The Arts: Being through Meaning

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The Arts: Being through MeaningAuthor(s): George P. SteinSource: The Journal of Aesthetic Education, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Oct., 1971), pp. 99-113Published by: University of Illinois PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3331623Accessed: 28-11-2015 06:50 UTC

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The

Arts:

Being

through Meaning

GEORGE

P. STEIN

I

A

pianist

was once

asked about the

meaning

of

a

composition

he

had

just

played.

He

replied

by playing

it. His

assumption

was

that

the mean-

ing

of a work of

art

can be

rendered

only

through

itself

and not

by

a

verbal

translation.

This assumption is of course implicitly questioned by anyone who

says anything

about

what

a

work of art

means. And

the

fact is

that

philosophers,

critics,

educators

and those

being

educated

do often

ask

and

attempt

to

answer

the

question:

"What

does this

poem

(or

painting,

or

symphony)

mean?"

If

these

questions

and the answers

are

themselves

to

be considered

meaningful,

some

theory

of

meaning

in the

arts

would

have

to be

implicit

in

the

questions

and answers. Such

a

theory

will

have

of

course

some

effect

upon

the

sorts

of

questions

asked

and

upon

the

nature

of

the answers

given.

The

problem

of a

theory

of

meaning

in

the arts is simplyan interestingone to some. But to those involved in the

design

of

educational

curriculums from

kindergarten

through

college,

the

problem

should

be,

interesting

or

not,

a

major

one.

The

purpose

of

this

paper

is to reduce the

ambiguity

of the

question,

"What does this

work

of

art mean?"

to

the

point

where

it

may

assist

curriculum decisions

in

the

arts.

To

begin

with,

there are

a

couple

of

"nonassumptions"

o

be

made:

1.

There

is

no

assumption

as

to the

essential nature

of

"art" or "the

arts." Whatever

is

claimed

with

respect

to the

nature

of

meaning

in the

arts

requires

no adherence to

any

of the classical or

contemporary

defi-

nitions of art.

GEORGE

P.

STEIN

is

professor

of philosophy

and

chairman

of

the

department

of

philosophy

at

Bloomfield College,

New

Jersey.

His

most recent

publication

is

The

Ways

of

Meaning

in

the Arts

(1970).

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100 GEORGE .

STEIN

2.

There

is

no

assumption

as to whether or

not art

is definable at all.

It

is

assumed

that

people

recognize

or learn

to

recognize

that

certain

things

or events

are

works

of

art,

in some

way

similar to

the

way

we

recognize

or

learn to

recognize

that certain

things

are

bridges,

games,

horses,

disasters,

etc. It had

been,

before

Wittgenstein,

traditional to

assume

that

one

could not

reliably

make this sort of

recognition

unless

one

was

equipped

with

a "definition"

of art. But

it is now common

for

theorists

to believe that

works

of art are

recognized

as

such

by

virtue

of

the

strands

of

similarities

among

the

things

called works

of

art.

The

main claims of this paper will be that:

1. Works

of

art come to have

meaning

in

one or more of several

definable

ways.

2.

The

ways

in which

works

of art have

meaning,

once

defined,

enable

questions

and

answers

about "the

meaning

of

a

work

of

art"

to be

put

more

precisely.

3.

The

ways

in

which works

of art have

meaning

are

among

the

strands

of

similarities

enabling

us to

recognize

works

of art as

such;

and

thus

open up

the

various avenues

of

understanding

and

"appreciating"

we believe should be accessible to the educated person.

II

What makes a

thing

a

work

of art?

And

can

we answer this

question

without

the

help

of

a

definition

of art?

Certain

things,

through

the usual

processes

of

education,

come to

be

recognized

by

viewers as works

of art

simply

by

their

noting

that

this is

what

the

works

are called

by

others.

And

other

things

get

recognized

as

works of art in

virtue

of similarities

to

already recognized

works

of art.

One kind of

similarity

s the

similarity

n the

ways

worksof art come to

have

meaning

or

are

meaningful.

There are

of

course

other kinds

of

similaritieswhich

"stamp"things

as works

of

art,

but

here we are

inter-

ested

only

in

the

"meaning"

similarities.

This manner

of

recognition

has

the

ring

of

circularity

about it. But

consider how

we

recognize

and

value

games.

After

a

snowstorm,

one

child

says

to

another,

"Let's see how

many

times we

can

each

hit

that

tree with a

snowball,

three throws each."

The

game

is

recognized

quickly

and

is

usually

valued and attended

to for one

or more of a number

of

reasons:

it

is

competitive,

some skill is

involved,

some

chance

is

involved,

score

can

be

kept,

etc. In a

very

different

setting,

such as

a

stockbroker's

office,

a

man

who

buys

and sells his

securities,

keeps

his

score, etc.,

can

also be

said

to be

playing

a

game, although

there

is

no

competition

in







THEARTS:BEINGTHROUGHMEANING 101

the

usual

sense, very

little

skill

according

to

some,

and

(unlike

in

the

snowball

game)

a

great

deal

of

money

can be "made."

The

game-

making

reason

in

this

case is

simply

the

score-keeping.

Analogously,

we often

recognize

or learn to

recognize

works

of

art

quickly.

Works of

art have

many

art-making

characteristics.

And some

of these

characteristicshave been selected

singly

or in combination

by

theorists

as

the

art-making

characteristics,

.e.,

the

definition or essence

of

art. But

having

bracketed out

the

problem

of

defining

art,

we

are

here

selecting

one

of

the

art-making

characteristics,

namely meaning,

for

analysis.

The

value of the

analysis,

in

addition

to

its intrinsic value as

analysis,

is the

clarification it can introduce into discussions about the

meaning

of

works

of

art.

And

incidentally,

but

importantly

for educa-

tion,

a work of

art,

once

stamped

as

a

work of art

by

virtue of

its

way

of

meaning,

is

open

to valuable

ways

of

attending

to it other

than

through

its

meaning.

What

are the

ways

in which

works of art

have or

convey meaning

or

become

meaningful?

A.

Relational

Meaning

I.

A.

Richards

said,

in

an

anticipation

of

what

philosophers

have

identified

as emotive

meaning,

"Many

arrangements

of words evoke

attitudes without

any

references

being required

en

route.

They

operate

like

musical

phrases."l

Clement

Greenberg

has written:

This

sort of

view has led to theories of art

(and

moral

behaviour)

as emotive

behaviour

and

as

the

conveyor

of "emotive

statements,"

theories which

have

been

at

times

widened

to include

effects

other

than

emotions,

e.g.,

images

and

thoughts.

This is

not to

say

that

earlier

theorists in the

history

of

aesthetics

have

not

recognized

the connection between art and

its

causes or

consequences,

but that from Richards on there begins a line of development in which these

causes or

consequences

became the

meaning

of art. Plato had

recognized

that

the

poet's

peculiar power

is

"enthusiasm" rather than "wisdom."

But after

Richards it became

easy

to

say

that

the

wisdom

of

the artist consists

in his

enthusiasm:

Picasso,

Braque,

Mondrian, Miro,

Kandinsky,

Brancusi,

even

Klee,

Matisse

and Cezanne derive

their chief

inspiration

from the

medium

they

work

in.

The

excitement of their art

seems to lie

most

of all in

its

pure preoccupation

with the invention

and

arrangement

of

spaces,

surfaces,

shapes,

colors,

etc.,

to

the exclusion of

whatever

is not

necessarily

implicated

in these

factors.2

Here emotions, feelings, excitements become the meaning of the work

1

I.

A.

Richards,

Principles

of

Literary

Criticism

(New

York:

Harcourt, Brace,

1934),

p.

267.

2"Avant-Garde

and Kitsch."

Partisan

Reader 1934-44

(New

York: Deal

Press,

1946),

p.

381.







102

GEORGE . STEIN

of

art. No

meanings

are

"necessarily mplicated"

in

colors

and surfaces.

Yet

a

definite and

understood sense of

the term

meaning

in the arts

is

being

used. We

will call this sense of

the term: relational

meaning.

A

work of art

may

obviously

have

more

than

one

recognized

relational

meaning.

How do

we

know when a relational

meaning

is

being

asked

for?

One form in which this

kind

of

meaning

is

referred

to

is

in a

question

such

as: "What

is the

meaning

of art?" and

in its answer.

This

partic-

ular

question

is

unambiguous,

so that when Ananda

K.

Coomaraswamy

in

Introduction to Indian Art

said

that

"Art in

India"

and

"art" in

the modem world mean

[my emphasis]

wo

very

different

hings.

In

India

it

is

the statementof a racial

experience...

The

names

and

peculiarities

of individual

artistseven

if

we

could

recover

them would not

enlighten

us:

nothing

dependsupon

genius

or

requires

he

knowledge

f an

individual

psychology

or its

interpretation,3

it

is clear

that the

writer was

comparing

Indian art with

modern

art

with

respect

to

their differences

within

the

relationships

constituted

by

the

mutual influence

of

art and a

(social

and

individual)

psyche.

Similarly

when

Dewey

defined

art

as

organization

of

energies,

the

definition consisted

in

part

of the

relating

of works

of

art

to

"those

features

that make

any experience

worth

having

as an

experience."

This

of

course

was

not

Dewey's

account

of

meaning

in art

in the sense

in

which he

claimed art

expressesmeanings,

but

it was his

account of

what

is

sometimes called

the

meaning

of

art and

of

what

we are

here

terming

a

relational

meaning

of

art. In the

latter

sense

the work of

art does

not

tell us

about

organization

of

energies;

it makes no

meaningful

statement.

It

organizes

energies;

and

the statement

of

this fact is a statement

about

a relational

meaning.

Thus

in Wordsworth's"Prelude,"

the lines

...

the

wind and

sleety

rain,

And all

the

business

f

the

elements,

The

singlesheep

and

the

one blasted

ree,

And the

bleak

music

romthat

old stonewall

build a

sense of desolation in the

reader

but

do

not

discuss the

"build-

ing"

of

the mood.

Dewey

however

did

discuss the

building

and his

statement

about

it

was a statement of

a

relational

meaning

of the

"Prelude."

Another instance of "relationalmeaning" is implicit in such "purist"

theorists as

Hanslick,

Bell,

and

de

Gourmont. When the

particular

arts

in

which

they

were

mainly

interested have

no

cognitive

content it is

'A. K.

Coomaraswamy,

ntroduction

o Indian

Art

(Madras:Theosophical,

1923), p.

v.







THE

ARTS: BEING

THROUGH MEANING 103

because the

aesthetic

relevance

of

what

we

are

terming

relational mean-

ing

is denied

by

them.

Works

of

art

may

have

causes

or

consequences

but these

theorists held that

such causes or

consequences

are

irrelevant

to

the work

of art as work of

art.

Hanslick,

for

example,

was

concerned

with

destroying

the notion of

emotive

meaning

(before

the latter

became

the

philosophical

concept

used

by

Ogden,

Richards,

Ayer,

Stevenson

and

others).

To define the

relationships

obtaining

between

a

given piece

of music

and its

causal or

consequential

emotions,

Hanslick

thought,

was

to

illuminate

no

part

of

that

work

of

music.4

In

painting, Bell, although

he

used the

phrase

"esthetic

emotion,"

considered

that

emotion to

be

"unrelated

to the

significance

of

life"5

or to

the

emotions

of life

resulting

from

such

paint-

ing.

And

in

literature

where

it is more

difficult to hold

such an extreme

view

(since

the basic

materials of literature

are

words),

Remy

de

Gourmont,

theorizing

Mallarme's

desire "to

put

some

smoke

between

the

world and

himself,"

said

"Mallarme's

work is the

most marvelous

pretext

for

reveries

yet

offered men

weary

of

so

many

heavy

and

useless

affirmations."6

What they had in mind (and this is a usage which is sufficiently

subject

to definition

to sanction its

qualified

use)

when

they

denied

meaning

to

a work

of

art

was,

at

least in

part,

that

the

work

of

art had

in fact no

relevant

emotional,

image-al,

or intellectual

consequences

or

causes. This

denial

suggests

the

theoretical

possibility

that

if a work

of

art should

have

relevant

consequences,

then

those

consequences

would

be

its

(relational) meaning.

For

them the

work

of art

had either

a

musically intelligible

structure or a

sensuously

attractive sound

(which

were

considered

by

them

to be relevant to the

work as

art),

but

it had

no meaning since it was not relatable to an element outside of the work

of art.

Now the

concept

of

relational

meaning

assumes

no

definition

of the

work

of

art,

or

of

the

essentially

aesthetic

part

of

the

work of

art.

It

takes the

work of art as

it

occurs.

For

example,

in the Brahms

Double

Concerto

in A

Minor

it notes

certain

consequences,

such

as are

indicated

in comments

by Specht,

who

describes

it as

"one of

Brahms'

most

inapproachable

and

joyless compositions";7

and

in

Tovey's

characteri-

zation

of

the same work

as

having

"vast and

sweeping

humor"

which

Edward

Hanslick,

The

Beautiful

in Music

(New

York:

Novello,

Ewer

and

Co.,

1891).

Clive

Bell,

Art

(London:

Chatto and

Windus,

1914), p.

26.

6

Remy

de

Gourmont,

Decadence

(New

York:

Harcourt,

Brace, 1921), p.

155.

7Richard

Specht,

Johannes

Brahms

(London:

J.

M. Dent and

Sons,

1930),

p.

300.







104 GEORGE P. STEIN

some think

"the

most

deadly

crime

possible

to a

great

work"8

of music.

Both of

these

may

be

verifiable

consequences empirically

correlated with

and so related to

the

work

of

music. Taken with all the

other

reactions

to

the

Double

Concerto,

in

their

aggregate,

these constitute

the

rela-

tional

meanings

of

the Double

Concerto. Which

relational

meanings

are

justified

can

only

be determined

by

the continuous

historical

criticism

that

is

being

applied

to the

Double Concerto.

That different

and even

contradictory

relational

meanings

coexist seems to

me a

matter

primarily

for

musical

history

and

sociological

determination,

rather

than aesthetic

determination,

since the

relational

meanings

do not

depend upon

aes-

thetic

analysis

of notes

which

do not

change

from

generation

to

gener-

ation

(except

in

performance

interpretations),

but on how

people

react

to

those

notes: what emotions are

aroused

in

them,

what

images,

if

any,

they

form

to

accompany

the

music,

what

arguments

the music

suggests.

This

of

course does

not

preclude

the

possibility

that a

changed

or

deepened

understanding

of the Double

Concerto's

structure will alter

such reactions.

The

assertion of relational

meanings

emphasizes

the fact

(once

disputed)

that

art

exists in no vacuum

free

of a social atmo-

sphere. Whatever pure or intrinsic qualities a work of art may have, it

has causes and

effects,

factors

influencing

it

and influenced

by

it,

ideas

which

bring

it

about

and ideas

brought

to

life

by

it.

A

complete

state-

ment

of all the

relational

meanings

of a

work of

art,

if

this were a

possibility,

would be an

account

of its

significance

in the life of

which

it

is

a

part.

If the artist's

breakfast

can

actually

be

indicated as

being

responsible

for

some

elements

in the

work

of

art,

then

the statement

of

that

responsibility

would be a

relational

meaning.

When some other

factor

(e.g.,

the

artist's attitude

towards some

aspect

of

life)

is

respon-

sible for elements of the work of art, then a statement of that responsi-

bility

could be called

a relational

meaning,

perhaps

a more

important

one.

B.

Interpretive

Meaning

A second

usage

of

the

word

meaning

in the

arts can

be called "inter-

pretive

meaning."

For

the

purpose

of

framing

a

preliminary

definition,

let

us

consider

an

illustration of

interpretive

meaning.

Take Freud's elaboration

on

how

art

gets

to mean

something.

In this elaboration

is

contained an

implicit

assertion

of

a

particular

sort of

meaning-claim

for

works

of

art:

...

to

those who

are

not

artists the

gratification

that can be

drawn

from the

8D. F.

Tovey,

Essays

in

Musical

Analysis

III

(London:

Oxford

University

Press,

1936), p.

145.







THE

ARTS:

BEING THROUGH MEANING 105

springs

of

phantasy

is

very

limited;

their inexorable

repressions prevent

the

enjoyment

of all but the

meagre day-dreams

which can become conscious. A

true

artist

has

more at

his

disposal.

First

of all

he

understands

how to

elaborate

his

day-dreams

so that

they

lose that

personal

note

which

grates

upon

strange

ears

and

become

enjoyable

to

others;

he knows

too how

to mod-

ify

them

sufficiently

so that

their

origin

in

prohibited

sources

is

not

easily

detected.

Further,

he

possesses

the

mysterious

ability

to

mould

his

particular

material until it

expresses

the ideas of

his

phantasy

faithfully;

and then

he

knows

how

to attach

to

this reflection

of his

phantasy-life

so

strong

a

stream

of

pleasure

that,

for

a time at

least,

the

repressions

are out-balanced

and

dispelled

by

it.9

Now it seems to me that whatever verdict we

pass upon

the truth of

this statement

we must

recognize

that it indicates

one

sense

in

which

works of art

make a

meaning-claim.

It asserts that a

work

of

art

gives

us

in

some

way

some

particular

information,

in this

case "the ideas of

[the

artist's]

phantasy."

To the

question:

"What does this

work

of

art

mean?"

Freud

has

written:

Stefan

Zweig

...

has

a

story

which he calls

Vierundzwanzig

Stunden

aus

dem

Leben einer Frau

(Four

and

Twenty

Hours in a

Woman's

Life).

This

little

masterpiece ostensibly

purports

only

to

show

what

an

irresponsible

creature

woman is, and to what excesses, surprisingeven to herself, an unexpected ex-

perience

may

drive

her.

But the

story

tells

far

more

than

this: when

it is sub-

jected

to

an

analytical

interpretation

it

represents

without such

apologetic

tendencies

something quite

different,

something universally

human or rather

masculine. And

such an

interpretation

is so

obvious

that it cannot be denied.

It

is

characteristic of

the nature of

artistic

creation that the

author,

who

is

a

personal

friend,

was able to

assure

me that

the

interpretation

given by

me

was

completely

alien

both

to

his

mind and

his

intention,

although

many

details

were

woven into the

narrative

which

seemed

expressly

designed

to indi-

cate the

secret

clue

...

10

And Freud proceeds with a thorough psychoanalytic reading of the

story.

We are not interested in the truth

of

any

part

of

Freud's state-

ment

about the

meaning

content

of

Zweig's story.

We are

considering

the claim

implicit

in

it that the work of art tells

us

something,

even if

the mediation

of

a

theory

is

necessary,

and

also

the

form in

which Freud

maintains this

claim:

the form of

significant

discourse.

He

apparently

is

saying something

we understand

when

he

says:

"Zweig's story

really

means

.

. .

,"

etc.

Here

of

course

some

proponent

of a

"story-teller" theory

of fiction

could make the following objections:

9Sigmund

Freud,

A

General Introduction

to

Psychoanalysis (Garden

City:

Garden

City Publishing

Co.,

1938), p.

327.

10

Sigmund Freud,

"Dostoevski

and

Parricide,"

Partisan

Review,

Vol.

12,

No.

4

(Fall 1945),

530.







106 GEORGE . STEIN

1. That the

interpretive meaning

here is

gratuitous, i.e.,

that

the

meaning

that

Freud

delineates

is

the

meaning

of

perhaps

an

interesting

story

but not

Zweig's

story

which is

a

mere

recounting

of

what has

happened

or

might

happen;

2.

That the

interpretive

meaning

here

is a

formal consideration

in-

volving

an

elaborate

theory

and

its

possible

connection with

reality,

i.e.,

that one

could

easily

predict

the

meaning

of

"Freud's"

story

from

the

general

claims

of his

psychoanalytic heory,

and that

this

is an

interesting

but

playful

deductive

procedure

from

a

theory

that

perhaps

has some

meaning;

3. That the

interpretive

meaning

is not

what

the

artist

intended, i.e.,

that

Zweig

did

not

intend to

convey

the

meaning

of

which

Freud

speaks;

and

4. That

one

does

not

apprehend

this

interpretive meaning

if

one

comes to

the

conclusion

that

Freudian

theory

is

scientifically

unsound.

A

consideration

of

these

objections

serves to

bring

out

the

formal

characteristicsof

the

kind

of

meaning

involved

here.

Answering

them in

order:

1. Freud

insists that

"many

details were woven into

the narrative

which

seemed

expressly

designed

to

indicate the

secret

clue,"

i.e.,

his

procedure

is

to be

empirical

about this

Zweig

story

and to relate

certain

details of it to certain theoretical

constructions which make the details

more

meaningful,

i.e.,

more

communicative

of

certain

facts--a

pro-

cedure

with

which

one can in

principle

hardly

argue.

This

procedure

allows

Freud to

make

a

statement of

the

form

"A

means B" where

Zweig's

story

as

it

appears literally

means

Zweig's

story

as

it

appears

interpretively

or

in its

interpretive meaning.

Thus in

principle

Freud

is

constructing

another

story only

in the

sense

that

we

end

up,

if

we are

convinced,

with

another

more

accurate

apprehension

of

what

Zweig's

story

has to

say

than we would

have

had without the Freudian inter-

pretation.

We are

led in this

case with the

help

of Freudian

theory

to

determine

what

the

story

"really

has to

say,"

that

is,

what,

on

the

assumption

of

a

more or less

plausible theory,

it

can be said to

mean

(interpretively).

2.

It is true that we would

probably

know what sort

of answer

a

"Freudian aesthetician" might give

to

the

question "What does 'Four

and

Twenty

Hours

in a

Woman's

Life'

interpretively

mean?"

if

we

knew

beforehand that

he

was

a "Freudian

aesthetician,"

that is to

say,

that

he adhered

generally

to

the

theory

stated

by

Freud

above. But







THE

ARTS:

BEING THROUGH MEANING 107

there is

no doubt that

the

word

"meaning"

as

applied

to

the arts is

being

used here

significantly

both

in

question

and

answer: on

the basis

of

one

interpretation

Zweig's

story,

when

read in

the

light

of

theory

having

some

degree

of

probable

truth,

tells

us

many

facts

about the

(conscious

or

unconscious)

wishes

of the

artist.

And

presumably

if

the

artist

were

to

agree

to

the

interpretation

Freud makes

he

would

have

a

greater

degree

of

self-knowledge.

His

story

would

interpretively

mean

something

to

him,

i.e.,

give

him some

information about himself.

We

could

leave it as

optional

whether

or

not we

generalize

this

knowledge

into "something universallyhuman or rather masculine,"

an

extension

of the

scope

of the

meaning

not

necessary

for

our

present

argument.

If

we have more information

about

Zweig

after

reading

the

story

(with

the

Freudian

interpretation

in

mind

or

imposed

later

upon

the

story)

we

would

say

that

his

story

interpretively

means at

least

this

additional

information.

3.

Whether

Zweig

did

or

did not

intend

to

convey

certain informa-

tion is

not

important except biographically,

or

psychologically;

just

as

when I

say

"It is

raining"

it is not

important

for

a determination

of the

meaning of those three words to ascertain whether or not I intend to

convey

information,

true

or false.

As

a

matter of

fact Freud is

asserting,

however

paradoxical

it

may

sound,

that

Zweig

is

saying something

inter-

pretively

meaningful

which for

reasons

of inner

moral

censorship

he

cannot make

literally

meaningful.

And

this

must be considered for

what

it

is

worth

as

a scientific claim.

4. The

meaning

that

is

conveyed

to

Freud

is

obviously dependent

upon

the

existence of an

elaborate

psychological

theory.

But this

is

sometimes true of

the

simplest

linguistic

statements.

In

discussing

prob-

lems of translatability,Malinowskiremarkedupon the necessityin some

cases of

understanding

a whole culture and its

history

before under-

standing

the

meaning

of one sentence of that

culture's

language.1l

C.

Contextual

Meaning

We have often

heard it said that

ordinary language

states

meanings

while art

expresses

meanings.

And

some

theorists have

claimed that

whatever

the

differences

between

"stating"

and

"expressing,"

hey

are

both forms

of

communication

and

that art

is

in

some

way

a

superior,

more effective

form

of communication than

ordinary language.

On

the

basis of the

latter

claim

we can

be

led

to the

unusual

position

of

asserting

"

C. K.

Ogden

and

I.

A.

Richards, Meaning

of Meaning,

8th

ed.

(New

York:

Harcourt,

Brace,

1944),

pp.

301-02

(Supplement 1,

B.

Malinowski).







108 GEORGE .

STEIN

that

a

statement

in

ordinary language

such as "There sometimes

seems

to be

a

spiritual entity

pervasively present

in

our

experience

of

natural

objects"

is less

communicative

than lines

93-102

of "Tintern

Abbey":

And

I

have felt

A

presence

hat disturbsme

with

the

joy

Of

elevated

houghts;

sensesublime

Of

something

ar

more

deeply

nterfused,

Whose

dwelling

s the

light

of

setting

uns,

And

the roundoceanand

the

living

air,

And

the

blue

sky,

and

in

the

mind

of man:

A motionand a spirit, hatimpels

All

thinking hings,

all

objects

of

all

thoughts,

And

rolls

through

ll

things.

In

one

sense of

the

word

expressive,

Wordsworth's

poetry

is

obviously

more

expressive

than

the

more or less literal

translation

above: certain

feelings

are

much

more

vividly

expressed

in

the

poetry

than

in the

"translation."But this is

an

evincing

and

an

evoking

more

adequately

described

in terms of relational

meaning.

Much

more

is

being

created

and/or

recreated

in the

poetry

than

specific feelings. Let us examine the poetry in the light of a sort of

meaning

we

may

call

contextual. Some

experiences

we

have

give

us an

awareness

extending beyond

the

moment and

revealing

to us the

sources,

movement,

and culmination

of

the

sorts

of

interactions

we have with

our

(physical

or

cultural)

environment. When an

object

or event

is

contrived

to

present

and

convey

such

an

awareness,

we

call the con-

trivance

a

work

of

art.

And

what

it is

contriving

is what we are

calling

contextual

meaning.

Now

let us take another

look at

"Tintern

Abbey":

Five

years

past:

five summers

with the length

Of five

ong

winters And

again

I hear

These

waters....

With these lines Wordsworth

begins

his

poem,

and

later in

the

poem

we

find

that

those five

years

this

landscape

has been of

special

value to

the

poet:

it has

given

him

serenity

and

pleasure

in

an otherwise chaotic

world.

He

finally

comes

to feel

the

presence

of a

source

for that

serenity

and

pleasure.

When

we

have lived

through

Wordsworth's

poem

and

have

finally

felt

the

expressed

quality

near Tintern

Abbey

we can

recon-

struct two elements which stamp the work as art:

1. We become

at

least aware

of,

even

if

we do not

completely

share

Wordsworth's

prior

values

(prior

to

the

expressive

act which eventuated

in

the

expressive

object,

the

poem),

visual

and

emotional states.







THE ARTS: BEING THROUGH MEANING

109

2.

We

experience

the

existence

of a new

objective entity:

the

poem

which

in

its

words,

sounds,

and

rhythms

embodies a new

experience.

It

is

certainly

possible

to

imagine

Wordsworth

living through

those

five

years hearing

"these

waters,"

revisiting

and

actually

lying

down in

the sun to

... hear

These

waters,

rolling

from

their

mountain-springs

With

a

soft inland

murmur...,

and

to:

... see

These

hedge-rows,

hardly

hedge-rows,

little

lines

Of

sportive

wood

run

wild

..

,"

without ever

having

written "Tintern

Abbey."

There

would

then cer-

tainly

have been an

experience,

but none

of the

contrivances

of

poetry

would have been used

to

create an

ordering

of

events

designed

to reveal

either

to

Wordsworth

or

his

possible

readers the

total context

within

which specific events would "add-up" to mean something. The poem

does

in

fact

do

the latter

and tends

to

convince

the

reader

of the exis-

tence

(in

some

important sense)

of

the sort of

presence

he senses.

To be aware of

a

contextual

meaning

we

do not need an

interpretive

theory

of

the sort

which

generates

an

interpretive

meaning.

But

the

distinction

between contextual

meaning

and relational

meaning

is not

so

obvious. The events of the

past

which

may

be

apparent

in the hushed

reverberations

(in

Santayana's

phrase)

of

the

present experience

of

the

work

of

art,

are events

which

upon analysis

we

could

theoretically

relate

to the work of art. In a contextual meaning there are "these waters"

outside of and related to

the

poem,

and we

have

apparently simply

another relational

meaning.

The difference

lies

in the

importance

of

context

in

a

contextual

meaning.

Cezanne's Sainte-Victoire

may

have

the contextual

meaning

ascribed to it

by

critics

who

speak

of its revela-

tion of

spiritual

forces or

of

the manner in

which

it

echoes the

rhythm

of

the universe. But

none of

its

relational

meanings

could be stated as:

this

is the

way

the

world

outside

this

frame can be seen

-

a world of

spatial depth

through

nuanced

surfaces,

where

the

painting simply

indi-

cates this way of looking at the world with no construction of a universal

context. Yet this

way

of

looking

at the

world

is not

unrelated to

such a

possible

context.

Any

element which is

related to

the work

of

art

in

a

relational

meaning

may

be

brought

into

a context

of

other

elements







110 GEORGE . STEIN

such

that where

previously

that element was

directly

related

to

the work

of

art,

it

would,

in

a contextual

meaning,

take

its

place

in a

meaningful

context

having

a

quality

and

significance

of its

own.

The

painting

prop-

erly

has

both

meanings

-

one of the

values

in

recognizing

both

mean-

ings

is that there

then

should be no

dispute

about

which

is the

meaning.

D.

Referential

Meaning

It

is

quite possible

for the

products

of human

activity

to

convey

meaning

without there

being

an

understanding

of

how

such

an

activity

conveys

the

meaning.

That

Rubens

in

The

Battle Between

Emperor

Constantine and Maxentius

conveys

a

meaning

is obvious to

everyone

who

looks at such an

allegorical

scene.

But this

is

not

as

obvious

in

a

Mondrian

painting.

And

yet

while

it

may

be

true that

this

is

so

because

the

Mondrian

painting conveys

no

meaning

in

fact,

it

may

possibly

be

the

case that since we have not

been sure

how

the Rubens

painting

conveyed meaning

that

therefore we have

no method

by

which

to

determine the

meaning

of

the

Mondrian

painting.

We

can

attempt

to

define such

a

method in

a

way

continuous with

ordinary

usage

of the

word

"reference."

In the

sciences,

we find a set of

symbols,

signs,

or marks used in

definable

ways

to refer

to

certain

aspects

of

their

spheres

of

interest,

i.e.,

we find

a

method for

"telling

about"

something.

The obvious

search,

if

art

is

to

have

any

referential

meaning,

is

for

a

defined

system

of marks

and sounds

by

which

it

may

refer to

aspects

of its

sphere

of interest.

By way

of

contrast to

this search

for method

we can

note that

Plato,

the source

philosopher

of

many

imitational,

representational,

and

refer-

ential theories of

art,

was not

interested

in

defining

the

method of refer-

ence

employedby

the

artistic endeavor.

He

was

concerned with

pointing

out that "the

soul

which

has seen

most of truth shall come

to

the

birth

as

a

philosopher,

or

artist,

or some musical

and

loving

nature"

and

at

some

later

time,

in

a

way

beyond complete

control,

recall that

truth.

In

the

Apology

Plato

knew

"that not

by

wisdom

do

poets

write

poetry,

but

by

a sort of

genius

and

inspiration;

they

are

like diviners or

sooth-

sayers

who

also

say

many

fine

things,

but

do

not understand the

mean-

ing

of them." That

is,

they

wrote

meaningful

poems

but

did

not know

by

what

method

the

poems

came

to have

meaning.

Let

us

consider

Mondrian's

Composition

in

Grey, Red, Yellow,

and

Blue.

What

we see

offhand

is

a

group

of

rectangular

blocks of

specifiable

primary

colors

-

the

boundaries of the

blocks

being

vertical and hori-

zontal

lines.

And let

us

call that a

description

of

the surface of the

painting.

At

this

point

let

us

temporarily

halt

the

analysis

and see if we







THEARTS:BEINGTHROUGHMEANING

111

can derive

anything

from this

description

that could

be called

meaning.

We now notice that

we have

not

stepped

outside

the frame

of the

picture

except

in the

very

weak

sense

that

we

have

used

words

for

the

descrip-

tion of this

painting

which

are

used in

other

(artistic

and

nonartistic)

contexts.

And we have in

principle

fully

described

the

surface

of this

work

of

art. We

could

go

on

to

specify

the

size,

relative

position,

and

relative

hues,

intensity,

and values

of

the

colors,

i.e.,

all

the

objective

qualities

of the

painting.

There

is,

one

may

notice,

the fact

that

using

words

like

"yellow"

or

"vertical"immediately introduces something exterior to the painting or

outside

its

frame.

A

whole

group

of

comparisons

to events and

objects

outside the

frame is

made

possible by

the use of

words which

are

in

their

nature

generalized

so

that

they

may apply

to

outside

events and

objects.

These words tend to

pull

us

away

from

the

surface

but

only

in an unim-

portant

because undirected

way.

If

someone

were

to

say,

for

instance,

that

this

yellow

is

like the

yellow

of

many

bananas he has

seen and that

this

painting

therefore is

about some

aspect

of

bananas,

we

could

only

ask

for

some

rule

or

direction

by

which one could

go

from

this

yellow

to

those bananas. In the absence of such a rule or direction (method) one

could

say

only

that between the

description

of this

work

of

art

and the

description

of

the

experience

of

a banana there exists

only

the word

"yellow"

describing

some

element

common

to

the

experiences.

Thus

we

are left on the

surface,

or,

more

precisely,

in

our

experience

of

the

sur-

face,

despite

the use

of

the word

"yellow,"

because we

have

no rule

by

which

to

leave the

surface.

Yet

leaving

the surface in an undirected

way

means that

we

could derive some

meaning

(and

this

may

be

enough

or

all there

is

in

some works

of

art).

These

would be relational

meanings

such as "this work of art provides perceptual delight of a certain sort,"

or

"this

work

of art reminds

us

of

many previous

pleasant

experiences

of

bananas."

But here no direction is

given

to

the

way

in

which

we

leave the

surface.

Reactions differ from observer to

observer,

from

age

to

age,

and there

is no

authority

as

to

which reactions

must,

notwith-

standing

the artist's

intention,

be

had.

The

sense

configuration

he

pro-

duces

may

have effects other

than

he

anticipates,

intends,

or

desires,

and

there

is

nothing

improper

n this

happening.

A

variety

and

large

number

of relational

meanings

may

occur

(and

this has sometimes

been used

as

a measure of value of the work of art).

Let us further notice

that

there are

no

diagonals

or

curved lines

in

the

painting.

All lines

are

straight,

vertical,

or

horizontal;

and this deter-

mines the fact that

all the

shapes

are

rectangles.

This is

obviously

not like







112 GEORGE P. STEIN

the

visual

field,

as the

purity

of color

was

like the

calmness

of the

spec-

tator in

the

visual field. Then

what

is its

relation

to

the

visual field?

Impressedby

the vastness

of

nature,

I

was

trying

to

express

its

expansion,

rest,

and

unity.

At

the

same

time,

I was

fully

aware

hat

the

visible

expansion

of nature

s

at the same

time its

limitation;

vertical and horizontal ines are

the

expression

f

two

opposing

orces;

these exist

everywhere

nd dominate

everything;

heir

reciprocal

action

constitutes"life." I

recognized

hat the

equilbrium

f

any particular

spect

of naturerests on the

equivalence

of its

opposites.

felt

that

the

tragic

s created

by unequivalence.

saw

the

tragic

in a

wide

horizontal

r a

high

cathedral.l1

From Mondrian'scompositionto the struggle against the tragicmight

seem

like

a

long

jump,

but

in

this

painting

we can

see

the

preparations

for,

execution

of,

and

ensuing

excitement of

a

very

methodical

leap.

Looking

at

this

composition

with Mondrian's

view

of

"nature

expand-

ing"

in all

vision,

we can see

it as a visual field of no

particular,

deter-

mined

origin

or location. In

this

field we

must

see a

necessary

imitation

if we are to

see

anything, any

form.

We see this

limitation

by

means

of

verticals

and

horizontals

(curved

lines could

have

accomplished

the

same effect

to some

degree,

but the limitations

they suggest

are

not as

abruptor dramatic as a straight ine block).

What we

have seen

in

this

painting,

as described n the last

paragraph,

is

not

a matter of

simple

vision

or

survey

of

the surface

of the canvas.

It

required seeing

the verticals

and

horizontals

of this

painting

as limita-

tion of

the

"visible

expansion

of

nature," i.e.,

in terms

of

a

concept

logically previous

to

the

painting.

Mondrian is of course

not

talking

about

the

universe

(which

may actually

be

expanding

but

certainly

not

visibly).

He must be understood

as

talking

about

the visual

field

and its

characteristics.

A concept "the visible expansion of nature" was thus one of the

causes of this

painting

and is

also one

of

the

relational

meanings

of

the

painting.

But

it is also the

pre-work-of-artconcept

motivating

the

paint-

ing.

This

concept

has a content made evident

by

the

painting:

the

visual

field

naturally

expands

when we

open

our

eyes;

it

expands

until it is

limited

by

two basic

sorts of

lines,

verticals and

horizontals;

when verti-

cals

and horizontals

are seen as

forces

they

are

sometimes seen

to

be

in

balance,

thus

giving

their

visual

fields

qualities

of

rest and

calm

which

may

be felt

by

a

spectator.

It

is

possible

that

this

concept

be

a

constituent of a relational

meaning

of the

painting

and still be an in-

adequate pre-work-of-art concept.

For

instance

there

undoubtedly

are

12

Piet

Mondrian,

Plastic

Art

and

Pure Plastic Art

(New

York:

Wittenborn,

Schultz,

1945),p.

13.







THE

ARTS: BEING THROUGH

MEANING 113

some

spectators who, given

the

pre-work-of-art concept

of

this

painting

might

not

have

feelings

such

as

would

make

the

concept

evident in

this

painting.

By

virtue of the

visible resemblance

between

the

verticals

and

horizontals of

this

painting

and those seen

in

nature,

one

could

say

that

Mondrian has been

painting

nature but

distorting

it

to extreme.

This

of

course is true but

says

very

little:

it

says

merely

that

"remote

resonances"

are

discernible. The

questions

"Why

distortion?"

"Why

to

extreme?"

bring

to

focus the method

Mondrian is

using.

He is

selecting

elements of

a

plastic language:

straight

vertical and horizontal lines

and

pure

color

to

point

in

a

definite

(its

definiteness establishes

to

its extent the

exis-

tence of a

language)

and

unique

(what

make this

work of art

new)

way

to certain

"specific

sections of

reality":

expansion,

forces,

equilibrium.

He

points

to

those

facts

by

giving

us

a

particular

instance of

exempli-

fication,

in

terms

and materials

of an art

form,

of

a

concept

logically

previous

to this

painting.

Mondrian's

painting

now can

be said

to

mean

referentially

(whatever

else

it

means)

that a

visible

expansion

occurs

in

visual

fields and that

this

expansion

encounters certain

characteristic

obstacles

(verticals

and

horizontals) and has certain resolutions in a "dynamic equilibrium."

This

meaning

is

presented

in

the

painting

by

means

of a

pointed

exem-

plification

of

such

logically prior

concepts

as "visible

expansion,"

"ob-

stacles,"

"dynamic

equilibrium"

and

"pure

reality."

The Arts: Being through Meaning

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