The Arab Transformations Project Policy Briefs 20170… · Brief 2. Socio-economic Inequality and...

The project received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme under grant agreement no #320214

Editors: Pamela Abbott and Andrea Teti

The Arab Transformations Project

Listening to the Voice of the People:

Policy Briefs on Democracy, EU-MENA Relations, Security, Migration, Socio-economic Development, Corruption and Gender

Contents Introduction

Section1: Arab Transformations Policy Briefs What do the People (Still) Want? Conceptions of Democracy. Arab Transformations Policy Brief 1.

Perceptions of the EU in MENA Public Opinion. Arab Transformations Policy Brief 2.

Socio-economic Inequality and the Failure of Development Strategies for the Middle East. Arab Transformations Policy Brief 3.

From Ring of Friends to Ring of Fire: challenges to Stability and Legitimacy in MENA. Arab Transformations Policy Brief 4.

Against the Tide: Why Gender Attitudes Remain Profoundly Conservative in Arab Countries. Arab Transformations Policy Brief 5.

The Integrity of States: Corruption in the EU’s Southern Neighbourhood. Arab Transformations Policy Brief 6.

Iraq After ISIS: Continued Conflict or Rebuilding Beyond Ethno-Sectarian Identity? Arab Transformations Policy Brief 7.

Mutual Support MENA-EU Migration. Arab Transformations Policy Brief 8.

Section 2: EU Policy Briefs What do ’The People’ Want? Citizens’ Perceptions of Democracy, Development, and EU-MENA Relations in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, and Morocco in 2014.

Building Decent societies: Economic and Political Cohesion in Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia.

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Introduction to the Arab Transformations Policy Briefs Pamela Abbott and Andrea Teti

1. IntroductionThe policy briefs in this volume are based on the findings from the Arab Transformations projected funded by the EU FP7 Programme, Project Grant Agreement no #320214 from 2012-2016. They are the outcome of the collective efforts of all the project partners with the named authors taking responsibility for the content of each brief. The project was a partnership between teams of researchers based in the MENA region and teams based in the EU with the University of Aberdeen as the coordinating partner. Dr Andrea Teti was the Scientific lead. The EU in the wake of the 2011 Arab Uprising said that it wanted to listen to the voices of ordinary people living in the MENA region. It is important that the EU understands what the people living in the region want and uses that as a basis for opening up dialogue and supporting the people of the region to have a better life. The findings from the Arab Transformations project gives it a unique opportunity to do so. One of the main outputs from the project was a public opinion survey carried out in 2014 in six MENA countries Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia. The survey collected information on people’s political, social and economic attitudes including unique information on people’s attitudes to the EU and its interventions in the region. In order to extent the coverage of attitudes and values and to look at change over time the project also drew on the Arab Barometer, the Afro Barometer, the World Values and the Worldwide Gallup Poll surveys.

2. Background

The Arab Uprisings represented a series of events unprecedented in the history of the Middle East: mass, popular, and largely non-violent uprisings rejecting the existing political and socio-economic order started in December 2010 in Tunisia and reverberated throughout the region. These protests threatened – and in several cases resulted in the overthrow of – apparently stable autocratic regimes. At the same time, Western governments were caught in a bind, on the one hand being committed to support democracy and human rights as ‘fundamental values’, while on the other hand having previously wedded themselves to autocratic regimes on ‘pragmatic’ grounds and espoused those regimes’ own narratives of a slow transition. Despite such an unfavourable domestic, regional and global environment, protesters won significant victories: Tunisian President Ben Ali resigned on January 14th, Egyptian President Mubarak stepped down on February 11th, protests flared in Yemen on February 3rd, in Bahrain on February 14th and in Syria on the 15th, with smaller protests in Iran, Iraq (albeit were less related to the Arab Uprisings themselves and more to ongoing strife since 2003), Morocco, and Jordan. For all the assumed resilience of these authoritarian regimes, conventional instruments of repression and co-option appeared ineffective,

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betraying both the regimes’ lack of support domestically, and the precariousness of the altar of stability upon which Western allies had sacrificed the pursuit of democracy. By mid-2011, Tunisia and Egypt appeared to be struggling for transitions away from authoritarianism, Libya and Syria had descended into domestic conflict, Bahrain’s protests had been bloodily repressed (with the Saudis sending forces across the King Fahd Bridge), the Moroccan and Jordanian monarchies had promised reforms, Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies were moving to shore up authoritarian regimes, including in Yemen, and Algeria alone appeared not to have experienced significant protests. By late October 2011 Syria and Yemen were mired in conflict, the Libyan conflict had been brought to an end with Gaddafi’s assassination and foreign intervention, and only renewed protests preventing Egypt – however temporarily – from descending into counter-revolution. These setbacks produced much handwringing – and thinly-veiled delight – by observers who had in the past argued against the region’s potential for democratisation, for either cultural or economic reasons. These commentators began to describe events either as a conflict-ridden ‘Arab Winter’ or as an ‘Islamist Winter,’ in which Islamist parties would translate popular uprisings into electoral advantage, as in Tunisia and Egypt, only to smother embryonic democracy in its cradle. However, their cynicism was at least as simplistic and misplaced as the over-eager confidence in the inevitability of profound change which others expressed in the early days of the Uprisings. The Arab Uprisings represented a genuine political challenge, as well as a challenge both to analysis and to policy. At an analytical level the Uprisings represent a major event which must be explained. However, existing models of transformations/transitions – or indeed of the absence thereof (transitions to democracy, resilient authoritarianism and hybrid regimes being the three main models) – face major challenges in doing so. For example, the fact of the Uprisings needs to be explained by authoritarian resilience models, particularly those relying on culturalist claims such as Huntington’s notion of a ‘clash of civilisations’ (e.g. that Arab culture or Islam as a religion make transitions away from authoritarianism difficult if not impossible). Certainly, during the high points of the Uprisings regional autocracies appeared far more fragile than the literature on authoritarianism had supposed. On the other hand, the Uprisings represent a challenge for models of transitions to democracy, since only Tunisia can be said to have experienced a transition to even a semblance of it; mostly, protests did not lead to democracy, at least up to the present. In addition, both sets of models need to be able to explain the timing and outcome of the Uprisings, and indeed the diverse range of those outcomes. On a more specific level, the Uprisings were notable for the important role of trade unions before and during the protests (particularly the strong and relatively independent unions in Tunisia), and of Islamist parties in determining post-Uprisings trajectories (e.g. Tunisia’s Nahda party, Egypt’s Freedom and Justice Party), as well as independent civil society, an important component of which viewed Western ‘democracy promotion’ with deep scepticism.

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Authoritarian states in the region have been able to use the instability across the region to perpetuate the political status quo at home and abroad. The support for authoritarian leaders by Western powers undermines the support they claim to give from democratisation and the promotion of human rights and the rule of law. In the power vacuum extremist Islamist groups have managed to become established across the region, not just the so called Islamic State but also al-Quaeda , Ansar al-Sharia and Jabhat al-Nusra, with fighters moving freely across the region and membership of the various groups being fluid. Powerful regional and external powers, most notably Russia and Iran have been able to further their interests and strengthen their positon. Weakening influence of the EU (and the US) with key allies in the region has enabled China and Russia to make advances in the region.

3. 3. MAIN OBJECTIVES

From the point of view of policy-making towards the region, the Uprisings represent a challenge to major regional and international actors’ conceptions of security, economic development and democratization. Understanding democracy and its promotion as focusing on elections and certain civil-political rights, understanding security as the absence of conflict, and accepting that development strategies came with a considerable amount of socio-economic dislocation had contributed to Western policy-makers prioritising a narrowly-conceived ‘stability’ over political and economic inclusion and over democratization in particular. The epitome of this misconceived policy ‘iron triangle’ was the offer made to Ben Ali by the then-French Interior Minister Michelle Alliot-Marie to help control Tunisian protests. This offer suggests how entrenched – and how mistaken – was the prioritisation of stability as a mere absence of change. In turn this suggests a broader problem, namely, that a better understanding of socio-political transformations generally can inform policy-makers’ re-evaluation of goals and instruments of policy. The goal of the project was to: ‘Describe, explain, and understand the root causes, and evolution of the Arab Uprisings (also known as ‘Arab Spring’ or ‘Arab Revolutions’) and the outlook for them’. To do this the project consortium: reviewed the literature on the political, social and economic development of seven Arab countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq) from the 1960s; developed a data base of political, social and economic macro indicators, international indexes and individual country level data; and carried out public opinion surveys in six countries(Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq) . It analysed socio-political transformations in the seven countries with a focus on examining homogeneities and heterogeneities in regional and historical development. The project also examined and compared the beliefs, values and behaviour of ordinary people in the six countries, for which survey data was collected, with respect to political and social

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transformations through use of comparative sample survey data. The findings from the project were published in a series of reports:

1. country reports and a comparative report discussing the attitudinal and behavioural self-report information collected through the comparative survey

2. country reports and a comparative report combining an analysis of subjective survey data from public opinion surveys carried out from the beginning of the 21st Century with longitudinal macro-data and international indexes and with qualitative data to provide a significantly enhanced description and analysis of process of political and social transformation;

3. a comparative report discussing mobilisation with a focus on the role of social media in the uprisings;

4. a report critically reviewing the development and implementation of the European Neighbourhood policy in the MENA region and the impact on the region including the attitudes of citizens to the EU and its policies.

The project findings outline, examine, and inform policy options about the political and social change in these countries. They provide a unique and valuable source of comparative data, building on previous knowledge, which will be of use to the EU, the policy-making community, the scientific community and a range of nongovernmental stakeholders. The project design and its outputs are also tailored to be easily integrated into future comparative analyses both within the region and beyond it – for example, with the European and Eastern Neighbourhood contexts, in which socio-economic dislocation and political anomie have also produced important electoral and non-electoral protest phenomena. The project will also contribute to creating a common research area across the European Union’s Southern neighbourhood in the Southern and South-Eastern part of the Mediterranean area, since many of these countries have been left out of international research programmes or incompletely included until now.

5. Policy Recommendations

The EU has clearly failed in its policy objective of working in partnership with MENA countries to build stable and prosperous countries with democratic values and respect for human rights and the rule of law. The EU has a clear interest in a stable and well-governed states in its Southern Neighbourhood. The instability in the region threatens the stability of Europe. However, the EU has not been able to respond in a positive way to the events since 2011. The European Neighbourhood Policy does not have the tools to deal with complex political transformations and has fallen back on a traditional focus on security -related issues. It is important that the EU works with its Member states to develop a more effective strategic approach to the MENA and not to repeat the mistakes of the past and equate stability with security and continue to support totalitarian regimes. The people of the region made it abundantly clear in 2011 that whatever else they wanted they wanted regime change. Even as the EU prioritises security in the current climate it should not abandon working for democratization, respect for human rights and the rule of law. In furtherance of this it should develop, along with its member states, more sophisticated conditionality tools and apply them consistently. In the past, the conditionality of ‘more for more’ has been

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applied inconsistently. The EU should abandon a policy of one size fits all and tailor its policy to the specific conditions and needs of each of its partners in its Southern Neighbourhood. The EU also needs to consider how it can better ensure that it works in genuine partnership and that there are clear benefits to the partner countries as well as the EU. The EU tends to gain more from the partnership and to have the upper hand. The development assistance the EU gives to the countries in its Southern Neighbourhood is modest, none of the countries are aid dependent and the EU is only one of a number of partners each country has. However, it does represent a fifth of the total aid the EU gives. The EU relies on the region for energy and the commercial ties it has are important with the balance of trade being in favour of the EU. Mobility Partnerships also give greater benefits to the EU than MENA partners. The EU needs to listen to what people in the MENA countries say they need. The priority of ordinary people is not democracy and human rights but jobs, decent social services and governments that crackdown on corruption. The main driver of discontent and underlaying threat to stability is not a lack of democracy but a lack of economic security, decent employment, decent public services, socially inclusive development and social justice. What people want is a decent society. Each of the 10 policy papers in this volume discusses what ordinary people‘s perceptions on the issues covered are and makes policy recommendations based on these. The papers in this volume could not have been written without the support of all the members of the Arab Transformations Consortium. Details of all the members are at the end of this volume. We would like to acknowledge the support and help that Roger Sapsford, Gabi Lipan, Ilia Xypolia and Francesco Gavatorta have given us with preparing this volume. Further details about the Arab Transformations project and the published reports can be found on the project website http://www.arabtrans.eu/. Pamela Abbott and Andrea Teti April 2017

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What do the People Want? Conceptions of Democracy Authors Andrea Teti and Pamela Abbott

The Arab Transformations

POLICY BRIEFS

NUMBER 1


Summary: • EUpolicytowardsitsSouthernNeighbourhoodaimstoachievesecurityforitsMemberStatesthrough development and democracy. Ashared understanding of democracy isassumed to be in place, and Western-stylemarket democracy is the main tool forachievingsecurityandprosperity.

• AlthoughpublicopinionpollsinArabcountriesshowstrong supportfordemocracy,theArabTransformations Survey shows thatrespondents mostly reject the EU brand offormal liberal democracy in which civil andpolitical rights remain decoupled from socialandeconomicrights.

• Onlyinonecountrydomorethan50percentof respondents identify elections as anessential characteristic of democracy. Socialjustice, economic security and an end tocorruptionarethecharacteristicsseenasmostimportant.

• Islamisnotseenasanopponentofdemocraticgovernmentbybetween60and70percentofrespondents,dependingoncountry.

• However,there isstrongsupportforreligious(shari’a) law, particularly in family matters,whichcastsdoubtontheregion’scommitmenttowesternidealsofgenderequality.• RespondentsdonotthinktheEUhasdoneagood job of facilitating a transition todemocracy intheircountry,nordotheyhavemuch appetite for EU involvement in theirdomesticpolitics.

Keywords: Democracy, European Neighborhood Policy, Arab Uprisings, Political Rights, Economic and Social Rights, Security

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1. IntroductionEU policy towards its Southern Neighbourhood is focused on ensuring the security of its member states and is underpinned by an assumption of a shared interest in democracy, security and prosperity through market liberalisation and trade. It sees the main way of achieving its aim as promoting Western-style liberal democracy which it sees as the only political system which secures peace and stability. In this ambition, it would seem to be supported by the citizens of Arab countries, where public opinion polls over the last decade have reported strong support for democracy. However, findings from the Arab Transformation survey carried out in 2014 in six developing Arab states suggest that the EU assumption of democratisation as a shared value is misplace. Few people wanted the EU brand of ‘thin’, procedural democracy in which civil and political rights remain decoupled from social and economic rights. Furthermore. few people thought the EU had done a good job of facilitating a transition to democracy in their country or had much appetite for EU involvement in the domestic politics of their countries. The EU, like other Western powers, were quick to portrayed the 2011 Uprisings as a popular demand for liberal democracy – procedural democracy and political rights. However, while the Uprisings were intensely political, a demand for regime change, they were not primarily demands for democratisation or at least the ‘thin’ definition promoted by the EU. The protesters were more concerned about social justice, economic security and employment. In response to the Uprisings the EU revised its policies and claimed that in it would encouraged ‘deep democracy’. It also promised to listen to Arab voices. However, analysis of policy documents reveals that the EU model of democracy remained demonstrably ‘shallow’ and did not respond to popular demands for social justice and economic rights. The model focuses nearly exclusively on formal and procedural aspects of democracy to the detriment of substantive aspects. In particular, it systematically underestimates not only the role of social justice and economic rights in sustaining and ‘deepening’ democracy but also the importance of inclusive economic development for security. Democracy without inclusive economic growth is not going to prevent conflict in the region. Furthermore, it continues to cooperate with authoritarian regimes on democracy and human rights rather than trying to establish the domestic conditions for democratisation. By 2014 when the Arab Transformations survey was carried out of the six countries covered only Tunisia was on a path to democracy. In Egypt the military had overthrown the democratically elected government and a military dominated government was in place. In Jordan and Morocco incumbent authoritarian rulers had made some concessions but not democratised, Libya had descended into anarchy and Iraq was engaged in a fight against the so called Islamic state. Polity IV classified Tunisia and Iraq as simple electoral

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democracies, Libya as a failed state and Egypt, Jordan and Morocco as anocracies. The economic and social conditions that drove the 2011 Uprisings had if anything got worse with high unemployment and worsening social inequalities.

2. WhatthePeopleWant

The Arab Transformations survey carried out in six MENA countries (Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia) in 2014 shows that citizens are deeply unhappy with the performance of their governments and lack trust in them. However, they do not think that the Arab Uprisings were primarily motivated by citizens wanting more political rights nor do they think that lack of political rights is among the two most important challenges facing their countries in 2014. They are generally far more concerned about corruption and the economic situation.

Source: Arab Transformations Survey 2014

In 2014 only a very small minority of citizens thought that authoritarianism was one of the two main challenges facing their country - ranging from a low of just two per cent in Egypt and Jordan to 17 percent in Libya. By way of contrast, the economic situation was nominated by three quarters of citizens across the six countries, varying from around 90 per cent in Egypt and Jordan to just over three-quarters in Morocco and Tunisia, a half in Iraq and 28 per cent in Libya. In Iraq and Libya, perhaps not surprisingly, there was more concern about the security situation. What is clear is that, whatever their political preferences, citizens want both a substantive inclusion – i.e. government responsive to people’s needs - rather than the democratic façade which ‘adaptable autocrats’ have sought before and since the Uprisings. They want responsive governments that they can trust and

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25.1

14.927

16.5 20.27.7

22.9

9.1

34.119.4 25.3

41.150.5 47.8

63.857.1 61.3

32.643.3

28.334.5

25.9 24.4

55.7

29.9

64.1

20.9

40.347.8

Egypt Iraq Jordan Libya Morocco Tunisia

Figure 1: The Two Most Important Drivers of the Uprisings , %

Political Freedom Against Authoritarianism Corruption Basic Services Economic situation

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who prioritize meeting the needs of citizens rather than lining their own pockets and those of their ‘cronies’1.


3. SupportforDemocracyinPrinciple

As in previous research, most citizens agreed that ‘democracy as a system may have its problems but is better than other systems’. This ranged from a low of 62 per cent in Egypt to a high of 90 per cent in Jordan. Although the proportion that strongly agree is much lower varying from a high of 39 per cent in Jordan to a low of 18 per cent in Tunisia and Iraq suggesting that there may be only be qualified support for the proposition.


4. IslamandDemocracy

Nor is there any evidence that Islam is seen as a major barrier to democratisation. A majority agree that democracy is compatible with Islam - or rather, disagree that the two are incompatible - ranging from 71 per cent of Moroccans and Iraqis to 59 per cent of Egyptians.

1Althoughonly20%ofEgyptiansnominatedcorruptionasoneofthetwomostimportantchallengestheresponsestootherquestionsindicatethatEgyptiansareconcernedabouthighlevelsofperceivedcorruption.

90.3

20.751

2

49.3 48.7 60

12.8

87.671.3

9.8 2.328.4

61 62.1

17.4

79.358.6

12.9 12.8

79.8

49.5 42.2

6.7

Economic Situation Corruption Internal Security Authortarianism

Figure 2: Nominated as One of the Two Major Challenges Facing Their Country in 2014, %


61.381.7 89.8

74.6 80.3 77.7

EGYPT IRAQ JORDAN LIBYA MOROCCO TUNISIA

Figure 3 Democracy the Best System Despite its Faults, %

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There is general agreement that religious leaders should not interfere in how people vote in elections although less so in Morocco and relatively strong support for the view that there should be a separation between politics and religion ranging from nearly three-quarters in Egypt to 49 per cent in Morocco. However, in Libya, Morocco and Jordan a narrow majority prefer a religious party. There is considerable variation between the six countries when it comes to the extent that all laws should be based on Shari’a varying from two-thirds of people thinking this should be the case in Libya to just 17 per cent in Tunisia.

However, there is strong support for all family, criminal and property law being based on Shari’a, although it is somewhat lower in Tunisia raising questions about the extent to which there is a commitment to human rights. Support is highest in Jordan and Libya with over 90 per cent of people supporting it for all three types of law. In Iraq over 90 per cent and Egypt and Morocco over 80 per cent support it for family law and property law with between 50 and 60 per cent supporting it for criminal law. Even in Tunisia 78 per cent support it for inheritance law, 60 per cent for family law and 33 per cent for criminal law. Support for non-Muslims having fewer political rights than Muslims varies across the countries from a high of 50 per cent in Libya to a low of 11 per cent

58.670.7 65.7 68.5 70.6 65.4


Figure 4: Disagree that Democracy is Incompatable with Islam, %

85 7879.9 80

56.4

84.4

7367.2

51.5

64.4

49

69

16.2

42.6

53.160.8

55.2

26.832.1

40.5

74.867.3

41.5

16.5


Figure 5: Support for Securlar Values, %

Religious Leaders Should Not Influence How People Vote (AT)

Seperation of Religious and Political Life (AB)

Preference for a Religious Party (AT)

All Law Based on Shari'a

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in Egypt, 13 percent in Iraq and 16 per cent in Tunisia. Support is 20 per cent in Morocco and 42 per cent in Jordan.

5. SuitabilityofDemocracyinPrinciple

While there is strong support for democracy people do not necessarily see democracy as a suitable system for their country in 2014. While nearly two thirds do so in Morocco, this falls 45 per cent in Jordan and Libya and just under a third in Egypt and Tunisia. The surprisingly low proportion doing so in Tunisia the one country that has moved from an anocracy to a democracy since 2011 is likely a reflection of heightened expectations and fractious reality since the fall of Ben Ali.

6. WhatPoliticalSystemDoTheyWant?ElectoralsystemsvsOtherSystems

Furthermore, they do not necessarily want the type of liberal democracy promoted by the EU. Taking a minimalist procedural definition, a clear majority of citizens in Iraq (78%) and Jordan (60%) do see open multiparty elections as at least somewhat suitable for their country but only around a half do in Tunisia (56.7), Morocco (53%) and Egypt (45.9%) and less than a third in Libya (32.2%). Also support falls dramatically when we consider those that see procedural democracy as the only suitable system - that is, that is that it is the only suitable system for their countries - varying from 51 per cent in Iraq to around 38 per cent in Egypt and Tunisia, around a quarter in Jordan and Morocco and 17 per cent in Libya. Suggesting that people are open to more than one type of government being suitable for their country and that there is relatively strong support, at least in some countries for other systems. This is likely to be at least in part because they have been told for years by authoritarian rulers that they have democracy because they have the right to vote in elections. Yet few people think that elections are completely free and fair in their country with the notable exception of Tunisia where 59 per cent do so. In the other countries, it varies from just 10 per cent in Jordan to 36 per cent in Libya.

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7. WhatdoCitizensThinkDemocracyIs?

So what do people in the six countries think about when they say that democracy is the best system despite its faults? When they are asked to say what the two most important characteristics of democracy are, it is clear that political rights are not by any means seen universally as the most important. Perhaps not surprisingly, the most frequently mentioned political characteristic is the right to vote in elections, but it is only in Iraq and Libya that more than 50 per cent nominate it and even then it is only just over a half, and choice of it falls to around 20 per cent in Egypt and Jordan. Freedom of speech and political equality are much less frequently mentioned. The proportion that nominate two political characteristics as the most important is much lower, varying from around a quarter in Iraq, Libya and Tunisia to just six per cent in Egypt. If we require ‘voting in elections’ to be one of the two the proportion making this choice falls even further, varying from a quarter in Libya to around a fifth in Iraq and Tunisia, a tenth in Morocco and around five percent in Jordan and Egypt.


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1.8

9.4 6.9

43.950.6

11.3 10.516.7

10.8

25.3

5.8 5.9

46.9

1617.1 17

7.7

37.5

20.627.1

12.7

2.8

35.3

22.1

38.8

10.7 12.6

28.1

Unrestricted Parliamentary

Islamic Parliament Authoritarian Islamic Authority Undecided

Figure 5: Only Type of Government Suitable for Country, %


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52

20.2

54.2

29.9

43.1

8.7

27.219.5

29.5

19.726.3

11.5

25.232.4

21.3 2230.2


Figure 6: Political Rights as Essential Characteristics of Democracy, %

Elections Freedom of Speech Political Equality

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It is clear then that there is a broader understanding of what democracy means than a narrow focus on political rights even among the minority of those that do think that political rights are important. Providing for the welfare of citizens through inclusive development, the provision of basic services and full employment is seen as important by a majority of citizens, varying from nearly two thirds in Morocco to a half in Libya. Inclusive growth and the provision of basic service are both seen as important by a sizable minority and full employment is also nominated by a noticeable minority. In Iraq and Jordan over 40 per cent of citizens think that a democracy fights corruption, as do a noticeable minority in the other countries.


Indeed, in three of the countries more people nominate at least one welfare variable as being one of the two most important characteristics of democracy than nominate a political variable (one or more of elections, freedom of speech, political equality), and more in all countries than nominate voting in elections, with the notable exception of Libya (and in Iraq ‘welfare’ and ‘elections’ are about equally popular).

28.719.8

29.224

43.7

31.736.1

30.334.4

25.9

36.432.3

23

43.7 4232.5 32.9

19.72310.5

19.78.4 11.3 10.6


Figure 7: Non-Political Characteristics Nominated as One of Two Main Characterisitcs of Democracy, %

Inclusive Growth Univeral Provision of Basic Services

Elimination of Corruption Full Employment

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52

20.2

54.2

29.943.1

30

78.7

61.3

78

57

74.859.5

52.4

69.5

50.1

73.860.8


Figure 8: Political and Welfare Rights as Essential Characteristics of Democracy, %

Elections Political Righ: Elections; Feedom of Speech; Political Equality Welfare Right

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Finally, Figure 7 is a useful illustration of similarities and differences between countries when it comes to the question of what is meant by ‘democracy’. In none of the six countries do citizens consider electoral process as something essential to the concept. In the two countries that have been most torn apart by internal and external conflict – Iraq and Libya – we find a (bare) majority of the population list elections as important, but the same can be said for welfare rights, but far more people (more than 30%) are concerned about political rights and freedoms in total). Jordan and Morocco, the two monarchies, have few citizens who consider elections the most important characteristic of democracies; their choice falls on political rights and, much more, on welfare rights. Tunisia, which is on the path of democratic development, ranks elections fairly high and political rights highest, but it is still very concerned about welfare rights. In Egypt, which tried out procedural democracy after the 2011 Uprising but did not manage to make a success of where the democratically elected government was over thrown by a political coup, ranks welfare rights above all and has the lowest proportion of people selecting electoral process as important. Thus, different countries have different priorities, depending on their economic and historical contexts. Similar patterns emerge if we look at what are seen as challenges in the various countries.

8. SummingUp

It is important to recognise that there is regional diversity, there is not a common distinct understanding of democracy. However, in all countries significant proportion of people include welfare as well as political rights as essential characteristics of democracy. What does emerge quite clearly is that there is not a strong demand for procedural democracy as promoted by the EU. People have a thicker understanding of what democracy is including economic rights as well as political rights. In general, they are much more concerned about the economic situation, corruption and inequalities, and in the case of Iraq and Libya security than they are authoritarianism. When people in MENA say that democracy is the best system despite its faults or that it is suitable for their country, it is not a political system they have in mind but a way of life. MENA citizens would like to live decent lives in decent societies, with good economic and welfare support and freedom to engage in politics, if they wish to do so, without fear of arrest, assault or social exclusion. The two sides of their image of the decent society are related to each other insofar as lack of resource and access to necessary goods, services and support excludes people from the society of their fellow citizens. To the extent that European countries, which are democracies of various kinds, are able to offer their citizens decent life-opportunities, they are role models to be copied, but the precise way in which they select their governments is not the most important thing about them.

9. Policyrecommendations

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• IfamajoraimofEuropeanpolicyisthenormativeoneofinstilling‘democratic’values and systems in the neighbouring countries – the rule of law,governments which are responsive to what citizens want, social inclusivepolicies–thenitisclearlynecessarytoappealtotheheartsandmindsofthepopulaceatlarge,notjustarulingordominantelite.TheEUneedstoacceptthat progress will be slow given state repression and ambivalence withinsocietyaboutoutsidesupport,especiallyfordemocratisation.

• Thishastwoconsequences.Thefirst,alreadyrecognisedinEuropeanpolicy,isthe need toworkwith non-state civil society organisations aswell aswithgovernments.Thismayentailtrainingthepopulaceinadvocacyfortheirownpositonsandcritiqueofgovernmentpolicy,whichwillnotendearEuropetogovernments,butitistheonlywaytochangevaluessustainably.

• TheEUcanusecommongroundwithMENApartners focusingonthemainconcernsofcitizensaneconomicorderthatismorejustandlesscorruptandguaranteessocio-economicrights.

• In order to appeal to the populace, the EU must arrange for congruencebetweenwhatitoffersandwhatisdesiredontheground.Thecountriesdifferin their situations and in what their citizens say they want in response toattitudesurveys:o IraqandLibyahavebothbeendamagedbyinternaldissensionandconflict

with outside powers over the last two decades, and in both the centralgovernment is at best only imperfectly in control of at least part of thecountry and, indeed, has lost control altogether in some areas. Forsustainabledevelopmentascountriestheyneedthetrustoftheirpeople,which means greater effectiveness in delivering both security andresources,strongerreflectionofthewishesofall factions ingovernmentpolicy and more reliable responsiveness of government to populardemands. Citizens’ concerns are with the establishment of electoralprocessesandwithpoliticalrightsbutalsowithcorruptionandtheuniversalprovisionofbasicservicesandresources.

o JordanandMorocco,thetwomonarchies,haveretainedsomecredibilitywith their citizensby thekings’ responses t0popularprotest– replacinggovernments,makingsmallincreasesinfoodsubsidies,etc.Majorissuesinboth are corruption and the provision of basic services. Elections are ahigherpriorityinMorocco,butonlyto30percentofthepopulation(and20% in Jordan). Political equality counterbalances these figures – 32percentinJordanand22percentinMorocco.

o Tunisia, where democracy appears to be established but still highlyvulnerable,ishighlyconcernedaboutpoliticalrightsandtoalargeextentaboutelectoralprocess,butit isalsoconcernedaboutwelfarerightsandparticularlyinclusivegrowthandtheprovisionofbasicservices.

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o Egypt,whoseelectedregimeafterthe2011uprisingswasunseatedbytheArmywithsomepopularsupport,isnotmuchconcernedwithelectionsorpoliticalrights.Itslargesconcerniswiththeprovisionofbasicservices,butsubstantialminoritiesalsocall foranendtocorruption, fullemploymentandwiderinclusionineconomicgrowth.

• WhenitbecomesanissueofEUaidandsupport,allcountriespreferfinancialaid– tocreate jobs, to trainpeople for themormoregenerally to supporteducation,healthetc.Thereislittleappetiteforexplicitordirectinterferencein national policy, and they are not impressed by the EU’s influence ondemocratisationsofar.

19

Perceptions of the EU in MENA Public Opinion Authors Andrea Teti and Pamela Abbott


POLICY BRIEFS

NUMBER 2


Summary: • New findings from the 2014 Arab

Transformations research in sixMENAcountriesshedlightonwhatcitizensthinkoftheEUandwhetheritspoliciesaddresstheirconcerns.

• The survey shows that citizens areless concerned with proceduraldemocracy and more withcorruption, the rule of law andsocial justiceon theonehandandthe economic consequences ofliberal developmental policies ontheother.

• The EU is not seen as currentlypromoting stability and relativelyfewseeitaspromotingdemocracy.

• When asked what policies the EUshould prioritise, their emphasis ison economic support anddevelopment.

Keywords: European Union, Arab Spring, Democratization, Human Rights, European Neighborhood Policy, Public Opinion, Social and Economic Rights

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1. IntroductionWhile the EU stresses the importance of working in partnership with its Southern Neighbourhood, to what extent do its policies meet the needs and expectations of partner states and indeed of their citizens as the ultimate rights holders? Novel findings from the Arab Transformations research carried out in 2014 in six countries - Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia - enable us to shed some light on this. The survey was specifically designed not only to provide information on how citizens viewed the EU and its involvement with their countries but also the extent to which they thought EU policies addressed their concerns. The EU’s policy towards the Southern Neighbourhood is underpinned by an assumption of shared interests as the EU aims to build societies in the image of itself, prosperous, peaceful, stable and underpinned by values of democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law. It aims to exert influence over its Southern neighbours by incorporating them in its own governance and common trade policy based on voluntary inclusion, shared power and partnership rather than coercion. The EU recognised at the time of the Arb Uprisings that its policies had failed the people of the region and in 2011 reviewed the ENP and strengthened its focus on promoting deep and sustainable democracy and inclusive economic development. However, in practice EU did not adapt its policy to address popular demands for social justice and economic rights but continued to promote a narrow procedural definition of democracy, to support authoritarian rulers and to implement liberal economic policies that have proved not to support economic development. The emerging consensus is that the EU is more interested in stabilising its borderlands and creating a ring of tranquillity around the EU to protect its (the EUs) security, peace and stability than democratization, the promotion of human rights and inclusive economic development in its Southern Neighbourhood. The EUs policy of trying to exert influence over its Southern Neighbours rather than being a realist power has had limited success in the wake of the Arab Uprisings. For its approach to work there have to be ready and willing partners to be mobilised. Achievements have been modest and limited to some improvement in economic governance structures in Morocco, some improvement to state structures in Jordan and Palestine and some convergence of energy regulations between the EU and the Southern states. It has certainly not achieved its aim of creating a ring of tranquillity and security on its Southern Boarders protecting the security of Europe. It has not been able to prevent the deteriorating security situation in the region and in 2015 indicated that security was going to be the main priority in its relations with its Southern Neighbours over the next few years. Its focus is on controlling the flow of migrants to Europe, and the defeat of the so called Islamic State as well as on counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation measures

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The findings from the Arab Transformations Public Opinion Survey show citizens are more concerned about economic security and their governments fighting corruption than about procedural democracy and political rights. Our findings suggest that what citizens want is social justice, economic rights, and the eradication of corruption rather than strictly, explicitly or exclusively Western-style (neo) liberal democracy.

2. PerceptionsoftheEU’sRoleinStabilisingtheRegion

The EU is perceived more favourably than other global powers, but even so its role in the region is not seen very favourably. Thirty-one per cent of people saw the EU as a force for instability in the region and 41 per cent as a force for stability. The USA was seen as a greater destabilising influence, by 52 per cent of people, with only a third seeing it as a force for stability. Egypt had the most negative attitudes to the EU of the six countries, with only 15 per cent seeing it as a force for stability, while, at the other extreme ,54 per cent of Moroccans saw it as a stabilising force. Only the Arab League was rated as a greater force for stability than the EU overall, and even then by only a small margin (44%). Russia (32%) and China 25%) were seen as a threat to stability by a smaller proportion of people than the EU, with the notable exception of Jordan, where 56 per cent of people saw Russia as a threat. However, these two powers were also less likely to be seen as a force for stability, with Russia at 26 per cent and China at 31 per cent. EU countries were not often nominated by respondents as ones with which they would like to see their own country form closer relations. In response to an open question respondents nominated a total of 58 countries but only seven per cent of respondents nominated an EU member state, with the three most frequently mentioned being Germany (2.5%), France (2.3% and the UK (1.6%); nine other EU countries were mentioned by less than one per cent of respondents. By contrast, the US was nominated by 6.3 per cent of respondents, Turkey by 7.7 per cent, Russia by 2.4 per cent, China by 2.6 per cent and Iran by 1.4 per cent. When asked specifically with which European state they would like their country to have closer relations, 53 did not name any and only 39 per cent named an EU member state. In total, 16 member states were nominated, with only Germany (13.4%). and the UK (11.3%) achieving double digits. Regardless of the intentions or merits of EU policies, it would appear that a majority of citizens have little appetite for closer relations with either the EU as a whole or its component parts.

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Table 1: Top Ten European Countries with which Citizens Think Their Country Should Strengthen Relations to Improve Current Situation (Open Question), %

Egypt Iraq Jordan Libya Morocco Tunisia Total Sample

No country nominated

62.6%


28.9%


66.2%


62.5%


31.3%


59.3%


53.5%

Russia 16.9%

UK 17% Germany 14.5%

UK 15.3% Germany 30.4%

Germany 22.8%

Germany 13.4%

Germany 11.5%

Germany 13%

UK 12.1% Italy 9.4% Spain 8.5% Italy 10.0% UK 11.3%

Italy 2.4% Sweden 9.5%

Italy 2.1% Germany 5.6%

UK 7.0% Switzerland 5.0%

Italy 6.2%

UK 2.4% Italy 7.5% Switzerland 2.1%

Switzerland 2.1%

Sweden 4.4% Spain 1.6% Russia 4.1%

Turkey 1.9%

Russia 6.7%

Spain 1.0% Spain 2.0% Italy 4.3% Belgium 0.5% Spain 2.9%

Sweden 0.9%

Netherlands 5.1%

Sweden 0.7%

Netherlands 0.6%

Russia 3.3% Sweden 0.3% Sweden 2.2%

Greece 0.7%

Switzerland

4.0

Norway 0.3% Sweden 0.4% Switzerland 3.0%

Austria 0.2% Switzerland 2.1%

Spain 0.5% Denmark 1.6%

Netherlands 0.3%

Greece 0.4% Netherlands 1.3%

Netherlands 0.2

Netherlands 1.1%

Belgium 0.2%

Spain 1.6% Denmark 0.3%

Bulgaria 0.4% Norway 1.1% UK 0.2% Belgium 0.7%

Notes: white squares denote non-EU countries; 12.7% of respondents nominated no country, Egypt 11.8%, Iraq 4%, Jordan 15.5%, Libya 19.2%, Morocco 2.6%

3. Perceptions of the EU’s Role in Promoting Democracy and

DevelopmentCitizens were also asked about their perception of the EU’s impact in specific policy areas, particularly democracy and development. Overall, one in three did not think the EU should have any involvement in policy or did not know in what policy it should be involved, and only 13 per cent said that the most positive thing the Union could do would be to support democratisation (with some variation by country, ranging from four per cent in Egypt to a quarter in Iraq). On the other hand, support for economic development, with promoting economic development being the most frequently nominated response in all countries, ranged from 31 per cent in Egypt and Iraq to 64 per cent in Tunisia.

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Note: 25.8% of respondents in Egypt, 16% in Iraq, 3.6% in Jordan 15.5 in Libya, 10.9% in Morocco and 12.6% in Tunisia said they did not know. The EU is not seen as having had a very positive influence on the development of democracy. It does vary by country, ranging from 47 per cent in Libya to just six per cent in Egypt. The US is viewed in much the same light, suggesting that lack of support for Western powers being involved in democracy promotion is not specific to the EU.

4. PerceptionsofDevelopmentAssistance

Less than a third of peoples said they had a heard about EU development assistance to their country in general, varying from 56 per cent in Libya to a mere nine per cent in Egypt. Of those who had heard of it, a majority held positive opinions about it, varying from 92 per cent in Iraq to 57 per cent in Egypt. Nearly twice as many people (63%) said they had heard about EU programmes specifically responding to the Arab Uprisings. However, only 24 per cent evaluated the impact of these programmes positively and the same proportion overall thought they had had a negative impact. Libyans were the most positive by a considerable margin, at 35 per cent, and the Egyptians were the least positive (only 3.4%).

30.8 34.7

4 3.7 1

31.2

18.224.1

7.82.8

48.8

24.4

6.911.4

5

40

17.8 21.2

4 1.6

45.1

14.4 16.58.3 4.9

64.1

10.95.5 4.3 2.6

Economic Development

Should Not Get Involved

Democracy Resolving the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Women's Rights

Figure 1: Policy the EU Should Prioritise in Supporting Development, %


6.334.4 21.3

46.8 40.5 352.9

24.9 26.748 36.5 33.8


Figure 2: EU and US Positive Influence on Development of Democracy, %

EU USA

25

5. WhatSupportCitizensWantfromtheEU.

When asked to name the two most important things the EU could offer to support their country, over 80 per cent gave at least one example. Various kinds of financial support were most frequently mentioned (Figure 4), with 56 per cent of peoples naming support for at least one of basic services, jobs, investment, and/or loans and grants. There was noticeable variation by country: 76 per cent mentioned financial support in Egypt, compared to 49 per cent in Libya. Given the security situation in 2014 it is not unsurprising that citizens in Libya and Iraq were more likely to suggest security support. It is interesting to note that ceasing to support Israel was relatively low given that nearly three quarters thought Israel had a destabilising effect on the region. This is probably indicative of the priority citizens give to improving their economic situation. It may also be because citizens have given up on the EU and the West more generally actually taking any effective measures to resolve the Palestinian question.

9.4

23.2

43.3

13.9

23.1

12

5.6

17

14.2

18.3

19.4

13.6

3.4

17.7

14.9

35.1

14.2

27.3

46.5

20.6

20.6

9.7

24.6

30.4

35.1

21.6

7

23

18.8

16.7

EQYPT

IRAQ

JORDAN

LIBYA

MOROCCO

TUNISIA

Figure 3: Assesment of the EU Programme in Response to the Arab Uprisings, %

Negative No Impact Positive Never Heard of It DK

26

Note: 17.8% in Egypt, 14.9% in Iraq, 2.2% in Jordan, 11.2% in Libya, 5.9% in Morocco and 2.4% in Tunisia said they did not know.

6. TheMismatchbetweenEUPolicyandwhatCitizensWant

The 2014 Arab Transformations survey shows that citizens in the six countries have a low opinion of the EU’s claims to be a normative actor, to facilitate democratisation and development or even to be a force for stability in their region. The Union’s specific response to the Arab Uprisings is not judged positively and there is at least implicit hostility to the EU’s self-imposed role as a normative actor committed to supporting democratization in the region. There seems to be a considerable disjuncture between the declared intentions behind EU policy and what people in the region see as their priorities This disconnection is likely to be at the root of the poor reputation the EU enjoys amongst regional citizens. The problem lies partly in the goals and instruments of the EU’s policies themselves. The facts that citizens have a generally poor opinion of the EU’s efforts at democracy promotion and that democracy ranks

23.8

31.6

36.6

3.9

0.7

14.2

18.8

9.1

4.3

56.4

52.1

14.8

13.8

8.8

6.8

6.8

18.7

5.2

35.8

31.2

25.4

23.2

3.2

6.6

36.8

18.9

6.9

46.3

52.3

19.9

0

10.8

3.8

9.3

21.4

9.6

29.8

37.8

13.4

18.5

6.4

7.1

29.6

13.7

7.9

60.5

53

1.8

5.1

0.3

0.4

6.6

7.9

7.7

Financial support for basic services

Finance for job creation and investment

Loans and grants

Technical support for education and training

Women's empowerment

Support for Migration

Security/military

Stop supporting Israel

EU should not provide support

Figure 4: Nominated as One of Two Top Priorities for EU Support, %


27

very low among areas on which citizens would like to see the EU focus are not results of a culturally determined or religiously mandated aversion. Rather, they seem to be related to a mismatch between the conception of democracy contained in EU documents and the conception of it which the survey data suggest is held by MENA public opinion, on the one hand, and on the other hand to respondents’ socio-political priorities more generally. While the former focuses on formal institutions and processes, for the latter the substantive aspects of democracy – inclusion, social justice, etc. – are also important and cannot be separated from the more formal or procedural considerations.

7. PolicyRecommendations• ThemostobviouscommentthatwecanmakeonthesurveyresultsisthattheEU

needs to align its declared prioritieswith those of the citizens in the SouthernNeighbourhoodifitwishestoincreaseitsinfluencethere.Atpresentitspolicyofnormativeleadershipisnotworking:theEUisnotrecognisedasaforceimpellingtheregiontowardsdemocracynorevenasaforceworkingtomaintainstabilityintheregion.IftheEUwantstoincreaseitsinfluenceitmustbeseentoofferwhatthe people feel they need, and this is not the implementation of electoralproceduresatthistime.

• TheEUshouldnotabandonattemptstobringaboutpositivechangeanduseitsinfluencetocontinuetopromotedemocratisationandrespectforhumanrightsasvaluesthatunderpinpoliticalstability.Itshouldalsocontinueregionalcooperation,buildingregionalnormsandrulesisessentialifthereistobesecurityintheregion.

• What is wanted, in all countries, is an end to corruption or at least a well-grounded belief that someone is trying to end it. In most countries purely household/ personal goals (employment, access of basic services) and wider economic goals such as moving towards a less unequal society are also very important. These are what peoples see as challenges, what they would hope to receive from the EU (if they approve of outside interference at all) and what the 2011 Uprisings were fought over. In some countries (Iraq, Libya) political and electoral factors loom larger, but on the whole MENA’s interest in help and guidance revolves around economic issues.

• As the previous point suggests, the six countries are not uniform in what they value and in their priorities. Policy will obviously need to be tailored to the needs and views of the receiving country (in the light, probably, of the history of their relations with the donor country or countries).

• Whatever rhetoric of democracy appears in the official documents, the EU might do better in practice to pay less attention to encouraging the use of the systems and mechanisms (which in any case differ from country to country) through which democracy has grown up in European countries and more to supporting or introducing the conditions under which free

28

politics can flourish, which are economic security, social inclusion (the reconciliation of groups with diverse histories and goals), the rule of law (including its underlying assumptions of fair and equal dealing), political ‘voice’ and the ability to change governments without bloodshed. Not every country which holds formally correct elections can validly claim to foster all of these conditions.

29

Socio-economic Inequality and the Failure of Development Strategies for the Middle East Authors Pamela Abbott and Andrea Teti


POLICY BRIEFS

NUMBER 3


Summary: The main drivers of the Arab Uprisings were economic grievances and a perceived growth in inequalities. Poor economic growth and lack of inclusive policies are the underlying causes of insecurity in the region The main concerns of people in the MENA are economic security and corruption. People think that the best way in which the EU can help their countries in the wake of the Uprisings is with support for inclusive economic development. The EU needs to develop its policies so that they bring economic benefits to the countries in the region as well as to the EU Keywords: Economic Security, Employment, Corruption, Development Assistance, Trade, Mobility Agreements, European Union, Arab Spring

31

1. IntroductionEU strategies for economic development in the MENA region have relied on free trade agreements and loans and continue to do so. However, these policies have demonstrable failed to deliver inclusive socio-economic development in the past and led directly to the conditions that sparked the 2011 Uprisings. The structural adjustment programme (privatisation of public assets, reductions in state spending, tax reforms, trade liberalisation, market-determined exchange rates and open-door FDI) that have been required to meet the conditions for free trade agreements and loans have increased the polarisation of income and wealth distribution by facilitating the emergence of monopolies and crony capitalism and reducing opportunities for decent employment. Ordinary people had become dissatisfied with their standard of living, seeing the benefits of economic development going to the elite and experiencing a growing gap between their expectations and the reality of their lives. The middle class have become frustrated by a progressive deterioration in their (real and perceived) living conditions, with a continued lack of meritocracy, and with the persistence of a system in which connections and patronage (wasta) determined social status and social mobility rather than ability. At the same time, the working classes are concerned about their poor living conditions, poor public services, and increasing poverty. This put pressure on the (implicit) authoritarian social contracts by which citizens exchanged political freedom for public-sector employment, health care, education and food and fuel subsidies. What happened in 2011 was the coming together of the working and middle classes against a backdrop of growing disaffection and a common interest in fighting for regime change. What citizens expressed in 2011, then, was deep dissatisfaction with the effects of the economic policies and ‘façade democracies’ which the EU and its Western allies had encouraged, cajoled, and incentivised the MENA countries to implement since the 1980s. However, international financial institutions and Western governments quickly recast the Uprisings as a struggle merely for formal democracy and the overthrow of autocracy, ignoring people’s substantive demands for economic reforms and more socially inclusive and just societies. Western governments’ narrow interpretation made it possible for them to stress the need for an orderly transition to democracy on the unquestioned acceptance that it provides the conditions for security and building prosperity. However, people’s priorities were and remain decent jobs, economic security, adequate public services, and the rule of law. People’s expectations have been largely ignored or have gone unfulfilled on a range of issues, from social security to the availability of jobs. Trust in governments has declined drastically, the economy remains the single largest challenge (and cause of migration),

32

corruption remains pervasive, unemployment is endemic, political reforms have been either cosmetic or reversed (or, in Tunisia’s case, remains fragile) and people’s faith that things might change has evaporated. They do not want to wait for some promised future; what they want is a decent standard of living now. Citizens have clearly expressed this in public opinion surveys carried out since 2011, including the 2014 Arab Transformations survey.

2. PopularPerceptionsoftheCausesofthe2011UprisingsCitizens clearly see economic grievances and corruption as the main drivers of the 2011 Uprisings, with political rights some way behind. Asked in 2014 what they thought had been the two main drivers of the Uprising in their country in 2011, economic grievances were the ones most frequently mentioned - ranging from 50 per cent in Libya to 77 per cent in Jordan – followed by corruption, which was nominated by just over 40 per cent in Egypt, rising to 64 per cent in Libya. Political rights were less frequently mentioned, although a noticeable number did so in each country, ranging from 21 per cent in Egypt to 57 per cent in Libya.

3. People’sGrievancesin2014The same concerns were still being given priority in 2014. Despite the diverse histories and current situations of the different countries, the issues most likely to be named by citizens as the two main challenges facing their country in 2014 were factors pertaining to economic conditions and rights (including employment and inflation), on the one hand, and government corruption on the other. The economic situation was nominated as the most important challenge everywhere except in Libya, and corruption was also

Egypt Iraq Jordan Libya Morocco Tunisia Economic Situation 69.2 62.2 76.9 49.5 57.7 62.8Government Corruption 41.1 50.5 47.8 63.8 51.7 61.3Political Rights 21.4 44.9 23.4 57.3 34.5 42.8

Figure 1: Citizens' Perceptions of the Two Main Drivers of the 2011 Uprisings, %

Economic Situation Government Corruption Political Rights

33

reported as an important challenge, although less so in Egypt2. Internal security emerged as a major challenge in 2014 in four of the countries – Egypt, Iraq, Libya and Tunisia. Authoritarianism, however, was only seen as one of the two main challenges facing their country by a tiny minority. This suggests that there is a mismatch between what the West thinks Arabs want and what they themselves see as the most important things they need.

Citizens across the countries, with the notable exception of Morocco, thought on average that the general situation of both their families and their country had worsened between 2009 and 2014, generally and in terms of the economic, political and security situations. Their family situation was generally rated more favourably than that of their countries in both years and the perceived decline in the general situation was notably greater in Jordan, Libya and Tunisia than in the other countries.

10-point scale 1= ‘very bad’, 10 = ‘very good’

People are concerned the economic situation and generally think that it has got worse compared with 2009. They did not rate the economic situation of their

2AlthoughanoticeablysmallerproportionofrespondentsseecorruptionasoneofthetwomainchallengesfacingtheircountryinEgyptcomparedtotheothercountries,responsesbyEgyptianstootherquestionsneverthelessindicatethatitwasconsideredaproblembymanyrespondents,aswediscussbelow.

Egypt Iraq Jordan Libya Morocco Tunisia Economic Situation 90.3 49.3 87.6 28.4 79.3 79.8Government Corruption 20.7 48.7 71.3 61 58.6 49.5Internal Security 51 60 9.8 62.1 12.9 42.2Authoritianism 2 12.8 2.3 17.4 12.8 6.7

Figure 2: Issues Nominated as One of Two Major Challenges Facing the Country in 2014, %

Economic Situation Government Corruption Internal Security Authoritianism

6.65.6

8.17.4

67

6 5.66.6 6.2 6.4

5.6

EGYPT IRAQ JORDAN LIBYA MOROCCOTUNISIA

Figure 3a: Mean Score for Genral Situation of Household in 2009 and 2014

2009 2014

6.6

4.8

8.2

6.4 5.87

64.4

5.84.4

6.2

4.4


Figure 3b: Mean Score for Genral Situation of Country in 2009 and 2014

2009 2014

34

households and or country highly in 2014 and generally see it as having since 2009. In Tunisia and Jordan, the decline in the average scores for 2014 compared to 2009 very noticeable. By contrast, Iraqis and Moroccans report little difference, but with scores that are comparatively low in both years.

10-point scale 1= ‘very bad’, 10 = ‘very good’

Post-2011 Governments were also not judged to be performing well in delivering economic policy. This is not surprising given the poor economic performance since 2011 and the continuing high levels of unemployment, including youth unemployment, with some of the highest rates in the wold. Tunisians were the least likely to think their government was delivering, with only four per cent of citizens saying they were performing well in fighting inflation or reducing inequalities and nine per cent in creating employment opportunities. Egyptians were the most likely to think their government was performing well, but even here less than 40 per cent thought the government was performing well on employment creation, 30 per cent on inclusive development and just under a quarter on fighting inflation.

Perhaps not surprisingly, people were not very satisfied with the way the economy was developing or the delivery of the public services which make up what is often referred to as ‘the social wage’ and are important for people’s standard of living. Given the low scores the Tunisians awarded to the economic situation of their country and households it is perhaps not surprising that they

6.4 5.9

7.87

5.86.6

5.6 5.9 5.6 6.2 6.25.2


Figure 4a: Mean Score for Household Economic Situation in 2009 and 2014

2009 2014

6.45.2

7.86.4 5.6

7

2.75 4.8 5.2 5.6

4

EGYPT IRAQ JORDAN LIBYA MOROCCOTUNISIA

Figure 4b: Mean Score for Country Economic Situation in 2009 and 2014

2009 2014

38.5

11.3

29.233.4

21.3

8.5

23 2518 20.9 18.1

3.7

29

11.616.7 17.8 16.1

3.7


Figure 5: % Agreeing that their Government was Performiing Well in Delivering Economic Policies in 2014, %

Creating Employment Inflation Inclusive Development

35

were the least satisfied with the way the economy was developing, with only 11 per cent being satisfied. The level of satisfaction in the other countries ranged from a quarter in Libya to just over a half in Egypt. Satisfaction with government social provision was noticeably higher in Jordan than the other countries, but elsewhere noticeably less than half were satisfied, ranging from 42 per cent of Iraqis thinking the education was developing well to only 16 per cent of Libyans thinking the health system was developing well.

Dissatisfaction with the government’s economic performance was fuelled by concerns about high levels of government corruption and the failure of government to make a concerted effort to tackle it. Concerns about high levels of corruption varied from 70 per cent in Libya to 89 per cent in Morocco. Only a minority thought their government was making a concerted effort to tackle it, varying a from a low of six per cent in Tunisia to a high of 30 per cent in Egypt. People were also concerned about employment security, not surprisingly given the high rates of unemployment and with Wasta (nepotism) being necessary to get employment. Virtually no one thought Wasta was never necessary to get employment and noticeably more than half, ranging from 74 per cent in Egypt to 51 per cent in Morocco, thought it was always necessary. Between 29 per cent (Jordan) and 56 per cent (Morocco) expressed concern about the main breadwinner losing his or her job. People were also concerned about their ability to give their children getting a good education, ranging from 40 per cent (Jordan) to 53 per cent (Morocco).

51.2

34.6 30.141.2

30.8

42.536.9

22.5

37.2

62.471.6

52.3

24 2012.3

29.330.3

16.322

28.3

10.8

30.8 30.925.7

Economy Developing Education System Health Care System Social Security System

Figure 6: Satisfaction With the Way in which the Economy and Government Services are Developing in 2014, %


36

Perhaps not surprisingly, people thought that the best way in which the EU could provide support to their country was through one or more types of support for economic development.

This varied from a high of 86 per cent in Tunisia to 62 per cent in Libya. The figure was noticeably lower in Iraq and Libya, where security, not surprisingly, was seen as more of a priority than in the other countries, but never the less still a clear majority prioritised some form(s) of economic support.

43.1 47.151.446.1

28.640

48 45.655.6 53

4449.9

Concerned about Main Breadwinner Losing Job Concerned about Ability to Give children a Good Education

Figure 7: Concerned about Security of Employment and Ability to Give Children a Good Education, %


23.8

31.6

36.6

3.9

0.7

14.2

18.8

9.1

4.3

56.4

52.1

14.8

13.8

8.8

6.8

6.8

18.7

5.2

35.8

31.2

25.4

23.2

3.2

6.6

36.8

18.9

6.9

46.3

52.3

19.9

0

10.8

3.8

9.3

21.4

9.6

29.8

37.8

13.4

18.5

6.4

7.1

29.6

13.7

7.9

60.5

53

1.8

5.1

0.3

0.4

6.6

7.9

7.7

Financial support for basic services

Finance for job creation and investment

Loans and grants

Technical support for education and training

Women's empowerment

Support for Migration

Security/military

Stop supporting Israel

EU should not provide support

Figure 8: Nominated as One of Two Top Priorities for EU Support, %


37

4. PolicyRecommendations

The European Neighbourhood Policy objective is to bring security, stability and prosperity underpinned by respect for the shared values of democracy, the rule of law and human rights to the countries bordering on the EU. The policy has failed to deliver this to its southern Neighbourhood. The poor economic performance of MENA countries and lack of inclusive socioeconomic growth were the main drivers of the 2011 Uprisings and of the ongoing security situation. The EU needs to recognise the importance of its adapting and developing its policies so that it supports inclusive economic growth. Neo-liberal economic policies have failed to deliver growth across the developing world but as yet viable alternatives have not been developed. Given this the EU needs to review its policies and ensure that they deliver mutual benefits. Steps that the EU can take include:

• Driving international efforts to prevent illicit financial flows and support theregulation of tax havens, and sharing agreements aimed at preventinginternationalpersonaltaxabuse.Tacklingillicitfinancialflowsandmeasurestotackle tax havenswill increase government revenues in developing (aswell asdeveloped)countriesbyensuringfairmarketsandmorevibranteconomies.

• Providingtechnicalsupportforthefightagainstcorruption inbothgovernmentandbusiness;

• EnsuringthattradedealsbenefittheMENAcountriesaswellastheEU-atpresentMENAcountrieshavebalanceoftradedeficitswiththeEU;

• Usingdevelopmentassistancetoinvestinprogrammesforemploymentcreationandespeciallyfordecentjobsforyouthandwomen;

• Encouraging FDI from the EU in enterprises that that will create decentemployment and not just in industries that create few local employmentopportunitiesandSpecialEconomicZonesthatprovidepoorqualityemploymentwithcompromisedlabourrightsandlowwages;

• Reducingthecostofremittancetransfers,giventheimportanceofremittancestopeople’swelfare;

• ReviewingMobilityPartnershipstoensurethatMENAcountriesaswellastheEUbenefitfromthem.Atpresent,theytendtofunctionasawayfortheEUtodealwithmigrationasanon-traditionalsecurityissue.MENAcountriesarereluctanttonegotiatethembecausetheydonotseehowtheywouldbenefit.

39

From Ring of Friends to Ring of Fire: Challenges to Stability and legitimacy in MENA States Authors Pamela Abbott and Andrea Teti


POLICY BRIEFS

NUMBER 4


Summary: • TheEuropeanUnionaimstoassureitssecurity

bybringingprosperity,stabilityanddemocracytoitsneighbours.

• Southernneighbourshavebecome lessstableafterthe2011Uprisings,andtheregionfacescontinuingconflictsandfloodsofrefugeesandinternally displaced people causing greateconomicstrain.

• TheEUpolicyisfailingbecauseinpracticeithasfailedtoengagewiththeunderlyingproblemswhich citizens are facing: economic hardship,unemployment corruption, social exclusion,distrust of government and lack of cohesionacross sectarian, historical and geographicallinesofdivision.

• Policy aimed at fostering sustainabledevelopment must go beyond too narrow afocusonsecurityandtooprescriptiveaprocessof economic restructuring, to build popularacceptancebyprovidingdecentjobs,improvedbasicservicesanddevelopmenttowardssocialjusticeandtheruleoflaw.

Keywords: European Neighborhood Policy, middle-eastern conflict, terrorism, security, instability, social justice, rule of law, MENA economic development.

41

1. IntroductionAn ‘arc of instability’ surrounds the European Union’s (EU) on its eastern and southern borders, undermining the European Neighbourhood Policy which aimed to secure its own security by bringing prosperity, stability and democracy to its neighbourhood. The policy has manifestly failed and the root causes of instability in the region have not been addressed. The Southern Neighbourhood has become more unstable and insecure following the 2011 Uprisings and there has been little progress in economic reform, inclusive development or democratisation and respect for human rights. This instability has spilt over into Europe with the destabilising impact of the refugee crisis and terrorist attacks aimed at the mass killing of ordinary residents. Terrorism and the refugee crisis are of great concern in Arab countries. Arab citizens are at significantly greater risk of terrorist attaches than European ones. The region forms a security complex from Morocco to Iran with weapons, people and violent ideologies moving freely and fostering instability. The conflicts across the region are complex and interlocking and bound together in a vicious cycle of worsening violence, as one conflict ends fighters move location. Civil-military relations are not primarily about defence or security but reflect a power struggle, making progress on the reforms which are necessary to improve the security situation difficult to achieve. Forty-eight per cent of terrorist attacks worldwide in 2014 took place in the region, it has sent more people to fight for the so-called Islamic State, in both absolute and relative terms, than any other region and has the highest number of refugees and internally displaced persons in the world. The reverse flows of fighters back to their countries threatens security while prisons and refugee camps are fertile breeding ground for radicalisation. The strain on the economies of the countries hosting refugees, mainly Jordan and Lebanon, feeds into the conflict cycle through a negative impact on employment opportunities and the delivery of services for the country’s own citizens. The so called Islamic State has gained a foothold in countries across the region with terrorist attacks being carried out against government targets, the local civilian population as well as tourists. Instability deters tourists who are an important source of revenue and employment. Against the tide of a steep increase in tourism across the globe numbers have stagnated or even decline in MENA most noticeable in Egypt where numbers decline 69 per cent between 2010 and 2014 from 14 million in 2010 to 9.4 million in 2014. Numbers have also declined but less so in Tunisia and stagnated in Jordan and Morocco three other countries with a high reliance on tourism revenues. The Palestine-Israel conflict remains unresolved and a major barrier to peace and stability in the region. The Syrian civil war, the Islamic State invasion of Iraq, the descent into civil war and anarchy in Libya, the North Sinai conflict in Egypt and the conflict between Morocco and Algeria over disputed territory in the Western Sahara are all destabilising as is the presence of so called Islamic State in other countries in the region. In the wake of the Arab uprisings there has been an increase in religious extremism, lack of progress towards more democratic government and respect for human rights (with the notable exception of Tunisia) and lack of economic progress.

42

2. EUPolicyResponseAfter 2011 a ‘Fortress Europe’ mentality has developed, with priority given by the EU and its member states to controlling the flows of refugees, preventing the radicalisation of citizens and taking measures to counter terrorism. EU states are responsible for law enforcement and military matters and few are prepared to engage diplomatically and/or militarily in the MENA, with the majority preferring to build ‘fences’ an attempt to prevent spillover. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has continued to fail to deliver; rather than driving the region to a more sustainable future it has continued to fuel the drivers of the Uprisings and feed regional insecurity. The 2015 review recognised that the most urgent challenge was stabilization and tackling the root causes of instability, including a lack of inclusive socio-economic development and corruption. However, the policy instruments remain unchanged and no reference is made to Israel –Palestinian conflicts or to the destabilising effect of armed intervention in the region by foreign powers, including EU member states. It is clear that security and the protection of Europe and her citizens is the main concern. Meanwhile, the MENA| countries have moved to a security agenda whereby defense budgets are increased at the cost of stifling economic development, discouraging foreign direct investment and endangering human rights. They lack faith in EU capacity-building approach to Counter-Terrorism, which goes beyond a strictly military- and security-based interpretation of counter-terrorism as building state capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and includes respect for human rights and the rule of law. They also dislike the tripartite approach, being reluctant to engage with independent civil society and efforts to empower and integrate marginalised groups. Some countries prefer a ‘military model’, that is using force rather than persuasion and wiping out the terrorist threat.

3. CitizensPerceptionsofCausesofInstabilityintheRegionThe Arab Transformations project carried out in six Arab countries in 2014 (Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia) shows that citizens see the Israel -Palestine conflict as a major source of instability in the region (Figure 2 below). While few saw it as one of the two main challenges facing their country or as a priority for EU intervention, they nevertheless though it had a destabilising influence. Indeed, turning to the 2013 Arab Barometer, a clear majoring in each country thought that the Arab World should not accept the existence of Israel as a Jewish State in the Middle East (Figure 1).

43

Source: Arab Barometer III 2013 International and regional powers are generally seen to have more of a destabilising influence than a stabilising one. Israel is seen as being the most destabilising especially by those countries lying closest to it geographically - Egypt, Iraq and Jordan (Figure 2). There is less agreement concerning the destabilising/stabilising influence of other regional and international powers. Iran and the US are seen as having a destabilising influence by a higher proportion of citizens than the proportion that think they have a stabilising influence. Opinion on the EU is more evenly divided and there is no evidence that Russia, China and the Arab League are seen as having a strongly stabilising influence. It should also be noted that opinion varies quite strikingly by country – there is no cross-regional public opinion consensus.

63.6 79.7 72.4 83.8 69.5 83

E G Y P T I R A Q J O R D A N L I B Y A M O R O C C O T U N I S I A

Figure 1: The Arab World Should not Accept the Exsistance Of Israel as a Jewish State in the

Middle East , %

44

Source: ArabTrans 2014. Note: Only includes respondents who expressed and opinion so totals do not add up to 100 There is some evidence that military intervention in the region by Western powers can have a destabilising impact beyond the region, as is evidenced by recent terrorist attacks in European countries. These are generally portrayed as the work of a small minority of extremists but there is some evidence from the Arab Barometer (Figure 3) that armed intervention by an international power in the region may be seen by a noticeable minority of citizens as justification for armed operations against that power.

0.43.2

9.73.1

9.21.2

1.927.5

4.76.9

10.49.5

38.438.3

13.120.1

22.126.5

2.922.1

32.639

44.232.8

36.143.7

26.923.5

29.736.8

734

36.728.3

37.553.8

1037.5

28.441.8

57.251.6

41.831.432.2

4644.1

35.9

-82.9-88.8

-83.4-62.7

-58.5-71.7

-62.8-57.7

-79.7-47.7

-32.6-35.1

-20.5-15.5

-55.5-42.3

-16-12.3

-75.1-68.8

-55.1-42.3

-33.4-33.5

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-37.3-33.5

-15.9-8.4

-54-43.6

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-7.1-7.7

-34.4-25.9

-44-29.4

-18.5-15.7

-11.7-28.1-28.2

-19.9-12.8

-17.9

EgyptIraq

JordanLibya

MoroccoTunisia

EgyptIraq

JordanLibya

MoroccoTunisia

EgyptIraq

JordanLibya

MoroccoTunisia

EgyptIraq

JordanLibya

MoroccoTunisia

EgyptIraq

JordanLibya

MoroccoTunisia

EgyptIraq

JordanLibya

MoroccoTunisia

EgyptIraq

JordanLibya

MoroccoTunisa

EgyptIraq

JordanLibya

MoroccoTunisa

Figure 2: Countries Seen as a Factor for Stability or Instability, %

Stability Instability

EU

USA

ISRAEL

IRAN

CHINA

RUSSIA

TURKEY

ARAB LEAGUE

45

Source: Arab Barometer III 2013

4. TheChangingInternalSecuritySituationMENA Citizens think that the security situation in their countries has become worse in recent years and are concerned about the security situation generally. They are quite justified in their concern: the Global Terrorism Data Base shows that there has been a significant increase in terrorist incidents in all the countries except Morocco and Jordan since 2011. Not surprisingly, Iraq has had by far the most attacks, followed by Libya. At the time as the Arab Transformations survey was being carried out in Iraq in June 2014 the so called Islamic State was invading the Central Region and Libya had descended into anarchy and civil war. Islamic state has also gained a foothold in Tunisia and Egypt and been credited with carrying out terrorist attacks. In Jordan there is the potential for conflict between the local population and refugees over access to resources and jobs. Jordan is housing large numbers of refugees, according to the 2016 Census 31 per cent of Jordan’s total population are refugees, and 46 per cent of them are Syrian refugees.

People were concerned, perhaps not surprisingly, about the security of their households, and in four countries they thought the situation had deteriorated since 2009. In Morocco and Iraq there was little change (Figure 5) but the means were relatively low in both years.

40.8 47.3 41 36.948.2

34.1

E G Y P T I R A Q J O R D A N L I B Y A M O R O C C O T U N I S I A

Figure 3: US Armed Interference in the Region Just i f i es Armed Operations Against the US Elsewhere,

%

14 48314 349

581

20112012201320142015

4a: Egypt Terrorist Attacks, 2014

1306

1737

2848

3864 280

1

20112012201320142015

4b: IraqTerrorist Attacks 2014

2 61292

729541

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

4c: LibyaTerrorist Attacks 2014

3 127 22

76

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

4d: Tunisia Terrorist Attacks 2014

46

Source: Arab Trans Data 2014

Citizens were even more concerned about the security of their countries, however, and there was an increase in concern in all the countries except for Morocco (Figure 6). The increase in concern is especially noticeable, not surprisingly in Libya, but also in Tunisia.

Source: Arab Trans Data 2014 When it came to internal stability and security and the threat of a war with another country, citizens show a noticeable level of concern – varying from a high of 93 per cent in Iraq and Egypt to 78 per cent in Jordan and Morocco. In Libya (62%) and Iraq (60%) citizens nominated internal security as the main challenge facing their countries. It was also nominated as one of the two main challenges by just over half of citizens in Egypt and 42 per cent in Tunisia but only by around 10 per cent in Jordan and Morocco, with citizens in these countries nominating the economic situation more frequently. Concern about at least one internal security threat ranged from 87 per cent in Iraq to 46 per cent in Jordan (Figure 7). Iraq and Tunisia show the highest levels of concern, followed closely by Egypt and Libya, then Morocco and Jordan, which are least concerned. It should be noted, however, that Egypt and Tunisia, and Morocco, are more concerned about terrorism than other threats; indeed, Tunisia has the greatest concern, followed by Iraq and Egypt, and exceeds Libya in this respect. In Iraq there is strong regional variation, with those in the Central Region, not surprisingly, being much more concerned, 77 per cent, compared with 66 per cent in the South and 37 per cent in the North. It should also be noted that half of the citizens in five of the six countries are worried about the possibility of a war with another country, and even in Jordan 40 per cent are concerned.

7.86.2

9.2 8.26.8 7.8

6.6 6.28.2

5.66.8 5.8


Figure 5: Mean Score on 10-Point Scale for Household Security in 2009 and 2014

2009 2014

7.44.6

9 7.8 6.4 7.85.8 3.8 7 3.6 6.6 4.2


Figure 6: Mean Score on 10 Point Scale for Country Security in 2009 and 2014

2009 2014

47

Source: ArabTrans 2014.

5. BroaderandEnduringChallengestoStabilityWhile instability in the MENA region is shaped by interlocking conflicts and crisis, any enduring solution will require addressing the broader and enduring challenges to stability. MENA citizens are above all concerned about their economic situation, social justice and authoritarian regimes that do not deliver economic and social wellbeing. The Arab Transformations data show that citizens’ main concerns are economic security, decent public services, responsive government and getting rid of corruption; they are much less concerned about democratisation and human rights. Citizens think that the economic situation and corruption were the main drivers of the Arab Uprisings and remain major challenges in 2014. They are generally dissatisfied with their economic situation, the poor provision of educational and health services and the unresponsiveness of governments to citizens’ demands. To the extent that they want the EU involved in their country they want economic support; they certainly do not want the EU interfering in policy making. The discontent that drove demands for regime change in 2011 have not been addressed and the potential for demands for change remains adding to the other causes of instability in the region.

6. PolicyRecommendationsThe EU lacks the resources to make a significant impact alone and needs a strategic partnership with its own member states and allies to work towards stabilising the region. It can play an important role in an alliance as a normative power. EU citizens, not unnaturally, expect their countries and the EU to prioritise taking measures to protect them from internal and external security threats and to prioritise counter-terrorism and counter radicalisation measures. The EU has had little option but to shift from driving for political change to the management of security. However, this does not mean that it should abandon using its influence to encourage democratisation and respect for human rights and economic development, progress on which will also have a positive impact on the security situation.

73.1 76

39.2

64.956.4

80.1

54

69

35.9

64

44.4

60.1

46.4

68.3

30.9

4740.1

51.7

75.686.6

45.5

74.7

60.7

84.3

58.6 61.5

40.1

55.1 49.9

63.6


Figure 7: Citizens Worried About Security Threats in 2014, %

Terrorist Attack Civil War Ethnic/Sectarian Violence Concerned 1+ Internal Security Threat War with Another country

48

The EU can use its influence as a normative power with the Union for the Mediterranean, in line with policy objectives, to encourage MENA states to work together on counter- terrorism and counter radicalisation measures and share best practice with them. This would reduce the extent to which fighters, guns and radical ideas can move freely from country to country. The EU needs, however, to avoid a too narrow focus on security which does not adequately address the key concerns of MENA citizens. Sustainable development depends on inclusive economic development. When life is worth living, extremism does not seem as attractive. Speeding up bilateral trade agreements, and ones that actually benefit MENA countries, is one concrete policy action that the EU can take. This has the added bonus that it is likely to convince ENP partners to speed up counter-terrorism cooperation with the EU. In Iraq there is a specific need to support post-conflict reconstruction and specifically to support initiatives to mitigate ideological cleavages and build social inclusion and cohesion. In Libya there is a specific need to continue to work towards the reconciliation of the rival governments. While Libya has largely disappeared from the headlines chaos still prevails, the country is divided by rival governments and torn by various paramilitary groups and militias and the chaos enables Libya to be used as a gateway to Europe. Given that oil exports are fuelling the conflict the EU should encourage its member states to ensure that they do no purchase illicit oil exports coming from the war-torn cities of the Libyan ‘Oil Crescent’. The Israeli-Palestinian Question is used to justify terrorism and creates a threat to the West as well as the in the Middle East. While a two-state solution is an unrealistic goal at this juncture this does not mean abandoning working towards a final agreement. The findings from the Arab Transformations survey support the argument that there is a need for an Arab-Israeli agreement not just an Israeli-Palestinian one. The involvement of Arab States (Egypt, Jordan, Gulf Cooperation Council) will enable both Israel and the Palestinians to compromise. In the short-term, stability needs to be obtained in the Gaza. Strengthening the pro-peace Palestinian leadership and encouraging the Palestinian authority to take gradual control of Gaza, with development assistance being used in a way that increases on-the-ground legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority, is one stratagem for contributing to this. The EU should also engage with Hamas. Support is needed for countries hosting large numbers of refugees both to reduce migrant flows to Europe and to mitigate the potential of refugee camps becoming hotbeds of extremism. However, this needs to be balanced with economic assistance to host communities for employment and education and health services, to prevent the alienation of the host community.

49

More specifically there is a need to continue to progress joint security issues and security sector reform including building popular support for the EU by supporting anti-corruption initiatives including against police corruption. Technical assistance can be provided to improve security by eliminating the power struggle between civilian governments and the armed forces, building trust and improving efficiency as well as reforming the technical aspects of civil-military relations.

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Against the Tide: Why Gender Attitudes Remain Profoundly Conservative in Arab Countries


POLICY BRIEFS

NUMBER 5


Summary: • The Arab region retains deeply

conservative gender attitudes against the trend of moves to more liberal values generally across the globe.

• Arab citizens say they support gender equality but women are generally treated as second class citizens especially in family law.

• Islam is often blamed for gender conservatism, but the systematic repression of political alternatives to Islamism and often-perfunctory way in which women’s equality agendas are treated by autocratic regimes are more important.

• Efforts to promote gender equality and the empowerment of women need to be led by Arab women and men and incorporate Islamic feminists as well as secular ones

Keywords: Gender equality, Islamic feminism, Middle East, public opinion surveys

53

1. INTRODUCTION

Against a gradual rise of support for gender equality and women’s empowerment across the globe, public opinion surveys suggest that Arab citizens are profoundly resistant to promoting gender equality. Islam is often identified as the cause of this resistance. Some even claim that such differences are evidence of a ‘clash of civilizations’ between the West and the Islamic world, often depicting the treatment of women and girls as proof of ‘backwardness’ and ‘barbarism’. Data from public opinion surveys shows that while there are considerable differences between Arab countries, conservative values on gender are clearly entrenched, and may have grown more so after the 2010-2011 Arab Uprisings. Islam is often blamed for such conservatism, but the lack of progress on gender equality is the product of internal and external causes, including the systematic repression of political alternatives to Islamism and the often-perfunctory way in which women’s equality agendas are treated by autocratic regimes.

Opinion polls show that while most societies across the globe are becoming more liberal, not only are Arab countries the most gender conservative, but that there is little evidence of these values changing. Our research looking at how political and social attitudes have changed in the wake of the Arab Uprisings in six Arab countries (Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia) suggests that both women and men share conservative gender attitudes, and that if anything they have become more conservative since 2011. Public opinion surveys carried out in 2014 show that while women are generally less conservative than men, differences are relatively small. However, women are no more likely than men to think that they are treated less equally than other citizens. Perhaps paradoxically, while a clear majority of men and women think that gender equality should be enshrined in the constitution, there seems to be little support for gender equality and the empowerment of women. Indeed, on the Arab Transformations Gender Index only 17 per cent scored at least 70 out of 100, with the proportion of women (25.1%) being noticeably higher than men (8.9%). In addition, while the proportion of men across the six countries showed little difference, varying from a low of six per cent in Egypt to 12 per cent in Iraq and Morocco, women’s attitudes showed much greater variation, ranging from just over 10 per cent in Egypt and Libya, to just over a fifth in Tunisia and just over a third in Jordan, Iraq and Morocco.

Figure 1: Score 70+ on the Arab Transformations Index of Gender Equality (Index 0-100)

5.3 11.5 8.7 7.3 11.7 8.510.9

37.333.6

13.5

35.8

22.4


Men Women

54

Source:ATSurveyData

There is, however, considerable variation between attitudes on gender to different dimensions of life as there is between genders and women from different countries. There is relatively strong support for gender equality in education and for married women working outside the home, but less so for women to be involved in politics. However, it is when it comes to family law there is the strongest support for gender discrimination as codified in Islamic law which, notwithstanding different interpretations, constitutes women as second class citizens in rights in marriage and divorce, over children and in inheritance. Men and women across the six countries want the constitution to enshrine religious law (shari’a) as the main source of law, with nearly half wanting all law based on it, and less than 10 per cent wanting no law based on it.

Source:ABIII

88.9 91.5 89.8 94.4 87.769.7

92.1 92.7 94.6 92.1 87.375.4


Figure 2: Shari'a Should be the Main Source of Law, %

Men Women

55

People’s preferences for the role of religious principles and institutions in family law, is often seen as being the cornerstone of a system of male privilege and control over women. Indeed, whilst most Arab countries have ratified the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, with the notable exceptions of Morocco and Tunisia most Arab governments have entered reservations to clauses relating to family law. Although public opinion surveys are rough instruments when it comes to understanding what exactly people mean by religious law, more than three quarters of citizens want family law to be based on ‘traditional’ interpretations and, with the notable exception of Tunisia where it is around a quarter, and well under 10 per cent want it to be based on civil law. In this case, differences between men and women are slight and women are if anything more conservative in Jordan and Libya than men.

The active role played by women in the Arab Uprisings was seen by many both inside and outside the region as an example of the possibility – and feasibility – of a different kind of gender politics. Some hoped it might mark a potential tipping point that would usher in greater gender equality and the empowerment of women. However, as the Uprisings were increasingly met with resistance from regime remnants and from conservative forces generally, the public sphere was de-democratized and women have simultaneously been increasingly excluded from it. In some cases, this step back has been spearheaded or gone unopposed by Islamist movements, a fact that some commentators have attributed to the supposed increase in the influence of religious groups across the region, the so-called ‘Islamist winter’. However, in other cases this patriarchal restoration is driven by self-proclaimed ‘secular’ forces which actively opposed the Uprisings. Either way, the patriarchal contract whereby men and women have separate and ‘complementary’ roles has in fact seldom been successfully challenged, leaving women’s subordination to men as strong as ever.

So why do a clear majority of women, as well as men, support a situation in which women are presented as second class citizens? In the West, the resilience of such attitudes is often attributed to a supposedly patriarchal ‘essence’ of Islam. Indeed, influential Islamist actors across the region – including governments – often make the same claim. But it is a mistake to think that the cause of these attitudes – or of their

77.5 76.4 75 74.8 75.5 82.5 77.6 80.372.8 65.8

50.9 47.1

15.9 18 22.2 20 21.615 18.7 14.2 24.6

28.9

2524.8

6.6 5.5 2.9 5.3 2.9 2.6 3.7 5.5 2.6 5.3

24 28.1

Traditonal shari'a Informed by Current Best Understanding shari'a Civil Law

Figure2:LegalBasisforFamilyLaw(%),Source:ABIII

56

popularity – is somehow built into the nature of Islam. In fact, historians have shown that such conservatism has not been a constant across the Arab world, and that progress had begun in the 19th and 20th centuries but was reversed in the late 20th century, ‘re-traditionalising’ gender attitudes. Also, the idea that Islam itself blocks women’s empowerment runs into trouble in the face of progress which is in fact being made in other Muslim-majority countries. The idea that ‘Islam is the cause’ is little more than a convenient fiction for conservative groups.

One factor identified by women’s rights advocates in the region is women’s strong support for the patriarchal bargain whereby men provide for and protect women and children and women are the nurturers. Many women have invested in this model of family life and see gender equality as a threat to men’s obligation to provide for their wives and family threatening women’s and children’s economic security.

The biggest obstacle, however, that women’s rights advocacy faces in the region is that in most cases women are caught in a bind: on the one hand, male-dominated conservative Islamist leaderships are perfectly happy to acquiesce to a discriminatory status quo; on the other hand, gender equality was and still is promoted by autocratic regimes for reasons that frequently have little to do with a commitment to these ideals, but are instead a form of rhetorical appeasement of often equally perfunctory Western demands. In addition, the gradual retreat of Arab states from provision of essential social services created the conditions for a de facto cooperation between state and religious institutions, in which regimes acquiesced to growing Islamist influence in return for the provision of services like welfare, education, and healthcare.

Egypt provides a case in point. Throughout the 1970s, secular and ‘pro-Western’ president Anwar Sadat used the Muslim Brotherhood to weaken the Egyptian left and compensate for his programme of austerity and privatizations. He was eventually assassinated by precisely the Islamist radicalism he sought to stoke, and the left never recovered, leaving the Brotherhood and the Salafists to fill the vacuum created by Mubarak’s departure in the 2011 revolution. By contrast, when the 2010-11 Revolution significantly weakened the Tunisian regime, progress was possible because more equally balanced moderate progressive forces – both secular and Islamist – could attempt to establish a consensus more difficult for former regime elements to reverse.

Independent progressive forces struggle valiantly between the Scylla of Islamist conservatism and the Charybdis of local autocracies, but they face enormous odds. Patriarchal attitudes persist not because Islam is ‘incompatible’ with gender equality, but because in most Arab countries since the 1970s influential progressive forces have been undermined by precisely supposedly ‘secular’ regimes – often using Islamist groups to do so. Public opinion data show that conservative gender attitudes are entrenched, but they also show that people remain profoundly dissatisfied with their ruling elites for precisely the same reasons they protested in 2010-2011. During the Uprisings protesters demanded not just the removal of corrupt leaders, but an end of a system of increasing economic injustice and political marginalisation held together by repression: gender equality is an essential part of achieving that better alternative.

57

Western governments, including the European Union, policy attempts to promote gender equality and the empowerment of women as part of a policy to support democratisation and human rights more generally have failed. There is little appetite for the EU, for example, to provide support to the Arab countries for gender equality programmes. Although EU policy to the region makes financial aid and agreeing free trade agreements conditional on progress on human rights conditionality is rarely implemented. Western governments need to move away from promoting a Western secular version of feminism and work with all women in the region working to improve the lives of ordinary women including Islamic feminists. They can best do this by focusing on providing economic and technical support to improve women’s lives including access to employment where women have one of the lowest employment rates in the world with little evidence that it is increasing even among young women.

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The Integrity of States: Corruption in the EU’s Southern Neighbours Authors: Roger Sapsford, Pamela Abbott & Andrea Teti


POLICY BRIEFS

NUMBER 6


Summary: Corruption is the antithesis of the Rule of Law and erodes the discourse of fairness and mutual consideration which is necessary for peace, prosperity and socioeconomic development. It increases the risk of state capture and resistance to change by the political elite. It results in poor public management and resource allocation and an inequitable distribution of resources and national wealth. It is a problem not just for individual countries but also for harmonious diplomatic and economic relations. The European Union’s Neighbourhood Policy is intended to help its near neighbours develop into a sustainable economic, social and political stability. At the same time the EU deploys normative leadership to promote a social and political security based on a respect for human rights, a dependence on the Rule of Law and a style of governance which can listen to its people and can face replacement, if need be, without the need for armed confrontation. For this, the extent of corruption in MENA is a serious problem. Keywords: Corruption, Middle East, Arab Spring

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1. CORRUPTION IN THE MENA COUNTRIES

Corruption is seen as rife in MENA countries and as a central cause of volatility, discontent and instability, migration, terrorism and underdeveloped economies. In a public opinion survey carried by the Arab Transformations Consortium in 2014 in six MENA countries, corruption was frequently mentioned by citizens as a major reason for the 2010-11 Arab Uprisings (aka ‘Arab Spring’). Corruption was nominated by between 41 and 64 per cent of respondents across the countries as one of the main drivers of the 2011 Uprisings. It is by far the single most frequent reason in four of six countries, and comes second after ‘economic problems’ in Egypt and Jordan (Figure 1).

Around 60 per cent in every country thought that there was a great deal of corruption in their country, with virtually no-one saying there was no corruption in government, except in Libya.

A crack-down on corruption is one thing that rulers mostly promised at the time of the Arab Uprisings – it is an easy rhetorical gesture – so we might ask whether

147.7

41.132.6

55.7

4.6

25.1 22.9

50.543.3

29.9

14.514.99.6

47.8

28.3

64.1

16

2734.1

63.8

34.5

20.9

9.716.5 19.9

57.1

25.9

40.3

5.9

20.225.3

61.3

24.4

47.8

4

To demand more political freedom

To oppose an authoritarian regime

To protest against corruption

To protest lack of basic services

Economic problems To promote foreign interests

Figure 1: Reasons for taking to the streets in 2011 (%)


4.6

3.3

16.1

7.3

9.9

5

10.4

7.7

8.1

26.6

27.3

26.6

16.2

31.9

28.4

61.4

62.4

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57.2

59.8

62.4

Egypt

Iraq

Jordan

Libya

Morocco

Tunisia

Figure 2 Extent of corruption in state institutions and agencies (%)

None at all A small amount A medium amount A large amount

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peoples felt such a crack-down had taken place, three years after the Uprisings. The simple answer is that they did not: over half thought that little or nothing was being done (Figure 3). Even in Egypt, the country most impressed with government’s efforts, more than a third thought little or nothing was being done. MENA citizens are therefore clearly aware of the extent of corruption in their countries and of the negative impact it has their daily lives as it increases the costs of getting public services and distorts development priorities and stalls service delivery as public resources are siphoned off for private gain. It denies them the right to claim and exercise their social, economic and political rights, and creates fundamental injustice. It also creates obstacles to economic growth, and deters both domestic and foreign investment. For companies, corruption raises transaction costs and undermines fair competition, impedes business growth, increases costs and poses serious legal and reputational risks. Corruption exists in the form of bribes levied on businesses – particularly new or expanding businesses – as the price of a government department doing its routine job. The World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys identify the giving of ‘presents’ to government officials to secure contracts or in general to ‘get things done’ as the form most frequently identified by businesses based inside or outside the country; the percentage mentioning them approaches 40 per cent on average in MENA countries. Bribes or presents are also used to obtain other licences and permits, to get access to electricity or water and in meetings with the tax department, by over 10 per cent of reporting businesses and often over 20 per cent. Fraudulent accounting at an international level is also common: money is spirited abroad by straightforward fraudulent transfer or by varieties of misinvoicing in large amounts. Illicit financial outflows for 2004-2013 calculated by Global Financial Integrity frequently amount to at least five per cent of GDP; the highest was more than fifteen per cent (Iraq in 2010).

Non-monetary corruption

More pervasive than bribes at the level of the ordinary citizen is ‘wasta,’ or social influence. Wasta is the practice of preferring family, friends and people with whom one is in some kind of personal relationship or at least recognises as ‘one of us’, when it comes to awarding jobs, promotion, bonuses, pay increases,

35.2

65.754.1

62.354.8

67.5


Figure 3: Little or nothing being done about corruption (%)

Source: ArabTrans Survey

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positions of responsibility or honour, university places, etc. Its effect is that who you know, or more broadly the recognition of your in-group status, is more important and more valuable than what you know. It is firmly and widely believed in the MENA countries that wasta is what gets you employment and, mostly, that no route which does not involve wasta will do so. Asked in the Arab Transformations survey whether wasta played a role in employment, there are significant differences between the countries but the overall ‘picture’ does not vary by much. Between half and three quarters said it was extremely widespread, depending on the country, and only a very few (ranging from 0.9% in Jordan to 5.8% in Egypt) said it was possible to get work without it. Being constrained by such practices has profoundly divisive effects.

Crony capitalism, or government wasta in business

Over and above these corrupt acts or requirements, we need also to consider the more systemic ways in which corruption has become structured into the MENA states. The structural reform of state economic control in the MENA countries driven by international financial institutions such as the IMF was supposed to bring about an economic structure based on a strong private sector independent of government. However, privatization of state assets did not lead to market liberalization, but rather gave rise to ‘independent concerns’ which then continued to work closely with government in networks of friends and allies, following a political rather than an economic agenda. New industrial, commercial and financial leaders were effectively co-opted into government elites, or members of the government elite became entrenched among new ‘private’ elites. Sometimes the ‘crony’ capitalists were given favoured access to bank loans, making it virtually impossible for non-favoured enterprises to obtain them. Since governments are responsible for the regulatory framework, all too often this kind of clientelism led to favourable operating rules for cronies – or, indeed, little or no regulation at all – while new capital from outside faced both formal and informal barriers to entry, and did not have equal access to markets. Structural adjustment has been expensive for middle classes, costing them decent jobs and opportunities to establish industrial or commercial concerns. Such changes brought about the loss of government employment, privatisation of state assets and concerns, and the failure of ‘crony’ capitalists to invest in employment-generating enterprises. Before structural adjustment was imposed in the 1980s most MENA countries displayed some version of an ‘authoritarian social contract’ whereby autocratic government was accepted in exchange for decent job (public sector employment), decent social services, and subsidies in key areas such as fuel and food. It was the breakdown of this contract well before 2010 that eventually became one of the main drivers of the Uprisings. Survey data shows that most people do not believe things have changed much since then.

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2. CORRUPTION AND THE RULE OF LAW

Corruption may be seen as a special case of breaching the Rule of Law, the principle that no-one should stand outside and above the law and that rulers are subject to the same rules as every other citizen. Corruption breaches this principle because a corrupt society has two classes of people: a superior class that demands bribes and an inferior class that pays them, and/or an elite or a set of intermediaries dispensing favour and an inferior group that is excluded from them. The superior class effectively stand above the law – at least in this respect – thereby bringing both law and government into disrepute. Corrupt governments give themselves powers and rights that are not extended to the rest of the society. Around 90 per cent of People think there is a lot of corruption in state institutions (Libya is a little lower, at 73%) in their countries, and there is even a fair amount of distrust of the police and the courts (Figure 4). For the rule of law to take hold and deliver social inclusion there must be trust.

It must be possible for citizens to trust that everyone and every group is required

63.6

68.4

87.6

89.4

71.1

56.3

71.9

64.3

84.3

73.4

55.5

48.1

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71

81.6

16.3

43.3

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83.4

91

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50.1

40.2

89

75.2

38

36.6

77.4

91

41.7

Police

Courts/legal system

Local Govt.

Parliament

Ministers

Figure 4: Little or no trust in aspects of government (%)


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to work together for the benefit of all – that different fractions may have different needs and goals and see the world differently, but that the resolution of disputes requires all to make the effort to understand life form the position of the other.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS

There is no ‘silver bullet’ for eradicating corruption, which persists even in the countries we think of as the least corrupt. Fighting corruption requires strong political will, which despite governments covered here having ratified the UN Convention Against Corruption, remains lacking. The EU should use the full weight of its influence to support the fight against corruption in its Member States as well as in MENA countries, and support MENA governments in effectively fighting corruptions in all its forms. Fighting corruption and promoting transparency is a shared problem across both shores of the Mediterranean, with less than half of EU Member States scoring 70 or more (out of 100) and five scoring less than 50 on the Transparency International Index of Corruption. The EU should support both the UN’s Office on Drugs and Crime Action Against Corruption and Economic Crime, and the work of the OECD’s Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, encouraging MENA countries to participate in both. The ‘carrot’ of closer relations with the EU has failed to bring about an effective fight against corruption and renewed effort is required. The EU should develop anti-corruption initiatives and institutions to tackle corruption and increase financial and technical support to MENA countries as well as agreeing systems for corruption monitoring and benchmarking. The latter could be based on the UN Convention Against Corruption using the UN Office on Drugs and Crime checklist. Good evidence on what works for effectively fighting corruption is scarce. What we do know is that it takes political will and time and effort. This means the EU supporting MENA governments in changing the rules of systems to reduce the potential for corruption combined with strong enforcement. Corruption should be seen and treated as a serious crime. Corrupt politicians and officials need to know that there is a strong chance they will be found out and that they will face serious consequences. This requires a mixture of strict laws, strictly enforced, and well-staffed, well- funded public-sector audit departments with draconian powers.

“Let’s get straight to the point: no country gets close to a perfect score in .. 2016. …The global average score is a paltry 43, indicating endemic corruption in .. [the] public sector.” http://www..transparency. org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016

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Simultaneously, the EU should build capacity among local civil society organisations which monitors and publishes news of corrupt practices, as well as building their capacity to engage with public authorities.

Teti, Abbott, and Dagher Iraq After ISIS

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Iraq After ISIS Continued Conflict or Rebuilding Beyond Ethno-Sectarian Identity? Authors: Andrea Teti, Pamela Abbott and Munqith Daghir


POLICY BRIEFS

NUMBER 7


Summary: • With ISIS’ influence declining, Iraq

faces the challenge of rebuilding both its economy and its political system.

• Amidst the devastation left by conflict, Iraq’s political leaders have the opportunity to address the internal divisions which made ISIS possible.

• Any post-conflict settlement must take into account the population’s concerns and priorities.

• Sectarian identity is less influential than commonly assumed in shaping people’s political priorities: often more important are local conditions, particularly regarding security, the economy, and migration.

• Ignoring popular priorities risks undermining post-ISIS attempts to build a stable country, with knock-on effects at a regional level.

Keywords: Iraq, ISIS, Middle East, public opinion surveys, post-conflict reconstruction, deeply divided societies, civil conflict, democracy, development, resilience, security, migration.


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1. INTRODUCTION

As the defeat of ISIS/Daesh looms large both in Syria and in Iraq, attention turns to post-ISIS settlements: while in Syria the Assad regime seems set to remain in power with Russian support, how Iraq’s diverse political forces – which mostly self-identify along Shi’a, Kurdish, and Sunni lines – will address the deep divisions highlighted by ISIS’ rise to prominence remains a more open question. Post-ISIS nation-building will certainly require negotiation between political elites, most of which ground their legitimacy in sectarian identity, but the long-term stability of any settlement they reach depends crucially on their ability to address popular priorities and national (non-sectarian) interests. However, recent evidence from nationwide public opinion surveys shows that these priorities are not always determined by ‘identity’, as is often assumed, but are often shared across communities. For example, data suggests that in crucial areas – including security – people’s location is at least as important as identity, and that people want stability, jobs, decent services, and an end to corruption whatever their ethno-religious identity. Basing either domestic politics in Iraq or foreign policy towards it on ‘identitarian’ assumptions is likely to miss popular demands and priorities. Indeed, the fact that people’s concerns are not determined by their identity alone provides an opportunity to forge a socially, economically, and politically inclusive post-conflict settlement. The divisive consequences of both Saddam Hussein’s ‘Sunni-centric’ regime and the ‘Shi’a-centric’ central government which emerged in the wake of US-led regime change provide cautionary tales about the price of failing to find such an inclusive settlement, both at home and abroad.

2. DIVERSITY AS OPPORTUNITY The latest empirical information from nationwide public opinion survey dates to June 2014, just before the fall of Mosul. This evidence suggests that regional location and sectarian affiliation significantly shapes people’s perceptions and priorities regardless of their religion or sectarian identity, including perceptions of the main challenges facing their country, of security, the economy, governance, corruption, and migration.3 Contrary to the assumption that sectarian identity is the most important factor in contemporary Iraqi politics, this analysis shows that regional location better captures variations in respondents’ perceptions in some key areas such as security, the economy, and migration. The northern region is mainly Kurdish and Sunni, the Central Region is split between Sunni and Shi’ite Arab, while the south is mainly Shi’ite Arab.

3BasedonAbbott,P.andTeti,A(2016).TheRelative ImportanceofReligionandRegion inExplainingDifferences inPoliticalEconomic and Social Attitudes in Iraq in 2014: Findings from the Arab Transformations Public Opinion Survey. Aberdeen:UniversityofAberdeen.


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2.1 MAIN CHALLENGES

In 2014 Iraqis saw internal security and the economy as the two greatest challenges facing their country, with corruption a close third. The high levels of discontent are a clear indication that people were really unhappy with the way the government was running the country. Internal security was, not surprisingly, more likely to be seen as a major concern by those living in central areas, irrespective of sectarian identity. The South were more concerned than those in the other regions about external interference, while in the North concern focused on the economy, authoritarianism, and corruption. This is because the Norther Kurdish areas are more secure. The data shows few marked differences between Sunnis and Shi’ites, with the exception of Sunnis’ concerns about authoritarianism (20%) outstripping Shi’ites’ (6%) nationally.

Source:ArabTransformationsSurvey2014

More extensive analysis of the data suggests that concerns about security have been common across the sectarian divide and higher in the Central than the other regions for some time. It also suggests that Sunnis are more concerned about totalitarianism than Shi’ites. How such concerns will have been affected by the experience of ISIS occupation remains to be seen, particularly in ISIS-occupied areas.

2.2 THE ECONOMY

In 2014, people across Iraq were pessimistic about the country’s economic predicament and dissatisfied with prospects for its development. No group or region expressed confidence much above 40 per cent, but dissatisfaction was particularly high in the case of Sunnis, both in the Kurdish-majority Northern areas and in the Centre. Beyond regional or ethno-religious differences, however, such markedly low levels of satisfaction signal the urgent need for inclusive development nationwide. Peoples s’ religious differences were less significant than region of residence in shaping perceptions of both their own economic situation and government performance: residents of central governorates were more pessimistic (40%

55.1 55.6

35.2

17.8 21.7

45.3 47.1

75.1

15 12

50.6 45.957.9

30.5

7.5

Economic Situation Corruption Internal Security External Interference Authoritarianism

Figure 1: Nominated As One of Two Main Challenges Facting Iraq in 2014, %

Northern Region Central Region Southern Region


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bad, 20% good, 40% neither) compared to both Northern Sunnis (20% bad, 45% good, 35% neither) and Southern Shi’ites, who held similar views. Perceptions of the federal government’s economic performance followed a similar pattern. Regional location was also more important in perceptions of economic hardship: on a 10-point Deprivation Index, Northern populations appear significantly more deprived than their counterparts. By contrast, there are sectarian differences in dissatisfaction with the way the economy is developing, which is relatively higher among Sunnis both in the Centre and in the Kurdish-majority Northern areas, compared to Shi’ites in the Centre and South. This confirms suggestions that Sunni Arabs – and to a lesser extent Kurds – feel relatively marginalised in post-Saddam Iraq. Regional and ethno-religious differences are surely important, but more important than variations between such areas and identity groups is that a considerable majority of the population nationwide were unhappy with the country’s economic performance and lacked confidence in the federal government’s work to improve it. While certainly posing a challenging political task, this dissatisfaction emphasises the importance of an inclusive post-ISIS economic settlement. The long-term stability of any political settlement must be underpinned by growth that is – and is perceived to be – inclusive across regional and sectarian lines.

2.3 CORRUPTION, AND THE CAUSES OF PROTEST

Corruption is perceived as pervasive: between 88 and 98 per cent identify it as a problem regardless of regional location or religion. Indeed, for half of respondents nationwide it was corruption which motivated them to support or take part in protests during the 2010-11 Arab Uprisings, followed by economic factors (demand for improved basic services, 43%; economic problems, 30%) and political factors (demanding more political freedom, 25%; opposition to authoritarian leaders, 23%). By contrast, even the highest levels of confidence that government will work towards tackling corruption – among Shi’ites in the Central and Southern regions, at 50 per cent and 40 per cent respectively – remain troublingly low. While politically sensitive and practically complex, tackling corruption is likely to both boost economic growth and generate considerable legitimation for the federal government and the political forces supporting it.

2.4 TRUST IN GOVERNMENT AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

Few social or political institutions command much trust in Iraq, often including religious leaders. However, demand for inclusive representative government remains, providing opportunities for stable long-term solutions to Iraq’s problems. Trust in central government varies significantly along both sectarian and regional lines but is low nationwide. Although trust is relatively higher among


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Shi’ites in the Central Region (32% for Council of Ministers) and in the South (37%) compared to at most half these levels for Sunnis in other regions, even at its higher levels it remains worryingly low. Trust in local government is significantly different: over two thirds of Shi’ites in central areas and nearly 88 per cent in the South trust local government, compared to a bare third of Sunnis in both the Northern and Centre. Trust in other institutions is nearly universally lower. The police score very poorly among Sunnis (16% in the North, 2% in the Centre). Political parties also receive relatively low scores, between 30 per cent and 47 per cent. Religious leaders are a partial exception, trusted by 41 per cent amongst Northern Sunnis, 60 per cent amongst Central Shi’ites, and 86 per cent amongst Southern Shi’ites but a mere 12 per cent by Central Sunnis; overall, they are trusted by 26% of Sunnis and 76% of Shi’ites. Such low levels of trust in political leaders, however, do not translate into a lack of confidence in an inclusive form of government. Iraqis clearly favour a parliamentary form of government in which all parties – religious and secular, right and left – take part (91% among Southern Shi’ites, 83% by both Central Shi’ites and Northern Sunnis). Despite the comparatively significant drop, Central Sunnis (64%) still also favoured such a system overwhelmingly. These data highlight the problems of central regions but also show that despite the intense and complex problems Iraq faces and the difficulty of reaching a negotiated compromise, a politically and economically fair and inclusive settlement would be well received by all Iraqis and improve social, economic, and political resilience.

2.5 SECURITY

Support for successive federal governments has been undermined by the failure to provide security and stability. An inclusive security settlement will be crucial to redressing such lack of confidence. Before ISIS’ take-over of Mosul, respondents nationwide were concerned about violence: two thirds or more worried about war, terrorism, civil war, and sectarian violence. The least concerned across all categories are Northern Sunnis, followed by Southern Shi’ites. By far most concerned were residents of central regions, regardless of sect. Nor were people confident the government’s performance on security: even before the emergence of ISIS, this was uniformly perceived as very poor, with dissatisfaction at just under 60 per cent amongst Northern Sunnis, 85.7% amongst Southern Shi’ites, 91.1% amongst central Shi’ites, and 97.5% amongst Central Sunnis. In any post-ISIS scenario, government must both ensure security and gain people’s trust.

3. CONCLUSIONS Iraq’s problems and politics are often viewed through sectarian lenses. However, nationwide public opinion survey data challenges received notions about the relative weight of sectarian identity in explaining respondents’ perceptions key social, economic, and political cleavages. These regional


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variations point to the crucial importance of local conditions alongside identity. It is also clear that while Iraqis are not satisfied with the current economic and security situation or with most of their political leaders, most are open to an inclusive political and economic settlement. This has significant implications for post-ISIS nation-building in Iraq: it is not just ‘identity’ which politicians must represent, but people’s interests. In particular, for any negotiated settlement to be stable in the long term it must address popular demands for both economic and political inclusion. Herein lies both a challenge to conventional ways of perceiving Iraqi politics and an opportunity – if it can be grasped – to build bridges across sectarian lines.


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Mutual Support: EU-MENA Migration

Authors: Pamela Abbott and Andrea Teti


POLICY BRIEFS

NUMBER 8


Summary: • The EU is concern about the security threat posed by

flowsofmigrantsfromtheArabWorldtoEurope.• Instability in the region has increased the flow of

migrantsbutmigrationisnotnewandjustoverhalfofmigrantsstayintheregion.

• Migrants bring economic benefits to the destinationcountries; the EU, with an ageing population, needsmigrantlabourers.

• Migrantscanbenefittheir countryoforiginfinancially,buttheyalsorepresentthelossofskilleddynamicyoungpeoplefromthecountry.

• Themaindriversofmigrationareeconomicandsecurityconcernsandeducation.

• Migrantstendtobemale,youngandeducated.• TheEUneedstodevelopitspoliciestowardstheregion

so that countries in the region benefit from theirdiaspora,and

• toaddresstheconditionsthatdrivepeopletomigrate.

Keywords: Migration, Arab Spring, Security, European Union, Middle East and North Africa, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Jordan, Iraq.

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Introduction Europe sees itself as facing a migration crisis, with concerns about flows of migrants from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) high on the agenda. Migrants are fleeing from the conflicts in Syria, Iraq and Libya, and the anarchy and violence in Libya has enhanced its role as a gateway to Europe for migrants from Sub-Saharan countries. Migrants from the region are seen as a danger to guard against and a risk to be managed. The EU’s No. 1 priority is its security. European countries have increasingly closed their borders to migrants, concerned about their own security, the economic costs of housing migrants and the potential for conflict between their citizens and migrants, with Islamophobia increasing in many parts of Europe. The EU sees providing for migrants within the borders of the MENA region as part of the solution to the crisis. By focusing on the immediate situation of forced migration it has failed to develop a long-term policy that takes account of the fact that, with an ageing population, European countries will need the labour of migrant workers in the coming decades. Furthermore, by focusing on the push factors of migration the EU has failed to develop a migration policy that benefits the sending regions as well as Europe. In 2015 migrants from the MENA region, overwhlemingly from the Mashreq and North Africa, made up about 10 per cent of the international migrant stock. The main sending countries in 2015 were Syria (5m), Palestine (3.5 m), Egypt (3.3m) and Morroco (2.9m). A significant ammount of migratation, however, is within the region with just over half of migrants from MENA countries remaining within MENA. Europe is the second most popular destination, with 50 per cent of North African migrants, 22 per cent of Mashreq and 17 per cent of GCC4 migrants ending up there. The top desinations in Europe are France, Spain and Italy. Predicting future migrant flows is uncertain; current or previous trends are not necessarily a good guide. The main driver at present is ‘fleeing conflict’, so resolution of current conflicts could reduce flows and an increase in conflicts drive them up. However, migrant flows have been relatively high in the past ,driven on a continuing basis by economic factors and unresolve conficts that periodically flare up. Even in the absence of conflict economic push and pull factors are likley to drive migration in the future. The GNI per capita of the six MENA countries included in the Arab Transformation public opinion survey is at best a third of European countries’ GDP’s and at its lowest around a sixth. The economies in all the survey countries are weak and at best stagnating, and unemployment and especially youth unemployment is high (Figures 1a,b).

4ButonlysevenpercentofallmigrantsarefromtheGCC.

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Source: World Development Indicators. A key finding from the 2014 Arab Transformation survey is that the main driver of the Uprisings was concerns about the economic situation and that this continued to be seen as the major challenge in 2014. While receiving countries benefit more than sending countries from migration there can be benefits to both. According to the OECD, migrants are positive for labour markets and economic growth in developed countries and have a positive impact on the public purse. Developing countries lose out through brain drain but there are potentially positive benefits for them: remittances are an important source of income for households, playing a role in poverty reduction and supporting macroeconomic stability in recipient countries. In four of the six Arab Transformations countries, personal remittance receipts are noticeably higher than Official Development Assistance. Egypt has long seen migration as part of its development strategy.

Authors Calculations; population data Source: World Development Indicators. http://countrymeters.info/en/, Note: Data for Libya not avalable. Other positive benefits include the potential for Diaspora engagement to improve trade links, investment and support skills, and knowledge transfer unlocking the benefits of globalisation, with migrants linking their country of origin with the destination country.

10.3 15.1 11.916

7.3 11

39.547.5

Figure1a: GNI per Capita 2014, Selected MENA and EU Countries,

PPP$

13.2 16.4 11.1 19.2 10.2 13.3

4234.6

28.8

48.9

20.231.8

EGYPT IRAQ JORDAN LIBYAMOROCCOTUNISIA

Figure 1b: Offical Unemploment Rate and Youth Rate (18-24) in Selected

MENA Countries, 2014

Unemployment Rate

Youth (15-24 Years) Unemployment Rate

3.5

7.9 9

2.2

8.15.7

E g y p t I r a q J o r d a n L i b y a M o r o c c o T u n i s i a

F i g u r e 2 a : M i g r a n t S t o c k % o f P o p u l a t i o n o f C o u n t r y o f O r i g i n

6.5

0.1

10.46.3 4.8

1.2 1.2

7.6

2.1 2

Egypt Iraq Jordan Morocco Tunisia

Figure 2b: Offical Development Assistance and Personal Remittances

as % GDP in 2014

Remittances ODA

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The EUs policy response has two main elements neither of which look to provide a long-term solution to the current migration crisis or the management of those that migrate by choice. The main response to the migration crisis has been to encourage refugees being looked after in the region. They have offered economic support to Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon to make provision for refugees and in the case of Jordan have eased the conditions on making progress towards democratisation and promoting human rights. They have supported the setting up of special economic zones (SEZ in Jordan to provide employment for refugees. However, these do not provide decent employment and refugees are reluctant to take up the jobs. Labour rights are compromised, wages are low, workers are forced to do overtime and there are other abuses. Indian refer to SEZs as ‘Special Exploitation Zones’. Providing employment for refugees whether in SEZs of or on the general labour market is likely to alienate the local population given the high rates of youth unemployment youth and increase the potential for conflict and unrest. The longer-term policy is Mobility Partnerships (MPs) which are designed to manage legal migration, combat illegal migration and manage forced migration. To date only Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia have signed Mobility Partnerships. Southern Neighbours are reluctant to sign as MPs are seen as functioning as a way for the EU to deal with migration as a non-traditional security threat to Europe rather than serving the interests of both parties to the agreements.

Drivers of Migration People migrate by choice, as opposed to being forced to because of fleeing from violent conflict or persecution, for various reasons including employment, education, health care and lack of security/protection. They may intend to migrate permanently or for a limited period, although temporary migration can turn into permanent migration. The Arab Transformations survey found that just over a third of citizens across the six countries (Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, morocco & Tunisia) had considered living abroad. However, this does not mean that they wanted to settle permanently in another country; a majority were considering migrating for a temporary period, usually for employment or education. Interest in migrating varied by country, with nearly half of Moroccans saying they had considered it, compared with just under a quarter of Iraqis and Egyptians. Just over a fifth of Jordanians and Moroccans had thought about permanent migration, compared with just six per cent of Egyptians. Egypt has a long history of people migrating on a temporary basis to the Gulf States for employment.

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The main reason people gave for considering migration was economic. Political reasons account for only a tiny proportion, just three per cent with little variation by country. However, in Iraq security reasons are more important with those living in the Central Region (at the time of the survey the Central Region was being invaded by the so called Islamic State) being significantly more likely to have considered migrating than those living in the other two regions. In Libya security and education were more important than economic factors. There is a clear relationship between the main reason for considering migration and whether a temporary or permanent move is envisaged. Those that are considering migrating for economic reasons are the most likely to say that they want to move permanently, but even then nearly half want to go for a limited period. Conversely, a clear majority of those considering migration for educational reasons want to go for a temporary period and only a third of those wanting to migrate for security reasons and a quarter wanting to do so for other reasons want to move on a permanent basis.

2.712.6

17.8

11.2

18.4 19

1 3.2 2.4 6.6 6.2 4.3

19

6.913.9

23.918.4 19

22.7 22.7

34.1

41.9 43 42.3


Figure 3: Those Who Considered Living Abroad, % by Country

Permanent Indeterminate Temporary Total

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Note: 1.1% in Iraq, 1.6% in Jordan, 2.3% in Libya, 1.2% in Morocco and 10.5% in Tunisia ‘did not know’/refused to answer. Those that have considered migrating tend to be young educated men. In all the countries, younger people are more likely to have considered migration; as people get older this appears to become less likely. The more educated and men are more likely to have considered migrating than the less educated and women in all the countries with the notable exception of Libya, where there are no differences by education or gender.

Summing Up The EU’s response to the migrant crisis has been a short-term policy of controlling migration. However, with an ageing population the EU needs migrant workers to ensure the continuing growth of it economies, and Arab countries are likely to continue to be ‘sending countries’. Both receiving and sending countries benefit from migration. The main drivers of migration are economic and security factors and education. About a half of those considering migration would do so on a temporary basis. Migrants tend to be young, male and educated

Policy Recommendations The EU should consider:

• prioritisingpolicesdesignedtoreducetheimpactofconflictsintheregionthusreducing the flows of migrants fleeing conflict. This includes, working inpartnership with the countries concerned, stabilising Libya, supportinginclusivepost-conflictreconstructioninIraqandbringingpeacetoSyria.Italso

88.7

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13.7

14.6

5.5

Egypt

Iraq

Jordan

Libya

Morocco

Tunisia

Figure 4: Main Reason for Considering Moving Abroad, % who Ha Considered Migration, by Country

Other Security Education Political Economic

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needs to focus more on policies that will promote inclusive economicdevelopmentintheregiontoreduceoneofthemaindriversofmigration–thesearchforabetterlife;

• developinganimmigrationpolicythatmanagesflowsofmigrantssothatthedemandsofitsownlabourmarketaremet.Theongoingviolenceandchaosin the region especially in Libya, Iraq and Syria is driving large numbers offorced migrants to flee to Europe. Responding just to this to this is shortsightedandnotinEurope’slongerterminterest.TheArabregionprovidesapotentialsourcefortheworkerstheEUwillneedoverthecomingyearsifitsmemberstatesaretocontinuetohavevibranteconomies;

• ensuring thatMENAcountriesaswellas theEUbenefits frommigrationbyprogressingthedealmadeattheVallettasummitin2015.ThisincludedthecreationofaTrustFundtopromoteeconomicdevelopment,thefundingofprojectsforyouthemploymentandmicrocredit,reductionofcommissiononremittances and theencouragementof the voluntary returnofmigrants totheircountryoforigin;

• the extent to which it wishes to compromise its claim to be a ‘normativepower’ by providing economic incentives to countries in MENA to houserefugees without requiring the usual commitment to make progress ondemocratisationandhumanright.ItshouldalsoconsidertheextenttowhichSEZs are likely to provide acceptable employment for refugees and thepotential that providing employment for refuges has for creating tensionsbetweenthemandlocalpopulation.

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***

EUROPEAN

POLICYBRIEF

What do ‘The People’ Want? Citizens’ Perceptions of Democracy, Development, and EU-MENA Relations in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, and Morocco in 2014

This document looks at how citizens of Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Libya, and Morocco viewed EU-MENA Relations in 2014 when the survey took place and what their attitudes are to the policies pursued by the EU with respect to their countries.

Focusing on North Africa, Jordan, and Iraq, the Arab Transitions project combines a cross-national public opinion survey carried out in 2014 with microdata, indexes, and other survey data to analyse trajectories of political, social and economic transformations before and after the 2010-2011 Arab Uprisings.

May 2016

INT RODUCT ION

In 2010-11 an unprecedented wave of protests and demands for regime change spread across the MENA region following the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouaziz in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia, on December 17th, 2010. In the wake of this ‘Arab Spring,’ many called for a ‘paradigm shift’ in the EU’s approach, including the t hen Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy Commissioner, Štefan Füle, who stated: “The peoples of this region have taken a courageous stand to defend their rights and to introduce democracy and social reforms. The EU must rise to the challenge […] it has often focused too much on stability […] Now is the time to bring our interests in line with our values. Recent events in the South have proved that there can be no real stability without real democracy” (SPEECH/ 11/436; p. 1). However, the EU’s substantive vision for both development and democratization remained unchanged, paying too little attention to socio-economic rights and inclusive economic development on the one hand and to politically sensitive civil and political rights (e.g. freedom to protest and freedom of association) on the other. This lack of responsiveness is evident in public opinion surveys conducted by the Arab Transitions project in Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Libya, and Morocco in 2014, which provided an insight into the attitudes and behaviours of ordinary citizens. Specifically, it sheds light on what people’s political demands are, what they understand by democracy, what they want governments to deliver, their attitudes to the EU, how they evaluate EU policies and how they think the Union can best support them. This research suggests populations are using ‘thicker’ conceptions of democracy, including social justice and economic rights as well as civil/political rights. In short, what they want is a ‘decent society’ in which there is economic security, in which they are recognised as full citizens, in which different groups work together and in which they are empowered to take control over their own lives. Failure to engage with the populations’ demand for a better life risks undermining EU credibility as a normative actor and as a stabilising force in the region. Correspondingly, by not responding fully to people’s hopes the EU risks missing an opportunity to exert a stabilising influence in the region.

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EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS

The Arab Uprisings and Citizens’ Demands: Why People Protested and What Remains a Challenge

In the media and in scholarly literature, the Arab Uprisings (‘Arab Spring’) are presented as a spontaneous popular mobilisation of citizens demanding regime change. Frequently, these analyses also explicitly state or implicitly assume that what people were demanding was Western-style democracy, understood as free and fair elections and the rule of law alone. Much of this coverage also suggested that a significant proportion of citizens in the Arab Middle East supported the Uprisings even if they did not participate actively.

The 2014 Arab Transitions survey findings suggest a more complex picture in all these respects.

For a start, across the five countries surveyed, just under a third of respondents said they supported the Uprisings, although this varied from a low of 14% in Jordan to a high of 73% in Libya.

Support for and Participation in Arab Uprisings by Selected MENA Countries, %

Support Participation

27.9

7.6 15.7 3.2 13.6 4.2

72.5 56.6

30.4 30.5

11.4 15.5

EQYPT IRAQ JORDAN LIBYA MOROCCO TOTAL

When asked what kinds of issues drove t hem to protest, people gave answers which can be grouped together based on whet her they refer to civil-political rights, socio-economic rights, or corruption. These answers suggest that while civil-political rights are indeed important, socio-economic rights are also vital. Socio-economic rights are ones to which people are entitled under international conventions which all the countries governments have ratified, and which they were supposedly pursuing – not least with EU help. In this 2014 survey, people continued to see the same main challenges as facing their countries, namely t hose that stemmed from corrupt, self-seeking regimes unwilling or unable to deliver socio-economic as well as civil-political rights. While there are differences between countries, it is clear that corruption and economic problems are seen as at least as important as the denial of political rights in driving people to protest. Over 60% of people thought that one of the two main factors behind the Uprisings was the demand for economic rights – specifically, protest against economic problems and/or demand for better basic services. Fighting corruption was seen as a main factor by 52% of respondents, while less than half of all respondents thought that one of the two main drivers was to demand political rights (i.e. to oppose authoritarian leaders and/or to demand more political freedom).

Demands for Political Rights, Economic Rights and Fighting Corruption as Drivers of the Arab Uprisings in Selected MENA Countries, %

Political Economic Corruption

31.3

76.9

41.1

68

47.8

84.1

50.5 47.8

22.1

59.9

49.9

63.8

59.3 57.1

38

45.4

61.7

51.9

EGYPT IRAQ JORDAN LIBYA MOROCCO TOTAL

As far as their opinions of the Uprisings three years on are concerned, answers suggest that in respondents’ eyes calls for regime change had in the main brought no positive outcomes, and few saw much hope for the future. This is perhaps not surprising, since uprisings by their nature bring a period of instability, including attempts by displaced leaderships to regain power. Nonetheless, both the political system and the national economy were judged to be performing even more poorly than they had been five years previously. Only

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19% of respondents thought the political system was performing well in 2014, compared to 32% who said it had been doing well in 2009; 19% thought the economy was doing well in 2014, compared with 29% who thought it had been doing well in 2009. In addition, only a third of respondents thought that the political system or the economy would be performing well in five years’ time, suggesting a considerable scepticism about the f future. While there are differences between countries – in Morocco and Iraq respondents did actually see marginal improvement – the overall picture is that political and economic systems were perceived to be performing poorly by the populations they ought to be serving.

Political System Performing Well in 2009

and 2014, % of Respondents Economy Performing Well in 2009 and

2014, % of Respondents

2009 2014 2009 2014

79.7 70.1

22.4 29.4

3.2

38.3

6.7 31.3 13.4 13.6 20.1

39.7 12.8

39.7

11.6 21.9 8.6 21

14.3 22.2

EGYPT IRAQ JORDAN LIBYA MOROCCO

EGYPT IRAQ JORDAN LIBYA MOROCCO

Ongoing Challenges: Corruption, Basic Services, Poverty, and Jobs

The survey also asked what people thought the two main challenges were that were facing their countries. Here, the economic situation and official corruption stand out, along with internal security. Across all countries, only a small minority see aut horitarianism as one of the two main challenges, although the forms of authoritarianism in respondents’ countries often involve a deep interconnection between political, economic, and security issues. Although each country displays a different situation, in Egypt, Morocco, and Jordan the economic situation was seen as the greatest challenge, in Iraq economy and security are virtually tied with corruption not far behind, while in Libya corruption and security outstrip both the economy and authoritarianism. The prominence of security in Iraq and Libya is not surprising, and the prominence of economic difficulties and of corruption underlines the continuing importance – and absence – of inclusive and equitable growth across the region.

Economic Situation, Corruption, Internal Security and Authoritarianism as One of Two Major Challenges in 2014, Selected MENA Countries, %

Economic Situation Corruption Internal Security Authoritarianism

88

54.4

58.9 57.3

49.4

89

66.2 63.4 59.9

80

59.8

57.5 55.3

42.2

19.8

2.6 10.7

11.4 0.7 26.5

18.9

9.4 15.7 12.8


When asked specifically about corruption, 81% of respondents thought it was a problem in state agencies, seen as self-serving and not responding to the legitimate demands of citizens. This varied from a high of 91% in bot h Morocco and Iraq to a relative low of 69% in Libya. Interestingly, in Egypt, although corruption was only mentioned as a major challenge by 20% of respondents, 87% nonetheless thought that it was a problem in state agencies. On average, only 20% of respondents thought their government was making a concerted effort to crack down on corruption, varying from a relative – but still modest -– high of 31% in Egypt to a low of 8% in Iraq.

A similar picture emerges when people were asked about the delivery of services by governments. Here, people remain concerned about the government’s record on controlling inflation, reducing income inequalities, and creating employment. The provision of basic utilities by government was seen as somewhat better in 2014, although access to basic utilities is a human right and all residents, as rights holders, should have access to these, and in most cases MENA governments are still far from achieving the Millennium Development Goals.

86

Government Service Delivery Judged to be at Least Good in Selected MENA Countries, %

Creating Employment Narrowing Income Inequalities Controlling Inflation Providing Utilities

40.5

30.8 26.8

55.8

7.5 14.6 20.2

49.8

21.8 9.7 10.3

67.3 38

18.8 23.2

31.8

22.6 21.2

16.9

42.1 43.4

30.5 19 21.6

E GYPT IRAQ JORDAN LIBYA MOROCCO SAMPLE

A Lack of Trust in Institutions

More worryingly, not only was government seen as not delivering what citizens wanted, but there was also a lack of confidence in other institutions – government, political organisations, the forces of law and order, and civil society more generally. In the sample as a whole, only one in twenty people said they trusted parliament, and only one in four trusted the Council of Ministers. Even fewer trusted political parties: just 13 per cent. Confidence varied by country, with as many as 31% of respondents trusting parliament in Libya but only 4% in Iraq, and 55% trusting the Council of Ministers in Egypt compared with just 18 % in Iraq. While slightly higher, confidence in the police and the legal system was also low, 46% and 47% respectively overall, meaning that citizens could have no confidence that corrupt politicians and public officials would be held to account. Trust and confidence did vary by country: in Egypt and Jordan, for example, confidence in both the police and the courts was noticeably higher than in other countries, while few Iraqis expressing confidence in eit her of the two – 2.9% and 4.9% respectively.

In addition, people reported having poor access to impartial political information. They also said that they had little confidence in organisations that generally help to hold governments accountable by providing an independent voice. For example, taking all countries together, only 1 respondent in 20 had confidence in the press, 29% in civil society, and 31% in religious leaders. This suggests that none of these institutions were seen as being able to hold government to account, nor were they seen as representing citizens’ views. While the levels of confidence varied by country, they were uniformly and worryingly low: the highest level of trust in the media was in Iraq with barely over one third, while a mere 14% trusted the media in Libya, which scored the lowest. The picture was much the same for civil society, with the highest level of confidence being in Egypt, at just over a third, and the lowest being 17 per cent, in Iraq. Confidence in religious leaders was only marginally higher, at 30 per cent and varying from a high of 51% in Iraq to a low of 19% in Libya.

What kind of Democracy and Political Regime do ‘the People’ Want?

One of the most famous slogans of the Uprisings was ash-sha’b yurid isqaat an-nizam: the people want the downfall of the regime. But what did they want it to be replaced by? The Arab Uprisings were often portrayed as calls for removing particular dictators and installing a liberal form of democracy concentrating on aspects of democracy such as elections and political rights. While populations certainly protested against aut horitarianism and called for civil and political rights, this is at best a partial vision of what populations called for and protested against in 2010-2011. This difference is crucial, because too often ‘Western’ governments concentrate nearly exclusively on these aspects. From the 2014 Arab Transitions survey, it is clear that respondents wanted responsive government but not simply the ‘thin’ form of liberal democracy focusing on the formal characteristics and procedures of democracy.

For example, asked how democracy compares with other systems of government, 79% of respondents agreed that while democracy has its problems, it is better than alternatives, and 68% thought that the government should make laws according to the wishes of the people. Responses varied somewhat by country, with Egyptians being less certain about democracy and Jordanians the most certain. However, Jordanian citizens were also the least likely to think government should make laws according to the wishes of the people.

87

Democracy as a Preferable System of Government and Government Should

Make Decisions According to the Wishes of the People

Democracy Better than Alternatives Make Laws According to the Wishes of the People

61.3

81.7 79.4

71.8

89.8 60.3

74.6 80.3 78.6

67.9 62.3 67.6


Across all countries, 49% of people thought that parliamentary democracy – a parliamentary system with left wing, right wing, secular, and religious parties all competing – was suitable for their country. However, there was considerable variation across countries, with an overwhelming majority of respondents in Iraq selecting it (80%) but only 26% in Libya.

In addition, the surveys show that people think of democracy not just in its ‘thin’ procedures (e.g. elections) but also in its ‘thick’ or substantive aspects such as socio-economic rights. For example, asked to nominate the two most important characteristics of democracy, the most frequently mentioned was being able to change governments through elections, at 43 per cent; but getting rid of corruption was the second most frequently mentioned at 35%. Combining the items related to civil-political rights (elections, freedom to criticise government, and citizens’ political equality), 68% of respondents mentioned at least one of these, while 58% mentioned an economic right (reducing economic inequalities and/or provision of basic services and/or employment creation). The evenness of the split across civil-political and socio-economic areas is also reflected in the fact that 40% of respondents nominated only political rights, 29% mentioned only economic rights, and 29% mentioned bot h a civil-political and a socio-economic right. There were noticeable differences by country, with respondents in Iraq and Libya – bot h conflict-torn countries – being most likely to nominate at least one political right, while those in Morocco, Jordan, and Egypt were more likely to mention an economic right. There was sometimes noticeable variation by country – for example, while 59% of respondents in Iraq mentioned changing governments through elections, only 20% of Jordanians mentioned this factor. While a significant minority in all the countries nominate lack of corruption as an essential characteristic of democracy, Jordan had the highest proportion of respondents mentioning corruption, at 49.3 per cent, but only 29.6% of Egyptians mentioned t his factor. However, despite these differences, in all countries a noticeable proportion of respondents nominated at least one political right and/or one economic right.

Two Essential Characteristics of Democracy, % Nominating in Selected

MENA Countries by Type of Characteristic

A Political Right An Economic Right Fighting Corruption

46.8

61.6

84.2 44.7

59.3

70.3

49.3

79.6

73

60 48.2

68.4

57.6

29.6

35.2 33.1 35.7 35.1


88

Perceptions of the European Union

The EU is sometimes described as a ‘normative actor’ and certainly sees its fundamental values as central not only to its internal dimension but also to its external relations. However, although it is perceived more favourably than other global powers, respondents did not necessarily see the Union as supporting either democracy or development.

Thirty-one per cent of respondents saw the EU as a force for instability in the region, 41% saw it as a force for stability, and the rest remained neutral. The US was seen as a greater force for instability, by 52% of respondents, with only a third seeing it as a force for stability. Egypt was the most negative about the EU, with only 15% seeing it as a force for stability, while at the other extreme 54% of Moroccans saw the Union as a stabilising force. Only the Arab League was rated as a greater force for stability than the EU – and only then by a small margin, at 44%. Across the surveyed countries, Russia (32%) and China (25%) were seen as a threat to stability by a smaller proportion of respondents compared to the EU, with the noticeable exception of Jordan, where 56% of respondents see Russia as a threat. However, these countries were also less likely to be seen as a force for stability, with Russia at 26% and China at 31 per cent.

Despite their relatively high rating as a force for stability, EU countries were not frequently nominated by respondents as ones with which they would like their own country to have closer relations. In response to an open question, respondents nominated a total of 58 different countries, but only seven per cent of respondents nominated an EU Member State, with the three most frequently mentioned being Germany (2.5%), France (2.3%) and the UK (1.6%). Nine other EU countries were each mentioned by less than 1% of respondents. By a considerable margin, the most frequently nominated country was Saudi Arabia – although even t hen, the Kingdom was nominated by only 20% of respondents. By contrast, the US was nominated by 6.3% of respondents across all countries, Turkey by 7.7 per cent, Russia by 2.4 per cent, China by 2.6 per cent, and Iran by 1.4 per cent.

In addition, when asked specifically about a European state with which they would like t their country to have closer relations, 53% did not nominate any country, and only 39% nominated an EU Member State. In total, 15 Member States were nominated, with only Germany and the UK achieving double digits (13.4% and 11.3% respectively). Only five other Member States received more than one per cent of nominations: the UK (11.3 %), Italy (6.2%), Spain (2.9%), Sweden (2.2%), and the Netherlands (1.1% ). Non-EU European countries fared little better: the most frequently nominated was Russia at 4.1 per cent.

Regardless of the intentions or merits of EU policies, it appears that the majority of respondents have little appetite for their countries forming closer relationships with either the EU as a whole or its component states.

Top 10 European Country Respondents Think Their Country Should Strengthen Relations with to Improve Current Situation (Open Question), % of Respondents

Egypt Iraq Jordan Libya Morocco Sample

No Country Nominated 62.6%






Russia 16.9%

UK 17%

Germany 14.5%

UK 15.3%

Germany 30.4%

Germany 13.4%

Germany 11.5%

Germany 13%

UK 12.1%

Italy 9.4%

Spain 8.5%

UK 11.3%

Italy 2.4%

Sweden 9.5%

Italy 2.1%

Germany 5.6%

UK 7.0%

Italy 6.2%

UK 2.4%

Italy 7.5%

Switzerland 2.1%

Switzerland 2.1%

Sweden 4.4%

Russia 4.1%

Turkey 1.9%

Russia 6.7%

Spain 1.0%

Spain 2.0%

Italy 4.3%

Spain 2.9%

Sweden 0.9%

Netherlands 5.1%

Sweden 0.7%

Netherlands 0.8%

Russia 3.3%

Sweden 2.2%

Greece 0.7%

Switzerland 4%

Norway 0.3%

Sweden 0.4%

Switzerland 3%

Switzerland 2.1%

Spain 0.5%

Denmark 1.6%

Netherland 0.3%

Greece 0.4%

Netherlands 1.3%

Netherlands 1.1%

Belgium 0.2%

Spain 1.6%

Denmark 0.3%

Bulgaria 0.4%

Norway 1.1%

Belgium 0.7%

Note: white squares denote non-EU countries

89

The Perception of EU Policies: Democracy, Development, and the Response to the Uprisings

Respondents were also asked about their perception of the EU’s impact in specific policy areas, particularly democracy and development.

Overall, only a third of respondents thought the EU has had a positive impact on the development of democracy in their countries; roughly the same response as for the USA. However, there was considerable variation in responses across countries: nearly half of respondents in Libya and 41% in Morocco thought that the EU has had a positive influence, compared with a mere 7% in Egypt.

Positive Influence on Development of Democracy of the EU and/or the USA in Selected MENA Countries, %

EU USA

6.8

2.9

34.4

24.9 26.7

21.3

46.8 48 40.5

36.5

35 33.8


Indeed, to the extent people agreed that the EU should be involved in their country at all, they thought it should be in supporting economic development. Overall, one in five did not think that the EU should have any involvement in policy in their country at all, and only 16% said that the most positive thing the Union could do would be to promote democracy. On the other hand, support for economic development stood at 43 per cent. There was some variation by country, but the pattern was quite clear: promoting economic development was the most frequently nominated response in all countries, albeit by less than half of respondents across the 5 countries.

When asked to nominate the two most important things the EU could offer in support of their country, over 90% gave at least one example. Various types of financial support were the most frequently mentioned, with 56% of respondents nominating at least one – e.g. support for basic services, for jobs and investment, and/or loans and grants. There were noticeable variations by country: 76 % of people mentioned financial support in Egypt, compared to 49 % in Libya. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the security situation, respondents in Libya and Iraq were more likely to suggest that the best way the EU could provide support was to their military. It should be interesting to note that while nearly t hree quarters of respondents (74.5%) thought that Israel had a destabilising influence in the region – ranging from 89% of respondents in Iraq through 83% in both Jordan and Egypt, 63% in Libya to 59% in Morocco – only 9 % of people actually saw ceasing to support Israel as a way in which the EU could support MENA countries.

One thing to note is that less than a third (30%) of respondents had actually heard about EU development assistance to their country – varying from 56% in Libya to a mere 9% in Egypt – and that, of those that have heard of it, a majority had positive opinions about it, varying from 92% in Iraq to 57% in Egypt.

Nearly twice as many people said they had heard about EU programmes specifically in response to the Arab Uprisings (63%). However, only 24% evaluated the impact of these programmes positively, and exactly the same proportion saw them as having had a negative impact. Libyan respondents were the most positive by a considerable margin, at 35%, and the Egyptians were the least positive, with only 3.4% thinking the programmes had had a positive impact.

In sum, the 2014 ARABTRANS survey seems to show that people in Morocco, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq have a low opinion of the EU’s claims to be a ‘normative actor’, to facilitate democratization and development, or even to be a force for stability in t heir region. People are on average not very familiar with the EU’s work in the region, but when they do know about it they appreciate it. However, the Union’s specific response to the Arab Uprisings is not judged positively.

90

HowtheEUCanSupportSelectedMENACountries,%Nominating

Morocco Libya Jordon Iraq Egypt Sample

EUSHOULDNOTPROVIDESUPPORT

7.9

6.8

13.7 16.5

36.8

STOPSUPPORTTOISRAEL

SECURITY/MILITARY

MIGRATION

9.3 6.6

176.86.6

3.87.1

29.6

STOPSUPPORTTOISRAEL

0.44

3.2

8.8 10.8

TECHNICALSUPPORTFOREDUCATIONANDTRAINING

.

6.4 6.3

13.8

23.2

5.1

11.4

18.5

14.8 25.4

LOANSANDGRANTS

1.8

13.4

19.9

FINANCEFORJOBCREATIONANDINVESTMENT

16.5 31.2

37.8

52.1 52.3 53

FINANCIALSUPPORTFORBASICSERVICES

35.8 29.8

45.9 46.3

45.9

56.4

60.5

91

Conclusions

The 2014 ARABTRANS survey sheds light on three key areas: what led people to revolt, their political priorities and conception of democracy, and their perception of the EU’s regional role.

EU policy towards the MENA region has focused on promoting a ‘thin’ version of democracy focusing on t he one hand on civil and political rights (e.g. free and fair elections), and on the other on liberal economic policies aimied at achieving economic inclusion. While securing civil and political rights is very important to people in the countries surveyed, the survey shows that citizens are also deeply concerned with securing social and economic rights and with fighting corruption. A majority of respondents want governments that are responsive to the wishes of their citizens, but only slightly more than half think that ‘thin’, procedural democracy – free and fair elections, civil and political rights alone – is a suitable form of government for their country. There are differences among respondents in what they see as the most important characteristics of democracy: 40% prioritised political rights, with the rest evenly divided between those who prioritised bot h political and economic rights and those prioritising economic rights alone. This balance between socio-economic and political factors was also what people perceived were the causes of the ‘Arab Spring’: people saw the causes of the Uprisings as discontent with the economic situation and with corruption as much as, if not more than, wanting Western-style democracy or even more political rights and greater freedom. What people want is governments that are responsive to their demands for a decent life – economic security, decent employment, adequate utilities, and social services (including education and health), and an end to a political system rife with corruption and cronyism.

With regard to regional relations, the EU was as frequently seen as a force for instability in the region as a force for stability, nor did respondents did not prioritise EU Member States when choosing countries with which their countries should develop closer relations. Over 90% did think that the EU can provide positive support to their countries, but they prioritise economic support rather than the Union’s programmes supporting democracy.

In sum, few respondents wanted the EU to promote its brand of ‘thin’, procedural democracy in which civil and political rights remained uncoupled from social and economic rights, and it is this balance between issues that drove them to revolt in 2010-11. A majority of respondents, with some variation by country, were not aware of what support the EU is actually providing to their country, and while a majority of those that had heard about EU programmes were positive about development assistance, people were much less positive about programmes the EU implemented specifically in response to the Uprisings.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

EU programmes in the Southern Neighbourhood have consistently emphasised civil/political rights and procedural aspects of democracy. While not ignoring the socio-economic dimension, programmes have subsumed it under the rubric of development, specifically aiming for market-driven inclusive development through which to stimulate democratization. Such policies are likely to have helped produce precisely the socio-economic dislocation against which MENA populations protested in 2010-2011.

The pursuit of current policies has produced considerable popular disenchantment with the EU as a ‘normative power’. To regain regional credibility and offer a political vision capable of meeting regional and global challenges, the EU should consider a response that rethinks not just the instruments but also the substantive objectives of its approach to the promotion of democracy, development, and regional stability.

Specifically, the EU could explore alternative types of programmes to fund (e.g. focusing on socio-economic rights as well as challenging civil-political rights such as freedom of association and freedom to protest) and broaden the types of organisations it targets. It should look beyond its orthodox approaches to democracy and give greater priority to socio-economic rights, integrating the programme more systematically into the holistic human rights agenda articulated in the Sustainable Development Goals.

RESEARCH PARAMET ERS

The ARABTRANS NS project’s multi-method research deploys an interdisciplinary approach drawing on Polit ical Science, Sociology, Middle East Studies, Development Studies, Public Policy, and Social Psychology. The project looks comparatively at attitudes and behaviours in selected MENA countries in the context of the social, political and economic transformations that have been taking place across the Middle East and North Africa since February 2011. The main methods used are nat ionw ide probability surveys carried out in 2014 in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, and Morocco, secondary analysis of macrodat a, discourse analysis, and historiography.

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PROJECT IDENTITY

PROJECT NA Political and Social Transformations in the Arab World (ARABTRANS)

COORDINATO Dr Andrea Teti, School of Social Sciences, University of Aberdeen, UK; [email protected]. uk

CONSORTIU Análisis Sociológicos Económicos y Políticos – ASEP – Madrid, Spain Applied Social Science Forum – ASSF – Tunisia Centre de Recherche en Économie Appliquée pour le Développement – CREAD – Spain Centre for Survey Methodology – Conclusia – Chisinau, Moldova Dublin City University – DCU – Dublin, Ireland Egyptian Centre for Public Opinion Research – BASEERA - Cairo, Egypt Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies – IIACSS – Amman, Jordan Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale – ISPI – Milan, Italy MEDA Solutions – MEDAS – Morocco University of Aberdeen – UNIABDN – Aberdeen, UK University of Graz – UNI GRAZ – Graz, Austria University of Jordan – JU – Amman, Jordan

FUNDING SCHEM FP7 Framework Programme, Social Changes and Political Transformations in the Arab World – Collaborative Project

DURATIO April 2013–September 2016 (42 mont hs)

BUDGET EU Contribution: Euros 2,489,914

WEBSI http://www.arabtrans.eu/ FOR MORE

INFORMATIO

Contact: Dr Andrea Teti, School of Social Sciences University of Aberdeen Aberdeen AB24 3FX Scotland, United Kingdom [email protected]. uk

FURTHER READI Abbott, P., Sapsford, R, and Teti, A. After the Arab Uprisings: Political, Social and

Economic Attitudes in the MENA Region in 2014. Aberdeen: University of Aberdeen.

Talbot, V., Maggiolini, P. and Teti, A. EU-MENA Relations. Milan: Instit uto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale.

Teti, A., Talbot, V. and Maggiolini, P. The Impact and the Role of the European Union on Political Transitions in the Middle East and North Africa: Democratization and Democracy Assistance Policy. Aberdeen: University of Aberdeen

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In the decade before the Arab Uprisings, people became increasingly disaffected with corrupt regimes which maintained power by rewarding a political and economic elite while excluding increasing swathes of the population from economic gains and political voice. As structural reforms failed to ‘trickle down’ and only increased crony elites’ strength, the middle classes joined working classes in becoming disaffected and politically mobilised. Survey data shows that with the unprecedented wave of protests across the MENA region in 2010-11 came a renewed optimism that post-Uprisings governments would bring desired change, but also awareness that socio-economic problems remained as acute as political ones, if not more so. Survey data also suggests that what drove protesters was a demand for both social and economic rights (e.g. decent jobs, social protection, universal education and health services) as well as political change. Protesters displayed this sense of betrayal in the slogans they used, such as the immensely popular ‘Bread, Freedom, Social Justice’ (‘ Aysh! Horreya! ‘Adala al-igtima’eyya!) . Since then, people’s expectations have gone largely unattended on a range of issues from social security to jobs, trust in governments has dropped drastically, the economy remains the single largest challenge (and cause of migration), corruption remains pervasive, unemployment is endemic, political reforms have been either cosmetic or reversed or in Tunisia’s case remain shaky, and people have little faith that things will change. This potentially toxic mix of factors has not been addressed either by regional governments or by their international counterparts. Indeed, International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and Western governments quickly recast the Uprisings as a struggle merely for formal democracy and the overthrow of autocracy. This made it possible to stress the need for an orderly transition to democracy while continuing the very economic policies ordinary citizens blamed for the increasingly precarious lives they were leading.

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Building Decent Societies: Economics and Political Cohesion in Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia This policy brief looks at the main drivers of the Arab Uprisings that took place across the Arab world in 2011 and draws on data from the ArabTrans public opinion survey, as well as the Arab Barometer II, the Gallup World Poll and the World Development Indicators, to ask to what extent people think that things are getting better, that the regimes in place post-2011 are addressing their concerns and delivering a way of life that they have reason to value. We illustrate our argument by looking at three countries, namely Tunisia, Jordan and Egypt.

Focusing on North Africa, Jordan, and Iraq, the ArabTrans Project combines a cross-national public opinion survey carried out in 2014 with microdata, indexes, and other survey data to analyse the trajectories of political, social and economic transformations before and after the 2010-2011 Arab Uprisings.

August 2016

INTRODUCTION

EUROPEAN

POLICYBRIEF


The Situation in 2011: Challenges and Hopes for the Future People in Egypt, Tunisia and Jordan identified a range of issues which drove them to protest,1 and in 2011 they identified a number of challenges they saw their country as facing, but they were also reasonably trusting that governments would deal with them and optimistic for the future.2

Asked to identify the two main challenges facing their country, people focused on the economy: 81% of Egyptian respondents to the 2011 Arab Barometer survey nominated the economic situation, closely followed by 80% of Jordanians and 70% of Tunisians. Other significant challenges, albeit noticeably less important, included: internal security – mentioned by half of Egyptians, nearly a third of Tunisians, but only 10% of Jordanians – and corruption, mentioned by between a quarter and a third of respondents. In Jordan, Palestine was also seen as an issue by a significant minority. Corruption was not always named as one of the two major challenges, but it was seen as pervasive in state institutions: around 80% of Egyptians and Tunisians and 74% of Jordanians agreed it was a problem. In fact, the vast majority of respondents thought it difficult to get employment without connections (wasta) and nearly two-thirds in Jordan and

Tunisia and nearly half in Egypt thought it difficult to get a job at all without connections. However, in 2011, three-quarters of Egyptians, two-thirds of Tunisians and just over half of Jordanians did think that the government was making reasonable efforts at cutting down on corruption. Democracy was noticeably low among challenges identified in Egypt and Jordan, although a fifth mentioned it in Tunisia. At the time, both Egypt and Tunisia were in turmoil, with concerns about whether the upcoming elections for the Tunisian Constituent Assembly would be fair and free, while in Egypt there was no timeline to elections at all, so respondents may have underestimated how easy it would be to obtain democracy after their Revolutions. It is also possible that these results reflect a certain amount of ‘democracy fatigue’ in Arab MENA countries, resulting from local regimes’ strategy of heavily relying on ‘democracy’ as a rhetorical banner to legitimize their regimes but delivering none of the social justice of political voice citizens wanted, while Western governments cooperated with those regimes claiming this would facilitate democratization.

(Source: authors’ calculations from ArabBarometer II) As Fig. 3 shows, while people were relatively hopeful in general, they were much less certain that governments 1In the 2014 ArabTrans survey, respondents were asked to reflect on 2011: 69.2% of Egyptians, 76.9% of Jordanians and 62.8% of Tunisians said economic factors were one of the two main drivers of the Uprisings, and 41.1% of Egyptians, 47.8% of Jordanians and 61.3% of Tunisians mentioned corruption compared with 21.4% of Egyptians, 23.4% of Jordanians and 42.8% of Tunisians indicated political rights were one of the two main demands of demonstrators.

2The data for 2011 is based on analysis of Arab Barometer II data. The surveys were carried out in June/July 2011 in Egypt, December 2010 in Jordan, and September/October 2011 in Tunisia.

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Figure2:FactorsNominatedasOneofTwoMainChallengesFacingtheCountryin2011

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EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS

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Figure1:DriversoftheUprisingsinEgyptandTunisia(Source:authors'calculationsfromArabBarometerII)



in 2011 were actually delivering on the specifics of what they saw as their countries’ challenges. In fact, governments were thought to be performing badly in two of the areas that were seen as major drivers of the Uprisings: job creation and inclusive development (i.e. all social groups benefiting from economic growth).

(Source: authors’ calculations of Arab Barometer II . Note: Questions on Democratic Transition and Providing Internal Security were not asked in Jordan )

Despite such considerable challenges and poor current performance by governments, most people were optimistic that things were going to get better and that by 2016 governments would address the main challenges facing their countries. This optimism peaked in Egypt (81%) and in Tunisia (74%) whereas Jordanians were less certain, with not more than half being reasonably optimistic. Many also expressed trust in government (77% in Egypt, 72% in Jordan and 62% in Tunisia), and a feeling that governments were undertaking far-reaching reforms (76% in Egypt, 69% in Jordan, 66% in Tunisia). Again, Egyptians and Tunisians were particularly optimistic about prospects for post-revolutionary change: just over 90% of Egyptians and around 85% of Tunisians thought that in coming years they would have better economic opportunities and greater social justice. This optimism was likely due to the fact that, at least in Egypt and Tunisia, people felt that the economy, despite being identified as the major challenge, would improve considerably. In Jordan, however, the number of people who expected the situation to be better by 2014-16 dropped over 10%.

(Source: authors’ own calculations from Arab Barometer II data set)

Did the Uprisings Bring Change? Assessing Material Developments from 2011 to 2014 As with any post- revolutionary period, temporary turbulence in economic as well as political life is to be expected: the key question is whether the socio-economic and political causes of the Uprisings are being addressed in a manner which satisfies the expectations of a majority of the population. To what extent was people’s optimism rewarded? Did things change for the better by 2014? How do people see the future? People were no happier in 2014 than they had been in 2010. According to the Gallup World Poll life satisfaction in the three countries is low. It should be emphasised that survey data suggest that no single pattern captures post-Uprising

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Figure3:PerformaceofGovernmentSeenasatleastGoodin2011inDeliveringSelectedServices

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Figure4:EvalutionofEconomicSituationin2011andProspectsforImprovementin3-5Years



developments: Jordan, Tunisia, and Egypt epitomise these differences. These countries’ political trajectory differed markedly. Tunisia undertook a shaky path towards greater formal democracy and human rights. It is seen as the only MENA country on this transition path, although many question both the ‘depth’ of political changes and whether both secular and Islamist post-revolutionary governments have addressed issues of social justice. In Jordan, the monarchy assuaged discontent by changing governments and making some concessions, achieving a semblance of equilibrium, if perhaps temporary and precarious. In Egypt, the ‘January Revolution’ was met with successive counter-revolutionary efforts: first a military government (2011-2012), then an Islamist-majority Parliament and Presidency (albeit freely and fairly elected), and finally a second Army-dominated government, after the 2013 coup removing the elected President and dissolving parliament. With the partial and qualified exception of Tunisia, post-Uprisings governments across the region have not responded proactively to citizens’ demands, but rather combined security crackdowns with making the minimal concessions necessary to stave off mass mobilisation. Secondly, unemployment, one of the key drivers of the Uprisings, has remained high. Youth unemployment in particular has increased in Egypt and has remained unchanged in Jordan and Tunisia. Unemployment continues to affect educated young people disproportionately and especially young women. Furthermore, the overall rate conceals the number of people, including the young, who have withdrawn from the labour market altogether or have become demoralised and are no longer actively looking for work. In addition, there are the underemployed, those in poor-quality, poorly remunerated jobs in the informal sector, and those working as unpaid family workers. Precarious employment of this kind inflates the apparent rate of employment, masking the difficulty of bringing about inclusive development.

(Source: World Development Indicators)

Given that resources on which these countries must build their development have not increased, other indicators oof macroeconomic halth provide cause for concern. Economic growth has slowed compared with pre-Uprising levels, wehich ere already sluggish relative to these coutnries’ ‘youth bulges. The Egyptian economy depends on income sources like tourism and the Suez Canal which are vulnerable to political instability, and on hydrocarbons the price of which has dropped to historic lows. The portion of GDP made up of natural resource rents and tourism receipts declined from 11.7% of GDP in 2010 to 5.4% in 2014 (having already fallen from 19.6% in 2008). Consequently, GDP per capita growth rate declined from 5.1% in 2010 to 1.8% in 2011 before recovering slightolyh to 2.2% in 2014. Jordan, where the economy wasd already in recession in 2010 due to the impact of the 2007-8 global financial crisis, saw GDP per captia contract by 3.4% in 2010 and by 3.5% in 2011 before growing by 1.3% in 2014. Tunisia saw negative growth in nated because of high inflation: between 2010 and 2014 the Consumer Price Index increased by 42% in Egypt, 17% in Jordan, and 27% in Tunisia. The extent to which poverty and inequality patterns changed is not yet available in detail. However, overall, in Egypt poverty increased by 1% to 26.3% in 2012/13 compared to 2010/11, continuing a trend in increasing poverty that started in 1999/2000. There is no recent poverty data for Jordan, but the influx of Syrian referees has certainly had a negative impact on the country’s social and educational services. As with Jordan there is no recent data on poverty incidence for Tunisia but loss of tourism revenues, decline in mining activities and low agricultural productivity is almost certainly having a negative impact on incomes, particularly in rural areas.

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Other economic data are no more encouraging. The external debt stock of the three countries has increased: in Egypt it nearly doubled, from US$14.1 billion to US$24.3 billion, in Jordan it went from US$36.54 billion to US$39.6 billion, while in Tunisia it went from US $22.5 billion to US$ 26.4 billion. Foreign direct investment (FDI) in Egypt nearly halved, going from 3% to 1.6% of GDP; in Jordan FDI declined from 6% of GDP to 5%; and in Tunisia it remained virtually unchanged at about 1% of GDP. Net Official Development Assistance (ODA) in Egypt increased from 0.3% of GNI to 2%; in Jordan it increased from 2.6% to 4.9% of GNI; and in Tunisian it increased from 5.3% of GNI in 2010 to 9.2% in 2014. In real terms (constant 2013 prices) ODA receipts increased by 56% in Egypt, 73% in Jordan and 97% in Tunisia. In Egypt the relative importance of donors changed from Western ones to the Arab Gulf states, with the Arab donors contributing 75.5% of ODA in 2011-14 compared with 11.9% in 2007-10. Although EU Institutions’ ODA nearly doubled and that of the EU countries remained much the same, the share of their contribution declined from 32.7% overall for the period 2007-10 to 23% for the period 2011-14. In Jordan, by contrast, the combined contribution to ODA of the EU member states and EU Institutions increased from 27% to 36% while that of the Arab donors increased from 12% to 20%. In Tunisia the combined contribution of EU member countries remained the same, at 65%, while Arab donors’ share declined from 12% to 8%. In Egypt nearly a third of ODA was made up of concessional loans, and half in Tunisia, but only 16% in Jordan. Remittances in Egypt increased from 4.8% of GDP to 6.5%, recovering to the level before the 2008 Economic Crisis, in Jordan they declined from 13% of GDP to 10%, and in Tunisia they remained virtually unchanged at just over 2% of GDP. The number of Egyptian migrant workers declined between 2010 and 2013 while those from Jordan increased by 6.5% and those from Tunisia by 4.5%. Furthermore, little progress has been made in reforming the economy: in all three countries, the public sector remains comparatively large, with little being done to liberalise the private sector; crony capitalism remains untouched, with the government favouring an insider economic elite in return for continuing support and carrying out ‘liberalising’ economic reforms which serve the interest of precisely those client elites. With such a track record, it is little wonder that the IMF itself recently recognised ‘trickle down’ economics has not worked.

Evidence of the existence of corruption and the negative impact it has had on economic growth and development more generally is coming to light. In Egypt, for example, politically connected firms have been shown to have virtually cornered the market in loans but employ less workers and are less profitable than comparable ones that are not politically connected. Levels of perceived corruption by expert informants remain high, although it has decreased since the 2010- 2011 Uprisings in Egypt (from a score of 3.1 in 2010 to 3.8 in 2015 on the Corruption Perceptions Index, i.e. a 7% absolute decrease), and in Jordan (from 4.7 in 2010 to 5.3 out of 10 in 2015, a 6% absolute decrease). However, in Tunisia there was an increase by 2015 (from 4.3 to 3.8 out of 10, i.e. an absolute increase of 5%).

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(Source: Transparency International)

There is little evidence of any improvement in wellbeing with virtually no progress on the Human Development Index and subjective satisfaction on the Gallup World Poll moving up only marginally between 2010 and 2014 (from 4.7 to 4.9 on a scale from 0 to 10) in Egypt, remaining unchanged at 5.1 in Tunisia and declining in Jordan but only from 5.6 to 5.3. For countries experiencing such profound turmoil as Tunisia and Egypt, this in itself could be considered a positive result, although it does suggest that underlying causes of dissatisfaction remain

Did the Uprisings Meet Expectations? How People Perceive Changes after the Uprisings

This lack of progress was evident in the responses of ordinary people to the 2014 Arab Trans public opinion survey. Despite their optimism about the future in 2011 only 12% of Egyptians thought that the Arab Spring had been positive for their country by 2014, and although the proportion was higher in Tunisia it was still only 31%. Jordanians had been less confident about the future even initially, but even here progress had been less than anticipated, with only 25% thinking that the Arab Uprisings had been positive for their country.

Furthermore, respondents saw the same challenges facing their country as the ones identified in 2011, with the economic situation nominated by a far higher proportion of respondents than other challenges. Concern about corruption had increased by over 2.5% to 71% in Jordan and concern about internal security increased marginally in Tunisia. However, as in 2011, few thought that the nature of the political regime was one of the two main challenges facing the country. Concern centred on the economy and to a lesser extent security and corruption. As in 2011, the overwhelming majority of respondents thought that corruption was pervasive in state agencies and institutions, - 77 % in Egypt, even though it is not specifically nominated as one of the two major challenges, 88% in Jordan and 85% in Tunisia. Getting a job without ‘wasta’ continued to be seen as difficult, with the proportion that saw it as virtually impossible increasing from about half to three quarters in Egypt and from about two thirds to about three quarters in Jordan and remaining the same at about two thirds in Tunisia. Trust in government plummeted most noticeably in Tunisia, where it fell from 62% in 2011 to 16% in 2014, and in Jordan, where it fell from 72% to 29%. Although less drastic, there was also a significant decline in Egypt, from 77% to 56%. The latter difference is most likely due to the political polarisation which took place between the election of President Morsi (who received 51.49% of the vote in 2012) and the 2013 coup removing him which set Islamists against those supporting Egypt’s second post-revolutionary military government. No such polarisation took place in Jordan, while splits between Islamists and secularists in Tunisia have ultimately been recomposed in national unity governments.

(Source: authors’ own calculations from ArabTrans data) The main concerns of ordinary people in 2014, then, continued to be the economic situation, as it had been in the aftermath of the revolution (see Figure 2 above) but with heightened concerns about security. Furthermore,

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Figure6:TransparencyInternationalCorruptionPerceptionIndex2000-2015,Scoreoutof10(10=leastcorrupt)forSelectedMENACountries


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Figure 7: Economic Situation, Corruption, Internal Security and Authoritarianism as One of Two Major Challenges in 2014, Selected MENA Countries, %



the optimism that people had expressed in the aftermath of the Uprisings that the economic situation would improve had not been met. Asked to compare the economic situation in 2014 with 2009 people felt that their own and the country’s economic situation had deteriorated, more so in Jordan and Tunisia than Egypt but to some extent in all three countries. Specific economic concerns included just over 50% of both Egyptians and Tunisians and 28% of Jordanians being worried about a loss of their or their spouse’s job. Around 40% of respondents in all three countries were worried that they would not be able to ensure that their children received a good education.

Although not highly nominated as one of the two main challenges facing the country compared with how respondents remembered the situation in 2009, respondents perceived the overall security situation as having deteriorated alarmingly by 2014. This was the case for perceptions both of the security of the country and of the security situation of respondents’ own families, although less so in Jordan than in Egypt and Tunisia. Ordinary people were concerned both about the threat of a war involving their country and about internal strife and terrorism. Three quarters of Egyptians and well over three quarters of Tunisians (84%) were concerned about the threat of civil unrest/terrorism, as were 46% of Jordanians. Concern about their country being involved in a war was lower but still high, with 59% of Egyptians, 66% of Tunisians and 40% of Jordanians being worried about the possibility. It should be noted that while Egypt and Tunisia have experienced some spectacular terrorist incidents – including some aimed at tourists, with consequent impact on the economy – neither of these countries was ever at serious risk of nationwide insurgency, civil war, or war with neighbours. The perception of insecurity of this kind is more likely to be a measure of the effectiveness of regime propaganda, particularly in Egypt where the government has emphasised the theme of external and internal threats to security. In Jordan there has been less internal instability, but the threat of instability spilling over from Iraq or Syria has been much more realistic.

Governments were generally seen as performing badly, especially in implementing economic policy and

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generally to be performing less well than in 2011 ,when performance had not been rated that highly (see Figure 3 above). The decline in the rating of government performance as at least good in terms of managing the economy was noticeable higher in Tunisia (from 56.5% to 8.5%) and Jordan (from 66.3% to 29.2%) than in Egypt (52.4% to 38.5%) but still a significant and large decline in all three. There was also little confidence in governments' performance in employment creation, controlling inflation or creating a more inclusive society. By contrast Jordanians and Egyptians thought their respective governments were doing a reasonable job in providing security, unlike Tunisia, where only a fifth thought the government was doing a good job.

Levels of satisfaction with government performance in 2014 varied across the three countries but none scored highly. This contrasts sharply with the optimism of 2011, especially among Egyptians and Tunisians. In Egypt, while a relatively high proportion of citizens rate their government’s overall performance highly (59%), noticeably less than 50% of people are satisfied with the way education, healthcare, social security and democracy are developing, with just over 50% being satisfied with the economy. This suggests that despite comparatively higher levels of overall satisfaction with government, structural problems in Egypt remain unaddressed. Indeed, people’s expectations have gone frustrated: across all three countries, levels of satisfaction with how things are developing in 2014 are much lower compared to the over 90% who thought things would improve in 2011. Jordan scores noticeably better on the way education, healthcare, social security and democracy are developing, but less than 40% are happy with the economy and only 50% are happy with the government’s performance of its duties. Tunisia scores particularly low on all counts. Of particular note are very low levels of satisfaction with government performance (19.6%), with developments in the economy (10.8%) and in social services (25.7%), and while 40% of Tunisians judge government performance in providing basic utilities as being at least good, they are also profoundly disillusioned with their governments’ efforts at creating a more inclusive society (only 3.7% judge it to be at least good), at controlling inflation (3.7%), and at creating employment (8.5%). These results suggest how limited post-Uprisings improvements are perceived as being, despite Tunisia’s better track record compared to other countries that experienced uprisings. Furthermore, levels of satisfaction with how democracy is developing – a proxy for how responsive governments are seen to be in addressing the concerns of their citizens – is fairly low, varying from a high of just over half in Jordan to less than a quarter in Tunisia

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Figure10:GovernmentPerformanceJudgedtobeatleastGoodin2014,%



Conclusions Populations in Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan were driven by both political and socio-economic marginalisation to protest in what became the 2010-11 Arab Uprisings. The success of those protests endowed post-revolutionary governments with considerable trust from their population, but that trust was predicated on expectations of reform being delivered on both underlying social and economic issues and on political reform. Economic data suggest no significant change since 2011 and political analysis suggests leaderships are at best sluggish in carrying out reforms. ArabTrans survey results in 2014 show that trust in political leaderships has fallen, as have expectations of future improvements, while, in populations’ perceptions, underlying socio-economic tensions remain largely unimproved. This suggests not only that pre-Uprising economic policies contributed to socio-economic dislocation, leading to the Uprisings, but that post-Uprising policies have failed to deliver the promised inclusive growth, leaving countries vulnerable to political instability. Furthermore, the economic and political influence of Gulf monarchies increased in all three countries, including through the provision of development assistance and foreign direct investment. This is especially the case in Egypt, which is also dependent on Gulf States providing employment opportunities for migrant workers, a dependency made worse by the unemployment crisis. The EU continues its policy of promoting liberal democracy and tying political rights to trade while ignoring popular demands for economic and social rights, economic security and decent public services. In practice, it also continues to support authoritarian rulers, seen as essential partners in maintaining stability, fighting terrorism, ensuring hydrocarbon supplies, and stemming migration into Europe. This stance has lost the EU any moral authority it had in the region. IFIs, along with the US and the EU, have failed to learn lessons in economic policies, blaming crony capitalism and authoritarian rulers for the financial bankruptcy of regimes and for their failure to deliver inclusive social development rather than recognising the contribution of economic orthodoxy to this result. A major lesson learnt by citizens across the region is that street protest is an indispensable complement and corrective to the ballot box when governing elites do not deliver on their commitments. Authoritarian rulers may have regained the upper hand, but the Uprisings suggest that this ‘stability’ is precarious and that lasting solutions require fundamental political and economic reforms delivering social justice.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS Policy interventions must include a clear understanding of what people want, including the existence of strong support for a development state. Data suggest a fundamental mismatch between the EU’s liberal conception of democracy and people’s view that social justice and economic rights are integral to democracy. The EU should replace its emphasis on procedural democracy with a broader approach, including modernising the public sector and good governance, alongside the promotion of human rights (civil, political, economic, and social). Policy should aim to eliminate elite capture, promote effective government (policy formulation and service delivery), and tackle corruption. Development assistance should be directed towards investment in infrastructure, supporting programmes creating social development and decent employment opportunities for young people. The EU should continue to support measures to prevent illicit financial flows and ensure that businesses pay corporation and other taxes in the countries where the profits were earned.

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The ARABTRANS project’s multi-method research deploys an interdisciplinary approach drawing on Political Science, Sociology, Middle East Studies, Development Studies, Public Policy, and Social Psychology. The project looks comparatively at attitudes and behaviours in selected MENA countries in the context of the social, political and economic transformations that have been taking place across the Middle East and North Africa since February 2011. The main methods used are nationwide probability surveys carried out in 2014 in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, and Morocco, secondary analysis of macro and survey data, policy analysis, and historiography

PROJECT NAME Political and Social Transformations in the Arab World (ARABTRANS)

COORDINATOR Dr Andrea Teti, School of Social Sciences, University of Aberdeen, UK; [email protected]

CONSORTIUM Análisis Sociológicos Económicos y Políticos – ASEP – Madrid, Spain Applied Social Science Forum – ASSF – Tunisia Centre de Recherche en Économie Appliquée pour le Développement – CREAD – Spain Centre for Survey Methodology – Conclusia – Chisinau, Moldova Dublin City University – DCU – Dublin, Ireland Egyptian Centre for Public Opinion Research – BASEERA - Cairo, Egypt Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies – IIACSS – Amman, Jordan Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale – ISPI – Milan, Italy MEDA Solutions – MEDAS – Morocco University of Aberdeen – UNIABDN – Aberdeen, UK University of Graz – UNI GRAZ – Graz, Austria University of Jordan – JU – Amman, Jordan

FUNDING SCHEME FP7 Framework Programme, Social Changes and Political Transformations in the Arab World – Collaborative Project

DURATION April 2013–September 2016 (42 months)

BUDGET EU Contribution: €2,489,914

WEBSITE http://www.arabtrans.eu/

FOR MORE

INFORMATION Contact: Dr Andrea Teti, School of Social Sciences University of Aberdeen Aberdeen AB24 3FX Scotland, United Kingdom [email protected]

RESEARCH PARAMETERS

PROJECT IDENTITY


FURTHER READING Abbott, P., Sapsford, R, and Teti, A. After the Arab Uprisings: Political, Social and Economic Attitudes in the MENA Region in 2016. Aberdeen: University of Aberdeen.

Teti, A., Xypolia, I., Sarnelli, V. Tsourapas, G., Abbott, P. and Lomazzi, V. (2016). Transformation Analysis - Egypt. Aberdeen: University of Aberdeen. Cavatorta, F., Naseem, A., Merone, F., Teti, A., Abbott, P. and Lomazzi, V. (2016). Transformation Analysis - Tunisia. Aberdeen: University of Aberdeen. Talbot, V., Maggiolini, P., Teti, A., Abbott, P. and Lomazzi, V. (2016) Transformation Analysis - Jordan. Aberdeen: University of Aberdeen. Teti, A., Maggiolini, P., Talbot, V., (2016). The Impact and Role of the European Union on Political Transitions in the Middle East and North Africa. Aberdeen: University of Aberdeen.

The Arab Transformations Project was an international research project that operated within the European Commission’s FP7 framework. The project looks comparatively at attitudes and behaviours in the context of the ongoing social, political and economic transformations across Middle East and North Africa. The countries covered by the project are Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq. Ethical approval for the Project was given through the Ethical Review Procedures of the University of Aberdeen. Further details of the project including the Survey Technical Reports and Working Papers can be found on the project web site at www.arabtrans.eu. Acknowledgements These briefs were written as part of the Arab Transformations Research Project funded by the EU under Grant #320214. The Arab Transformations Project was coordinated by the University of Aberdeen (UK) and included further: Dublin City University (DCU), Dublin, Ireland; Análisis Sociológicos Económicos y Políticos (ASEP), Madrid, Spain; Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI), Milan, Italy; Universität Graz (UNI GRAZ), Graz, Austria; Societatea Pentru Methodologia Sondajelor Concluzia-Prim (Concluzia), Chisinau, Moldova; Centre de Recherche en Économie Appliquée pour le Développement (CREAD), Algiers, Algeria; Egyptian Centre for Public Opinion Research (BASEERA); Cairo, Egypt; Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Studies (IIACSS), Amman, Jordan; University of Jordan (JU), Amman, Jordan; MEDA Solutions (MEDAS), Casablanca, Morocco; Association Forum Des Sciences Sociales Appliquées (ASSF); Tunis, Tunisia. Copyright ©2017 Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. The report may be copied and used in whole or part and adapted for non-commercial use subject to the original publication being acknowledged. The authors alone remain responsible for the content of this report. It cannot be taken to necessarily represent the views of the EU, the Court of the University of Aberdeen or any of the project partners. The authors have asserted their right under the Copyright, Designs and Patients Act 1988 to be identified as authors of this work.

The Arab Transformations Project Policy Briefs 20170… · Brief 2. Socio-economic Inequality and...

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