The Art of War During the Norman Conquests · 2012-08-18 · The Normans in France 900 to 1200 3...

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The Art of War During the Norman ConquestsMerlin Douglas Larsen

©Copyright 2003 by Merlin Douglas Larsen

Table of Contents

The Normans in France 900 to 1200 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

The Normans in Britain and Ireland 1066 to 1200 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

The Normans in Italy and Sicily 1000 to 1194 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

The Normans in the East 1050 to 1119 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

INTRODUCTION

Once upon a time, the rules our friends playedwith were all of one piece. We wrote them withthe end in mind of having fun battling endlesslywith all our favorite armies, under a single systemthat would allow period tactics to work for eacharmy in its historical setting. Of course, noteveryone wanted to play the same period andsetting; so we got into trouble by meeting on gamenights and laying down our favorite pre-gunpowder armies and slugging it outanachronistically. This produced strangeanomalies. For instance, two popular armies wereHundred Years War English and Dark AgesByzantines. They met a number of times in battle,with the English getting routinely trounced. Swisspike and halberd armies did not do so well againstByzantines either; nor against Mongols or otherwell-run steppes armies that featured masses ofhorsearchers. We did not always end up havingfun, but for years we did try. Letting playersoccupy some kingdom on a fantasy map andplaying out conquer-the-world campaignsproduced the aforementioned anachronisms in aprolonged way. Only the clever player(s) who ranthe killer-elite types of armies and won thecampaign had fun. Some armies which made animpressive splash in history simply did not do wellagainst enemies they had never met historically.

The English did very well against the feudalFrench because of a built-in weakness in theFrench army of the period: command control wasponderous, and the proud knights and lords couldnot bring themselves to attack the lowly peasantarchers which made up the great majority of theEnglish forces, concentrating instead uponcrossing lance or sword with their equals, theEnglish men-at-arms. The result was catastrophicfrom the French point of view, to say the least; asEnglish yeomen shot the French knighthood downand then took up hand combat weapons tounsportingly bash the French knights from twosides at once: One yeoman would draw the Frenchknight into an attack, and then when he had laidhimself open, the second yeoman would clobberhim up-the-side-of-the-head with his maul: atwhich point the Frenchman would fall to theground, to be straddled and offered the chance tosurrender or have his throat cut. But if you put thissame English tactical array up against Mameluksthey do not have a happy time at all: The Muslimsprudently use their mobility and firepower to turnthe English flanks, which of course makes the en-staked English battle line useless. On a gamingtable, you can get around this by anchoring theEnglish flanks to terrain or the edges of thegaming surface: this makes the English playerhappier, but the Mameluk player then complainsthat he would never attack such a strong defensive

The Art of War During the Norman Conquests2

position in the first place — which is probablytrue, had Mameluks ever chanced to meetlongbow-equipped English armies at all. This isover-simplification, of course. For instance: if theEnglish were in fact besieging an important cityheld by the Mameluks, and they wanted to breakthat siege, they would be compelled to attackwhere the English stood on their chosen ground —assuming that starvation of the besiegers could notbe effected by cutting their lines of supply, thusavoiding pitched battle and resulting in no war-game: How expedient, and yet how boring!

After years of keeping The Art of War enclosedin one set of covers, it is apparent that the ruleswill never fly beyond our own circle of friends ifthey are not written as period-specific volumes. Sowith that goal firmly in mind, here is the same setof rules, simple, quick-playing, fun and accurate,only just for the period c. 900 to 1200 A D.Fortunately, the geographic area is enormous,making a variety of army vs army combinationspossible: And all of them historically accurate.

The Normans were the dynamic race of theirtime. Sons and daughters of the Vikings, theirforebears settled down to become lords ofnorthwestern France, in what had been hithertoknown as Neustria. It quickly took on a new name:“Land of the Northmen,” or Normandy. Soonenough, the duchy was too strait by way of theinhabitants, and younger sons had perforce to hiveoff and look for other places to make theirindividual fortunes. Italy beckoned, and soonthousands of mercenaries were trooping across theAlps and into the toe and heel to sell their swordsto the highest bidder. This did not suffice to keepthe loyalty of the indispensable mercenaries: andby 1038 the first Norman count had been created,with land and fortresses to hold for his lord, theLombard duke of Naples. This first Normanmagnate in Italy soon threw off his allegiance, toown the duke of Capua as his sovereign. OtherLombard princes gave their Norman captains landsto hold in fee, thus hoping to bind their loyalty tothemselves by their generosity. But the Normanswere never a grateful race: Always ruthless,rapacious occasionally when pressed by need, and

always grasping, but seldom if ever grateful. Justas soon as they could manage it, the Italo-Normansbegan to seize the territories abutting their fiefs —always “in the name of” whomsoever they hadsworn fealty to, of course. But in effect, theseunsanctioned conquests wound up passing solidlyunder Norman control, further strengthening theirhold in the southern peninsula and weakening theposture of the Lombard dukes. The Byzantineswere made to suffer a like fate, finally losing thelast of their ports ( Bari) in 1071. The leisurelyconquest of Sicily from the Muslims was achievedwith little setback. From there, the Normansaggrandized themselves into a kingdom; evenholding the opposite coast of North Africa forawhile. Elsewhere, they conquered England fromthe Anglo-Saxons and Anglo-Danes. From therethey pressed into Wales, Scotland and Ireland,though with limited success in the “Norman”period: the subjugation of the British Isles was leftto their descendants, after the Anglo-Normans hadbecome English. They founded also a Normanprincipality in Northern Syria at Antioch as aresult of the First Crusade.

This book will cover the wargaming aspects byperiod and locale. The first section will deal withonly the Normans and their mainland expansion inFrance. The second section will center on theirconquest of England and expansion into Britain.The third section will deal with the Normanoccupation of southern Italy and Sicily. The lastwill allow players to campaign after the FirstCrusade, beginning with the founding of theNorman principality of Antioch.

Wargame rules are only meaningful if theyexplain the motivations of the warrior caste. Theresultant motives of the defenders explain whythese wars took place, often to a prolonged degree.Special rules will be used as little as assumednecessary; but take careful note of them, how theymodify the standard mechanics while playing TheArt of War During the Norman Conquests.

The Normans in France 900 to 1200THE BACKGROUND

The Normans in France 900 to 1200 3

According to the Gesta Normannorum Ducum,Rolf the Viking Dane was baptized a Christian in912. After that he was known as Rollo. He madean alliance with king Charles of France andmarried his daughter; agreeing to hold the landbetween the river Epte (which empties into theSeine from the north midway between Rouen andParis) and the coast, as far south as Brittany, andincluding Brittany itself — which at this time was“deserted.” It was quite a chunk of land to cede toa Viking. But by doing so, Charles hoped to useRollo to stave off further incursions by otherViking bands. The whole northwest coast ofFrance was plagued with them. Charles enteredinto this one-sided arrangement to form a bufferbetween the raiders and the interior of hiskingdom, by using the Vikings to fight each other.Rollo had till then been the worst of the lot, layingsiege to Paris more than once, besieging Chartres,and sacking numerous lesser towns over the years.But the alliance succeeded in taming the furiousRollo, turning him into a prudent land-holderinstead of a wanton reaver. He took totaladvantage of his new authority to exact advantagefrom the king; getting his lands confirmed to hisheirs and thus assuring that the “Normans” werethere to stay.

The Bretons did not agree with king Charles’cession of their lands to the Vikings and Rollo wascompelled to subdue them violently. From thisearly beginning sprang the Norman view thatBrittany belonged to the counts of Rouen (andlater dukes of Normandy).

Rollo was apparently devout, for a convertedDane. He bequeathed much of his land to thechurch and rebuilt many ruined monasteries andcities, strengthening their fortifications againstinvasion. He divided his lands up among his men,creating of the Viking warriors an aristocracymodeled upon the Frankish. With these changescame mechanical alterations in the manner inwhich the Normans waged war: They took upusing the horse like proper knights, though forquite awhile they continued to fight on foot intheir traditional shield-wall; and in fact, theirpropensity to dismount was reinforced by contactwith the English at Hastings, and typified the

Anglo-Norman response to most battlefieldsituations from that point on.

Rollo’s marriage to the French princessproduced no heirs. So when she died, he took uphis former concubine again, by which his sonWilliam “Longsword” had been born. Rollobrought William, now a young man, before hisvassals and persuaded them to accept him as theirlord. Oaths of mutual loyalty were sworn. Rollothen abdicated and retired, living five more yearsbefore he died sometime after 928 but before 933.This became the traditional way for the dukes ofNormandy to assure a smooth succession.

Under Longsword and his successors Normanpower was extended and consolidated further.Rollo had subdued the other Scandinavian settlersof Lower (western) Normandy: His son andgrandson (Richard I) resisted all efforts of theFrench to regain some control over their powerfulNorman vassals. Oaths of fealty were obtainedfrom magnates living in the frontier regions, thushelping to solidify their frontier, which had fewnatural defenses. Many of these border magnates(such as the house of Bellême) owed fealty to theNorman duke and the French king, and played offone against the other where possible; thusfurthering their own aggrandizement and creatinga turbulent region where warfare was endemic forgenerations. In fact, frequently throughout thisperiod, the history of Normandy is one of Frenchkings trying to regain active control of the duchy.Even after the conquest of England, and long afterNormandy had ceased to be associated withScandinavian connotations, the kings of Franceremembered their rights as sovereigns and tried toenforce them when opportunity afforded a chance.

In war-gaming the early part of this period, oneshould get a feel for the under-populated nature ofthe region. Vast tracts of forest and wildernesshave been reclaimed by nature; villages havedisappeared under the fresh growth; fields are leftto be overgrown with scrub and eventually lost toview. Here and there — notably along the rivers— can be seen small towns, most of them walled,at least in earth and timber palisade, though someof the older ones, such as Paris, Rouen, or


Chartres, boast the medieval patchwork ofmaintained Roman stone fortifications. Villagestend to cluster tightly around the towns and thetimber motte and bailey castles of the lords.Population is slowly on the increase: But even atthe end of this period, Normandy, and in fact allof western Europe, is still a thinly-peopled place.(Population estimates arrive at an average figurefor Domesday England — 1086 — of c. 26 soulsper square mile; France is probably around thesame.) The peasants are rude and exploited, hardlynoticed at all by their lords except for the wealththey produce. It is little enough, for the land iswasted by generations of warfare and rapinecaused by the Vikings. There are many of thesepersons settled in coastal France, especially in theCotentin and into Brittany. As Normandy expands,they have all adopted Christianity; but pagansuperstitions abound for many years yet; andespecially amongst the warrior class, worship or atleast respect for the old gods of war is tacitlyaccepted in times of danger. Christian faith is stillnew, and careful warriors hedge their bets, notwanting to be left out in case the new creed, forsome reason, does not award what it promises onthe other side of death. Motifs of the old wayslinger on, in raven banners and mythic creatures,as depicted upon shields (see especially theBayeux Tapestry). Old ways of disposing of theheroic dead also continue alongside the Christianrites of burial. (E. g. the interment of HaroldGodwinson by William the Conqueror in 1066 wasdecidedly paganistic, even though William wasthe darling and champion of Mother Church.)

So Normandy throughout the 10th and 11th

centuries is a potpourri of cultures and religiousmores. Warriors intermingle anything whichsatisfies their fears and ambitions. They franklyadmire the Scandinavian mythos of the warrior’slife, where his ultimate fate is to enter a heavenpeopled by fighting men. A militant Christ isalways preferable to a peaceful one: and anylegitimate excuse to war is better than peace aswell.

The church, slowly making a comeback aftermany years of virtual annihilation in the region, ischampioned by Rollo and all his successors. The

Normans, youngest and rudest of the sons of HolyChurch, are her staunchest supporters. Their pietyis simple and flexible to circumstances, but rarelyphony. Expediency will dictate whether a warriorexpects to enter a warrior’s heaven, or restblissfully in the presence of Christ and the angelsafter death. Such an ambivalence must producefluctuating obedience to the letter of churchcanon. But excommunication is reserved only forthe most intransigent and heinous crimes. Thechurch cannot hope — as yet — to flagrantlythreaten warlords and their vassals with the fear ofheavenly anger. Only the imminence of personaldissolution brings a wicked baron, count or dukewillingly under the auspices of the sacraments.Then he can be made to swear things which willbind his heirs with closer ties to the church.Monasteries are rebuilt or founded anew, by thosemagnates who, in the hour of their greatest fear,have sworn to be better than they have hithertobeen. Few renege on these devout promises whenProvidence grants them a stay of venue.

As for chivalry and the vaunted oaths of fealtywhich accompany it: right up until the eve of theConquest there is little enough of it in evidence inthe written sources. Many scholars are reassessingearlier, simple views about Normandy before1066. Some feel that medieval customs had not asyet caught on, that perhaps older Scandinavianand Carolingian traditions were intermixed in noaccepted norm; that the whole question ofvassalage and raising armies thereby was in a stateof flux, slowly becoming the recognizable socialtraditions and laws that appear definitely inNormandy for the first time in the 12th century.But although terms, such as fealty, are from thelater part of this period, the knights (milites) andvavasseurs are clearly seen in the earlier historicalrecord of Norman expansion and consolidation.Promises and mutual support were absolutelyc entral to the lord and liegeman relationship, nomatter what the terms used. No doubt, Carolingiancustom abounded in the Île-de-France and othersurrounding Frankish feudatories and greatlyinfluenced how the fledgling Norman dukesapproached vassalage.


The succession of Norman dukes continuedunhindered from Richard I to his son Richard II,who died in 1026. His eldest son, Richard III, diedsuddenly a year later, and Robert the Devil hisbrother assumed the duchy. There was somesuspicion that Robert had arranged his brother’sdeath by poison. And he had difficulties with hisuncle Robert the archbishop of Rouen. The countof Brittany also was rebellious and supported bythe estranged nobles of Normandy against the newduke. Robert had married the sister of Canute,king of England and Denmark. But he hadcontinued to associate with his concubine, Herleveof Falaise. Under pressure from archbishop Robert,he put her aside, and the archbishop helpedsmooth the way to a reconciliation with Brittanyand the bellicose Norman magnates. But dukeRobert’s wife bore them no children: which leftonly Robert and Herleve’s bastard son, William(II) as his heir. With archbishop Robert’s aid, thetraditional ceremony of obtaining fealty for theducal heir was arranged: but the majority of theNorman magnates were far from pleased with theirfuture lord, who was, in addition to beingillegitimate, only a small boy. Duke Robert wenton pilgrimage to Jerusalem soon after that, anddied on the way homeward in 1035. For a coupleof years, little William’s uncle the archbishopsteered the duchy as his regent. But his own deathin 1037, quite possibly by murder, loosed the reinsof government and brought about a decade ofanarchy. While William was growing up, hisduchy flew to pieces, each magnate looking outfor his own interests. Plots by William’s jealousrelatives against his life struck down those closestto him, and were often foiled by seeminglymiraculous coincidence; and despite every attemptto supplant or kill him, he finally arrived at hismajority and took over offic ial rule of his domain.I t was in a sorry state. He possessed hardly anyauthority outside the county of Rouen itself. Foryears, he had to rely on his overlord king Henry ofFrance, to keep his enemies from overwhelminghim. They had all sworn to obey duke Robert andhonor his bastard as their next sovereign. ButWilliam’s uncles and cousins boasted of betterbirthrights. Their oaths of conspiracy superceded

their oaths of fealty. Their excuse of: “I have moreright to the throne than the Bastard,” raisedrebellions from 1046 till duke William finallysecured a powerful alliance by marrying Matildaof Flanders in 1051. King Henry was mostunhappy with the marriage negotiations when hehad learned of them, warned William to desist,and declared war against him when he refused tolisten. In the next seven years, William achieveda complete victory. He went on the offensive, andby 1063 was lord of Maine, sovereign in easternBrittany, and had over-awed king Henry’s youngson Philip, who assumed the French crown in1060.

William had never forgotten the avowedpromise to him of his cousin, Edward of England,who became king in 1043: While living in exile atthe Norman court, Edward may at least haveintimated that William would be his successor; a“promise” that he renewed — according to theNorman accounts — in 1051 shortly before theirduke’s marriage, when he visited England. UponEdward’s death in 1065, the English crown wasassumed by the earl of Wessex, HaroldGodwinson. Harold had two years previous beenplaced in duke William’s power by suffering shipwreck on the coast of Ponthieu. The count ofPonthieu had delivered Harold over to William,who had exchanged oaths of fealty with himbefore he allowed him to return home. Harold’sseizure of the throne was, therefore, tantamount inNorman eyes to open rebellion and betrayal.William gathered as large an army as he couldattract to his cause and invaded England inSeptember of 1066. At Hastings, Harold and histwo brothers were killed, the English army heavilydefeated, and William’s path to the throne clearedconsiderably. He was crowned on Christmas Dayby the archbishop of York.

After the Conquest of England, Normandycontinued to be held by William, who was bothduke and king. Near the end of his reign, hiseldest son and heir to the duchy, Robert(commonly known by his epithet of “Curthose” -short breeks), fought him for control of hispatrimony. The Conqueror had, on the eve of theinvasion of England, followed tradition enough to


have Curthose crowned as the next duke; but hehad refused to relinquish control of Normandy intothe hands of his son, whom he judged to beincompetent.

When William died in 1087, Curthose tookcontrol of the duchy, while his younger brother,William “Rufus” (the Red), received the kingdom.They were more or less constantly at war witheach other, although this did not often flare intoopen, armed conflict involving armies. Raidingthe lands of each other’s vassals in Normandy wasepidemic, and the folk of the villages andcountryside suffered most from the fear of beingburnt out, of having their crops ruined and theirstocks of grain and animals stolen. William Rufuswas in possession of the upper hand, when the FirstCrusade (1096 to 1100) took Curthose out of thepicture. Normandy settled down to a brief periodof peace. But shortly before Curthose’s returnfrom the East, Rufus was killed in a huntingaccident. Henry, the youngest son of theConqueror (and the only one born in England) washailed by the English and French in England astheir new king. Curthose accused Henry ofstealing his throne. He had an impressive numberof nobles in England who declared for him;especially Robert of Bellême the Earl ofShrewsbury, and his Montgomery brothers, whosemain strength lay in the Severn valley. Curthosedeclared war and invaded in 1101 by landing anarmy on the south coast at Portsmouth. But Henryled his troops to quickly cut off Curthose from hissupporters in central England and Wales. He suedfor a parley. A truce brought a hiatus in the war:Curthose was left in possession of Normandy,Henry was recognized as king; and the rebels inEngland, abandoned by Curthose, were soonenough banished to the mainland. In Normandywere nobles who held lands in both the duchy andthe kingdom. Curthose began to persecute thosewho owed fealty to king Henry for their lands inNormandy, and those who held estates in England.This resulted in a renewal of armed conflict in1106: and at the battle of Tenchebrai, dukeRobert was captured and spent the rest of his longlife as a prisoner in England. Henry was then inpossession, as the Conqueror had been, of both

duchy and kingdom. He never faced anotherrebellion of his own subjects in England after theouster of the Bellême-Montgomerys.

But in the duchy, Henry was engaged in longyears of war; as the king of France intrigued withhis enemies, the disaffected Norman barons andhis jealous neighbors. When Curthose’s son,William Clito, came of age in 1119, king Louis VIsponsored his cause in the duchy and theyinvaded. King Henry won a decisive battle atBremûle. But for the next nine years Clito poseda serious danger to Henry’s authority inNormandy. Many magnates thought his treatmentof Curthose unfair, and his refusal to hand over theduchy to Clito wrong, and joined Louis andClito’s faction. Henry’s position was damagedwhen his legitimate son, William, was drowned atsea in the White Ship tragedy of 1120. He hadbeen betrothed to the daughter of count Fulk ofAnjou. Clito obtained the marriage instead. ButHenry complained to the pope, and the marriagewas annulled on the grounds of consanguinity.King Louis then arranged for Clito to marry hiswife’s sister; and made him count of Flandersbecause the former count had been murdered byhis own people, leaving no heir. To help offsetClito’s growing prestige and political power,Henry married off his daughter Matilda (thewidow of emperor Henry of Germany) to GeoffreyMartel, Anjou’s heir. Henry then advanced hisdaughter as his heiress and made all his noblesswear fealty to her. That was in 1127. In 1128,Clito defeated a rival who had an equal claim tothe county (Clito had right through hisgrandmother, Matilda of Flanders, theConqueror’s wife), and the whole of Flanders thenaccepted him. But two months later, he diedsuddenly from a minor wound which turned septic.The danger to Henry was over, and the rest of hisreign passed off peacefully .

Matilda of Anjou was a disagreeable and proudwoman. When king Henry died in 1135, she wasopposed by her cousin, Stephen of Blois, whoseized the crown and was hailed by London andmost of the barons and churchmen as their king.But Stephen soon lost the support of the church byarresting the bishop of Salisbury. And the barons


became disenchanted with him when he did notmove swiftly to take active possession ofNormandy. Matilda came to England to press herclaim and war erupted in 1139. Geoffrey Martelconquered Normandy in 1144. He reasserted thepowers of an independent duke, and remodeledAnjou’s administration along superior Normanlines. Upon his death in 1151, his realm passed tohis and Matilda’s son, Henry Plantagenet. The warfinally ended in 1153, when Stephen agreed afternegotiation to recognize Henry as his heir.Stephen died the following year.

King Henry II was lord of the greatest realm inWestern Europe: He had begun as count of Anjou,Touraine and Maine, duke of Normandy andsuzerain of Brittany. His marriage to Eleanor ofAquitaine (divorced wife of king Louis VII ofFrance) brought him Aquitaine (Gascony), Poitouand Auvergne. As king of England, he wassuzerain of Scotland and Wales. In war, heconquered and held the French Vexin on thedoorstep of Paris. His rambling Angevin Empirestretched from Scotland to the frontier with Spain:And the middle link of this unwieldy chain wasNormandy.

But Henry’s relationship with his sons wasturbulent in the extreme, and the Anglo-Normanrealm was shaken by rebellions. When Philip wascrowned as king of France in 1180, he set aboutdestroying the Angevin power. The obvious targetwas Normandy. While Henry lived, Philipencouraged his sons to rebellion. And afterHenry’s son, Richard Lionheart, was crowned king(1189), warfare became constant. It wasinterrupted between 1190 and 1192 by the ThirdCrusade: But Philip returned early to encourageRichard’s younger brother, John “Lackland,” tointrigue for the throne. The release of Richardfrom captivity in 1194 strengthened the tiesbetween the English crown and the duchy: theNorman estates were reorganized aroundimportant fortresses, and seneschals whom theking trusted were given military powers to meetany French invasion. Normandy was defendedsuccessfully (but at enormous cost) till the death ofRichard in 1199.

King John’s strategic problem was much more

difficult than Richard’s had been. He did notcommand the same level of respect as hisformidable brother. The royal mercenaries werehated for their brutality, especially in Normandywhere much of the war had been fought.Furthermore, the chivalric culture of thearistocracy had for years been growing, with itsappreciation of poetry, music and the ideals ofCourtly Love. No place in all of northern Europerivaled Paris as a center for the expression of theseideals. The kings of France had never relinquishedtheir rights to Normandy: To embarrass king John,the right of the duke to enter any castle in theduchy was claimed by king Philip as his suzerain.The deadlock continued; until, in 1202, Philiplaunched several major campaigns whichreclaimed part of Poitou, Brittany, Anjou, Maineand Touraine. Normandy was cut off. Furthercampaigning in the duchy drove the troops of kingJohn out by 1204. For the first time in threecenturies, the land once known as Neustria wasreturned to the realm of the kings of France.

(Gascony remained an English colony. The factthat the king of England was also duke ofAquitaine, and held of the French king, causedthree hundred years of conflict: from the marriageof Eleanor of Aquitaine to Henry II to the end ofthe Hundred Year’s War.)

The situation was anything but clear-cut to theAnglo-Norman barons. Many held lands in the lostterritories. Some did homage to the French kingfor their Norman holdings. But most baronsremained in England. Normandy had thus lostmuch of its ruling class and was absorbed easilyenough into France.

When during the Hundred Year’s War theEnglish returned to Normandy, there was nothingof the old connections remaining: the soul of theNormans was pathematically French, and they hadto be subdued by the ruthless campaigning of aconquering English king.

S O C I A L S T R U C T U R E A N D T H EMILITARY.


Rollo, like any prominent warlord, had astanding force which formed the core of any armyhe mustered: his hirdmen, or housecarles: atightly organized brotherhood of householdwarriors whom he valued and who had all sworn tobe his loyal followers to the death. He in turn paidthem with booty, gifts, and, now that he held landin legal right from the Frankish king, steadings oftheir own, the antecedents of the Norman feudalfiefs. The rest of an early Norman army comprisedof other Scandinavian settlers such as freemen andbondi (landed tenants), and a few Frankish land-holders who had become the men of the newNorman lords. During the 10th century arrivingViking raiders were looked upon by the earlyNorman dukes as potential allies. Normandy wasitself a small power as compared with hersurrounding neighbors. Rollo and his successorsmade use of such allies as often as possible.Armies were small, seldom numbering in thethousands, and then only a few. Great armies ofover five thousand men were almost unknown. Thepeasantry were left to themselves; and as long asthey minded their husbandry and paid their taxesthe Norman landlords ignored them for the mostpart.

Rollo’s successors adopted more Frankishmilitary customs. During Longsword’s time, thefiefs were probably given with the same oaths asthe Franks used. These were, of course, beingmodified as the generations passed, evolving intothe ornate and solemn ceremonies typical of thehigh Age of Chivalry. In this rude beginning ofthat so-called era, there was little of the ceremonyand none of the pageantry whatsoever. Society wason an almost perpetual war-footing. The classes ofmen were geared toward raising and supportingarmies. It was how any lord and his people assuredthemselves of a future.

At the top of the pyramid stood the duke; forWilliam Longsword assumed that title, andclaimed personal right to rule all the lands onceplaced under Rollo’s jurisdiction. King Charleshad only bequeathed the county of Rouen asRollo’s personal fief, but placed him in commandto defend the afore-stated region from the Epte to(and including) Brittany. The Norman counts of

Rouen forcibly assumed possession of the whole ofit and were in process of time confirmed in thatpossession by the Capetian kings. Under the dukecame his various counts, who were enfoufed upontheir holdings and their offices made hereditary.Viscounts were specifically ducal appointees, withmuch the same duties and rights as counts, butsubordinate to them in the social order; they couldbe dismissed by ducal fiat. Milites, or the knightsin this early feudal period, whether landholding orotherwise, were not possessed of a very significantstatus, being merely recognized as the professionalwarrior caste. Simple knights were often landless,but never long without a lord. Household knightsserved in much the same capacity as the formerhirdmen; although the oath to fight to the death iftheir lord was killed had gone out of vogue. Someknights were powerful enough to have landedvassals under themselves. Typically, a fief waslarge enough to supply a knight with his horses,servants, and sufficient income to maintain themand his arms in the service of his lord. A knightwho also had other enfoufed knights owing himpersonal service was known as a baron. (Latersubdivided into barons and lesser lords calledbannerets.) A peculiar class of warrior amongst theNormans, that of vavasseur, was shared by ignoblelandholders, lower in status than even landlesshousehold knights, but occupying a status abovethe peasants. Vavasseurs were likely acombination of Carolingian custom, and thesettling of freemen of Scandinavian origin uponsteadings; whose obligation, and that of theirdescendants, was to perform military service likethe knights did, in return for the privilege of beingpart of the landholding class. (In this respect, theyare perhaps equal in social level and privilege withthe English geneat.) They provided lighter-armedhorsemen and infantry. Stipendiarii, the paidmercenaries of the period, were usually knights,who swore limited oaths of loyalty; but othertroops, such as bands of Vikings, could also bepaid, usually with promised booty. And infantrytended to be specialists in Norman armies, ratherthan raw peasant levies. Archers, crossbow-menand mailed spearmen were hired; notably fromBrabant, as well as from the Low Countries and


Denmark. For his invasion of England in 1066,Duke William hired masses of infantry; and troopsfrom as far away as the Norman holdings insouthern Italy joined his mostly-stipendiary army.

At first, military obligation was varied induration, commensurate with the present dangers.But as time went on, a fixed obligation of forty oreven sixty days in a year was imposed upon thecounts, viscounts, barons and their troops. Outsideof that obligated period they expected to be paid.And beyond the borders of the duchy they alsoexpected to be paid. No matter how powerful theduke might be, he always had to convene a warcouncil to allow his requests of his vassals to beaired. He could not merely impose his commandsupon them and expect to be obeyed. William theConqueror, the most powerful of the Normandukes, had to work very hard to convince hisreluctant magnates to support his bid for theEnglish throne.

WEAPONRY, TACTICS AND STRATEGY

This entire “Norman” period is the period ofmail; and for three hundred years there is littlechange in arms and armor. Mail is comparativelyrare: Knights, of course, are almost universallyequipped with it; but even as late as the FirstCrusade, perhaps only one in six foot soldierspossesses a mail shirt or coat. The Scandinavianname for a mail shirt is a byrnie. The mailcovering for the head and shoulders is a separatepiece, called a hauberk: but as time goes on, thehauberk comes to be attached to the coat moreoften than not, giving the name to the wholearmor; and by the 12th century, this integral mailhood is now called a coif . Scale armor iscommonly a cheaper substitute in the place of ringmail; the scales being often formed of cow horn inthe place of iron. A simple leather tunic, or adouble-layered garment sewn with padding —called a gambeson, and after the First Crusade aquilted aketon — are worn under mail to avoidchafing and to add protection from heavy blows;and by poor soldiers or light troops as their onlybody defense (although stylized, some of thearchers in the Bayeux Tapestry seem to be wearing

padded tunics). It is assumed that warriors abovethe poverty of peasants will outfit themselves asbest they can, according to their means to provide.(In the 12th century, assizes of arms are passed bythe Anglo-Norman kings of England, limiting thelevel of arms the common freemen and burgessmilitia of the towns can buy. The danger, as thenobility sees it, is that the proliferation of armswould risk the social order of things: common menas well-armed as the nobility could threateneffective rebellion. Yet, having the civic militiasavailable to protect their own property is alsoviewed as a desirable economy. The trick is toallow the militias to be effective, but not tooeffective. Thus a minimum and a maximumstandard is attempted by the crown: for instance aburgess may only have a gambeson and helmet ofiron, and carry spear and shield; or alternately abow and quiver of 24 arrows. Freemen — small-holders — can possess mail shirts, calledhaubergeons, the diminutive of the full hauberk;while only knights can own the complete armor ofthe elite warrior class, which by now includes mailleggings and feet, and long sleeves and mittens.)Mail shirts are expensive, and so too are ironhelms. Helms are the simple conical cap, manywith an added nasal bar to protect the face fromthe most common blow, a horizontal slash. (By thelate 12th century, the nasal has begun to give wayto a full face-plate, and the conical shape isreplaced by a broad, flat top, designed to helpdeflect lance points and missiles away from theface and shoulders.) Leather caps are far morecommon, some banded with iron hoops over thecrown of the head for added protection, andfastened to a brow band of iron, to form a cheapbut serviceable protection against slashing blows;but of limited effectiveness against spear thrusts ormissiles. Shields, on the other hand, are carried bypractically everyone (except archers and crossbow-men). Early on, they are most often round; but asthe 10th century draws to a close, the kite-shapedshield supplants the round shield amongst themounted knights. It is large enough to cover thehorseman from neck to ankle, and is supported bythe guige a leather strap which goes over the rightshoulder. Round shields continue to be used often


by spearmen, and some continue in use bycavalrymen as well. (Throughout the 12th century,armor styles are introduced to the West from theEast, via returning Norman crusaders. Amongst theinnovations are the jazerant, a form of mail sewninto a covering garment; lamellar plate armor,mainly for the torso, and sometimes made ofhardened leather, called in French cuir bouilli,which is boiled in wax and then shaped; and theuse of a linen, muslin or silk gown to cover thearmor, which is most often called a surcoat. Horsearmor, which has gone virtually out of use in theWest till now, but has always been used in theEast, begins to make a comeback on the destriersof the great lords and such knights as can afford it:the wealthy use mail — called a bard — whilethe main company of barded horses are protectedby quilting; the surcoat of the knight is extendedto the panoply of equestrian equipment, and ahousing of equal material is painted or sewn tomatch the knight’s personal insignia: which by theend of the 12th century is beginning to follow somerudimentary rules of heraldry.)

The spear remains the most common weapon.On horseback it is called a lance, but at first isessentially the same: around eight feet long with afairly substantial head of iron, and capable ofbeing thrust or thrown. Foot troops can use theirspears to slash as well as stab. (A great variety ofspear points survive today. Some were purelystabbing and slashing weapons, others were moreacutely shaped and were meant to be weapons ofversatility in hand combat and as missiles.)Javelins abound in the first half of this period, butafter around the first quarter of the 12th centuryseem to have fallen out of general use.

After the spear the most common weapon is thelong knife, or seax, a secondary weapon for useafter the spear breaks; they are all single-edged,and some are long enough to be classed as shortswords.

Few troops carry the long, double-edgedknightly broadsword. Even the Vikings havecomparatively few broadswords, as they are veryexpensive to make or import. All knights andhirdmen carry swords, as an early badge of theirprivileged rank. (By the 12t h century, steel

smithing has progressed and proliferated, and thetwo-edged broadsword is no longer the rare statussymbol of before: the finest examples still go tothe nobles, but any trooper who will afford onemay carry his sword of choice.)

The long-hafted (Danish) axe is often thoughtof as the primary weapon of the infantry and ofdismounted knights. But throughout this period,the spear is always the primary weapon employedin the melee. When used, the axe is usually heldwith both hands, and the shield slung over theback on its guige. Shortening the grip on the haftallows single-hand use with a shield. When usedtwo-handed, the intent is to deal the most deadlyblows possible to heavily-armored foes, requiringthe axeman to step forward from the ranks and intothe enemy (see the Bayeux Tapestry, which showshousecarle axemen well-forward of the much morenumerous spearmen): this leaves the axemanexposed to counter-attack, and so he must becovered by his spear-armed fellows on either handand behind him. The combination of heavy cuttingweapons and spears in a phalanx creates a stoutdefensive formation with strong killing power. It isespecially deadly against exposed horseflesh.

Troops are not arrayed as a horde withoutdiscipline. Vikings form for battle in dense lines,referred to prosaically as shield-walls; or indefensive shield-rings. The early Normans are nodifferent. And when put on the defensive, theknights dismount to fight alongside, or in the frontranks of, the foot. After Hastings, Anglo-Normanarmies typically dismount a portion, or at timeseven all, of their cavalry.

The simple bow is the most common missileweapon. Many, such as those employed by theVikings, are as tall as a man and are properlycalled longbows. The most common source forarchers is to recruit them from the rustics whohunt. Early in this period, hunting is not widelyforbidden or controlled by assize as it will bec omelater on. Although mounted archery is very highlydeveloped in the East, European bowmen fightalmost exclusively on foot. Few have horsesanyway, as they are too poor to own them. Thosemounted archers who operate like early hobilarsare mercenaries usually. It is possible for them to


shoot from the saddle, but the practice is rare. (Seeearly examples of the existence of mountedarchers shooting from horseback: in the closingpanel of the Bayeux Tapestry, and the claim bySnorri Sturluson that the mounted portion of theAnglo-Saxon army at Stamford Bridge shotjavelins and arrows as they closed in on the flanksand rear of the advancing Vikings.)

The crossbow is known (or rediscovered ) atleast by the 10th century. But it is always anuncommon weapon as compared with the simplebow. As this period progresses, crossbow-menbecome professional stipendiarii; most of themoriginating from the urban militias of the LowCountries. Toward the end of the 12th century,crossbow-men come from Germany and Italy aswell. They are highly valued and demand a dailywage second only to that allowed for knights.They are often mounted infantry; but crossbow-men using a lighter weapon can load and shootfrom the saddle when desired; like bowmen, theireffectiveness is limited to skirmishing, harassingor pursuing. (The cross-bow’s entry into westernEurope is controversial. One theory states that itwas a fresh invention by hunters, who found ithandy to lash a simple stock to the grips of theirself-bows, such that the bowstring could be heldfully-drawn in the provided groove without effort,the arrow nocked and ready: In short: it was asensible idea waiting to happen. The crossbow’sapplication into warfare was then inevitable. Theprod was a single, stout piece of wood; actually aself-bow laid horizontally. This developed into ashorter and stiffer bow, until the draw weight wasaround eighty pounds. Earlier crossbows with longprods were spanned by standing on the insidecurve of the prod with both feet and hauling backwith both hands until the string was cocked. As thec rossbow developed, the stock became moresophisticated, receiving a trigger assembly and astirrup for the foot to brace against while spanningthe string with both hands. The crossbow hadreached this stage of development by the end ofthe 11th century. Next came an increase inpenetrating power by increasing the draw weight.Eighty pounds was about the maximum an averageman could manage repeatedly in battle when

spanning with two hands. To span a heaviercrossbow, the crossbow-man now attached a belthook to the string; while standing on one foot, theother was inserted in the stirrup and the legextended, thus drawing back the string: anothermethod was to keep the stirrup on the ground,crouch to slip the belt hook over the string, andwhile keeping the crossbow grounded with onefoot in the stirrup, stand upright and drag the stringback. The prod increased to c. 150 pounds drawweight with this spanning method. Returningcrusaders in the 12th century brought backknowledge of a composite prod, formed of woodlayered with horn and sinew; it was more efficientfor the same draw weight, but was expensive tomake and therefore less common.)

Viking armies can array their archers behindthe shield-bearing spearmen, to take shelterthereby from cavalry attack or incoming missiles.The Normans either lose this facility, or at leastthe evidence of later armies (such as William’s atHastings) shows the archers and crossbow-menonly shooting out in front of, or on the flanks of,the main army. (Although another reason whyWilliam mustered his marksmen before hisspearmen might be that he knew the English couldnot make any effective reply and had no cavalrywith which to ride them down: and certainly,having your marksmen out in front, in anautonomous unit, makes them more handy. So it ispossible that stationary defensive formations canfire their missiles over the heads of the stationaryfront rank spearmen and dismounted knights, whenthe Norman commander deems such a tacticnecessary.)

The central feature of tactics on the battlefieldis the warhorse, or destrier. Early in this period,they are not far different in size or quality from theusual horse. It is in their training where they differ.The horses employed by Viking or Anglo-Saxonarmies are essentially the same, but they neveracquire the training in shock tactics; and when thebattle array is being formed, the troopers mostoften descend to fight on foot and leave theirhorses in the rear. Because of the long trainingrequired, destriers are therefore very expensive,and become increasingly so as the Middle Ages


advances. In the late 11th century a saddled horsecosts as much as 2.5 to 8 oxen, while the hauberkis worth at least 10 or as much as 16 oxen. But bythe 13th century the destrier has soared in value toas much as seven times the value of a full suit ofarmor. The best steeds of the knightly class comefrom Spain, northern Italy or Sicily. Along withservants, weapons, provisions, camp equipment,lesser mounts for the march and sumpter beasts,the value of a knight’s retinue can equal half oreven a full year’s revenue from his fief. The dukeexpects his vassals to lay this expensive militaryequipage at his disposal.

Because his horse is expensive and difficult toreplace, the knight is naturally reluctant to engagein pointless or risky daring-do. Cautious scoutingof the enemy’s lands is the norm. Campaignsinvolve either swift raids to damage the peasants’husbandry and gather booty, or the siege of someimportant fortress. Field battles are consideredvery risky and are therefore rare. Most of them areprecipitated by a relieving army coming to the aidof a beleaguered castle or town. The chancebumping-into of opposing forces is a phenomenonalmost unheard of. And uppermost in everywarrior’s mind, from lord down to the humblestdrafted peasant, is the opportunity to gain booty.Obviously, the taking of noble prisoners andholding them to ransom is the quickest way toacquire a lot of cash. Simply sharing in the captureof a knight can bring a common soldier moremoney than he will make in a year.

Only the cavalry arm is drilled well enough tobe used as a shock weapon en masse. Bretons andManceaux especially are famed for theirexcellence as horsemen, using the couched lanc eor javelins from the saddle with equal facility.They refuse to dismount to fight on foot. But bythe mid 12th century, they have lost any distinctionthey once had; as the Normans and others aroundthem learn to be their equals, and themselves haveevolved to be more like their neighbors.

The knights of a mesne form into a small unitcalled a conroi: around twenty to thirty men. Twoor three of these grouped together form an acie, orsquadron. The men of the conroi are well-knownto each other and are practiced in the frequent use

of their weapons together, in regular drill first andthen in battle. Other than some stipendiary units,the knights are the only professional warriorscapable of sustained maneuvers on the battlefield.When a larger army is formed, by joining the smallarmies of several lords together, they nearlyalways muster into three battles (battalions) ofvarying, though often roughly equal, size. Theycan be drawn up into a single line; but often theyare arrayed in column of battles, or with one inreserve and two in line. (At Hastings, dukeWilliam formed his army into three battles in line:marksmen and spearmen in front, and knights inthe rear; the fact that he was able to arrest the routof his troops by riding across their front indicatesthat he further had a reserve of cavalry under hispersonal command. At Tenchebrai, king Henrydecisively employed a concealed reserve ofBreton horsemen.)

Knights are trained in the use of javelins onlythrough the first quarter of the 12th century: Afterthe missile capacity of the lance/javelin isabandoned, the lance is only used couched underthe arm, and it gets longer (up to twelve feetcommonly) while the head becomes smaller andmore acute; obviously developing to moreefficiently pierce armor. The couched lance, heldby a knight braced in his high-cantle saddle,imparts the greatest possible kinetic energy againstthe target of his charging horse.

One need not imagine a great rate of speedhere. A gallop at the end of a charge, to swiftlycover the open ground, would serve only twopurposes: reduction in the time the cavalry mightbe exposed to defensive missiles; and, the chancethat the mass of approaching horsemen mightfrighten the enemy into breaking ranks in flight.Should the enemy stand firm — if infantry — ormeet them with a charge of their own — if cavalry— the horses of their own accord will tend to huntout a way through or over the obstacle of theenemy formation: and, not finding either, will pullup. Rash, inexperienced or incompetentleadership, and attendant similar qualities amongstthe led troopers, will possibly produce by accidentthe very dramatic carnage of horses thrusting upfrom the rear ranks and forcing the issue by way of


irreversible physics: Horses are impaled onawaiting spears and, in the very act of perishing,crush down the front ranks of the spearmenwielding them. At that point, either the foot breakand are pursued by the surviving horsemen whoremain as yet mounted: or perhaps the horsemen,aghast at the sight of their slaughtered leadingcomrades, turn with what alacrity they can manageand flee. Had the engagement been betweensimilar bodies of mounted knights, a final clash attoo great a speed would produce the horribleeffects of horses rebounding from each other, ortoppling head-over-heels to the ground, someknights to land above and the rest to be crushedbeneath. Broken bones would be the immediateresult: All order lost and irreversible damage theend result to both sides. Therefore, usually cavalrycharges are conducted by the most experiencedheads available. (It should be assumed. Most if notall of the young knights will have never crossedlances with an enemy in deadly earnest until thatvery day: not in a dense array of packed conroisat least; certainly not beyond the scattered hurley-burley of a raid.) Accidental collision wouldtherefore be reduced to a minimum chance. Thehorses would arrive with a rapid slowing down oftheir initial closing speed, the foremost ridersselecting a target for their couched lances. Thelance point, if not deflected aside by a parryingshield or weapon, would certainly pierce anyshield or armor placed to resist: With roughly athousand pounds of forward momentum to utilize,the knight’s single-hand grip on the lance is thelimiting factor: just so many pounds of grippingpower as he can muster is carried on the tip of hiskeen lance. Forward speed, therefore, is notrequired: just uninterrupted, inexorablemomentum, however ponderous. By reverse andsuperior application, the planted weapon of thespearman could impale the breast of the steedbeing targeted: or drive the rider out of the saddle,and run him through in the bargain should he fail,with his own defenses and maneuvers, to avert theintent of his enemy. The only limiting factor thata grounded spear has in transmitting the energy ofthe horse against itself is the strength of thewooden shaft: potentially far more lethal than the

single-hand grip of a mounted rider on his ownlance, and in the bargain far easier to aim as well:the knight must rely upon the steadiness of his seat(his steed) and his own skill in managing bothhorse and lance together at the moment of impact:the spearman has merely to angle his groundedweapon toward the mass of approaching horsefleshand wait. This sort of engagement results in acontrolled, but no less deadly, melee. The constantpressure of horse-flesh might worry the front rankof spearmen back upon those behind, topplingmen to the ground to be run through by lance workand trampled by hooves (thus, the increasedadvantage of a bigger horse). But a failure by thecavalry to penetrate the massed ranks willultimately result in their withdrawing to reformand try again. Should they persist in remainingoutside the defensive enemy formation, stalled outand trading blows with hand-held weapons alone,the knights soon enough find that their massivesteeds afford a target impossible to miss, and theweapons of the enemy will quickly dispatch thehorses, whose naked flesh is so vulnerable to athrusting spear point or sweeping axe blade; theunhorsed knight will be fortunate indeed, if he cangain his own feet before those same weapons seekhis life while he is indisposed upon the ground.

Tactics are simple. All troops of this period arelimited by insufficient drill from performing thebattlefield evolutions characteristic of moreregular armies. Even conrois cannot be expectedto respond automatically to sudden commands onthe field. Feigned routs are within their small arrayof tricks; but these must be planned outbeforehand to have any hope of success. (They aredangerous, as other troops might think the rout isall too real and join it!) The evidence, such as atHastings, indicates that withdrawing from acombat to reform and rest is well within thecapability of the cavalry: the feigned rout, orflight, is merely an extension of this. The infantry,however, is rooted to the spot, once they arecommitted to the melee. A pursuit by them quicklyrenders their shield-wall into a ragged mass,vulnerable to cavalry charges or even the attack offresh and inspired infantry.

Sieges are the most common feature of total


war. The science and art is reviving again in thisperiod, after a decline in Western Europe duringthe dark night of the barbarian invasions. In thisperiod, the defense and the attack are shifting inadvantage: Against the timber stockades, adetermined assault can expect to soon reduce thedefenders to terms of surrender: fosses can befilled in and the palisades under-mined and pulleddown: Machinery is not required, just bravery andmuscle. But against those fortresses which dopossess stone walls and towers, more sophisticatedmethods must be employed if the fortress is to fallmore quickly than from starvation. Mining — thedigging and propping of a tunnel beneath a wallsection or tower, and then the burning of thewooden props to bring about its collapse — is nota widely-applied skill; it requires instinct andexperience, and therefore falls into the category oftalent: to be in possession of a competent engineerwho knows how to mine is a fortunatecircumstance perhaps only available to a greatwarlord, who can attract such persons by the allureof frequent employment and a suitable reward.Simple machines, like battering rams orcounterpoise catapults (trebuchets) are alwaysemployed in a siege of any duration. They havelittle effect upon stone walls, but an exposed gatecan be battered in with a penthouse- covered ram.The trebuchets and other missile-throwing siegeengines are used mainly as antipersonnel weapons:stones weighing over a hundred pounds can bethrown; or baskets of sharp flints can be cast tocreate a rude shrapnel; bladders of oil and afirebrand can cause instant carnage when thebladders burst upon impact: the trebuchet isespecially effective at reaching flammable targetswithin the walls because of its high trajectory. Fireposes the most serious danger to the wooden motteand bailey castles; but, of course, is almost nodirect threat to stone. Siege towers, or belfries, arerare devices only because the technology of theirproper construction is dependent upon the scienceof geometry. That, and they are expensive tomake, requiring an enormous amount of timber,rope and iron: not forgetting to mention thehundreds of cattle which must be slaughtered, sothat their dripping hides can cover the belfry

against the threat of defensive fire. Thesematerials are not always available on the spot. Andthen, there is the limitation of approach to thefortress: not all castles can be reached by using abelfry. The assault is a rare event in any case: it isoften too costly of life and material for theattackers. Scaling ladders are frightening devicesto fight from. The defenders on their solid wall-walks, behind their parapets of stone or wood,have an enormous advantage, both mechanical andpsychological. The besiegers, however, have onegreat advantage over the defense: that of freedomof movement. They can pull off at any time, whilethe defenders are subjected to greater discomfortand despair the longer they hold out. This is well-known. And if a stubborn commander lays siege,his reputation might win for him the surrender ofa fortress, because the defenders know that toresist is ultimately hopeless. (William theConqueror laid a three year siege to the castle ofBrionne. And at the siege of Alençon, his ruthlesstreatment of the Angevin garrison won him thequick surrender of Domfront. After these back-to-front episodes, his reputation was such in siegewarfare that his enemies were already half beatenmen when he beleaguered their rebelliousfortresses.)

The main advantage of the defense is theseasonal and limited nature of campaigning.Armies are very small when a lord has only hisknights and a few of their retainers in hand. Notmany of them will remain after their feudal duty isdone, but return home to their fiefs to manage theirown affairs. To hold them in the field longer thanc. forty days a year requires money: or sufficientpromises of loot and preferment to induce them toremain in arms. Mercenaries are available if theycan be paid. Arrears in their pay will make themincreasingly surly and will finally result in theirdesertion. (Unemployed mercenaries in thecountryside are often as dangerous as an invadingarmy: They plague the peasantry, seize places thatare poorly defended, loot and burn as they will.)When a lord’s army is breaking up to return home,the siege comes to an end. When another yearcomes, he must start over, with little hope that asecond effort will succeed any better. Few lords


have enough troops, even for forty days, toeffectively threaten a fortress. (The siege ofBrionne was possible for three years, becauseWilliam rotated his troops, calling out fresh onesto take the place of those whose feudal term ofduty was expired. He also probably usedmercenaries, which he could now afford.)

The whole subject of castles is related to ducalpower. When Richard I consolidated his authority,he restricted the building of castles without hispermission. A ducal licence was required to buildone. The duke retained the right to enter anycastle in his domain. He reserved the right as wellto appoint or dismiss the ducal castellans.Privately owned castles were therefore strictlylimited to the strategic necessity of a defense indepth. Normandy’s frontiers were easilypenetrated by an invading army. The only answerwas the arraying of fortresses in depth. An invaderwould be faced with the prospect of one siege afteranother if he wished to get a grip on the country.If he passed the castles by, then each one in hisrear further increased the risk of his advancedeeper into Norman territory: his lines ofcommunication would be cut, and the garrisonsfrom castles bypassed could form a substantialforce to harass his foraging parties, or impedefuture siege operations. (In the period of anarchyduring William the Conqueror’s minority, thebuilding of unlicenced castles burgeoned. Afterhis coming into power, many of them were pulleddown. Others were incorporated into the duke’scollection of official strongholds and weremanaged by appointed castellans. By the time ofthe Norman Conquest of England, there werevirtually no unsanctioned castles anywhere inWilliam’s realm. Castle building in AngevinNormandy during the 12th century was as strictlycontrolled.)

* * *Knights are the initiators of war. Their

rapacious conduct will drive the common folk attimes to desperate, though futile rebellion. Butusually, it is the knights who agitate for action.Older and wiser heads — when they can makethemselves heard — will dissuade young hot-heads from pointless bravado. They know the risks

of war, how a battle can result in a nasty reversalof fortune. Far better is it, if total war can beavoided in the first place: if one can raid one’senemy, burn his crops and destroy his peasanttenants, then he will appear as a lord who cannotprotect his people. Advantages can be won fromtruces under such conditions. When blows must begiven, let them be the exchanges of equals: knightsshould fight each other and not condescend tobattle with inferiors, with footmen and villeinswho do not understand the rules of conductbetween true warriors.

Such is the chivalric code as it relates towarfare. In this period, it is only developing. Bythe end of it, knights are a distinct social classcalled noble, or of high birth: the rest of the worldis common or ignoble. Only those of noble birth(they insist) can understand what motivates aknight to war: the love of prowess, to demonstrateone’s valor in the face of an enemy: for the love ofone’s lady, for the loyalty one has for one’s lord.To die fighting is the highest form of destiny.Victory is always preferred, but to die with honoris essential to life, more so than bread and meat.To win riches is shameful if there is no honor.

(This ideal was impossible, even when it wasbeing sung and rehearsed in gesta, chanson andlay. It was a dream world, to hold up against thesordid reality of ignorance, poverty, sickness anddeath. Even by the end of the 12th century, manyknights were avoiding going to war at all:preferring to pay a subs titute to join the muster oftheir lord’s army. This paying of another to carryout their feudal obligation was known as scutage:or “shield money.” The knights so-relieved of theonerous duty of bearing arms soon learned to playat the games of Courtly Love without facing therisks of total war. They became courtiers, if theybelonged to the upper crust of the social order. Ifthey were simple lords of a manor, they becamelandlords, managing the economy of their feudalfiefs, evolving into the emasculated aris tocracywho paid for the armies but seldom fought in them.Knights who had a taste for war, then, would serveas the officer corp, leading men-at-arms who weredrawn from the ignoble classes, but looked likeknights in their heavy armor. This reality of


medieval warfare in the Age of Chivalry hadalready its beginnings before the 12th century wasout.)

ARMY LISTS

In using these lists you have a few options. Ifyou are gathered for an evening of set-on, once-offbattling, then the Battle Generator system isprobably the most painless and fun way togenerate a couple of quick armies. If you like totailor-make your forces, then you and youropponents will have to separately sit down toseveral hours of labor with a calculator before youplay, and generate one or more troop mixes ineven 250 point increments. The minimum size foran A of W points army is 250. Then go up fromthere, e. g. 750 points, 1,000 points, 1,250 points,and so forth. If what you are contemplating is acampaign, then the task is both more simple andcomplex. You only have to fix a maximum pointsize to start your campaign with for each involvedplayer, then generate that army once in totalstrength. After that, you must make certain in yourpaper work and your moves on the map beingused, that you do not field the same troops morethan one place at the same time. Thus, for anygiven battle, the troop mix can be varied withinthe total of troop types available: You could, forinstance, send all your knights to one place, whileyour vavasseurs and stipendiarii foot lay siege toyour enemy’s capital city; and thus the apparentpercentages limiting troops by the list are negated;but the overall percentages of the list limit the mixof troops in the campaign. This is the best way toplay. But the choice may not be yours, sinceperhaps a majority of war-gamers are restricted bythe lack of available players. I have played someof my most enjoyable games using the BattleGenerator system. And in one respect at least, itreflects reality better than using points armies thatare bought: in the real world, the duke or countseldom knew with certainty what his call to armswould provide for his army until the troops hadgathered under his banner. Sometimes he wasaghast at the poor army he had to work with, andat other times he was pleasantly surprised at the

quality of the turnout. The percentages listed are men, not army

points. Where there is a double heading, andpercentages listed below that, the heading refers tototal percentage of the whole army; and the listedpercentages below the heading are percentages ofthat heading. For example: “Up to 30% milites,vavasseurs and mercenaries” would be amaximum of 300 men out of every 1,000; and35% heavy cavalry would be 35% of 300 men, or105 men. When buying figures with army points,round off to the nearest whole figure: for example,using 20 mm stands (40 cavalrymen ), 35% wouldbe three figures, 120 men; while 25 mm stands (50cavalrymen) would only buy two figures, 100 men.

(Note: the points values for various tacticalabilities and weaponry are detailed in the BasicRules by stand size, i. e. head count.)

Viking Raider Armies900 to 1150

up to 20% light infantry, seax and bow 2. Morale:00-39=D, 40-69=C, 70-99=B.

up to 100% light infantry, seax, some sword,spear/javelin, Danish axe and throwingaxe or javelin. Morale as above.

up to 50% medium infantry, spearmen as above.up to 20% heavy infantry, spearmen as above.

Organization:Up to three battles are allowed per Viking

force/player. The minimum size for a battle is 500men, or one unit. 500 men units are for purchaseand morale purposes. Troop types may intermix ina single unit, except cavalry with infantry.

Mounted infantry are created bycommandeering the horses from the district. Up to25% of a Viking force can be mounted as cavalryon the battlefield — a rare occurrence in any case.They may not intermix with infantry units.

Infantry tactics:open and close order, shield-wall, shield-ring,

open order missile fire, close order missile fire(hand missiles only), immobile-screened missile


fire, phalanx (spearmen and axemen only: locked-line on the defense, does not check to receivecavalry charge), wheel.

Cavalry tactics:open and close order, column, open order

missile fire.

Norman Armies900 to 925

Up to 30% hirdmen and mercenaries:up to 20% light infantry, seax, and bow 2;

Morale: 00-39=D, 40-89=C, 90-99=B.up to 50% medium infantry, sword and

spear/javelin, Danish axe, javelin or throwing axe. Morale as above.

up to 20% heavy infantry, as above.up to 50% light, medium and heavy cavalry,

sword and lance/javelin and javelin.Morale: 00-29=D, 30=69=C, 70-99=B.REQUIRED UNIT.

Up to 95% bondi and freemen infantry:*up to 60% unarmored peasant levy, assorted

rude weaponry; 25% bow 1 or sling.Morale: 00-99=D.

up to 10% unarmored bowmen, seax and bow 2. Morale: 00-39=D, 40-99=C.

up to 50% light spearmen, seax, spear/javelinand javelin. Morale: 00-39=D, 40-89=C,90-99=B.

up to 20% medium spearmen, as above.

Organization:Up to three battles of infantry and cavalry

allowed. The minimum-sized battle is 500 men, orone unit. Units are 500 men for purchase andmorale purposes. Troop types may intermix in asingle unit, except mounted with foot.

Note: the hirdmen and mercenaries are thefull army when campaigning outside the duchy.The infantry are not mustered except to campaignwithin the realm.

Infantry tactics:open and close order, column, wedge, shield-

wall, shield-ring, open order missile fire, closeorder missile fire (hand missiles only), immobile-screened missile fire (hirdmen and mercenariesonly), phalanx (spearmen and axemen only:locked-line on the defense, does not check toreceive cavalry charge), wheel (hirdmen andmercenaries only).

Cavalry tactics:open and close order, column, open and close

order missile fire (bow open order missile only),charge (mounted infantry prohibited), withdrawpost combat.


Up to 30% milites, vavasseurs and mercenaries:*up to 50% unarmored infantry, seax and

bow 2;with up to one-fourth crossbow 1 and 2. Morale: 00-39=D, 40-89=C, 90-99=B.

up to 50% medium infantry, sword andspear/javelin, Danish axe, javelin orthrowing axe. Morale as above.

up to 20% heavy infantry, sword and spear/javelin. Morale as above.

up to 80% light and medium cavalry, sword,lance/javelin and 2 javelins. Morale:00-29=D, 30-89=C, 90-99=B.

up to 35% heavy cavalry, sword,lance/javelin

and javelin. Morale: 00-29=D, 30-79=C,80-99=B. REQUIRED UNIT.

Up to 85% vavasseur feudal infantry:*up to 60% unarmored peasant levy, assorted


*up to 10% unarmored bowmen, seax andbow 2. Morale: 00-69=D, 70-99=C.

*up to 50% light spearmen, seax, and spear/javelin. Morale: 00-59=D, 60-89=C,90-99=B.


*up to 20% medium spearmen, as above.


allowed. The minimum-sized battle is 500 men, orone unit. Units are 500 men for purchase andmorale purposes. Troop types may intermix in asingle unit, except mounted with foot.

Note: the milites, vavasseurs cavalry andmercenaries are the full army when campaigningoutside the duchy. The feudal infantry and levyare not mustered except to campaign within therealm.


wall, shield-ring, open order missile fire, closeorder missile fire (hand missiles only), immobile-screened missile fire (mercenaries only), basicphalanx (feudal infantry spearmen only), phalanx(dismounted cavalry and mercenaries only: do notcheck to receive charging cavalry, locked-line ondefense, reinforced line when mustered with otherinfantry on a minimal ratio of one dismountedcavalryman or mercenary per seven infantry: inother words, forming the front rank), wheel(dismounted cavalry and mercenaries only).

Cavalry tactics:open and close order, column, wheel, pivot,

charge (mounted infantry prohibited ), withdrawpost combat, open and close order missile fire(bow open order missile only).


Up to 30% milites, vavasseurs and mercenaries:*up to 50% unarmored infantry, seax and

bow 2; with up to one-fourth ascrossbow 1 and 2.Morale: 00-39=D, 40-89=C, 90-99=B.

up to 50% light, medium and heavy infantry,sword, spear/javelin and javelin.Morale as above.

up to 80% light and medium cavalry, sword,

lance/javelin and 2 javelins. Morale: 00-29=D, 30-89=C, 90-99=B.

up to 35% heavy cavalry, sword,lance/javelin

and javelin. Morale: 00-19=D, 20-69=C,70-99=B. REQUIRED UNIT.


rude weaponry; 25% bow 1 or sling. Morale: 00-99=D.

*up to 10% unarmored bowmen, seax andbow 2. Morale: 00-69=D, 70-99=C.

*up to 50% light spearmen, seax andspear/ javelin and javelin. Morale: 00-

59=D,60-89=C, 90-99=B.



allowed. The minimum-sized battle is 500 men, orone unit. Units are 500 men for purchase andmorale purposes. Units may intermix by weight butnot by type, i. e. mercenaries, marksmen andcavalry in separate units.

Note: the milites, vavasseurs cavalry andmercenaries form the full army when campaigningoutside the Norman realm. The feudal infantry andlevy are not mustered except to campaign withintheir own province: the Normans within the duchy,the Manceaux within Maine, and so forth.


wall, shield-ring, open order missile fire, closeorder missile fire (hand missiles only), immobile-screened missile fire (mercenaries only), basicphalanx (feudal spearmen only), phalanx(dismounted cavalry and mercenaries only: do notcheck to receive charging cavalry, locked-line ondefense, +25% versus cavalry, reinforced linewhen mustered with other infantry on a minimalratio of one dismounted cavalryman per seveninfantry: in other words, forming the front rank),wheel (dismounted cavalry and mercenaries only).



c harge (mounted infantry prohibited), withdrawpost combat, feigned rout, open and close ordermissile fire (bow open order missile only).


Up to 40% milites, vavasseurs and mercenaries:*up to 50% unarmored infantry, sword and

bow 2; with up to one-fourth crossbow 2.Morale: 00-39=D, 40-89=C, 90-99=B.

up to 50% medium and heavy infantry, swordand spear/javelin OR sword and pike. Morale as above.

up to 50% light cavalry, sword and crossbow 1. Morale as above.

up to 80% light and medium cavalry, swordand lance. Morale: 00-29=D, 30-89=C,90-99=B.

up to 50% heavy cavalry, sword and lance.Morale: 00-19=D, 20-69=C, 70-99=B.REQUIRED UNIT.

up to 10% cataphract cavalry, sword andlance. Morale as above. (After 1150 only.)



*up to 10% unarmored bowmen, sword andbow 2. Morale: 00-69=D, 70-99=C.

*up to 05% unarmored crossbow-men, swordand crossbow 1 or 2. Morale as above.

*up to 50% light spearmen, sword and spear/javelin. Morale: 00-59=D, 60-89=C, 90-99=B.

*up to 20% medium spearmen, as above.*up to 05% heavy spearmen, as above.

Organization:Up to three battles of infantry and cavalry.

The minimum-sized battle is 500 men, or one unit.Units are 500 men for purchase and moralepurposes. Units may intermix weights but not

types: cavalry, mercenaries and marksmen are inseparate units.

Note: Outside the Norman realm, the wholearmy mustered is milites, vavasseurs cavalry andmercenaries. Feudal infantry and levy are onlymustered for campaigns within their own province:Normans within the duchy, the Manceaux withinMaine, and so forth.


w all, square, open order missile fire, immobile-screened missile fire (mercenaries only), basicphalanx (feudal spearmen only), phalanx(dismounted cavalry and mercenary spearmen andpikemen only: do not check to receive cavalrycharge, locked-line on defense, reinforced linewhen mustered with other infantry on a minimalratio of one dismounted cavalryman per seveninfantry: in other words, forming the front rank;pikemen only: +25% versus cavalry, locked-line,rank bonus), wheel (dismounted cavalry andmercenaries only ).


feigned rout, Western Charge (mounted infantryprohibited), withdraw post combat, open ordermissile fire (mounted bow and crossbow only).

Breton and Manceaux Armies1000 to 1125

Up to 75% cavalry and mercenaries:*up to 20% unarmored infantry, sword and

bow 2; with up to one-fourth crossbow1 and 2.Morale: 00-39=D, 40-89=C, 90-99=B.

up to 20% light, medium and heavy infantry,sword and spear/javelin and javelin.Morale as above.

up to 80% light and medium cavalry, sword,lance/javelin and javelin. Morale:00-19=D, 20-69=C, 70-99=B. REQUIRED UNIT.

up to 35% heavy cavalry, as above.


REQUIRED UNIT.

Up to 50% feudal infantry:*up to 60% unarmored peasant levy, assorted

rude weaponry; 25% bow 1 and sling.Morale: 00-99=D.



*up to 50% light spearmen, sword and spear/javelin. Morale: 00-59=D, 60-89=C.90-99=B.


Organization:Up to three battles of infantry and cavalry. A

minimum-sized battle is 500 men, or one unit. 500men units are for purchase and morale purposes.Units may mix weights but not types.

Armies campaigning outside Brittany orMaine are all cavalry and mounted infantrymercenaries.

Infantry tactics:open and close order, shield-wall, square,

wedge, column, open order missile fire, closeorder missile fire (hand missiles only), immobile-screened missile fire (mercenaries only), basicphalanx (feudal spearmen only), phalanx(mercenaries only: locked-line on defense, do notcheck to receive cavalry charge), wheel(mercenaries only).


charge (mounted infantry prohibited), WesternCharge (mounted infantry prohibited ), withdrawpost combat, feigned rout, open and close ordermissile fire (bow open order missile only).

Frankish (French) Armies900 to 1100


bow 2; with up to one-fourth crossbow1 and 2.Morale: 00-39=D, 40-89=C, 90-99=B.

up to 50% light, medium and heavy infantry,sword and spear/javelin and javelin.Morale as above.

up to 80% light and medium cavalry, swordand lance/javelin and javelin OR sword and lance. Morale: 00-29=D, 30-89=C,90-99=B.

up to 35% heavy cavalry, sword and lance/javelin and 2 javelins OR sword andlance. Morale: 00-29=D, 30=79=C, 80-99=B. REQUIRED UNIT.


rude weaponry; 25% bow 1 and sling.Morale: 00-99=D.



*up to 40% light spearmen, sword andspear/javelin. Morale: 00-59=D, 60-89=C,90-99=B.


Organization:Up to three battles allowed of cavalry and

infantry. The minimum-sized battle is 500 men, orone unit. 500 men units are for purchase andmorale purposes. Units may mix weights but nottypes.


wall, square, open order missile fire, close ordermissile fire (hand missiles only), immobile-screened missile fire (mercenaries only), basicphalanx (feudal spearmen only), phalanx(dismounted cavalry and mercenary spearmenonly: locked-line on defense, do not check toreceive cavalry charge), wheel (mercenaries only).



charge (javelin-armed only), Western Charge(sword and lance only), withdraw post combat,feigned rout, open and close order missile fire(bow open order missile only).

French Armies (Breton and Manceaux after c. 1125)1100 to 1200



up to 50% medium and heavy infantry, swordand spear/javelin OR sword and pike. Morale as above.

up to 50% light cavalry, sword and crossbow. 1Morale as above.


up to 50% heavy cavalry, sword and lance.Morale: 00-19=D, 20=69=C, 70-99=B.REQUIRED UNIT.

up to 10% cataphract cavalry, sword andlance. Morale as above. (After 1150 only.)





*up to 40% light spearmen, sword and spear/javelin. Morale: 00-59=D, 60-89=C,90-99=B.

*up to 20% medium spearmen, as above.*up to 05% heavy spearmen, as above.

Organization:Up to three battles of cavalry and infantry

allowed. The minimum-sized battle is 500 men, orone unit. 500 men units are for purchase andmorale purposes. Units may mix weights but nottypes.


wall, square, open order missile fire, immobile-screened missile fire (mercenaries only), basicphalanx (feudal spearmen only), phalanx(dismounted cavalry and mercenary spearmen orpikemen only: locked-line on defense, do notcheck to receive cavalry charge; pikemen only:locked-line, rank bonus, +25% versus cavalry),wheel (mercenaries only ).


Western Charge (sword and lance only ), openorder missile fire (mounted bow and crossbowonly), feigned rout, withdraw post combat.

BATTLE GENERATOR SYSTEM

1. Choose your period.

2. Choose opponents.

3. Choose the first army’s size: 1,500 to10,000 men, as your resources and time allows. Ifone side was usually outnumbered historically —e. g. William the Conqueror when facing invasionsfrom king Henry and count Geoffrey of Anjouduring the 1050's — then the possibly-outnumbered side must be this first army.

4. Roll for the size of the opposing army:Roll 1d6: 1-2 = equal size. 3 = 1.25 to 1 4 = 1.5 to 1 5 = 2 to 1

6 = 2.5 to 1

5. Roll up army units: A. If one side is using standard 500 men

units, the other side must also; or use double-sized


% of troops roll of 3d6under headingup to 05% 17 or 18up to 10% 15 or 16+up to 15% 14+up to 20% 13+up to 25% 12+up to 30% 11+up to 35% 10+up to 40% 9+up to 50% 8+largest % on list 3 to 7

units and roll up half as many. (Note on numbers:If you wish to play battles with small armies butlots of figures, simply change the men-to-figureratio to suit; of course, the ground scale will beoff, the more so as you use less men per figure; butif you don’t tell anyone, no one will notice! Thebattles play figure-for-figure like a skirmish gameanyway, no matter how many men are covering thearea of a single figure stand.)

B. The first unit that you must lay down isone of each REQUIRED UNIT. Then you may laydown ONE special unit of your choice.

C. If the army list being used has a singleheading, like Vikings, or like Normans oncampaign outside the duchy — and only usingtroops from the “Up to 30% milites, vavasseursand mercenaries” heading — then proceed to the3d6 chart under D. If the army list uses twoheadings, then roll 1d100 with the 3d6 for eachunit: a 1d100 roll of not more than the upperheading percentage will generate the unit from theupper heading troop types; a roll higher than thepercentage limit of the upper heading willgenerate the unit from the lower heading. Forexample: A Breton unit will come from the “Up to75% cavalry and mercenaries” heading if the1d100 roll is 01 to 75; but a 1d100 roll of 76 to100 generates a feudal infantry unit. If the Bretonsare on campaign outside Brittany, the 1d100 is notrolled at all, and every unit is generated by 3d6from the upper heading.

D. Generate each unit:

If more than one unit type is possible, theplayer is free to choose now only which type hewants; if he rolls up a subsequent unit, then theearlier units stand as selected. If figures for theunit rolled are unavailable, then substitute a unittype which is more common; in other words, agreater percentage of the army. Keep within yourresources! Do not try and roll up armies that areequal in size to your maximum army. Always havetroops in reserve. If you must field your entirearmy to be happy, then do not use the BattleGenerator system: Field full points armies instead.

6. Once armies are generated, you can lay themdown according to a previously arranged scenarioor campaign situation. If you have not decided bysome method or other how the table is to bearranged, or the scenario decided upon, then thefollowing Battle Generator may be of some use.

Roll 2d6 to determine the encounter. If thesides are unequal, then +1 to the dice roll for eachlevel of advantage the larger army has over thesmaller army: giving a range of +1 to +4. Thepossible scenarios are given beside the finalnumber rolled:

2-8 = neutral ground, class zero woods andclass zero slopes only; no water courses that effectmovement or combat, etc.

9-10 = Smaller army (or the first armygenerated if equal size) has picked field with oneof the following terrain advantages:

A. one flank covered by impassableterrain;

B. army arrayed on a class one hill; C. army arrayed behind a fordable stream

or ditch or behind a 3' wall or hedge.11 = Smaller army (first army) has picked

terrain from one of the following: A. both flanks covered by impassable

terrain;B. army arrayed on a class one hill with

one flank covered by impassable terrain; C. army arrayed behind a river that is

swim-mable, with a ford — or fords — that arewadeable, the total width of the ford(s) not toexceed 3d6";

D. army arrayed on a class two hill;


E. army arrayed on class one hill with bothflanks partially covered (limits movement throughto light troops only).

12 = Smaller army (first army) has pickedterrain from one of the following:

A. arrayed behind a swimmable river, withone bridge and a possible one or more fords not toexceed (2d6) - (1d6) = total inches in width;

B. arrayed in a pass on a class one slopenot wider than 3" per 500 defenders, with classtwo and three slopes on their flanks;

C. arrayed on the opposite side of a rising,swimmable river (thunder storms are swelling thewater level several miles away upriver) with fordsof total width not to exceed 2d6 + 2 inches: eachturn, roll 2d6 for each ford, with the first rollmaking the ford uncrossable if a 2 is rolled: thesecond turn, a roll of 2-3 raises the water tounfordable levels: the third turn a 2-4 raises thewater to unfordable levels, and so on until all thefords are now unfordable. The larger army startswith all units massed behind the fords, and theleading units already halfway over the river, notmore than two figures wide, the rest following incolumn. Smaller army is drawn up guarding fords.The river is 4" wide. (Alternatively, for each 2"the river is wider the larger army may deploy withone 500 men unit already over the river at the farend of the table on the first army’s flank or intheir rear — up to a maximum width of 12"=2,000men over.)

13 = Smaller army is breaking out. Largerarmy sets on first. Then smaller army sets on:

A. 1.5 charge moves away, choosing thetargeted point of contact. OR:

B. 3 charge moves away, and must gettwo-thirds of their forces off enemy base edge towin. Less that two-thirds down to half off is adraw. OR:

C. 3 charge moves away, and must get“His Nibs” off the enemy base edge to win. “HisNibs” is some important commander or otherperson who must avoid capture at all costs. Hisidentity can be concealed but must be writtendown.

14 = Larger army is in column gettingambushed. A map with hills and woods must be

drawn up for the smaller army to write downwhere their concealed units are placed. Theirplaces of concealment must begin 1.5 or morecharge moves away from the road that theambushed units are using. Upon being charged, theambushed units must make a performance check torespond: each subsequent turn of checking torespond +1 to the unit’s dice roll. Failure torespond means the ambushed unit stands where itis and may only defend without facing — theymay not use missiles.

15-16 = Larger army attacked in their camp.Smaller army units start 2 charge moves away.Defenders are in extended order: 2" or morebetween each figure. Defender units must makeseveral performance checks to become useable;these performance checks are at the current moraleclass level; morale tests, however, are at class Duntil after the second performance check is made:the first successful check allows the unit to see andarm: they may use their missiles but are only halfcombat value; the second performance checkmade allows the unit to muster into open order; thethird performance check allows the unit to move.

7. Alternatively, rolls of 10-12 may producethe “battle in the pass scenario”, a favorite of oursand one which we have probably played in morevariations and more times than any other. Theremust be a larger army, which outnumbers thesmaller army by no more than 1.5 to 1.

A. The defenders are the larger army.B. One-quarter to one-third of their man-

power is blocking a mountain pass (or river ford):the rest (the mounted portion of the army) ispursuing raiders (the first army).

C. The mounted raiders are laden withbooty and are trying to get out of enemy territoryand home with their ill-gotten gains. They startjust outside effective missile range, or 1.5 to 2charge moves away from the pass defenders,:whichever distance is furthest away.

D. In 2d6 turns, the rest of the defenders— all mounted — come onto the table base edge,behind the starting position of the raiders.

E. Whichever way you divide up thedefenders, the men in the pass should be heavily


1 2 3 4 5 6

Side B 6 5 4 3 2 1Side A 1 2 3 4 5 6

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outnumbered by the raiders.F. The only safe exit for the raiders is off

the table edge behind the pass defenders.

Deployment generator:If deploying simultaneously causes a problem,

with players on both sides shifting their supposedstarting positions to counter what the other side’sdeployments are, then try using this simple randomdeployment generator.

Roll for initiative with 1d6 as usual; add in anycommander/leader bonuses (if you use such stuff:our leadership levels are +1 to +3). Loser must rollto deploy his units first. This is side A.

Each unit is put in the formation side A desiresand then rolled for. Each unit is given a 1d6 rolland placed along the table base edge in thefollowing arrangement:

Roll for cavalry units first if you wish for themto be out in front. If on the defensive, or if desiringto have infantry in the forwardmost positions, thenroll for cavalry units last. Units which roll thesame section number as units previously rolled forline up behind them: in other words, each sectionis only one unit wide, and the width is determinedby the frontage chosen. Once all units have beenpositioned, gaps in the line may be eliminated bybringing units into contact; or rear rank units maybe brought up to fill the gaps to either sidecontiguous with the section they rolled into. SideA’s army is now deployed. They may not changeanything once they are done and it is side B’s turnto deploy.

Side B puts their units into formation andplaces their units in the same manner by 1d6 dieroll: side B’s section 1 aligns with side A’s section6, i. e. both sides start with section 1 on their ownleft flank and count across to their own right flank.

The advantage side B has is that they can reactto side A’s deployment and widen or shorten thefrontage of their units by modifying their depth.

The initial unit side B lays down must align withside A’s opposite section, like this:

but after that, side B’s sections, which are wider ornarrower than side A’s, do not have to line up.

In the example below, side A has deployedtheir five 500 men units in line and in double-depth (each ‘x’ is one 64 man company on a20mm x 20mm base). Their initial deploymentrolls put one unit each in sections 1, 3 and 6; whiletheir last two units rolled up one behind the otherin section 5. They pulled the rearmost ‘5 unit’ upbeside the other into section 4 (which was empty),and moved their section ‘1 unit’ into stand contactwith their unit in section 3: thus forming acontiguous line of double-depth:

3 4 3 2 Side B

Side A 1 3 5 5 6

Side B — outnumbered by 1.25 to 1 — opted touse standard single-depth units, to help extendtheir frontage. The section deployment rolls were2, 3, 3,4. Because there is no open space in eithersection 2 or 4, the second ‘3 unit’ must be placed


behind the first ‘3 unit’. Notice how B’s initiallydeployed ‘2 unit’ aligns as closely as possible withA’s ‘5 unit’. The rest of B’s units were deployedas rolled and do not line up precisely with A’s,which are on a narrower frontage.

SPECIAL RULES DEFINITIONS

Locked-lines:Usually, a locked-line is for all combat results.But some of these early shield-wall phalanxesshow a stubbornness that resists being driven back.So we allow a locked-line on defense only. Thismeans that if the unit is 51% plus driven back, thewhole unit goes back c. 1"; individual figures arenot driven back on the Combat Results Table. Butindividual figures do advance when the CRTresults demand. A normal locked-line onlyadvances the whole unit when they win 51% plusof their combat results.

Shield-wall and shield-ring and square:There is no difference to any of these formationsversus incoming missile fire: they all +1 to theneeded roll of the shooters. Shield-ring is so-listedto impart a bit of period flavor in thenomenclature. A square is the later name for thesame thing: a formation facing all points of thecompass, either hollow or in a dense mass. None ofthem move. As in the basic rules, a performancecheck is required for the unit (or units in a battle)to break out of a shield-ring or square. A shield-wall can be dropped at any time. (Do not confusethis with phalanx-using troops going into openorder from close order: this always requires aperformance check.)

Reinforced lines:In the basic rules, this refers only to having asecond line of close order troops in stand contactbehind a front line: the front line gets a +1 CVpoint. In the context of phalanx attributes, it refersto some armies allowing their cavalry to dismountto stiffen (reinforce) the morale of feudal and levyinfantry. Not every army that dismounts theircavalry to fight as foot troops does this. The

French especially seem reluctant or averse tomustering their nobility with the common feudalmasses. They form up instead as an autonomousdismounted unit. The Normans, however, comingfrom more humble origins and having no suchclass snobbery on the battlefield, maintain thetactic of putting a front rank of knights before thefeudal spearmen and marksmen, or evenintermixing these with rear ranks of peasant levy.The result is a “brave” phalanx which is notrequired to check morale to stand up to a cavalrycharge. The minimum ratio required for this tacticto work is: one dismounted cavalryman for everyseven infantry: enough to form a full front rank ofdismounted cavalry. The mechanics of reflectingthis in a war-game are simply to have onedismounted knight figure as a member of an eightfigure unit or line. If the ratio drops to less thanone-in-eight, then the front of that unit is no longercovered and they become subject to the usualmorale check when charged by cavalry.

Immobile-screened missile fire:In mixed units, where marksmen are allowed tomingle with spearmen and axemen, etc., a specialsort of “screened-fire” is allowed. As long as thearcher mix is not closer together than extendedorder ( 2" between marksmen ) they may shoot aspart of the front rank of figures: but, they count as“screened” by the heavier troops on either side ofthem; they are considered the same weight classwhen receiving missile fire. In melee combat, theirCV is unchanged. This rather feeble missilepresence is confirmed by the sources, whichdescribe archers and spearmen together; and statealso that the archers fired from behind thespearmen. The archers mentioned are obviouslynot in great enough numbers to form any sort ofunit. They have mustered alongside theirneighbors from back home. (See the opening sceneof the battle at Hastings in the Bayeux Tapestry:the lone archer figure on the Anglo-Saxon side is“crouching” under the protection of the thegns andhousecarles, well back in the ranks but still able toshoot, as he has an arrow on the string of his bow.)If marksmen figures are closer than 2" apart, andtheir tactical listing does not include immobile-

26

screened fire, then they must receive missile fire attheir armor class: they are out in front of the restof the phalanx, even though the figures themselvesmay be placed contiguous with the rest of themixed unit.

Missile-in-Melee:As per usual, bows and crossbows get half-densityif arranged in less than full open order: e. g. a 60-men base gets 30 hits. Hand missiles get full valuewhen they throw using missile-in-melee. And ifthe attacker rolls against himself the results count:i. e. all AE, AB and ABm results take full effect.The usual rules apply otherwise: CV is armor only,and the unit must first make a performance checkto use missile-in-melee.

Cavalry using hand missiles:All cavalry in northwestern Europe are evolvingthe use of the lance into couched-only. As thethrowing of javelins from horseback is going out ofvogue, they may throw only one round per turn.

The Normans in Britain and Ireland 1066 to 1200

THE BACKGROUNDThe lands of Britain and Eire have been

estimated during late Roman times to have held atmost one to two million people. After centuries ofendemic warfares, and Viking incursions on the eveof and during the first part of the Norman expansionperiod, the population could not likely have beengreater. The Domesday Book statistics have beenused to indicate a population of 1.25 to 2 millionfor England. Scotland during the time of the Brucehad c. half a million; so at the time of the Normanoccupation almost certainly less. Wales and Irelandbetween them shared the rest, perhaps another c.two hundred thousand. It was into this vast, under-peopled region that the Normans came, looking asalways for new lands to conquer and rule. Even withtheir allies and vassals from Maine, Brittany andFlanders the magnitude of the task was too much forthem. Yet incomplete though the Norman Conquestwas (beyond the borders of England itself), the

impact upon the culture and traditions of the Scots,Welsh and Eastern Irish was permanent, and pavedthe way for future English occupation andassimilation.

Unfortunately, nearly all the information we

have about the Norman Conquest and occupation ofEngland comes from the Normans themselves. Thevictors write the histories — the old adage goes —and it is perfectly true in this case.

The Norman official view was that king Edward,the last to rule of the royal line of the Cerdingas,promised his young cousin, William Bastard, dukeof Normandy, that he would declare him his heir. Ofcourse, not even the Normans pretended thatEdward had actually first said this when he wasalready king. No, the promise had originatedperhaps thirty years before 1066, when Edward andhis younger brother Alfred were pensioners of theNormans, in exile while Canute the Great and his

27

sons occupied the throne that was rightfully theirs.Edward and Alfred wanted desperately to regaintheir heritage. But as exiles they had no militarypower. What was worse for them was the fact thattheir own mother Emma, the daughter of dukeRichard I, was married to Canute: her second royalhusband. Edward’s and Alfred’s father, kingEthelred, was dead and in his grave since 1016,shortly after he and his sons had lost the calamitousbattle at Ashdon: the year Canute took over allEngland. Well, there was the very brief episodewith king Edmund Ironside, son of king Ethelred byhis concubine Ælfgifu: he was king for less than ayear. But before he died, Canute agreed to let himrule England south of the Thames. If he had been agentleman, Canute would have let Ironside’s half-brothers inherit at least that much of the formerrealm of king Alfred’s descendants. But instead,Canute sought for the lives of his rivals. Emma’ssons fled to her kinsfolk in Normandy. The infantson of Ironside was conveyed secretly aw ay byfriends; and thus Edward “the Exile” disappearedfrom the stage of European politics for many yearsas he grew up at the German and Hungarian court.

When Canute died in 1035, Edward and Alfredwere encouraged to try their hand once again atregaining their heritage. Accordingly, they soughtout military backing. The future count of Boulognewas their brother by marriage; this connectionprovided them with a fleet, and the Boulognnais andNormans supplied the troops. Alfred went to Doverand Edward disembarked near Southampton.Edward won a battle, but gained little support fromthe locals. They were too in awe of king Harold I,the bastard son of Canute by his concubine Ælfgifuof Northampton, who had usurped the crown withthe help of Godwin the earl of Wessex. So Edwardretreated back across the Channel to wait forAlfred. But his brother never came: earl Godwinhad promised a parley, to hear Alfred’s grievances;and instead attacked and seized the young atheling.Then he gave him into the hands of king Harold.Alfred was blinded so savagely that he died of hiswounds. It was perhaps either before or soon afterthe ill-fated expedition that Edward promised hiscrown to the child-duke of Normandy: No doubt inexchange for Normandy’s support.

But matters took quite a different turn, and

undoubtedly the promise — if such had ever beengiven — was forgotten or dismissed by Edward.King Harold I died in 1040, childless; and in hisstead reigned his half-brother, Hardicanute. But theson of Canute and Emma ruled only two short yearsand died suddenly from choking on his food. He toowas without heirs. A treaty of Hardicanute’s withking Magnus of Norway, that either would inheritthe other’s realm if either died childless, meantnothing to the witan; and they extended theirheartfelt invitation to Edward to accept the crown.He had been living at Hardicanute’s court formonths and must have also felt the treaty with theking of Norway to be worthless. A threat to seekvengeance amounted to nothing, as Magnus was tooembroiled trying to subdue the Danes. He diedwithout reclaiming his English kingdom.

Earl Godwin and his new king did not have aneasy relationship. Edward never forgot the partGodwin had played in Alfred’s death. But Godwinand his family were the most powerful magnates inEngland. Edward could not survive without theirgood will. Godwin was an efficient minister, but hefeathered his own nest, which he made certain grewwith the years. His sons held half the realm withtheir father; and his daughter, Edith, was married tothe king. It was a childless union. Popular opinionsaid that king Edward and his pious wife had bothagreed to never consummate their marriage. Edithhad been on her way to life as a nun, when herfather’s powerful will had compelled the girl to doher duty to her family and become the queen.Godwin died in 1053. But his son, Harold the earlof Wessex, became then Edward’s right-hand manas his father before him. The witan had followedGodwin’s advice and sent to Germany for news ofEdward the Exile; inviting him to come and takeup his rightful crown. The king and queen hadproduced no children, and it looked as though theynever would. King Edward agreed to make his half-nephew his heir. But upon his arriving in England,Edward the Exile died before the king could evenmeet him. Surviving the Exile were his children,and his son Edgar the Atheling was popularlyregarded as the king’s heir in his father’s place.

Meanwhile, in Normandy things had also notgone as expected. When little William Bastard hadsupposedly obtained his promise to be recognized as


Edward’s heir in England, he was sittingprecariously upon the ducal throne surrounded byresentful magnates who wanted nothing less than tobe ruled by a bastard boy. When William’s uncle,archbishop Robert of Rouen, died suddenly in 1037,the duchy fell apart as each ambitious relative of thechild-duke sought to make himself as powerful aspossible. Jealous cousins and uncles rose up to killthe boy and take his place. But for the next tenyears William survived — almost miraculously —until upon arriving at his majority he assumed fullauthority over his patrimony. By then, Normandywas a shambles. Unlicenced castles had proliferatedlike mushrooms. The border counts and barons hadgone over to the French or declared themselvesindependent. Almost nobody outside the county ofRouen itself listened to William Bastard. He wouldhave gone down swiftly enough in his first campaignagainst the rebels, if king Henry of France had notbacked his young vassal and protégé. At the Battleof Val-ès-Dunes in 1047, William and the king wona decisive victory over the nobles who had soughtthe duke’s life. He followed that victory up withone just as important: He called for a church councilat Caen and had the Truce of God proclaimedthroughout his realm. King Henry, when he heard ofit, was displeased that William had assumed suchpowers in his own right. But there was little hecould do, as the Truce became law in Normandy.William had the backing now of the church to helphim curb his magnates. They were cowed for a time.He went after his cousin, Guy of Burgundy, whowas holed up in his castle at Brionne. That siegelasted for three years, and was only terminated whenduke William offered Guy his freedom in exchangefor the surrender of the castle and banishment.William required all his strength to meet a mostdangerous enemy: count Geoffrey Martel of Anjou.Martel had seized Domfront and Alençon and wasmaking further deep raids into Normandy. WithBrionne taken and Guy of Burgundy banished, dukeWilliam was freed up to attack the Angevins insidehis borders. He laid siege to Domfront; and in alightening strike at Alençon he took the city backfrom the troops that Martel had garrisoned there.They had mocked William’s bastardy, so to teachthem a lesson the world would not forget, he had the

members they had used to mock him amputated.Returning to the siege of Domfront, he soonobtained the surrender of the terrified Angevingarrison.

Fresh from his total victory, William proceededat once to his marriage. It cost him his vassalagewith the king of France. Henry had warned Williamagainst the marriage between Normandy andFlanders, but neither William nor count Robertcared to listen. The result was alliance betweenHenry and Martel. The king invaded Normandy in1052, in support of the rebellion of the count ofArques, William’s uncle. But William won acomplete victory at Arques and the royal armyretired to link up with the Angevin reinforcements.Arques was taken and the whole of upper (eastern)Normandy passed back into William’s control.Martel and Henry returned in February, moving upboth sides of the Seine. But Norman partisans atMortemer destroyed Henry’s eastern army. Andwhen he learned of it, he with-drew back to his ownterritory, despite Martel’s encouragement to keepfighting.

William had in fact survived the storm. Fromthen on, he was not in real danger of beingovercome. He went on the offensive in Maine,where vassals of his had defied him. There was onemore invasion by king Henry and count Geoffrey in1057: but William so soundly trounced the royalarmy as it forded the river Dives that Henrywithdrew all intentions of subduing his formervassal in the field. He and Martel were both dead inany case three years later. That same year, Williamobtained forgiveness from Rome for his marriage:he and Matilda had been excom-municate since1052. Perhaps there was some slight taint ofconsanguinity; but surely not enough to anger thepope. King Henry had complained and the ban hadfollowed. Now that Henry was dead, William’sfriend, Lanfranc the prior of Bec Hellouin, obtainedthe papal pardon. William and his wife built twoabbeys in Caen as penance.

William had campaigned tirelessly in Maine allthe while. And Brittany had been compelled torenew her fealty. The county of Maine was given toRobert Curthose, William’s eldest son. A marriagewith the daughter of the former count was secured.

The Normans in Britain and Ireland 1066 to 1200 29

Even though the girl died later, William claimedright to Maine and ruthlessly enforced it. By the eveof the Conquest, he was lord of a peacefulNormandy and held permanent sway in easternBrittany and all of Maine.

Then in 1064 came the historical windfall.Harold Godwinson, sailing in a new ship in theChannel, ran into foul weather and was forcedashore in Ponthieu. The count of Ponthieu sentHarold to William: and William only let him goafter he swore to be his man for certain of his landsin England: and, to aid William in his old claimsupon the crown. The promise of Edward, given to asmall boy nearly thirty years before, had not beenforgotten nor dismissed by the man, duke Williamof Normandy.

In 1065 king Edward fell mortally ill. DuringChristmas Tide and New Years, the witan met oftenand argued about what should be done. No one,except perhaps the Londoners, wanted the youthEdgar the Atheling as their next king. And no one atall desired to be ruled by a Norman — distantkinship to their dying king notwithstanding. Therewas no one else: unless someone perhaps suggestedthe possibility of inviting over the king of Norwayto assume his half-forgotten right to the throne ofEngland. He wasn’t even the same man: Magnushad forged a co-kingship with his famous uncle,Harald Hardrada; and now Magnus had been deadthese many years, and Hardrada embroiled in a longwar trying to subdue the Danes alone. They wereenjoying a truce just then. Hardrada’s claims, ifentertained at all, were swiftly dismissed. Therewas, in fact, no one left to choose who had anylineal or legal claim upon the throne. So the witandispensed with lineage and legalities and electedHarold Godwinson as their next king. He wascrowned on the very day Edward was buried, in thefirst week of 1066. The witan claimed to befollowing the last wishes of king Edward in this: ashe was supposed to have said to Harold, just beforeexpiring: “into your protection I commend all thekingdom.” It wasn’t exactly an admission ofsuccession. Harold had for years been thepreeminent leader of England’s armies and theking’s closest advisor. Edward may, therefore, havebeen merely stating the obvious. Probably he

expected Harold to see that Edgar the Atheling hadgood counsel and military backing. If so, thenEdward had misjudged his man. Harold, for all hisstrengths, seems to have fallen for the lure of powerand popularity. He could not resist when so many ofhis peers cried out for his elevation.

William, when he heard of the crowning of hisvassal in his place, was livid. He retired for hoursand would speak with no one save Matilda and hishalf-brothers, bishop Odo of Bayeux and Robert thecount of Mortain. Afterward, the duke spoke ofother things, but sent messengers to Harold,admonishing him to remember his solemn promisesupon holy relics. But Harold sent back regrets andfeeble excuses. William then openly prepared forwar. His council were at first reluctant to engage inwar with such a great and powerful nation: Englandwas far larger than Normandy, both in resources andpopulation. But William never faltered, nor relentedin his expectations of his friends and vassals. In theend, they agreed to accompany him voluntarily, inexchange for the fiefs he promised them would begiven: taken from the people who supported Haroldof Wessex.

All that summer, troops and ships and provisionspoured into the riverside Norman camp on theDives.

And opposite, Harold had the fyrd out andwatching the southern coasts.

Harold’s estranged brother Tosti, the former earlof Northumbria, had been cast out of England forcrimes against the people of his earldom. He hadsworn revenge. But he could not wait for William’sarmy to muster, and took the troops he had gainedfrom the count of Flanders over to raid England’seastern shores. In the Humber his troops weredefeated by the young earls of Northumbria andMercia. But rather than admit failure, Tosti sailedover to meet with Hardrada and convinced thebored veteran that an invasion of England was agreat idea. For the rest of the summer, Hardradagathered his Leidang. Then he sailed to the Orkneysto secure marriages for his daughters. The earls whowere to be his sons-in-law accompanied the Norsefleet to England. They ravaged the coast on theirway to the Humber. The Norse army disembarkedalong the Ouse river at Riccall, and on the morrow


moved north up the east side of the river towardYork. They met and heavily defeated the northernearls, securing oaths of fealty from them and theirpeople. But as the Norse waited at Stamford Bridgefor the hostages from York, king Harold arrivedfollowing a swift march from London. His army waslarger than Hardrada’s; and furthermore, the Norsewere practically unarmed, having left most of theirmail at the ships because of the warm weather: thatand the feeling that after their victories England wasas good as theirs already. King Harold and his twobrothers, Gyrth and Leofwine, proved to the Norsethat England was not in fact ready to become a mereprovince again, as they had been in the days ofCanute. The battle was long and bloody: the Norseand their giant-of-a-king took a heavy tole of theEnglish elite. But the victory was complete: Tostiand Hardrada were slain on the field, and the Norsearmy which had arrived in c. 200 ships of warreturned to Norway in 24 (or 20).

Three days after Harold’s great victory atStamford Bridge, William’s armada landed atPevensey in Sussex on the 28th of September. KingHarold learned of the invasion while his army wasrecuperating at York. He took all his troops whowere ready on a swift return march to London. Thearmy was mounted, but the steady drain of travelingand battle had to take a tole upon the stamina of thewarriors. Their morale, however, was very good: Atleast until they neared London: there Harold and hismen learned that the pope had excommunicated himfor his broken oaths to the duke of Normandy, andplaced all England under the ban of Rome. Harolddid not waste time in London, but gathered suchtroops as had come in late and continued on towardthe Hastings peninsula, where William’s army hadbuilt their main camp. A last-ditch effort by theduke to avoid war was wasted words: he offered tomeet Harold in single combat. Harold replied toWilliam’s envoy that God, the arbiter of battles,would decide between them on the morrow. And soon the 14th of October was fought one of history’smost decisive and bloody battles. The number oftroops involved was small enough, — less than20,000. But the carnage was terrible. Harold hadarrayed his forwardmost troops on the hill latercalled alternately Senlac or Battle. His flanks were

covered by steep ground, and he blocked theNormans and their allies from reaching any furtherinland toward London. The battle was thereforeforced on William upon ground not of his choosing,and with the outcome absolute defeat should he failto break out. His troops were at the end of theirprovisions, and their morale was shaky. The news ofHardrada’s death had created Harold Godwinsoninto a mighty and terrible figure. His army waslarger than William’s; though the actual troops whopacked the ridge were not very superior in numbers.The rest of the fyrd hovered about far to the rear inthe forests of the Weald, refusing to fight where thefore-sworn king enjoined them, declaring that theground was “too narrow.” But the Norman dukecould not have known anything of that on themorning of battle. All he knew was that his armywas now compelled to fight uphill against some ofthe best troops of the day. His destriers would not beable to charge properly; his arrows and bolts andsling stones would mostly be wasted upon theshieldwall. The day would go to the English if theywere not driven from that damnable ridge. And onlyhard fighting could hope to accomplish that at all.The battle of Hastings was one of history’s mostclosely-fought. All day long the victory was indoubt. Despite large numbers of English beingdrawn down from the ridge, by feigned flight andretreat, to fight in the low ground where they werebutchered: despite the deaths of Gyrth andLeofwine: despite the growing fatigue of the troopson either side as the evening came on: Harold’scommand post remained undaunted and too strongto break. It was a fluke that won the day (chroniclersfor centuries admitted that it was the will of God):a chance arrow perhaps, or at least the work of agroup of knights who had penetrated deeply into theEnglish shieldwall: they cut down Harold beside hisred banner of the Dragon of Wessex. The word ofhis fall quickly spread, and then the English brokefor the trees. William had his tent set up on the topof the ridge and had a search conducted forHarold’s body. When it was identified the next day,he had it buried under a pile of stones overlookingHastings. After a futile wait of a fort-night for theEnglish to come and submit, William marchedslowly on London, taking a serpentine course


through southern England, laying the land wastehere or there and gathering provender. At last, thenorthern earls, the Londoners and Edgar theAtheling came to him and submitted. He wascrowned king of England on Christmas Day.

* * *William’s reign was anything but the peaceful

resignation he must have hoped for. His firstattempts to be magnanimous and just were scornedby the northern earls and Edgar Atheling, whorebelled in 1069 against Norman rule and broughtdown upon them William’s wrath the followingyear. Yorkshire did not recover from that campaignof reprisal for the rest of the century. William alsofaced the more or less continuous threat of Danishintervention. The kings of Denmark assumed, bydefault, the right of Canute’s line to the crown ofEngland. And they had many friends who invitedthem over to try; including certain of William’s ownmagnates. But the Danish coordination with the1069 and 1075 uprisings was abysmal and allowedWilliam and his deputies to successfully defendEngland. The greatest danger to his realm, that ofthe combined invasions of 1085, saw him inEngland at the head of the “largest host of men andhorses this kingdom has ever seen.” But the invadersof Normandy and England (the kings of France,Denmark and Scotland; and the counts of Anjou,Maine and Brittany) failed to coordinate properly:again especially the tardy Danes, who were causingtroubles for their king, Canute IV: whom theycaptured and killed, thus averting the immediatedanger of an invasion from Scandinavia. But thesituation remained perilous for William nonetheless:his son Robert Curthose was in rebellion, andsupported by his beloved uncle Odo, who incitedrevolt amongst William’s vassals. The king wasvigorous in obtaining full use of his realm. In 1086he sent abroad seven teams of court functionaries toassess the value of his kingdom: The collection ofdata, minutely detailing all the wealth and serviceowed to the king, was called Domesday Book(because “not till Doomsday will such anaccounting again be demanded of the Englishpeople”). By it William was thoroughly appraised ofwhere his kingdom stood, in matters of annualwealth, productivity of farmlands, flocks, and all

taxable goods; as well as the implied manpower hecould draw upon for his armies. He crossed theChannel to Normandy at the end of 1086. The lastyear of his life was spent campaigning against hisnumerous enemies, including his own son. He diedat Rouen on the 9th of September 1087, after beinginternally injured by a fall from his horse at thetaking of Mantes.

The Conqueror’s realm divided up betweenRobert Curthose, who got Normandy at last; andWilliam II (Rufus), who crossed over to Englandwith his father’s dying approbation and was dulycrowned king of England by archbishop Lanfranc.After surviving the revolt of 1088, and havingbanished all those who were a danger to him(including bishop Odo of Bayeux, who favored theeldest of his nephews),William II held his kingdomfirmly in hand. He defeated the rebellion of 1095and carried the war to the mainland, until Curthoseagreed to a truce and departed on the First Crusade.England and Normandy were peaceful until WilliamII’s death from an accident while hunting in Augustof 1100.

(By then, England had been thirty three yearsunder foreign domination. The two races, Frenchand English, would not meld fully together for a fewgenerations yet: but all through the 12th century thatmelding was slowly taking place. Not even by theend of this period, however, did the aristocracy ofEngland finally become an English-speaking onealone, and no longer one that thought of themselvesas French and spoke that language as well.)

The invasion of England by Curthose in 1101against his brother king Henry I fizzled out afterhostilities were suspended by the Treaty of Alton.Henry dealt with the Anglo-Norman rebels later thefollowing year, banishing the Bellême-Montgomerys and their adherents from England.There were no further uprisings against royalauthority in England for the remainder of Henry I’slong reign.

The anarchy of the civil war (1139 to 1153)made England miserable with dread, but not somuch by violence. It was, after all, fought on a smallscale in terms of people actively involved. Mostly,the English got on with the business of living andignored as best they could the squabbling over the


succession. When, in 1054, their new king HenryPlantagenet was crowned, there was huge relief andopen rejoicing by nobility and commoners alike.

Henry II’s wars were almost exclusively on themainland. But his sons grew up to be a perpetualproblem for him. And the rebellion of his heir,prince Henry, in 1173-74 produced the most seriousthreat to royal rule ever faced by the Norman andAngevin kings. But Henry II put down the revoltwith thorough dispatch, further strengthening thehold of the crown over the turbulent Anglo-Normantenants-in-chief.

The accession of Henry’s son Richard (1189 to1199) finished out the period covered as “Anglo-Norman”. King Richard Lionheart spent a mere fivemonths of his ten year reign in England. The ThirdCrusade and his wars against king Philip of Franceoccupied all his time and resources. He ignored andexploited his English subjects, and was therefore apoor king. But many took pride in his warlikeaccomplishments; and by having the wars so farfrom home, England remained at peace.

* * *The Norman and Breton magnates were a

volatile group. Many held lands in England as wellas in the duchy. Their experience with William Itaught them to be obedient. The great rebellion of1075 he put down swiftly; executed the earl ofHuntingdon, imprisoned for life the earl of Herefordand ejected the Breton tenants in England who hadfomented it. Other threats were similarly dealt with.None of them amounted to anything. The chiefreason for this was the fact that the king hadretained a very large portion of the conquered landsas the royal demesne.

The Norman kings enjoyed a larger revenue andland-holding power than their contemporaries on themainland.

Nevertheless, the Anglo-Norman magnates didnot always fear this royal power. They resented it.During the reigns of William II and Henry I,rebellions in England took on somewhat of a typicalform. The English barons who had grown discontentunder the rigid rule of the king, and without properrestraint in Normandy under Curthose’s lax rule,sought to throw off the King’s control by allyingwith the baronage in Normandy, who promised aid

in a timely fashion. The standard of revolt would beduly raised: The king, or his deputies, would mustera sufficient force of troops from the royal demesneand move against the rebels, who would then retirewithin the walls of their castles to await the arrivalof their promised allies. These invariably couldeither not get to the beleaguered places, or failed tocome at all, forcing the rebels to surrender. Therebellious coalitions simply did not have enoughresources to defy the king successfully. Throughoutthe 12th century, things were changing, as the kingtightened by royal decree the manner in whicharmies could be raised. By the end of the century,the feudal levy had become antiquated and hadbeen replaced by a system first legislated by HenryII in his Assize of Arms of 1181. In it, Henrydeclared that a man’s armaments were decided uponby his wealth and no longer by his social station.The feudal baronage were taxed and no longerexpected to provide personal military service;although they could if they chose to. The truestrength of the nation’s defense lay with the kingand his army of paid troops, who operated from theconsiderable network of royal castles. The baronialcastles in England, however, also were obsolete bythe end of this period: except on the Welsh marchesand the frontier with Scotland.

WalesWhile the Scottish border was often at peace;

this was not true in Wales. The Anglo-Normanpresence there was highly resented. The Welsh clanswere fiercely proud of their traditions and freedoms.Even before the Norman occupation of England wascomplete, the marcher barons were already pressinginto the fastnesses of the Welsh wilderness. But theruggedness of that terrain, the adverse climate andthe primitiveness of the Welsh people prevented theconquest of Wales by normal military methods. TheWelsh were adept at guerilla tactics, which theyused against the Anglo-Norman intruderscontinuously and on many occasions successfully.The Norman motte and bailey castles were far fromimpervious to attack and were sometimes destroyedby the sudden assaults of Welsh forces before reliefcould be mustered and sent. But the Welshthemselves could not hope to hold the castles that


fell to them; they would burn them and retire withtheir spoils back into the Cambrian wilderness. Theburnt castles would be replaced by new ones, andgarrisoned by fresh Anglo-Norman troops. A minorsetback would be automatically repaired by thepassage of time. Important castles were rebuilt instone. Each new advance into a valley, or pushalong a river to another settlement, wasaccompanied by yet another castle being erected tohold down the new territory. Slowly, Wales wasnibbled away at. By the end of the 11th century, aband of heavily castellated territory had beencreated which extended from the Mersey estuary tothe mouth of the Severn. And southwestern Walesaround Pembroke was in Anglo-Norman hands.Most of the princes of the south became vassals tothe Anglo-Normans; and south Welsh troops helpedto invade northern Wales, though without lastingsuccess: An important factor which limited theadvance into Wales was the shortage of Anglo-Norman manpower. The magnates on the Welshfrontier simply did not have the resources toconquer and hold down more land. And when theytried they invariably met with disastrous results.

But the Welsh should have done far more thanmerely survive: if only they could have overcometheir internal feuding. Even during the anarchy ofStephen’s (1139 to 1153) reign they did not takeproper advantage of the English weakness. Somesmall territorial gains were made, but not nearlywhat was possible to them had the Welsh princesunited in a war to drive out the Anglo-Normans.The frontier did not change notably for 175 years.Not until the reign of Edward I in the late 13th

century could the English claim that Wales wasreasonably pacified.

(Wales would not be totally subdued until theWelsh changed themselves under the long reign ofLlywelyn the Great — 1194 to 1240: He saw thatunity was the only possibility for resisting andultimately throwing off the English domination. Hemarried the daughter of king John; built a string ofstone castles second to none around his homeland ofGwynedd; subdued and united the princes of theclans under his rule, and resisted successfully theEnglish attempts to check the Welsh resurgence. Hisgrandson Llywelyn, was the only Welshman

recognized by the English crown officially as princeof Wales; but he could not resist the vengeance ofEdward I, and the English military system whichhad by now gained a large enough advantage inresources to permanently occupy the whole countrywith castles and garrisons. Ironically, the Welshunity and their own castles worked against them, asthe English royal house assumed the title prince ofWales and exacted the same unified obedience thatLlywelyn the Great had first obtained.)

ScotlandFamilial ties were established with Scotland in

the first generation of the Norman occupation ofEngland. King Malcolm’s son Duncan was kept atthe Norman court to guarantee his continuedloyalty. But when Malcolm died in 1093, hisbrother Donaldbane was elected king by the CelticScots, according to their ancient custom of tanistry.King William II sent Edgar the Atheling, who hadsworn fealty to him, into Scotland at the head of anarmy of Scots and Anglo-Normans to champion therights of Duncan. Donaldbane was forced to retire,and Duncan was crowned. But the intrigues ofDonald-bane succeeded in obtaining the murder ofhis nephew. Donaldbane reigned another threeyears, and upon his death Edgar, the nephew ofEdgar the Atheling, was raised up by the power ofthe Anglo-Normans as sole king of the Scots.

Henry I, the youngest son of the Conqueror, wasmarried to the daughter of king Malcolm, whosewife was the sister of Edgar the Atheling. So theelevation of Henry over his elder brother RobertCurthose, was pleasing to the native English fortraditional reasons: He was the former king’s son, hewas native-born, and his wife was of the royal linesof England and Scotland: her brother Edgar wasking of Scots.

Henry proved to be a very able king, and hispolitical relations with the ruling house of Scotlandwere amicable. But upon his death (1135), thebrother of king Edgar, king David, did not feel thathe owed the usurper king, Stephen of Blois,anything at all. He raided the northern frontier, andfinally invaded Yorkshire in 1138. But at the battleof Northallerton he was routed back to Scotland bythe levies and feudal contingents of Yorkshire.


David swore fealty to Stephen then and made peacewith him.

Another major Scottish invasion took placeduring the Anglo-Norman rebellion of 1173-74.The Scots were often eager to invade on their ownaccount, or in alliance with Anglo-Norman rebels.Many discontented Anglo-Normans had, during thereign of king David (1124 to 1153), settled by royalinvitation in the Southern Uplands and Lowlands ofScotland, and therefore had familial ties withEngland. (One of these Norman families, that of DeBrus, figured prominently in later Scottish history asthe royal house of Bruce. ) So the Normanization ofScotland was for the most part a peaceful process.But the Scots king and his “foreign friends” wereresisted by the natives especially of the Highlandsand western Scotland. However, the building ofnumerous motte and bailey castles subdued theirattempts at revolution. The new Scottish nobility,being Anglo-Norman in origin, held estates inEngland that they owed fealty for to the Normanand later Plantagenet kings. This was true of theroyal house as well. But the fact that they were to bevassals of the king of England never sat entirelywell with them.

(The overbearing treatment of the Scots by thePlantagenet kings finally drove them to revoltduring the reign of Edward I, precipitating theScottish wars of independence.)

IrelandThe situation in Ireland was different. Only the

eastern coast was conducive to Norman settlement:The Vikings had already integrated there, andcontact with the Anglo-Saxons and Anglo-Daneshad begun a change in the traditional Gaelic tribalstructure before the Normans arrived. The firstNorman presence there was in the form ofmercenaries. King Dermot, exiled from Leinster byrivals for his throne, enlisted the aid of the Anglo-Norman marcher lords of south Wales. King HenryII gave his permission and the first Anglo-Normanand Welsh troops entered Leinster in 1167. In 1170Richard de Clare (“Strongbow”) the earl ofPembroke, arrived in Ireland and soon the coast wasin Dermot’s control. He married his daughter toPembroke. When Dermot died a year later,

Pembroke took over as ruler of Leinster by right ofhis Irish wife. The Anglo-Normans intermarriedwith the old native Irish and Scandinavianaristocracy. The Anglo-Norman region of easternIreland prospered and trade with the rest of Europebrought Ireland into the mainstream of Europeanculture and politics for the first time. One of thechief exports was their light, fast horses; which werehighly prized not only in England but on themainland as well.

But the main part of Ireland remained Gaelic.They were a semi-nomadic people, especially in thenorth; and a community’s wealth was measured inhorses and cattle. Warfare, therefore, was anendemic series of seasonal raids. This did notchange after the Normans showed up and began toexpand inland. In fact, the nomadism of the Gaelsmade Norman control of the countryside impossible:When a chieftain submitted or allied himself to theforeign settlers, a castle went up to control the newdistrict; but soon enough the Anglo-Norman lordfound himself ruling a denuded fief, as the Gaelswould destroy their rude homes and decamp with alltheir moveables to fairer and farther-removedpastures. Attempts to compel the Gaelic chief toforce his people’s return proved abortive.

Typically, the Gaelic aristocracy had more togain from associating with the intruders than thecommon people: and the tiny courts of the pettyIrish kings mimicked the Anglo-Norman court ofEngland.

But the Anglo-Normans never got a grip on thecountry, which was too vast for the number ofpeople settled in it, and who preferred to raid forw hat they wanted and kept out of harm’s way bybeing willing to move at any time. Feudalism wasimposed only upon those areas in eastern Irelandwhere the Anglo-Normans ruled over a morecosmopolitan populace. Foreign settlers wereencouraged, only partially successfully, to occupythe farmlands abandoned by the Irish. The rest ofIreland remained Gaelic, and implacably opposed tothe English occupation. The tiny towns (villagesreally) in occupied Ireland were protected byw ooden palisade along the frontier, where most ofthe fighting took place in the form of reprisals andperpetual raiding of each other’s settlements. The


forward advance of the Anglo-Normans came to ahalt for want of manpower, and a lack of interestfrom the Angevin court of England to extend furtheraid.

The Anglo-Norman conquests in Britain andIreland were all incomplete. Scotland remained avassal state, though often in name only. Raidingalong the Gaelic frontiers was a fact of life. Butperhaps the Norman and Plantagenet kings ofEngland never wanted to completely eradicate thedangers posed to their border tenants in theunconquered regions: Having dangerous andunsubdued enemies so close to hand must havehelped to keep the bellicosity of the Anglo-Normansthere fully occupied, and being so occupied theywere less prone to plotting against their sovereign.

SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND THE MILITARY

Anglo-Saxon England was highly stratified. Theinclusion of Scandinavian colonies disrupted the oldsocial order: The Danelaw was a loose mixture offreemen, bondi and subject Englishmen, but fewslaves. In the English-held areas of the Midlandsand the south, the old Anglo-Saxon classescontinued. The king was all-powerful in theory; buthe had a council of the most influential nobles andchurch heads that advised him upon importantmatters, called the witan, and which elected hissuccessor. After the king came the earls: there weresix great earldoms: Wessex, Mercia, Northumbria,Sussex/Kent, Huntingdon and East Anglia. Theearldoms were subdivided into shires and hundreds,administered by shire-reeves and ealdormen.Serving under these nobles were the warrior class,the thegns: and, after the Danish influx at theopening of the century, the housecarles, equal instatus with the thegns. At first the housecarles werelandless mercenary warriors, highly-paid and(arguably) the best troops in western Europe. By thetime of the Conquest, housecarles were coming intothe possession of lands and titles, like the thegns,and had assumed the main “fire-brigade” duties indefense of the kingdom. Housecarles were full-timewarriors; and in time of peace served in a variety of

official functions, even as tax gatherers, butespecially as royal or earldom police. The vastmajority of England’s population were the commoncitizenry — ceorls: Domesday Book separates theminto a variety of classes: villans, bordars, cottars,freemen, burgesses, slaves; with villans and bordarspredominating. All but freemen and burgesses wereconsidered bound to the land where they lived. Butin Anglo-Saxon times only the slaves were literallyunfree to move: villans worked in the fields, but fewof them actually held their own land as free-holdersand could “go with it where they would”; i. e.choose their lord as they would. Bordars were small-holders who tenanted their farms in exchange forservices to the thegn or some other lord— whenthese services included military service, they werecalled geneats (companions) and joined the retinueof the thegn. Cottars were craftsmen without land,who served the village lord for one or two days aweek on his fields, and three days a week duringharvest. Slaves — thralls — were a significantproportion of the population, as high as ten percent.

(The Norman Conquest leveled all that out andmade every Englishman who had not been a thegninto a peasant tenant of the new masters. Within thefirst generation of the Conquest, even the thegnlyclass was largely eradicated by reduction to thelevel of free peasants, their lands having beenassumed by the Anglo-Normans.)

Under the Anglo-Saxon kings, all citizens wereobligated to perform military duty in the fyrd. Thiswas the levy of all able-bodied male citizens. But itwas discovered long before, that a heavily-equipped, select group of warriors was moreeffective than a mob of poorly-armed men: and thesystem was established whereby one man from afive hide unit of land (typically one hide per family)was selected to serve in the fyrd when it was calledout; and the other four families contributed to hismaintenance. This has been conveniently called the“select” fyrd, though the term is a modern one ofconvenience. Later, a freeman could only beelevated to thegnly rank if he possessed at least fivehides of land: so it seems reasonable to assume thatthe thegns were the core strength of the fyrd. Thefyrd could be summoned by the king in a nationalemergency; or the earls could raise the fyrd in their


earldoms. The fyrdman was obligated for twomonths of duty per year. Outside the shire, he was tobe paid a wage. The whole body of ceorls in a shirewas only called out during dire local emergencies,and was not expected to leave the shire. Port townsprovided ship fyrd, a quota of ships and the men tocrew them. The housecarles were not part of thisfyrd system, except as they became land-holders.And they provided the crews for the ships of theearls and king.

After the Conquest, the proficiency of the fyrddeteriorated, but it was called out for service manytimes right into the first quarter of the 12th century.The holdings of the thegns and housecarles and thefree-holders were converted or rearranged into fiefsfor knights and serjants, mounted and foot.(Vavasseurs had no place in the Anglo-Normansocial structure.) In Anglo-Saxon England it isestimated that c. 70,000 hides provided for c.14,000 fyrdmen. William the Conqueror created5,000 to 6,000 knights fees and an unknown numberof serjants fees on the same land. The total numberof housecarles before the Conquest is not known.But Tosti Godwinson had somewhere between 200and 300 as earl of Northumbria. If the other earlshad similar numbers, and king Harold maintainedanother c. 2,000 royal housecarles, the total for thekingdom would be c. 3,500. There could easilyhave been more (Canute retained perhaps 2,500; butEdward the Confessor 1,000 and even less).William the Conqueror and his successors mighttherefore have maintained a similar number ofmercenaries in the royal army.

The former great earldoms were dispensed withas the Anglo-Normans advanced into contact withthe Welsh and Scots. Palatine earldoms of a muchsmaller size and greater number were created tomore efficiently meet local needs and emergencies(and to moderate the military potential of any givenpeer). The king retained the largest portion of landin his own hands: William and his family held 17%of the fiefs created; the clergy were given 26% andknight service was assessed upon them as it wasupon the lay tenants; the lay tenants held 54% ofthe whole: c. half of this, 25%, was held by twelvegreat lords or peers. By this breakdown the royaldemesne was about as powerful as any eight or nine

peers together.


In all of the 12th century, there is a paucity ofaccounts of pitched battles. Only three havesufficient information surviving about them to offerany sort of detailed analysis.

Two, Lincoln and the rout of Winchester, bothfought in 1141, offer little if anything original toillustrate the strategy and tactics already describedabove. But the fact that Lincoln was fought inFebruary to break a winter siege of the town showsthat Anglo-Norman armies could in fact campaignall throughout the year, and far beyond the feudalobligation of 40 days.

Winchester is unique only because it was a battlebrought on by a besieged rebel army trying to leavean untenable situation by marching out of the townin column. They were attacked on all sides by thefeudal contingents and mercenaries of the royalarmy and could not make headway — unlikeChristian armies in Outremer routinely were able todo when fighting their way through clouds ofSaracens or Turks: soon the marching rebel columnwas destroyed as a fighting force. The lesson ofWinchester, therefore, is that Anglo-Norman armieslacked the level of discipline to perform lengthywithdrawing maneuvers in the face of enemyopposition: If they did not remain rooted to the spoton the defensive, the battles opened up and becamevulnerable to attack.

The battle of Northallerton will be referred to indiscussing Scottish tactics. Certainly, there wereother pitched battles than these three; but they musthave all been on a small scale and producedinsignificant results.

Warfare in 12th century England centered uponthe defense and besiegement of castles and fortifiedtowns. The royal fortresses were maintained on thelines of communication throughout the realm. Thisfact proved vital to the survival of king Henry IIwhen his son and namesake rebelled with the helpof a long list of powerful Anglo-Norman magnates,and the alliance of the kings of France and


Scotland.During Chris tmas of 1172, king Louis invited

prince Henry to Paris, and while there encouragedthe prince’s already-outraged feelings toward hisroyal father: king Henry had had his heir crownedas England’s next sovereign (a continuation of theold Norman custom of ensuring a peacefulsuccession); but like the Conqueror and his sonCurthose before, king Henry refused to let princeHenry actually rule anything. The young kingnaturally wanted real power, and Louis offered hima way to get it. The revolt was well planned. Itincluded some of the most powerful magnates of theAnglo-Norman realm. The earl of Huntingdon wasbrother to king William of Scotland; and Williamhimself held large estates in central England. Themotive of the rebels was the chance to remake theirpower bases: The Anglo-Norman tenants wereweary of the controls they lived under, imposedupon them by king Henry’s heavy hand: AndScotland’s Anglo-Norman aristocracy chafed underEnglish vassalage. But the revolt, which lasted fromthe spring of 1173 through July of 1174, ended infailure for the rebels, and saw the English crownmore powerful than ever:

King Henry had remained to deal successfullywith the French-backed rebels on the mainland.

His lieutenants in England moved powerfullyagainst the rebellion there. In preparation, the royalcastles had all been strongly garrisoned andprovisioned: a number of old motte and baileycastles were rebuilt or brought up to standards ofreadiness. The cordon of royal castles divided theareas of revolt — in East Anglia, the Midlands andNorthumberland — from each other and controlledthe coastal areas. More royal castles in the far northinhibited the Scots when they invaded in August1173; but the Scots army was large enough that kingWilliam bypassed the border castles and laid siegeto Carlisle. The royalists had already begun the warby laying siege to Leicester in July; but raised thesiege to move against king William at Carlisle. Heretired back into Scotland and the English burnttheir way through part of the Lowlands. But thelanding in Suffolk of the earl of Leicester with alarge force of French and Flemish mercenariescaused Henry’s lieutenants to sign a truce with king

William, to last till mid-January of 1174. The royalarmy hastened to the town of St Edmundsbury,where it was augmented by recruiting many of thelocal peasantry. The invaders had moved inland,ignoring the powerful royal castle of Walton on thecoast. They burnt the royalist castle of Haughleybefore continuing their march. By then they knew ofthe royalist army at St Edmundsbury: the earl ledhis troops in a circling move to the north of thetown, rather than take the direct route to Leicester.But the royalists caught the rebels as they werefording the Lark near Fornham. After a very shortfight, the rebels broke. The peasants hunted theFlemings down in the marshes and massacred nearlyall of them.

The next year, in March, king William returnedwith an unwieldy host of mostly Highland kerns,reinforced with Flemish mercenaries. The Scotsarmy was divided in two and succeeded in capturingseveral royalist castles, before king Henry’slieutenants raised an army in York and marchednorth. The Scots army, united once again, wasbesieging Prudhoe castle on the river Tyne, thenorthern border of Yorkshire. The situation in thenorth was therefore serious, as all of Yorkshire wasbeing threatened. But the arrival of royal reliefforces caused king William to pull back to Alnwick,which he besieged. Elsewhere things were goingwell for king Henry’s loyal vassals: The rebels inthe Midlands, cut off by the cordon of royal castles,had launched raids and burnt several towns; but theylacked the resources to lay effective siege to theroyal castles; their attempts at assaulting Dunwichfailed, despite the addition to the rebel army ofanother body of Flemish troops; and out in the openthey were outclassed by the armed forces of Henry’slieutenants. They maintained their stranglehold onthe Midlands and laid siege to Huntingdon in lateJune. King Henry returned to England early in July.While he was in London, he learned that kingWilliam had been captured by a reconnoiteringcompany of royalist cavalry outside Alnwick, as hemade an early morning inspection of his siege lines.King Henry arrived at Huntingdon to receive thesurrender of the rebel garrison. The earl of Norfolksurrendered the castles he held in East Anglia to theking. The rebellion collapsed altogether soon after


that. Henry let king William loose only after heceded a number of his own castles. Each of the rebelmagnates gave up important castles to the king asthe price for their surrender.

The king had been victorious mainly because hiscastles controlled the lines of communication; andbecause his resources were more than a match forthe combined might of the rebel magnates. Therebels had never been capable of securing the coastand making unbroken contact with their partisans inNormandy. The result of Henry’s victory was suchan increase in royal power that he was able twoyears later to force his baronage to admit his owncastellans into every castle in the realm. Thosecastles which did not follow his strategic needs wererazed.

Anglo-Norman tactics.The tactics employed by the Normans, Bretons

and French who settled in England were nodifferent than as already described in the chapter onNormandy. But the presence of the Anglo-Saxonmilitia system — the fyrd — reinforced the relianceupon infantry. William the Conqueror madeimmediate use of the fyrd in his wars on themainland. The fyrd was present at probably everysiege conducted by royal troops during the reign.William II made frequent use of the fyrd in his warsagainst his brothers in Normandy; and the fyrd wasimportant in his victories against the rebellions of1088 and 1095. Henry I used the fyrd to augmenthis forces in 1101, when he faced invasion byCurthose and rebellion in the Severn valley by theBellême-Montgomerys. And at Tinchebrai in 1106,his army contained a strong force of fyrd infantry.Some of the fyrd served at least as mountedinfantry; and there is evidence that Englishmenmustered alongside mounted Norman knights,probably as mounted serjant cavalry: It was anAnglo-Saxon “knight” who gave up his own horse tosave William outside the castle of Gerberoi, whenhe was embroiled in war against his son RobertCurthose. Most of the former Anglo-Saxon-Anglo-Danish aristocracy emigrated away from England inthe generation following Hastings; so the troops whofought for the Norman kings were enlisted from thecommon people and were seldom members of the

former thegnhood. The English fyrd was trained in the use of the

spear. Some throwing of javelins was also there;though this seems to have vanished by early in the12th century. It appears that during the firstgeneration of Norman occupation the training of thefyrd lapsed to a lesser level of proficiency. DuringAnglo-Saxon times they formed the main rank andfile of English armies; but under the Normans theEnglish were relegated to a secondary role, even astheir former social standing as free citizens fell tothe status of mere peasants. By 1101, king Henryhad to retrain the fyrd in the tactics of resistingcavalry. Their military equipment had deterioratedas well, and there was little left to compare with thewell-armed “select” fyrd of 1066.

The custom of dismounting knights to stand withand stiffen the morale of common foot soldiersbecame the norm in England; and royal armiescampaigning across the Channel fought in theamalgamated and evolving style. The use ofpeasants, as in 1173-74, was also common. Most ofthe time, as field battles were rare, they came to themuster not expecting to fight, but rather to engage inthe duties of the camp, and to perform the gruntlabors of a siege. Their arms were as rude as can beimagined; and the pitchforks and threshing flails oftheir husbandry, mentioned in the 1173-74rebellion, can be assumed as typical throughout theperiod and after.

Ship fyrd was continued as it had been in Anglo-Saxon times. The Anglo-Norman fleet wasfeudalized. Roads into the more troublous regionswere carved through forests; and the land forces andthe fleet were capable of united actions anywhere inthe islands.

Along the frontiers with Scotland and Wales,fighting developed into quick hit-and-run. Anglo-Norman cavalry tended to lighten their arms to moreeasily pursue their elusive foes into mountain, forestand fen. Marksmen figured more prominently in thetactics employed there. They became adept atfighting mounted — the precursors of the Bordererswho skirmished with their counterparts fromScotland right through the 16th century.

The Welsh of the south, where the Normanpresence was most strongly felt, were famed


bowmen; while the Welsh of the more mountainousnorth lands were armed traditionally with smallround shields and long spears. Cavalry did notfigure into Welsh tactics until well into the 12th

century; by which time a number of Welsh magnateshad been enfoufed and now fought in the manner ofproper, albeit rustic, knights. Welsh auxiliary troopswere soon employed in English armies. Henry I mayhave had Welsh troops in his armies on themainland. Bowmen in particular were used.

There is argument about whether Normanarchery improved Welsh archery, or the traditionalview of the other way around. But the strongScandinavian presence in Wales from the bad oldViking days convinces me that the bow was alreadya well developed weapon long before the Normansbegan to encroach. Archery was already emphasizedin Norman armies at the time of the Conquest. Andthe bows seem to have been as long as the user wastall. Their penetrating potential was identical to theso-called longbow of later days; this was typicallya 50-pound bow, with some men able to pull a warbow of 70-plus pounds. It was the manner in whichthe bow was employed which made it less effectivein this early “Norman” period; the marksmen werein fewer numbers than would be found in much laterEnglish armies: It was the deluge of missiles whichmade the English longbow in its thousands such adeadly weapon from the late 13th century andonward. By contrast, William’s hundreds — orseveral thousands — of marksmen at Hastings couldonly create a shower. Certain it is, that throughoutthe 12th century the bow was steadily gainingimportance in Anglo-Norman armies: So that by theend of the following century it had become thedominant arm of the English infantry. During the12th century, however, crossbow-men continued tobe the most sought-after missile troops. They wereexpensive and were never very numerous on a givenbattlefield, so their effectiveness was also limited.

Another source of troops in England were themunicipal militias. London’s militia wasparticularly valued, and were famed for theirmartial appearance in mail shirts. This was a rarity,however, and most burgess infantry would havesufficed with a quilted gambeson. Spears and axeswere the predominant weapons early on; but were

giving way to brown bills during the 12th century.Their training was lacking, compared with that ofmercenaries, but was superior to the fyrd. Theirorganization would have been tighter than that of afeudal host, which was cobbled together only afterthe muster showed the commanders what troops theyhad to work with; and the militia units would haveremained autonomous.

But the best troops were mercenaries. Most ofthem were locally raised, being Anglo-Normanswho fought for a living, for the pay the king’streasury provided. Specialists, such as crossbow-men, had to be hired in from the mainland. Theroyal army was always augmented with mercenaries;and as time went on, they made up a largerproportion of the total troops. This was because theywere generally more proficient to their work andwere not limited by feudal obligation to a fixedperiod of service per year. The kings raised themoney to hire them by letting their tenants commutetheir feudal service into a money payment equal tothe cost to hire a replacement. This was known asscutage, or ‘shield money’, and is mentioned inEngland as early as 1100. The revenues from theroyal demesne provided the king with a larger armythan any coalition of his nobles could hope to raiseand maintain for a lengthy period of time. Thisbecame more true after the reign of Stephen.Central authority was the secret of English royalpower, which began with the Norman Conquest andincreased steadily throughout the medieval period.

Northallerton: An example of Scottish tactics.The Scots were a poor people, lacking proper

horses and armor, and relying upon masses ofspearmen like the north Welsh. The Anglo-Normanand Anglo-Scottish nobility formed only a tokenforce of mounted men. Such mounts as the fast-moving raiders possessed were mere nags and poniesfor travel only. The chieftains and their householdwarriors — Scandinavian mercenaries for the mostpart — fought on foot, mailed and bearing greataxes; but they were only an elite core.

The Scotsmen preferred to raid rather than becaught in a formal battle. They were always mostlyinterested in obtaining booty and prisoners forselling as slaves or retaining for ransoms. Lacking


archery power themselves, they liked to get in andout quickly. Scotland was iron-poor, and so theacquiring of good weapons and armor as booty wasalways a goal. Raiding was a way of making warprofitable; and so plundering was the means to thatend, and not wanton pillaging and destruction.

If brought to battle, however, the Scots armywould form up into three or four masses ofspearmen, called schiltrons: on the defensive thesewould form on the compass: on the offensive theywere capable of a ponderous, close order forwardmomentum.

The other element in the Scots army were thesemi-independent picts of Galloway in southwesternScotland; the descendants of the Gaels of Romantimes. They fought under their own chiefs and evenelected their own king, but were tributary to theking of all Scotland and his sovereign the king ofEngland. This in no way reduced the pride of theGalwegians, who saw in themselves the pinnacle ofwarrior prowess. They were nominally Christian: butat the battle of Northallerton (the Standard) in 1138they displayed such paganism as would have beenthoroughly at home in an army of picts assaultingHadrian’s Wall: before the campaign, their druidicpriests had incanted spells over the warriors toprotect them from the weapons of the Sassenach,assuring them that the blue woad sigils thatdecorated their naked bodies were more proof thaniron armor. King David had arranged an order ofbattle which would have delivered a succession ofattacks against the Yorkshire levies. But his pridefulGalwegian subjects (or allies) would not hear of anybattle plan which ignored their time-honored rightto make the opening attack. Having said as much,they assumed the forwardmost position and threwthemselves upon the English: who awaited acrossthe shallow valley in a single, dense phalanx, witharmored foot and marksmen in front of the rusticlevies: a cart bearing the standards of Sts Peter ofYork, John of Beverley and Wilfred of Ripon stoodin the center of the host, thus awarding to the battleits other name. The Galwegians fought in theirtraditional manner, with a light dart (or javelin), asmall round targ and broadsword — the claymore,which was at this period useable with one or twohands. Armor they disdained, out of necessity due to

their poverty, and because they trusted in theirpries ts’ magic. The crossbow quarrels and arrowsand javelins and sling stones of the Yorkshiremensoon proved the lie, as woad-daubed flesh waspierced. But the furious Galwegian attack reachedthe English phalanx. The darts were warded by theirshields; then the weapons of the armored knights,dismounted in the front ranks, worked steady deathupon the naked picts. Twice they flinched back,only to charge in again and again. Many were soworked up into a berserker rage that they foughtlooking like hedgehogs, with the shafts of theenemy sticking out of their bodies. But finally theirfire was all spent and they fled. There was a smallsquadron of Anglo-Scottish knights, led by princeHenry, which early in the battle charged across theopen ground, burst right through the English left andfound themselves in their rear; these pillaged theEnglish baggage, stationed about 400 yards behindthe army. King David tried to lead his Highlandersforward, but they had been cowed by thediscomfiture of the Galwegians and melted away onthe flanks and rear: until the king had only his smallbodyguard of Anglo-Norman and Scottish knightswith him. He withdrew to an eminence, where thedregs of the Scots army reassembled. It lookedformidable enough still, that the Yorkshiremendared not move to attack it. But when the Scotsbegan to retreat, the English pursued and cut downthe stragglers. When they were done pillaging theEnglish baggage, prince Henry turned with hisfollowers to join the main battle; but as the rest ofhis father’s large army was by then dispersing to thefour winds, the prince and his men threw away theirbadges and blended in with the pursuing English,until they had cleared the battlefield and could ridefor home.

Northern Wales, a paucity of battles.Like the Scots, the Welsh refrained from open

battle. On those occasions when they did form anarray upon a hillside or some other defensible place,the superior missile fire of the Anglo-Norman armyovercame them. The south Welsh had offered evenless resistance to the Norman advance, and soonwere vassals or tributary to the new lords: theirbowmen then were used to turn upon the north


Welsh.The most common form of resistance offered by

the stubborn north Welsh was the surprise attack.Villages were quickly raided of anythingimmediately removable; prisoners were taken off;the hovels were burnt, and then the raiders wouldfade back into the vales of the Cambrian mountains.If found in sufficient strength, the Welsh wouldeven make sudden assaults upon motte and baileycastles; at times successfully. Pursuit by theassembled local Anglo-Normans would offeruncertainty to either side: If the Welsh had disposedof sufficient forces to lay in ambush, then theAnglo-Norman pursuit, if not arrested by suspicion,would suffer the outcome of a bloody repulse; but ifthe pursuers found themselves strong enough innumbers to deal with this particular raid, they, withtheir horses and not being burdened with loot,would overhaul the raiders and inflict vengeanceupon them. Thus continued the warfare in Wales forover a century and a half.

There are no accounts of Welsh field battles inthe 12th century at all that I have ever heard tell of.This speaks of their rarity, or perhaps even of theirnonexistence in the Norman period. Certainly, ifthey ever did fight formally drawn up for battle,they lost routinely and would have soon given upthe attempt as futile. Warfare in northern Wales,therefore, presents the war-gamer with onlyskirmishing scenarios and surprise attacks uponsettlements or encampments. In this form of combatthe Welsh excelled. They would attack only withthe determination to just as swiftly withdraw backinto the trees: their archers were adept at shootingon the move, even while retreating, and wereespecially deadly at close range. The best use of thiswithdrawing or retreating method of combat was toattempt to lure the Anglo-Norman pursuers into aprepared ambush.

Ireland, the endless war.The Irish had many horses, though no

sophisticated saddlery. They rode without stirrups,carrying a brace of javelins and small round shields,or targs. Short spears and axes predominated ashand combat weapons. Compared with continentalweapons, these tended to be of light construction,

speed and handiness being their primary function.The cavalry formed the main strike force of anyarmy; but infantry were always present. Fewtroopers wore armor: that being the privilege of thechieftains and their few well-paid householdwarriors. These used long axes and broadswords,and their mail shirts tended to be light. (There werenot significant numbers of these warriors, however,until in the 13th century, when mercenaries, the gallóglach from the Hebrides and western Scotland,were hired.)

The Normans were called “grey foreigners”,referring to their distinctive appearance whenwearing their mail hauberks and helmets. But themarksmen of the foreigners were more respectedand feared than the armored knights and footsoldiers. This was because the Irish fought in forestand marsh; and, like the Welsh, used hit-and-runguerilla tactics rather than open battle: A knight andmailed spearman might not be able to close with anIrish kern before he took to the forest or across amarsh at the breaking off of a raid: but an arrowfrom a Welsh longbow could catch him before hereached cover.

When the Norman intervention on the side ofking Dermot began in 1167, the Irish had not as yetlearned to appreciate the futility of meeting the“grey foreigners” in open battle. This they learnedfrom hard experience during the years 1169 to1175.

During this time the Norman mounted forcesnever numbered more than a few hundreds. Withthem came south Welsh bowmen on a ratio ofperhaps two to one, and Norman mailed foot alsomore numerous than the knights. Their success insubduing the eastern portion of Ireland was duemainly to the inability — like the Welsh — of theIrish clans to cooperate with one another. Had theydone so, their naturally defensible island ofmountain, forest and bog would have frustrated theNormans at once. With few exceptions, the onlyopen terrain lay around each settlement: the passesbetween them went through marshes, woods androcks. The tribesmen had already developed adefensive system against the Vikings, wherein thebest positions along these trackways were fortifiedwith considerable ingenuity and skill. In the boggy


places they dug trenches across the roads, withstockades on the farther side, such that passage wasvirtually impossible to horsemen. In areas of forest,the tracks were “plashed”, i. e. the underwood wascut down and interwoven between the trunks oftrees to form barriers ahead and on either hand,behind which the kerns would fight practicallyunseen with their javelins and stones. Only byhewing apart the springy wall could the road-boundinvaders hope to get at the Gaelic warriors. Thesetactics were “most distressing” to Norman knightsaccustomed to winning their battles from the backsof charging destriers. But they adapted to the newconditions and won yet another realm.

Because of their weakness in armor and lack ofbeing accustomed to fighting in formal battle array,the Irish could not face down a Norman army in theopen. Thus warfare revolved around either sidetrying to force the other to meet them on the groundthey favored best. Once a Norman knight couldarrive within weapon stroke of the kern, he dealtwith him easily enough, for the kerns of Ireland hadnever learned how to stand shoulder to shoulderagainst charging horse. The kern’s weapons, on theother hand, were very formidable in bogs andwoods. They lacked archers, however, and in theopen their hand missiles were outranged by thecrossbows of the Anglo-Normans and the longbowsof their Welsh auxiliaries. The Anglo-Normansavoided fights where the Irish had set up defensiveworks: instead, they waited until they thought thechances of a surprise attack were good. This wasoften, as the Irish kept a notoriously lax watch. Themarksmen in the invader army were the best answerto heavily-defended positions: in some situationsthey could gall the Irish behind their breastworkswithout fearing return fire. When the Irishabandoned their defensive positions, the Welsh footwere the most adept also at pursuit, being lightly-armed like the kerns. The mailed Anglo-Normanscould only follow up slowly or not at all.

But the archery of Anglo-Norman armies was notalways powerful enough to effect a resolution. Thenthe Normans might resort to other expedients.

The feigned flight was used successfully: CharlesOman’s description of the Battle on the Dinin in1169 shows the feigned flight at its best:

The Anglo-Normans helping king Dermot hadaccompanied him on a successful raid into the landsof his enemy, MacDonnchadh, king of Ossory.While they were busy, MacDonnchadh led histroops to a defile that lay between water and woods,and along which the returning raiders would have tocome. Dermot’s army of c. 2,000 men from Hy-Kinselagh marched ahead of the Anglo-Normans, aforce of 300 knights and Welsh archers. The men ofKinselagh panicked at the sight of MacDonnchadhand his warriors waiting for them in the pass: thriceduring Dermot’s reign they had defeated his armieson the same spot. Nearly all of his troops on thisoccasion fled into the woods. The Anglo-Normanswith a handful of remaining Kinselagh men foundthemselves outnumbered six or seven to one in themarshy valley. If MacDonnchadh chose to attackthem they were in a most disadvantageous spotwhere the knights could not charge. And an attackup the pass seemed hopeless. One of the Anglo-Norman commanders suggested a retreat back to thehigher, open ground from which they haddescended: They might lure the men of Ossory fromtheir defenses thereby. Appearing fearful, theAnglo-Normans withdrew in haste. As they arrivedat the edge of the woods they left forty Welshbowmen in ambush with orders to attack the men ofOssory in their rear as best they could.MacDonnchadh led his warriors forth across thevalley and up the hill in pursuit. The place ofambush was bypassed without notice, and theyemerged upon the high ground to find, to theirdismay, that the Anglo-Normans had reformed thereand now launched an attack. Before the chargingknights the kerns of Ossory broke and fled for thetrees. The Welsh pursued them, and the skulkingmen of Hy-Kinselagh emerged and chased down thefugitives. Two hundred heads were taken anddropped at the feet of king Dermot. “No quarter wasgiven in Irish war. To the horror of his auxiliaries,the brutal king was seen to pick out the head of oneof his special enemies, and to tear with his teeth thenose of the fallen chief.”

Another tactical expedient which workedpowerfully, against not only Irish kerns but mailedScandinavian columns, was the attack in flank andrear by mounted knights:


By autumn of 1170, Dublin had fallen to theEnglish. Richard Strongbow was now at the head ofhis troops. He had claimed the whole of Leinstersince the death of his father-in-law in May of 1171.A fortnight after his accession, a Viking fleet of“sixty sail” arrived and anchored in Dublin Bay.Haskulf the Danish lord of Dublin, whomStrongbow had driven out, had sought help from theScandinavians of Orkney, Man and the Hebrides.The Viking host was c. forty-five hundred strongand wearing mail. They formed up on the shore andmarched toward the city walls in a dense column.As earl Richard was away, the commander ofDublin was one Miles Cogan. His garrison wasperhaps fifteen hundred men, some three hundredknights and mounted serjants and the rest Welsharchers and foot serjants. Miles sallied against theVikings, with his spearmen and archers in front, butwas unable to break the Viking ranks. He withdrewagain through the east gate, and his marksmen linedthe walls and began to shoot hard into the Norsecolumn. Anticipating this beforehand, Miles haddispatched a small body of thirty knights from thegate on the west side of the city, with orders tocircle around and attack the Vikings in their rear.When the diversion arrived they made a furiousassault and succeeded in creating so much clamorthat the whole Viking host turned away from thecity and went to the succor of their comrades in therear. Miles emerged again through the east gate andattacked the Norse. The knights’ charge cut throughto the center of the column and wreaked havocthere. The Norse broke in disarray for their ships.An Irish host of uncertain loyalty had been watchingfrom a distance, waiting to see which side would bew orsted: Miles had enjoined their leader to do so,allowing that if the Norse won, then the Irish couldjoin them in attacking his men: but if the Norsewere getting the worst of it, then the Irish could helpthe Anglo-Normans. According to this dubiousprearrangement the Irish fell upon the discomfittedVikings. Some twenty-five hundred were slain ordrowned before the longships were thrust out intothe bay. Haskulf was taken prisoner and laterbeheaded.

Oman gave a detailed example of a typicalAnglo-Norman surprise attack:

A month later, the high king of all Ireland,Roderic O’Connor, arrived outside Dublin with anarmy reputed to be thirty thousand men (or in somesources 60,000!), drawn from every clan on theisland. They beleaguered Dublin on all sides,divided into four camps. Strongbow had by thenreturned to his capital city. Famine was threateningthe city after six weeks, and there was no chance forhelp by sea, as the king of Man lay in the bay witha Viking fleet. Strongbow despaired at theoverwhelming strength of the Irish host, and enteredinto negotiations, even offering to becomeO’Connor’s vassal for Leinster. O’Connor repliedthat he might hold the three towns of Dublin,Waterford and Wexford, but no more. These werethe tow ns of the Scandinavian and Celtic ostmen,who had handled Irish trade.) Rather than bereduced to the role of a mere merchant, Strongbowdecided to sortie. The very afternoon of the brokennegotiations, he marshaled all the troops he couldspare from watching the walls and marched in threesmall columns of horse and foot against the Irishcamp at Castle Knock, some four miles away fromthe city. Each column had forty knights, sixtymounted archers and a hundred foot serjants (ridingdouble?). Making speed from the west gate, theyarrived where the men of Connaught wereencamped before any alarm could be given. Thestockade they had surrounded their camp with wasunguarded: even the king himself was in his bath.The Anglo-Normans broke into the camp at threepoints and slaughtered the Irish everywhere theytried to get formed up. In short order they were infull flight, the naked king leading the rout. Fifteenhundred were killed, and the English only lost oneserjant. After hearing of Roderic O’Connor’sdefeat, the rest of the Irish army broke up andreturned to their homes.

“The three battles which we have thus set forthgive us the three main tactical devices by which theNormans won their victories — the feigned retreat,the flank attack by horsemen, and the suddensurprise.”

After that, the Irish were “so cowed that theyhabitually retired to wood or bog when the invadersadvanced, and never fought save in night surprisesor behind impregnable stockades and ditches.” They


thus gave over the open countryside of the easternportion of the island to the invaders.

Since Oman wrote his treatise on the medievalart of war, not much has changed to color what hesaid about Anglo-Norman warfare in Ireland. Thefact that the Irish used light cavalry a lot earlier andin greater numbers has to modify his views of an all-infantry army of naked kerns. Also, his emphasisupon the Anglo-Norman presence being a majorfactor in Irish politics is based upon thecontemporary English historian, GiraldusCambrensis, who was flagrantly prejudiced: the IrishAnnuls of Ulster do not admit of any greatimpression made upon the north and west of GaelicIreland by the invaders from England. They wereviewed only as auxiliaries fighting for king Dermot,and then later as opportunist holders of the formerostmen towns of the east coast. When Henry II camewith 500 knights and thousands of other troops in240 ships in 1171, only then did the Irish clansmenadmit the presence of a superior force. Henry tooknames and proclaimed his overlordship inassemblies of the Irish clergy and chieftains. EvenRoderic O’Connor supposedly swore some sort offealty. But Henry II was soon back in England todeal with home-based troubles (that uprising ofprince Henry’s was brewing), and he never returned.The Irish clans went back to their interminablefeuding, in which the Anglo-Normans were hardlymore than a “pin-prick.” They were absorbed, likethe Vikings before them, into the greater picture ofIrish raid and counter-raid, becoming just alike.Oman places the blame for Ireland’s longbackwardness upon their war with the superiorEnglish settlers, too few in numbers to conquer, buttoo powerful to drive out. However, the Irishthemselves were the ones at fault, and the Englishintruders simply joined in the endless round ofarmed bickering that had already been goingforward long before 1167.But Oman’s assessment ofthe stalemate is worth quoting again:

“Against (the Anglo-Norman castles) the Irishcould seldom prevail — and indeed, a castle, whenonce completed, never fell save by treachery. Onthe other hand, the Anglo-Normans were almostequally incapable of mastering the woods and bogsin which their enemies took refuge. Hence came

that unhappy division of the island, destined to lastfor four centuries and more, in which the nativesheld out in their fastnesses, while the invadersdominated the open land — each levying undyingwar on the other, yet neither able to get theadvantage.”

ARMY LISTS

Only additional army lists are included in thissection.

The Vikings are no different than the list alreadygiven on page 15. (However, at Stamford Bridge —25 September 1066 — the Norse spearmen must belight infantry: even King Harald himself left“Emma”, his famous mail coat, behind at the ships.If you allow a few warriors who opted to keep theirmail, and others who wore leather or quilted bodyarmor, then maybe one fifth of the spearmen can beclassed as medium infantry.)

Percentage breakdowns for the Scots, Welsh andIrish are purely guess work. No one can tell what anaverage army would have looked like. All we cando is reflect typical troops and use common sense tolimit the “cats whiskers”. Economics plays thedominant role here: fully-armed warriors cos t a lotmore to accumulate and maintain than a pack ofkerns. I assumed for this period a fairly uniformeconomic factor for everyone, and limited thenumber of troops a population could be expected tofield as a maximum number; and the so-calledstanding troops to a maximum of 2% of thepopulation. It is assumed that even the standingarmy is largely disbanded to their holdings, and aretherefore part of the economy when they are notfighting. Purely full-time and idle warrior bands —such as paid household knights of the great lords —are a minority far less than 1% of the population.

Anglo-Saxon Armies1014 to 1066

*up to 10% unarmored infantry, ceorl levy,assortedrude weaponry and one hand missile or


sling. Morale: 00-69=D, 70-99=C.*up to 10% unarmored infantry, ceorl levy, hand

weapon and bow 2. Morale as above.*up to 10% light infantry, ceorl levy, hand weapon

and one hand missile. Morale as above.up to 40% light infantry, geneat fyrd, sword or axe,

spear/javelin and 2 javelins. Morale:00-39=D, 40-89=C, 90-99=B.

up to 10% medium infantry, geneat fyrd, as above.up to 40% medium infantry, thegn fyrd, sword,

Danish axe, spear/javelin and 3 javelins.Morale: 00-29=D, 30-79=C, 80-99=B.

up to 10% heavy infantry, thegn fyrd, as above.up to 25% heavy infantry, housecarles, sword,

Danish axe, spear/javelin and 3 javelins.Morale:00-09=D, 10-59=C, 60-89=B, 90-99=A.

Organization:Up to three battles and one bodyguard. The

minimum-sized battle is 500 men, or one unit.Bodyguard may be any size. Units are 500 men forpurchase and morale purposes. Fyrd andhousecarles may not intermix units; but a battle ofat least two units may contain units of both.Housecarle units test morale separately, and canmove separately, from fyrd units. Fyrd units mayintermix weights and types. Ceorl levy alwaysmuster with fyrd units.

Fyrd and housecarles are mounted infantry. Abattle may fight mounted. The bodyguard is alwaysan infantry force on the battlefield.


wall (bowmen/slingers prohibited), shield-ring, openorder missile fire, close order missile fire (handmissiles only), phalanx (spear and axe only: do notcheck to receive cavalry charge, locked-line ondefense,), wheel (ceorl levy prohibited).

Cavalry tactics:open and close order, column, open order

missile fire.

Anglo-Norman Armies1068 to 1125



up to 50% light, medium and heavy infantry,sword and spear/javelin. Morale as above.

up to 80% light and medium cavalry serjants,sword, lance/javelin and javelin. Morale:00-29=D, 30=89=C, 90-99=B.

up to 35% heavy cavalry milites. Morale as above. REQUIRED UNIT.

Up to 85% feudal and militia infantry:*up to 60% unarmored levy, assorted rude

weaponry; 25% bow 1 or sling. Morale:00-69=D, 70-99=C.

*up to 10% unarmored bowmen, sword and bow 2. Morale: 00-59=D, 60-89=C,90-99=B.

*up to 10% unarmored bowmen, Welsh auxiliaries, sword and bow 2: with one-fourth bow 3. Morale as above.


up to 50% light spearmen, sword, spear/javelinand javelin. Morale: 00-39=D, 40-89=C,90-99=B.

up to 20% medium spearmen, as above.up to 05% heavy spearmen, as above.


allowed. The minimum-sized battle is 500 men, orone unit. Units are 500 men for purchase and moralepurposes. Units may intermix weights but not types(exception: the feudal bowmen may intermix withspearmen or dismounted cavalry). Welsh andmercenaries maintain autonomous units.

Infantry tactics:open and close order, column, shield-wall,

square, wedge, wheel (levy prohibited), open ordermissile fire, close order missile fire (hand missilesonly), immobile-screened missile fire (mercenaries


only),basic phalanx (feudal spear only), phalanx(mercenaries and dismounted cavalry only: do notcheck to receive charging cavalry, locked-line ondefense, reinforced-line), withdraw post combat(Welsh auxiliaries only).


open and close order missile fire (mounted bow orcrossbow, open order missile only), charge (mountedinfantry prohibited), withdraw post combat, feignedrout.

Anglo-Norman Armies1125 to 1200



up to 50% medium and heavy infantry, swordand spear/javelin OR sword and pike.Morale as above.

up to 50% light cavalry, sword and crossbow 1.Morale as above.


up to 50% heavy cavalry, sword and lance.Morale: 00-29=D, 30-79=C, 80-99=B.REQUIRED UNIT.

up to 10% cataphract cavalry, sword and lance.Morale as above. (After 1150 only.)

Up to 85% feudal and militia infantry:*up to 60% unarmored levy, assorted rude

weaponry; 25% bow 1 or sling. Morale:00-69=D, 70-99=C,

*up to 15% unarmored bowmen, sword andbow 2. Morale: 00-59=D, 60-89=C,90-99=B.

*up to 15% unarmored bowmen, Welshauxiliaries, sword and bow 2; with one-fourth bow 3. Morale as above.


up to 40% light spearmen, sword and spear.Morale: 00-39=D, 40-89=C, 90-99=B.



allowed. The minimum-sized battle is 500 men, orone unit. Units are 500 men for purchase and moralepurposes. Units may intermix weights but not types.(Exception: feudal bowmen may intermix withspearmen.) Welsh and mercenaries maintainautonomous units.


wedge, square, wheel (levy prohibited), open ordermissile fire, immobile-screened missile fire(mercenaries only), basic phalanx (feudal spearonly), phalanx (mercenaries and dismounted cavalryonly: do not check to receive cavalry charge,locked-line on defense, reinforced-line; pikemenonly: +25% versus cavalry, locked-line, rankbonus), withdraw post combat (Welsh auxiliariesonly).


Western Charge (sword and lance only), open ordermissile fire (mounted bow and crossbow only),feigned rout, withdraw post combat.

Scottish Armies1066 to 1124

up to 100% unarmored pikemen, Highlander, seaxand pike. Morale: 00-59=D, 60-89=C,90-99=B.

*up to 10% unarmored bowmen, seax and bow 2.Morale as above.

up to 30% light swordsmen, Galwegian, broadsword and javelin. Morale as above.

up to 30% light pikemen, Highlander, seax andpike. Morale as above.

up to 25% medium pikemen, as above.up to 15% medium and heavy pikemen,


Highlander,sword and pike OR medium and heavy axemen, galloglas, sword and broadaxe.Morale: 00-39=D, 40-89=C, 90-99=B.

Organization:Up to three battles allowed and one bodyguard

if the king is present. The minimum-sized battle is500 men, or one unit. Units are 500 men forpurchase and morale purposes. Units of Highlandersmay intermix with galloglas; Galwegians formautonomous battles.

Tactics:open and close order, column, wedge, square,

pre-contact missile fire (Galwegian only ), openorder missile fire, basic phalanx (Galwegian only ),phalanx (pike and broadaxe only: do not check toreceive cavalry charge, +25% versus cavalry,locked-line, rank bonus).

Scottish Armies1125 to 1200

Up to 15% feudalized Lowlanders:*up to 50% unarmored infantry, sword and

bow 2; with up to one-fourth crossbow 1 or2. Morale: 00-39=D, 40-89=C, 90-99=B.

up to 50% medium and heavy infantry, swordand spear/javelin. Morale as above.


up to 50% heavy cavalry, as above.up to 10% cataphract cavalry, as above.

(After 1150 only.)

Up to 100% common army infantry:up to 60% unarmored pikemen, Highlander,

sword and pike. Morale: 00-59=D, 60-89=C,

90-99=B.*up to 10% unarmored bowmen, sword and

bow 2. Morale as above.up to 30% light swordsmen, Galwegian,

broadsword and javelin. Morale as above.up to 30% light pikemen, Highlanders, sword

and pike. Morale: 00-39=D, 40-89=C,90-99=B.

up to 25% medium pikemen, Highlander,sword

and pike. Morale as above.up to 15% medium and heavy pikemen,

Highlander, sword and pike OR mediumand heavy axemen, galloglas, sword andbroadaxe. Morale: 00-29=D, 30-89=C,90-99=B.

Organization:Up to four battles of infantry allowed. The

minimum-sized battle is 500 men for infantry, orone unit: cavalry will form up in one unit, whichmay be less than 500 men. Infantry units of 500 menare for purchase and morale purposes. Highlandersand galloglas may intermix. Galwegians formautonomous battles. Feudal infantry may intermixwith each other but otherwise may not intermix.


wall (feudal only), square, open order missile fire,basic phalanx (Galwegian), phalanx (pike andbroadaxe only: do not check to receive cavalrycharge, locked-line, rank bonus, +25% versuscavalry. Feudal spear and dismounted cavalry only:do not check to receive charging cavalry, locked-line on defense, reinforced-line).


charge (sword and lance only), open order missilefire (mounted crossbow only), withdraw postcombat.

Welsh Armies1068 to 1200

up to 100% unarmored infantry, bowmen OR spearmen. Morale: 00-49=D, 50-99=C.REQUIRED UNIT

up to 50% light infantry, spearmen. Morale:


00-49=D, 50-89=C, 90-99=B.up to 20% medium infantry, as above.up to 10% heavy infantry, as above.

After c. 1150 only:up to 20% light cavalry, sword and lance; up to

half as mounted bowmen. Morale:00-39=D, 40-89=C, 90-99=B.

up to 10% medium and heavy cavalry, sword andlance. Morale as above.

Organization:Up to three battles of infantry allowed. May

intermix weights and types. The minimum-sizedbattle is 500 men, or one unit. Units are 500 menfor purchase and morale purposes. Cavalry mayform a unit smaller than 500 men; but to have morethan one unit there must be at least 500 men perunit.

North Welsh: are at least two-thirds spearmen.South Welsh: are at least two-thirds bowmen.

The bows are bow 2, with one-fourth bow 3.

Infantry tactics:open and close order, column, wedge, square,

open order missile fire, shield-wall (light, mediumand heavy spearmen only), basic phalanx (+25%versus cavalry, rank bonus, locked line on defenseonly). Special skirmishing tactics: in open orderonly: withdraw post combat, bowmen shoot whilepivoting, i.e. effectively while walking backwards.


withdraw post combat, charge (sword and lanceonly), open order missile fire (mounted bowmenonly).

Irish Armies1167 to 1200

up to 100% unarmored infantry, broadaxe OR sling.Morale: 00-59=D, 60-89=C, 90-99=B.

up to 50% light infantry, broadaxe, spear/javelin2 javelins. Morale as above.

up to 15% medium infantry, as above.

up to 05% heavy infantry, as above.

Organization:Up to three units allowed. There is no

minimum-size restriction. The clan chief or kingand his household have horses: up to 30% of thearmy can be mounted as cavalry.

49

Infantry tactics:open and close order, column, open order

missile fire, withdraw post combat (in open orderonly).

Cavalry tactics:open and close order, column, open and close

order missile fire, withdraw post combat.

Anglo-Norman Armies in Ireland1167 to 1200

Up to 30% cavalry:up to 80% light serjants, sword and lance.

Morale: 00-29=D, 30-89=C, 90-99=B.up to 50% medium and heavy knights, sword

and lance. Morale: 00-29=D, 30-79=C.80-99=B.

Up to 50% mounted infantry:up to 100% unarmored Welsh bowmen, sword

and bow. Morale: 00-49=D, 50-99=C.up to 10% light crossbow-men, sword and

crossbow 1. Morale as above.up to 50% light spearmen, sword, spear/javelin

and 2 javelins. Morale as above.

Up to 90% infantry:up to 100% unarmored Welsh bowmen, sword

and bow. Morale: 00-49=D, 50-99=C.up to 50% light spearmen, sword, spear/javelin

and 2 javelins. Morale: 00-39=D, 40-89=C,90-99=B.

up to 10% light crossbow-men, sword andcrossbow 2. Morale as above.

up to 30% medium spearmen, sword andspear/javelin. Morale as above.

up to 20% heavy spearmen, as above.

Organization:Up to three battles allowed of infantry and

cavalry. There are no minimum-sized units or

battles. Mounted infantry may muster alongsidecavalry.

This army in total may not exceed 2,000 men.Irish allies always out-number these troops.

Welsh bowmen are bow 2, with up to one-fourth bow 3.


wall, square, open order missile fire, immobile-screened missile fire, basic phalanx (spearmen only.Dismounted cavalry: do not check to receivecavalry, reinforced-line ). Special skirmishingtactics: Welsh in open order only: withdraw postcombat, shoot while pivoting, i. e. effectively whilewalking backwards.

Cavalry and mounted infantry tactics:open and close order, column, wheel, pivot,

Western Charge (serjants and knights only),openorder missile fire (Welsh and mounted crossbowonly), withdraw post combat, feigned rout.


Withdraw post combatIn the Welsh and Anglo-Norman Armies in Irelandlists, the Welsh bowmen can withdraw post combat.This is special to them. Irish troops, who are just asprone to flee a standup fight in the open,nevertheless do not show any discipline in doing so.The only time Welsh bowmen can withdraw postcombat is when in open order. While withdrawing,they may make a full walk move, face the enemy,and shoot: in melee if contacted.

The Normans in Italy and Sicily 1000 to 1194

50

THE BACKGROUND

Norman pilgrims had been traveling up anddown through Italy since at least 1000. Some ofthem had paused to take advantage of theinternecine wars of rebellion, and thus began twocenturies of Italo-Norman intervention, culminatingin the longest-lasting monument to the Normanexpansion period: the kingdom of Sicily, the directdescendants of which endured till the unification ofSicily and Italy by Garibaldi in 1860.

In 1015, at the shrine of St Michael on MonteGargano, the rebel Melus of Bari met a band ofNorman pilgrims journeying home from Jerusalem.Melus had returned to southern Italy after fleeinginto exile following his failed revolt against theByzantine catapan in 1009. He and his compatriotshad entered into an alliance with the Lombarddukes of Salerno, Benevento and Capua, but theircombined army of civic militia and smattering ofnoble retainers had been easily scattered by theByzantine professionals. What the disaffectedLombards needed was good troops, if their efforts tothrow off Byzantine rule were to have any hope ofsuccess. Melus related all of his past history andthat of his oppressed people to the forty Normans,and asked them if they might prefer to stay in Italyand fight as mercenaries. They said that theprospects sounded interesting, but they would notthemselves take Melus up on his offer. Instead, theytook the word back to Normandy.

The following year, the first bands of adventure-hungry Norman milites crossed the Alps to takeservice with Melus and his insurgents. In the sameyear, another returning band of Norman pilgrimsstopped over at Salerno, which was even then beingbesieged by Muslims. Borrowing arms and horses,the Normans issued from the town and put theMuslims to flight. The impressed townsfolk offeredto hire the Normans on full-time; but they declinedand returned to Normandy, where their relatedadventures encouraged other landless Normanwarriors to head out for Italy to seek their fortunes.For the main part, the Norman freebooters were theyounger sons of minor tenants whose fiefs were toosmall to provide an inheritance for their numerouschildren. Hardly beyond their Viking roots, these

restless, landless warriors brought nothing with themsave their prowess at arms, their horses andequipment and the Norman genius to seize andmake the most of any opportunity.

By 1017, Melus felt strong enough to resumeactive campaigning against the hated Byzantinecatapan. In 1018 he brought his army to the banks ofthe river Ofanto. But in a battle near Cannae hisshort-lived success came to an end and the Normancontingent was practically annihilated. Only 10 of250 managed to escape from the field. Nevertheless,Normans continued to arrive looking for work.Since the rebellion was crushed, they took servicewith the Byzantines instead and were posted togarrison duties on the frontier with Benevento.

Normans continued to arrive and during thefollowing decade they entered the service ofNaples, Capua and Salerno. The Lombard duchieswere often at war and Normans found themselvesranged against each other. They arrived inimpressive numbers, and with a willingness to fightfor chicken-feed as compared to the normal expensefor mercenaries. The market became glutted; and atthe same time, the Normans were the most efficientto their labors. Bargaining for their services becamequite spirited: and the money, though far less thanwhat Italian mercenaries had been wont to charge,was still enticing to the northerners, whose almostcashless economy back home made any hard coinalmost a novelty. They remained landless men,living and dying by the sword; until in 1029 dukeSergius IV of Naples regained his throne largelythrough the aid of his Norman mercenaries, led byone Rainulf. In 1030 Sergius built a castle on hisborder with Capua and gave it to Rainulf to hold.The duke’s sister became his wife and he was thusthe first of the Norman freebooters to become alanded nobleman in Italy. The other Lombardprinces followed suit, and during the next few yearsat least a dozen Norman captains became landedtenants. In 1038, Rainulf , who had thrown off hisallegiance with Naples to join Capua, was formallyrecognized as the count of Aversa by emperorConrad II himself, as he traveled down through Italyduring one of his expeditions.

Although Rainulf mouthed the platitudes ofobedience to his Lombard lord at Capua, he was in

The Normans in Italy and Sicily 1000 to 1194 51

effect a law only to himself. The other Normancounts were alike in behaving more as independentrobber barons. The fragmented nature of southernItaly played into the grasping hands of theinterlopers: the Lombard duchies were constantly atodds with the maritime city-states; the so-calledHoly Roman empire was ranged against theByzantines and rebellions kept rising up against thecatapan in Apulia. The Normans as a race werepotentially the most unified in sentiment andpurpose, if only a leader could be brought to centerstage.

In 1032 arrived William and Drogod’Hauteville, sons of Tancred a middling tenant inNormandy. They had answered the personal, writteninvitation of Rainulf who encouraged hiscompatriots to come also to Italy and seek theirfortunes. William and Drogo joined Rainulf ofAversa in helping the duke of Capua capture thecity-states of Gaëta, Amalfi and Sorrento. Thed’Hautevilles were a large clan. William and Drogowere joined by their younger brothers and half-brothers as they came of age: Humfrey, Serlo,Robert, Tancred, Mauger, another William,Geoffrey and Roger. William and Drogo helpedApulian insurgents capture the towns of Melfi andVenosa, and the Normans in Byzantine employdeserted to join them. In 1041 the combinedLombard-Norman army defeated the catapan atMonte Maggiore. Norman conquests in Apuliacontinued and they divided it into twelve counties.In 1043 William d’Hauteville was recognized ascount of Apulia, with his capital at Melfi, and thusbecame something of a military chairman of theboard over the other Norman counts. All theirconquests had been performed in the name of theprince of Salerno, whom the Normans hailed asduke of Apulia. But it was an empty title: In 1046,Drogo assumed the position of his brother Williamwho had died. It was now apparent to the Apulianrebels and Lombard dukes that the Normans wereout for themselves. But it was too late to doanything about it: there were by then thousands ofthe former mercenaries spread across Apulia andCalabria. In 1051 Drogo was murdered and hisbrother Humfrey succeeded to the rule of Apulia.His son Abelard was a child when Humfrey died in

1057, and Humfrey’s half-brother Robert Guiscardwas appointed as Abelard’s guardian.

Guiscard — which signifies “cunning” — livedup to his epithet. He was the most intelligent andcourageous of the d’Hautevilles. He managed to winthe allegiance of the other counts and to dispose ofhis nephew. The subjection of Calabria wentforward, with the aid of the Norman counts ofApulia and the local Lombard princes. It was fairlycompleted by 1060; and then Guiscard and hisyoungest brother Roger, decided that to make theNorman holdings secure the island of Sicily must beoccupied. But they received no help from the othercounts and had to conquer the island by their ownlimited resources; therefore it took quite awhile;and in fact, Roger did most of the work becauseGuiscard was so often too busy with troubles on themainland. Guiscard succeeded in driving out thelast of the Byzantines in 1071 when Bari fell aftera three year siege. In 1073 Amalfi recognized hislordship. Salerno was absorbed into the expandingNorman realm and Guiscard was now called duke ofApulia. That left only Benevento, Naples andCapua outside his sovereignty. And Capua hadalready been taken over in 1058 by the Normancount Richard of Aversa, who was the nephew ofRainulf. These two Norman powers were to remainbitter rivals for the major part of a century. Theexpansion of Guiscard’s domain was hampered byfrequent revolts amongst his Norman vassals. Thesiege of Benevento in 1077 had to be abandoned sothat he could deal with an uprising; and likewise, ahitherto successful invasion of the Byzantine empirehad to be left in the hands of Guiscard’s sonBohemond in 1083 so that he could return to Italyand put down yet another baronial revolt.

The main power behind the Normans during themiddle years of their greatest expansion was thepapacy. This had not always been the case. Thepope had been just as alarmed as the Lombarddukes when Drogo assumed the county of Apulia in1046. He made alliance with the catapan at Bari,and, at the head of a papal army, marched in 1053into Apulia to link forces with the Byzantines. ButGuiscard and his usually-uncooperative vassalcounts put aside their differences and joinedtogether near Civitate. They had positioned


themselves between the pope and the catapan.Guiscard moved to attack pope Leo’s army beforehe could join with his Byzantine allies and theNormans won a complete victory. Leo was capturedand compelled to receive the oaths of vassalage theNormans desired to swear with him. From then on,he and his successors were touted by the Italo-Normans as their suzerain. The Norman conquestswere made to receive papal approval; and whenGuiscard and his brother invaded Sicily it was alsowith the pope’s blessing. Before Civitate, theNormans had received their authority from the HolyRoman emperor. Afterward, they became theenemies of the pope’s rivals the anti-popes ofGerman imperialism. This gave to the Italo- andSiculo-Norman adventurers the same churchbacking that later blessed William the Conqueror’sarms as he crossed the Channel. With it, theNormans in the Mediterranean could go forward asthe champions of Holy Church and were not to becalled with impunity mere “land pirates.”

There was in southern Italy and especially inSicily, a very large population of Muslims. In Sicilyalso the Greek populace was distinct and numerous.The island was divided between three enemyemirates: Trapani, Palermo and Girgenti. Emir Ibnath-Thimnah of Palermo sought the alliance of theNormans to aid him in his rivalry with his twojealous neighbors. Guiscard had captured Reggio inCalabria in 1060. From there he sent 60 knightsacross the Straits and disembarked outside Messina.A detachment of the Muslim garrison chased theNormans, who evidently had merely lured them ona considerable distance by a feigned flight: for theyturned upon their pursuers and chased them backinto the city. The following year 160 knights wereshipped across to make a reconnaissance of severaldays before returning again to the mainland. Fromthese two forays, perhaps, Guiscard and Rogerdecided that Messina was vulnerable. They landedin two trips a total of 440 knights a few miles southof the city and then rode toward the walls. TheMuslim garrison fled and Messina was seizedwithout a blow. The transports continued to shuttleback and forth between Reggio and Messina untilsome 1,000 mounted knights and a like number ofinfantry had been collected. Messina gave the

Normans a secure base from which to embark on theconquest of the island. It was interrupted by othercampaigns, but with no real setbacks, Rogercontinued to press around the coasts of Sicily. Hisfirst attempt to take Palermo failed in 1064; but anarmy of relief sent by the Zirids of Tunisia wasdefeated in 1068, and after that the progress wassteady, albeit somewhat slow because of a lack ofmilitary power. With the conquest of Syracuse in1085 (the year Guiscard died), and Butera and Notoin 1088 and 1091, the conquest of Sicily wascomplete.

While Guiscard had lived, Roger admitted thesovereignty of his elder brother and his rights to ashare in the island. Roger was called the count ofSicily; and after Guiscard’s passing assumed fullpossession of the island and the Calabrian peninsula.Guiscard’s successors could not assert their rightsbecause they lacked the power to confront Roger.He died in 1101 and was succeeded first by an eightyear-old boy, then two years later by his then eightyear-old brother, Roger II. Adelaide the dowagercountess was regent until 1112, when she embarkedfor Outremer to consummate her disastrous marriagewith king Baldwin I of Jerusalem.

Roger II was as able and ambitious as hisforebears. He created southern Italy and Sicily intoa Mediterranean power second to none, and it wasperhaps the most powerful feudal state in Europe. In1127 he took over the duchy of Apulia whenGuiscard’s grandson died without heirs — ignoringthe protestations of the pope and the legal rights ofanother grandson, the prince of Antioch. Heassumed the title king of Sicily and was crowned onChristmas Day in 1130. For the next twenty-fouryears, king Roger quarreled with the Holy Romanemperor and the papacy, who resented his risingpower. His attempts to hold the Tunisian coastlineopposite Sicily ultimately failed: but he did lodgepermanently on the island of Malta, thus securing tohis realm the strategic and economic control of themiddle Mediterranean. The Sicilian fleet was themost powerful at that time. He raided Byzantineterritory on several occasions successfully, exactedtribute from the Tunisians and passed on to his sonWilliam in 1154 a realm that was prosperous andwell-administered.


William I (the Bad) was a just and competentruler, but his severity and the unpopularity of hisministers caused several revolts during the reign. Hemaintained closer relations with the papacy, becausethe popes were looking for allies to help stem therising power of emperor Frederick Barbarossa.

From 1166 till 1189, William II ruled duringSicily’s “golden age.” He is referred to as “theGood.” His laws and justice were later rememberedas such, and well into the 13th century the Siciliansinsisted that they could not endure imperial orFrench rule because they had not respected theorder of things as they had been “in the days ofgood king William.”

With William II’s death in 1189, the direct maleline of Norman kings came to an end. Their centuryof rule was fondly remembered by the populace ofthe island. The palace at Palermo had been theirpermanent home, from which both Williams wereseldom seen to emerge. Their court was fashioneddeliberately upon the Byzantine hieratic model, andthe Siculo-Norman kings lived more like Muslimsultans than Christian monarchs. Their employmentof a numerous army of Muslim auxiliaries shockedthe rest of western Europe. But it was just thechiefest reflection of a Norman propensity to makedo with whatever means were to hand, and tochange as little as possible the conditions they foundwhenever they took over new territory. By the closeof the 12th century, Sicily in particular was a realmwhere Greek, Muslim and Catholic elements wereliving together in peace and well on their way toblending into a national consciousness. Christianwomen went about dressed like Muslims in veilsand abbas. The courts maintained the lawsgoverning civil cases according to the alreadyestablished customs of Muslims, Greeks and evenJews; and the cases were heard in the language ofthe contestants. Religion was left utterly alone, aftera short and abortive attempt early on to enforceCatholicism upon the native Greeks. Muslims wereallowed freedom to build and worship in theirmosques; the Greeks revered without fear theirpatriarch at Constantinople. Norman treatment ofthe cosmopolitan populace was therefore fair andlargely unprejudiced. Their government was basedupon feudalism, but the kings retained a large

portion of the island as the royal demesne, keepingvassalage there to a minimum. This was in contrastto their mainland holdings, where a number of largeand powerful baronies and numerous vassals madetheir authority there more challenging to maintain.

But when William II died, his heir was hisfather’s half-sister, the posthumous daughter of kingRoger II. She was already married to the son ofFrederick Barbarossa, Henry of Hohenstaufen. Butthe Sicilians and mainlanders did not like the ideaof a German king. They elected instead Tancred thecount of Lecce, the bastard grandson of Roger II,whose father had died even while Roger II yet lived.The intrigue which allowed this was patentlyillegal: but Henry of Hohenstaufen was toopreoccupied governing Germany for his crusaderfather to intervene and secure his rights. Tancred’srule was short and unsettled: the Muslims revoltedagainst him, and his barons resented his elevation.His authority was barely maintained by an alliancewith king Richard Cœur-de-Lion, when he stoppedoff at Sicily on his way to the Third Crusade. Butthe alliance did no long-term good, as Richardcontinued on to Acre. Henry Hohenstaufen camesouth in 1191 and was crowned Holy Romanemperor in place of his father Barbarossa, who hadperished whilst marching to Acre. But he was notable to attack until 1194, when he came at the headof a mighty army into southern Italy. Tancred haddied earlier that same year, leaving his little sonWilliam III under the regency of his widow Sibylla.The nobles of Sicily considered it impossible toresist the Germans and Sibylla surrendered. But theterms were not kept and she was imprisoned andmany of her supporters put to death. The child-kingWilliam III simply disappeared. Henry ofHohenstaufen was crowned king of Sicily onChristmas Day, 1194.

His rule was harsh and very unpopular. TheSicilians felt that they were now relegated to a mereprovince in Henry’s growing empire. His imperialambitions they did not share in at all. A plot to havehim murdered in 1197 was discovered and hemoved with even more severity against thoseassumed guilty than he had done against his enemiesin 1194. But he succumbed to dysentery soonafterward anyway. His wife arranged for the care of


their little Frederick, sec uring pope Innocent III tobe his ward, and then followed her husband indeath.

The story of Hohenstaufen rule in the kingdomof Sicily is not within the scope of this Normanexpansion period. But a brief overview will helpconnect it to what followed. Pope Innocent did hislevel best to govern well. But while Frederick grewup his father’s empire was dismembered byintrigues. The royal demesne in Sicily was largelyparceled out to reward those nobles whom Innocentfelt were indispensable. Although Frederick ofHohenstaufen was as much Siculo-Norman in hisupbringing as any previous heir to the throne ofSicily, yet his ambitions were like his father’s: tounite the Holy Roman empire under his single rule.He loved Sicily more than any other of hispossessions and Palermo where he had grown up ashis only true home. His court was centered there andhis children were born there. But he spent little timehimself in Sicily, and his subjects resented him asthe son of the hated German, Henry. Although hedoted upon the welfare of the island, reforming theirlaws and giving them prosperity, his rule wasunpopular and had to be enforced. A Muslim revoltlasting ten years began after a terrible famine in1212. It was finally crushed, and the entire Muslimpopulation transplanted to northern Apulia. Afterthat, the nobles who had risen in private rebellionsduring the Muslim crisis were dispossessed, theirfiefs being returned to the royal demesne fromwhich they had been pared away during the papalregency. Although throughout Frederick’s rule theisland had regained much of her former grandeur asin Norman days, the people did not feel the same.They were no longer the independent kingdomwhose kings preferred to live at the royal palace inPalermo; now Sicily was merely a piece in asprawling empire that Sicilians wanted no part of.This resentment would eventually tempt the papacyinto offering the kingdom to the French royal house,in a scheme to curb the encroaching imperialism ofthe Hohenstaufen. But one brand of imperialism tobe replaced by that of Charles of Anjou would notsatisfy the Sicilian desire to be independent offoreign ambitions. The growing resentment of nearlya century of foreign domination would finally flare

into open revolt, when, as the bells of Palermo toledVespers on Easter 29 March 1282, the Siciliansarose and massacred all the French living in thecity, and declared themselves an independentnation: they threw themselves upon the pope’smercy, offering to continue as his political subjects,but the papacy had already committed itself toCharles of Anjou and refused even to listen to theSicilian ambassadors. The Sicilian Vespers formsone of the pivotal events in European political andreligious history. By it the papacy felt forced intodefending their Angevin policy, poured wealth itdid not have into the Sicilian war, declaredanathema all who warred against the church,launched French crusades against them, and thusbrought about the ignominy of the papacy in Europewhich gave birth to the Protestant Reformation.


The population of Southern Italy was complexand given over to anarchy. Greek-speaking areas,especially in the extreme south — remnants of theByzantine empire’s former greatness — continuedinto the 12th century. The largest segment remainedItalian, which is to say, those intermixed raceswhich spoke medieval Latin. The ruling class, theLombard princes, was the final vestige of the once-great barbarian conquest: for the main part theirwarlike qualities had become vitiated by thesoftness of civilized ways and the more ready ployof the hidden knife and poisoned cup. The mass ofLombard warriors had long ago blended into theItalian populace. Warfare was endemic between thecoastal republics and the principalities; but it tookrather the form of reprisal than conquest. There wereno effective troops with which to form an army withdecided advantages over those of neighboringpowers. The Byzantine catapan of Langobardia(Calabria and Apulia) was the enemy of all theLombards who detested imperial rule, whichincluded the vast majority: and although the navalrepublics of Gaëta, Naples and Amalfi werenominally Byzantine vassal states, they had become,by the time the first Normans began to arrive,effectively independent. Muslim settlementflourished in the south and especially in Sicily,


where the island was divided between rivalemirates. From time to time, large piratical fleetswould arrive from north Africa, join with the localMuslims and proceed inland burning and pillaging,till either brought to battle, or, sated with plunder,they would retire of their own accord; sometimes,this would not be for years, and the Muslim armywould establish a semi-nomadic encampment, or tryto maintain a temporary conquest centered uponsome captured town or towns. Lombard rebellionsagainst the Byzantine catapan were frequent inApulia, whose populace always sought alliance withthe dukes to the north. But the only troops therevolutionaries had to hand were the civic militias;and these, comprising a half-trained infantry levy,were no match for the profess ional units of theimperial army, small in numbers though these were.(The emperor kept the garrisons of imperial troopsin Italy to a minimum, requiring most of the army toprotect the northern and eastern frontiers against thesavage Bulgars and Turks). Life in southern Italywas therefore always at hazard from one enemy oranother. The stone-walled cities, however, werenumerous and large and sheltered enough of therustics of the contado so that existence continued ongeneration following generation unchanged.

Religion played a large part in further dividingthe peninsula. The Greek-speaking populace werealmost entirely associated with the Greek Orthodoxand their head patriarch at Constantinople. TheCatholics revered the pope at Rome; or occasionallythe antipopes raised up by the kings of Germanywhenever their cause with Rome worsened, thusthreatening either their ambition to receive theimperial diadem (which could only come from apope’s hand), or impeding their progress towarduniting the Holy Roman empire under their rule.(The antipopes during the Norman expansion periodwere: in 1012, Gregory VI; in 1058-59, Benedict X;in 1061-72, Honorius II; in 1080-1100, ClementIII; in 1100-02, Theodoric; in 1102, Albert ; in1105-11, Sylvester IV; in 1118-21, Gregory VIII; in1124, Celestine; in 1130-38, Anacletus II; in 1138,and another in 1159-64, Victor IV). Islam, ofcourse, presented a largely misunderstood, alienreligion, surrounded by a Christian majority. Thefrequent expeditions to Italy from North Africa were

at least partially motivated by the last flickers ofJihad, as the Zirids of Tunisia and EgyptianFatimids sent troops to the succor of theircoreligionists in the hopes that the conquests of thatholy war might continue.

Related to the religious squabbling, but in fac tmotivated entirely by political ambition, the effortsof the German imperial houses of Welf andHohenstaufen brought frequent expeditions downinto the peninsula. Loyalty to the pope first of allinvolved his political alliance; and the antipopessurfaced whenever it appeared expedient to resistthe pope and his allies. The French were almostuniversally loyal to the popes of Rome. TheNormans were thus inclined to be loyal, and werethe self-avowed champions of the Vatican followingthe capture of Leo IX in 1053. Before this, however,it was to the emperors of Germany that the Normansfirst turned for political recognition. Richard ofAversa in 1038, and Drogo d’Hauteville in 1047,received confirmation in their counties from ConradII and Henry III. But after they became thechampions of Holy Church, the Normans becameincreasingly the rivals, and under Roger II theenemies, of the German imperialists. There was onenotable exception to this: Roger II turned to theantipope Anacletus II in 1130 to receive officialrecognition of his coronation, at a time when popeInnocent II refused to sanction the increasing powerof the Siculo-Norman realm. But later, Innocent feltthreatened enough by the king of Germany ConradIII, and his antipope to make peace with king Rogerand receive him back into papal favor. Roger II’salliance with the French, and public knowledge ofhis ambition to invade and conquer the Byzantineempire, threw Conrad III and emperor ManuelComnenus together against the papacy and the kingof Sicily.

Against this polarizing political backdrop, theNorman realm grew in size, power and unitythroughout the late 11th and 12th centuries. TheNorman dukes of Apulia and the kings of Sicilyrecognized no earthly prince as their sovereign,deeming it wise to claim their authority from thepapacy alone.

Below the duke (or king) the realm was dividedamongst the rather numerous class of counts, or


cons tables. Their governments centered upon theprincipal towns, or capitals of the counties, orconstabularies. Beneath the counts/constables camethe barons, whose authority centered upon castles,and was therefore chiefly military. The lowest rungon the ladder of nobility was the warrior class, themilites. These were further subdivided into thosewho held nothing, and the feudati, those holdingsome minor watch post or castle or manor directlyfrom one of the lords. In southern Italy there were agreat many fiefs. The Catalogue of the Barons,contemporary at the earliest with the ending years ofRoger II’s reign, shows 3,453 fiefs which supporteda total of 8,620 milites and 11,090 serjants. Thisdid not include Sicily or Calabria. By extrapolationthis figure can roughly be tripled for the entirekingdom of Sicily at its fullest extent: the northernborder of which terminated along the southernfrontiers of the duchy of Spoleto and the papalStates. In addition to these feudal troops, the dukes,counts and kings relied upon the civic militias of thetowns. Feudalism had not existed in Italy before thecoming of the Normans. Duke Sergius IV of Naplesrewarded his valuable captain Rainulf according tothe custom that was familiar to the Normans. It isinteresting that the Italians knew enough aboutfeudalism to institute it first, but did not themselvespractice it. The armies of the peninsula, as has beenalready stated, were largely foot troops supplied bythe ancient obligations of the towns. This system oflevying an army from the common populace was adirect descendant of the Byzantine. The Normans,as they expanded their own territories, made full useof the militias of the towns, augmenting their ownmeager feudal forces with much greater numbers ofLombard infantry. In some areas, such as the duchyof Naples, there was already a land-holdingaristocracy which lived most of the time in the citiesbut held estates in the contado. Just because thesenoblemen were not feudal lords and vassals did notpreclude the presence of mounted retinues andhousehold troops. Italian or Lombard noblesrecruited their bodyguards and garrisons for theirtown-houses or castles from amongst the masses ofmercenaries constantly available in Italy. Lack of afeudal system merely assured the warlords thatmercenary armies were the only other answer to

their needs for an elite core to their otherwisecitizen infantry armies. The Normans when theytook over Naples simply enfoufed those Italiannoble cavalry whom they found loyal enough tokeep on; and therefore the former estates becamefiefs, which thenceforth produced feudal milites andserjants. The coastal towns continued to provideships upon demand, according to older assessmentsw hich the Normans either continued or modified.Sicily especially possessed a great fleet, second tonone anywhere in the Mediterranean by the mid 12th

c entury. Roger II’s threatened invasion ofByzantium was therefore a very serious one. Buteffective though the milites and serjantsundoubtedly were, they did not form the largestportion of the Siculo-Norman army. The backboneof any host was the corps of Muslim foot andcavalry archers. These were provided mainly by theMuslim townsmen of Sicily. Muslim populations onthe mainland also were recruited from. A corp ofsiege engineers was also maintained by the king,unrivaled in their knowledge of poliorcetics. Thisstate of affairs was frankly a source of scandal toconservative Europeans, who looked upon theChristian kings of Sicily as something almostheretical for their hiring and maintaining of legionsof infidel troops in a Christian army. But there wascunning uppermost in the Siculo-Normanemployment of such troops: they owed their welfare,even their safety, to the well being, power andlargess of their Christian sovereign; and while hemight profess unswerving loyalty to a pope, thepersistent, potential threat of an army of infidels,who would fight in spite of papal bans, made thekings of Sicily immune to much of the politico-religious pressures the papacy was able to bring tobear upon the other princes of Christian Europe.


Warfare in the Mediterranean world of the earlymiddle ages was more advanced than innorthwestern Europe; and at the same time, it wasmore varied. In some areas the formality of thelimited war that would typify Renaissance Italy hadalready begun between the various city states. TheGerman intervention retarded this natural Italian


tendency for making war into just another branch ofpolitical rivalry and intrigue. Barbarossa inparticular was thoroughly indoctrinated with theidea of total war and brought the threat of seriousbattlefield confrontation into the Piedmont. Butlong before this, in southern Italy, the dangers ofMuslim piracy and invasion, the animosity of theLombard princes toward each other and theByzantines, the intensity of religious bickering, allproduced an unsettled way of life which made warmore savage. The Muslim incursions were viewedby the Mediterranean Christian peoples as theViking incursions had been by the Franks andGermans, the Anglo-Saxons and the Gaelic folk ofthe British Isles: as the last of the barbarianinvasions of Europe. Other than in the Crusaderstates or Christian Spain, it is doubtful thatanywhere else in Europe was more accustomed tothe clamor of war than southern Italy.

The military elements were very diverse. The Byzantine imperial army — the tagmata —

was composed of highly-trained and well-equippedcavalry and some mounted foot. The cavalry usedlong lances, and either bows or darts (themartiobarbuli of the Goths). The infantry weresteady pikemen — scutati — backed by a screenedline of archers, the psiloi. But so strapped for troopswas the emperor, with his many fronts to defend,that he even sent his personal Varangian guard toItaly to aid the catapan. These were the best infantryof the time: armed in long mail coats and oftenwearing a lamellar vest over their mail, they did notmeet their equal anywhere in Italy. Their favoredweapon was the broadaxe. The native Byzantinetroops had formerly been the militia of the thema ofLangobardia. But this had been dissolved as aneconomy, and the individual towns were nowexpected to defend their own walls and immediatedistricts only. To what degree the higher level ofthematic training and equipment still persisted isunknown.

The Lombard/Italian militias continued through-out this period a somewhat unreliable phalanx ofspearmen who threw the javelin. There was atransition going on though, from spear and javelin topike drill. The latter was more economic andeffective at resis ting cavalry, leaving the missile

duties solely to marksmen and spec ial peltasts (lightinfantry which skirmished with javelins). The pikephalanx was probably first learned from theByzantines who drilled their thematic infantry in itsuse. From southern Italy it spread into the northernhalf of the peninsula. (The Swiss cantons thenpicked it up from their Italian neighbors, and intheir hands carried the pike phalanx to its maximumdevelopment.)

Although some city states might boast of betterarms and modern drill, the morale of their troopssuffered from the same inbred fear of being betrayedon the field of battle. Treachery was rampant in thepeninsula and had been for countless generations.(The civic and mercenary armies of the Renaissancewould inherit this tendency.) The Normans broughta certain ‘steadiness’ to the warfare of southernItaly. A Frank’s or Norman’s sworn oath wasgenerally trustworthy (except to an infidel enemy).A few instances of treachery did not destroy thisgeneralization. And when the Normans fielded theirown armies, their Italian vassals and subjects wereat least spared the fear of being sold out on the eveof battle.

The civic militias were well organized into unitsbased upon guilds and districts within the cities.They formed on the battlefield under the standardsof their guilds and saints. Many of them woredistinctive badges, or even uniform colors. (E. g. thegreen and white particolored uniforms of SanMarino trace an unbroken tradition that predates theNormans.) By contrast, the rustics levied from thecontado were rude and ill-armed. They were onlycalled up when the principality or county wassufficiently threatened by invasion.

The feudal troops established upon the fiefs ofNorman Italy were alike with their cousins back inFrance. The milites — the knights — were a forceof mailed heavy cavalry, armed with lance andjavelins and broadsword. In Italy, the traditional useof missiles preserved this tactic inclusive in theknightly training far beyond the period whencouched lances only had become the norm in thenorth of Europe. There was nothing inferior,however, in the effectiveness of the Italo-Normancharge. At Monte Maggiore in 1041, some 2,000Norman knights rode against the elite of the


Byzantine foot, the famed Varangian guard of Rusaxemen, and crushed them. The ignoble elements ofthe feudal forces were the serjants. These were amixture of infantry and Italo-Norman light cavalry.The cavalry arm fielded by the principalities hadbeen few in number, as compared to the foot troops(being perhaps a maximum of 10% of the total). TheItalo-Normans continued to demand this auxiliarycavalry arm; and the serjants were largely Italian inorigin. The foot serjants were trained spearmen,perhaps indistinguishable from the Italian militias.They would not have mustered with them, butremained in the feudal levy under the banners oftheir lords. Crossbow-men — infantry and mounted— were obtained from the militias and frommercenaries.

In Italy the Normans came into contact on thebattlefield with a variety of light cavalry. TheByzantine thema of Langobardia had producedcavalry called trapezitos armed with javelins ordarts. This was the ancestor to the light cavalry ofthe civic militias, and therefore the model as well ofthe Italo-Norman mounted serjant. The auxiliarylight cavalry of the tagmata were usually Turkishmercenaries armed with their powerful recurvedcomposite bows; while some native Byzantinehorsemen also used the bow, but probably by thebeginning of this period they were either extinct orrelegated to the role of imperial guard regiments atConstantinople. Other light cavalry were MuslimArabs and the Tuaregs of North Africa. Swords,lances and javelins predominated, and a quick hit-and-run style of fighting. Some used bows fromhorseback. But there is no evidence that they couldperform Parthian-style tactics like the Turks.Probably they stopped their horses to shoot, like theSaracens of the later 12th century were wont to dowhen engaging the ponderous columns of thecrusader Franks. Often, the lance was long and wasused with both hands in a fencing style moreconducive to individual combat and skirmishingthan to massed formation tactics.

The wide-spread use of missiles from horsebackdid not confine itself to the light cavalry. Heavycavalrymen of the tagmata were armed withmartiobarbuli (darts): their long lances (called akontos) could be slung over their backs on a thong

that was attached in the middle, allowing them afree hand to throw their darts. The militiacavalrymen of the thema were also armed with themor with javelins. Arab cavalry included few armoredmen, but their weapons did not differ from thoseused by the light cavalry.

As a result of this exposure to more mobiletactics, the Italo-Normans included light troops andMuslim mercenaries, thus achieving a far moreversatile array than their brethren back home inFrance. (It was no accident, that Bohemond thecount of Taranto, could gain the unrivaled esteem ofthe other crusading princes in the war councils ofthe First Crusade: his experience in war far out-shown theirs, and his army of Italo-Normans was thebest-equipped and accustomed of all the crusadercontingents to meet the tactics of the more mobileSeldjuk Turks.)

Infantry was relegated to a supportive role. Thebattle that included no foot troops was a very rareone. (Raids, on the other hand, were conducted byexclusively mounted forces. Such infantry as weretaken along came horsed and did not alwaysdismount to do combat.) Because of a long traditionof annual training, the civic militias were able toform for battle in orderly phalanxes, capable ofmovement and maneuver; and in the case of thebetter-maintained Byzantine thematic training, evencapable of performing a charge with pikes. Themarksmen usually took shelter within or behind thephalanx of spears or pikes. They were capable ofshooting overhead while on the move.

The greatest difference between southern Italyand France effecting strategy was the presence ofmany fortified towns. These were the relics of theRoman empire, maintained and even extended bythe succeeding generations of Byzantine andLombard rule. The difficulty of trying to take atown by escalade — or equally improbable, bybattering the fortifications until a breach appeared— made Norman strategy a simple affair: theywould appear before the walls of the city slated forconquest, build wooden castles outside eachentrance and sit down to starve the populace intosubmission. The inability of their enemies tocooperate and raise an army of relief made suchinfantile methods thoroughly effective. Coupled


with this tenacity was a deliberate campaign ofterrorism. Whenever a city gave the Normans toomuch trouble, upon its capitulation the citizenrywere decimated with slaughter and rapine. Theexample went far to convince the subsequent targetsof Norman expansionism that resistance was futile.Many towns beleaguered by Norman warlords gaveup on terms without a struggle.

Resentment, of course, flourished underground.The Normans might take many cities, and punishmany with reprisals, but that did not preventrebellions throughout the 11th century. Guiscard’scareer was dominated by having to repress onerevolt after another. Many of these were his ownItalo-Norman vassals, but others were the attemptsof Italian cities to throw off the Norman yoke whenit looked promising. There were opportunities to doso, whenever an imperial German army entered thepeninsula with promises of deliverance; wheneverthe pope made similar attempts and promises; orwhen the Byzantine emperor sent another imperialfleet with reinforcements to aid the catapan in hisflagging war. In the 12th century, king Roger facedserious uprisings from his vassals on the mainland.But by then, the Siculo-Norman possession of alarge siege train, captained and staffed by Muslimengineers, made his leaguers far more effective thanthe earlier Normans’ had been. Mining wasespecially the talent of Muslim sappers; and a rebeltown or castle would soon find itself compromisedby the appearance of a breached wall or tower.

A feature of Siculo-Norman royal strategy wasalmost unique: king Roger obtained the royalmonopoly on forestry, mining and quarrying. Thusthe materials to make war were difficult for rebelsto obtain; and furthermore, as it was already in theAnglo-Norman realm, a royal licence was requiredto legally construct any castle. The successfulsuppression of the rebellions of 1132-34 and 1135-39 put even more land directly into the king’shands, further strengthening his ability to enforcehis royal licences.

The wholesale eviction of Roger II’s rebelliousvassals was first of all possible because of hisnonfeudal resources. Not only did he have sufficienttroops from the civic militias, he also employedgreat numbers of Muslim mercenaries and had

Muslim feudati in western Sicily. The whole feudalstructure of the island differed from that establishedon the mainland. There, the occupation had beenintermittent and fraught with setbacks andrebellions. The power of the Normans was dividedup amongst powerful peers of the realm. These,especially Aversa, were a thorn in the side of thedukes of Apulia and the king of Sicily. Rebellionswere difficult to crush because of the inaccessiblenature of the land: steep mountains and narrowvalleys made campaigning against even petty rebelslengthy and expensive; and after a town or castlewas finally subdued it did not guarantee that a fewyears later the whole task of subjection would nothave to be repeated. But in Sicily, Roger I and hisson achieved a far smoother government. TheMuslim system of iqta was upheld, so far asallotments to individual soldiers was considered;but they were feudalized so that they wereinheritable. (Iqta, the assignment of property or aportion of revenue to provide for the maintenance ofa soldier, was more alike with the common paymentof mercenaries. Iqtaat varied in size according tothe social importance of the holder; and where itinvolved the holding of two or more estates thesewere in separate districts, to prevent the iqtadarfrom gaining too much popularity in one place.Iqtaat could be revoked by the government at anytime and for any reason, to be transferred to anothersoldier or abolished altogether as no longer needed.)There were no large fiefs in Norman Sicily. It istherefore likely that most if not all of the knights inthe island were supported upon the former iqtaat ofthe Muslims. Roger II did not rely upon hisChristian subjects alone. He allowed his Muslimvassals in the western portion of the island to retaintheir towns and other holdings, in exchange forfeudal military service and religious tolerance. TheMuslim population of the kingdom of Sicilysupplied half of the armed strength by the mid 12thcentury. Most of the troops were infantry archerswith long, recurved, composite bows. They werefamed for their speed and firepower; and were everybit as influential upon tactics in southern Italy asEnglish bowmen later were upon French tactics inthe Hundred Years War. Other infantry werespearmen with javelins. Cavalry were either lancers


with javelins or mounted bowmen. There must havebeen a mutual agreement between king Roger andhis Muslim vassals, not to employ them against theircoreligionists: for in his abortive occupation of ZiridTunisia he used only Christian troops.

The kingdom of Sicily provided enoughrevenues and Muslim auxiliaries that Roger IIneeded to rely less and less upon the civic militiasand his feudal vassals. Half of the Siculo-Normanarmy was Muslim, some feudati but mostlymercenary; the balanc e of it was made up from thenobles and their vassals and other mercenaries. Thecivic militias were called out only to defend theirhome territories.

ARMY LISTS

Italo-Lombard Armies1000 to 1200

Up to 15% cavalry and mercenaries:up to 50% unarmored and light infantry, sword

and crossbow 2 or 3 (crossbow 3 limited toone-fourth of total crossbow) OR sword andbow 3. Morale: 00-39=D, 40-89=C,90-99=B.

up to 50% medium and heavy infantry, sword,spear/javelin and 2 javelins OR sword andpike. Morale as above.

up to 20% light cavalry with sword and bow 3OR sword and crossbow 2. Morale as above.

up to 80% light and medium cavalry, sword, lance/javelin and 2 javelins.

Morale as above.up to 50% heavy cavalry, sword, lance/javelin

and 2 javelins. Morale: 00-29=D, 30-79=C,80-99=B. REQUIRED UNIT.

up to 10% cataphract cavalry, sword, lance/javelin and 2 javelins. Morale as above.

Up to 95% militia infantry:*up to 60% unarmored contado levy, assorted

rude weaponry; up to 25% with bow 1 orsling. Morale: 00-69=D, 70-99=C.

up to 30% light marksmen, sword and bow 2or 3 OR sword and crossbow 2; with up to

one-fourth as crossbow 3. Morale: 00-39=D, 40-89=C, 90-99=B.

up to 25% light spearmen, sword, spear/javelinand 2 javelins. Morale as above.

up to 40% medium spearmen, as above OR sword and pike. Morale as above.

up to 20% heavy spearmen, as above OR swordand pike. Morale as above.

Organization:Units of at least 500 men. May intermix

weights but not types.


shield-wall, wheel (contado levy prohibited), basicphalanx (sword and spear only: +25% versuscavalry), phalanx (sword and pike only: +25%versus cavalry, rank bonus, locked-line, do notcheck to receive cavalry charge), open and closeorder missile fire (contado levy open order missileonly), screened missile fire (contado levyprohibited), pre-contact missile fire (spear/javelinonly).


charge (sword and lance only), half-charge(mounted bow and crossbow), withdraw postcombat, open and close order missile fire (mountedbow and crossbow open order missile only; special:crossbow can reload at a trot).

Italo-Norman Armies1030 to 1200

Up to 35% cavalry and mercenaries:up to 50% unarmored infantry, sword and

bow 3. Morale: 00-39=D, 40-89=C,90-99=B.

up to 50% light infantry, sword and crossbow 2or 3 (crossbow 3 limited to one-fourth oftotal crossbow). Morale as above.

up to 20% light cavalry, sword and bow 3 ORsword and crossbow 2. Morale as above.


up to 50% medium and heavy infantry, swordand spear/javelin and 2 javelins OR swordand pike. Morale as above.

up to 30% light and medium cavalry, Italo- Lombard militia, sword, lance/javelin and 2 javelins. Morale as above.

up to 50% light and medium cavalry, serjants,sword, lance/javelin and 2 javelins. Morale as above. REQUIRED UNIT.

up to 15% heavy cavalry, Italo-Lombardmilitia, sword, lance/javelin and 2 javelins.Morale as above.

up to 35% heavy cavalry, milites, sword and lance/javelin and 2 javelins. Morale:

00-19=D, 20-69=C, 70-99=B.REQUIRED UNIT.

up to 10% cataphract cavalry milites, sword, lance/javelin and 2 javelins.Morale as above.

Up to 85% feudal and militia infantry:*up to 60% unarmored contado levy, assorted

rude weaponry; up to 25% with bow 1 orsling. Morale: 00-69=D, 70-99=C.

up to 30% unarmored and light marksmen,sword and bow 2 OR sword and crossbow 2. Morale: 00-39=D, 40-89=C, 90-99=B.


up to 40% medium spearmen, as above ORsword and pike. Morale as above.

up to 20% heavy spearmen OR pikemen.Morale as above.


allowed. The minimum-sized battle is 500 men, orone unit. Units are 500 men for purchase and moralepurposes. Units may intermix weights but not types.


shield-wall, wheel (contado levy prohibited), openand close order missile fire (contado levy openorder missile only), screened missile fire (contado

levy prohibited), pre-contact missile fire (spearmenonly), basic phalanx (spear/javelin only: +25%versus cavalry; dis-mounted milites and serjantsonly: do not check to receive cavalry charge,reinforced line, +25% versus cavalry, locked-lineon defense only), phalanx (sword and pike only:+25% versus cavalry, rank bonus, locked-line, donot check to receive cavalry charge).


charge (sword and lance/javelin only), half-charge(mounted bow and crossbow), Western Charge(milites and serjants only), withdraw post combat,feigned rout (milites and serjants only), open andclose order missile fire (mounted bow or crossbowopen order missile only; special: crossbow canreload at a trot).

Siculo-Norman Armies1060 to 1129

Up to 35% cavalry and mercenaries:up to 50% unarmored infantry, Muslim archers,

sword and bow 3. Morale: 00-39=D, 30-89=C, 90-99=B.

up to 50% light cavalry, Muslim lancers,sword, lance/javelin and 2 javelins. Morale as above.

up to 20% unarmored and light cavalry,Muslim

horsearchers, sword and bow 3 OR swordand crossbow 2. Morale as above.


up to 50% light infantry, sword, and crossbow2 or 3 (crossbow 3 limited to one-fourth oftotal crossbow). Morale as above.

up to 30% light and medium cavalry, Italo-Lombard militia, sword, lance/javelin and2 javelins. Morale as above.

up to 50% light and medium cavalry, serjants,sword, lance/javelin and 2 javelins. Morale as above. REQUIRED UNIT.

up to 15% heavy cavalry, Italo-Lombard


militia, sword, lance/javelin and 2 javelins.Morale as above.

up to 35% heavy cavalry, milites, sword, lance/javelin and 2 javelins. Morale:00-19=D, 20-69=C, 70-99=B.REQUIRED UNIT.

up to 10% cataphract cavalry, milites, swordlance/javelin and 2 javelins. Morale as above.

Up to 85% feudal and militia infantry:*up to 60% unarmored contado levy, assorted

rude weaponry and up to 25% bow 1 orsling. Morale: 00-69=D, 70-99=C.

*up to 30% unarmored archers, Muslim levy,knife and bow 2 or 3 (bow 3 limited to one-fourth of total bow). Morale: 00-59=D,60-89=C, 90-99=B. REQUIRED UNIT.

*up to 15% light spearmen, Muslim levy,sword, spear/javelin and 2 javelins.Morale: 00-39=D, 40-89=C, 90-99=B.

up to 15% light crossbow-men, sword andcrossbow 2. Morale as above.

up to 15% light spearmen, sword, spear/javelin and 2 javelins. Morale as above.

up to 40% medium spearmen OR pikemen.Morale as above.

up to 20% heavy spearmen OR pikemen.Morale as above.

Organization:Up to three battles of non-Muslim infantry and

cavalry. The minimum-sized battle is 500 men, orone unit. Units are 500 men for purchase and moralepurposes. They may intermix weights but not types.

Muslim units brigade separately into 1,000men units. A cavalry unit may be smaller than 1,000men, but to have two units you must have more than1,000 men; three units, more than 2,000 men, etc.Muslim units may intermix weights but not types.


shield-wall, wheel (contado levy prohibited), openand close order missile fire (contado levy openorder missile only), screened missile fire (contadolevy and Muslim prohibited), immobile-screened

missile fire (contado levy prohibited), pre-contactmissile fire (spearmen only), basic phalanx(spear/javelin only; Italian spear only: +25% versuscavalry; dismounted milites and serjants only:+25% versus cavalry, reinforced line, do not checkto receive cavalry charge, locked-line on defenseonly), phalanx (sword and pike only: +25% versuscavalry, rank bonus, do not check to receive cavalrycharge, locked-line).


charge (sword and lanc e/javelin only), half-charge(Muslims and mounted bow and crossbow), WesternCharge (milites and serjants only), withdraw postcombat, feigned rout (Italo-Lombard prohibited),open and close order missile fire (mounted bow andcrossbow open order missile only; Muslimhorsearchers close order missile while stationary orat half-walk only ).

Siculo-Norman Armies1130-1194

Up to 50% Muslim auxiliaries and mercenaries:up to 100% unarmored infantry, sword and

bow 3. Morale: 00-29=D, 30-79=C,80-99=B. REQUIRED UNIT.

up to 50% light infantry, sword and spear/javelin and 2 javelins. Morale:00-39=D, 40-89=C, 90-99=B.

up to 25% light cavalry, sword and lance/javelin and 2 javelins. Morale as above.

up to 50% unarmored and light cavalry, horse-archers, sword and bow 3. Morale as above.

up to 20% light cavalry, sword and crossbow 2.Morale as aboveup to 25% light infantry, sword and crossbow 2 or 3 (crossbow 3 limited to one-fourth of total crossbow).Morale as above.



Up to 60% feudal and militia troops:*up to 60% unarmored contado levy, assorted

rude weaponry and up to 25% bow 1 orsling. Morale: 00-69=D, 70-99=C.

up to 30% unarmored infantry, archers, swordand bow 2 OR up to half crossbow 2.Morale: 00-59=D, 60-89=C, 90=99=B.

up to 25% light infantry spearmen, sword,spear/javelin and 2 javelins.Morale: 00-39=D, 40-89=C, 90-99=B.

up to 40% medium infantry spearmen OR sword and pike. Morale as above.

up to 20% heavy infantry spearmen OR pikemen. Morale as above.

up to 15% light and medium cavalry, Italianmilitia, sword, lance/javelin and 2 javelins.Morale as above.

up to 25% light and medium cavalry, serjants,sword, lance/javelin and 2 javelins. Morale:00-29=D, 30-89=C, 90-99=B.REQUIRED UNIT.

up to 10% heavy cavalry, Italian militia,sword, lance/javelin and 2 javelins.Morale as above.

up to 20% heavy cavalry, milites, sword, lance/javelin and 2 javelins. Morale:00-19=D, 20-69=C, 70-99=B.REQUIRED UNIT.

up to 05% cataphract cavalry, milites, sword,lance/javelin and 2 javelins. Morale as above.

Organization:Up to three battles of non-Muslim infantry and

cavalry. The minimum-sized battle is 500 men, orone unit. Units are 500 men for purchase and moralepurposes. Units may intermix weights but not types.

Muslim units brigade separately into 1,000men units. A cavalry unit may be smaller than 1,000men, but to have two units you must have more than1,000 men; three units, more than 2,000 men, etc.Muslim units may intermix weights but not types.


shield-wall, wheel (contado levy prohibited), openand close order missile fire (contado levy open

missile only), immobile-screened missile fire(contado levy prohibited), screened missile fire(Muslims and contado levy prohibited), pre-contac tmissile fire (spear/javelin only), basic phalanx(spear/javelin only: +25% versus cavalry;dismounted milites and serjants only: +25% versuscavalry, do not check to receive cavalry charge,reinforced line, locked-line on defense only),phalanx (sword and pike only: +25% versus cavalry,rank bonus, locked-line, do not check to receivecavalry charge).


charge (sword and lance/javelin only), half-charge(mounted crossbow and Muslims), Western Charge(milites and serjants only),withdraw post combat,feigned rout (Muslims, milites and serjants only),open and close order missile fire (mounted bow andcrossbow open order missile only; Muslimhorsearchers close order missile when stationary orat half-walk only).

Byzantine Armies1000 to 1071

Up to 50% tagmata:up to 50% light and unarmored cavalry,

Turkish mercenaries, sword,lance/javelin and bow 4.Morale: 00-29=D, 30-89=C, 90-99=B.

up to 40% medium cavalry, Frankish mercenaries, sword, lance/javelin and 2 javelins. Morale as above.

up to 15% heavy cavalry, as above.up to 15% light cavalry, imperial regular

horsearchers, sword, lance/javelin andbow 3. Morale: 00-49=C, 50-89=B,90-99=A.

up to 10% medium cavalry, imperial regular,as above. Morale as above.

up to 25% medium cavalry, imperial regularlancers, sword, lance and darts.Morale as above.

up to 20% heavy cavalry, imperial regular, as above. Morale as above.


up to 20% cataphract cavalry, imperial regular,as above. Morale as above.

up to 20% heavy infantry scutati, sword and pike OR sword and broadaxe. Morale: 00-39=C, 40-79=B, 80-99=A.

up to 10% light infantry psiloi, sword and bow 3. Morale: 00-49=C, 50-99=B.

Up to 90% Italo-Lombard Armies (page 58).

Up to 60% city militia:up to 50% unarmored or light infantry psiloi,

sword and bow 2. Morale: 00-59=C,60-99=B.

up to 50% light infantry peltasts, sword,spear/javelin and 3 javelins. Morale as above.

up to 50% medium infantry scutati, sword andpike. Morale as above.

Organization:Units of 250 to 500 men. It is required that at

least one psiloi unit be attached to every two scutatiunits. No mixed units.

Italo-Lombard troops organize according totheir own list on page 60-1.


square, wedge, checkerboard, pivot, wheel,withdraw post combat, open and close order missilefire, double pre-contact missile fire (peltasts only),screened missile fire, phalanx (scutati only: locked-line, rank bonus, +25% charge bonus, +50% versuscavalry, do not check to receive cavalry charge,trot, testudo, moving bonuses), basic phalanx(peltasts).

Cavalry tactics:open and close order, column, wedge,

checkerboard, pivot, wheel, half-charge (Turkishmercenaries), charge, Western Charge (Frankishmercenaries only), open and close order missile fire,withdraw post combat, feigned rout.

Note: Italo-Lombard troops use their owntactics given on page 58.

Italo-German and Papal Armies1030 to 1150

Up to 50% cavalry and mercenaries:up to 50% light infantry, sword and crossbow

2 or 3 (crossbow 3 limited to one fourth oftotal crossbow). Morale: 00-39=D, 40-89=C, 90-99=B.


up to 80% light and medium cavalry, swordand lance. Morale as above. When dismounted: 00-29=D, 30-89=C, 90-99=B.

up to 35% heavy cavalry, sword and lance.Morale: 00-29=D, 30-89=C, 90-99=B. When dismounted: 00-19=D, 20-69=C,70-99=B. REQUIRED UNIT.

Up to 90% feudal and militia infantry:*up to 60% unarmored peasantry, assorted

rude weaponry and 25% bow 1 or sling.Morale: 00-99=D.

*up to 30% unarmored or light archers, swordand bow 2. Morale: 00-59=D, 60-89=C,90-99=B.

*up to 15% light and medium crossbow-men,sword and crossbow 2. Morale as above.

*up to 25% light spearmen, sword,spear/javelin and 2 javelins.Morale as above.

*up to 30% medium spearmen, sword, spear/javelin and 2 javelins OR sword and pike.Morale as above.

*up to 15% heavy spearmen OR pikemen, asabove. Morale as above.

Organization:Up to three battles of infantry and cavalry (or

dismounted cavalry) allowed. The minimum-sizedbattle is 500 men, or one unit. Units are 500 menfor purchase and morale purposes. Units mayintermix weights but not types.

Infantry tactics:


open and close order, column, wedge, shield-wall, square, wheel (mercenaries only), open andclose order missile fire (peasantry open ordermissile only), immobile-screened missile fire(mercenaries only), basic phalanx (spearmen only),phalanx (pikemen only: +25% versus cavalry, donot check to receive cavalry charge, locked-line,rank bonus ).


charge.

Dismounted cavalry tactics:open and close order, column, square, wedge,

shield-wall, wheel, phalanx (+25% versus cavalry,do not check to receive cavalry charge, locked-line,rank bonus).

Imperial German Armies1150 to 1200

Up to 75% cavalry:up to 50% light and medium serjants, sword

and lance. Morale: 00-29=D, 30-89=C,90-99=B.

up to 70% heavy milites, sword and lance.Morale: 00-19=D, 20-69=C, 90-99=B.

up to 10% cataphract milites, sword and lance.Morale as above.

Up to 50% infantry:*up to 60% unarmored peasantry, assorted

rude weaponry and 25% bow 1 or sling.Morale: 00-99=D.

*up to 20% unarmored archers, sword andbow 2. Morale: 00-59=D, 60-89=C,90-99=B.

*up to 10% unarmored and light crossbow-mensword and crossbow 2 or 3(crossbow 3 limited to one fourth of total

crossbow). Morale as above.*up to 40% light spearmen, sword and

spear/javelin. Morale as above.*up to 30% medium infantry, as above.*up to 10% heavy infantry, as above.

Organization:Up to three battles of cavalry allowed. Infantry

form into one unit, usually as camp guard. Theminimum-sized battle is 500 men, or one unit. Unitsare 500 men for purchase and morale purposes.Units may mix weights.

Infantry tactics:open and close order, column, square, wedge,

shield-wall, open and close order missile fire(peasantry open missile only), basic phalanx.


Western Charge. (Dismounted: see preceding list.)

Muslim Armies1000 to 1200

Up to 50% cavalry:up to 100% unarmored and light lancer, sword,

lance/javelin and 2 javelins. Morale: 00-39=D, 40-89=C, 90-99=B.

up to 20% unarmored and light horsearchers,sword and bow 3. Morale as above.

up to 35% medium lancers, sword,lance/javelin and 2 javelins.Morale as above.

up to 10% heavy lancers, as above. Morale as above.

Up to 85% infantry:up to 60% unarmored spearmen, knife and

spear/javelin. Morale: 00-69=D, 70-99=C.up to 30% unarmored bowmen, knife and

bow 2 or 3 (bow 3 limited to one fourth oftotal bow). Morale: 00-59=D, 60-89=C,90-99=B.



up to 20% medium spearmen, as above.Morale as above.

Organization: Units of 1,000 men. May intermix weights but

not types.

Infantry tactics:open and close order, column, square, wedge,

shield-wall, wheel, open and close order missilefire, pre-contact missile fire (spear/javelin only),immobile-screened missile fire, basic phalanx(spearmen only: +25% versus cavalry).


open and close order missile fire (horsearchers mustbe stationary or at half-walk to shoot in close order),half-charge, withdraw post combat, feigned rout.

67

The Normans in the East 1050 to 1119BACKGROUND

The presence of the Normans in the east did notbegin with the First Crusade. Norman mercenarieshad fought for the Byzantines throughout the 11th

century. Most of the “Franks” in Byzantine employseem to have been Italo-Normans, or at least enteredthe empire via southern Italy. They were formed intoFrankish contingents and fought as far away asMalatya and Edessa against the Turks. The leaders ofthese “Norman” corps were ambitious enough to getinvolved in intrigues: a certain Hervé tried to carveout for himself an independent principality in easternAnatolia: but he was apprehended and sent back toConstantinople; where, instead of being punished, hesomehow managed to ingratiate himself back intoimperial favor; another, Robert Crispin, wasapparently poisoned following the catastrophicByzantine defeat at Manzikert in 1071; a thirdleader, Roussel of Bailleul, had been one of RobertGuiscard’s lieutenants in Italy before taking hiscareer to the east: following Manzikert, Roussel setup for himself as others had tried before him. He onlyhad 3,000 men, but they were all well-trained andequipped. Man for man they could outfight anyGreek or Turk. The emperor thought Roussel wasmore dangerous than the infidels and put togetherwhat troops he could spare under the command of thecaesar John Ducas. But Roussel easily defeated thisarmy, taking the caesar captive. To make his causelegitimate, Roussel proclaimed John Ducas therightful emperor and marched on the capital. Nothinghindered him from reaching the Asiatic shore of theBosporus. In desperation the emperor called upon theaid of the Turks, and Roussel was defeated in battleat mount Sophon in Cappadocia. Roussel himselfmanaged to escape with a few followers, and sethimself up as the governor of Amasea. But theemperor dealt with him by sending AlexiusComnenus (the future emperor). Alexius gained thesupport of the local Turkish chieftain, and Rousselwas compelled to surrender. He was a populargovernor at Amasea and the townsmen tried to rescueRoussel. A faked blinding of him by Alexius stopped

further aggressions — so great was Roussel’scharisma that Alexius could not bring himself tomutilate him. Roussel was later employed as leaderof the ‘Frankish” mercenaries when Alexius becameemperor.

Following Manzikert, some 8,000 “Franks”under the leadership of Oursel and Raimbaudmoved to the upper Euphrates valley. There theyjoined forces with one Philaretus, an Armeniangeneral. He was well-known to the Normans, havingformerly been in charge of Byzantine garrisons onthe south-eastern frontier. With this reinforcementhe could command 20,000 warriors. Philaretusexpanded his holdings to include Edessa. Theformer Byzantine cities of the upper Euphrates stillnominally recognized the emperor as their lord: buttheir isolated position made them vulnerable in thestruggles between the Turks and Arabs of Syria, towhom they paid fluctuating tr ibute. Their autonomycontinued in this uncertain environment right up tothe time of the First Crusade. The main castle of theNormans was Afranji (castle of the Franks) nearHarput. Other Franks were in garrison at Edessa andAntioch. Raimbaud died defending Philaretus in1074. Philaretus seized Antioch in 1079. But heand his Norman supporters were defeated at the endof 1085 when the Seldjuk Turks conqueredAntioch. Edessa fell to treachery in 1087: althoughher Armenian — and tributary — governorscontinued to employ their own forces to defend thewalls of the city and outlying fortresses. These weremilitia, and mercenaries when affordable. TheFrankish troops seem to have been absorbed by theArmenian states. The Greek and Armenian (andFrankish?) military classes worked in with the newSeldjuk masters, intermarrying and becoming“Turkified.” It was they or their descendants whichapparently fled the arriving First Crusade. Thepresence of “Franks” amongst these “Turkified”local warriors is not specifically mentioned: butonly 12 years separates their definite involvement insignificant numbers, and the arrival of the FirstCrusade. It seems, therefore, that many of the troopson hand in Syria at the end of the 11th century were


either Franks or descendants of the same.These experiences with the Norman penchant for

self aggrandizement taught Alexius and his peoplethat they could not be trusted.

The preaching of the First Crusade in 1095 bypope Urban raised an unprecedented military forcefrom all over western Europe and launched it torescue the Holy Places from Islamic occupation. Theearliest enthusiasm followed Peter the Hermit todestruction in Asia Minor. The remnant of his ill-fated crusade waited in Constantinople for the arrivalof the princes and their more formidable armies.These were divided into four main contingents: theFranco-Germans of Lotharingia and Lorraine underthe leadership of duke Godfrey; the north French andNormans followed duke Robert of Normandy andcount Robert of Flanders; the south French joinedcount Raymond of Toulouse. The Normans of Italyand Sicily were proud to follow the banner of countBohemond of Taranto. There were other lessercontingents, such as those of count Hugh ofVermandois, and count Stephen of Blois; but theytended to group with the main leaders. (Of theseveral so-called crusader armies which wroughthavoc upon the Jews of Germany, ran afoul of theHungarians and were dispersed or killed off, we shallnot concern ourselves.)

By keeping them well-supplied and policed,emperor Alexius managed to get the Franks throughhis dominions without too much hardship andembarked across the Bosporus to the siege of Nicaea.The full strength of the crusaders was gathered thereby early June 1096. Nicaea fell to Byzantine intrigueon 19 June: the crusaders were mollified with thedistribution of spoils and continued on across theplateau of Anatolia. Near Dorylaeum the Turksambushed the northernmost of the crusader’s twomarching columns. A defensive battle, set in array byBohemond of Taranto, held off the Turks longenough for the cavalry of the southern army to arrive:then a general charge scattered the Turks — whoseleft was caught by a cleverly timed attack in theirrear by the papal legate, bishop Adhemar of Le Puy.The Turks stood once more at Heraclea to contest theadvancing Franks, but were broken by a charge of theknights. By then, the hard march had taken a severe

toll of their horses; and the heat of the high summercaused many soldiers of Christ to abandon theirarms on the desert floor. Traversing the storm-wracked passes of the anti-Taurus mountains furtherreduced the army, and it was a remnant, of theglorious forces that had answered Urban’simpassioned appeal, which finally laid out theirsiege lines before the mighty city of Antioch late inOctober 1097. By then, Bohemond was theacknowledged military leader of the crusaders. Itwas not an official position. The jealous chiefs andprinces would never have allowed such a thing. Buttheir pride was humbled before a greater experienceand talent; and they deferred time and again toBohemond’s advice. His tactics had been mainlyresponsible for the survival of the north French atDorylaeum, allowing the crusaders to finally claimtheir resounding victory. His voice was mostpersuasive in the councils as the siege of Antiochdragged on depressingly throughout the winter andspring of 1098. No one was in any doubt that histactics in February had once again saved the GreatPilgrimage from destruction from a powerfulrelieving force of Turks at the lake of Antioch:where the vastly inferior Franks (down to some 700mounted knights) charged with surprise into theTurks and broke them. He offered to get theChristian army inside Antioch, by means of a traitorhe was in contact with; and no one could resist hisovert scheming to possess the mighty fortress forhimself. Raymond of Toulouse, who stubbornlydisagreed with Bohemond whenever he could, andhated him with a singular envy, tried fruitlessly tochampion emperor Alexius’ rights to Antioch. Butthe Franks were naturally jealous of the Greeks andtheir superior ways, and would rather that one oftheir own hold such an important city. The councilof leaders agreed with Bohemond, that if he couldeffect an entry, Antioch should become his domain.Timing was critical, since Kerbogha the atabeg ofMosul was on his way with a huge army to crush theFranks. Just before he arrived, Bohemond’s traitoropened his two towers to the entry of the Normansof Italy; a nearby gate was taken from within andthrown open to the army; and by nightfall of 3 June1098 there was not a living Turk inside the city. By7 June Kerbogha had his entire army in the former

The Normans in the East 1050 to 1119 69

crusader camps. The crusaders themselves becamethe besieged, and they were out of food. Bohemond,once again, came up with a battle array which savedthe army from destruction. It helped, that Kerboghahad angered his allies by his pride: Ridwan ofAleppo and Duqaq of Damascus hated him and heldback in the hour of battle. Kerbogha himself wasunaware of the actual size of the Frankish army,having believed reports which emphasized theirfeebleness. As he watched rank upon rank of dark-armored warriors emerge from the gate of thefortified bridge, he changed his mind about lettingthe entire host of Franks come out so that he couldannihilate them en masse. He sent Kilij Arslan tohead their column and turn their flank. Then helaunched an attack along the Frankish line.Bohemond, in charge of the reserve, came forward tocontend with Kilij Arslan and secured the Christianfar-flung flank — which was some two miles beyondthe walls of the city. The crusaders advanced withreligious fervor and the desperation of starving men.Kerbogha’s army broke up as the Aleppans andDamascenes fled the field. The camp was overrunand taken. Kerbogha himself then turned in flight.His power was broken: the Muslims were disunitedfor years and this more than any other single factorassured the First Crusade of success.

While the main Christian army went south to theglorious capture of Jerusalem in July of 1099, princeBohemond remained in the north, consolidating hispower and expanding his borders. He journeyed tothe Holy Sepulcher with count Baldwin of Edessa tofulfil their pilgrim’s vows in December of that sameyear. Then they returned to their lands that they hadseized from the Muslims. (Baldwin had in fact beenthe first Christian chief to secure a domain of hisown; by working in with the Christian Armeniansagainst their hated Muslim masters. Edessa, a citysecond only to Antioch, became the capital of thenorthernmost Frankish holding — the county ofEdessa.)

In the summer of 1100, Bohemond went to theupper Euphrates to aid some allies. But he wasimpulsive, trusted in his reputation too much, tooktoo few troops, and suffered defeat and capture at thehands of the Danishmend emir. Apart from the loss ofmanpower, his capture had little effect on the

security of the principality of Antioch. A far moreserious disaster was the fate of the crusades of 1101.The Lombards refused to continue on without tryingto rescue their hero Bohemond, and after turningeastward for a long ways, they changed their mindsin the presence of Turkish harassment and tried tomake off for the north coast. The entire mass ofwarriors — a force fairly equal to the original FirstCrusade — was destroyed and the road across AsiaMinor closed to further reinforcement from theWest.

The loss of these crucial reinforcements and theincreased confidence of the Turks posed a seriousthreat to the new Frankish holdings in the East. TheTurks went on the offensive. It was only theirinfighting which spared the Franks fromannihilation.

Bohemond was released from captivity by thepayment of a heavy ransom. He set out at once togain back lost time. Joining with the Edessans, theNormans of Antioch formed the largest army theChristians had yet raised: some 3,000 cavalry andnearly 10,000 infantry, mostly Armenians. But thisgreat effort met a complete defeat near Harran in1104. Baldwin of Edessa — the cousin of the firstcount Baldwin, who was now king of Jerusalem —and his chief vassal Joscelin of Courtenay werecaptured and most of the army of Edessa wiped out.They did not secure their own releases until 1108,by becoming the allies of their Turkish captors.

Bohemond, despairing of any permanentadvantage while emperor Alexius was in his rear,decided that the best strategy was to return to theWest and raise a new crusade: this time, to take outthe schismatic Greek emperor, who posed perhapsthe most serious threat to the Norman hold onAntioch: not merely because he claimed suzeraintyover any lord there, but also because the Greekswere not averse to using intrigue to buy alliesagainst the Normans from amongst the Armenians,other local Christians and even the Muslims.

Bohemond’s nephew, Tancred, had alreadyserved as the regent of Antioch in his uncle’sabsence during his captivity: he filled that roleagain as Bohemond left to raise his new crusade.While Bohemond worked toward that end, Tancredwent around and by dint of bravado, skill and luck


increased the principality’s borders to their greatestextent. He pushed raids right up to the walls ofAleppo.

The Antiochenes, beginning with their regent,considered themselves the overlords, or at leastfeudal superiors, of the Franks of Edessa. Tancredquarreled with Baldwin of Edessa and Joscelin ofCourtenay over land rights among other things, andtheir disunity threw both camps into the good gracesof opposing Muslim warlords: Jawali of Mosul —who was at odds with his master the sultan ofBaghdad — and Ridwan of Aleppo, who seemed tobe at odds with everybody at one time or another.Jawali, with the Edessans, fought Ridwan andTancred in a battle near Menbij: the Edessans werepressing forward beside Jawali — who was worstingTancred — when Jawali’s Bedouin auxiliariessuddenly quit the field in order to steal the Franks’spare horses. Baldwin and Joscelin rode to preventthis, and the whole army fell apart. Losses wereheavy to both sides.

Jawali was soon afterward reconciled with hisoverlord the sultan and given a command in far awayPersia. His successor as atabeg of Mosul was oneMawdud, a most dangerous man. He began tocampaign against Edessa. In 1110 he laid siege to thecity. King Baldwin came north to the rescue: andMawdud obliged by retiring when the Franks drewnear. The king made Tancred and Baldwin formallyforgive each other; then the united army of theFrankish east turned to bring Mawdud to battle. Buthe withdrew further to the east, trying to lure theFranks on. The Frankish coalition broke up andreturned to their homes: Tancred to face an invasionfrom Aleppo and king Baldwin to defend Jerusalemagainst a threat from Fatimid Egypt. Baldwin ofEdessa set about evacuating the Armenian populationfrom the open countryside: king Baldwin hadadvised his cousin that it was impractical to try andhold the open country east of the Euphrates. The beststrategy, they agreed, was to hold only the two greatfortresses of Edessa and Saruj, and a few castles, andto emigrate the Armenians west of the river. Butwhile the Christians moved slowly with theirbelongings to the river crossings, spies informedMawdud of what was happening and he came withhis cavalry just as the Edessan army was in the midst

of ferrying over. The civilians, unprotected on thenear side of the river, were massacred. CountBaldwin was so sore over the slaughter of hissubjects, that he led a rash counter attack across theEuphrates. He would have perished against superiornumbers if king Baldwin had not suddenly come tohis rescue (with a rather reluctant Tancred in tow).Mawdud retired with his booty and captives. Thecounty of Edessa never recovered from the loss ofits hardy and prosperous peasantry. For a few moreyears, there would be counts in Edessa; but theireventual defeat was assured.

In 1111 Mawdud launched another invasion.Tancred sent to the king for help, and Baldwinsummoned the entire Frankish east to the muster.Before the Christian host of some 16,000 men,Mawdud prudently retired behind the walls ofShaizar. His own coalition was riven with problems:Damascus was reluctant to aid him unless hecampaigned further south: Aleppo was intriguingwith his enemies: the Kurds wished to return home:the Ortoqid’s emir suddenly died and they withdrewnorth with his corpse. There were other desertions,and Mawdud, who had already come too far southto winter safely, then retired to Mosul. His failureshowed that while the Muslims were not united,they could effect nothing against a unified Frankishfront.

Bohemond had died in 1111, never havingreturned to the East following his failed invasion ofthe Byzantine empire (1107 to 1108). Tancred diedin 1112, choosing as his heir to the regency hiscousin Roger of Salerno; stipulating that Rogermust give up the regency when the heir,Bohemond’s son Bohemond II, should come to theEast. Mawdud was assassinated the following year.Ridwan of Aleppo died as well; removing a sullenMuslim prince who had done much to aid theFranks by his failure to cooperate with anyone. Thesultans of Baghdad had failed to oust the Franksbecause the emirs of Syria were divided, and mostof them desirous of avoiding any increasing tiesw ith the Seldjuk sultans. Mohammed, the last greatSeldjuk sultan (died 1118), sent another championto try where Mawdud had failed. Bursuq IbnBursuq, the governor of Hamadan, was sent asgeneral of a great army to bring the Muslims of


Syria under better control and to destroy the Franks.Such a move threw the more recalcitrant Muslimsinto alliance with the Christians. Homs and Shaizarremained loyal to the sultan; but the Muslims ofAleppo, Mardin and Damascus wanted to resist.Roger the regent of Antioch (who nevertheless calledhimself prince) made a pact with Toghtekin ofDamascus and his allies and invited them and theirarmy to join forces near Apamea. King Baldwin andPons of Tripoli came north and entered the camp.Bursuq felt it wise not to face such oppositionfrontally and withdrew toward the Jezireh. Theallianc e thought the campaign was ended and brokeup to go home. Roger of Antioch had not disbandedhis troops. Bursuq made a sudden return and capturedKafartab: the Aleppans broke with Toghtekin andmade peace with Bursuq, requesting him to send adetachment to occupy their city, which he did. Rogerof Antioch sent to Baldwin of Edessa to help him;king Baldwin and Pons of Tripoli — even Toghtekin— were too far away. As Bursuq marched north,eastward of the Orontes, Roger and the Normans ofAntioch marched south along the river. It was thegood fortune of the Christians to find the enemy first:they attacked Bursuq’s camp while many of his besttroops were away and the remainder of his army indisarray as they broke ranks for the afternoon meal.Bursuq rode with a few hundred horsemen onto aspur of the nearby hill of Tel-Danith and fought forawhile, despairing; then he and his bodyguard fled tothe east.

The victory at Tel-Danith was complete. Bursuqsoon died from the shame of his defeat, whilst Rogerof Antioch enjoyed the peak of his prestige. Tel-Danith ended the active attempts of the Seldjuksultans of Baghdad to recover control of Syria. Formany years, the only enemies of the Frankish stateswere the disunited local emirs.

Prince Roger quickly recovered Kafartab.Toghtekin repented of his former alliance and madepeace with the sultan; who did not, however, sendhim material aid.

In 1118, king Baldwin died, and his cousinBaldwin of Edessa was made king in his stead.Joscelin of Courtenay, prince of Galilee, took over ascount of Edessa. In the first few months of BaldwinII’s reign, there was a big standoff in the south of the

kingdom between the Damascenes and the Fatimidson one hand, and the united army of the Frankisheast on the other. But both sides broke up and wenthome without fighting, preferring on that occasionto live and let live.

Upon returning north, Roger of Antiochcontinued his aggressions against Aleppo. Hiscapture of Biza’a in 1119 left the city surroundedon three sides. The Aleppans had thrown themselveson the protection of Ilghazi the Ortoqid, emir ofMardin. He had hitherto been reluctant to commithimself: but the loss of Biza’a was more than hec ould stand. He summoned his army and requiredhis ally Toghtekin of Damascus to join forces. KingBaldwin sent to prince Roger that he was coming,and commanded him to stand firmly on thedefensive until the armies could unite. But Rogerimpatiently moved out to broken ground at theeastern edge of the plain of Sarmeda. He had raisedthe full levy of Norman Antioch: some 700horsemen and 4,000 infantry. He hoped to wait,despite his inferior numbers, on defensive grounduntil the king should arrive. Ilghazi, informed of theexposed position of the Franks, decided to attackwithout waiting for the Damascenes. He moved intothe hills on the evening of 27 June and surroundedthe camp of the Normans. A dry, enervatingkhamsin was blowing up during the night, and theFranks’ rest was further broken by a somnambulistcrying throughout the camp that all was lost. Dawnof 28 June saw the crusaders up and on the alert:scouts reported that they were surrounded. Therewas little food or water in the camp, so Roger’soriginal purpose of standing on the defensive wasproved impossible. The archbishop of Apameapreached to the gathered troops and confessed them;he absolved Roger in the privacy of his tent. ThenRoger emerged and boldly stated that he would gohunting. He sent out another scouting party. But fewof these men returned: Whereupon, Roger drew uphis army in four divisions with a reserve. Thearchbishop blessed them once more. Then theChristians charged in perfect order into the midst ofthe enemy. Hordes of Turcoman horsearchersplagued the Christians with arrows: then the windchanged and blew blinding dust into their faces.About a hundred knights had managed to break out


early in the battle— no doubt concealed by thecurtains of dust; and later a few more arrivedexhausted at Antioch with the news that Roger andall his army had perished. It was a disaster known tothe Franks as the Auger Sanguinis: the Field ofBlood. The Norman aristocracy was thus largelyeliminated in this one battle and ever replaced.

Ilghazi wasted his victory in riotous celebrations;merely sending out raiding parties of Turcomans topillage the helpless principality.

When king Baldwin came up with the royal army,he fought Ilghazi and Toghtekin in a drawn battle atHab. The Turcoman auxiliaries were tired of thecampaign, and they and the Arabs of the Jezirehbegan to desert Ilghazi’s army and go home.Toghtekin withdrew to Damascus. Ilghazi thenreturned to his capital of Mardin.

King Baldwin rearranged affairs in Antioch,repairing the damage of the Field of Blood as muchas possible by marrying off his landless nobles withthe widows of the fallen warriors.

Because the Norman occupation of Antioch wasessentially a Western enclave, they never succeededin adapting themselves into the mosaic of the MiddleEast. The only Christians the Normans gained assolid allies were the Armenians. The principality wasorganized along strict feudal lines: the military elitewas always a small, thinly-spread class; always inneed of new settlers from Italy, Sicily and France.Most of these new arrivals, however, went to thekingdom of Jerusalem; which further restricted theability of the principality to grow or even maintainits territory. Though they might adopt eastern ways,the Franks remained an alien aristocracy, at oddswith their urban, Christian subjects over religiousdifferences; and ideologically at war with theMuslims, who formed the main mass of countrysidepopulation. To minimize the powerful danger theByzantine empire posed to his security, Tancred hadworked in with the local Christians where he could.Any possible compromise was used to allow theChristian sects of Syria to continue to enjoy theirusages. In this, Tancred was resisted most often byhis own coreligionists. And his policy of religioustolerance and appeasement, though insightful, wasnot followed up by his successors.

Bohemond II did not come out to the east until1126. He was the last Norman prince of the directline and died in 1130; under foolish circumstancesremarkably like those of his sire, when BohemondI was captured in 1100: a march into enemyterritory with a small force, followed by an ambushof Danishmend Turks. His head was embalmed andsent to the sultan as a gift. After that, the princesdescended from his daughter Constance, whomarried Raymond of Poitiers. Normanitasnevertheless remained the identifying feeling of theprincipality’s rulers; no less than seven princesbearing the name of Bohemond, including the last.


In theory, the feudal chief of all the Franks of theEast was the king of Jerusalem. Baldwin I andBaldwin II both insisted upon this and reinforcedtheir authority many times. Under the Latin kings ofJerusalem, Outremer was divided into fiefs tosupport the feudal knighthood and their retainers.But soon enough the church lands and then the landsheld by the growing power of the military orders(the Knights of St John and the Templars) fell out ofdirect control of the crown. This weakened thecentral power of the later 12th century kings. Inaddition to this loss of authority, the kings failed tosecure a strong grip on the princes of Antioch, whowent on as independent potentates. Occasionally ajourney into the north would bring about atemporary renewal of active fealty. But usually theprinces of Antioch were on their own and preferredit that way. (It was not a policy designed tostrengthen Christian unity. Ultimately, the inabilityof the four crusaders states to cooperate effectivelyresulted in their erosion and collapse.)

Norman Antioch maintained a greater hold onstrict feudal structure than the other three states ofEdessa, Tripoli and the kingdom. There was lessopportunity for intrigue amongst the ruling classes;politics in the north were not as complex as theybecame in the kingdom — which politics proved thechief cause of the defeat at Hattin in 1187.

If there was no prince, then a regent filled hisrole. Under the prince came his constable, the chiefmilitary officer. Next in military authority was the


marshal, then the seneschal. Virtually every ministerwas also a warrior. Viscomtes were the chief officersmost immediately answerable to the prince or regent;being appointed to oversee districts, always centeredupon a castle as the administrative headquarters.Each castle had its bailiff. A castellan or chatelainemight serve the same function as a bailiff, but wouldrank lower in the social order. Every household hadtheir own chamberlains. Simple knights who heldland as a fief would be greatly outnumbered by thelandless variety, the household knight who served fora money fief, or regular stipend. These hardlydiffered from mere mercenaries, except that the oathof fealty would bind them to their lord’s service forthe duration of their contract.

Antioch, even weakened as she was by the loss ofmuch land later on, was always a wealthy state.Before the Franks came, Antioch had been the chiefcity along the northern trade route between theMediterranean and Iraq and Iran. Thus, even as hercommercial powers declined under Frankish rule —while Aleppo gained the upper hand as Syria’s chieftrading center — the principality of Antioch was therichest of the four crusader states. Local industrieswere considerable: glass, textiles, and arms. Thew ide pastures of the Antiochene plain were ideal forraising horses, and the knighthood of the principalitynever suffered from a lack of horses as did the rest ofOutremer.

Many westerners — merchants, artisans and thelike — settled in the city, forming the basis of theinfantry levy. The Armenian population provided thesingle largest source of troops. But the rest of thedivided native Christian population were poorsoldiers and were early on recognized as worthlessfor anything other than providing wealth throughtaxes and their industry. The Moslem populationwere exploited and never trusted, for good reason.The branch of local troops referred to as Turcopoleswere apparently converted Muslims in the early yearsfollowing the First Crusade. But later on theTurcopoles were the offspring of Muslim mothers andChristian fathers.


Throughout the crusader period the armies of

Antioch remained — as all the crusader states did— almost exclusively European in their tacticalmethods and weaponry. There were essentialdifferences.

The first difference to manifest itself in crusaderwarfare was an emphasis in the importance ofinfantry. The First Crusade taught the Franks howvulnerable their horses were to Turkish arrows.Byzantine tactics were taught to them and wereheeded. Perhaps Bohemond of Taranto, experiencedin the ways of eastern warfare, had the mostinfluence here. Horsearchers were not unknown inEurope, but as a troop type encountered on thebattlefield only the Italo- and Siculo-Normanswould have had previous experience with them. TheTurks, however, fought in a different style thanSaracen horsearchers. Saracens, and the laterAyyubid ghulams, stood their horses in close orderto shoot: they did not gallop in loose, maneuveringclouds of horsemen, advancing and withdrawing, allthe while shooting ahead or over their horse’s tails— as was the traditional method employed byTurkish cavalry. But against either type ofhorsearcher, the Frank’s horse was the first targetand protected only by a wall of marching, mailedspearmen bearing shields. When the terrain allowed,these walls would completely enclose the horsesinside a hollow “box” of marching foot troops. Inthe rear ranks of this moving phalanx marched themarksmen, shooting volleys over the heads of thescreening spearmen. The crossbow was the mostplentiful weapon and the bow relegated to asecondary role, by virtue of its lesser power. (TheMaronite Christians of Lebanon provided a notableexception for the counts of Tripoli, being first-ratearchers. But these excellent auxiliaries were not tobe duplicated at Antioch.) The Armenians wereindifferent archers, but provided steady spearmenand a numerous cavalry. They tended to be morelike mounted serjants, wearing lesser armor than theknights and even using javelins from horseback.Perhaps most of the Turcopoles were of this varietyand only a minority used the bow.

The usual tactical method employed on the fieldof battle was to keep the crusader cavalry wellprotected by the heavy spearmen who provided asteady wall to absorb incoming arrows: and all the


while the marksmen would maintain a steady barrageof missiles to keep the Muslim light horse at arespectable distance. Crossbows could do this at twohundred yards. The infantry were adept at marchingand shooting. Thus a Frankish army could literallymarch through the midst of the enemy and keepfighting. The best troops, including unmountedknights, would form the rearguard, which could stayin formation and march facing the rear. When theMuslims appeared to have committed themselves toa fight, the knights would issue through gaps in thewall — created by the infantry bunching tightlytogether or advancing quickly by alternate files toopen alleys for the horses to be steered through. Thecharge would be sudden and might catch the Muslimcavalry if they were not very careful. So in effect, abattle between the ponderous crusaders and theirfleet-footed enemies was in the nature of a cat-and-mouse game: the Turks trying to goad the knights outprematurely, to be shot down in the open: the knightswaiting to charge only when they were confident thatthe enemy could not in fact get away in time. Mostbattles resolved themselves into standoffs where thecrusaders marched toward their goal, stood theirground or withdrew from a campaign toward theirown territory: meanwhile, the enemy cavalry wouldpry at the flanks and rear of the marching column,trying to open weak points in it to exploit. If this didnot happen — and it usually didn’t — the battlewould remain a draw. Such a running fight could goon for days.

The most crucial factor regulating strategy wasthe acute shortage of manpower for the crusaders.They never had the luxury of being able to risk a lostbattle. The Muslims knew this. Nevertheless, it iswrong to assume that the superior Muslim pool ofwarriors meant that the crusaders were usuallyheavily outnumbered. They usually were inferior innumbers; but not to the degree the chroniclers wouldhave us believe. In maximum efforts, the armies ofboth sides would be similar in size: the limitingfactor being economics, not total manpower. TheMuslim states were not superior to the economicpower of the Franks; and their large armies weremade up mostly of volunteers who would melt awayif the campaign dragged on, or the opportunity forbooty seemed disappointing. If the Muslims lost a

battle, they would be at a temporary disadvantageonly: whereas if the Christians lost heavily theircastles and towns were at risk and they would nothave any field army for a long time. They fieldedarmies only by taking troops from the garrisons ofthe castles and towns. This factor, after politicaldisunity, was the principal weakness of Outremer.

Because they were short of manpower, theFranks made maximum use of castles to hold theirterritory. Some of them were enormous, withgarrisons of over 2,000 men in time of war. Mostwere considerably smaller; but the principality wasdotted with castles of all sizes — from single watchtowers to fortresses the size of small towns (likeSahyun, the only large castle built in theprincipality during the 12th century: the largestcastles date from the late period of Outremer’sdecline, when the shortage of men was at its mostacute). Muslim armies often were adept at siegewarfare, and the Franks learned quickly, even usingMuslim engineers in their own armies. The strategyof either side was thus the taking and relieving ofimportant strongholds. Most field battles werebrought on by such campaigns. If the besiegers didnot get inside before an army of relief came up, theywould either withdraw or stand to fight — usuallythe former. But the most potent enemy of a garrisonwas the so-called “castle mentality,” the decrepitfear that they were trapped and would never berescued in time. The longer a siege went on, themore pervasive this feeling became. (Later, when itwas well known to the Franks that their beleagueredfortresses would receive no help — there being nofield army to relieve them — garrisons often gaveup on terms without any appreciable struggle at all.By such feeble means did the Muslims obtain someof the mightiest castles ever built. But all of thisrelates more particularly to the end of the crusades,not here at the beginning.)

Whenever a large contingent of crusaders arrivedon pilgrimage, it would be a good time for the localsto plan a campaign: to obtain a coveted enemystronghold, or regain lost territory. Maximum effortsat recruiting amongst the visitors would occur.Hopefully, a number of them would opt to remainbehind and strengthen the war effort.

The arms and armor of the warring parties


differed less than most people realize. The nature oftheir preferred tactics was the chief deciding factor,not some economical limitation. The Muslims feltmost comfortable refusing battle till the odds favoredthem: speed and maneuverability therefore were theassets most sought for. Armor was inimical to suchtactics. The Franks, accustomed to armor and theclose-in fight, were prepared to engage even whenthe odds were heavily against them. Unlessweakened by adverse conditions, such as weather, orlack of provender and water, any Frankish knightwas worth at least two of the enemy. The Frankishinfantry, because of their important defensive role,saw combat as often as the chivalry. The quality oftheir training, experience and arms was thereforesuperior to that of the Muslim infantry — whichplayed only a minor part in Turkish tactics.

Muslim cavalry fought in distinct units, theregular ghulam or mameluk units of the emir’s askarbeing separate from the volunteers and militiacavalry. The Arabs did not mix with the Turks; andTurcoman and Bedouin auxiliaries fought under thecommand of their own chiefs. Muslim units thereforetended to operate much like independent armies,being drawn from many sources and differinglanguages: the ghulams and mameluks were slavewarriors, purchased from every nation under the sun.Not at any given time would every warrior in anemir’s askar understand the same spoken command:this created a certain ponderousness in receivingextemporaneous commands, at variance with theirpreferred tactics of mobility: Once the Muslimcavalry were committed to the melee it was difficultif not impossible to extricate them as a cohesivebody: thus their reluctance to engage in hand to handcombat unless they were confident of victory.

The Franks were by contrast practicallyautonomous. French was the universal language, andtheir training was thus enhanced by a uniformity oflanguage and drill. The cavalry was divided intoseveral squadrons or battles according to need.Turcopoles were used separately as scouts andsometimes as skirmishers. But in battle usually all thecavalry were grouped together, the serjants andTurcopoles ranged in the rear ranks behind theknights. It was often possible for the cavalry toexecute sudden withdrawals from a stiff combat and

retire within the infantry phalanx, and from there tocharge out again where desired or required. Suchwas not a given, however; and the risk of troopsgetting out of control — especially during a pursuit— was well known and guarded against. Usually acharge would not be launched until it was deemedcertain of success, or the situation was so desperatethat no other option was available.

Hab, 19 August 1119, an example of successfulFrankish tactics.

The defeat of prince Roger’s army at the Field ofBlood seriously reduced the strength of thecrusaders’ army. King Baldwin came up with theforces of the kingdom and the county of Tripoli.Counting the army of Edessa and the relics of theAntiochenes, the king marshaled some 700horsemen and a few thousand foot. Roughly twomonths after the disaster, another battle was foughtagainst the coalition of Ilghazi of Mardin andToghtekin of Damascus. They were threatening thecastle of Zerdana, and the Christians marched to itsrelief. The castle in fact fell before the battle, butBaldwin was unaware of this as he drew up his armybefore daybreak. The Muslims were in greatstrength — though “twenty thousand horse” must bestretching it quite a bit: the later armies of Saladinhardly numbered more than this, horse and footincluded, and drawn from the entire Ayyubid realmof Mesopotamia, Syria and Egypt; hardly could thetwo emirs of Mardin and Damascus have matchedsuch a muster.

The king put three squadrons of knights out infront, backed up by three divisions of foot troops:behind these rode Baldwin himself with his ownvassals, divided into three squadrons — eachintended to form a reserve for the forward battles.To cover the flanks of this main force, Pons ofTripoli rode with his cavalry on the right, andRobert Fulcoy the lord of Zerdana with Antiochenecavalry on the left: both squadrons were refused. Afinal line of more Antiochene cavalry was postedbehind the king. (As the army of Antioch had beenpractically annihilated two months previous, none ofthese nine squadrons of cavalry could havenumbered more than around eighty.) Opposite wereIlghazi’s troops on the crusader right and


Toghtekin’s on the crusader left: regular askaris andan unknown number of Turkoman and Arabvolunteers.

The two Turkish chiefs were normally at oddswith each other, and had only cooperated on thisoccasion out of self interest. The battle opened witha Muslim attack, they hoping to have caught theChristians off guard; but instead they were alreadyon the march. The Turcomans advanced their wingsto form the customary crescent formation — mostuseful to enfilade an enemy with arrows. The threeadvanced squadrons of knights charged but werebadly mauled by the arrow fire: they fell back towardthe infantry behind. Seeing this discomfiture, theMuslims threw aside their bows and charged in withsword and lance. The whole mass of Christian horseand foot were driven back, losing many men.Meanwhile, the wings of the Muslim host werecharged by the two flank guards: Robert Fulcoy’ssquadron (including the men of Antioch in theextreme rear, as they are never mentioned separately)attacked so vigorously that they drove right into theTurks, scattering them left and right. (One sees inthis an example of disaffected troops, fearing theworst from their allies on the other flank, and makinga break for it first before it’s too late.) Rather thanturn aside to aid the king, Fulcoy continued thepursuit for awhile, then went off to see if he couldaid his castle’s garrison: he and his men took nofurther part in the main battle. On the Christian right,Pons of Tripoli was worsted by the pressure of aheavy counter attack: the Turks did not shoot morethan a few arrows before also charging in with handarms at close quarters: Pons and his men were drivenright up against the king’s knights of the second line.King Baldwin with his three squadrons moved wherethey were most needed. By dint of repeated charges,Baldwin managed to keep his beleaguered army fromdestruction. Toward evening, Ilghazi gave it up — orwas incapable of keeping his troops any longer in thefield — and withdrew. The Antiochenes were ridingcasually back toward the battlefield, havingdiscovered that Zerdana was lost: they ran into theTurks and were defeated quickly: Fulcoy was himselfcaptured and later executed. Ilghazi and Toghtekintook their prisoners to Aleppo for a grand publicexecution, thus claiming victory. King Baldwin came

cautiously out to the battlefield the followingmorning to bury their dead and loot the fallenMuslims: as there was no sign of the enemy at all hetoo could claim a victory. Since the Muslims failedto continue the campaign, the battle of Habachieved its purpose. (This narrative is according toOman. Runciman gives essentially the sameoutcome for the same reason: the king’s fresh troopswere able to charge at the critical moment. But hediffers by placing the Christians in a single line ofright, center and left: puts Robert “the Leper”beside Pons in the right wing: switches the positionsof Ilghazi and Toghtekin, and withal gives a far lessdetailed account.)

The points where both sides could have done farbetter seem obvious: king Baldwin perhaps shouldnot have started the battle with a charge of theheavily outclassed knights, but rather should havekept them behind the foot till the optimum momentfor a charge. By contrast, the Turks should not haveassumed that such a heavily outclassed force wasalready as good as defeated: which conclusioncaused them to fight using close combat weaponsand disdain their missiles. The crossbows of theFranks were feared; but as the battle reveals, theheavy blows of the men-at-arms were even moreformidable. The Turks could have spent more timeassaulting the Christian host with arrows beforegoing in with the sword and lance.

(But perhaps there was method in kingBaldwin’s “sacrifice” of his three forward squadronsof cavalry: by getting immediately to grips, hesucceeded in pulling the Turks into a hand-to-handbattle rather than a missile exchange: which wouldcertainly have gone very badly for the heavilyoutnumbered Christians.)

ARMY LISTS

Northern Crusader Armies1096 to 1150 A D

Up to 30% cavalry and mercenaries:*up to 50% light cavalry, Turcopoles, sword,

lance/javelin and 2 javelins (1/4 with bow 3).Morale: 00-59=D, 60-89=C, 90-99=B.


up to 80% light and medium cavalry, serjants,sword, lance/javelin and 2 javelins. Morale: 00-19=D, 20-69=C,70-89=B, 90-99=A.

up to 50% heavy cavalry, knights, sword andlance. Morale as above. REQUIRED UNIT.

up to 50% unarmored infantry, archers, swordand bow (half bow 2, half bow 3).Morale: 00-39=D, 40-89=C, 90-99=B.

up to 50% light infantry, crossbow-men, sword and crossbow 2. Morale as above.

up to 50% medium and heavy infantry, spearmen,sword and spear/javelin. Morale as above.

Up to 90% infantry:*up to 60% unarmored levy and pilgrim

volunteers, assorted melee weapons and up to 1/4 with bow (half bow 1, half bow 2) orsling. Morale: 00-59=D, 60-89=C, 90-99=B.

up to 20% light crossbow-men, sword and crossbow 2 OR unarmored archers, sword

and bow (half bow 2 and half bow 3).Morale: 00-39=D, 40-89=C, 90-99=B.

up to 40% light spearmen, sword and spear/javelin. Morale as above.


Organization:Infantry in units of 500 men or more, which may

be further grouped into battles of two or more units.May intermix weights but not types in a unit.

Cavalry: knights and serjants and Turcopolesmay intermix in units of fairly equal size: orTurcopoles may be in separate units of at least 500men. Serjants and knights are always mixed together.

Dismounted knights and serjants can muster withinfantry; and if on a ratio of at least one dismountedhorseman to seven infantry — I. e. the whole frontrank — the infantry then “do not check” to receivecharging cavalry.

Infantry tactics:open and close order, column, wedge

(levy/pilgrim prohibited), square, wheel (levy/pilgrimprohibited), pivot (levy/pilgrim prohibited), open and

close order missile fire (levy/pilgrim open ordermissile only), screened missile fire, shield-wall,phalanx (spear/javelin only: may walk in shield-wall; other phalanx bonuses, dismounted cavalryonly: +25% versus cavalry, do not check to receivecharging cavalry).

Cavalry tactics:open and close order, column, wheel, pivot, half

charge (Turcopoles only), Western Charge (knightsand serjants only), withdraw post combat, open andclose order missile fire (Turcopoles only), feignedflight.

Turkish Armies in Syria, Mesopotamia and Asia Minor1000 to 1250 A D

Up to 40% Turkish cavalry:up to 80% unarmored Turcoman volunteers,

sword, lance, 2 javelins and bow 4 and 5.Morale: 00-59=D, 60-89=C, 90-99=B.REQUIRED UNIT.

up to 40% light Turcoman volunteers, as above.up to 20% light and medium mameluk/ghulams,

sword, lance, 2 javelins and bow 4 and 5.Morale: 00-19=D, 20-69=C, 70-89=B,90-99=A. REQUIRED UNIT.

Up to 80% Kurd-Arab militia and volunteers:up to 40% unarmored cavalry, Bedouin-Kurd-

Arab volunteers, sword, lanceand 2 javelins.Morale: 00-69=D, 70-89=C, 90-99=B.REQUIRED UNIT.

up to 20% unarmored cavalry, Saracen horse-archers, sword, lance and bow 3. Morale as above.

up to 20% light cavalry, Saracens, as above.up to 40% light cavalry, Syrian-Arab militia

lancers, sword, lance and 2 javelins.Morale: 00-39=D, 40-89=C, 90-99=B.

up to 35% medium cavalry, Syrian-Arabmilitia, as above.

up to 10% heavy cavalry, as above.


*Up to 50% militia infantry:up to 60% unarmored spearmen, sword and

spear/javelin. Morale: 00-59=D, 60-99=C.up to 20% unarmored archers, sword and bow 2.

Morale as above.up to 10% unarmored archers, sword and bow 3.

Morale as above.up to 40% light spearmen, sword and

spear/javelin (1/4 with 2 javelins). Morale as above.

up 10% light crossbow-men, sword and crossbow 2 OR naphatin*. Morale as above.

up to 15% medium spearmen, sword andspear/javelin. Morale as above.

Bow note: Turkish bow 5 may not exceed 15% oftotal Turkish bow. The rest are bow 4.

*Naphatin: These troops use either slings orspecial crossbows to hurl small “grenades” filledwith naphtha. Use the Sling table in either case forrange to kill: but any roll of 9-12 out to 20" againstany armored class target will require a morale checkon the hit figure, if it is not eliminated. If the figureis actually eliminated using the Sling table, theneach figure in base contact with the eliminated —“broiled” — figure will make a morale check .Naphatin only shoot in open order, and only onevery second turn.

(Naphatin cost 9.8 points for each 20mm base.)

Organization:Infantry in units of 1,000 or more. No intermixing

of types, but intermixing of weights is allowed.Cavalry: mameluks/ghulams in units of 500;

volunteers and others in units of 1,000 or more. Nointermixing of types, but intermixing of weights isallowed.

Infantry tactics:open and close order, column, square, shield-wall,

phalanx (spear/javelin only), open and close ordermissile fire (naphatin open order only), pre-contactmissile fire (spear/javelin only, in open order only).

Cavalry tactics:open and close order, column, wheel, pivot

(Turkish only), half charge, withdraw post combat,feigned rout, open and close order missile fire(Saracen close order missile fire is limited to a walk

or stand), checkerboard (Turkish only).

Imperial Roman “Byzantine” Field Armies1080 to 1176

Up to 30% Frankish mercenary cavalry:up to 80% medium and light, sword and lance.

Morale: 00-19=D, 20-89=C, 90-99=B.up to 35% heavy lancer, as above.up to 10% cataphract lancer, as above.

Up to 50% irregular Steppes-type cavalry:up to 100% unarmored and light horsearchers,

sword, lance and bow 4 and 5.Morale: 00-49=D, 50-89=C, 90-99=B.

up to 25% medium horsearchers, sword, lanceand bow 4 and 5. Morale: 00-39=D, 40-79=C, 80-99=B.

Up to 75% regular native and recruited Steppes-typecavalry:

up to 75% light horsearchers, sword, lance and bow 4 and 5. Morale: 00-39=D, 40-79=C, 80-99=B.REQUIRED UNIT.

up to 50% medium horsearchers, as above.up to 25% heavy horsearchers, as above.

Up to 25% regular mounted infantry:up to 50% light or unarmored archers, sword and

bow 3. Morale: 00-79=C, 80-99=B.up to 75% heavy and plate (plate 1/4 maximum)

pikemen, sword, broadaxe and pike.Morale: 00-59=C, 60-89=B, 90-99=A.

Bow note: bow 5 limited to 15% of totalcavalry bow.

Organization: Infantry in units of 400 to 600; no intermixing.Cavalry in units of 400 to 500; no intermixing.

Infantry tactics:open and close order, column, square, shield-

wall, wheel, pivot, withdraw post combat, open andclose order missile fire, screened missile fire,phalanx (pike/broadaxe only: locked line, rank


bonus, +25% charge, +50% versus cavalry, does notcheck to receive; special: missile second rank may beincluded in rank bonus).

Cavalry tactics:open and close order, column, wheel, pivot, half

charge (irregular Steppes-type), charge (regulars),Western Charge (Frankish only), open and closeorder missile fire, withdraw post combat, feignedrout (native regular and Steppes-type only).

Clissuras:Semi-independent “Byzantine” semi-feudal borderholdings pre 1050 to 1200

Up to 100% cavalry:up to 50% light cavalry, sword, lance and bow 4.

Morale: 00-39=C, 40-79=B, 80-99=A.up to 50% medium cavalry, sword, lance, bow 3

and 4. Morale as above.up to 20% heavy cavalry, sword, lance and

bow 3 OR darts. Morale as above.up to 10% cataphract cavalry, sword, lance and

bow 3 OR darts. Morale as above.

Up to 75% infantry:up to 50% light or unarmored bowmen, sword

and bow 3. Morale: 00-59=C, 60-99=B.up to 50% light spearmen, sword, spear and

3 javelins. Morale as above.up to 50% medium pikemen, scutati, sword and

pike. Morale as above.up to 20% heavy pikemen, scutati, as above.

Note: infantry in defensive support of localpass/ford or in garrison only. All offensive operationsare conducted entirely by the cavalry.

Organization:Infantry in units of 250 to 500. Bowmen may be

paired with scutati on an equal or one to two ratio.Cavalry in units of 200 to 400. No intermixing of

types.Note: these little “baronies” are never more than

c. 2,000 cavalry and 3,700 infantry (40 bases ofcavalry and 60 bases of infantry: with infantry on20mm by 20mm and cavalry on 25mm by 40mm

bases). In the 11th century, they were often held byex-foreigners: the bow 4 types being ex-steppesmercenaries and the listed heavy and cataphractcavalry being “Franks” I. e. Normans: in which casethey do not equip with bow or darts; substitutejavelins instead. After Manzikert (1071) they claimindependence, join the larger entrepreneurs — suchas Philaretus and various Armenian princlings — orbecome absorbed by the Turkish expansion.


square, wedge, checkerboard, pivot, wheel,withdraw post combat, open and close order missilefire, double-pre-contact missile fire, screenedmissile fire, phalanx (scutati only: locked line, rankbonus, +25% charge bonus, shield-wall, +50%versus cavalry, moving bonuses, does not check toreceive cavalry charge, trot).

Cavalry tactics:open and close order, column, wedge (Franks

prohibited), checkerboard (Franks prohibited),pivot, wheel, charge, Western Charge (Franks only),open and close order missile fire, withdraw postcombat, feigned rout.


Shield-wall (crusaders)Normally this is an immobile formation. But, asgiven in the crusader tactics, it can move and bemaintained at a walk. While maintained, anyscreened missile troops may not shoot. When raisingor lowering shield-wall, the player must clearlydeclare the change at the beginning of the impulse.

Withdraw post combat (crusaders and Muslims)In order to withdraw post combat, cavalry mustmake a performance test. The Franks do this bywhole units: Muslims must test each figure in theunit — those which succeed withdraw and the reststay where they are, doing what they were lastdoing.

When Western Charge cavalry (the Franks)are withdrawn from, and they test successfully topursue, they do so at a full charge.

The Art of War During the Norman Conquests · 2012-08-18 · The Normans in France 900 to 1200 3...

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