the-arab-spring.docx

7/27/2019 the-arab-spring.docx

1/9

THE REASONS FOR THE ARAB SPRING

1. Arab Youth: Demographic Time Bomb

According to the UN Development Program, the population in Arab countries more than doubled between 1975 and 2005 to 314

million. In Egypt, two-thirds of the population is under 30. Political and economic development in most Arab states simply could not

keep up with the staggering increase in the population, as the ruling elites incompetence helped lay the seeds for their own demise.

2. UnemploymentThe anger of university graduates forced to drive taxis to survive, and families struggling to provide for their children transcended

ideological divisions.

3. Ageing Dictatorships

The economic situation could stabilize over time under a competent and credible government, but by the end of the 20th century

most Arab dictatorships were utterly bankrupt both ideologically and morally. When the Arab Spring happened in 2011, Egyptian

leader Hosni Mubarak had been in power since 1980, Tunisias Ben Ali since 1987, while Muammar al-Qaddafi ruled over Libya for 42

years.

4. Corruption

Economic hardships can be tolerated if the people believe there is a better future ahead, or feel that the pain is at least s omewhat

equally distributed. Neither was the case in the Arab world, where the state-led development gave place to crony capitalism that

benefited only a small minority

5. National Appeal of the Arab Spring

The key to the mass appeal of the Arab Spring was its universal message. It called on the Arabs to take back their country away from

the corrupt elites, a perfect mixture of patriotism and social message. Instead of ideological slogans, the protesters wielded national

flags, along with the iconic rallying call that became the symbol of the uprising across the region

6. Leaderless Revolt

Although backed in some countries by youth activist groups and unions, the protests were initially largely spontaneous, not l inked to

a particular political party or an ideological current. That made it difficult for the regime to decapitate the movement by simply

arresting a few troublemakers, a situation that the security forces were completely unprepared for.

7. Social Media

The first mass protest in Egypt was announced on Facebook by an anonymous group of activists, who in a few days managed to

attract tens of thousands of people. The social media proved a powerful mobilization tool that helped the activists to outwit the

police.

8. Rallying Call of the Mosque

The most iconic and best-attended protests took place on Fridays, when Muslim believers head to the mosque for the weeklysermon and prayers. Although the protests were not religiously inspired, the mosques became the perfect starting point for mass

gatherings. The authorities could cordon off the main squares and target universities, but they could not close down all mosques.

9. Bungled State Response

The response of Arab dictators to the mass protests was predictably awful, going from dismissal to panic, from police brutality to

piecemeal reform that came too little too late. Attempts to put down the protests through the use of force backfired spectacularly.

In Libya and Syria it led to civil war. Every funeral for the victim of state violence only deepened the anger and brought more people

to the street.

10. Contagion Effect

Within a month of the downfall of the Tunisian dictator in January 2011, the protests spread to almost every Arab country, as people

copied the tactics of the revolt, though with varying intensity and success. Broadcast live on Arab satellite channels, the resignation

in February 2011 of Egypts Hosni Mubarak, one of the most powerful Middle Eastern leaders, broke the wall of fear and changed

the region forever.

ARAB COUNTRIES FACING REVOLUTION

1. Tunisia

Tunisia is the birthplace of the Arab Spring. The self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi, a local vendor outraged over the injustices

suffered at the hands of the local police, sparked countrywide protests in December 2010. The main target was the corruption and

repressive policies of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, who was forced to flee the country on January 14 2011 after the armed

forces refused to crack down on the protests. Following Ben Alis downfall, Tunisia entered a protracted period of politica

transition. Parliamentary elections in October 2011 were won by Islamists who entered into a coalition government with smaller
http://www.arab-hdr.org/reports/regionalarab.aspxhttp://middleeast.about.com/od/egypt/p/hosni-mubarak-09.htmhttp://middleeast.about.com/od/libya/p/me080906.htmhttp://middleeast.about.com/od/tunisia/p/tunisia-profile.htmhttp://middleeast.about.com/od/tunisia/p/tunisia-profile.htmhttp://middleeast.about.com/od/libya/p/me080906.htmhttp://middleeast.about.com/od/egypt/p/hosni-mubarak-09.htmhttp://www.arab-hdr.org/reports/regionalarab.aspx


2/9

secular parties. But instability continues with disputes over the new constitution and ongoing protests calling for better living

conditions.

2. Egypt

The Arab Spring began in Tunisia, but the decisive moment that changed the region forever was the downfall of Egyptian President

Hosni Mubarak, the Wests key Arab ally, in power since 1980. Mass protests started on January 25 2011 and Mubarak was forced to

resign on February 11, after the military, similar to Tunisia, refused to intervene against the masses occupying the central Tahrir

Square in Cairo. But that was to be only the first chapter in the story of Egypts revolution, as deep divisions emerged over the

new political system. Islamists from the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) won the parliamentary and presidential election in 2011/12and their relations with secular parties soured. Protests for deeper political change continue. Meanwhile, Egyptian military remains

the single most powerful political player, and much of the old regime remains in place. The economy has been in free fall since the

start of unrest. But in July 2013 Military coup took place

3. Libya

The protests against Col. Muammar al-Qaddafis regime in Libya started on February 15 2011, escalating into the first civil war

caused by the Arab Spring. In March 2011 the NATO forces intervened against the Qaddafi's army, helping the opposition rebe

movement to capture most of the country by August 2011. Qaddafi was killed on October 20. But the rebels triumph was

shortlived, as various rebel militias effectively partitioned the country among them, leaving a weak central government that

continues to struggle to exert its authority and provide basic services to its citizens. Most of the oil production has returned on

stream, but political violence remains endemic, and religious extremism has been on the rise.

4. Yemen

Yemeni leader Ali Abdullah Saleh was the fourth victim of the Arab Spring. Emboldened by events in Tunisia, anti-government

protesters of all political colors started pouring onto the streets in mid-January 2011. Hundreds of people died in clashes as pro-

government forces organized rival rallies, and the army began to disintegrate into two political camps. Meanwhile,Al Qaeda in

Yemen began to seize territory in the south of the country. A political settlement facilitated by Saudi Arabia saved Yemen from an

all-out civil war. However, little progress toward a stabile democratic order has been made since, with regular Al Qaeda attacks,

separatism in the south, tribal disputes and collapsing economy stalling the transition.

5. Bahrain

Protests in this small Persian Gulf monarchy began on February 15, just days after Mubaraks resignation. Bahrain has a long history

of tension between the ruling Sunni royal family, and the majority Shiite population demanding greater political and economic

rights. The Arab Spring reenergized the largely Shiite protest movement and tens of thousands took to the streets defying live fire

from the security forces. Bahraini royal family was saved by a military intervention of neighboring countries led by Saudi Arabia, asWashington looked the other way (Bahrain houses US Fifth Fleet). But in the absence of a political solution, the crackdown failed to

suppress the protest movement. Protests, clashes with security forces and arrests of opposition activists continue

6. Syria

Ben Ali and Mubarak were down, but everyone was holding their breath for Syria: a multi-religious country allied to Iran, ruled by a

repressive republican regime and a pivotal geo-political position. First major protests began in March 2011 in provincial towns,

gradually spreading to all major urban areas. The regimes brutality provoked an armed response from the opposition, and by m id-

2011 army defectors began organizing in the Free Syrian Army. By the end of 2011, Syria slid into an intractable civil war, with most

of the Alawite religious minority siding with President Bashar al-Assad, and most of the Sunni majority supporting the rebels. Both

camps have outside backers Russia supports the regime, while Saudi Arabia supports the rebels with neither side able to break

the deadlock.

7. Morocco

The Arab Spring hit Morocco on February 20 2011, when thousands of protesters gathered in the capital Rabat and other cities

demanding greater social justice and limits on the power ofKing Mohammed VI. The king responded by offering constitutional

amendments giving up some of his powers, and by calling a fresh parliamentary election that was less heavily controlled by the royal

court than previous polls. Rallies demanding a genuine constitutional monarchy continue, but have so far failed to mobilize the

masses witnessed in Tunisia or Egypt.

8. Jordan

Protests in Jordan gained momentum in late January 2011, as Islamists, leftist groups and youth activists protested against living

conditions and corruption. Similar to Morocco, most Jordanians wanted to reform, rather than abolish the monarchy, giving King
http://middleeast.about.com/od/egypt/a/Profile-Freedom-And-Justice-Party-In-Egypt.htmhttp://middleeast.about.com/od/egypt/p/Egyptian-Militarys-Power-Profile-Of-The-Supreme-Council-Of-Armed-Forces-Scaf.htmhttp://middleeast.about.com/od/libya/a/Why-Is-There-Still-Violence-In-Libya.htmhttp://middleeast.about.com/od/yemen/tp/Al-Qaeda-In-Yemen-Profile.htmhttp://middleeast.about.com/od/yemen/tp/Al-Qaeda-In-Yemen-Profile.htmhttp://middleeast.about.com/od/syria/p/Syrias-Armed-Opposition-Free-Syrian-Army.htmhttp://middleeast.about.com/od/syria/tp/The-Difference-Between-Alawites-And-Sunnis-In-Syria.htmhttp://middleeast.about.com/od/morocco/p/mohammed-VI-profile.htmhttp://middleeast.about.com/od/morocco/p/mohammed-VI-profile.htmhttp://middleeast.about.com/od/syria/tp/The-Difference-Between-Alawites-And-Sunnis-In-Syria.htmhttp://middleeast.about.com/od/syria/p/Syrias-Armed-Opposition-Free-Syrian-Army.htmhttp://middleeast.about.com/od/yemen/tp/Al-Qaeda-In-Yemen-Profile.htmhttp://middleeast.about.com/od/yemen/tp/Al-Qaeda-In-Yemen-Profile.htmhttp://middleeast.about.com/od/libya/a/Why-Is-There-Still-Violence-In-Libya.htmhttp://middleeast.about.com/od/egypt/p/Egyptian-Militarys-Power-Profile-Of-The-Supreme-Council-Of-Armed-Forces-Scaf.htmhttp://middleeast.about.com/od/egypt/a/Profile-Freedom-And-Justice-Party-In-Egypt.htm


3/9

Abdullah II the breathing space that his republican counterparts in other Arab countries didnt have. As a result, the king managed to

put the Arab Spring on hold by making cosmetic changes to the political system and reshuffling the government. Fear of chaos

similar to Syria did the rest. However, the economy is doing poorly and none of the key issues have been addressed. The protesters

demands could grow more radical over time.

The Arab Spring revolutions varied according to the social environment and nature of each ruling regime, and depending on the

degree of civility in surrounding environments, the momentum in achieving the revolution's goals and was faster when charting the

features of such revolutions. The revolts of Tunisia and Egypt were the fastest to take shape despite the apparent control and

strength of the ruling class

Syrian case

In those countries where, historically or politically, regional, tribal, sectarian, doctrinal, or ideological partisanships have developed

and prevailed, the demise of existing regimes meant a collapse of their supporting institutions gains. Such an environment led to a

prolonged conflict and an escalation of confrontation, revolts, actions, and reactions to an extent that drained each party and forced

them into accepting bargains and compromises, as in Yemen. In other cases, the parties had to consider such insurrection as a

chapter in a long battle of destiny, so each party, particularly revolutionists, had to be content with what has been achieved, and

postpone a showdown until sometime in the future. However, each party understands the risks such a stand entails for their

presence. This is evident in the Syrian case, where the possibility of the regime relinquishing control, as in Tunisia and Egypt, or

bargain with the populace, as in Yemen, is unlikely. The international presence, however, may make the liquidation of opposition

figures by the regime a difficult task due to the relative weakness it would suffer after the battle.

Libyan Situation

The Libyan situation can be considered a mixture of the two cases above. The spark of mobility against the regime was a byproduct

of the violent way in which it faced people with other ideologies (i.e., Islamists). Such groups have become centered and built

capabilities in the eastern part of the country for work-related reasons, which was then mingled with regional and tribal sympathy.

International Factor

The international factor was strong in setting the course of mobility against regimes, though indecisive in some cases. One cannot

claim that the external factor was a key player in the Tunisian and Egyptian cases. Rather the motives, effectiveness, and persistence

of the movements were propelled by factors capable of resolving the battle with civil too ls. Perhaps the external factor, with its

media and political pressure, was effective in that it made the target regime lose effectiveness, as well as the confidence in its tools

and methods, causing an ultimate loss of control. The external factor, led by Western countries, was certainly important in taking

the Libyan revolution away from a situation like that of Syria

China, Russia and USNoticeably, the nature of the dispute and battle in Yemen and Syria may have defined the directions of Western intervention,

regardless of the nature of the West's relations with ruling regimes. This is not to say that the Russian and Chinese stances had a

direct impact in charting Western intervention because the West has always had the tools and means to pressure both countries.

The West has always been able to ignore their stands, while retaining international support by fabricating political and secu rity

pretexts as in the Iraqi case

Role of turkey

The Arab Spring highlighted the effectiveness of another power, Turkey. Turkey soon realized the political and social impact of Arab

mobility in the Middle East, and it felt it had to steer events in the Arab region, perhaps as a historical right. Turkey's awareness of

that role, undoubtedly, heightened after political forces with Islamist views took over social and political affairs in the country. The

role of Turkey has been effective for sure, given its large civilization, strategic geography, and robust economic capabilities. Turkey

managed to efficiently become a direct contributor to regional affairs in line with the international stand.

Jordon, Morocco and Algeria

In countries like Jordan, Morocco, and Algeria, the revolutionary movements have been content with partial responses from the

regimes. They had no united intellectual, central political or coordinating leadership, with cross-regional influence.

Reasons for the Arab Spring

BAHRAIN ISSUE

Bahrains largely Shiite opposition continues its struggle against the Sunni royal family, even though it has met little international

support. Heres five reasons why crisis in Bahrain won't go away:


4/9

Stalled Reforms

In response to protests demanding greater democracy that began in February 2011, the ruling Al-Khalifa family promised

constitutional reform but little has been delivered. Bahrain has multi-party elections and opposition media. But lets be clear: even

after decades of peace-meal reform and regular bouts of political unrest, the kingdom remains a highly authoritarian state where

elected legislative bodies hold little control over a narrow royal elite. And the government may just have kicked the can down the

road for a few years too long. Many Shiites no longer consider the Khalifa as legitimate rulers

Growing Sunni-Shiite Tension

The fact that senior government posts and positions in the security apparatus seem almost exclusively reserved for Sunnis hasalways added a distinct sectarian dynamic to Bahraini politics. Any political opening would inevitably empower the Shiite majority.

Bahrains protest movement is overwhelmingly Shiite, and fears of a Shiite-dominated government have led most Sunnis, including

those critical of Khalifa, to side with the regime. For its part, the government consciously encourages suspicions of protesters

alleged loyalties to the Shiite Iran. Shiite protesters, on the other hand, are outraged over the brutality of the Sunni security force,

which includes mercenaries from Sunni Arab countries

Economic Crisis

Bahraini rulers lack the luxury of abundant oil reserves to keep the masses happy with massive welfare programs and cozy

government jobs. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has pledged $10 billion in budgetary support, but ongoing unrest is deepening

Bahrain's economic crisis. Shiite protesters at the forefront of regular clashes with the police come from low-income areas on the

outskirts of the capital Manama. They are young, unemployed and angry, just like their counterparts in restive.

GCC Intervention

The principal safety valve of Khalifa rulers is the staunch support from Saudi Arabia and other GCC members who sent troops to

Bahrain in March 2011 to quell the unrest. The wealthy Gulf monarchies simply cant allow one of their own to go down, while

the US is reluctant to poke at the last bastion of pro-American rulers in the Middle East. This makes the downfall of the Bahraini

regime very unlikely in the near-term but it seems that the GCC intervention made the government even less compelled to gamble

with an unpredictable process of political opening. At the same time, the presence of foreign Sunni (Wahhabi) troops in this small

island can only radicalize the Shiite opposition.

Saudi-Iranian Rivalry

Unfortunately for Bahrainis, the future of their country has become firmly embedded in the regional rivalry between Iran and Saudi

Arabia. Bahraini and Saudi governments have long claimed Irans hand in domestic unrest, although we have yet to see any solid

evidence of that. But this could change. Faced with hostile Sunni states and an unsympathetic US government, some Shiite groups

might eventually turn to Iran for help.

SYRIAN CONFLICT

OPTIONS FOR INTERVENTION IN SYRIA: PROS AND CONS OF INTERVENING IN THE SYRIAN CONFLICT

Talk of intervention in Syria resurfaces whenever a new massacre of civilians by Syrian government forces hits the world headlines,

but theres little appetite in Western capitals for the huge risks involved in a direct military intervention in the Syrian conflict. Severa

other options are still on the table, including an enforcement of a no-fly zone, establishment of humanitarian corridors, and support

for Syrias armed opposition, although none of them promises a quick end to the Syrian tragedy.

1. Ground Troop Intervention

Pros:

Breaking Syria-Iran alliance: Syria is Irans chiefArab ally, conduit for weapons that flow from the regime in Tehran to theLebanese Shiite militia Hezbollah, and sponsor of various radical Palestinian groups. Its difficult to overstate the impact that the

fall of Syrias Bashar al-Assad would have on the region.

Humanitarian concerns: Violence by Syrian government forces has provoked genuine revulsion in Western capitals and amongSyrias neighbors. Governments behind the regional push against Assad, such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, have staked

their reputation on pushing through Assads departure.

Cons:
http://middleeast.about.com/b/2011/03/18/barbaric-bahrain.htmhttp://www.amnesty.org/en/news/bahrain-reforms-risk-appearing-hollow-violations-continue-2012-04-17http://www.aljazeera.com/video/middleeast/2012/04/201243161021288116.htmlhttp://www.aljazeera.com/video/middleeast/2012/04/201243161021288116.htmlhttp://middleeast.about.com/od/bahrain/a/American-Interests-In-Bahrain.htmhttp://middleeast.about.com/od/glossary/g/me080106.htmhttp://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/elizabeth-dickinson/how-long-can-bahrains-opposition-hold-out-dialoguehttp://middleeast.about.com/od/bahrain/a/American-Interests-In-Bahrain.htmhttp://middleeast.about.com/od/syria/http://middleeast.about.com/od/iran/http://middleeast.about.com/od/iran/http://middleeast.about.com/od/syria/p/Bashar-El-Assad-profile.htmhttp://middleeast.about.com/od/syria/p/Bashar-El-Assad-profile.htmhttp://middleeast.about.com/od/iran/http://middleeast.about.com/od/syria/http://middleeast.about.com/od/bahrain/a/American-Interests-In-Bahrain.htmhttp://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/elizabeth-dickinson/how-long-can-bahrains-opposition-hold-out-dialoguehttp://middleeast.about.com/od/glossary/g/me080106.htmhttp://middleeast.about.com/od/bahrain/a/American-Interests-In-Bahrain.htmhttp://www.aljazeera.com/video/middleeast/2012/04/201243161021288116.htmlhttp://www.aljazeera.com/video/middleeast/2012/04/201243161021288116.htmlhttp://www.amnesty.org/en/news/bahrain-reforms-risk-appearing-hollow-violations-continue-2012-04-17http://middleeast.about.com/b/2011/03/18/barbaric-bahrain.htm


5/9

Lack of UN mandate: Direct intervention will not win an authorization in the UN Security Council, given Russia and Chinasintense opposition to any form of interference in Syria.

Ghosts of Iraq: US has little taste for sending soldiers into another Arab country, after thecalamity in Iraq. Turkey is likewise waryof getting bogged down in Syrias civil war, which would risk a direct confrontation with Iran, or possibly rally the Syrian

population behind Assad against a foreign army.

Who could replace Assad:Theres no credible, cohesive political body that could assume transitory authority and prevent adescent to chaos. Syrias opposition is divided and has little influence on the events on the ground

Regional destabilization: A full-scale war could spark clashes in Lebanon, which is polarized between Hezbollah-led pro-Assadcamp and political parties backed by Saudi Arabia and the West.

2. No-fly Zone

Pros:

Libyan model: Proponents of some form of intervention argue that not doing anything will not prevent a civil war or stop theviolence from spilling over to Lebanon. Rather than a ground invasion, US legislators such as Senator John McCain argue for

intensive bombardment of Syrian military installations that would disable the Syrian Air Force, similar to NATO-led intervention in

Libya.

Weaken regimes morale: Bombardment could encourage further defections from the military, goes the argument, and with air-cover whole army units could desert together with heavy weaponry. Balance of power would tilt toward the opposition and

precipitate the meltdown of the regime.

Cons:

International tension: Russia will of course never consent to bombardment of its sole Arab ally. Moscow would step up armsshipments to Syria, although it's unlikely it would actually choose to confront US planes for Assad's sake. Rebels weakness:Libyas lessons show bombardment alone will not break the regime unless theres a capable, centrally-led

rebel force that can take on Assads ground forces. Syria's armed opposition, represented by the Free Syrian Army, is a long way

from reaching that stage.

3. Safe Zones

Pros:

Limited risk: This is probably the least well defined option. Some governments, particularly Turkey and France, have argued forthe establishment of safe zones inside Syrian territory, along with corridors for delivery of aid. One idea was for Turkey to

secure a buffer zone across its border with Syria, creating a safe haven for civilians, while stopping short of direct military

intervention.

Cons:

Armed confrontation:How would safe zones be enforced and protected from Assads forces? Wouldn't that amount tooccupation of parts of Syrian territory? Its difficult to imagine this scenario not provoking clashes with the Syrian military or pro-

government militias, with similar implications as with other intervention scenarios.

4. Support for Syrias Rebels

Pros:

Playing it safe: This is a scenario already in play: provision of logistical support and arms for Syrian rebel groups to avoid thepitfalls of more direct forms of intervention, while presumably giving foreign powers a degree of control over the conflict. Saudi

Arabia and Qatar have spearheaded the calls for arming the Free Syrian Army.

Cons:

Who do you arm:Syrias armed opposition has no effective central leadership, and an influx of foreign money and weaponscould make the matters worse by proliferating the number of poorly coordinated and poorly trained armed groups. There are

fears that some of the money would end up in the hands of militant Islamists, such as the Al Qaeda-linked Al Nusra Front. Unclear outcome:Unless senior commanders of the Syrian army started deserting Assad, Syria would still be looking at a

prolonged conflict, including the risk of growing violence between the Sunni majority and Alawite minority and tensions in

Lebanon.

Top 5 Dangers that the Syria Conflict could destabilize its Neighbors

In fact, the longer the crisis goes on, the more likely it is that it will have consequences for its neighbors

1. As Syrian refugees flow into Turkey, the possibility of Syrian-Turkish clashes grows.
http://middleeast.about.com/od/iraq/tp/me080220f.htmhttp://middleeast.about.com/od/lebanon/tp/The-Impact-Of-Syrian-Uprising-On-Lebanon.htmhttp://edition.cnn.com/2012/03/05/world/meast/syria-unrest/index.htmlhttp://edition.cnn.com/2012/03/05/world/meast/syria-unrest/index.htmlhttp://middleeast.about.com/b/2011/06/18/u-s-involvement-and-costs-in-libya-new-revelations.htmhttp://middleeast.about.com/b/2011/06/18/u-s-involvement-and-costs-in-libya-new-revelations.htmhttp://middleeast.about.com/od/syria/p/Syrias-Armed-Opposition-Free-Syrian-Army.htmhttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17398264http://middleeast.about.com/od/syria/tp/Al-Qaeda-In-Syria-Al-Nusra-Front.htmhttp://middleeast.about.com/od/syria/tp/The-Difference-Between-Alawites-And-Sunnis-In-Syria.htmhttp://www.juancole.com/2012/03/top-5-dangers-that-the-syria-conflict-could-destabilize-its-neighbors.htmlhttp://www.juancole.com/2012/03/top-5-dangers-that-the-syria-conflict-could-destabilize-its-neighbors.htmlhttp://middleeast.about.com/od/syria/tp/The-Difference-Between-Alawites-And-Sunnis-In-Syria.htmhttp://middleeast.about.com/od/syria/tp/Al-Qaeda-In-Syria-Al-Nusra-Front.htmhttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-17398264http://middleeast.about.com/od/syria/p/Syrias-Armed-Opposition-Free-Syrian-Army.htmhttp://middleeast.about.com/b/2011/06/18/u-s-involvement-and-costs-in-libya-new-revelations.htmhttp://middleeast.about.com/b/2011/06/18/u-s-involvement-and-costs-in-libya-new-revelations.htmhttp://edition.cnn.com/2012/03/05/world/meast/syria-unrest/index.htmlhttp://edition.cnn.com/2012/03/05/world/meast/syria-unrest/index.htmlhttp://middleeast.about.com/od/lebanon/tp/The-Impact-Of-Syrian-Uprising-On-Lebanon.htmhttp://middleeast.about.com/od/iraq/tp/me080220f.htm


6/9

2. As small arms flow into Syria, bought up by the revolution, they can be sold back onto the market and flow into Jordan,

which has in the past seen heavy fighting between the central government and tribal groups in places like Maan over

smuggling.

3. Likewise, the Palestinian refugee camps in the region could be flooded with small arms weapons, encouraging thereemergence of a militant faction, with negative implications for all concerned, including Israel.

4. In Iraq, the dominant Shiite parties tend to support al-Assad, whereas the Sunnis mostly support the revolutionaries.Renewed sectarian tensions in Iraq could produce further turmoil.

5. Lebanons fragile peace could easily be disturbed. Sunni leader Saad Hariri, supported by Saudi Arabia, supports theuprising. Many observers blame the Syrian Baath Party for assassinating his father, Rafiq al-Hariri, in 2005. At the sametime, the party of the Southern Shiites, Hizbullah, supports Bashar al-Assad and is patrolling the border to keep weapons

and aid shipments from going to the opposition. Renewed Sunni Shiite fighting could break out over Syria

Irans Policy towards Syria: Security Implications of a 'Failed State' Scenario

Although turning Syria into a failed state will impose huge challenges on regional countries, it will nevertheless offer Iran many

important opportunities on several fronts. Syria is now at a critical juncture where Assads leaving will be the best solution in these

circumstances for the future of Syria and for that of the region.

Contrary to what some might think, the usage of these weapons and the heavily dependence on the Air force are not signs of

Assads hold on power. Rather they prove that the regime is losing control on the ground. Not only this, but the regime has l ately

lost control on many of its strategic and military assets like: air defense bases, military airports, missile batteries, barracks, weapon

reservoirs, border gates, logistics points.

The Iranian stanceAlthough Russia had some time to reconsider its position from the Syrian regime based on these new facts, it is interesting that Iran

is still fully supporting Assad in such circumstances. The Iranian insistence on supporting Assad till the end raises many questions

regarding the real goal of Tehran as it is not showing the classical attitude of the known Iranian pragmatism.

Iran still supports Assad military, financially and politically and confirmed several times the presence of IRGC members inside Syria

The Only reasonable approach towards Irans such kind of stance is that if Iran is destined to see Assad regime lose anyway, the

best option then is to give support to Assad, to the last moment. This stance will in fact benefit Iran in the future. Irani an support to

Assad, in such an environment, will prolong the crises, drain Syrias resources as a state and thus pave the way to a failed state

scenario, which is something Iran might be preparing for it from now.

Risk of Syria turning into a failed state

In such a scenario, all indicators show us that Syria can be suitable environment for mercenaries, radical groups and terrorists. As a

result this will make things altogether more difficult fueling ethnic and sectarian strife and strengthen the separation tendencies. In

this scenario in contrast to the other regional states, Iran will not be the absolute loser. Iran has extensive experience, in dealingwith such situations. This will not only allow Tehran to survive in such environment an environment but will also allow Tehran to

exploit this environment to its benefits. Using this environment Tehran can force international powers to sit on the negotiating table

and make some gains. Although turning Syria into a failed state will impose huge challenges to the regional countries, it wil l howeve

offer Iran many important opportunities on several fronts: buying time in the nuclear program issue, strengthen its national security

vis-a-vis Israel since Syria can be turned at that time as another playing ground to be added to Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, Bahrain and

Yemen.

Moreover, Iran will have a chance to use Syria in this scenario against its regional rivals, such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia in the

struggle for influence on the regional level. Such a scenario is very dangerous scenario for the other smaller countries too like

Lebanon and Jordan, especially if this scenario involved fueling the sectarian strife and radicalism in the region.

The three important cards

Moreover, a failed state scenario in Syria offers Iran many cards to play:

1- The Kurdish card: This can be used against regional rivals like Turkey. There is increasing evidence of Iranian involvement of

supporting terrorist groups like PKK against Turkey.2- The Alawite card. Iran will have interest in supporting Alawite groups and Alawite areas in order to secure a foothold inside Syrian

which enables it later to create and form a highly trained military Alawites groups as Hezbollah in Lebanon and its proxies in Iraq.

These groups will work as proxies for Iran and secure its strategic interests. Such a step will divide Syria into cantons based on

sectarian differences and result in a misery situation in which the group formations seem to be stronger than state. In addition, this

step will also disrupt the stability in Syria. This will also harm the Arab states who have interests in Syria and Lebanon; and feed the

separatist movements on regional base.

3- Radical Groups card. Iran will be able to create radical militias from different sects under many slogans and use them against

Israel or to undermine Syrias security and stability making the possibility of forming strong government almost impossible.


7/9

EGYPT CRISIS

WHY EGYPTS IS TRANSITION SUCH A MESS?Egypts transition to a democratic system has come crashing down. It seemed for a while that the interim military regime, whi ch

took power after ex-president Hosni Mubaraks resignation in January 2011, was happy to let an elected civilian leadership struggle

with Egypts enormous challenges, in exchange for some form of a special role in the new system. But my mid-2012 the military

pushed back: the constitutional court dissolved Egypts democratically elected parliament, and the generals helped Mubaraks

former prime ministerAhmed Shafiq reach the run-off in presidential elections.1. Revolutionary Camp Falls Apart

Those 18 days ofanti-Mubarak protest beginning 25 January 2011 brought out the best in Egypt. Copts and Muslims, liberals and

Islamists, middle class kids and hardened laborers joined together to push the riot police from the famous Tahrir Square in centra

Cairo, while photogenic English-speaking graduates from the American University in Cairo won the sympathy of the global audience

watching live coverage of the protests. The pharaoh was gone, but remnants of Mubaraks regime were still lurking behind the

interim military government. The protest movement could only sustain itself as a mass political force by keeping alive the grand

alliance between Islamists and secular revolutionaries. However, while the latter wanted to continue the revolution, the Islamists

shifted their attention to the electoral process, hoping to strike a transition deal with the military.

2. No Consensus on Egypts Future

By late 2011 it was clear that beyond removing Mubarak and his cronies there were few ideological points of convergence between

different political groups that contested the December legislative polls. Should Egypts constitution include more articles d rawn

from Sharia religious law, or should Egypt remain a secular state? Should it have a strong presidency and what would be the role of

the military? Should the state create jobs through public investment or resume with liberal reforms? Transition in post-communist

Eastern Europe was relatively smooth because most people agreed to adopt a clear political and economic model offered by their

western neighbors. In Egypt, by contrast, there was no such unifying narrative, no minimal consensus on how to go forward.

3. Military Resists Reforms

Enter the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). Transition from authoritarian rule can only run smooth if the security

apparatus agrees to step aside. Egyptian generals led by Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi didnt: they skillfully pitted

Islamists against liberals, stripped the new Islamist-dominated parliament of any real power, and tried to dominate the process o

drafting a new constitution. The tragedy is that beyond securing its material privileges and safeguarding Egypts secular character

the military seems to be void of any clear long-term program. Master tacticians, whose divide-and-rule machinations have pushed

Egypt closer to the abyss.

4. Muslim Brotherhood Overplays Its Hand

Meanwhile, the Muslim Brotherhoods Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), grew increasingly frustrated. It won legislative elections but

soon realized it was stuck in a toothless parliament, and tension with secular parties grew over the constitution. The militaryoutplayed them and so the Islamists decided to renege on their earlier promise not to field a candidate in May 2012 presidential

polls. It was a costly mistake as it exposed the FJP to accusations, fanned by the army-friendly state media, of Islamists' designs for

absolute power.

5. Public Develops Protest Fatigue

The youth activist groups that brought down Mubarak lost the ability to mobilize the wider public for mass street protest that could

bring down the military rulers. As lamented by the popular Egypt-based blogger Issandr el-Imrani, the revolutionaries failed to

define what it was they wanted from this revolution, and to sell this idea to the wider population that, most of the time, is not

interested in protests and marches.

Many Egyptians grew weary of ongoing unrest that has crippled the economy, others fear that chaos can only lead to therise of religious extremists. Few people protested when the parliament, Egypts only democratically -elected institution, was

dissolved just two days before the presidential run-off in June 2012.

The military has pushed back but failed to resolve any of the political and economic issues facing the country. Moreconfrontation and civil disobedience will follow and Egypts failed transition could enter a new, more dangerous phase.

LIBYA CRISIS

The violence in Libya has crushed hopes for a happy transition to democracy after the downfall and death of former leader Col

Muammar al-Qaddafi in September 2011. Clashes between former anti-Gaddafi rebels, detention of staff from the Internationa

Criminal Court, an attack on the US consulate in Benghazi, and all of this before the countrys political forces have even begun to

discuss key issues, such as the constitution or regulation of the oil industry.

2011 Civil War: The Rise of the Militias
http://middleeast.about.com/od/egypt/p/hosni-mubarak-09.htmhttp://middleeast.about.com/od/egypt/p/hosni-mubarak-09.htmhttp://middleeast.about.com/od/egypt/a/Ahmed-Shafiq-Profile.htmhttp://middleeast.about.com/b/2011/01/28/egypt-awakes-mubarak-thugs-up-obama-freezes.htmhttp://middleeast.about.com/od/religionsectarianism/g/me071128.htmhttp://middleeast.about.com/od/egypt/a/Profile-Freedom-And-Justice-Party-In-Egypt.htmhttp://www.egyptindependent.com/opinion/next-battle-will-take-longer-18-dayshttp://www.egyptindependent.com/opinion/next-battle-will-take-longer-18-dayshttp://middleeast.about.com/od/libya/p/me080906.htmhttp://middleeast.about.com/od/libya/p/me080906.htmhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/attacks-on-western-targets-in-libya-sow-fears-islamist-extremists-want-to-disrupt-vote/2012/06/15/gJQAx8kWeV_story.htmlhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/attacks-on-western-targets-in-libya-sow-fears-islamist-extremists-want-to-disrupt-vote/2012/06/15/gJQAx8kWeV_story.htmlhttp://middleeast.about.com/od/libya/p/me080906.htmhttp://middleeast.about.com/od/libya/p/me080906.htmhttp://www.egyptindependent.com/opinion/next-battle-will-take-longer-18-dayshttp://middleeast.about.com/od/egypt/a/Profile-Freedom-And-Justice-Party-In-Egypt.htmhttp://middleeast.about.com/od/religionsectarianism/g/me071128.htmhttp://middleeast.about.com/b/2011/01/28/egypt-awakes-mubarak-thugs-up-obama-freezes.htmhttp://middleeast.about.com/od/egypt/a/Ahmed-Shafiq-Profile.htmhttp://middleeast.about.com/od/egypt/p/hosni-mubarak-09.htm


8/9

The ongoing violence in Libya has its roots in the bloody civil war that ended four decades of Qaddafis rule. In the early d ays of the

anti-government uprising in Spring 2011, regular armed forces largely melted away as protesters took control of most major Libyan

towns, particularly in the east of the country. Barracks and armed depots were looted, and Libya was suddenly awash with weapons

Qaddafis opponents formed city militias, armed groups that recruited both local residents and army deserters, and c arried on the

fight against the elite regime units commanded by Qaddafis kin. Backed by NATO airpower and Qatars money and weapons, the

militias defeated government forces. Commanders of large militias, Abdel Hakim Belhaj, proclaimed the liberation of Libya but then

refused to disarm their men, claiming they needed to keep their weapons to protect the revolution. And so Libya became carved

out between dozens of militias, which became the de-facto rulers of the territories under their control. Tens of thousands of heavily

armed young men from various parts of Libya descended upon the capital Tripoli, where rival militias began vying for power andsources of revenue.

Weak Interim Government: Militias Dig In

The uprising was nominally led by the National Transition Council (NTC), an opposition coalition recognized by most world

governments as the legitimate governing body after Qaddafis downfall. But the NTC never actually controlled the unruly militi as

that saw themselves as the real winners, entitled to some reward for their sacrifices in the war.

And so the post-civil war chaos became a standing reality. Libyas central government remains weak, the remnants of Qaddafi -era

national army vastly outgunned by armed groups commanded by former rebel leaders. Militias assumed the role of the police,

manning checkpoints, running prisons, and enforcing law and order. Stories of arbitrary arrests and abuse soon resurfaced, and you

can read about it inAmnesty Internationals reports.

Militia Violence: Vying For Power, Settling Old Scores

With the central authorities too weak to take over security role and mediate between disputes, tensions soon broke out between

groups on several levels:

Control over Tripoli: In the capital, clashes erupted between rival groups over control of key strategic points. The airport was aparticularly lucrative target, and militiamen from the town of Zintan only agreed to hand it over to the government in April 2012.

Regions vs Tripoli: Division of Libya into de-facto self-ruled territories has greatly reinforced regional identities. Militiamen inMisrata, Libyas third largest city, mistrust Tripoli and are prepared to use guns to defend their autonomy. Eastern towns wi th

major oil refineries want to get a fair slice of oil profits, and some politicians back the idea of autonomous status for eastern

Libya. With so many weapons around, its an explosive mix.

Local rivalries: Some militias have used their new-found power to persecute Libyans accused of collaborating with Qaddafi, asexemplified in the tragic story of people displaced from the town of Tawarga (see Human Rights Watch report. In the south

violence between rival tribes goes back decades and has its roots in Qaddafis strategy of playing one tribe against the othe r. In

the west, there is tension between ethnic Arabs and Berbers.

Protracted Disarmament Process

The progress in mobilizing former rebels into the army and police has so far been limited. Often, the authorities just dont have

much to offer, as there arent many jobs in Libyas oil economy (see report in Foreign Affairs).Just think of it: will a young man, hardened through battles against Qaddafis troops, happily give up the prestige and power of a

militiaman for the life of a low-paid clerk at the Interior Ministry? Some militias now perform security jobs for the government, such

as guarding the 2012 elections. But this appears only to have deepened the problem, as the state now depends for security on

militiamen, who, on the other hand, retain their weapons and remain loyal to their own commanders, rather than the government.

Libya faces a long road toward full stabilization and the presence of autonomous, heavily armed groups will pose the biggest threat

to the political process.

OBAMAS TOP FIVE CHALLENGES IN THE MIDDLE EAST OBAMAS SECOND TERM & US

FOREIGN POLICYWhat are Barack Obamas top five challenges in the Middle East as he begins his second mandate? Without the pressure of

electability, US presidents proverbially get more adventurous in the second term, but the list below is daunting:1. Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process (or lack of it)

Palestinians are hopelessly divided between the Islamist Hamas & the secular Fatah groups, while Israelis, comfortable with their

immense military superiority, and show no interest in removing the illegal settlements on territories occupied in the 1967 war.

Obama will have to continue keeping the peace process alive, simply because theres no other diplomatic alternative on the table.

2. Irans Nuclear Program

Relations with Iran are as frosty as at the beginning of Obamas first term, as the government in Tehran continues its nuclear

enrichment program which it claims is used for peaceful purposes and which Israel and the West strongly suspect is ultimately

aimed at producing a nuclear weapon. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with whom Obama is on famously bad terms

has made it clear he would not wait forever for international sanctions to break Irans will. If Israel attacks Iran, Obama would be
http://middleeast.about.com/od/libya/p/Profile-Abdel-Hakim-Belhadj.htmhttp://middleeast.about.com/od/libya/f/Libya-National-Transitional-Council.htmhttp://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE19/002/2012/en/608ac5a8-95d0-4a3b-89de-b4a1b585feee/mde190022012en.htmlhttp://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE19/002/2012/en/608ac5a8-95d0-4a3b-89de-b4a1b585feee/mde190022012en.htmlhttp://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE19/002/2012/en/608ac5a8-95d0-4a3b-89de-b4a1b585feee/mde190022012en.htmlhttp://www.hrw.org/news/2011/10/30/libya-militias-terrorizing-residents-loyalist-townhttp://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/08/us-libya-violence-idUSBRE83702Z20120408http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137776/frederic-wehrey/libyas-militia-menacehttp://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137776/frederic-wehrey/libyas-militia-menacehttp://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137776/frederic-wehrey/libyas-militia-menacehttp://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/08/us-libya-violence-idUSBRE83702Z20120408http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/10/30/libya-militias-terrorizing-residents-loyalist-townhttp://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE19/002/2012/en/608ac5a8-95d0-4a3b-89de-b4a1b585feee/mde190022012en.htmlhttp://middleeast.about.com/od/libya/f/Libya-National-Transitional-Council.htmhttp://middleeast.about.com/od/libya/p/Profile-Abdel-Hakim-Belhadj.htm


9/9

under immense pressure to offer military support to his No.1 regional ally, and risk being dragged into an extremely risky war he

really, really doesnt want.

3. Al Qaeda Threat

And then theres the mother of all terror groups. The killing of Osama bin Laden in 2011 was Obamas finest foreign policy moment

in the first term for the US public, at least. But on the ground it was far from a mortal blow for Al Qaeda, whose deadly affiliates

continue to wreak havoc in parts of Iraq, Yemen and North Africa. Al Qaeda cells are small, have little popular support, but they

bring together a core of committed and well-funded militants willing to go after US targets. Containing the threat is perhaps the

most that can be done.

4. Civil War in SyriaTen years ago the US would have jumped on an opportunity to take out Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad, Irans chief Arab ally and an

old adversary of US interests in the region. The bloody uprising against Assad that started in 2011 offers just this, but times have

changed since Iraq and Afghanistan fiascos. The US is tired from military adventures in the Middle East and weary of Islamist groups

fighting Assad. Is Obama going to send weapons supplies to Syrian rebels, or let Turkey do the dirty work? Doing nothing risks seeing

the violence spread to neighboring countries

5. Egypt the Heart of the Arab Spring

The Arab Spring, a series of anti-government protests that broke out in early 2011, may have started in Tunisia, but its the Arab

worlds most populous country that matters most. The US has enjoyed close military and political links with Egyptian dictatorships

for decades, but under the new popularly elected governments the US influence in the country will never be the same.

Obama faces a tough balancing act. How to save the relationship with the Egyptian army, the guarantor of Egypts peace agreement

with Israel, without forever losing the Egyptian public?
http://middleeast.about.com/od/humanrightsdemocracy/tp/Arab-Spring-Uprisings.htmhttp://middleeast.about.com/od/humanrightsdemocracy/tp/Arab-Spring-Uprisings.htm

the-arab-spring.docx

Documents

Transcript of the-arab-spring.docx