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THE ANALOGY OF BEING

Paul Gerard Horrigan, Ph.D., 2001.

Equivocal Terms. Equivocal terms are terms used with entirely different meanings. In univocal terms the same term, in at least two occurences of the term, has meanings completely different from one another. Examples of equivocal terms: 1. “Pen” as in the writing instrument, and “pen” as in pig pen which houses animals ; 2. “Bill” as in a piece of paper from a company showing what you owe, and “bill” as in the parts of a bird’s jaws ; and 3. “Seal” an emblem or figure used as evidence of authenticity, and “seal” the sea mammal that feeds on fish and has limbs reduced to flippers. The Angelic Doctor writes: “In the case of equivocity the same term is predicated of various things with an entirely different meaning. This is clear in the case of the term dog (canis), inasmuch as it is predicated both of a constellation and of a certain species of animal.”1

Univocal Terms. A term is univocal if it signifies exactly the same concept, or essence, in (at least) two occurrences of the term. Univocal terms have one and only one meaning. They are constantly used in an identical sense. For example, when I say “A dog is an animal,” and “A cat is an animal,” “animal” in both propositions is univocal. Aquinas writes: “In the case of univocity one term is predicated of different things with absolutely one and the same meaning; for example, the term animal, which is predicated of a horse and of an ox, signifies a living, sensory substance.”2

Analogical Terms. Terms are analogical3 when the term, in at least two occurences of the term, has several meanings which are partly the same and partly different. Analogical concepts

1 In XI, Metaph., no. 2197. 2 Ibid. 3 Studies on analogy: B. DESBUTS, La notion d’analogie d’après Saint Thomas d’Aquin, “Annales de philosophie chrétienne,” 151 (1906), pp. 377-386 ; J. M. RAMÍREZ, De Analogia secundum Doctrinam Aristotelico-

Thomisticam, “La Ciencia tomista,” 24 (1921), pp. 20-40, 195-214, 337-357, 25 (1922) 17-38 ; B. LANDRY, La

notion d’analogie chez S. Bonaventure, “Revue néo-scolastique de philosophie,” 24 (1922), pp. 137-169 ; B. LANDRY, L’analogie de proportion chez S. Thomas, “Revue néo-scholastique de philosophie,” 24 (1922), pp. 257-280 ; B. LANDRY, L’analogie de proportionalité chez S. Thomas, “Revue néo-scholastique de philosophie,” 24 (1922), pp. 454-464 ; M. DE MUNNYNK, L’analogie métaphysique, “Revue néo-scolastique de philosophie,” 25 (1923), pp. 129-155 ; N. BALTHASAR, L’abstraction et l’analogie de lêtre, “Estudios Franciscanos (Barcelona),” 34 (1924), pp. 166-216 ; J. LE ROHELLEC, De Fundamento Metaphysico Analogiae, “Divus Thomas (Piac.),” 29 (1926), pp. 77-101, 664-691 ; M. T.-L. PENIDO, Le rôle de l’analogie en théologie dogmatique, Paris, 1931 ; A. MARC, L’idée thomiste de lêtre et les analogies d’attribution et de proportionalité, “Revue néo-scholastique de philosophie,” 35 (1933), pp. 157-189 ; M. T.-L. PENIDO, Cajetan et notre connaissance analogique de Dieu, “Revue Thomiste,” 39 (1934-1935), pp. 149-192 ; N. BALTHASAR, L’abstraction métaphysique et l’analogie des

êtres dans l’être, Louvain, 1935 ; J. JACQUES, Abstraction et Analogie, “Revue néo-scholastique de philosophie,” V. BRUSOTTI, L’analogia di attribuzione e la conoscenza della natura di Dio, “Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica,” 27 (1935), pp. 31-66 ; G. CERIANI, Teologia e dottrina dell’analogia nel Tomismo, “Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica,” 28 (1936), supplement, pp. 55-65 ; A. VAN LEEUWEN, L’analogie de l’être. Genèse et contenu du

concept analogique, “Revue néo-scholastique de philosophie,” 39 (1936), pp. 293-320 ; A. VAN LEEUWEN, L’analogie de l’être. Précisions sur la nature de cette analogie, “Revue néo-scholastique de philosophie,” 39 (1936), pp. 469-496 ; E. LAURENT, Quelques réflexions sur l’analogie, “APARTSA,” 5 (1938), pp. 169-184 ; E. T. FOOTE, Anatomy of Analogy, “The Modern Schoolman,” 18 (1940), pp. 21-37 ; D. EMMET, The Use of

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Analogy in Metaphysics, “Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,” 41 (1940-1941), pp. 27-46 ; G. B. PHELAN, Saint Thomas and Analogy, Marquette University Press, Milwaukee, 1941 ; J. F. ANDERSON, Mathematical and

Metaphysical Analogy in Thomas, “The Thomist,” 3 (1941), pp. 564-579 ; L. BELLEFIORE, Univocità dell’essere

a analogia dell’ente, “Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica,” 33 (1941), pp. 222-228 ; W. ESDAILE BYLES, The

Analogy of Being, “The New Scholasticism,” 16 (1942), pp. 331-364 ; L. BELLEFIORE, Le basi gnoseo-

metafisiche dell’univocità e dell’analogia, “Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica,” 34 (1942), pp. 191-211 ; A. GAZZANA, L’analogia in S. Tommaso e nel Gaetano. Nota critica, “Gregorianum,” 24 (1943), pp. 367-383 ; C. RYAN, God and Analogy, “Blackfriars,” 25 (1944), pp. 137-143 ; A. M. FARBER, The Extension of St. Thomas’s

Doctrine of Knowledge by Analogy to Modern Philosophical Problems, “The Downside Review,” 65 (1947), pp. 21-31 ; J. HELLIN, La analogia del ser y el conocimiento de Dios en Suárez, Madrid, 1947 ; I. M. BOCHENSKI, On

Analogy, “The Thomist,” 11 (1948), pp. 424-447 ; P. GRENET, Les origines de l’analogie philosophique dans les

dialogues de Platon, Paris, 1948 ; J. GARCIA LOPEZ, La analogía del ser, “La Ciencia tomista,” 76 (1949), pp. 607-625 ; E. MASCALL, Existence and Analogy. A Sequel to “He Who Is,” London, 1949 ; O. N. DERISI, Esencia

y significado de la analogía metafísica, “La Ciencia tomista,” 76 (1949), pp. 298-312 ; J. PETRIN, Univocité et

analogie dans les lois de la logique, “Angelicum,” 26 (1949), pp. 233-249 ; A. MacINTYRE, Analogy in

Metaphysics, “The Downside Review,” 69 (1950), pp. 45-61 ; J. F. ANDERSON, Analogy in Plato, “Review of Metaphysics,” 4 (1950), pp. 111-130 ; C. RYAN, The Reach of Analogical Argument, “The Downside Review,” 4 (1951), pp. 102-118 ; H. LYTTKENS, The Analogy Between God and the World. An Investigation of Its

Background and Interpretation of Its Use by Thomas of Aquino, Uppsala, 1952 ; J. F. ANDERSON, G. B. BURCH, R. ROBINSON, and J. OWENS, Some Basic Propositions Concerning Metaphysical Analogy, “Review of Metaphysics,” 5 (1952), pp. 465-472 ; J. HORGAN, Aspects of Cajetan’s Theory of Analogy, “Irish Ecclesiastical Record,” 71 (1953), pp. 113-135 ; J. RAMIREZ, En torno a un famoso texto de Santo Tomás sobre la analogía, “Sapienza,” 8 (1953), pp. 166-192 ; J. F. ANDERSON, The Bond of Being: An Essay on Analogy and Existence, B. Herder, St. Louis, 1954 ; H. T. SCHWARTZ, Analogy in St. Thomas and Cajetan, “The New Scholasticism,” 28 (1954), pp. 127-144 ; G. CANALELLA, Analogia e causalità nel problema dell’essere, “Educare,” 5 (1954), pp. 226-235 ; A. MAURER, St. Thomas and the Analogy of Genus, “The New Scholasticism,” 29 (1955), pp. 127-144 ; A. NEMETZ, The Meaning of Analogy, “Franciscan Studies,” 15 (1955), pp. 209-223 ; M. P. SLATTERY, Metaphor and Metaphysics, “Philosophical Studies (Maynooth),” 5 (1955), pp. 89-99 ; G. E. MUELLER, Analogia

entis and dialectic, “Sophia,” 24 (1956), pp. 29-36 ; J. RIESCO TERRERO, El objecto de la metafisica y la

analogia del ente según Escoto, “Sapientia,” 11 (1956), pp. 331-347 ; I. O’BRIEN, Analogy and Our Knowledge of

God, “Philosophical Studies (Maynooth), 6 (1956), pp. 91-104 ; G. P. KLUBERTANZ, The Problem of the Analogy

of Being, “Review of Metaphysics,” 10 (1956-1957), pp. 553-579 ; T. M. FLANIGAN, The Use of Analogy in the Summa Contra Gentiles, “The Modern Schoolman,” 35 (1957), pp. 21-37 ; R. McINERNY, The Logic of Analogy, “The New Scholasticism,” 31 (1957), pp. 149-171 ; O. A. VARANGOT, Analogía de attribución intrínseca en

Santo Tomás, “Ciencia y Fe,” 13 (1957), pp. 293-319, 467-485 ; M. P. SLATTERY, Concerning Two Recent

Studies in Analogy (A. Maurer and M. Schwartz), “The New Scholasticism,” 31 (1957), pp. 237-246 ; R. J. MASIELLO, The Analogy of Proportion According to the Metaphysics of St. Thomas, “The Modern Schoolman,” 35 (1957-1958), pp. 91-105 ; P. C. HAYNER, Analogical Predication, “The Journal of Philosophy (New York),” 55 (1958), pp. 855-862 ; O. A. VARANGOT, El analogado principal, “Ciencia y Fe,” 14 (1958), pp. 237-253 ; B. KELLY, The Metaphysical Background of Analogy, London, 1958 ; S. MOORE, Analogy and the Free Mind, “The Downside Review,” 76 (1958), pp. 1-28 ; S. Y. WATSON, Univocity and Analogy of Being in the Philosophy of

Duns Scotus, “Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association,” 32 (1958), pp. 189-206 ; S. MOORE, Analogy. A Retraction and a Challenge, “The Downside Review,” 76 (1958), pp. 125-148 ; C. ABRANCHES, Ser y analogia, “Pensamiento,” 15 (1959), pp. 33-45 ; G. KLUBERTANZ, St. Thomas on Analogy, Loyola University Press, Chicago, 1960 ; W. L. REESE, Analogy, Symbolism, and Linguistic Analysis, “Review of Metaphysics,” 13 (1960), pp. 447-468 ; Y. R. SIMON, On Order in Analogical Sets, “The New Scholasticism,” 34 (1960), pp. 1-42 ; J. GOMEZ CAFFARENA, ‘Analogia del ser’ y dialéctica en la afirmación humana de Dios, “Pensamiento,” 16 (1960), pp. 143-174 ; B. MONDIN, Il principio ‘omne agens agit sibi simile’ e l’analogia dei

nomi divini nel pensiero di S. Tommaso d’Aquino, “Divus Thomas (Piac.),” 63 (1960), pp. 336-348 ; J. F. ROSS, Analogy as a Rule of Meaning for Religious Language, “International Philosophical Quarterly,” 1 (1961), pp. 468-502 ; R. McINERNY, The Logic of Analogy: An Interpretation of Aquinas, Martin Nijhoff, The Hague, 1961 ; J. F. ROSS, Analogy as a Rule of Meaning for Religious Language, “International Philosophical Quarterly,” 1 (1961), pp. 468-502 ; M. S. O’NEILL, Some Remarks on the Analogy of God and Creatures in St. Thomas Aquinas, “Mediaeval Studies,” 23 (1961), pp. 206-215 ; J. OWENS, Analogy as a Thomistic Approach to Being, “Mediaeval Studies,” 24 (1962), pp. 303-322 ; B. MONTAGNES, La doctrine de l’analogie de l’être d’après St. Thomas d’Aquin, Louvain,

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are predicated of their subjects in a way that is partly the same and partly different. Analogical terms share in the same perfection but have a diversity in the manner of possessing that perfection. For example, there is a difference between a good rock, a social good, and a good person. The metaphysical foundation of analogy lies in the different ways various subjects possess the same perfections. Different manners of being results in different manners of signifying. Now, an analogical term may be based either on the analogy of proportionality or on the analogy of attribution (of which there are two types, namely, the analogy of extrinsic

attribution and the analogy of intrinsic attribution).4

Analogy of Proportionality. In the analogy of proportionality, the analogous term is applied to unlike things because of some proportion or resemblance existing between them. A concept is predicated with the analogy of proportionality when several subjects possess a common perfection in ways that are not exactly but only proportionately the same. There can be an analogy of proportionality in the mathematical order, for example, with the proportion between quantities such as the double proportion obtaining in 2:1, 4:2, 8:4 and so on. These ratios are proportionately equal so we are able to say that 2:1 equals 4:2 equals 8:4. Though it is true that four is not equal to eight, nevertheless, the relation 4:2 is identical with the relation 8:4.

1963 ; R. McINERNY, Studies in Analogy, Martin Nijhoff, The Hague, 1968 ; R. E. MEAGHER, Thomas Aquinas

and Analogy: A Textual Analysis, “The Thomist,” 34 (1970), pp. 230-253 ; J. C. CAHALAN, Analogy and the

Disrepute of Metaphysics, “The Thomist,” 34 (1970), pp. 387-422 ; T. A. FAY, Analogy: The Key to Man’s

Knowledge of God in the Metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas, “Divus Thomas,” 76 (1973), pp. 343-364 ; B. MONDIN, L’analogia di proporzione e di proporzionalità nel Commento alle sentenze, “Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica,” 66 (1974), pp. 571-589 ; T. CHAPMAN, Analogy, “The Thomist,” 39 (1975), pp. 127-141 ; K. NIELSON, Talk of God

and the Doctrine of Analogy, “The Thomist,” 40 (1976), pp. 32-60 ; P. LEE, Language About God and the Theory of

Analogy, “The New Scholasticism,” 58 (1984), pp. 40-66 ; P. AUBENQUE, The Origins of the Doctrine of the

Analogy of Being, “Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal,” 11 (1986), pp. 35-46 ; R. LEE, The Analogies of Being in

St. Thomas Aquinas, “The Thomist,” 58 (1994), pp. 471-488 ; R. McINERNY, Aquinas and Analogy, Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C., 1996. 4 Explaining the analogy of attribution and the analogy of proportionality, Wallace writes: “(1) In the analogy of

attribution, which is sometimes referred to as two- or three-term analogy, a perfection is predicated of each analogate, but one analogate is primary with respect to the other(s), and the perfection of the primary is attributed to the others by virtue of some relationship to the primary, usually that of causality. If the perfection is predicated properly and intrinsically of only the primary analogate and not of the other(s), the analogy is called extrinsic

attribution; an example would be ‘healthy’ as said of man and then attributed to other subjects because of some causal relationship to health in man, e.g., healthy food, healthy exercise, etc. If the perfection is predicated properly and intrinsically of all analogates, on the other hand, even though one is primary, the analogy is called intrinsic

attribution; an example would be ‘is’ or being as attributed to substance and accident, for here the being that is primary in substance is predicated properly of accident as dependent upon such substantial being. (2) The analogy of

proportionality, sometimes spoken of as four-term analogy, usually takes the form of a proportion (schematically A:B::C:D) stating that a perfection found in one analogate is similarly but proportionately found in another analogate. If the perfection is really extrinsic to one of the analogates, the analogy is said to be one of improper

proportionality; an example would be the metaphor of calling a king a ‘lion’ because the courage in the king is similar to the corresponding quality in the lion. If the perfection is found properly and intrinsically in both analogates, on the other hand, the analogy is called proper proportionality; an example would be the proportion, ‘as vision is to the power of sight, so simple apprehension is to the power of intellect.’ Similarly, one could say, ‘as substance is to its being, so accidents are to their being.’ As can be seen from the latter example, the analogy of proper proportionality can be very similar to that of intrinsic attribution. The difference is that in proper proportionality no direct relationship of dependence between the two analogates need be expressed, and so neither need be seen as primary with respect to the other or defined in terms of it, whereas in the case of intrinsic attribution such a relationship is explicitly recognized. Both types have important applications in natural theology”(W. WALLACE, The Elements of Philosophy, Alba House, Staten Island, New York, pp. 89-90).

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Such an equality is termed a proportional equality. We also see the analogy of proportionality working in other fields such as that of philosophy. We can say, through a similarity of relations, that matter is to form as potency is to act.

In the analogy of (proper) proportionality “the nature signified by the concept is formally

and intrinsically realized in each of the analogates according to a proportional similarity. Let us explain this definition: In the first place, the nature signified by the concept is intrinsically realized in each of the analogates. An example to the point would be the concept of life as predicated of plants, animals, man and pure spirits. Obviously, the life of plants, animals, man, and pure spirits is very different; yet the perfection signified by the concept of life is found in each of them.

“In the second place, the nature signified by the concept is formally realized in each of

the analogates. This feature distinguishes analogy of proportionality from metaphorical analogy, in which only one of the analogates realizes this nature formally. Life, for instance, is found in plants, animals, and man in a formal sense, and not merely as a figure of speech.

“In the third place, the nature must be realized in the analogates according to a

proportional similarity. This characteristic distinguishes analogy of proportionality from univocity. A nature can be realized formally and intrinsically either in exactly the same manner or according to a proportional similarity. If it is realized in exactly the same manner, the concept cannot be analogous, but is univocal because it does not vary. But a perfection can be realized also according to a proportional similarity. By this term we mean that in each of the analogates there exists a proportion or relation between two perfections or notes, and that these proportions or relations are similar. Hence it is no longer a question of one analogate being related to another, as is the case in analogy of attribution, but of a relation in one analogate being similar to a relation or proportion in another analogate. When, for instance, we predicate the term ‘living’ of plants, animals, and men, we do not consider the relations which these forms of life have to one another, but the fact that man’s nature is proportioned to the human mode of life as an animal’s nature is proportioned to a sentient mode of life, and the nature of a plant is proportioned to a vegetative mode of life. Thus in each of the analogates the concept of life is realized formally and intrinsically, but the content of this concept varies according to the subject under consideration.

“It should be clear that such an analogy is possible only in concepts which express a

nature indeterminately, in such a way that the concept can be determined from within.5 This determination takes place when the concept is predicated of one of the analogates. The concept ‘living,’ for example, implies a nature which is proportioned to self-movement, but it does not determine the kind of self-movement. But as soon as we predicate this concept of particular living things, we are referring to a definite type of self-movement, so that our concept undergoes a determination which makes it unsuitable for predication of another type of self-movement without being readjusted.”6

5 If the concept is determined from without, it is purely univocal. 6 H. J. KOREN, Introduction to the Science of Metaphysics, B. Herder, St. Louis, 1965, pp. 37-39.

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Metaphors are a type of analogy of proportionality (albeit improper). We say that hikers begin their adventure at “the foot” of the mountain, “foot” because of its resemblance to the position of the foot with regard to the human body. Graphic comparisons and parables also employ the analogy of improper proportionality.

Metaphorical analogy is called an analogy of improper proportionality wherein “the

nature signified by the term is realized formally and intrinsically in one of the analogates, and in the other or others intrinsically and virtually, i.e., only with respect to a secondary characteristic, such as the activity, proper to this nature. Take for example, the term ‘lion.’ The nature signified by this term is realized formally and intrinsically only in the animal which we call a lion. We cannot call a man a lion in the formal sense, for a lion is essentially irrational, whereas man is essentially rational. However, it is proper to the nature of a lion to act courageously in the face of danger, or at least we consider this to be so. Hence we may fix our attention upon this secondary aspect of the nature of a lion and predicate the term ‘lion’ of a man who is courageous. In doing so we merely want to convey the idea that in the face of danger this man acts in the same way as a lion is supposed to act. Hence we say that he is a lion because of his resemblance to a lion in the order of activity. As far as the predication of the term ‘lion’ is concerned, it is clear that only a certain type of brute animal formally and intrinsically realizes the nature expressed by this term. Hence in predicating ‘lion’ of a man we have to keep in mind the subject of our predication and to make an adjustment in the predicate. Again, however, this adjustment is rather in the term than in the concept; for the nature signified by the term is realized formally and intrinsically only in the animal. Nevetheless, pure equivocation is avoided because we see a basis for predicating the same term of both animal and man. This basis lies in a similarity of both subjects in a secondary aspect of the nature ‘lion,’ namely, in the order of activity. It should be clear that it is impossible to define ‘lion’ as predicated of a man without the primary analogate (the brute animal) being taken into consideration. For the reason of the predication is precisely some aspect flowing from the nature of the primary analogate.”7

Analogy of Attribution. In the analogy of attribution the analogous term is applied in an absolute sense to one thing and is then attributed to other things because of an intrinsic relation which they have towards the first. While analogy of proportionality merely compares different proportions, the analogy of attribution goes further, pointing to one of the terms of comparison as the principle of the rest. A perfection is predicated with the analogy of attribution if, among several subjects of a common perfection, there is one which possesses the perfection in all its fullness, while the rest possess it in derived manner or by what is called participation. In the analogy of attribution there is always a central and primary meaning by which the rest depend, and the analogical term is predicated beforehand of the subject (called the principal analogate8) of the principal meaning. With regard to the other subjects, called the secondary analogates, the analogical concept is predicated only posteriorly. The analogy of attribution involves the predication of a concept or term primarily to the principal analogate, and its posterior attribution

7 H. J. KOREN, op. cit., pp. 36-37. 8 When we say “analogate” we mean “that of which an analogous term is predicated.” The term “primary analogate” means the analogate to which a term belongs principally, while the “secondary analogate” would mean the analogate of which such a term is predicated in dependence upon the primary analogate. If, for example, I predicate “healthy” of man, climate, food and medicine, man would be the primary analogate, while climate, food and medicine would be the secondary analogates. This example deals with the so-called extrinsic analogy of attribution.

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to the other subjects by derivation. Now, the analogy of attribution can either be extrinsic or intrinsic.

Extrinsic Analogy of Attribution. In this type of analogy of attribution only the principal

analogate properly and formally possesses the analogical perfection; the secondary analogates possess it only in an extrinsic and improper manner. Take, for example, the term “health.” Medicine is deemed “healthy” because it restores health. Climate is termed “healthy” because it is conducive to health. Food is termed “healthy” because it sustains health. Exercise is termed “healthy” because it promotes health, and complexion is said to be “healthy” because it indicates a healthy constitution. Medicine, climate, food, exercise, and complexion are said to be healthy only in an improper sense for they are the external causes of a healthy body.

Intrinsic Analogy of Attribution. This type of analogy is the most important as it is of capital importance in describing the relation between God and His creatures. In the intrinsic analogy of attribution the analogical concept is properly predicated not only of the principal analogate but also of the secondary analogates because the former really is the cause of the perfection of the latter. For example, we say that creatures “are” and God “Is” ; being is said principally of God, the Supreme Being, for His Being is His Essence. However, being is properly predicated of created beings inasmuch as they received their being from the Supreme Being. Creatures “have” being by participation, while God “Is” being. The fundamental basis of the intrinsic analogy of attribution is the relations of causality among beings. It is based on the imperfect similarity or likeness of the effect to its cause. Sanguineti gives us some observations regarding this point: “a) Since one cannot give what one does not have, at least some perfections of the efficient cause will necessarily be reflected in its proper effects. The efficient cause is, therefore, also an exemplary cause of its proper effects. It follows that by studying the latter, we can, using the analogy of attribution, arrive at some knowledge of the former. It is in this way that we arrive at an analogical knowledge of the nature of God on the basis of the manifold perfections we find in creatures; b) Consequently, analogy of attribution implies both similarity and dissimilarity. The analogical concept is predicated per prius of the cause, and per posterius of the effects. It is partly attributed to the effects inasmuch as they are similar to the cause ; but it is partly not attributed to them since they are also unlike the cause. Hence, the universe is, at one and the same time, like God and unlike Him; c) The foundation of the analogy of attribution is not an abstract idea but a real cause, the cause of the participated likenesses of the perfection in the secondary analogates. For example, if being is common to God and the world, it is not because the abstract notion of being is found in both of them, but because the being of the world points to the Being of God as its principle and cause. It would be an error to establish the foundation of this analogical community of being on the most abstract concept of being-in-general (esse comune), which is necessarily univocal; d) The ontological priority of the principal analogate does not always mean gnoseological priority, for sometimes it is only through their effects that we acquire a knowledge of the causes. This is the case with our knowledge of God, the principal analogate of being. Though first in the ontological order, God comes after creatures in the noetical order since it is the latter that we first know and apply names to. In the order of knowledge, therefore, the meaning of our notions of being, goodness and truth applies primarily to creatures.”9

9 J. J. SANGUINETI, Logic, Sinag-Tala, Manila, 1992, pp. 68-69.

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Being is Analogical

When we say that “God is Being” and that “man is a being”, being here is predicated of

their subjects analogically. Not equivocally as many of the nominalists and atomistic empiricists maintain. Nor univocally as Parmenides held, for “if being were to be understood in a univocal manner, then all reality would be deemed to be in the same manner, which would ultimately lead to monism. Everything would be seen as identically one, and therefore, there would be no difference between God and creatures (pantheism). Taking into account the analogical notion of being, however, we can speak about God and creatures as beings, maintaining at the same time the infinite distance between them. By way of analogy, created being leads us to the knowledge of the divine being and its perfections. That is why this question is of utmost importance for metaphysics and theology.”10

Being is analogical by an analogy of proper proportionality (this is used when we deal

with diverse things whose acts of being are proportioned to their essences) and an analogy of intrinsic attribution. Not by an analogy of proportionality exclusively, as Cajetan would have it; and not exclusively by the analogy of intrinsic attribution, as Suarez’s version would have it. Against Cajetan’s analogy of proper proportionality-only interpretation of Aquinas on the analogy of being, Cornelio Fabro11 and Bernard Montagnes12 are in favor of the use of both analogy of proper proportionality and the analogy of intrinsic attribution.

There should also be a distinguishing between the analogy of the term ‘being,’ which

would pertain to the domain of logic, and the “analogy of being,” which would enter the domain of metaphysics (this has been advocated by Ralph McInerny in his studies on analogy13), the latter treating of the questions regarding the participation in the act of being (esse), the rapport between essence (essentia) and act of being (esse), and of the transcendental metaphysical ascent to a maximally perfect Being (the Ipsum Esse Subsistens): God.

10 T. ALVIRA, L. CLAVELL, T. MELENDO, Metaphysics, Sinag-Tala, Manila, 1991, p. 31. 11 Cf. C. FABRO, Partecipazione e causalità, S.E.I., Turin, 1960, pp. 469-526. 12 Cf. B. MONTAGNES, La doctrine de l’ analogie de l’être d’après St. Thomas d’Aquin, Louvain, 1963. 13 Cf. R. McINERNY, The Logic of Analogy: An Interpretation of Aquinas, Martin Nijhoff, The Hague, 1961 ; R. McINERNY, Studies in Analogy, Martin Nijhoff, The Hague, 1968 ; R. McINERNY, Aquinas and Analogy, Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C., 1996.