The Arab League Primary Issue: The question of ... · PDF fileand the Emirates departed...

UNAS Model United Nations Preparatory Conference The Seventh Edition

The Arab League Primary Issue: The question of restructuring the Arab League


Chair Foreword Ren Jiayi Whether she is up on stage or behind the curtains, Jiayi lives off drama. Literally. Her journey in the Model UN circuit began almost as early as her Theatre pursuits. Having been inspired by her very first MUN experience at UNASMUN 2015, Jiayi has decided that it is her time to give back to the community after 2 years of salinity poisoning and occasional ego boosters. When she is not inside the conference room or theatre backstage, she can be found cafe hopping with all 3 of her friends, or staying up late for literature projects like a good HP stereotype. As much as she would like to apologise to those whom she has intimidated before or is going to intimidate, she expects high level of self-discipline, integrity and work ethic from every delegate in the Arab League. She also hopes to see delegates taking the initiative to create an inclusive environment for one another and strike a balance between academic intensity and elements of fun.

Gareth Lim Gareth was born to argue. From being told from a tender age that he was “too smart for his own good” along with a myriad of other phrases that he cannot mention here to correcting his teachers for fun. It was after incessant suggestions that he finally joined the debate team. He remains extra till this day, so do not be surprised if you catch him listening to debates with his earphones on data and making speeches in the washroom. It was at in his second year that he discovered MUN and his life changed forever (now he makes MUN speeches in the bathroom). He spends most of his time participating in debates, thinking about participating in debates, thinking about studying and not actually studying. He spends whatever little time that he has left participating in MUN’s. In the meantime, he enjoys getting carried by his more esteemed co-chair, eating, reading obscure thick books in order while being pretentious (despite his extreme overuse of the very unsophisticated “KMS”), eating, praying for his math and science results and playing with his fidget spinner like a good normie. He hopes that you will learn as many things from this conference as he has and wishes delegates all the best in council!


I. Introduction:

On the 29th of April, 2016, The Economist published an article titled “What is the point of the Arab League?”, saying that it has “failed to find a mechanism for managing rivalry” and that it has “stood by” while its members were engulfed by war. During its 60 years as a regional organisation founded on the principle of Arab common cause, the League of Arab States has slowly lost the lustre of a once golden era. King Salman of Saudi Arabia stated during this year’s Arab League Summit in Jordan, that the League needs to “restructure, reform, cooperate and unify”. Restructure in this context refers to the reformation of internal and external political relations, stances, and attitudes of the region, namely in situations where foreign interference of Arab affairs take place. While coming up with decisions to amend regional stances and outward political attitudes, there is first of all, the inherent need of increasing the effectiveness of Arab League. Incompetent staff, low-yields, flaws in voting policies and competition among members for supremacy have resulted in the League’s apparent inability to deal with key issues such as the conflict in Libya, Yemen, Iraq and Syria. Recent years have seen growing momentum for the Arab League to reform its charter and its approach in handling regional conflicts, and play a greater role in international affairs in the long run. The nature of this issue encourages critical thinking and pragmatic approaches, and delegates are reminded that the purpose of their resolution

should stay realistic, yet future-ready. Background Information History of Arab League The Arab League, a group composed of 22 Muslim and Arab states, was founded in 1945 with the aim of fostering Arab unity and establishing a coherent, uniform Arab policy. The Arab League was charted in response to concerns about postwar colonial divisions of territory as well as strong position to the establishment of the Israeli state in Palestine. During the Second World War, the British pledged full support for Arab Unity 13 . History of the Issue In recent years, countless intra-Arab wars, endless infighting and internecine conflict bear testament to the incompetency of the organisation whether it be conflicts among member states, or presenting a united front it hypocritically claims to have. That is why Arab League summits are said to lead to nothing but a collection of “empty, banal pronouncements proclaiming unity and solidarity and a plethora of repetitions of the usual platitudes” 12 . The need for restructuring is self-explanatory if the organisation has any will to continue existing and make an influence in the 21st century political landscape—and frankly, it does. In fact, member states have openly expressed their hopes for an Arab League that could come out with decisions up to the “level of the situation and the aspirations of the Arab peoples” 12 . Seeing that the needs and the will for restructuring are given, for us to gain a better understanding of the Issue the questions


lie in what are the events that influenced the will of restructuring, and on a more practical note, what has the organisation done to achieve it. The following sections would focus on dissecting these areas for discussion. II. Case Study of Arab League’s involvements in regional conflicts: Despite the fervid advocacy for a united Arab front, the record of the Arab League in dealing with regional conflict resolution is extremely disappointing mainly in relation to civil wars. In fact, the Arab League intervened as mediator in only five of the twenty-two major civil wars that occurred in the region since its establishment in 1945. Regarding the League’s intervention on the occasion of the major civil wars, what emerges is a significant indecisiveness of the organization’s formal and informal bodies, mainly in the early stages of their development. Delegates are encouraged to make meaningful connections between these conflicts and the larger political backdrop of the Arab world, such as the origin of Arab Spring 1 , and its many impacts. Case Study of Lebanese Civil War The Lebanese Civil War here refers to the second Lebanese Civil War, lasting from 1975 to 1990 and resulting in an estimated 120,000 fatalities. The Arab League council approved a draft resolution on April 4th, 1958 to address the first Lebanese civil war, and yet failed to develop a formal resolution despite the efforts. In the spring of 1979, after the Arab League extended the mandate of the Arab Deterrent

Force, the troops from Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and the Emirates departed Lebanon, following Libya (November 1976) and South Yemen (December 1977), and only the Syrian forces remained. The huge influence that this gave Syria in Lebanon had dire consequences, and perhaps even allowed Syria to assume a position of dominance in Lebanese domestic politics. Evidently, instead of resolving regional conflicts, the nature of Arab League’s involvement has been one that planted more seeds of turmoil. Case Study of Yemeni Civil War: Arab League attempted to play a mediating role in the Yemeni Civil War, as the calls for separation by a number of political forces in the south of Yemen, and the challenges resulting from the activities and attacks by terrorist groups associated with Al-Qaeda are escalating and are having a destabilizing effect on the situation in the whole country. These problems had the potential to develop into a fully-fledged crisis. The League’s involvement, however, and was not welcomed by the then president of Yemen and hence leading to inconclusive actions. Case Study of Syrian Civil War Most recently, the organisation has directed its attention to the Syrian crisis. Following the suspension of its membership in November, having brokered an ill-fated peace agreement with Bashar al-Assad, for the first time in the League's history, a team of observers were assembled to monitor the implementation of its plan. Nonetheless, there were a number of


shortcomings in the observer missions as a result of institutional challenges and the lack of experience in these kinds of missions. Efforts could be made to raise the preparedness of the Arab League to address possible future needs of a similar nature in co-operation with the United Nations and the European Union. III. Measures taken by the Arab League The Arab League is trying to advance its capabilities in regional conflict resolution on a number of tracks. Most notably, as part of efforts to reform the League itself, a number of working groups have been formed, two of which will have a direct bearing on its role in the area of conflict resolution. The first is entrusted with the revision of the Charter, and the second is charged with reforming the League’s institutional mechanisms and their mandates, including the Peace and Security Council. Delegates are reminded that although these are concrete steps the League has taken in resolving the issue, their effects have yet to be evaluated. Delegates should not restrict themselves to similar actions, but are encouraged to build upon existing measures in the resolution where necessary. Apart from the working groups, there are also a number of projects and initiatives that aim at advancing the role of the Arab League in conflict resolution, including the following:

- A crisis-management platform to address the areas of early warning, crisis management, and post-conflict

needs assessment. This platform was a result of a joint project between the Arab League and the European Union, with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) assuming the responsibilities of the implementing agency.

The League has also identified a number of gaps in its capabilities to effectively address the peaceful settlement of disputes. Two are relevant here:

- The League’s capabilities to respond to post-conflict needs assessment. Activities are planned with the United Nations, the European Union, and the World Bank to enhance the League’s capabilities to effectively undertake post-conflict reconstruction and development alongside other international actors. The role of the Arab League in reconstruction efforts in post-war Iraq and post- revolution Egypt and Libya has been extremely limited. The League hopes to play a more effective role in addressing the reconstruction and development needs of Syria.

- The second gap concerns the League’s ability to respond with a presence on the ground during conflicts or periods of crisis. It seeks to build on lessons learned from the observer mission that was sent to Syria. The aim is to enhance the League’s capacity to place a presence on the ground, whether for fact-finding missions, observer missions, or, ultimately, peacekeeping


operations. Activities are planned in co-operation with the United Nations and the European Union in order to achieve this objective.

An ambitious programme is being implemented with the objective of building the capacity of officials in the Secretariat of the Arab League by means of numerous professional training modules directly related to conflict-resolution capabilities. This programme is being implemented in co-operation with the European Union and the United Nations and has been extended by the League to member-states as well. The Arab League also valued the initiative launched by the Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to advance cooperation between the United Nations and other international and regional organizations in the area of mediation and conflict resolution. The objective is to start working on implementing a number of practical ideas to advance co-operation between international and regional organizations, for example, by establishing networks of mediators and mediation team members, and compiling lessons learned in mediation and conflict resolution to make them available in an accessible format. These organizations will also co-operate in building their mediation and conflict-resolution capacities.

IV. Critical analysis of the issue: Flaws in the Arab Charter The organization is created to guarantee the respect for the independence and sovereignty of Arab countries, thus it has often hesitated to become involved in internal strife, even when they evolved into sub-regional crises with the intervention of neighboring states. As a result of the aforementioned principles, the Charter does not establish any special mediation mechanisms or mechanisms designed solely with the objective of achieving the peaceful settlement of disputes. When referring to the settlement of disputes, the Charter makes reference only to the League Council in which each member has a single vote, and is generally represented by its Minister of Foreign Affairs. It does not refer to the possibility of a role for the Secretary General or individual member-states in this regard. Furthermore, Article 5 of the Arab League Charter 15 limits dispute settlement to cases “which do [...] not concern a state’s independence, sovereignty, or territorial integrity” and only where “the parties to the dispute have recourse to the Council for the settlement of this difference”. It also focuses on “differences which threaten to lead to war between two member-states, or a member-state and a third state [...]”. Most importantly, the inefficiency in Arab League is a direct result from its voting mechanism. Despite that each member has one vote on the council, decisions are only binding to the states that have voted for them. Delegates are highly encouraged to


explore the implications of the self-restricting nature of the Arab League charter and draw meaningful connections between the charter and the league’s failure in managing regional conflicts. Lack of Arab Will The Arab League's performance was not consistent in all forms of conflict. For instance, the organization was less inclined to intervene in conflicts that involved certain major Arab states like Saudi Arabia and Syria, and that it has been subject to balance of power considerations. Furthermore, the League was not willing to intervene in most border disputes. All these limitations left very little room for the organization to function as it intended: to provide security and stability among its members. The ideal situation would be to carry out interventions in almost all major civil wars, which would reflect a shared interest by most Arab League members to reassert the rule and the inviolability of their boundaries from external interference. However, the organization’s activity was obstructed in practice because of such pressures and had internalized its role as a secondary actor when strong power political interests were involved. One can assume that the organization's organs seem to have accepted as early as its creation to the present and also in the coming future, that the League was little more than a forum of collective legitimation for Arab countries and had no power as soon as major states’ interests were involved. An ideal situation would therefore be a pan-Arab approach in resolving conflicts,

however, the Arab League is unlikely to reach this synergy because the charter of the League does not include a clause for enacting resolutions reached by member states. Rivalry among Arab states The Arab League's development and conduct were influenced by inter-Arab divisions since the creation of the League. The state of rivalry among the League’s member states had an impact on the focus, policy and direction of the Arab League by dividing the member states into competing blocs. The alliance among member states shifted from 1940s until 1970s based on ideological and political grounds. The most significant dividing factor that affected the League's ability to positively play its role in security was Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait had severe consequences for Arab state relations, and the American occupation of Iraq from 2003 onwards did not improve matters. The regional implications of that crisis are still witnessed in the region as it reshaped inter-Arab alliances as well as Arab states relations with other regional and international powers. Meanwhile, the majority of the conflicts between Arab states are border disputes and of unspecific political nature. Regional and international forces have been proven to complicate security in the Arab World and challenge the Arab League's ability to act in unity. The foreign presence in the Arab states further weakens the political integrity of the Arab League even though a number of League member states find it useful. One can argue that Arab countries do not oppose establishing military Arab


cooperation, but due to the previous historical experience and weak coordination among Arab states like the Gulf states which are more inclined to accept external offers such as those from the United States to safeguard their national security. Financial shortcomings Further plaguing the Arab League is a financial crisis prompted by the failure of member states to pay annual contributions – a system similar to the UN's membership dues. According to an Arab League report in 2004, member states were $100 million in arrears, leaving many staff members going months without pay and causing the cancellation of some 200 projects throughout the Arab world. At the Algiers summit, the financial crisis was nearly overlooked, prompting reports of Secretary-General Amr Musa's imminent resignation. "The financial crisis is part of the dysfunction which renders the Arab League incapable of doing its job. The Arab leaders didn't respond to pay some of their dues until Musa threatened to resign," 14 Bakri said. Liquidation of Arab League’s authority Established with the aim of serving as the central political organization of the region, Arab League’s influence as a regional body is weakened in recent years due to the presence of other organisations/alliances, namely the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). The existence of these organizations are direct competitors to the central authority Arab League aims to attain, at the same time, these organisations further

dilute the already diminishing regional solidarity, threatening the influence of Arab League in the region and international community. V. Key external stakeholders: United States of America As fanciful as it might seem today, there was a time when the Arab world was not only acquiescent to American involvement in its affairs, but fairly clamored for it. The American interests in Middle Eastern have been most notably manifested in its interference with the regional warfare and elections such as its involvement in building consensus on a presidential candidate in Lebanon with the league (coordinating closely with France), which could not have been achieved by the Arab League alone, and key international political forces did not accept at the time that reconciliation would be achieved through an Arab formula. In recent years, however, the American morale has been experiencing several setbacks seeing how democratization has turned spring into winter, winter into civil wars, coups, and other disasters that have instilled deep sense of distrust towards USA among the people of the Arab world. Still, there are things that glue USA and the Arab world together, most notably the issue of combating terrorism. In addition, the American oil strategy in the Middle East is subject to threats if there were to be any fluctuations of the Gulf Cooperation Council members’ change in stance or position in the Arab League. That being said, whatever


the resolution of this issue would be, it would bring about profound implications to USA, politically—in terms of reasserting dominance in the region and economically—preserving ties with the Gulf states to achieve tangible economic interests. Russian Federation It would be rushing away from the truth to say that Russian interests do not coincide with that of America’s. After railing for years against U.S. policy in the region—which Moscow has perceived as dangerous and destabilizing—Russia is now fashioning itself as an alternative "security manager" in the Middle East. Yet what we are witnessing is not a direct challenge to the United States—there is no full-throttle attempt to establish a new set of permanent military bases and client regimes, or to re-create a Soviet-style regional footprint. Rather, the Kremlin has been ambiguous with its plans for the Middle East; it is still clouded whether it is stability or turmoil that brings it more benefits. But there is one thing which is undeniable--Russia is striving for more control over Middle Eastern affairs. During the armed conflict in Syria, Russia has significantly upgraded its role and status both in the Middle East and beyond the region. The most radical upgrade has been Moscow’s carefully calibrated military intervention on behalf of the Syrian government since late September 2015, as well as its role in the revived Geneva negotiation 7 process since February 2016 and in the ensuing ceasefire co-brokered by Russia and the United States. This new role and level of engagement is at odds with the widespread

stereotype about post-Soviet Russia’s departure from the Middle East. That being said, just like the USA, Russia would be subjected to comparable amount of threats would there be any fluctuations in the current power paradigm of the region. Iran It seems almost absurd to label Iran as an “external stakeholder” here, however, the truth is, the Arab League does not define its membership on the basis of geographical features but on ethnic ones and therefore the League excludes from its membership Iran and Turkey, which are often considered as parts of the wider Middle East. The mostly Shia Muslim and Multi-ethnic country of Iran and the mostly Sunni and ethnically Arab organization Arab League meant that there is no surprise that the 40,000 “response force” formed by the Arab League in 2015 was largely believed to be another military stake aiming to pin Iran down after its then-clear determination in nuclear development. As much as the Middle East is a fertile ground for political rivalry between the superpowers, it is just as vulnerable in the face of sectarian conflicts. And any change in landscape would result in unpredictable repercussions in terms of the relationship between the Iran and the Sunni majority. VI. Key questions and Possible solutions This section should be by no means considered an exhaustive list of questions - delegates are encouraged to consider the topic at hand using


measures appropriate to their country and their stance. However, the questions below are expected to be discussed and answered to an appropriate degree during council debate. 1. What is the purpose of Arab League? It is important to examine the principles which Arab League was founded upon in order to fairly assess how effective it has been living up to these purposes. That being said, delegates are also encouraged to evaluate the relevance and implications of these purposes in the current political context. 2. What is the purpose of the restructure? The answer to this question automatically sets a scope to the discussion in terms of what the council aims to achieve by end of the day. As much as it seems to be extremely contentious, the nature of the issue also indues great flexibility to the resolution. Delegates are encouraged to consider the relevant aspects mentioned in the study guide and come up with a purpose for the pseudo-restructure of the Arab League. The purpose does not have to be all-encompassing, rather, a tight focus would be appreciated. E.g. a generalized purpose would be “Increase the efficiency of Arab League”, and a specific purpose would be “Increase the efficiency of Arab League in responding to regional conflicts”. 3. With regards to possible amendments of the Charter of the Arab League:

• What were the principles which the Charter was based upon? How can it then be amended to align with the purpose defined in the council discussion? • What are the implications of the amendments in the long run and the tangible effects on current conflicts? • What are the provisions to the amendments? How is the time factor defined here? 4. With regards to enforcing a central regional authority of the League: • What are the implications of a central authority on other regional alliances such as the Gulf Cooperation Council? • What are preventive measures in response to possible exacerbation of rivalries among member states? • What are the possibilities of reinforcing and utilizing existing Arab League features (its sub committees and working groups) to achieve this goal? * VII. Context-based amendment of current Rules Of Procedure Delegates are to note that the passing of resolution to this issue strictly requires a consensus voting i.e. The resolution would automatically fail if there is any number of countries voting against. That being said, delegates have to ensure that every member state has its interest achieved in the resolution in one way or another—of course, with varying extent.


VIII. Conclusion As much as this issue is challenging and contentious in every single way, it is also an extremely flexible one: one that allows delegate to fully engage with their national stance and scope the issue to where they deem most appropriate, where it best fulfills their national/regional interest--it is the closest to real world politics one could possibly attain in a model UN conference. It is also an issue that emphasizes on the need for political sustainability in a world of turmoil. We believe that you would find this topic an intriguing and refreshing one, and one that promises meaningful insights into the global and regional political paradigm.


IX. Bibliography 1. Anderson, Scott. Fractured Lands: How the Arab World Came Apart. New York: Anchor Books, A Division of Penguin Random House LLC, 2017. 2. Awad, Ibrahim. ‘The Future of Regional and Subregional Organization in the Arab World’, in D. Tschirgi (ed.), The Arab World Today, 1994. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 3. "Arab League: Reform or retire?" News | Al Jazeera. Accessed September 01, 2017. http://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2005/03/200841014144872474.html. 4. Barnett, Michael and Solingen Etel. Designed to Fail or Failure to Design? The Sources and Institutional Effects of the Arab League, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 180-81. 5. Chalk, Peter. Non-Military Security in the Wider Middle East, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 2003, pp. 197-200. 6. Dietl, Gulshan. Through Two Wars and Beyond: A Study of the Gulf Cooperation Council, 1991. New Delhi: Lancers Books. 7. Geneva peace talks on Syria - Google Search. Accessed September 02, 2017. https://g.co/kgs/5gS83Z. 8. Haddad, Hassan S., and Basheer K. Nijim. The Arab world: a handbook. Wilmette, IL: Medina Press, 1978. 9. Joffé, George H. ‘Disputes over State Boundaries in the Middle East and North Africa’, in L. Guazzone (ed.), The Middle East in Global Change: The Politics and Economics of Interdependence versus Fragmentation, 1997. Basinstoke: Macmillan. 10. Ibrahim, Nader. "The Failure of the Arab League in Solving Inter-State disputes." British Journal of Arts and Social Sciences. 2017. Accessed August 26, 2017. http://www.bjournal.co.uk/volume/paper/BJASS_22_1/BJASS_22_01_02.pdf. 11. Marcus, Jeremy, and Julia Kung. "Arab League." 2003. Accessed September 2, 2017. https://web.stanford.edu/class/e297a/Arab%20League.doc.


12. Marco, Pinfari. "NOTHING BUT FAILURE? THE ARAB LEAGUE AND THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL AS MEDIATORS IN MIDDLE EASTERN CONFLICTS." March 2009. Accessed September 2, 2017. http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/crisisStates/download/wp/wpSeries2/WP452.pdf. 13. Masters, Jonathan. The Arab League, Council on Foreign Relations, October 21, 2014, p. 4. 14. "Pan-Arabism." Wikipedia. August 28, 2017. Accessed September 02, 2017. https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pan-Arabism. 15. Staff, Toi. "Arab cleric claims Israel in league with Al-Jazeera." The Times of Israel. Accessed September 02, 2017. https://www.timesofisrael.com/arab-cleric-claims-israel-in-league-with-al-jazeera/. 16. Tahhan, Zena. "Arab Summit: 'Arabs lost confidence in their leaders'." | Al Jazeera. March 30, 2017. Accessed September 02, 2017. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/03/arab-summit-arabs-lost-confidence-leaders-170328114437100.html. 17. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. "Charter of Arab League." Refworld. 1945. Accessed September 02, 2017. http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3ab18.html. 18. Youssef, Hashem. "Mediation and Conflict Resolution in the Arab World: The Role of the Arab League." 2015. Accessed September 2, 2017. https://ifsh.de/file-CORE/documents/yearbook/english/13/Youssef-en.pdf.

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