimself about the nature of the targets/ Another statementT:1ini aps +hen thatJSoviet entryK comes about;Thas also been the sub'ect of controversy over+hether it meant that )ruman thought it possible that the +ar could end could

end +ithout an invasion of apan/J56K

&ocument 5LF Stimson &iary entries for uly 3 through 6( 3456

SourceF 9enry Stimson &iary( Sterling *ibrary( Dale University >micro


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ready for a confrontation +ith Stalin over !astern !urope and other matters hasalso been the sub'ect of debate/

An important uestion that Stimson discussed +ith Marshall( at )rumansreuest( +as +hether Soviet entry into the +ar remained necessary to secure

)okyos surrender/ Marshall +as not sure +hether that +as so although Stimsonprivately believed that the atomic bomb +ould provide enough to force surrender>see entry for uly ?/ )his entry has been cited by all sides of the controversyover +hether )ruman +as trying to keep the Soviets out of the +ar/J5K&uringthe meeting on August 5( discussed above( Stimson gave his reasons for takingOyoto o- the atomic target listF destroying that city +ould have caused such:bitterness; that it could have become impossible :to reconcile the apanese tous in that area rather than to the ,ussians/; Stimson vainly tried to preservelanguage in the Potsdam &eclaration designed to assure the apanese about :thecontinuance of their dynasty; but received )rumans assurance that such aconsideration could be conveyed later through diplomatic channels >see entry for

uly 5?/ 9asega+a argues that )ruman realiIed that the apanese +ould refuse ademand for unconditional surrender +ithout a proviso on a constitutionalmonarchy and that :he needed apans refusal to 'ustify the use of the atomicbomb/;J57K

&ocument 54F "alter Bro+n &iaries( uly 308August ( 3456

SourceF %lemson University *ibraries( Special %ollections( %lemson( S%C Mss 5("alter / Bro+n Papers( bo$ 30( folder 3( Byrnes( ames 1/F Potsdam( Minutes(

uly8August 3456

"alter Bro+n( +ho served as special assistant to Secretary of State Byrnes( kepta diary +hich provided considerable detail on thePotsdam conference and the gro+ing concernsabout Soviet policy among top U/S/ o=cials/ )hisdocument is a typed8up version of the hand8+ritten original >+hich Bro+ns family hasprovided to %lemson University?/ )hat there maybe a di-erence bet+een the t+o sources becomesevident from some of the entriesC for e$ample( inthe entry for uly 3L( 3456 Bro+n +roteF HAlthough# kne+ about the atomic bomb +hen # +rote thesenotes( # dared not place it in +riting in my book/;

)he degree to +hich the typed8up version reectsthe original is +orth investigating/ #n any event(historians have used information from the diary tosupport various interpretations/ 1or e$ample(Bernstein cites the entries for 0 and 5 uly toargue that :American leaders did not vie+ Sovietentry as a substitute for the bomb; but that thelatter :+ould be so po+erful( and the Sovietpresence in Manchuria so militarily signiPhoto from U/S/ NationalArchives( ,. 778A!%?
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colleagues had no idea +hat +as behind apanese peace moves( only that SuIukihad declared that he +ould :ignore; the Potsdam &eclaration/ AlperovitI(ho+ever( treats the August entry as evidence that :strongly suggests; that

)ruman sa+ alternatives to using the bomb/J5LK

&ocument 60F :Magic; R &iplomatic Summary( "ar &epartment( @=ce ofAssistant %hief of Sta-( .8( No/ 335 R uly ( 3456( )op Secret Ultra

SourceF ,ecord .roup 567( ,ecords of the National Security AgencyE%entralSecurity Service( :Magic; &iplomatic Summaries 34583456( bo$ 3L/

)his :Magic; summary includes messages from both )ogo and Sato/ #n a long andimpassioned message( the latter argued +hy apan must accept defeatF :it ismeaningless to prove ones devotion Jto the !mperorK by +recking the State/;

)ogo re'ected Satos advice that apan could accept unconditional surrender +ithone uali


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and utter destruction/; )he ne$t day( in response to uestions from 'ournalistsabout the governments reaction to the ultimatum( Prime Minister SuIukiapparently said that :"e can only ignore JmokusatsuK it/ "e +ill do our utmost tocomplete the +ar to the bitter end/; )hat( Bi$ argues( represents a :missedopportunity; to end the +ar and spare the apanese from continued U/S/ aerial

attacks/J63K)ogos private position +as more nuanced than SuIukisC he told Satothat :+e are adopting a policy of careful study/; )hat Stalin had not signed thedeclaration >)ruman and %hurchill did not ask him to? led to uestions about theSoviet attitude/ )ogo asked Sato to try to meet +ith Soviet 1oreign MinisterMolotov as soon as possible to :sound out the ,ussian attitude; on thedeclaration as +ell as apans end8the8+ar initiative/ Sato cabled )ogo earlier thathe sa+ no point in approaching the Soviets on ending the +ar until )okyo had:concrete proposals/; :Any aid from the Soviets has no+ become e$tremelydoubtful/;

&ocument 65F :Magic; R &iplomatic Summary( "ar &epartment( @=ce of

Assistant %hief of Sta-( .8( No/ 3 R uly 0( 3456( )op Secret UltraSourceF ,ecord .roup 567( ,ecords of the National Security AgencyE%entralSecurity Service( :Magic; &iplomatic Summaries 34583456( bo$ 3L/

)his report included an intercept of a message from Sato reporting that it +asimpossible to see Molotov and that unless the )ogo had a :concrete and de


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&ocument 67F "alter Bro+n Meeting Notes( August ( 3456

SourceF %lemson University *ibraries( Special %ollections( %lemson( S%C Mss 5("alter / Bro+n Papers( bo$ 30( folder 3( Byrnes( ames 1/F Potsdam( Minutes(

uly8August 3456

9istorians have used this item in the papers of Byrnes aide( "alter Bro+n( tomake a variety of points/ ,ichard 1rank sees this brief discussion of apansinterest in Soviet diplomatic assistance as crucial evidence that Admiral *eahyhad been sharing :MA.#%; information +ith President )ruman/ 9e also points outthat )ruman and his colleagues had no idea +hat +as behind apanese peacemoves( only that SuIuki had declared that he +ould :ignore; the Potsdam&eclaration/ AlperovitI( ho+ever( treats it as additional evidence that :stronglysuggests; that )ruman sa+ alternatives to using the bomb/J6K

&ocument 6LF :Magic; R 1ar !ast Summary( "ar &epartment( @=ce of Assistant%hief of Sta-( .8( no/ 60( 5 August 3456

SourceF ,. 567( Summaries of #ntercepted apanese Messages >:Magic; 1ar !astSummary( March 0( 345 R @ctober ( 3456?( bo$ 7( S,S 5438657

)his :1ar !ast Summary; included reports on the apanese Armys plans todisperse fuel stocks to reduce vulnerability to bombing attacks( the te$t of adirective by the commander of naval forces on :@peration 9omeland(; thepreparations and planning to repel a U/S/ invasion of 9onshu( and the speci


30/48

0&/ %able Q#%)@,D 3 from Marshall to .eneral 9andy( uly 6( 3456( 6 uly3456( )op Secret

0!/ .eneral )homas )/ 9andy to .eneral %arl SpaatI( uly ( 3456( )op Secret

SourceF ,. 77( M!& ,ecords( )op Secret &ocuments( 1iles no/ 6b and 6e >>copies

from micro


31/48

schedule advanced to late in the evening of 6 August/ )he hand+rittentranscriptions are on the original archival copies/

#G/ )he 1irst Nuclear Strikes and their #mpact

&ocument F Memorandum from .eneral */ ,/ .roves to the %hief of Sta-(

August ( 3456( )op Secret

SourceF ,. 77( M!& ,ecords( )op Secret &ocuments( 1ile no/ 6b >copy frommicroPhotofrom U/S/ National Archives(

,. 08N)?
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb525-The-Atomic-Bomb-and-the-End-of-World-War-II/#_tcref9http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb525-The-Atomic-Bomb-and-the-End-of-World-War-II/documents/063.pdfhttp://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb525-The-Atomic-Bomb-and-the-End-of-World-War-II/#_edn57http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb525-The-Atomic-Bomb-and-the-End-of-World-War-II/#_edn58http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb525-The-Atomic-Bomb-and-the-End-of-World-War-II/documents/064.pdfhttp://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb525-The-Atomic-Bomb-and-the-End-of-World-War-II/documents/065.pdfhttp://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb525-The-Atomic-Bomb-and-the-End-of-World-War-II/#_tcref9http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb525-The-Atomic-Bomb-and-the-End-of-World-War-II/documents/063.pdfhttp://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb525-The-Atomic-Bomb-and-the-End-of-World-War-II/#_edn57http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb525-The-Atomic-Bomb-and-the-End-of-World-War-II/#_edn58http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb525-The-Atomic-Bomb-and-the-End-of-World-War-II/documents/064.pdfhttp://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb525-The-Atomic-Bomb-and-the-End-of-World-War-II/documents/065.pdf


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@perations( No/ 333( Signed by J%ommunist Party .eneral Secretary osephKStalin and J%hief of .eneral Sta- A/#/K Antonov( 7 August 3456 >translation byAnna Melyaskova?

SourceF Q/ A/ Volotarev( ed/( Sovetsko8#aponskaia Qoina 3456 .odaF #storiiaQoenno8Politicheskogo Protivoborstva &vukh &erIhav v 0R50e .ody >Mosco+F

)erra( 3447 and 000?( Qol/ 7 >3?( 50853/

)o keep his pledge at Dalta to enter the +ar against apan and to secure theterritorial concessions promised at the conference >e/g/( Soviet anne$ation of theOuriles and southern Sakhalin and a Soviet naval base at Port Arthur( etc/? Stalinconsidered various dates to schedule an attack/ By early August he decided that4830 August 3456 +ould be the best dates for striking apanese forces inManchuria/ #n light of apans e-orts to seek Soviet mediation( Stalin +anted toenter the +ar uickly lest )okyo reach a compromise peace +ith the Americansand the British at Mosco+s e$pense/ But on 7 August( Stalin changed theinstructionsF the attack +as to begin the ne$t day/ According to &avid 9ollo+ay(

:it seems likely that the atomic bombing of 9iroshima the day before thatimpelled JStalinK to speed up Soviet entry into the +ar; and :secure the gainspromised at Dalta/;J64K

&ocument F Memorandum of %onversation( :Atomic Bomb(; August 7( 3456

SourceF *ibrary of %ongress Manuscript &ivision( Papers of "/ Averell 9arriman(bo$ 3L3( %hron 1ile Aug 684( 3456/

)he Soviets already kne+ about the U/S/ atomic pro'ect from espionage sourcesin the United States and Britain so Molotovs comment to Ambassador 9arrimanabout the secrecy surrounding the U/S/ atomic pro'ect can be taken +ith a grain

of salt( although the Soviets +ere probably una+are of speciMinistry of 1oreign A-airs? ed/ Shusen Shiroku >)he 9istorical,ecords of the !nd of the "ar?( annotated by un !to( volume 5( 6780 J!$cerptsKJ)ranslation by )oshihiro 9iguchiK

7BF Admiral )agaki &iary !ntry for "ednesday( August L ( 3456SourceF )akashi #toh( ed/( Sokichi )akagiF Nikki to oho JSokichi )akagiF &iary and

&ocumentsK >)okyo( apanF MisuIu8Shobo( 000?( 4845 J)ranslation by 9ikaru)a'imaK
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!$cerpts from the 1oreign Ministry2scompilation about the end of the +ar sho+ho+ ne+s of the bombing reached )okyo as+ell as ho+ 1oreign Minister2s )ogo initiallyreacted to reports about 9iroshima/ "hen he

learned of the atomic bombing from the&omei Ne+s Agency( )ogo believed that it +astime to give up and advised the cabinet thatthe atomic attack provided the occasion for

apan to surrender on the basis of the Potsdam&eclaration/ )ogo could not persuade thecabinet( ho+ever( and the Army +anted todelay any decisions until it had learned +hathad happened to 9iroshima/ "hen the 1oreignMinister met +ith the !mperor( 9irohitoagreed +ith himC he declared that the top

priority +as an early end to the +ar( althoughit +ould be acceptable to seek bettersurrender terms88probably U/S/ acceptance ofa


34/48

AugustC 1orrestal +ould not have been so :audacious; to take an action thatcould ignite a :political Nagasaki had not yetbeen attacked? and the dangers and di=culty of an atomic +eapons program/According to 9asega+a( this +as an important( even :startling(; conversationF it

sho+ed that Stalin :took the atomic bomb seriously;C moreover( he disclosedthat the Soviets +ere +orking on their o+n atomic program/J0K

&ocument 70F !ntries for L84 August( ,obert P/ Miekle'ohn &iary

SourceF "/A/ 9arriman Papers( *ibrary of %ongress( bo$ 33( ,obert PickensMiekle'ohn "orld "ar ## &iary At *ondon and Mosco+ March 30( 345381ebruary35( 345( Qolume ## >Privately printed( 34L0 JPrinted from hand8+ritten originalsK?>,eproduced +ith permission?

,obert P/ Miekle'ohn( +ho +orked as Ambassador "/ A/ 9arrimans administrativeassistant at the U/S/ !mbassies in Mosco+ and *ondon during and after "orld

"ar ##( kept a detailed diary of his e$periences and observations/ )he entries forL and 4 August( prepared in light of the bombing of 9iroshima( include discussionof the British contribution to the Manhattan Pro'ect( 9arriman >:his nibs;? reporton his meeting +ith Molotov about the Soviet declaration of +ar( and speculationabout the impact of the bombing of 9iroshima on the Soviet decision/ Accordingto Miekle'ohn( :None of us doubt that the atomic bomb speeded up the Sovietsdeclaration of +ar/;

&ocument 73F Memorandum of %onference +ith the President( August L( 3456 at30F56 AM



35/48

7A/ %able AP%@M 6556 from .eneral 1arrell to @*eary J.roves assistantK(August 4( 3456( )op Secret

7B/ %@M.!NAA1 L cable %M&" 67 to %@M.!NUSAS)A1( for .eneral 1arrell(August 4( 3456( )op secret

7%/ %@M.!NAA1 0 .uam cable A#M%%, 66 to %@M.!NUSAS)A1 .uam(August 30( 3456( )op Secret

SourceF ,. 77( )inian 1iles( April8&ecember 3456( bo$ 0( !nvelope . )inian1iles( )op Secret

)he prime target for the second atomic attack +as Ookura( +hich had a largearmy arsenal and ordnance +orks( but various problems ruled that city outCinstead( the cre+ of the B84 that carried :1at Man; e+ to an alternate target atNagasaki/ )hese cables are the earliest reports of the missionC the bombing ofNagasaki killed immediately at least 4(000 people( +ith more dying later/According to 1rank( the :actual total of deaths due to the atomic bombs +illnever be kno+n(; but the :huge number; ranges some+here bet+een 300(000and 00(000 people/ Barton / Bernstein and Martin Sher+in have argued that iftop "ashington policymakers had kept tight control of the delivery of the bombinstead of delegating it to .roves the attack on Nagasaki could have beenavoided/ )he combination of the


36/48

SourceF Venshiro 9oshina( &aitoa Senso 9ishiF 9oshina Venshiro Oaiso8roku JSecret 9istory of the .reater !ast Asia "arF Memoir of Venshiro 9oshinaK>)okyo( apanF 9ara8Shobo( 3476?( e$cerpts from Section 6( :)he !mperormade go8seidan J\ the sacred decisionK R the decision to terminate the +ar(;348354 Jtranslation by 9ikaru )a'imaK

&espite the bombing of 9iroshima( the Soviet declaration of +ar( and gro+ing+orry about domestic instability( the apanese cabinet >+hose decisions reuiredunanimity? could not form a consensus to accept the Potsdam &eclaration/Members of the Supreme "ar %ouncilT:the Big Si$;JKT+anted the reply toPotsdam to include at least four conditions >e/g/( no occupation( voluntarydisarmament?C they +ere +illing to


37/48

)he copy courtesy of Special %ollections &epartment?

NoteF )he second page of the diary entry includes a ne+spaper clipping of theAssociated Presss transmission of the Byrnes note/ Unfortunately( AP +ould notauthoriIe the Archive to reproduce this item +ithout payment/ )herefore( +e are

publishing an e$cised version of the entry( +ith a link to the Byrnes note/Secretary of %ommerce >and former Qice President? 9enry "allace provided adetailed report on the cabinet meeting +here )ruman and his advisers discussedthe apanese surrender o-er( ,ussian moves into Manchuria( and public opinionon :hard; surrender terms/ "ith apan close to capitulation( )ruman assertedpresidential control and ordered a halt to atomic bombings/ Barton / Bernsteinhas suggested that )rumans comment about :all those kids; sho+ed his belatedrecognition that the bomb caused mass casualties and that the target +as notpurely a military one/J5K

&ocument 74F !ntries for 30833 August( ,obert P/ Miekle'ohn &iary

SourceF "/A/ 9arriman Papers( *ibrary of %ongress( bo$ 33( ,obert PickensMiekle'ohn "orld "ar ## &iary At *ondon and Mosco+ March 30( 345381ebruary35( 345( Qolume ## >Privately printed( 34L0 JPrinted from hand8+ritten originalsK?>,eproduced +ith permission?

#n these entries( Miekle'ohn discussed ho+ he and others in the Mosco+ !mbassylearned about the bombing of Nagasaki from the :@"# Bulletin/; !ntries for 30and 33 August cover discussion at the !mbassy about the radio broadcastannouncing that apan +ould surrender as long the !mperors status +as nota-ected/ 9arriman opined that :surrender is in the bag; because of the Potsdam&eclarations provision that the apanese could :choose their o+n form of

government( +hich +ould probably include the !mperor/; 1urther( :the onlyalternative to the !mperor is %ommunism(; implying that an o=cial role for the!mperor +as necessary to preserve social stability and prevent social revolution/

&ocument L0F Stimson &iary !ntries( 1riday and Saturday( August 30 and 33(3456



38/48

superceded by the concept that all apanese +ould be :Sub'ect to the Supreme%ommander of the Allied Po+ers/; )he language +as ambiguous enough toenable apanese readers( upon 9irohitos urging( to believe that they coulddecide for themselves the !mperors future role/ Stimson accepted the languagebelieving that a speedy reply to the apanese +ould allo+ the United States to

:get the homeland into our hands before the ,ussians could put in anysubstantial claim to occupy and help rule it/; #f the note had included speci


39/48

&ocumentsK >)okyo( apanF MisuIu8Shobo( 000?( 4847 J)ranslation by 9ikaru)a'imaK

As various factions in the government maneuvered on ho+ to respond to theByrnes note( Navy Minister Donai and Admiral )agaki discussed the latestdevelopments/ Donai +as upset that %hief of Sta- Doshi'iro UmeIu and navalchief Suemu )oyada had sent the emperor a memorandum arguing thatacceptance of the Brynes note +ould :desecrate the emperors dignity; and turn

apan into virtually a :slave nation/; )he emperor chided UmeIu and )oyoda fordra+ing hasty conclusionsC in this he had the support of Donai( +ho also dressedthem do+n/ As Donai e$plained to )agaki( he had also confronted naval vice %hief

)aki'iro @nishi to make sure that he obeyed any decision by the !mperor/ Donaimade sure that )akagi understood his reasons for bringing the +ar to an end and+hy he believed that the atomic bomb and the Soviet declaration of +ar hadmade it easier for apan to surrender/J7K

&ocument L6F Memorandum from Ma'or .eneral %layton Bissell( Assistant %hief

of Sta-( .8( for the %hief of Sta-( :!stimate of apanese Situation for Ne$t 0&ays(; August 3( 3456( )op Secret

SourceF National Archives( ,. 36( Army @perations @P&( !$ecutive 1iles 345083456( bo$ 3( !$ec Y

Not altogether certain that surrender +as imminent( Army intelligence did notrule out the possibility that )okyo +ould try to :drag out the negotiations; orre'ect the Byrnes proposal and continue


40/48

SourceF .eorge %/ Marshall *ibrary( *e$ington( QA( .eorge %/ Marshall Papers>copy courtesy of Barton / Bernstein?

"hile )ruman had rescinded the order to drop nuclear bombs( the +ar +as notyet over and uncertainty about apans ne$t step motivated +ar planner .eneral

ohn !/ 9ull >assistant chief of sta- for the "ar &epartments @perations&ivision?( and one of .roves associates( %olonel */ !/ Seeman( to continuethinking about further nuclear use and its relationship to a possible invasion of

apan/ As 9ull e$plained( :should +e not concentrate on targets that +ill be ofgreatest assistance to an invasion rather than industry( morale( psychology( etc/;:Nearer the tactical use;( Seaman agreed and they discussed the tactics thatcould be used for beach landings/ #n 3443 articles( Barton Bernstein and Marc.allicchio used this and other evidence to develop the argument that concepts oftactical nuclear +eapons use


41/48

message to the nation >although he never used the +ord :surrender;?/ A fe++eeks later( on September ( 3456 apanese representatives signed surrenderdocuments on the USS Missouri( in )okyo harbor/J73K

&ocument 40F :Magic; R 1ar !ast Summary( "ar &epartment( @=ce of Assistant%hief of Sta-( .8( no/ 636( August 3L( 3456

SourceF ,. 567( Summaries of #ntercepted apanese Messages >:Magic; 1ar !astSummary( March 0( 345 R @ctober ( 3456?( bo$ 7( S,S 5438657

)his summary includes an intercepted account of the destruction of Nagasaki/

G#/ %onfronting the Problem of ,adiation Poisoning

&ocument 43F P/*/ 9ensha+ and ,/,/ %oveyou to 9// %urtis and O/ V/ Morgan(:&eath from ,adiation Burns(; 5 August 3456( %onprompt e-ects fromgamma +aves?( and radiation from radioactive substances88they concluded that:it seems highly plausible that a great many persons +ere sub'ected to lethaland sub8lethal dosages of radiation in areas +here direct blast e-ects +erepossibly non8lethal/; #t +as :probable(; therefore( that radiation :+ould produce

increments to the death rate and :even more probable; that a :great number ofcases of sub8lethal e$posures to radiation have been su-ered/;J7K

&ocument 4F Memorandum of )elephone %onversation Bet+een .eneral .rovesand *t/ %ol/ ,ea( @ak ,idge 9ospital( 4F00 a/m/( August L( 3456( )op Secret

SourceF ,. 77( M!& ,ecords( )op Secret &ocuments( 1ile no/ 6b

&espite the reports pouring in from apan about radiation sickness among thevictims of 9iroshima and Nagasaki( .eneral .roves and &r/ %harles ,ea( asurgeon +ho +as head of the base hospital at @ak ,idge >and had no specialiIedkno+ledge about the biological e-ects of radiation? dismissed the reports as

:propaganda;/ Una+are of the


42/48

A month after the attacks .roves deputy( .eneral 1arrell( traveled to apan tosee for himself the destruction of 9iroshima and Nagasaki/ 9is vivid accountsho+s that senior military o=cials in the Manhattan Pro'ect +ere no longerdismissive of reports of radiation poisoning/ As 1arrell observed in his discussionof 9iroshima( :Summaries of apanese reports previously sent are essentially

correct( as to clinical e-ects from single gamma radiation dose/; Such


43/48

Miekle'ohns diary does not prove or disprove !isenho+ers recollection( but itdoes conNe+ DorkF %olumbia University Press( 007?/ An importanton8linecollection focuses on the air8raids of apanese cities and bases( providingvaluable conte$t for the atomic attacks/

JK/ 1or the early criticisms and their impact on Stimson and other formero=cials( see Barton / Bernstein( :SeiIing the %ontested )errain of !arly Nuclear9istoryF Stimson( %onant( and )heir Allies !$plain the &ecision to Use the Atomic

Bomb(; &iplomatic 9istory 37 >344?F 687( and ames 9ershberg( ames B/%onantF 9arvard to 9iroshima and the Making of the Nuclear Age >Stanford(Stanford University Press( 3446?( 43803/

1or Stimsons article( see :)he &ecision to Use the Atomic Bomb(; 9arpers 345>1ebruary 3457?F 478307/ Social critic &+ight Mac&onald published trenchantcriticisms immediately after 9iroshima8NagasakiC see Politics PastF !ssays inPolitical %riticism >Ne+ DorkF Qiking( 347?( 3483L0/

JK/ )he proposed script for the Smithsonian e$hibition can be seen at PhilipeNobile(

udgment at the Smithsonian >Ne+ DorkF Matthe+s and %ompany( 3446?( pp/ 3837/ 1or revie+s of the controversy( see Barton / Bernstein( :)he Struggle @ver9istoryF &e


44/48

and "illiam A/ ,ooney( )he !nola .ay and )he Smithsonian >e-erson( N%FMc1arland and %ompany( 006?/

J5K/ 1or the e$tensive literature( see the references in / Samuel "alker( Promptand Utter &estructionF )ruman and the Use of Atomic Bombs against

apan >%hapel 9illF University of North %arolina Press( 005? at 3383( as +ellas "alkers latest contribution( :,ecent *iterature on )rumans Atomic Bomb&ecisionF A Search for Middle .round(; &iplomatic 9istory 4 >April 006?F 3385/ 1or more recent contributions( see Sean Malloy( Atomic )ragedyF 9enry */Stimson and the &ecision to Use the Bomb Against apan >#thacaF %ornellUniversity Press( 00L?( Andre+ ,otter( 9iroshimaF )he "orld2s Bomb >Ne+ DorkF@$ford( 00L?( %ampbell %raig and Sergey ,adchenko( )he Atomic Bomb and the@rigins of the %old "ar >Ne+ 9aven( Dale University Press( 00L?( "ilson &/Miscamble( )he Most %ontroversial &ecisionF )ruman( the Atomic Bombs( and the&efeat of apan >Ne+ DorkF %ambridge University Press( 033?/ Also important totake into account is ohn &o+ers e$tensive discussion of 9iroshimaENagasaki in

conte$t of the U/S/


45/48

J3K/ AlperovitI( C Bernstein >3446?( 34C Norris( 77/

J3K/ Wuotation and statistics from )homas ,/ Searle( :#t Made a *ot of Sense toOill Skilled "orkersF )he 1irebombing of )okyo in March 3456( )he ournal ofMilitary 9istory 66 >00?F30/ More statistics and a detailed account of theraid is in ,onald Scha-er( "ings of udgmentF American Bombing in "orld "ar## >Ne+ DorkF @$ford University Press( 34L6?( 30837/

J35K/ Searle( :#t Made a *ot of Sense to Oill Skilled "orkers(; 33L/ 1or detailedbackground on the Army Air 1orces incendiary bombing planning( see Scha-er>34L6? 307837/ @n Stimson( see Scha-er >34L6?( 37483L0 and Malloy >00L?(65/

J36K/ See for e$ample( Bernstein >3446?( 3508353/

J3K/ 1or useful discussion of this meeting and the other )arget %ommitteemeetings( see Norris( L8L/

J37K/ Malloy( :A Qery Pleasant "ay to &ie(; 63865/

J3LK/ Scha-er( "ings of udgment( 35835/

J34K/ AlperovitI argues that the possibility of atomic diplomacy +as central tothe thinking of )ruman and his advisers( +hile Bernstein( +ho argues that

)rumans primary ob'ective +as to end the uickly( suggests that the ability to:co+ other nations( notably the Soviet Union; +as a :bonus; e-ect/ SeeBernstein >3446?( 35/

J0K/ AlperovitI( 357C ,obert ames Maddo$( "eapons for QictoryF )he 9iroshima&ecision 1ifty Dears *ater >%olumbiaF University of Missouri Press( 3446?( 6C

.abiel Oolko( )he Politics of "arF )he "orld and United States 1oreign Policy(34583456 >Ne+ DorkF Pantheon Books( 3440?( 5385/ As AlperovitI notes( the&avies papers include variant diary entries and it is di=cult to kno+ +hich arethe most accurate/

J3K/ Malloy >00L?( 33

JK/ Bernstein >3446?( 35/

JK/ Bernstein >3446?( 355/ See also Malloy >00L?( at 338337( including theargument that 3? Stimson +as deceiving himself by accepting the notion that a:vital +ar plant [surrounded by +orkers houses; +as a legitimate military

target( and ? that .roves +as misleading Stimson by +ithholding the )arget%ommittees conclusions that the target +ould be a city center/

J5K/ "alker >006?( 0/

J6K/ 1rank %ostigliola( 1rance and the United StatesF )he %old Alliance Since"orld "ar ## >Ne+ Dork( )+ayne( 344?( L84/

JK/ Barton / Bernstein( #ntroduction to 9elen S/ 9a+kins et al/ editors( )o+arda *ivable "orldF *eo SIilard and the %rusade for Nuclear Arms%ontrol >%ambridgeF M#) Press( 34L7?( $$$8$$vC Sher+in( 30836/

J7K/ 9erbert P/ Bi$( 9irohito and the Making of Modern apan >Ne+ DorkF

9arper%ollins Publishers( 000?( 6/

56
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46/48

JLK/ "alker >006?( 3480/

J4K/ 1or a recent revie+ of the debate on casualty estimates( see "alker>006?( 36( 3783L( 3( ( and 586/

J0K/ 9asega+a( 306C AlperovitI( 787C 1orrest Pogue( .eorge %/ MarshallF

Statesman( 345683464 >Ne+ DorkF Qiking( 34L7?( 3L/ Pogue only cites the %Stranscript of the meetingC presumably( an intervie+ +ith a participant +as thesource of the Mc%loy uote/

J3K/ AlperovitI( C Bernstein( :Understanding the Atomic Bomb and theapanese Surrender(; &iplomatic 9istory 34 >3446?( 7( note /

JK/ Malloy >00L?( 3835/

JK/ AlperovitI( 5( 56C 1rank( 34/

J5K/ Malloy >00L?( 36837/

J6K/ Bernstein( introduction( )o+ard a *ivable "orld( $$$vii8$$$viii/

JK/ :Magic; summaries for post8August 3456 remain classi Ne+ DorkF ,andom 9ouse( 3446?( 33837 and &avid Oahn( )he%odebreakersF )he Story of Secret "riting >Ne+ DorkF Scribner( 344?( 387/

J7K/ AlperovitI( 8L/

JLK/ Maddo$( L8L5C 9asega+a( 383L/ See also "alker >006?( 3837/

J4K/ 9asega+a( L( 3383/

J50K/ Peter .rose( .entleman SpyF )he *ife of Allen &ulles >BostonF 9oughtonMi^in( 3445?( 3708375( 5L854/

J53K/ &avid 9ollo+ay( :Barbarossa and the BombF )+o %ases of Soviet#ntelligence in "orld "ar ##(; in onathan 9aslam and Oarina Urbach( eds/( Secret#ntelligence in the !uropean States System( 343L834L4>StanfordF StanfordUniversity Press( 035?( 85/ 1or the inception of the Soviet nuclear programand the role of espionage in facilitating it( see 9ollo+ay( Stalin and theBomb >Ne+ 9aven( Dale University Press( 3445?/

J5K/ 1or the distances( see Norris( 507/

J5K/ 1or on8line resources on the 3446?( 357C "alker >006?( / See also Ale$"ellersteins :)he Oyoto Misconception;

J5K/ Maddo$( 30C AlperovitI( 4870C 9asega+a( 36836/

J57K/ 9asega+a( 4/

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47/48

J5LK/ Bernstein( :Understanding the Atomic Bomb and the apaneseSurrender(; &iplomatic 9istory 34 >3446?( 358357C AlperovitI( 536C 1rank( 5/

J54K/ AlperovitI( 4C 1rank( 35L/

J60K/ AlperovitI( L38L/ 1or &avies at Potsdam( see !liIabeth Oimball

Mac*ean( oseph !/ &aviesF !nvoy to the Soviets >"estport( %)F Praeger( 344?(36383

J63K/ 9asega+a( 3LC Bi$( 63L/

J6K/ Bi$( 540( 63/

J6K/ AlperovitI( 536C 1rank( 5/

J65K/ 1rank( 7875C Bernstein( :)he Alarming apanese Buildup on SouthernOyushu( .ro+ing U/S/ 1ears and %ounterfactual AnalysisF "ould the PlannedNovember 3456 #nvasion of Southern Oyushu 9ave @ccurred; Paci3444?F 63804/

J66K/ Maddo$( 306/

J6K/ Barton / Bernstein( H2,econsidering the 2Atomic .eneral2F *eslie ,/.roves(H )he ournal of Military 9istory 7 >uly 00?F LL840/ See also Malloy(:A Qery Pleasant "ay to &ie(; 648650/

J67K/ 1or casualty )okyo( Oodansha( 34L?provides an unforgettable account of the bombing and its aftermath/ 1or earlyU/S/ planning to detonate the +eapon at a height designed to ma$imiIedestruction from mass 34L?F 307C 9ollo+ay( :Barbarossaand the Bomb(; 6/

J64aK 1or more on these developments( see Asada( H)he Shock of the AtomicBomb and apan2s &ecision to SurrenderF A ,econsideration(H 5L85LL/

J0K/ 9asega+a( 343834/

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48/48

J3K/ 1rank( L8L7C Sher+in( 87C Bernstein >3446?( 360C Maddo$( 35L/

JK/ )he Supreme "ar %ouncil comprised the prime minister( foreign minister(army and navy ministers( and army and navy chiefs of sta-C see 9asega+a( 7/

JK/ 1or the maneuverings on August 4 and the role of the kokutai( see

9asega+a( 85( 06835

J5K/ 1or )rumans recognition of mass civilian casualties( see also his lettertoSenator ,ichard ,ussell( 4 August 3456/

J6K/ 9asega+a( 46/

JK/ 1or :tug of +ar(; see 9asega+a( 87/

J7K/ 9asega+a( L84( /

JLK/ 9asega+a( 68L/

J4K/ Barton / Bernstein( :!clipsed by 9iroshima and NagasakiF !arly )hinkingabout )actical Nuclear "eapons(; #nternational Security 36 >Spring 3443?F 354837C Marc .allicchio( :After NagasakiF .eneral Marshalls Plans for )acticalNuclear "eapons in apan(; Prologue >"inter 3443?F 48505/ *etters from,obert Messer and .ar AlperovitI( +ith Bernsteins response( provide insight intosome of the interpretative issues/ :%orrespondence(; #nternational Security 3>"inter 3443E344?F 3583/

J70K/ Bi$( :apan2s Surrender &ecision and the MonarchyF Staying the %ourse inan Un+innable "ar(; apan 1ocus/

J73K/ 9asega+a( L854( L6/)ranslationsof 9irohitos speech are availableC so

is the actual broadcast/

J7K/ See Malloy( :A Qery Pleasant "ay to &ie(; 653865/

J7K/ 1or .roves and the problem of radiation sickness( see Norris( 48553(Bernstein( :,econsidering the XAtomic .eneralF *eslie ,/ .roves(; ournal ofMilitary 9istory 7 >00?( 407840L( and Malloy( :A Qery Pleasant "ay to &ie(;63863L and 64865

J75KSee anet 1arrell Brodie( :,adiation Secrecy and %ensorship after 9iroshimaand Nagasaki(; )he ournal of Social 9istory 5L >036?F L58L5/

J76K/ 1or !isenho+ers statements( see %rusade in !urope >.arden %ityF&oubleday( 345L?( 55( and Mandate for %hange >.arden %ityF &oubleday(34?( 383/ Barton / Bernsteins 34L7 article( :#ke and 9iroshimaF &id 9e@ppose #t; )he ournal of Strategic Studies 30 >34L7?F 778L4( makes a caseagainst relying on !isenho+ers memoirs and points to relevant circumstantialevidence/ 1or a slightly di-erent perspective( see Malloy >007?( 3L
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The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II

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