The American Influence on the Chinese Civil War: 1927-1949

_______________________

A Project Presented to

the Faculty of the Undergraduate

College of Arts and Letters

James Madison University

_______________________

in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements

for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts

_______________________

by Kathryn Elizabeth Barela

May 2012

Accepted by the faculty of the Department of History, James Madison University, in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts.

FACULTY COMMITTEE:

Project Advisor: Michael J. Seth, Ph.D.

Assistant Professor, History

Reader: Steven W. Guerrier, Ph.D.

Professor, History

Reader: Thomas P. Ward, Ph.D.

Assistant Professor, History

HONORS PROGRAM APPROVAL:

Barry Falk, Ph.D.,

Director, Honors Program

2

Dedication

To all those who served in China during the Chinese Civil War, and to all those who serve

overseas, be it Military or Foreign Service.

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Table of Contents

Acknowledgements 4

Introduction and Background 5

Aid, Influence, and Important Figures Prior to WWII 11

World War II 15

The End of a Dynasty 54

Bibliography 62

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Dr. Michael Seth for being my project advisor, and Dr. Steven

Guerrier and Dr. Thomas Ward for being my readers. I would also like to thank the Department

of History and the Department of Asian Studies for a wonderful 4 years, and I hope this shows

some of what I learned from every one of my instructors.

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Introduction and Background

One of the most important events in the twentieth century is the Chinese Civil War that

occurred from 1927-1949. It directly affected the relationship between the United States and

China because the United States’ policies of intervention during the Chinese Civil War. The

United States played a key role in the events of the Chinese Civil War because of their support,

both monetarily and militarily, of the Nationalist Party, or Kuomintang (KMT), in its struggle

against the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This intervention was a very important event in not

only Chinese and American history, but in world history. It is a critical series of events that

connects other important world events, such as Neo-Imperialism, the Second World War, and the

Cold War. The policies of the United States, and the uncertainty and confusion that sometimes

surrounded them, also contributed to the overall actions of the United States. The intervention

and actions of the United States, including the policy of giving of money, supplies, and advisors

to the Nationalist government was a significant part of the events of the Chinese Civil War, and

played an important part in its outcome.1

1 The secondary sources on revolutionary China are John King Fairbank, The Great Chinese Revolution 1800-1985 (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1987); John King Fairbank and Merle Goldman, China: A New History, 2nd enlarged edition (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006); Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China ( New York: WW Norton & Company, 1990). Secondary sources on the KMT and Chiang Kai-shek include Hannah Pakula, The Last Empress: Madame Chiang Kai-shek and the Birth of Modern China (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2009); Sterling Seagrave, The Soong Dynasty (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers. 1985); Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011). The secondary sources that discuss westerners in China before and during the Second World War include Charles F. Romanus, and Riley Sunderland. United States Army in World War II: China-Burma-India Theater: Stilwell’s Command Problems. (Washington DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1987); Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, United States Army in World War II: China-Burma-India Theater: Stilwell’s Mission to China (Washington DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1953); Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland. United States Army in World War II: China-Burma-India Theater: Time Runs Out in CBI (Washington DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1959); Jonathan Spence, To Change China: Western Advisors in China 1620-1960 (New York: Penguin Books, 1980); Barbara W. Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-45 (New York: Grove Press, 1971); Theodore H White and Annalee Jacoby, Thunder Out of China (New York: William Sloane Associates, INC, 1946. Primary sources include The Claire Lee Chennault papers, 1914- 1954. The Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington DC; The

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The United States aid to the Kuomintang arose right before and continued after the

Second World War because of the struggle between the Kuomintang and the Communists during

the Communist revolution. To understand the conflict between the Kuomintang and the Chinese

Communist Party during the revolution, and the reason for the United State’s support of the

Kuomintang, as opposed to the Chinese Communist Party, it is crucial to understand the two

backgrounds of the two parties. It is also crucial to understand the situation and political and

social events in China previous to the revolution that caused the creation of these parties. This

inevitably also will lead to understanding the extent of and outcome of the extensive aid given to

the KMT, and how greatly it impacted relations afterwards with the People’s Republic of China.

In the early twentieth century, China was in a fragile state, having had many influential

and dramatic events occur. Starting at the outset of trade with Europe and other foreign areas,

China had enacted strict trading rules on foreign trade. China’s growing internal difficulties

benefitted the foreign powers, and some countries used this advantage to smuggled opium into

China. The United States and China signed a treaty in 1844 that put legal governance of

Americans in China under American jurisdiction.2 This treaty, dubbed the Treaty of Wanghia,

also allowed Americans in the five Chinese treaty ports to build hospitals, churches, and

cemeteries. It also gave Americans the right to hire a tutor to learn Chinese, a privilege

previously withheld by the Chinese Government. This treaty was to be reviewed in twelve

years.3 This treaty was just the start of American involvement in China.

Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, Department of State, Washington DC; Lyman Van Slyke, ed., The Chinese Communist Movement: A Report of the United States War Department, July 1945 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1968); Theodore H. White, The Stilwell Papers (New York: William Sloane Associates, INC, 1948). 2 Michael Kort, China under Communism (Brookfield, CT: Millbrook, 1994), 30-33. 3 Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York: Norton, 1990), 161.

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In 1894-5, China fought a war with Japan for control over Korea and lost, which led to

foreign powers taking advantage of the now delicate situation in China. Different countries

claimed “spheres of influence”, which were large areas of control, and the powers had free reign

away from the Chinese law. Then Chinese peasants in 1900 responded with the anti-foreign

uprisings called the Boxer Rebellion.4 This ill treatment of the Chinese clearly demonstrates why

there would be a foundation for animosity for foreigners.

This situation already demonstrates a clear contempt for foreigners that the Communists

would continue after gaining control in 1949. In the year 1912, the last Manchu emperor

abdicated, resulting in chaos. The economic situation was disorganized and the financial

situation was difficult. Many intellectuals had expressed dissatisfaction with the old regime, and

now these problems now had to be addressed.5

As the government and control of the emperor deteriorated, Yuan Shih-k’ai became

premier under the Manchu dynasty, and exercised considerable power.6 As time passed, he

became the president of the newly declared provisional government, and found himself trying to

fill the place of the emperor when he really did not have any right or basis to do so.

Revolutionary groups had come together in 1905 to form a new Revolutionary League under the

leadership of Sun Yat-sen.7 In 1911, sixteen provincial assembly delegates recognized Sun’s

leadership, and elected him provisional president of the Chinese republic. He sent a delegate to

Yuan Shih-k’ai stating that he understood how weak his power really was, and how the position

4 Kort, 33-36. 5 Spence, The Search for Modern China, 275. 6 Spence, The Search for Modern China, 266-7. 7 Hilda Hookham, A Short History of China (New York: St. Martins, 1970), 188.

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and the power was really waiting for Yuan. At this time, the end of the Machu dynasty really

occurred, and the provisional republican government came to be.8

Yuan appealed to Sun to come to Peking to talk about a single nationalist party. Sun

agreed, and declared his confidence in Yuan. Meanwhile, the drafting of a new provisional

constitution was underway. It was in August 1912 that a merger occurred of four small groups

into one Revolutionary Alliance. This alliance now formed the new Nationalist Party, or

Kuomintang. Yuan’s regime, however, would gradually fall apart as time went on, for several

reasons. One of the young Alliance leaders, Sung Chiao-jen, helped elect the Kuomintang

(KMT) to a majority in the parliament, and many felt at the time that he would become Prime

Minister, and would keep Yuan’s power in line through legal parliamentary means. However,

Yuan viewed this as treachery and shot Sung, and shortly afterwards dissolved the KMT as a

public body. The rule of warlords became stronger as Yuan’s power faded, and their influence

would continue until 1926, when Chiang Kai-shek would revive the KMT.9

The United States was one of the only countries to recognize Yuan Shikai’s regime. The

idea of a new republic and of Yuan, who had won the respect of the American people, was

favorable. The United States began to see a “special relationship” with China. Full diplomatic

recognition was given to the new government, making the connection official.10 This initial

founding, fraught with complication, demonstrates a reason why the United States chose to

support them, despite their problems. It sprung from Nationalism and popular support, which

gave it the edge over the Communists. The popular support it gained would have possibly caused

the United States to be more inclined to support the Nationalists.

8 Spence, The Search for Modern China, 267. 9John King Fairbank, The Great Chinese Revolution 1800-1985 (New York: Harper & Row, 1987),167-172 10 Spence, The Search for Modern China, 282-283.

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After the fall of Yuan Shih-k’ai, the warlords controlled the government. In 1923, when,

as mentioned, the CCP was still in a stage of developing, they two groups conceived a strategy of

coalition. The KMT felt sympathetic with the Soviet Union, especially because of the points

Lenin made about imperialism, which was a crucial issue to China at the time. The Soviet Union

saw that it was in their interest that China be strong enough to keep Japan’s ambitions there at

bay.11 However, Sun Yat-sen, who was now in control of the party, rejected this idea of an

alliance, and it was then that Communists started to join the KMT while keeping their

membership in the CCP a secret. However, Sun was later desperate for aid, and contacted the

Soviet representative in Peking about discussing mutual relations. In 1924, the first Kuomintang

Party Congress stated its acceptance of the entrance of Communists if they accept KMT

principles. During the next few years, there were several strikes and the revolutionary movement

spread rapidly across China, which started to cause some concern among some KMT members.

By 1926, tensions in pro and anti-Communist groups in the KMT rose, and Chiang Kai-shek12, a

high ranking member and future leader of the KMT, began to take an open stand against them.

The end of the cooperation between the KMT and the CCP was because the most radical of the

KMT agreed with and felt sympathy for Great Britain, whose policies the Communists did not

agree with, because of the Communist’s anti-imperialist policies.13 It was during this period that

a Chiang Kai-shek would really take power, and change China dramatically.

Following this, starting in 1926, Chiang Kai-shek began his “Northern Expedition”,

where he attempted to seize warlord territory, and large cities fell to his troops. It was then he

11 Spence, The Search for Modern China, 335-6. 12 This version of Chiang’s name is the most popular. In documents of the time, he is also referred to as “Generalissimo”, and some use the alternate name Jiang Jieshi. The author will use this version of his name, and will call him Chiang for short. 13Lyman P. Van Slyke, The Chinese Communist Movement; a Report of the United States War Department, July 1945 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), 17-20.

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instigated what is known as the “White Terror”, where thousands of Communists were rounded

up and killed. By 1928, Chiang Kai-shek had brought more unity to China than anyone had since

the regime of Yuan Shih-k’ai.14 The country now united, the main military figures gave support

to the Nationalists. Chiang Kai-shek was now head of a one-party government structured

according to a plan outlined by Sun Yat-sen. However, Communism remained strong.15 Some of

the Communists who had not been eliminated by Chiang, led by Mao Zedong, controlled a small

area of land in the southern mountains which was proclaimed the “Chinese Soviet Republic” in

1931. Under constant threat of attack they were finally forced to flee from the area. The retreat,

which lasted for a year, is now called The Long March. The Red Army, the Communist army,

commanded under strict rules, marched over 6,000 miles.16 Animosity between these two parties,

the KMT and the Communists, culminated in initial fighting before World War II, and the

resulting US involvement in China would influence the revolution and foreign relations with

China for years to come.

14 Kort, 44-46. 15 Kenneth Scott Latourette, The Chinese Their History and Culture, 4th revised ed (New York: Macmillan, 1964), 331-332. 16 Kort, 46-55.

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Aid, Influence, and Important Figures Prior to the Second World War

The decade after World War I and before the Japanese invasion of China was one of

changes in the position of China in the minds of Americans. It also brought many ideas and

policies that would be important to understand later United States foreign policy.

Prior to the aid given during the period of the Chinese Civil War, the United States’

policy towards China had changed rapidly since the end of World War I. The Versailles Treaty

had made it so Japan was now in the forefront of East Asian priorities and played a more

dominant role than China. The United States made agreements with other foreign nations to

protect its interests in East Asia, and desired to end the British-Japanese alliance in East Asia.

Britain wanted to keep its empire safe, so it also desire to have dialogues on the subject. Japan

was thrilled at the prospect of these discussions, because they cemented its place as a great

power.

The meetings lasted from November 1921 until February 1922, and brought satisfying

results for the United States. The old British-Japanese military assistance was ended, and a new

four-power agreement between Britain, France, the United States, and Japan replaced it. It was

soon after this that the powers signed the Nine- Power Treaty. It condemned the spheres of

influence that existed in China, and it stated that China should be independent, and maintain its

own sovereignty. Shi Zhaoji, who headed China’s delegation, presented a “ten point program” to

define China’s territory and end extraterritoriality. 17

The relationship between the United States and China developed and became stronger. In

the early 1920’s, the United States began to develop a more active position in East Asia,

17 Spence, The Search for Modern China, 379.

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including both Japan and China. Through most of the 1920s, the US policy when it came to

China was very low key. The Communists and their actions were monitored, and the gain of

power by Chiang Kai-shek was welcomed by many in the United States. However, there was

lobbying for more cooperation and aid by T.V. Soong.

Soong, the son of a businessman from Shanghai, was educated at Harvard, and his sisters

were married to powerful men. They included Madame Sun Yat-sen, Madame Chiang Kai-shek,

and Madame H.H. Kung (the Minister of Industry, Labor, and Commerce at the time18). He was

well versed in financial matters, and this made him one of the most valuable members of the

government. Later, in 1940, Soong would become very involved with foreign affairs because of

his position first as Chiang Kai-shek’s personal representative in the United States, and then as

Minister of Foreign Affairs.19 This shows how diplomatic links developed between the United

States and China started to develop, starting with trade, and developing as times changed. It

demonstrates how influential and important their relationship with the United States was to

China, because Chiang’s own brother-in-law became so instrumental over time in relations. It

showed also how much Chiang also wanted the relations to remain and to succeed. These initial

loans given to China, however, were just the tip of the iceberg compared to the later aid given.

Meiling Soong, who became Madame Chiang Kai-shek, also became very instrumental at

this time to the image of the new Chinese Government. Chiang had realized that the easiest way

of receiving support was through the Soong family. T.V. had connections with foreign banks and

institutions which had influence in Washington D.C. Ailing, or Madame H.H. Kung, thought it

18 Latourette, 331. 19 Joseph Esherick, ed, Lost Chance in China: The World War II Despatches of John S. Service (New York: Random House, 1974), 77.

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was a strategic marriage.20 After Meiling married Chiang, she became “a power behind the

throne” and Chiang’s “interpreter to the Western world”.21 She wrote many articles and gave

interviews. It gave Americans a new fascination with China, feeling like a "brainy college girl

had taken over China, and was providing a running commentary on what was true and false in

the affairs of that mysterious and complicated nation”. She was very American in nature, and

was Christian, which increased her popularity in the United States.22 This marriage and its

results reflect the increasing importance of the United States in the mind of the Chinese. It also

reflects how the Americans thought of China, because of its new First Lady, whom they could

relate to easily, and who put a face on the “New China”.

Diplomatic ties between the United States and China were extremely complicated, and

had many different elements and aspects. China started to become more and more dependent on

aid from the United States, and the United States and the KMT realized this. However, some

historians feel that Chiang Kai-shek was using this dependency in an attempt to receive as much

money from the United States as possible.23 In any case, the aid from and interactions with the

United States developed over time, and included different areas. The fact that the KMT depended

on the aid from the United States, and that fact that this was widely acknowledged by both

governments, shows the extent already of the United States’ influence in China. It also shows

how it affected the relations during the war between the two countries. The measures that Chiang

took, especially utilizing the Soongs, demonstrates the importance of succeeding in winning the

approval of the United States.

20 Sterling Seagrave, The Soong Dynasty, (New York: Harper & Row, 1985), 258. 21 Seagrave, 284. 22 Seagrave, 284-85. 23 Jonathan Spence, To Change China: Western advisers in China 1620-1960 (Fairfield: Penguin Books, 1980), 237.

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The Japanese at this point in time had started their offense in China, and they were poised

to attack. This forced the Nationalists and the Communists into an alliance, called the “Second

United Front”, in which both leaders from each side sought something: Chiang to build prestige,

and Mao wanted to build the CCP’s strength. The first invasion by the Japanese took place in

1937, and the fighting proved detrimental to Chiang Kai-shek’s troops, and the strategy became

to retreat into China’s interior.24 By 1938, there were one million Japanese troops in China, and

the Japanese had stopped advancing.25 After Pearl Harbor, the United States then decided to play

a more active role in China’s problems.26 Their influence up until now had been important, but

soon it would be exponentially more influential.

24 Hannah Pakula, The Last Empress: Madame Chiang Kai-shek and the Birth of Modern China (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009), 312. 25 Kort, 46. 26 Kort, 57-58.

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World War II

The Second World War and its events were extremely influential in how Sino-US

relations took place. The conduct and decisions made in order to win the war, and the people

who were involved in it, were critical in all decisions of foreign policy. Understanding the Sino-

U.S. foreign policy during the Second World War also helps understand how the United States

interference in the Chinese Civil War was so influential.

Early Help

The years leading to Pearl Harbor was an important precursor to formal support and

assistance to China after December 1941. Both Chinese and United States officials had been

working together to help China, while at the same time not committing United States military

intervention. The actions taken by the United States when it was not formally at war with Japan

are extremely

At this time the United States also provided quite a bit of military aid and support to

China. By 1937, Chiang Kai-shek was in a desperate situation militarily, and his forces were low

and spread thin. Chiang sent General Claire Chennault, who was a retired member of the US

Army Air Corps and employed by the Chinese government to improve the Chinese Air Force, to

the United States to recruit pilots for a volunteer group of Chinese Air Force, and to purchase

more modern planes. One hundred and one men from the US Army and Navy Air Corps

volunteered for a salary of seven hundred and fifty dollars a month, plus five hundred dollars

bonus for every Japanese plane they shot down. In 1941, China and the US entered into a lend-

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lease agreement, and a fifty million dollar loan was confirmed, as well as the availability of one

hundred P-40 fighters.27

In 1939, it was unlikely that the situation in Europe would allow any European powers to

provide arms and technical assistance to the Chinese. The Chinese decided to approach the

United States, who had expressed its sympathy for the situation in China, though not enough to

enter the conflict. The American Export-Import Bank lent the Universal Trading Corporation, a

Chinese owned company, $45,000,000, which was to be used to buy civilian supplies.28

In June of 1940, T.V. asked the United States for military arms for China, and there were

several factors in China’s favor. The United States was beginning to realize that if there was a

conflict with Japan, that having China’s resources, including manpower and geographic

advantage, would be a beneficial. The United States was hesitant however to possibly provoke

any reaction from Japan that might end with it allying itself with Germany. There were also not

enough supplies to provide the United States in a possible conflict, as well as providing for the

plight of Great Britain, which was perceived as more important.29

However, in September of 1940, Japan entered northern Indochina, and four days later

Japan, Germany, and Italy signed a pact which vaguely said that they would take offensive

action against Britain and the United states. The United States decided to give China

$25,000,000 credit to China. However, this did not placate the Chinese’s desire for arms. Also,

this occupation closed the Yunnan-Indochina Railway, which made the Burma Road30 the only

link that the Chinese could use to receive supplies. It unfortunately was not in good condition for

27 Spence, To Change China, 228-231. 28 Charles F Romanus, and Riley Sunderland. United States Army in World War II, China-Burma-India Theater: Stilwell’s Mission to China (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, Department of the Army, 1953),7. 29 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Mission to China, 8 30 This was a road that extended from Chungking to the Burma railways

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major supply because of neglect. The events of September made the Chinese and British anxious

about the Japanese and how close they were to China. Britain could do little to help the

situation.31

In October, Chiang met with Nelson T. Johnson, the U.S. Ambassador to China of the

time, and stated his plight, and made proposals. He said that the Japanese had weakened China’s

economy and morale. The Chinese Communists took advantage of this situation, and Chiang

admitted that he feared them more than the Japanese. Chiang stated that China needed economic

aid as well as American airplanes manned by American volunteers, especially with the

possibility of Japan capturing Singapore and closing off the Burma Road. With this aid Chiang

said that China could be stabilized and that the aircraft could be used to enact major damage on

the Japanese Navy.32

These events so far are extremely enlightening to later events in Sino-U.S. relations, and

in the reactions of the United States in particular. We can see that Chiang and the GMD felt that

the situation in China seriously depended on whether the United States gave them the aid that

they wanted. We also see that the United States already had been supportive of the Chinese cause

from a distance, so the events that follow, especially those after Pearl Harbor, are not surprising.

In the aftermath of this meeting, there were messages sent by Johnson reporting the

meeting and his views on China and the actions that he felt should be taken. These telegrams,

though brief, relay interesting information from Johnson and then back from the Secretary of

State and the President of the United States demonstrate American sentiment, and the policy the

United States’ government had decided on in regards to China and its plight.

31 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Mission to China, 8-9. 32 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Mission to China, 9.

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The first telegram gives a good indication of the sentiment of Johnson, and what

information he gained from this meeting with Chiang. His first point discusses what Chiang told

him of the propaganda attacks by the Communists, and the resulting social and economic

deterioration of the people’s morale that Chiang knew was occurring. He then mentions in his

second point that there appeared to be an understanding with the Communists about problems

that Johnson had mentioned in his political summary for September of that year. He mentions

how relations appear to be positive, but that there is still tension on the matter of the removal of

the Fourth Army to North China.33 So, this so far gives a good indication that the diplomatic

mission to China at the time is very devoted to being a supporter of the Nationalists. Though

there is not a need at this point in time to choose one over the other, it is interesting to see the

sentiments of this time.

The third point then describes the Communist’s goals, based on what Johnson was told

by an informant. This informant said that the Communists refused to move their forces, and that

they desired to prolong the Sino-Japanese conflict in order to consolidate their position in China.

Johnson says that to put it another way, they therefore are taking advantage of Chiang’s difficult

situation to increase their own power base. Johnson says it is common knowledge that they have

not engaged in conflict with the Japanese for eighteen months, and that they have been focusing

on building military bases, and mobilizing the people. Johnson concludes his telegram by saying

that the Nationalists and Communists in his opinion will not have an open break under the

present circumstances, and that they will compromise to expel the Japanese. However, he warns

that if aid is not given to China by Great Britain and the United States, the end result might be a

Communist takeover of China. He ends this last point by saying that the current situation

33 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1940, Volume III: The Far East (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1955), 429.

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benefits the Communists more than the Nationalists, because the Communists have the chance to

consolidate power in a country that is becoming more unstable with the Japanese forces pressing

on.34

This last part of the telegram gives a very interesting insight into the situation in China,

and is very prophetic in many ways. It shows that Johnson, who was the Ambassador in China,

and who had access to all the most current information of the time, felt that the situation required

continued commitment of the United States. Not only this, but he also predicted the Communist

takeover of China nine years before it happened. It is something which demonstrates the

sentiments of the time, and which provides information on what Americans at the Embassy in

China might have felt, and what the policy was shaping towards.

The telegram of October 24th, 1940 from the Secretary of State to Ambassador Johnson

also provides interesting information. It give an enlightening insight into Washington’s policies

and sentiments towards China at the time. It starts by saying that this is both his and the

President’s response to Chiang and Johnson’s message and concerns. The telegram then goes on

to state that peace in the Far East does not seem to be feasibly possible in the near future,

because the Japanese would not be open to making a peace that would be beneficial for all

involved. It then says how the American people are aware of the plight of China, and that there is

surprise at the statement saying that there is no aid coming from Russia, which is contrary to

their information.35

The telegram then becomes extremely interesting in how it is worded and organized. It

discusses the desire of China for more economic aid, and its response is to say that on this

34 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1940, Volume III: The Far East, 430. 35 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1940, Volume III: The Far East, 680.

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subject: “There is of course no need to recount the various steps which the United States has

already taken which have had the effect of assisting China. Chiang Kai-shek is fully familiar

with these terms”.36 This gives a clear indication that the continuous request for aid from Chiang

was becoming a little aggravating for the President and Secretary of State. It also shows that they

probably heard about the need for aid quite constantly from Chiang and other Chinese officials

and delegates, and did not need to hear it from their own ambassador.

The telegram then discusses the topic of making military supplies accessible to the

Chinese. It says that there have been two hundred and seventy nine airplanes, which value at

$22,000,000. It also says that China has been among the top buyers for American planes in the

past three years, and that there are even some airplanes on their way to China. The next topic was

that of the Burma Road, which the telegram says, despite Chiang’s concerns, they feel will not

be closed by the Japanese, because of the efforts of the Chinese. It then goes into how the

European theater is extremely important to the efforts towards stalling the goals of the Axis

powers, and how it is interconnected with the situation in the Far East.37

This next part is very interesting and is typical of the isolationist mindset the United

States was in previous to Pearl Harbor:

“The Government of the United States has consistently endeavored in

relations with the Far East, while serving the interests of the United States, to

avoid and avert disservice to the interests of China. At the present moment

we are in no way forgetful of either of these objectives and we are intent

upon both. As Chiang Kai-shek is of course aware, it is a traditional policy of

the United States, except when this country is at war, to avoid entering into

alliance or entangling commitments, although we believe in cooperative

effort with other countries by peaceful and practicable means in support of

the principles to which this country is committed. Just as Chiang Kai-shek

and other Chinese leaders have foremost in their minds the interests of China,

36 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1940, Volume III: The Far East, 680. 37 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1940, Volume III: The Far East, 681.

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so we have foremost in our minds the interests of the United States. We are

fortunately situated in that our interests and those of China usually run along

parallel lines. Both the United States and China believe in peace, and the

United States desires to see China establish and maintain herself along the

lines of the democratic ideals in which we believe. It has long been a premise

of American policy that the Chinese are capable of creating and maintaining

a well-ordered state”.38

This clearly reiterates the overall message of the telegram; that the United States will continue to

be supportive of China, but that it at the same time still considers providing resources for the

United States itself as the first priority. It shows that even a year before Pearl Harbor, when the

United States clearly was siding in spirit with the Allied Powers, they still were in an isolationist

mindset, and it influenced their aid to China. It makes it even more interesting when looking at

the United States’ actions after Pearl Harbor.

The year before Pearl Harbor continued aid to China. After the purchase of one hundred

P-40 airplanes, the U.S. War Department told the Chinese that the program for aid, and to wait

for developments. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt39 had decided because of the

increasingly limited funds that Britain had to purchase supplies. Instead, aid would be given to

countries based on whether their defense was thought to be important to American Security. This

gave Britain and China both access to the many resources of the United States, as well as

continuing the race that was taking place between the United States on one side, and Germany

and Italy on the other. 40

When the Lend-Lease Act went before Congress on January 6th, 1941, China had played

a smaller role in the legislation than Great Britain had. This was partially because of the limited

38 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1940, Volume III: The Far East, 681. 39 The author will use the common abbreviation FDR or President Roosevelt from now on when mentioning this President. 40 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Mission to China, 13.

22

information that the United States had on what materials in China needed. They had provided

only one or two specific programs, whereas Great Britain had provided many details and

specifics for their programs, which was the basis for their lend-lease appropriations. Chiang

asked that one of the President’s administrative assistants, Dr. Lauchlin Currie, come to China to

examine the situation, both militarily and economically. Currie came back, after a short time,

with the information about how Chiang was working on airfields and the Burma Road. He also

brought and presented the various requests of the United States.41

On March 11th, 1941, President Roosevelt signed the Lend Lease Act. On the 31st of

March, T.V. made a proposal to Major General James H. Burns, who was the forerunner of the

Lend-Lease Administration. The request included three different projects:

“1. An enlargement of the Mao-Chennault proposals, calling for a

modern air force of 1,000 aircraft, with American training and

technical help.

2. Arms which, if issued on the basis of organization finally presented

by the Chinese in March 1942, would equip thirty divisions.

3. An efficient line of communications between China and friendly

powers, with:

a. A narrow-gauge railway from Yunnan to the Burma

Railways

b. A highway from Sadiya, India, across north Burma to

China

c. Trucks, repair shows, and resurfacing for the Burma

Road

d. Transport aircraft to supplement the road and

railways.”42

So, these proposals definitely show that the China continues its concerns over the Burma Road,

and that aircraft is a priority as well. This will also become evident in later events, with the

creation of the American Volunteer Group (AVG), better known as the “Flying Tigers”.

41 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Mission to China, 13-4. 42 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Mission to China, 14.

23

When he returned to the U.S., Currie had the task to expedite Chinese lend-lease aid.

However, when presented to the War Department, officials said that China was not yet prepared

to utilize the full extent of the Lend-Lease Act, because of their very vague requests. The

program promised to provide more detail in the future, but as time passed, it appeared that it

would not come. On April 22nd, a preliminary report about this program and what could be

spared without interfering with the current American and British programs. These allocations

and study would be the basis of Lend-Lease Aid to China before Pearl Harbor.43

44

However, when looking over the proposals prepared by Soong, the War Department

found there was not much that could be spared from the existing stocks, or the materials under

production. However, they said that if President Roosevelt were to allocate $184,000,000 from

43 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Mission to China,15. 44 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Mission to China,16.

24

the lend-lease funds, China’s needs might be met by mid-1942. By May 1941, the Secretary of

War agreed to allocate $50,000,000 of Lend-Lease funds to help the Chinese with their

rearmament, with $23,000,000 from army stockpiles and production. In May China Defense

Supplies, the purchasing and supply authority in the United States, approved the program created

by Soong. However, there were complaints that the purchasers were not aware of what China

exactly needed.45

So, the aid that came in the years before Pearl Harbor demonstrate that the United States

was interested in China, and that it was considered an important part of the possible conflict to

come. Pearl Harbor would change the nature of the United State’s commitment to China.

Pearl Harbor and Aid during the War

Pearl Harbor, the attack of the Japanese on December 7th, 1941, a date engrained in the

memories of many Americans, was an important landmark in United States involvement in

China. It was a somber event in the United States, which resulted in the United State’s

involvement in the war, and a more active one in China.

However, the news of the attack was met with happiness in China. Kuomintang officials

were congratulating each other as thought they had won a great victory. Many in the cities heard

the wrong story, and thought that the United States had bombed Tokyo. However, it did not

matter which story they heard, because they were happy because the United States was in the

war, and that now they had an ally. Chiang immediately took steps to confirm China’s global

role and prepare for China’s great power role in the alliance. He contacted the British and

45 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Mission to China, 25-6.

25

American officials in Chungking immediately, and suggested that those who were against the

Axis powers convene a war council, under the leadership of the United States.46

After Pearl Harbor financial aid started to be given to China in copious amounts. One of

the first agreements for aid between the United States and China was in 1940. A loan of twenty-

five million dollars was made to China in September, and another fifty million dollars was given

to the Chinese when China announced that it was allying itself with the United States and

Britain.47

As the United States became more involved in China, it became evident that there needed

to be a strategic plans for action in this new area. The Combined Chiefs of Staff of the Allies

suggested in December of 1941 the creation of a China Theater which would be under the

jurisdiction of Chiang Kai-shek. However, Roosevelt felt that because of the perceived

importance of China Theater, and to make the command of this theater most effective, Chiang

would need a staff of British, Chinese, and American officers.48

On January 2nd, 1942, the United State’s officer who would tentatively be Chiang’s Chief

of Staff was selected by the War Department. The officer was Lt. General Hugh A. Drum,

appointed by the Secretary of War Henry Stimson. General Drum, however, on his arrival to

Washington assumed that his assignment would be in Europe, because of conversations he had

previously had with President Roosevelt about what would happen if there were to be a war. The

offer of the position in China, therefore, was highly surprising to him.49

46 Barbara Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-1945 (New York: Grove Press, 1971) , 233-4. 47 Pakula, 360-2. 48 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Mission to China, 61-3. 49 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Mission to China, 63-4.

26

In Drum’s conference with Stimson, Marshall, and other high level military officials,

Stimson intimated to Drum that there was some danger that China would accept a separate peace,

and China was the most convenient place in which to base operations against the Japanese.

Problems had occurred because of the British’s refusal to allow Chinese troops to fight and aid

troops in Burma. Stimson saw the goals for Drum as securing China as a place for operations,

and keeping it in the war. He said that officer who was sent must be able to work between the

British and Chinese, and to make sure that the Burma Road problems were taken care of.50

However, when Drum talked with Marshall, he received a different plan. Marshall did not

envision China as a theater, but as a mission. He thought that there should be an emphasis on air

power in China. Drum became even further confused when he talked with other military

officials, whose ideas were different, yet usually went along one of the already established ideas.

This indecision gave Drum the idea that his position had not yet been fully confirmed by the War

Department. This was confirmed by a publication by the War Department entitled Notes on

China.51

By the 5th of January, Chiang had fully accepted the position as Supreme Commander of

the Allied China Theater, and had asked Roosevelt formally to send a high-ranking U.S. military

officer to be the chief of Chiang’s joint staff. However, Chiang did not want the officer to be

knowledgeable about China’s recent history, especially when it came to military matters. This

caused some discomfort to the United States officials. They were afraid that the Chinese wanted

50 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Mission to China,64. 51 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Mission to China,65.

27

another person who would believe whatever the Chinese told him, and be nothing more than an

envoy. 52

The confusion for Drum only increased. In continued meetings with Marshall and

Stimson, he confirmed his belief that there was no concrete. Drum also believed that the

resources China could provide were limited, and that the amount of resources Marshall proposed

to provide would not be enough in his opinion. Though this was not an uncommon occurrence,

he felt that he should have more consideration. He told Stimson that he would be happy to go if

his plan prevailed, but he felt that this post was a less significant post, where he would not be a

large part of the war effort. Stimson felt that Drum had “knocked down his plan like a house of

cards”53. Drum later stated he understood Stimson’s desire to send him to China, and was now

very anxious to go. Stimson, however, said that he no long wished Drum for the position. 54

So, this incident demonstrates several aspects of the American view of China, and Sino-

U.S. relations as well. The fact that Chiang appeared to want a person that would not question his

decisions is very interesting. Despite this knowledge and uneasiness, the United States still was

willing to send an officer to be chief of staff, which shows just how important China was in their

minds in terms of the efforts of the war.

In January 1942, George Marshall proposed the name of General Joseph Stilwell for the

position of Chief of Staff. Marshall and Stilwell had both previously served in China together,

and Marshall had a very high opinion of Stilwell.55 In a meeting with Stilwell on January 14th

Stimson, stated that he was no longer considering Drum for the position of Chief of Staff to

52 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Mission to China, 67-8. 53 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Mission to China, 70. 54 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Mission to China, 68-70. 55 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Mission to China, 70.

28

Chiang. Stimson also intimated that he felt that the Chinese would be pleased with an American

Commander, even despite Stilwell’s doubts. When asked how he felt about the position, Stilwell

stated that he would go where he was sent.56

On January 16th, in a meeting with Marshall, Stilwell was officially offered the position

by Marshall, and he asked the specifics of the job. When Marshall said that it was running and

maintaining the Burma Road, he asked Stilwell if the chances of getting results were good, and

Stilwell said that if he had control, it would be. Chiang by January 22nd had given his final

approval of his executive power, and of having an American chief of staff. On January 23rd,

Stilwell writes that T.V. Soong had looked into his background, and had conferred with Chiang,

and said that there is no better man for the job, or with more experience.57

The CBI Theater would soon be organized and the hierarchy within it confirmed. Figure

1 shows how the China Command fit into the hierarchy within the military and State Department

operations. Figure 2 shows how the China Command fit into the larger CBI Theater, and how

that hierarchy was organized.

56 Theodore H. White, ed., The Stilwell Papers (New York: William Sloane Associates, INC, 1948), 24. 57 White, 26-31.

29

58

59

58 Information taken from Ernest May, The Truman Administration and China, 1945-1949 (New York, J.B. Lippincott Company, 1975), ii. Generated by the author, because of the original was not clear enough. 59 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Mission to China, 195.

30

60

1944

The year 1944 was an important year in Sino-US relations. By this time, China was in a

desperate situation. Chungking became more and more corrupt, and the Japanese became more

worried by the continual success of American military efforts. It is considered such a critical year

that the United States Military dubbed their chapter on the subject in Stilwell’s Command

Problems: “The China Crisis of 1944”.

The policy change during this time towards China is evident in a Memorandum on May

19th, 1944 from O. Edmund Clubb, who was of the State Department’s Division of Chinese 60 Romanus and Sunderland, Stilwell’s Mission to China, 49.

31

Affairs. The memorandum discussed Sino-Soviet relations, especially in areas in which it

concerned the United States. The different sections of the memorandum and the assertions Mr.

Clubb makes gives a very clear indication of the American policy and sentiments of the time.

The memorandum starts by describing how many of the Chinese officials of the time

were afraid of Soviet influence in China. Then Clubb divides the fear of influence into three

different areas. They include political influence, philosophical influence, and the international

position in the Far East. Some political officials, including Ching-ling and several others,

maintained that China should have a good relationship with the USSR. They based their

argument on the previous sympathetic feelings that had been present during the time of Sun Yat-

sen, because of the anti-imperialistic feelings both countries had. However, the memorandum

then further states that these officials were a minority, and did not have any real influence on the

policy making of the time. Many of the GMD officials continued to maintain a strong anti-Soviet

train of thought. 61

The memorandum then goes on to explain the motives of the Nationalist government, and

why they had these particular policies towards the Soviet Union. The first was that the GMD

government wanted to establish control over all of China, including Xinjiang, and to test Soviet

policy towards Xinjiang, Outer Mongolia, and the CCP. The second was that the GMD wanted to

stimulate anti-Soviet feelings in China and abroad, and divert the people’s attention from the

failures of the GMD, and stimulate nationalist sentiments.62

The next part of the memorandum describes a conversation between Chinese

Ambassador to Moscow Foo Ping-Sheung and the Counselor of the U.S. Embassy on March

61 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1944, Volume VI: China (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1967), 785. 62 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1944, Volume VI: China, 787-8.

32

25th, 1943. In this conversation, Foo describes how the Chinese government is afraid of the

Soviet Union’s joining in the fight, and occupying parts of China. The GMD was particularly

concerned about Russia occupying Xinjiang, Outer Mongolia, and Manchuria, because they

would then be in a position to help the Chinese Communists. They were also concerned about

the possibility of plans that the GMD had for Korea, and its government, because of the Korean

troops in the Siberian Army.63 This memorandum demonstrates that the United States continued

to be interested in the Chinese government, and its actions. It also demonstrates that the Chinese

Government itself was aware of the waning support that they had among the Chinese people, and

the rising popularity of the Communists. The memorandum goes on to explain more about the

GMD’s fear.

The memorandum explains that the GMD had serious concerns about the possible

influences that the Soviet Union would have on the Chinese domestic situation. The memo

continues saying that this is not an unfounded fear, because the GMD had lost much of its

popular support in the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. It also had lost their

connection and basis of support with the Chinese people, who were becoming dissatisfied with

the GMD rule. The memorandum goes on to describe that the GMD would prefer that the Soviet

Union not completely destroy Japan, so that it can be powerful enough to check the power and

influence of the Soviet Union in the Far East. It also was concerned about the boundaries of

Xinjiang and Mongolia, and the political jurisdictions of the two states in Outer Mongolia.64 This

section of the memorandum demonstrates that the United States was fully aware of the GMD

losing the popular support of the Chinese people, but continued to support them. However, the

63 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1944, Volume VI: China , 788. 64 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1944, Volume VI: China , 789.

33

waning favor of the Nationalist government with the United States’ government is extremely

evident in the next part of the memorandum.

The memorandum starts describing the United States’ policy towards China by stating

that China is considered an ally of the United States, and that it has put forth a considerable

effort towards defeating Japan. It also says that the plight of the Chinese people is cause for

sympathy. However, it says that the United States government feels that the Chinese government

could put forth more effort, especially in relation to the military actions in the China Theater. It

also states that the U.S. government also wants to use all forces available, including the

Communist forces65. However, the most striking and telling part of this section is when it states:

“The United States is committed to fight by the side of China in the war against

Japan and to extend aid to China in resisting aggression. Nevertheless, it is not

committed to support the National Government in any and all circumstances,

and in general does not sympathize with mutual fears and suspicions among

the several United Nations or with attempts by any one of them to work for

individual selfish advantage against the common interests of all. In respect to

domestic problems in China it might be observed that the United States is not

concerned with doctrinal questions between contending Chinese groups. It is

desirous generally of seeing effected in China a program which will regard to

the political complexion of the Chinese group which effects that program. It is

the steadfast desire of the United States Government to see the Chinese people

receive a greater share of the equities and goods of China and participate more

fully in their government”66

There could possibly be no better quote than this to demonstrate the American view of the GMD

government than this one. It states in no uncertain terms that the United States does not unquestioningly

support the GMD. The fact that the memorandum also states that the United States does not care about the

disputes over power between the GMD and CCP, which shows its continuing dislike for GMD policies.

65 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1944, Volume VI: China , 791-2. 66 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1944, Volume VI: China , 792.

34

What the United States says it wants is the political system that is effective, and more involvement of the

Chinese people, with better living conditions for them.

The last part of the memorandum goes into the recommendations of the United States for the

future of the Sino-Soviet relationship, and the future of China politically. The memorandum says that

both China and the Soviet Union are both allies and that it hopes that both countries can be on cordial

terms, which will help ensure victory and destroy the fascist powers. The memo also states that the United

States will continue to protect the “territorial integrity” of China. The last part of the memorandum states

an interesting bit about the GMD:

“On the part of China there would presumably be some domestic

reorientation by the Kuomintang of its attitude and policies vis-à-vis the

Chinese people, particularly where “leftist” groups are concerned and also

toward minority groups under Chinese jurisdiction. On the part of the

U.S.S.R. it is believed that a sympathetic appreciation of the position of

China, and of the problems confronting the Chinese nation, would contribute

substantially to the readjustment of Sino-Soviet relations. The United States is

directly concerned with conditions in the Pacific area, and is itself desirous of

aiding in the solution of outstanding Pacific problems. Such solution can come

only through a sympathetic understanding and generous consideration by the

several States concerned of their interrelated positions and interests. It is felt

by the American authorities that anything the United States might be able to

do toward bringing about more cordial relations between China and the Soviet

Union would be a major contribution to the future progress of humanity in the

Pacific area.”67

This shows that the United States government wants the GMD to change, and that it considers this issue,

and the Pacific area, as both important both in the present time, and in the future.

One person important to understanding the complexities of foreign relations with the

Chinese is John Service. A Foreign Service Officer with the United States State Department,

Service was stationed in China during this time. The child of missionaries, he was born and

67 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1944, Volume VI: China, 792-3.

35

raised in China, and later educated at Oberlin College before being commissioned in the Foreign

Service in 1935. He witnessed the turbulent events of the later part of the 1930s, and during this

time met many people from different areas who would later play an important role in policy in

China. He visited the Communists at their headquarters, which made him ill favored with Chiang

Kai-shek. Service was one person who believed in being realistic about the current situation. He

could see the oncoming Civil War, and could see that the Communists would win.68 However,

his views were not exactly the one expressed by the US Government.

On June 20th, 1944, he wrote a long transmission stating his suggestions for American

foreign policy in China. He mentions the KMT government weakening in places away from the

large cities, and how they are continuing to ignore the call from the people for reform. He states

that the KMT have decided to let the United States do the work to win the war, and that they

realize that they are dependent on the United States for aid, and that this gives the possibility for

great influence for the United States. He suggested a coordinated effort with all United States

government agencies, and that the government should make known its dissatisfaction with the

current situation, and the desire for democracy and unity. Specific measures suggested were the

restriction of lend-lease, firmer stands on financial negotiations, and restrictions on training in

the military. He emphasizes that most of these policies can be applied gradually, and that there

would be only little modification and indirect intervention in Chinese affairs.69 The view of this

one Foreign Service Officer demonstrates a whole different side of foreign affairs, and shows

that not everyone agreed with the current policies, and that some were willing to state their

opinion.

68 Esherick, xiv-xvii 69 Esherick, 138-157.

36

This particular Foreign Service Officer with his personal and business contacts gives a

particularly detailed insight into the different views and sides of all the events occurring. The fact

that the United States Government did not agree or support his views reflects both the financial

and military investments that already had been put into China, and the unwillingness to change

or admit the fact that they may have chosen wrongly. John Service provides insight into the

United States Government’s views of the Communists because of how the government ignores

his opinion, despite his experience in the area. It also reflects a reason for why relations with the

CCP later were tense, because despite some people advocating for them, they did not receive

support.

The Wallace Mission and the Dixie Mission

The Dixie Mission is one of, if not the most, critical events in the relations between the

United States and the Nationalist government. It also is important in understanding the

relationship between the United States and the Communist forces as well. This was a mission

that was meant to send American Military Observers to the Communist controlled areas. It was

named after rebel side in the American Civil War, and after the song “Is It True What They Say

About Dixie?”. The mission preparations, however, did not start out very smoothly.70

The mission, and a possible consulate in Yenan, was discussed in June 1943 in a report to

Stilwell. The report argued that the Importance of the area and the fact that there had been only

one person who had visited the area in 1938 both warranted the visit of this new group of

observers. Stilwell was personally interested in this mission, because he saw that the Communist

70 Tuchman, 463.

37

forces were useful troops, who he felt were highly motivated. Stilwell knew that firsthand

information was needed.71

On January 14th, 1944, Davies, who was Second Secretary of the Embassy in China, and

who was a personal assistant to Stilwell, sent a memorandum about the possibility of an

American Observers’ Mission to Northern China. In this memo, he states that no observer has

been to the Communist controlled areas in six years, and that the information that the United

States was receiving about the areas is conflicting and second hand. 72

He says that the Communist areas are in close proximity to the location of the Japanese

military, it has the possibility of having intelligence on the Japanese that is not otherwise

available. Davies also says that the Communists are the most organized and anti-Japanese regime

in China, and that they are the largest threat posing against the Nationalists. He indicates that the

Chinese Communists have welcomed the idea of a mission coming, but it would have to be soon

before the offer is rescinded. Davies’ recommendation is:

“We need to dispatch immediately, while it is still welcome, a military and political

observers’ mission to Communist China to collect enemy information, assist in and

prepare for certain limited operations from that areas, obtain accurate estimates of the

strength of Communist armies, report on Russian operations in North China and

Manchuria should Russia attack Japan, and assess the possibility of North China and

Manchuria developing into a separate Chinese state-perhaps even as a Russian

satellite.”73

So, in this single sentence, there is a critical piece of information. The United States was already

keeping an eye on the Soviet Union in respect to their influence and their actions with the CCP.

71 Tuchman, 463. 72 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1944, Volume VI: China , 307. 73 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1944, Volume VI: China, 308.

38

The United States, as we will see, will be extremely concerned about the actions of the Soviet

Union, but this is a clear indication of earlier concern, which was not unfounded, as history

demonstrates.

Eventually, Marshall was convinced of the importance of the mission, and in February

1944 President Roosevelt convinced Chiang to permit the group to go to Shanshi and Shenshi

immediately. However, this request went unheeded, and Roosevelt renewed the request in April.

Because of this stalling by Chiang, President Roosevelt appointed Vice President Henry Wallace

as Special Envoy. Roosevelt felt the situation warranted a personal touch.74

The Wallace Mission’s purpose was to persuade Chiang to open a dialogue with the

Communists. Wallace and Chiang had a four day long discussion from June 21st to the 24th.

Chiang, however, did not agree with the opinion that the Communists were “agrarian

democrats”. He believed that they wanted to seize power over all China. However, he agreed to

allow the Observation Group to go to Yenan, in the possible hope of receiving a return favor

from President Roosevelt.75

The Wallace Mission is also significant for another reason. It was here where the

discussion about the removal of Stilwell from his position as Chief of Staff. Chiang had wanted

to be rid of Stilwell for quite a while, because he was one of the few men in China that was not

under Chiang’s illusion. Chiang decided to take a different route to ridding himself of Stilwell,

Fby asking for an emissary that would give him direct contact with the White House, without

having to go through the State or War Department first. T.V. Soong also told Wallace that

74 Tuchman, 462-4. 75 Tuchman, 464

39

Stilwell failed to meet the needs of the Fourteenth Air Force, and that he did not have confidence

in Stilwell’s abilities.76

Wallace continued to be given this opinion by Chiang’s and Chennault’s staff during his

visit to China, and he eventually agreed. He sent a telegram to President Roosevelt saying that he

strongly recommended that a personal liaison position should be created to be a line of

communication between the President and Chiang. He also recommended that Stilwell be

replaced by a high ranking officer, such as Albert Wedemeyer. He said that the new officer must

be able to win Chiang’s confidence , which Chiang said Stilwell did not enjoy.77

The Dixie Mission finally arrived on the 22nd July, 1944. They were housed in caves in

Yenan, which David Barrett, a member of the mission, describes as being more tunnels then

caves.78 John Service sent his first report, approved by Barrett, on July 28th, 1944, after six days

in residence in Yenan.

In his first report, Service describes the overall atmosphere and conditions. He describes

it as a positive atmosphere, where there is confidence that the war will be won, and that there is

no weariness from war, as there is with the Nationalists. He describes the atmosphere also as

being similar to that of a college, where you have an absence of formality, and the women dress

the same as the men, and speak openly. This last part in particular was striking to Service.

Service also emphasizes that there is a stress in being connected to the common people, and that

76 Tuchman, 464-5. 77 Tuchman, 465. 78 Barrett, 29.

40

there is a high level of political awareness, with almost any person being able to convey the

Communist program for the war.79

In subsequent reports from Service, it is evident that he feels optimistic and impressed

about the Communists. On July 27th he sent a report saying that he had a conversation with Mao

Zedong, and that Mao had expressed his pleasure at the arrival of the observers, and that he

inquired into the possibility of a consulate at Yenan. In another memorandum dated July 31st

Service describes the Communist forces. He says that it is clear that the Communists are

opposing the Japanese, and that this can be confirmed. He also recounts an interesting statement

about what Mao said. He said that Mao and other leaders are willing to have their 18th Group and

their New 4th Army incorporate into the Nationalist Army.80

Service and the other officers who went on the observer mission would return, having

spent a good amount of time learning about the Communists and their ideology and strength.

From Service’s reports back to the Embassy, it is evident that he at least felt that it was very

pleasant to be there in terms of conversation and atmosphere, and that he was impressed by their

actions and mentality. We also learn that the Communists wanted to try and work conjointly with

the Nationalists, and that it was possibly Chiang’s or another officials policy that caused the rift,

and that prevented cooperation.

The Expulsion of Stilwell

In late 1944, tensions grew even more between Stilwell and Chiang. In September, after a

meeting in which an incident between Stilwell and Chiang, Chiang decided that he no longer wanted to

have to work with Stilwell anymore, and that he wanted to have him removed from his post. Chiang

79 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1944, Volume VI: China , 517-20. 80 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1944, Volume VI: China , 522-3, 534-6.

41

wanted to make sure, however, that he did not offend or blame President Roosevelt, because he did not

wish to risk his Lend-Lease allocations. When Chiang met with Hurley, instead of moving forward with

working with the Communists, Hurley was met with Chiang’s refusal to allow Stilwell to assume his new

post. Not only this, but Chiang demanded that Stilwell be recalled. Chiang felt more secure in asking for

the removal of Stilwell because of the new connection with the President that he had through Hurley.81

Hurley attempted to convince Chiang that he was making a mistake, but Chiang was adamant in

his decision. He solved the problem by blaming Stilwell and his decisions for everything. He said that if

he handed over control of the army to Stilwell, there would be mutiny. Throughout negotiations and

discussions, Chiang was confident that he would win in the end. In negotiations, even when he began to

believe Chiang’s story, Hurley still attempted to receive control of the Chinese Army. This was because

of the continuing fight against the Japanese, which continued to be the chief concern.82

Stilwell then attempted to make a compromise. The inclusion of the Communist forces, which

was so controversial, would not take place. At this point, the request for the removal of Stilwell had

reached Washington, and the President was put in a tough position. President Roosevelt had become

impatient with Chiang, especially after the conference that occurred in Cairo. However, Roosevelt did not

want to impose an American Commander on Chiang when he now seemed so opposed to it.83

On October 5th President Roosevelt replied to Chiang. With Marshall’s help, they reached a

compromise where Stilwell would be relieved of duty as Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai-shek, but would

still command Chinese forces in Burma. Hurley formally forwarded Chiang’s formal case for Stilwell’s

dismissal in October, on the grounds that they were incompatible. Along with this Hurley told the

President that if Stilwell remained, then they might lose Chiang Kai-shek, and as a result China.

81 Tuchman, 494-6. 82 Tuchman, 496-7. 83 Tuchman, 497-8.

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However, Stilwell upon hearing this told Marshall that this was not the case, but that if Chiang was

allowed to dictate terms now then China would not put its full effort into the current conflict.84

On October 19th President Roosevelt sent a message to Chiang saying that a notice was sent

formally removing Stilwell from the China-Burma-India Theater. Marshall ordered Stilwell to leave

Chungking discreetly and quickly. This was because Marshall wished to spare Stilwell some of the

negative attention from the press once his departure became public knowledge.85

This removal of Stilwell is a significant event in Sino-U.S. relations. Stilwell had always been

questioning of Chiang and his regime, and with his removal, this element is gone. Stilwell also was an

effective commander, and his loss was detrimental to military efforts. Maybe Stilwell states the events of

the year 1944 best in a letter to his wife on June 2nd, 1944:

“The situation in China looks pretty bad. I believe the Peanut is going to pay dearly

for being stupid and stubborn. The jackass has salvation offered him free, and

wouldn’t take it. Now it’s too late and he’s screaming. This is just what I told them a

year ago but they knew better. The rains have held off miraculously, but we are about

to run into them now.”86

The Last Year of the War

The President’s death in 1944 caused a major change in the United States, and in how the

United States policy was viewed and carried out. Visits to Moscow and Yenan had given Hurley

the impression that uniting the Nationalist and Communist forces would be simple, and when it

proved to not be, he became frustrated. Hurley had always felt that his mission was to support

84 Tuchman, 500-1 85 Tuchman, 502. 86 White, 301.

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Chiang Kai-shek, and President Roosevelt’s death did not change this view, and no one

contradicted him.87 This would change soon.

On February 28th1945, a memorandum was sent out by the Chargé d’affaires88 in China,

Atcheson. It was drafted, however, with the assistance of every political officer in the Embassy

in Chungking. It is a document that would help seal the fate of some Foreign Service Officers,

and it would demonstrate that the American diplomats did not all agree with how the situation in

China was being handled. This memorandum says that the current situation would not be the best

one to conclude the war peacefully. It starts by saying that the recent diplomatic negotiations

were the correct first step to effectively handling the problem. It also says that there appears to be

the belief that the United States only wishes to strengthen and support the Nationalist

government, which is not accurate.89

The memorandum then says that the Chinese Communists have the wrong impression of

United States policy, thinking that they are supporting Chiang alone, and therefore are following

a program of self-protection, increasing troops and expanding. According to the memorandum,

the action of the United States saying that they will only deal with the Nationalist government is

diplomatically correct, the authors say that the conflict will become even worse, and the probable

outbreak of a full out civil war will increase.90

The memorandum then discusses what the authors’ recommendations for the situation in

China. It says that if military aid is necessary, Chiang must be informed that other groups that

87 Ernest R. May, The Truman Administration and China. New York: J.P Lippincott Company, 1975), . 88 This is a diplomatic title signifying that the person in for whatever reason is head of a mission in the absence of an ambassador. 89 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1945, Volume VII: The Far East: China (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1969), 242. 90 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1945, Volume VII: The Far East: China, 243-44.

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can fight against the Japanese, without taking away aid from the Nationalist government. The

memorandum admits that even though the negotiations for unification fell through, there should

still be coordination in relation to the aid given by the United States. This hypothetically would

be in the form of a “Supreme War Council” or the incorporation of the Communist and other

forces in the Nationalist army, under the command of American officers.91 An interesting

comment that is made is: “It should be made clear, however, that our decision to cooperate with

any forces able to assist the war will not be delayed or contingent on the completion of such

internal Chinese arrangements”92.

The last section of the memorandum discusses the desire to support other political groups

besides the Nationalists. The wording of one paragraph is especially interesting:

“Even though not made public, however, the fact of our assistance to the

Communists and other forces would soon become generally known throughout

China. This, we believe, would have profound and desirable political effects on

China. There is tremendous internal pressure in China for unity based on a

reasonable compromise with the Communists and a chance for the presently

repressed liberal goups to express themselves. However, these liberal groups,

even within the Kuomintang such as the Sun Fo group, and the minor parties were

ignored in the recent negotiations by the Kmt but not by the Communists (with

whom they present what amounts to a united front) and they are disillusioned and

discouraged by what they feel is American commitment to the present reactionary

leadership of the Kuomintang. By the steps we propose we would prove that we

are not so committed, we would greatly raise the morale and prestige of these

liberal groups, and we would exert the strongest possible influence through these

internal forces to impel Chiang to put his own house in order and make the

concessions necessary to unity.”93

There are several key points that can be inferred from this. Firstly, as previously

mentioned, it demonstrates that there were people who did not agree completely with the policies

91 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1945, Volume VII: The Far East: China, 244-45. 92 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1945, Volume VII: The Far East: China, 245. 93 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1945, Volume VII: The Far East: China, 245-6.

45

in place. It also demonstrates that contrary to what would be said later, these recommendations

did not say anything about fully supporting the Communists, or not supporting Chiang. On the

contrary, they supported Chiang being the head of this “Supreme Council”.

What is particularly enlightening is the language that these officers use. They call the

Nationalist government “reactionary”, and they talk about showing that the United States does

not commit to them solely. This memorandum demonstrates courage at being so blunt towards

the policies currently in place, while at the same time being diplomatic and tasteful in its

language. It provides concrete and rational solutions for the problems in China.

After the February 28th memorandum sent Hurley became furious at what he saw as a

clear disregard for United States Policy. In his mind, the fact that these officers were saying that

the uniting of the two Chinese forces, and that they were not for supporting the Nationalists were

outright going against the American policy. The policy makers who would be supporters of the

Communists were all taken from post, both military and diplomatic.94

Post WWII

The turbulent year of 1944 had taken its toll on the nature of the relations, and on how

strong the bond was. However, with the expulsion of the Japanese and Stilwell from China, and

with the death of FDR, there would be significant changes. The changes that took place

simultaneously with the changing of the president. These changes demonstrate not only how the

previous policies have changed because of prior events, but also why the United States

eventually decided to make the decisions it did.

94 May, 6.

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One element of change that took place is the change in Washington in the Division of

Chinese Affairs of the State Department. The previous head of Chinese Affairs, John Carter

Vincent, who had been stationed in Chongqing under Hurley, became the new head of the Office

of Far Eastern Affairs. He was not fond of the Nationalist government, but had not been a

supporter of the Communists. He, like some other policy makers of the time, he had hoped that

the Soviets would tell the Communists to come to an agreement with the Nationalists. His

previous position went to Everett Drumwright, who Hurley had specifically singled out.95 One

indication of how policy change came to China is in a memorandum that sent on November 16,

1945. It possibly is one of the best pieces of evidence of why there was such a significant policy

change between 1944 and 1945.

The memorandum starts with stating “It will be clear that the situation in China has

reached a critical stage and that the developments of the next few weeks will have a momentous

bearing on the future of China, of the Far East and of the world”96. This already piques the

interest of any reader, because it demonstrates that the policy in China at the time was considered

to be very important to the future of the world. It goes on to describe how the Chinese

Communists are attempting to gain control over Manchuria and northern China, and that the

Soviets are helping them in their efforts. It says that if the Communists were able to entrench

themselves in Manchuria, with or without Soviet aid, they would most certainly stop any

possibility of a untied a strong China