The Archipelago State in Disarray: Internal & External Battle for the Maldives
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Transcript of The Archipelago State in Disarray: Internal & External Battle for the Maldives
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Spotlight South Asia
Paper Nr. 4/ 2012:
The Archipelago State in Disarray: Internal & External Battle for the Maldives
Author: Djan Sauerborn (Heidelberg)
ISSN 2195-2787
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SSA ist eine regelmäßig erscheinende Analyse-Reihe mit einem Fokus auf aktuelle politische Ereignisse und Situationen Südasien betreffend. Die Reihe soll Einblicke schaffen, Situationen erklären und Politikempfehlungen geben.
SSA is a frequently published analysis series with a focus on current political events and situations concerning South Asia. The series should present insights, explain situations and give policy recommendations.
APSA (Angewandte Politikwissenschaft Südasiens) ist ein auf Forschungsförderung und wissenschaftliche Beratung ausgelegter Stiftungsfonds im Bereich der Politikwissenschaft Südasiens.
APSA (Applied Political Science of South Asia) is a foundation aiming at promoting science and scientific consultancy in the realm of political science of South Asia.
Die Meinungen in dieser Ausgabe sind einzig die der Autoren und werden sich nicht von APSA zu eigen gemacht.
The views expressed in this paper are solely the views of the authors and are not in any way owned by APSA.
Impressum:APSA
Im Neuehnheimer Feld 330D-69120 [email protected]
www.apsa.info
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Acknowledgment:The author is grateful to the South Asia Democratic Forum (SADF), Brussels
for the extended support on this report.
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The Archipelago State in Disarray: Internal & External Battle for the Maldives
The Republic of Maldives, located in the Indian Ocean southwest of Sri Lanka consists of
about 1200 coral islets (only 200 are populated) and is spread across an area of 90,000 sq
km. With about 394,500 inhabitants, the Maldives have the smallest population in Asia of
which more than a quarter live in the capital Malé. The first settlers who were
predominantly Buddhist seafarers from southern India and Sri Lanka populated the
Maldives in the 5th century B.C. In addition cultural infusion from the Arab Peninsula and
East Africa influenced the highly dispersed group of Islands. In 1200 AD the last Buddhist
king converted to Islam. Sunni Islam is the state law of the Maldives and only Muslims can
obtain citizenship, the practice of other forms of faith is punishable by law. Dhivehi, which is
a derivate of Sinhala, is the main language of the Maldives; due to its open market
economy and tourism English is also commonly spoken and referred to as the second
main language.
In October 2009 the relatively unknown archipelago made the headlines worldwide for
being the first country to hold a cabinet meeting under water. The purpose for this unusual
endeavor was to create awareness for the Maldives’ struggle with climate change. The
cabinet met sub aqua to sign a declaration which was to be forwarded to the U.N. climate
change summit in Copenhagen, demanding large cuts in carbon emissions. A reporter
approaching the then President Nasheed asking him what consequences the disapproval
of the declaration would have, received a grim answer: “if that happens, we are all going to
die”. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) sea levels will
rise between 18-59 cm until 2100. Nasheed promised his fellow Maldivians that they
would not “end up in refugee camps if the worst happens”. The Maldivian government has
made it one of its core tasks to seek for lands the country could acquire if forced to
evacuate their country. Sri Lanka and India are high on the list due to similar culture and
climate.
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Sociopolitical Turmoil & Radicalization
Sadly sea levels are not the only thing on the rise. Sociopolitical conflict and turmoil have
also reached the shores of the country many describe as the paradise on earth. Two main
events have influenced the Maldives negatively this year: The rise of Islamic
fundamentalism and the “coup d’état”. The former reached its pivotal point when in January
of 2012 the government ordered the shutdown of all spas and health centers operated by
resorts on the islands. The conservative Adhaalath Party justified its “call for closure” by
accusing these recreational retreats of promoting prostitution. Many protesters went a step
further and demanded a complete ban on selling alcohol as well as direct flights to Israel. If
the government had not nullified the proposals put forward the negative impact on tourism,
the strongest pillar of the Maldivian economy, would have surely been insurmountable. This
is nevertheless a troubling warning signal for this young republic which has traditionally
been known for its liberal, open and tolerant interpretation of Islam. Some officials state
that this initiative by conservative forces was only the tip of a much larger iceberg, pointing
to the increasing support within the archipelago state for the Taliban in Afghanistan and
Pakistan. Many liberals in the Maldives discount this notion as a severe form of hysteria.
But there have been incidents in the past that shine light on the hull of this alleged iceberg.
In 2002, Ibrahim Fauzee, a Maldivian citizen was deported to Guantanamo Bay by the US
for having ties to the Al Qaeda. One year later posters praising Osama bin Laden popped
up on the walls of a school. In 2007 tourists were injured in an explosion in the Sultan’s
Park in Male. On February 7th, the same day former President Nasheed was allegedly
ousted, half a dozen of men stormed the National Museum of the Maldives and destroyed
several Buddhist statues, some were so damaged beyond repair. According to the men
who attacked this cultural heritage these works of art were idols and therefore illegal under
Islamic and National Law. In an interview Ali Waheed, the director of the museum, which
was built by the Chinese confirmed that the entire collection on pre-Islamic history was
gone. The question if these occurrences are enough to justify speaking of a radical Islamic
threat to the Maldives is hard to answer, but authorities should stay alert and not belittle
these events. In a country in which approximately 5% of the population are addicted to
narcotics (Mohammed Shoaib, member of Journey, an NGO aimed at helping addicts said
it was “easier to buy heroin than pizza in Malé) and with gang violence on the rise, the
lack of perspective is creating a dangerous void which has to be filled with job
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opportunities, anti-drug programs and further education so that radical fundamentalism
does not gain the upper hand.
A Quasi-Coup?
The murder of Afrashim Ali, a lawmaker for the Progressive Party of the Maldives and
supporter of former President Nasheed on October the 2nd marked another low point in
the power struggle of the Maldives. On February 7th 2012, President Nasheed was (in his
words) forced to step down from office. Analysts, politicians and the media differ on the
question of legitimacy of this power transition. Some view it as the act of an aggressive
junta that removed a democratically elected President in a military coup others such as
India and the US have called the new government “legitimate”, since Nasheed, by coercion
or not, resigned and a successor Mohammed Waheed Hassan was sworn in. The arrest of
chief Justice Abdulla Mohamed on the orders of Nasheed for acting biased towards certain
criminals triggered protests amongst the population and can be seen as the tipping point of
Nasheed’s reign.
A national inquiry commissioned by the Commonwealth of Nations came to the conclusion
that the power transition was “legal and constitutional” and Nasheed’s resignation was
“voluntary”. The rationale behind the swift endorsement of this inquiry by several nations
indicates a strong sense of realpolitik. Nasheed skipped his trial on October the 1st and
continues on campaigning for the elections in 2013. Voices however are being raised that
the three judges presiding over the case have been hand-picked in violation of the legal
framework. In addition it seems questionably how the Inquiry can state that power
transition was “legal” but at the same time recognize a police mutiny that occurred
simultaneously as well as “serious problems” with the rule of law. Naushad Waheed, the
brother of President Waheed is amongst the skeptics. In a BBC interview he distanced
himself from his brother pointing to” human rights abuses against the opposition” as well as
an “immoral and illegal seizure of power”. Many fear that with Waheed the Island state will
experience a democratic downward spiral; some go even further and say Waheed is a just
the extended arm of Gayoom, who ruled the country for 30 years with an authoritarian iron
fist. Adding ex-Gayoom loyalists to his cabinet such as Dhunya Maumoon the daughter of
Gayoom as a state minister for foreign affairs, will not help Waheed silence his critics.
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The question remains if the legal nature of this case also leads to legitimacy. It comes as
no surprise that many analysts speak of a “quasi-coup d’état”. Concluding one can state
that although the Maldives have been successful in reaching almost all Millennium
Development Goals (MDG) as well as being removed from the list of Least Developed
Countries (LDCs) internal as well as external actors need to put this young democracy on
the right track again before it regresses back to autocratic patterns or in the words of the
EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, “without
a consensus on how to proceed the country will be unable to deal with the political,
economic and environmental challenges which will determine its future.” There is an old
Maldivian proverb, Furifá huri badiyale(r) gudu gude(r) nagáre (roughly translated from
Divehi: “The water pot that is full will not shake”) which describes the stability and
confidence of a person or society which is in control of her life. One can only hope that the
implications of this proverb, especially the aspect of stability regarding institutions, elites,
the rule of law and civil society are endorsed in the future by this young and troubled
democracy.
The shift in power as well as the subsequent turmoil did not pass unnoticed in Beijing and
New Delhi. Both import dependent nations rely on good relations with Malé and thus have
a geo-strategic interest in influencing the smallest South Asian State, which Hasan A.
Hilmy has named the “Diamond of the Indian Ocean”.
China-Maldives Relations: Building a dragon's den in India's backyard?
India is wary of growing Chinese Influence. Some naval officers and intelligence analysts
even go so far as to accuse China of schmoozing the Maldives with soft power tools in
order to add another pearl to the so often mentioned “Sino encirclement”, better known as
the “string of pearls”. Former President Nasheed did not exclude China from his foreign
policy agenda but nevertheless maintained closer relations with New Delhi which he often
called a “natural ally” in the Indian Ocean. He went even further in stating that there was no
room for “nontraditional friends” in the proximity of the Maldives. Furthermore Nasheed
was never shy to point out that India was a far more reliable partner than China. This
rhetoric also fell in line with Nasheed's pro-Western stance. The reality on the ground
however, has changed after the coup in February. In contrast to Nasheed, Waheed's
speech at the opening ceremony of the 2nd China-Eurasia Expo, and the second China-
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Eurasia Economic Development and Cooperation Forum on September the 5th sounded
more like an endorsement of China than a rejection. He described China as “our example
of a good international leader and citizen” and labeled China as an “invaluable friend” to
which the Maldives has a “traditional bond”. Increasing Chinese activities in the past
months have shown that this shift is not merely rhetorical in nature. “Island hoppers” from
China are the number 1 foreign tourists in the Maldives today. In addition on August 31st
China agreed to lend $500 million dollars to the Archipelago State. The Maldivian
government plans on investing $150 million dollars into infrastructural programs. The
current President Mohamed Waheed did not comment on plans for the rest of the $350
million dollars. But change is not only occurring on an economic level. In September 2012
China was granted land to construct a 3,920 square feet fully fledged embassy in the heart
of Malé and only a stone's throw away from the Indian High Commission. This made China
the only non-South Asian Country to establish an embassy on the Maldives. Maldives
Foreign Minister Abdul Samad Abdullah was quick in his attempt to silence alarms bells in
New Delhi, reassuring India's political elite, that a growing Chinese presence should not be
equated with deteriorating Indian influence. He added that the Maldives were “too small” to
play a role in the power game between the two most populated countries in the world. It
would not however be the first time that a pawn had a major impact in a game of geo-
political chess. In 1977 for example, The Soviet Union attempted to rent the Maldivian
Island of Gan for 1$ million annually and use it as a refueling and maintenance station, but
was eventually turned down. Most analysts believe that Moscow wanted to gain a foothold
in the Indian Ocean in order to be able to counter activities from the US base Diego Garcia.
Even though the first comprehensive security agreement between India and the Maldives
was signed in 1974 and joint military exercises between both nations have been
undertaken over the course of the past 20 years, many Indian security analysts and policy
makers are afraid that the Chinese might add the Maldives as yet another token to their
string of pearls. In 2000 rumors surfaced, that the Chinese were in the midst of establishing
a naval base on the Island of Maroa which was supposed to be operational by 2010. In
2002 the project allegedly was temporarily put on ice and reanimated in 2004. Chinese as
well as Maldivian officials have been reluctant to provide the public with further relevant
information. Both sides have stated that the purpose of the deep sea surveys conducted
was merely for gathering data relevant for environmental protection. The information
regarding Maroa is sketchy and most sources providing the so-called “truth” are rather
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dubious. The analytical increment value is not very high and until credible sources
generate reliable intelligence, conclusions should be left to conspiracy theorists.
It is not quite clear what to make of the rigorously mentioned but insufficiently analyzed
string of pearls concept which was coined by the American consultancy firm Booz Allen in
2004 to describe China’s energy supply strategy. Some see the establishment of Chinese
bases and naval ports in the Indian Ocean and beyond (Seychelles, Mauritius, Maldives,
Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Cambodia and Pakistan) as nothing really worth raising
eyebrows, since it is deemed as a normal step by a resourceful and powerful nation, which
will not really change the power dynamics within the region. China obviously seconds this
notion and adds that these bases are necessary to secure the livelihood of energy imports
through critical sea lanes, straits and choke points and if anything rather support India,
which also relies heavily on energy imports; both countries export and import huge trade
volumes through the Maldivian territory. It should not come as a surprise that New Delhi
has a quite difference stance. It interprets this nautical encirclement as a key element of
Chinese ambitions to reduce Indian influence in the region. This perspective is also shared
by the United States, which is well aware that its pivot to Asia relies heavily on India's
commitment to upgrade its Navy. It is neither in the interest of the Indian Navy, which is
keen on finally receiving the attention and financial assets usually reserved for the Army
and Air force nor is it in the interest of the Obama administration to abandon the idea of
hostile, Chinese encirclement. Although several naval security analysts and observers
have stated over and over again, that it would be neither feasible nor sustainable for China
to establish a nuclear submarine base in Maroa, the hawks in New Delhi remain
unconvinced.
India's “hard power” reaction: Buffing up security cooperation & security dependency
It seems that India's answer to China's open soft power strategy towards the Maldives is to
invest in more hard power capabilities. Instead of engaging in a battle of nutrition regarding
direct investment and trade with China, India has chosen to bet on the horse it already
knows: The security sector. The Indian government might even go further and terminate
the 25$ million foreign aid all together. Tensions between the Maldivian government and
the Indian minister for foreign affairs Salman Khurshid have risen during November due to
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the decision of the former to cancel a 511$ million contract issued to GMR, a Bangalore-
based infrastructural company, in 2010 to upgrade and operate Ibrahim Nasir International
Airport. New Delhi is quite aware that contesting China economically, a competitor which
has the backing of President Waheed, at a time where a comeback of pro-Indian Nasheed
is very unlikely is not a promising or viable option. Increasing capabilities in a sector which
it has influenced and shaped over the past decades seems to be New Delhi's answer to its
fear of losing its grip on the Maldives. Over the past years India has shaped the agenda of
the Maldivian Armed Forces, provided them with military equipment and has helped train
their troops, thus initiating integration into India's security grid. 24 of the 26 Maldivian atolls
have coastal radars set up by the Indian Navy. Furthermore the radar chains of the entire
coastal line have been integrated into a central control room within India's Coastal
Command. In 2006 the Indian Navy donated a Trinkat Class Fast Attack Craft to the
Maldives National Defense Force's Coast Guard. Memories of Indian paratroopers landing
on the archipelago state in 1988 in an successful attempt (Operation Cactus) to liberate
Malé from armed mercenaries of the People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Ealam who
were paid by a Maldivian named Abdullah Luthufi are still well alive amongst the Maldivian
military brass.
Following this strategic rationale it should not come as a complete surprise that the first
high profile Indian official to visit the Maldives after power transition was defence Minister A
K Antony. The three day visit in September turned out to be more than the usual
handshaking and saluting. Antony was accompanied by a high profile delegation which
included defence secretary Shashi Kant Sharma, Chief of Western Naval Command, Vice
Admiral Shekhar Sinha, Lt. Gen SP Tanwar and Director General Armed Forces Medical
Services Air Marshal DP Joshi. At the invitation of Maldivian defence minister Col
Mohamed Nazim Anthony inaugurated a military hospital and attended the stone laying
ceremony of the training academy of the Maldivial National Defence Forces. More
importantly, the Indian government has decided to deploy a permanent defence attaché in
Malé and has extended the stationing of its Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH) Dhruv, which
has recently been upgraded with night flying capabilities. In addition New Delhi will be
sending a team of flight instructors to train the Maldives Air Force. Furthermore, the Indian
Navy has decided to continue with its monthly surveillance activities of the Maldives’
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which intends to contain piracy and illegal activities close
to Maldivian territory.
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Treading uncertain waters:
The fragile Maldivian government seems to playing a risky balancing act. On the one hand
inviting China to invest heavily in its infrastructure and economic development and on the
other hand strengthening security ties with India. For now both Asian giants seem to be
eager to deepen their influence through their current modus operandi. The question
remains if this strategy of gaining “the best of both worlds” will be accepted by China and
India in the long run and if this strategy will have time develop. The current government
seems prepared to take the gamble. Just two months after Antony visited the Maldives in
September to boost defence cooperation, the Maldivian Minister of Defence and National
Security, Colonel (Retired) Mohamed Nazim met with the Chinese Minister of National
Defence, General Liang Guanglie and members of the Chinese central military commission
on December 10, 2012 to discuss strengthening Sino-Maldivian security ties. This
unsurprisingly created an uproar amongst Indian policy makers and military personnel.
As in almost all cases domestic politics determines foreign policy and if the future of
domestic politics is highly volatile and uncertainty rather than clarity is the starting point of
analysis, identifying foreign policy shifts seems rather difficult and should always be
interpreted as a possible model and not as something which is “written in stone”.
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References:
Fernando, S.N. 2010. China’s relations with Sri Lanka and the Maldives: Models of Good Relations among Big and Small countries, China Report, vol. 46, no. 285.
Chowdhury, I.A. 2012. Painful Politics in “Paradise”: Changes in the Maldives, ISAS Brief, No. 228.
Kumar, A. 2012. Chinese Engagement with the Maldives: Impact on Security Environment in the Indian Ocean Region, Strategic Analysis (IDSA), vol. 36, no. 2.
Mitra, S.K; Wolf, S.O; Schöttli, J. 2006. A Political and Economic Dictionary of South Asia: An Essential Guide to the Politics and Economics of South Asia, Routledge,London.
Samaranayake,N. 2012. Maldives: Why the US and India should remain calm, Pacific Forum CSIS (PacNet), no.13.
The Independent, March 30, http://www.theindependentbd.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=102409:the-maldives-in-a-stalemate
The Guardian, 22 October 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/oct/22/maldives-political-instability-gang-violence
New York Times, 13 February 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/oct/22/maldives-political-instability-gang-violence
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The Diplomat, December 5 2012, http://thediplomat.com/indian-decade/2012/12/05/india-maldives-row-over-airport-contract/
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