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poHE CIVIL WAR in En Salvador, US military aid was provided to the Salva-which lasted from 1980 to 1992, doran Air Force.n Some aspects of the war inwas one ofthelarg est and bloodiest Ei Salvador and the US involvement haveinsurgencies that the Western been told in numerous books and publica-

Hemisphere has seen. During the 12-year tionsf Yet, us of aipow iairpowerplayedamajorwar, an estimated one hundred thousand role in the conflict, its story has not been dealtpeople died-fairly horrendous losses for a with in any detail. In deed, there are no bookscountry of only five million people. or major journal articles specifically on the

The war in El Salvador saw significant in- history of the SalvadoranAirForceduringthevolve ment by the United States in the form of war. Consid er ing thatthe Salva doranwar pro-military and economic aid, advisors, and vides us with one of the most re cent exam plestraining. During the course of the war, the of the use of air powerin acounter insurgency

United States poured $4.5 billion of eco- campaign, this is a significant gap in the lit-nomic aid into the country and over $1 bil- erature about the use of airpower in modernlion in military aid.' Almost a quarter of the warfare.4

2719981201 097

28 NIRPOWNER ]JO3RN•PL S3IMMER XI9

This article is an attempt to fill some gaps The various smaller factions, however, main-in the history of the air war in El Salvador. It tained their identity.begins by outlining the history of the air war The rightist factions and parties in Eland then looks at some issues in greater de- Salvador, which in cluded parts of the armedtail, issues such as the effectiveness of the forces, reacted to the insurrection with atraining and equipment provided to El Salva- ruthless assassination program conducted bydor by the United States. The doctrine and "death squads." Anyone suspected of leftisttactics of the air war also merit discussion. sympathies was liable to be abducted andWas airpower used in an appropriate man- shot.Des wa liabert be abdutedndner? Finally, the article outlines some of the shot. Dozens of murders by progovernmentlessons about the use of airpower in counter- forces andmi litiawere con ductednightly.kln-insurgency that might be learned from the deed, an estimated 10,000 people were killedwar. in this manner in the first year of the war.6However, instead of sup press ingtheinsurrec-

tion, the extreme violence by the regimeBackground of the Conflict pushed many more Salvadorans into open re-

volt. The violence escalated, and the CarterIn 1980, El Salvador was ripe for a major administration, inits disgustwiththemassiveinsurrection. Itwasasmall,poor, anddensely level of human rights violations, cut off USpopulated nation long dominated by a small economic and military aid. By January 1991,

oligarchy and ruled by a series of military e rbl whotby tis tm numre as

governments that had little regard for civil the rebels, who by this time numbered as

rights. Theinfantmortalityratewashigh, and many as 10,000 fighters, mounted a final of-thelackofeconomicopportunityhadpushed fensive with the intent of occupying San Sal-hundreds of thousands of Salvadorans across vador and overthrowing the government.the bor der into Honduras inasearch for land Alarmed at the very real possibility of insur-and jobs. Several Marxist-oriented revolu- gent victory, the Carter administration in itstionary groups were already organized in the last days lifted the impounded military aidcountry. The events of 1979 would set the and authorized new aid.7 As distasteful as theconditions for an open rebellion.' regime was, in the US view, it was preferable

The successful revolution by the Sandi- toanotherMarxistrevolutionarygovernmentnistas against the SomozaregimeinNicara- in Central America. The revolution in Nicara-gua in 1979 provided encouragement to gua had alerted the United States and therevolutionary movements in Central Amer- other Central American nations who allica. If such a powerful and oppressive re- feared a "domino effect." If El Salvador fell,gime could be brought down by a poorly thenrevolutionsmightalsosucceedinGuate-equipped popular movement, then the oli- mala and Honduras, and the Carter admini-garchy in El Salvador could also be brought stration did not want Central America to col-down. Fur thermore, the October 1979 coup lapse on its watch.that resulted in a new military government TherebeloffensiveinElSalvadormadesig-in El Salvador left that country in chaos. Thereb utofailednE1Salvad orydinThe Salvadoran armed forces were divided nificant gains but failed to achieve victory inwith some officer factions favoringreforms early 1981.TheCarteradministrationwas fol-and others violently opposed. As a result of lowedinthatmonthbyaconservative Reaganchaos inthegov ernment and the unpopular administration that was ready to take a morestate of the regime, guerrilla war broke out active role against the expansion of commu-in 1980 and the major rebel factions amal- nism in the hemisphere. In 1981 the Reagangamated into one large alliance, theMarxist administration made the commitment that itFarabundo Marti National Liberation Front wouldas sistEl Salvador in defeating themost(FMLN), which directed the insurgency, serious insurgency in the region.

XI-W KRiPRXNI E.L SL'JPk1DO1, 29

El Salvador had a small armed force of ap-S~~..........•-,

proximately 10,000 military personnel and ...,. . ..............seven thousand paramilitary police in 1980 .when the war began. The army, the largestpart of the armed forces, had approximatelynine thousand soldiers organized into four Xn &C-7 gunshwip othvieVS.ffisoPlatio~m vide6thesmallinfantrybrigades, anartil lerybattal ion, mostaccutate and Pfetiv •close air suppott (,CNS' ofthewat.and a light armor battalion." The level oftraining was low. The training that the armydid have was all for conventional war-prepa- of 11 Ouragan ground-attack fighters ac-ration for a re play of the short war with Hon- quired from the Israelis, who had acquiredduras in 1969, where the army performed them from the French in the 1950s, and fourcreditably. There was no training or prepara- Fouga Magister trainers modified for combattion for fighting a counterinsurgency cam- (another 1950s aircraft). The combat squad-paign. rons also had four Super Myst6re fight ers and

The armed forces as a whole had severe sixRallyecounterinsurgencyaircraft.Therestleadership problems. The officer corps was of the air force consisted of a transportsquad-dis unitedaf terthe coup of Octo ber 1979. Asinmost armies in Central America, advance- ron with six C-47s and four Arava transports.ment and selection for command were The training squadron consisted of a handfulbased more upon politicalconnections and of T-34s, T-6s, T-41s, and four Magisters. Thesponsors than merit. In fact, there were no helicopter force amounted to one Alouettemerit promotions in the Salvadoran army. III, oneFH- 1100, oneLama, andtenUH- 1HsPAll promotion was by seniority. While offi- The FAS had two major air bases. The pri-cers had gone through a cadet school and maryairbasewas Ilo pango onthe out skirts ofmany had attended training in US Army the capital, and therewas asmallerbase at Sancourses, they were not members of an espe- Miguel in the southern part of the country.cially capable officer corps. On the other These remained the two bases of the FAShand, there was nothing even resembling a throughout the conflict. The training in theprofessional noncommissioned officer FAS was, like the army, geared for a conven-(NCO) corps in the Salvadoranforces. Most tional war. Unlike the army, the FAS had notenlisted men were simply conscripted (or done as well in the war with Honduras a dec-"press-ganged") young men, many of them adebeforeandhadlostairsuperiority. 0 Sinceintheirmidteens.Ifofficertrainingwasme- then, the only action the air force had seendiocre, the training of the enlisted men was was in the 1972 coup.' 'The air force had onlyminimal. In short, it was an army that was a handful of pilots, and the pilot-trainingnot ready for a serious war.

In comparison with the other branches of level was only fair. For a small and poor coun-the armed forces, the Salvadoran Air Force- try like El Salvador, an air force is an expen-the Fuerza Aerea Salvadorena (FAS)- was the sive luxury. There were few funds for main-most professional service arm. It was a small tainingthe ob soleteair craftofthe forceorforforce of under athou sand men consisting of a providing more than rudimentary combatsmall paratroop battalion, a security force, a training for the pilots. Things like joint train-small antiaircraft unit, and four small flying ing or practicing for close air support (CAS)squadrons with a grand total of 67 aircraft. were simply not part of the air force's reper-The main combat force of the FAS consisted toire.

30 PAW£(V'ER OX3RNML SXA3MME.(R X99%

The Rebels Hold the Initiative, plies into El SalvadoratnightfromNicaraguaus ing small land ing strips set up for crop dust-

1981-83 ers.14 One of the FMLN leaders who later left

Although the rebel "final offensive" of the cause admitted the importance of the air

early 1981 failed, the 10,000 rebels of the routes from Nicaragua to El Salvador in sup-

FMLN alliance held the initiative during the plying the insurgents."

first three years of the war. Large areas of El The whole country became the rebel infra-

Salvador's 14 provinces were held by guerril- struc ture. Large ar eas in the mountains along

las. 12 The rebels were able to put significant the Honduran border were rebel territory in

forces into the field and fight an almost con- the early 1980s. The rebels also had several

ventional war with battalion-sized columns. other strongholds undertheircontrolinclud-The insurgents were fairly well equipped and ing the region around Mount Guazapa-only

supplied with small arms (assault rifles and 30 miles from the capital of San Salvador. In

ma chine guns), as well as mor tars, mines, and the rural areas and small towns, the rebels

explosives. Some FMLN weapons were pro- could compel the local landowners and busi-

cured from Cuba and Nica ra gua, but many of nessmen to provide food and pay taxes to the

the rebels' weapons were captured from gov- rebel forces-or face de struc tion of their prop-

ernment troops. The rebels were, however, erty and assassination. In short, the rebels

deficient in antiaircraft armament with only were largely self-sufficient for many of theirafew. 50- caliberma chine guns for pro tec tion needs.agafew .aibermaft cndheinopterns. fEarly in the war, the tendency of the El Sal-against aircraft and helicopters. vdrnamdfre EA)wst odc

Effective interdiction of sup plies and arms vadoran armed forces (ESAF) was to conduct

to the rebels was not really possible. El Salva- sweeps in company and battalion strength.

dor shared a long land border with Honduras These tac tics worked to the bene fit of the reb-

and Guatemala and was separated by only 30 els, who could pick an engagement with

miles of water from Sandinista Nicaragua at company-strength government units and

the Gulf of Fonseca. Light weapons and sup- then ambush the reinforcing column. Whole

plies could be brought in by land, sea, or air. companies of the army were annihilated in

The land borders were hard to seal, although this manner. The rebels also specialized in

the United States made a major effort in pro- night operations-which nullified the Salva-

viding Honduran armed forces with aid and doran Air Force and the firepower advantagehelicopters to help close the land border to of the army. In the early 1980s, relativelygunrunners and rebel suppliers.13 However, large rebel col umns could even seize and holdlghtnaircraftacouldbalsosbringearmsandesup- towns for several days.light aircraft could also bring arms and sup- With the war going badly for the govern-

ment, Brig Gen Fred Woerner, later com-"................ . mander of US Southern Command, led a

small group of US militaryspe cial ists to El Sal-vador for consultations with the Salvadoran

............. :........... government and military leaders. The result:. . was a national strategic plan for waging the

.............. ..: war, which was ap proved by the United States- ...... . and Salvadoran leadership.16 Essentially, the

Upolicy was to emphasize land reform, po-. litical reform in the form of honest elections,•:economic development, and the end of hu-

.............. ............ man rights abuses. Most of the US aid was tobe civilian and financial aid. However, the

The •P•S headquartets and banacks at Uopango hi Base. military and economic aid to be provided toThis viasch s h oavý %tound combat duti the 191 El Salvador would be dependent upon theand 119( TMIN off ensves.

"fElWl M NR L SXLN OR 31

willingness of the Salvadoran government .........and armed forces to go along with the re- ......forms. If serious progress was not made onthe issue of human rights, for example, thenaid would be halted or delayed until satisfac-tory progress occurred. :...:.:;:

The military strategy was to dramatically 'in crease the size of El Salva dor's armed forcesand train the ESAF in counterinsurgency op- 8erations. Between 1980 and 1984, the ESAF ................more than tripled in size from 12,000 troops ... .......to 42,000 troops. 7 The ESAF would be pro- ..........vided with modernweap onsand equipment. . .-Even simple equipment such as adequate .....

field radios for the army were not avail able togovernment forces in 1980. Once the army knMD-5cw3 teronnissana h hicoptet dtheh'T.'&isis thewas built up andre trained, amajor portion of gunship - tsion at Iopangi Mt base.the counterinsurgency campaign would becarried out by specially trained "hunter" lightinfantry battalions. These light battalions aircraft had been fully modified and refur-would patrol aggressively and move quickly bished before being transferred. An addi-to keep the rebel columns under pressure. tional $2 million worth of aerial munitions

Airpower was to have a major role in the was provided for the FAS in 1982. As fast asnational strat egyfor the El Salva doran forces. equip ment transfers were ap proved by the USThe air craft of the forcewould be mod ern ized Con gress, the US Air Force would rush the air-andincreased.Trainingandweaponrywould craft and munitions to El Salvador. In Junebe improved. However, the primary empha- 1982, the USAF sent 12 planeloads of muni-sis was to build up a large and capable heli- tions to the FAS while still more munitionscop ter force that could lift a sig nifi cant in fan- went by sea.' 0

try force for offensive operations and also In 1982, the IMET program emphasizedprovide helicopter gunship support. This improving the Salva doranAir Force. A total oftype of mobility could provide a rapid reac- $1.4 million was spent on pilot, aircrew, andtion force to block and pin down rebel col- technician training of Salvadorans in theun-ms that engaged the ground troops. United States.2' The whole issue of training

The United States provided a total of the Salvadorans, however, was very complex.$48,920,000 in military equipment sales, Due to strong opposition from many in themilitary equipment credits, and military aid US Congress who remembered how theto El Salvadorinl981.18In 1982, the military United States had started in Vietnam with aassistance and sales program for El Salvador small group of advisors, the administrationhad grown to $82,501,000 with another imposed upon itself a strict limit to the$2,002,000 for the international military number of military personnel that could beedu cationand training (IMET) program (offi- as signed to the US Mili tary Group (MilGroup)cer and NCO training)."9 The portion of aid in El Salvador. Throughout the conflict, nogoingtotheSalvadoranAirForcewassignifi- more than 55 military personnel at any timecant. A steady stream of new aircraft for the could be assigned to the MilGroup.22 WithFAS flowed south throughout the conflict. In congressional committee acquiescence, addi-just the first six months of 1982 the United tional US military personnel could serve forStates delivered four O-2A aircraft for recon- brief periods on TDY in El Salvador. Some-nais sance, sixA-37B counterinsurgencyfight- times the total number of US personnelintheers, and two C-123K transports. All of these countryreachedashighas 150. How ever, the

32 SUMMOEER ROXIRNAL SXI , X9•

nominal restriction of the MilGroup to only sance air craft were also provided as well as 1255 meant that the USAF contingent in El Sal- UH-1H helicopters to replace the losses. 26

vadorwas onlyfivepeo ple-one Air Force sec- The FMLN strongholds along the Hondu-tion chief who acted as the senior advisor to ran border and in the south of El Salvadorthe FAS and four Air Force maintenance offi- were simply too strong in the early 1980s forcers or instructor pilots.2 3 The Army also pro- the government forces to attack directly. Onvidedafewhelicopterandmunitionsmainte- the other hand, the Salvadoran forces werenance in structorsto the Salva doran Air Force, not about to allow the rebels sanctuariesand some US contract personnel (not on the within thebor ders of their own country. So inMilGroup official strength) also assisted the 1982 and 1983 the FAS began a program ofFAS. However, this handful of Americans was bombing the rebel-held villages in thenot enough to make a serious impact on the strongly FMLN regions of Chalatenango intraining requirements of the FAS, so FAS per- the north and Mount Guazapa in the cen ter ofsonnel had to be trained outside their coun- the coun try. What the air ac tion amounted totry in the United States or at the Inter- was small har ass ment at tacks inwhichflightsAmerican Air Force Academy (IAAFA) at Al- of aircraft would regularly bomb and strafebrook Field in Panama. the rebel areas in a desultory fashion. If no

During the period 1981-84, as the ground maj or mili tary prog ress was made, at least theand air forces of El Salvador were being re- rebels could be brought under some pres-trained and reequipped by the United States, sure.27 Yet, the attacks seem to have made notheFAS put ina combat performance that can real impact in terms of rebel morale, infra-be rated as fair. As small and poorly equipped structure, or combat capability. At the sameas it was in 1981, it still represented the pri- time that the FAS began its bombing cam-mary mobile firepower of the government. paign-which it never actually acknowl-TheFAS performedwell in helping to stop the edged-the rebel forces managed to win aJanuary 1981 offensive. It was limited in its egdter fores mn aged to winraability to provide effective support to the number of victories in the field, to destroyarmy by the lack of training in the ESAF to ef- several army companies, and capture armyfectively coordinate air/ground operations.24 weapons and ammunition. 2 8

The FAS was also essentially a daytime airforce with a minimal ability to operate at The Government Gains thenight.

The FAS suffered a major blow in January Initiative, 1984-881982 when five Ouragans, six UH-lBs, andthree C-47s were destroyed and another five By 1984, the US military aid program wasair craft were badly dam aged on the ground at start ing to pay off in terms of increased effec-Ilo pango in a raid by one hun dred rebel com- tiveness of the government forces. While themandos. At one stroke, most of El Salvador's rebel forces had not increased past 10,000operational combat aircraft were knocked combatants, the Salvadoran army now out -out of action. 5 Itwas awell- planned and exe- numbered the rebels four to one. Moreover,cuted operation and demonstrated the tacti- new battalions had been formed and inten-cal superiority of the FMLN guerrillas over sively trained by the US Army in the Unitedthe sol diers at this stage of the war. While this States, in Honduras, and inPanama, and thenwas counted as a major victory for the rebels, returned to El Salvador. These forces wereit was also some thing of a blessing for the FAS ready to use a more aggressive strategy andin the long term. The worn-out Ouragans de- take the war to the rebels. The FAS had alsostroyed by the commandos were quickly re- been strengthened, had an improved level ofplaced by US- provided A- 37s, afar more capa- train ing, and was ready to take on a larger roleble and suitable aircraft for a in airmobile operations and air support op-counterinsurgency war. The 0-2 reconnais- erations for the army.

'X1A• PAR'NA I(N ELKL'.DOR 33

Even so, 1984 started off badly for the gov- them-learned to spot likely helicopter land-ernment forces when a large rebel force man- ing zones and prepare them for ambush.3

aged to overrun and capture the army's 4th The Salvadorans by the mid-1980s hadBrigade headquarters at El Paraiso on New built up a group of small, well-trained eliteYear's Eve.29 However, the army recovered units. Some functioned as light infantry pa-from this setback, and throughout 1984 and trol forces that could be inserted by helicop-1985, government forces started to gain the ter to search out the enemy and establishout-initiative throughout the country. Airpowerin the form of the A-37 fighters, helicopter -.........gunships, and helicopter lift played a major .role in the govern ment's suc cess. The FAS op- ........ ..... ....erational tempo in creased no tably. Therehadbeen a total of only 227 A-37 strikes in all of1983. In June 1984 alone, there were 74 A-37 ...... .......strikes."0 The army went on the offensive in pe u. :the spring of 1984 in order to protect the na- i .-.tional elections from disruption by the . .

FMLN. The UH- 1H gunship missions were in- IM N:i:: - ---------------------------creased by three or four times their previous : ::rate of operations during March to May .. ...' ..............X..1984.3 1 During 1984, US military assistance ............enabled the FAS to increase its helicopter in-ventory from 19 at the start of the year to 46 NMJ11-.IYhelkopten gumbap dthe VW.ffipsea'naitpaean impottantt role in the gound~ Vi•ghling •tumn the latetby year's end.32 The air attacks on the rebel ýaM dim PNtt-NW.a

strongholds surged throughout 1984 and1985 despite strict rules of engagement is-sued by President Jose Napoleon Duarte in posts deep in enemy territory. If contact withSeptember 1984.33 the rebels was made, the FAS could quickly

Ac cord ing to former FMLN lead ers, the ii- transport company-sized forces to reinforceprovement of the FAS played a major role in the light troops and block rebel units. The

turning the initiative over to the government helicopter force was the only practical meansforces. The US-supplied 0-2 light reconnais- of trans porting troops inmuch of the countrysanceplanes coyveredthe country thoroughly. due to the mountainous terrain and the badThearbeplascouldtholongeropatereatho ly, roads. With effective reconnaissance andThe rebels could no longer operate relativeoy light he libome forces, thegov emiment could,openly in large columns. Larger formations for the first time in the war, initiate combatatmade lucrative targets that could be easily places of its own choosing.3

spotted from the air and then subjected to at- One of the US advisors rated the FAS as

tacks by aircraft or heliborne troops.34 In- 'particularly effective" in the government

stead, therebel forces operated in smaller col- partions efe1984"an th e o fn toperations of 1984 and 1985 .381 One of the

umns, which would combine for larger most important events in the air war came inoperations such as the attack on El Paraiso.35 late 1984-85, when the United States sup pliedRebel forces had to stay on the move, making two AC-47 gunships to the FAS and trainedit more difficult for the rebels to coordinate aircrews to operate the system.39 The AC-47several columns to participate in an opera- gunship carried three .50-caliber machinetion. However, the rebels learned to adapt to guns and could loiter and provide heavy fire-the in creased danger of aerial attack. After the power for army operations. As the FAS hadFAS was able to successfully insert company- long operated C-47s, it was easy for thesized reaction forces to deal with FMLN at- United States to train pi lots and crew to op er-tacks, the FMLN-like the Vietcong before ate the aircraft as a weapons platform. By all

34 NIRPOW'ER JO1NAML SU3MMER IM

accounts, the AC-47 soon became probably found in the Central American officer corps.themosteffectiveweaponintheFASarsenal. The pay and conditions for the enlisted me-

The tempo of aid to the FAS increaseddur- chanics in the FAS were poor, and the mosting 1984 and 1985. Five O-2A aircraft were talented maintenance personnel would leavedeliv eredbetweenSep temberandNovember to find much higher-paying civilian jobs as1984. Two more O-2As and two O-2Bs along soon as their term of enlistment was up. AnwiththreeA-37swerepreparedfordeliveryin even more serious problem was the pilotearly 1985 along with an ad di tional five C-47 shortage. The pilot officers of the FAS had totransports that had been modified and refur- be graduates of the military academy, and,bished for the FAS at a cost of almost $1 mil- with the rapid expansionof the armedforces,lion each.40 However, the increased flow of there were not enough graduates to meet theaircraft to the FAS in 1984 and 1985 did not needs of all the services. Even with a seriousre sult in a rapid in crease in the number of air- training effort by the United States, the FAScraft avail able for combat, astheattritionrate had only about half the pilots it needed. Inas are sult ofop erational ac ci dentswas heavy. 1987, theFAS had only 70 active pilots for 135For example, in early 1994, an O-2A and one aircraft. 47

C- 123Kwerelosttoaccidents. 41 However, the With a slowly growing capacity to airliftUnited States tried to replace aircraft as soon troops by helicopter, the FAS and its airborneas they were lost. For example, areplacement reaction force began to make a real impact inC-123K was on the way from the United thewar. InJune 1984, an FMLN force at tackedStates within a month of the loss of the FAS the Cerron Grande Dam, El Salvador's largestC-123 transport.42 hydroelectric plant. Two companies were

The United States also increased the train- quickly airlifted to reinforce the small garri-ing funds available to the FAS during 1984.In son at Cerron Grande. The rebel attack was1984, 117 FAS personnel took courses at the successfully beaten back, albeit with heavyInter- AmericanAir ForceAcademyinPanama losses.84 However, the FMLN also proved thatin contrast to 98 personnel the year before. it would not be easily cowed by the FAS's fire-The IMET program funded training for 118 power. In October 1984, six hundred FMLNSalva dorans in the United States in1984. 43 US insurgents attacked an army "hunter" battal-military aid was also committed to building ion at Watikitu. The guerrillas were attackedup the infrastructure of the FAS. The FAS re- by aircraft that inflicted heavy casualties onceived $16.4 million in assistance funds in the rebels. Still, the FMLN troops persisted in1984, some of which went to building new the attack and by afternoon, the army battal-hangars and repair shops at the main air base ion had simply disintegrated. 4 9

at Ilopango. By the mid-1980s, Ilopango had The wider use of helicopters in support ofbecome a well-equipped air base.44 the ground campaigns also resulted in heavy

Despite all the training and expense, the losses for the FAS. In the October 1984 fight-FASremainedhamperedbytheexceptionally ing, one UH-1 was shot down. In Novemberlow operational readiness rate of its aircraft. of that year, three more UH-ls were shotWhile the FAS could muster well over one down and four heavily damaged in the fight-hundred aircraft by 1985, only 50 percent or ing around Suchitoto.5 ° While the A-37s andfewer of the aircraft were operational at any the AC-47 gunships proved to be relativelytime due to severe maintenance problems safe from enemy ground fire, the small armsand a shortage of qualified pilots. 45 The heli- of the FMLN proved to be lethal against heli-copter readiness rate was lower than that of copters.airplanes. The FAS was only able to maintain Throughout 1985 and 1986, ground andasmallproportionofitshelicopterinventory air operations increased, while the compe-at any one time. 46 The FAS suffered continu- tence of the army in counterinsurgency war-allyfromalack ofcompetentmechanics.Part fare continued to improve. In 1985 and earlyof this is a cultural disdain for maintenance 1986, the FAS aircraft and helicopters sup-

TE MAR NAkR IN UL SKPIV/NOR 35

ported several large army offensives, which §.K.. ......................... K*..'...finally reduced some of the FMLN's majorstrongholds in Guazapa and Chalatenango. 11 11......The population and the rebel forces in these -.enclaves were bombed heavifly as army troopsswept in and forcibly evacu ated thou sands of . ......civilians in FMLN areas and re set tled them in . . .. ..

refu gee camps. It was a harsh cam paign, but it '

succeeded in depriving the FMLN units of ....

their civilianinfrastructure in what had been W i................... ...their most secure strongholds.".

One of the FMLN leaders credits the igreater airmobility of the army in the mid- . ....1980s and the will ingness ofsome armyunits kno-2 SkVmastet at 11oangeo Nit Base. ThssimpXe atctaft

to move by air deep into rebel coun try as hav- ptove to be a , ft i rconnanassance tool tot the VNS ix ning caused "a very significant turn in the thwar.war. ,52 However, it should also be noted thatthe im provement of the airfor ce's and army'stactics and firepower was not the primary artillery force had been tripled since the startcause for the demoralization of the FMLN al- of the war and communications and supportliance in the mid-1980s. The rebels were just improved. The tiny 1980 navy of three patrolas capable as the government of making ma- craft had been expanded to a fifteen-jor strategic and tactical mistakes. By 1984, hundred-man force by 1988 and included athe infighting within the FMLN groups be- marine battalion, marine commandos, andcamesevereand, in true communist fashion, 30 patrol craft.was resolved by purges and executions within The FAS had more than doubled in sizethe ranks of the FMLN. Soon FMLN leaders since the start of the war. By 1987, The FASwere ordering the killing of rival leaders. By was a force of twenty-five hundred with an1984 and 1985, themembership oftheFMLN airborne battalion, a security group, five air-be gan to de dine as the rebel forces saw some plane squadrons and a large helicopter force.of their own officers abandon the FMLN The airplane force was organized into acause in disgust.5 3 Yet, despite the internal fighter squadron, with eight Ouragans, adissension, being outnumbered six or seven counterinsurgency squadron with 10 A-37Bsto one, and under steady pounding by army and two AC-47 gunships. A reconnaissanceand air force firepower, the FMLN was still a squadron of 11 O-2As supported the counter-formidable force by the end of 1988 and insurgency squadron. The transport squad-could still field approximately seven thou- ron consisted of five C-47s, one DC-6, threesand combatants throughout the country. Aravas, and two C- 123Ks. The train ing squad-

ron had one T-41 and six CM-170 Magisters.The helicopter force had expanded into a

From Stalemate to Peace, force of nine Hughes 500MD attack helicop-

1989-92 ters, 14 UH-1H gunships, 38 UH-1H utilityhelicopters, three SA-315 Lamas, and three

By 1988, the government of El Salvador SA-316 Alouette Ills, for a total of 67 helicop-could bring a tremendoussuperiorityofmili- ters.5 4

tary power against the rebels. The army had Progress in El Salvador's internal politicalgrown to 43,000 troops organized into six bri- situation had been made since the mid- 1980sgades. There were 20 light infantry battalions after free elections and the election of a mod-and six counterinsurgency battalions that erate reformer, Duarte, as president. Humanwere able to take the war to the enemy. The rights abuses by the armed forces had been

36 NMIROWNERI OU3RNNAL SXIWAMER X

curbed. US aid was continuing to flow. main FAS base at Ilopango was a major targetThroughout the mid-1980s, the direct US of the FMLN, and the rebel forces came closemili taryrole had grown es peciallyin the avia- to over run ning the main air base in the coun-tion side of the war. US Army OV-1 Mohawk try. If the rebels had been successful, theyreconnaissance planes of the 24th Military could have destroyed 80 percent of the FAS.Intelligence Battalion stationed in Palmerola As it was, only with heavy fighting and rein-

forcements did the FAS manage to hold on tothe base.

A further disturbing development for theair war in 1989 was the acquisition of hand-held SAM-7 antiaircraft missiles by the reb-els. 7 The attrition of FAS helicopters to the

8 lightweap onsof thereb elshadbeenheavyall--- - through the war. However, until 1989, the A-

37s and AC-47s had been relatively immune9 from the short-range ground fire of the: FMLN. Now the guerrillas had a weapon that

could knock down the best combat air craft of•.• the FAS.

Xn ak-3 t-homht Xopangp Nit Base. These Wit The war continued into 1990, and theXo,-techaitcraft took the plact of the-Sal-vadotan tce's FMLN was still able to conduct numerousold Ouraans antl ouga Magtuts. -wevet, due to the guerrilla at tacks against the armed forces and

XoXS'sXowlelotvlnfng-, thX-1%couldnothcuntedon economic targets despite the heavy losses oftot accutate C&PS. the 1989 offensive. In 1990, the FMLN forces

inflicted over two thousand casualties on theSalvadoran armed forces and police, an al-

Air Base in Honduras conducted regular re- most 5 percent casualty rate.5 8 By this time,connaissance flights over El Salvador.55 The the nation was simply exhausted by morecounterinsurgency campaign progressed, than a decade of war. Both sides finally agreedandthe election of the rightwing ArenaParty to serious peace talks in 1990. A nationalgovernment in 1989, a party that ran on a cease-flrewasagreedtoin 1991,andpeaceac-"law and order" platform, indicated that cords were signed between the governmentthere was considerable support among the and the FMLN in early 1992.populace for the counterinsurgency cam- The war was ended by a compromise solu-paign. tion. The FMLN disarmed its forces and be-

This impression ofprogresswas spoiled on came a legal political party. Amnesty was11 November 1989, when the FMLN guerril- granted to FMLN members. More than half oflas launched a sur prise of fen sive against mili- the armywould be de mo bi lized, and all ofthetaryand civil iantar gets across the nation. For paramilitary security forces-including thethree weeks, the guerrillas attacked military notorious Treasury Police, which operatedunits and government installations in San under the Defense Ministry and was identi-Salvador, San Miguel, Santa Ana, and other fled as having one of the worst human rightscities. The military in curred heavy losses, but records-were disbanded. A new national po-the FMLN sustained heavy losses as well. The lice force was cre ated, and former FMLN guer-FMLN reportedly suffered 1,773 dead and ril las were brought in. United Nations and Or-1,717 woundedbythe end of the of fen sive on ganization of American States observers5 December.5 6 The rebels did not gain their remained in the country to help ensure thatprimary objectives, but the power of the of- the disarmament was properly carried outfen sive as well as the sur prise fac tor was a real and free and fair elections were held.59 Someshock to the government and military. The of the American commentators would com-

TREN IU'NPRIN EL NSMIW.OR 37

plain that the military strat egyhad failed and them usually expect a campaign of manythat the Salvadoran armed forces were never years' duration. The FMLN intended to winable to defeat the FMLN on the battlefield. quickly in 1981. The government thoughtThat might be true, but in retrospect, the pro- that the rebels could be crushed in a rapidgram of military aid to El Salvador was a campaign. General Woerner shocked thegenuine suc cess for the United States. The pri- chair man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and somemary objective of keeping El Salvador from members of the Reagan administration in hisbecoming a communist state was realized. 1981 re portwhenhe outlined afive- yearplanMoreover, El Salvador ended the war with a (the five-year time frame was used as an out-democratic government that remains line only, and Wo er nerwas carefulnotto pre-friendly to the United States and committed dict the length of the war) and estimated thatto work ing peace fullywith its neighbors. The defeating the rebels would cost $300 millionpeace accord may have been a compromise, inmilitaryaid.Wo erner'sanalysiswasseenasbut it has been recognized as fair by both unduly pessimistic.60 In reality, General Wo-sides and provides a solid basis for peace fully erner's assessment was way off. The counter-developing El Salvador-and a favorable insurgency campaign cost over $1 billion,peace is, after all, the primary objective in lasted for 12 years, and still did not lead towaging war. outright military victory.

Part of the problem in conducting a coun-terinsurgency campaign is the long lead time

Comments and Observations in creating and training military and policeforces that can effectively wage a counterin-

The second half of this article focuses on surgency campaign. As is typical with coun-some specific comments and observations tries that face insurgencies, El Salvador wasabout the air war in E Salva dor. ThewarsinEg unprepared. Even with massive US supportSalvador was one of the longest-lasting com- for a small country, it took three or four yearsbat operations supported by the US military before the Salvadoran armed forces couldsince the end of World War II. In many re- conduct operations effectively. Air forces inspects, it was a classic counterinsurgency particular require a long time to build infra-campaign fought by the United States and El structure, acquire equipment, and trainpilotsSalvador.Becauseofthelongdurationandre- to operate in the kind of joint operations re-cent nature of the operation, it is likely that quired by counterinsurgency campaigns. Itthe conduct of the air war in El Salvador can did not help that the US Army and Air Force,offer insights that are useful for US air doc- suffering from the effects of post-Vietnamtrine and for executing future counterinsur- syndrome, had largely dropped counter insur-gency campaigns. gency operations out of the doctrine and

training repertoire in the late 1970s. Despiteh Prolongeld CIonft the many Vietnam veterans in the force, the

US military was not ready to train the Salva-Most insurgencies tend to last for years. In dorans in unconventional warfare. The bu-Malaya, the British faced a 12-year-long in- reaucratic requirements of the US militarysurgency (1948-60). In the Philippines, the system also got in the way of a timely re-United States supported the Philippine gov- sponse to El Salvador'ssituation.Therequire-ernment through an eight-year campaign ment that foreign pilots training with the US(1946-54).Colombiahasfacedaninsurgency Air Force first take a six-month languagefor more than 20 years. The 12-year duration course slowed down the pilot training pro-of the war in El Salvador fits the typical pat- gram for the Salvadorans. Finally, when thetern. shortage of helicopter pilots became truly se-

Mao's teachings notwithstanding, neither vere, the US Army conducted a one-time ef-the insurgents nor governments that oppose fort at Fort Rucker, Alabama, to train Salva-

38 OIRPOER JOU3RNML SX3MMER• TX

doran pilots with Spanish-speaking flight the offer of generous aid. If reforms were notinstructors.6 ' Ideally, the FAS pilots and tech- enacted quickly enough, the aid would benicians should have been fluent in English, if with held or de layed. Thus, the aid to El Sal vaonly to read the technical manuals for the dor was made contingent upon a program ofequipment. However, the immediate needs national land reform, fair elections, andjudi-of the war overruled this requirement. cial reforms.6 4 This approach by the United

For various reasons, US military schools States caused constant friction between thewere slow to create the courses that the Salva- two governments, but, in the end, it pusheddoranmilitaryurgentlyneeded. For example, the government tomakenec es saryre forms.theUS-runInter-AmericanAirForceAcademy However, aid restrictions and the strongin Panama only initiated an advanced train- objections of many US congressmen towardsing course for the A-37B in 1985, three years aid to El Salvador's armed forces resulted inafter that model aircraft had been supplied to unpredictablefundinginthemilitaryaidpro -the FAS.62 gram. This, in turn, inhibitedlong-termplan-

Most commentators onthewarinElSalva- ning and resulted in many inefficiencies indor agree that by the mid-1980s, the FAS themilitaryaid.6'Fis calyear 1983beganwithcould operate fairly effectively. However, the no congressional appropriations for El Salva-ability to conduct more complex joint opera- dor. A $25 million dollar continuing resolu-tions came very slowly. It was not until tion was provided instead of the $60 million1986-87 that the FAS intelligence section that the US military support program re-was reorganized for the needs of the counter- quired. Without adequate funds in the am-insurgency operations and a special analysis munition ac count, the army and FAS cut backcenter was set up at the FAS headquarters at operations and maintainedapolicy ofhoard-Ilopango. The cen terwas able to in te grate re- ing ammunition and supplies until a con-connaissance, area intelligence investiga- tinuation of the aid flow was assured.66tions, aerial photography, and special intelli- In the case of a small and poor countrygence into one coherent system. This had like El Salvador, such funding disputes hadmuch to do with the improvement of FAS a major impact upon operations and doc-combat capabilities.63 trine. El Salvador's lead erswere encouraged

In short, even if the United States had re- to look on an expensive asset such as the airsponded to the crisis in El Salvador in 1981 force as too valuable to risk in combat if re-with mas sive aid cou pled with the right kinds placements, mu ni tions, and funds were notof training programs given in a timely fash- assured. In the first half of the war, the atti-ion, it still would have taken the FAS two to tude existed that the FAS was an "insurancethree years to become a capable force. Sup- policy" for the government. One might notporting an air force involved in a counterin- win the war with airpower, but airpowersurgency is likely to involve a long commit- would keep one from losing. Therefore, thement by the United States. air force was sometimes held back as a re-

serve for use only in emergencies.67 Al-The 'Efect of 13S Nld Restrictions though aprac ti cal doc trine from theview of

the Salvadorans, this was not a way to con-At the start of the war, human rights abuses duct ef fec tivejoint op era tions in the field orbythe Sal va doran armed forces and govern- keep the rebels under constant pressure.ment were so bad and the government so The most problematic restrictions on themired in its traditional authoritarian cul- US military aid program for El Salvador wereture, that the US government had no realis- those governing the military trainers and ad-tic choice but to use a carrot-and-stick ap- visorsinthecountry.TheMilGroupthrough-proach in providing militaryandeco nomic out the war was limited to a total of only 55aidtoElSalvador.Themilitaryandthegov- advisors in order to deflect disapproval of aernmentwouldbe en couragedtoreformby Congress worried about another Vietnam.

TH-PAWN RIN LSALM OR 39

Withsofewadvisorsandtrainersinthecoun- armed forces played a large role not only intry, the US military had to create numerous appointing officers to command, but also inexpensive and inefficient workarounds to the way the war was fought.train the Salvadoran army and air force out- GenJuan Rafael Bus ti llo, who served as theside the country. Some troops were trained, at chief of the FAS from 1979 to 1989, was aenormous expense, atFortBragg, North Caro- competent pilot and probably one of thelina. A new training center had to be built in morecapableoftheseniorofficersinElSalva-Honduras, where US Army trainers could dor when the war started. However, he alsotrain whole battalions of the Salvadoran played a highly political role in the armedarmy.6 8 Salvadoran Air Force pilots had to do forces and used his position as air force com-virtually all their training outside their coun- mander to defy and even threaten the civil iantry. However, when the pilots returned, there government. In 1983, one of the most rightwas virtually no infrastructure to enable wing of the army of fi cers, Col Sig frido Ochoa,them to maintain proficiency or develop ad- demanded the firing of defense minister Genvanced skills. Due to the shortage of pilots Jos6 Guillermo Garcia and declared his mili-and the variety of aircraft models flown by tary district to be in rebel lion against the gov-the FAS, each pilot had to be able to fly three ernment. General Bustillo supported Ochoaor four types of air craft. As are sult, the FAS pi- and refused to fly in troops to oppose him.lots could not become truly proficient in any Eventually, a compromise was worked outone aircraft. 9 Another serious problem was that allowed Ochoa to remain but removedthe lack of qualified instructor pilots in the the defense minister.71FAS to oversee individual and unit training. Aswas typi calwiththeseniormilitarylead-This translated into a high accident rate and ership in El Salvador, the FAS under Bustilloonlyafairlevelofcompetencefortheaverage was scarcely a meritocracy. An officer's poli-FAS pilot.7' tics and connections tended to count for

One very clear lesson from the war in El more in promotions and gaining coveted as-Sal va dor is the need for a far larger number of signments than competence on the battle-US trainers and advisors to be present in the field. It was alleged by army officers that Bus-country in order to effectively support a tillo often reserved the helicopter force forcountry at war. An advisor/instructor group the air force paratroop battalion and tendedsent in early to support the FAS would have to give air support to army units commandedbeen far more effective in improving the by his friends while withholding air supportcombat efficiency of the force and would from units commanded by his rivals.72 Therehave been far less expensive than all of the is also considerable evidence that US militarytraining workarounds that the US had to im- aid funds were diverted to an FAS slush fund.provise to train the FAS. An early commit- In 1989, the US General Accounting Officementofinstructorpilotsandmaintenancein- found that the FAS had sold more than onestructors would have improved the hundred thousand dollars worth of US-operability rate of the FAS and brought it to a suppliedaviation fuel to theNicaraguanCon-respectable level of combat capability in one tras in violation of US rules. 73 For years, theto two years instead of the three to five years FAS DC-6 that carried pilots and cargo tothat it actually took. How ard Air Force Base, Pan ama, re turned full

of liquor and appliances which were sold on

'The Problem of Irnte~rnal P 6the black market.74

Unfortunately, inamilitaryculturesuchasThe military culture of El Salvador was not El Salvador's, such behavior was to be ex-only authoritarian and corrupt, it was also pected. It is also ar gued that the United Stateshighly politicized. Despite training and ad- tolerated this behavior and the diversion ofvice from the United States, old habits were funds because General Bustillo allowed thevery hard to break. The in ter nal poli tics of the Ilo pango Air Baseto be come the hub of the US

40 NIRPO'J'ER JOX1RNL SIMMXER I'M9

. Both the critics and supporters of the gov-[.................... i ernment of El Salvador provided testimony

. about thebomb ing of civil ians to the US Con-gress that was so propagandistic as to borderon the absurd. On the left, American critics

........ .... tes ti fled about the brutality oftheFAS. For ex-ample, the mayor of Berkeley, California, tes-tified in 1986 that 60,000 civilians had al-ready been killed by aerial bombardment inEl Salvador-a very implausible figure.77 Onthe right, Assistant Secretary of State ElliotAbrams rounded up tes timonythatwasjustasimplausible. Abrams argued that there hadbeen no indiscriminate bombing in El Salva-

National Security Council's supply network dor, despite the admissions made by Salva-for the support of the anti-Sandinista rebels doran officers.7" Others supporting Abrams'sin Nicaragua. Some 109 clandestine flights view provided the US Congress with anec-for Contra sup port shut tled in and out ofIlo- dotes about FAS pilots complaining that they

pango.75 In any case, Americans who become were denied permission to attack rebel troopinvolved in supporting counterinsurgency concentrations because of the fear that civil-cam paigns need to be ready to face the po liti- ians might be caught in the cross fire.7 9 It wascal friction generated from within the armed even argued that the AC-47 gunships wereforces of a third world state. used so care fully in bat tle that in the course of

the war they never fired a short round or evenaccidentallyhitcivilians. 8' If true, this is a rec-

The Bombing Dilemma ord for accuracy in aerial warfare that far sur-

The most controversial aspect of the air war passes the com pe tence of the United States orinElSalvadorwasthebombingof civiliansby any other major air force.the FAS. From 1981 to 1986, theFAS regularly In reality, the bombing campaign was nei-bombed the rebel-controlled areas of the thersobrutalasthecriticsallegednorascare-country, especially the strongholds of the ful of civilians as the US State Department ar-Guazapa and Chalatenango regions. The gued. The bombing campaign seems to havebombing campaign was virtually the only had no decisive results aside from harassingmeans to keep the rebels under pressure in insurgents and forcing the FMLN units toteeaeans untilke theywerebs oer presun e ad oremain dispersed. According to witness ac-these ar eas until theywere over run and oc cu- counts and US journalists who traveled in thepied by government troops in the campaigns counts and US aorn at taveled inlthof 1985 and 1986. The air attacks, carriedout rebel-held areas, the air attacks caused rela-primarily by the A-37s, but also by helicopter tively few civilian casualties. Civilians whogunships, were aimed at villages that sup- lived in the free-fige zones quickly adapted toported the rebels. Civilian casualties were a being the targets of aerial bombardment.consequence of the campaign. The Salva- They dug bomb shelters, learned to camou-doran forces were sometimes open about the flage their homes, and took cover as soon as abombing campaign. Colonel Ochoa, com- helicopter, an A-37, or an 0-2 reconnaissancemander in the Chalatenango district, toldthe aircraft was spotted. 8 The best estimates ofUS press that he had declared a dozen free- fire casualties are provided by Tutela Legal, thezones in his area and that anything in those hu manlrights office of the Catho lic Churchinareas would be presumed hostile and El Salvador. This organization estimated thatbombed.76 in 1985, a year of heavy combat, 371 civilians

had been killed by air bombardment.82 Sincethe air attacks in civilian areas were carried

TWEN WPhkRIN ELSXLVNi)O1R 41

out between 1981 and 1986, an estimate ofapproximately two thousand civilians killed •>by air bombardment for the course of the war ,

is probably close.The dilemmaofacounterinsur gencycam- . "

paign is that the government is bound to .bomb rebel areas and inflict civilian casual- ......... ...ties evenifno de cisive effect is likely to oc cur. . .......................

The gov erment forces cannot allow the reb- .els to hold sanctuaries within the country -where they can rest, rearm, recruit, and stage ......operations unmolested. Even if the govern-.... ......ment is not in a position to clear an area by aground offensive, it can at least apply some & 1X3413Ws-ntage YNS Outagan gounM attack aircraht atpres sure to the guer ril las by air power. Infact, Ropango Nix Base. In theafý eat•ats of the vatr, thes crtanký

civilians in rebel strongholds have normally any tces•\t. aicatt Vt a ma'nstay ot f Savadoan Mtbeen subjected to bombing in modem coun-terinsurgency campaigns. The Philippine AirForce bombed rebel villages in the 1940s and Airpower played an important role in the Sal-Forcs withd wrel p lanes supplied bthe Unitnd vadoran civil war. The air force was used pri-1950s w ith w ar planes sup plied by the U nited maiy s an r y su p tfo c , rd ce a nStates."3 The United States provided 40 dive- marnly as an army support force, and certainbombers to the Greek Air Force in 1949, weapon systems proved very successful forwhichrs us them toeek bob Freel stnghold this mission. The low- tech 0-2 spot ter air craftwhich used them to bomb rebel strongholds and the AC- 47 gunshipswere used effectivelyduring their civil war.8 4 The RAF in the Mala- an the AC4ins e usedftiveyan nsugeny evn ued he havyLinoln by the FAS in close support operations. Theyan insurgency even used the heavy Lincoln slow, easy-to-fly A-37, a modified trainer, car-bombers (the British equivalent of the B-29) ried a moderate bomb load and machine-gunto bomb the jungle strongholds of the insur- armament. Itwas not aheavyweaponsys tem,gents.85 but it still gave the army amajor fire power ad-

The brutal reality of insurgent and coun- vantage in battle with the lightly armed reb -terinsurgent warfare is that there is no such els. Itprovedverysurvivableinthelow-threatthing as a "clean" war, either on the ground counterinsurgency environment.8 7 The AC-or in the air. In virtually every insurgency 47 was one of the real success stories of themounted since the end of World War II, the war. These easy-to-operate weapons weremajority of casualties have been civilians. In probably about as much as the Salvadoranpi-El Salvador, both sides conducted campaigns lots, air crew, and sup port personnel could ef-designed essentially to assassinate, maim, fectively handle at the time.andterrorizecivilians.Asforanassessmentof Of the aircraft supplied by the Unitedthe FAS's bombing campaign of civilian ar- States to the FAS during the war, the most ef-eas, it probably had some effect in harassing fective was probably the UH-1 helicoptersand disrupting the rebel strongholds, but it is used for me de vac and troop lift. Even thoughdoubtful that these benefits of the bombing the operability rate was low, the limited liftcampaign were greater than the considerable was essential for transport in a mountainouspropa gandabene fits that the reb els gained by coun try with few roads. The next most usefulbeing portrayedasvictims ofarepressivegov- aircraft were the 0-2 light reconnaissanceernment in the international media. 6 planes that forced the rebels to operate in

smaller columns and start a move out of therural strongholds and back to the cities. The

The Operat'ona\ l'fectiveness of tispover in El third most useful aircraft of the war was theSalvadov AC-47, the only truly accurate and reliable

42 OPOVER 1(5XRNXL S13MMER IT319

emy. An array of US Army officerswho servedin El Salvador, as well as a USAF-sponsoredRAND study, all expressed misgivings about

................. the large number of helicopters as well as the.................................... heavy equipm ent provided to the Salva-

......... :.... dorans.9. These mili tary critics of our mill tary. policy argued that the Salvadoran army and

.. air force were trying to become a mini-US. Army and Air Force and were tryingto sub sti-

tute airpower for basic military skills-a verydangerous strategy for a poor country withfew resources. The large airmobile force thatthe United States supplied to El Salvador waslikely to make the army behave much as the

Th tugged tttai o eastern El Salvadot. ie, mountains United States had done in Vietnam, with theandlackoatoadsinthe regninainbted annymuvementand army flying over the population rather thanmade the area a hamen aoo the pMLNopulationrathe-thagcound units mild take te, ht into the Xeld ahtet 1195. working on the ground and op eratingclosely

with the civilian population. What wasneeded, it was argued, was a greater emphasison training more ground troops and saturat-

GAS weapon. The A-37 fighter comes way ing the country with light infantry forces thatdown on the list of useful aircraft simply be are always patrolling and always present. If

cause it was hard to bomb accurately with it one has limited resources to allocate, the

and the training levels of the FAS pilots were counterinsurgency experience of the last 50

rarely up to where they could reliablyand ac-

curately provide close air support."" years would tend to support a policy of

Probably the most effective single air unit greater numbers of ground troops and a per-

inthewarwasthefivemedevachelicoptersof vasive presence over a smaller army with

the FAS, coupled with the improved medical more technology.care for the Salvadoran army made possible Of course, the US military is not alone inthrough the US aid program. The availability preferring high-tech solutions. The FAS,of rapidme devac aswell as goodmedical care which could barely operate and maintain thecannotbeunderestimatedasamajorfactorin A-37s, AC-47s, and UH-lHs it was equippedimproving the morale and fighting ability of with, re quested that the United States pro videthe army. Soldiers fight much harder if they F-5 fighters and AH-1 Cobra gunships.9" Soknow they are likely to survive theirwounds. enamored was the Salvadoran army with theEven though the army took more casualties airmobility concept that its leaders insisteddue to the increased level of combat in 1985, on buying the much more expensive air-there were fewer fatalities due to helicopter transportable 105 mm howitzers from themedevac operations.8 9 United States in stead of the very ca pable-and

However, airpower in a low intensity con- much cheaper-heavier and older model. Itflict has its downside. Air forces are very ex- was probably a blessing for the Salvadoranpensive for small countries to man and oper- forces that their plans for a relatively high-ate. The FAS soaked up a disproportionate tech, airmobile force never came to fruition.share of the aid and defense budget, yet its By the mid-1980s, they hoped to have a heli-real capabilities were very limited due to the copter force large enough to airlift at least alow operational rate of aircraft, the shortage battalion anywhere in the country. However,ofpilots, andthedeficienciesintraining. Cer- the low operational rate and the pilot short-tainly through most of the war, the FAS was age ensured that the high command nevernot employed very efficiently against the en- could deploy more than a company or two at

TY-WE/kin M R 'N IN E.L SPkLN OR 43

a time. Like it or not, the Salvadoran army likelytofaceinsupportinganationinacoun-had to learn to be an infantry force. terinsurgency campaign are all found in El

There are more than a few lessons to be Salvador. The 12-year US experience showslearned about the role of an air force and the how airpower can be used well-and usedemployment of airpower in a low intensity badly. While the contribution of the Salva-conflict from the war in El Salvador. As a case doran Air Force to that war was significant,study, it is excel lent in that most of the op era- the finalanalysis in di cates that counter insur-tional and political problems that one is ever gencies still do not lend themselves to a pre-

dominately airpower solution. 13

Notes1. Benjamin Schwarz, kmetrean Counte nsusency Doctrine 21. History, Programs and Evaluation, DCS, July-December

and V1 Salvador: The lTustrattons ot Refotm and the Iltusions o( 1982, USAFHRA, K145.01, 181.Nation Building, RAND Report R-4042 (Santa Monica, Calif.: 22. Gen Fred Woerner, former CINCSOUTHCOM, interviewRAND, 1991), 2. with author, 26 January 1998.

2. Charles Lane, "The Pilot Shark of El Salvador," New 23. Waghelstein, appendix F.ltapubloe, 24 September 1990, 27. 24. Commander, US MilGroup, El Salvador, memo to chief of

3. For very useful works that cover both sides of the conflict, staff, El Salvador armed forces, 10 June 1982. Cited insee Marvin Gettleman et al., eds., 1a~vado: Centrat hmesta in Waghelstein, appendix E.theNew Cold Was (New York: Grove Press, 1986). See also Max 25. Flintham, 365.Manwaring and Courtney Prisk, eds.,EISai-adm at War, kn Oral 26. Ibid.Xlistory (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 27. A good description from the rebel viewpoint of these1988). operations in 1982 and 1983 is found in Charles Clements,

4. I was fortunate to have some valuable assistance and Wttness to as (NewYork: Bantam Books, 1984).advice in writing this article from Gen Fred Woerner, USA, 28. Manwaring and Prisk, 132-41.Retired, former CINC SOUTHCOM: Ambassador David Passage, 29. Ibid., 145-46.deputy chief of the US MissioninEl Salvador, 1984-1986; and Dr. 30. Gettleman et al., 233.Judy Gentleman of the Air War College faculty, who has 31. Ibid.interviewed former FMLN leaders. Comments and interviews 32. Ibid., 234.with these three experts were tremendously helpful in 33. Ibid.conducting research. 34. Dr. Judy Gentleman, Air War College faculty, interview

5. For the background to the revolution in El Salvador, see with author, 19 January 1998.Tommie Sue Montgomery, te-4olution in El Salvador: Orlt•ns and 35. Lt Col Edward King, USA, RetiredTestimonj'oeloye '-rouseE'volution (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982). See also Lilsa Committee on Toetgn Mhials, 99th Cong., 1st sess. (31 JanuaryNorth,Bltter C unds oots oRevo'AtnýX~alvados ,Toronto, Ont.: 1985), 21-22.Between the Lines, 1982). 36. Colonel Duryea, US defense attach6 to El Salvador, cited

6. Schwarz, 23. in Manwaring and Prisk, 316-19.7. North, xxii-xxiii. 37. Ambassador David Passage, deputy chief of US Mission in8. The MAilitary Batance, ,9B-19E (London: The Inter- El Salvador, 1984-1986,interviewwithauthor, lOJanuary 1998.

national Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982), 101. 38. Col James Steele, USA, cited in Manwaring and Prisk,9. Ibid. 145-46.10. Victor Flintham, Mr Wars and ircirait (New York: Facts 39. History, Directorate of International Programs,

on File, 1990), 359-60. July-December 1984, USAFHRA, K145.01, 6-7.11. Steffen Schmidt, R1 Sal-vado. humescas Next Jietnarn? 40. Ibid.

(Salisbury, N.C.: Documentary Publications, 1983), 82. 41. History, US Southern Command, 1985, USAFHRA,12. Schwarz, 85. K463.01, 6.13. Donald Schulz and Deborah Schulz, The United States, 42. Ibid.

-iondusas, and the Crisis in CentraY !hmeiica (Boulder, Colo.: 43. History, US Southern Command, 1984, USAFHRA,Westview Press, 1994), 60. K463.01, 46-47.

14. John Waghelstein, El Salvadorn Observations and 44.A.J. Bacevich etal., kmesicanNAiUtaryloolXl'nSmallVaTs:Yxretences in Countetinsurgency (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: US Army The Case oiEl Salvador (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's,War College, 1985), 21-22. 1998), 29.

15. Miguel Castellanos and Courtney Prisk, eds., The 45. Ibid., 32.Commandante Speass: Memofssofan~X~alyadoanGuefr\\aX~ades 46. Vance Bateman, "Tactical Air Power in Low Intensity(Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), 36-38. Conflict," Mhrpomer Journa\5, no. 1 (Spring 1991): 77.

16. Schwarz, 2-5; and Waghelstein, 36. 47. Bacevich et al., 32.17. Gettleman et al., 230. 48. Joseph Cirincione, "Latin America: Regional Threats to18. History, US Southern Command, 1981. USAF Historical Western Security," International Secuiltty Yeashoo'e, Barry

Research Agency (HRA), MaxwellAFB, Ala., 463.01, 10-11. Blechman, ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984/85),19. Ibid., 1982, 50-54. 183-210, especially 188.20. History, Directorate of International Programs, 1 49. Col Joseph Stringham, cited in Manwaring and Prisk,

January-30 June 1982, USAFHRA, K145.01, 5-6. 148-51.

44 MROWERI. OX3RML SUMMERVN9

50. Flintham, 366. 68. The cost of building the training facilities inHonduras in51. For an account of this campaign from the rebel FTY83 was $14 million. History, Programs and Evaluation, DOS,

viewpoint, see Joe Fish and Cristina Sganga EY Sal-vadorn July-December 1982, USAFHRA, K1 45.01, 18 1.Testament ot~triot (New York: Olive BranchPress, 1988), 88-89. 69. Bacevich et al., 32.

52. Castellanos and Prisk, 88-89. 70. Ibid.53. Ibid., xvii-xix. 71. Lane, 27; and History, US Southern Command, 1983.54. TXhe Mfitary Balance iI9 (London: International USAFHRA, K463.01, 85.

Institute for Strategic Studies, 1987). 72. Lane, 28.55. Schulz and Schulz, 153: and Barry Blechman and Edward 73. Ibid.

Luttwak, eds., Wmtatlonal euiy eroi (Boulder, Colo.: 74. Ibid.WestviewPress, 1984/85), 189, 192. 75. Ibid.

56. Leroy Thompson, Ragged Wan. The Story ot Xlnconven- 76. D1allas Morning Nevis, 21 January 1985.ttonal and Coumntevolvsttrmary Wariare (London: Arms and 77. Statement of Gus Newport, mayor of Berkeley, HouseArmour, 1994), 79. Committee on Foreign Affairs,Congesskonialiecrird, 14 May 1986,

57. Ibid. 17, 20, 21.58. Ibid. 78. Ibid., 23, 41, 51.59. For a useful over-view of the final stages of the peace 79. Statementof Samuel Dickens, American Security Council

process, see Tommie Sue Montgomery, "Getting to Peace in El FonaiHusCmiteonorgnAfr,Salvador: The Roles of the United Nations Secretariat and Feound,3JatinHusey Commtte on- Foeg1ffis.o~sslONUSAL," Journal ot Xntexanetican Studles 80. Ibid.ffarsWinter 1995, 139-72. 81. "Eld

60. Schwarz, 2-3. 8. ElSalvador's Guerrillas," Washington~ost , 7-8 Novem.-61. Wagheistein, 46-47. ber 1985.62. History, US Southern Command, 1985, USAFHRA, 82. Congrsessional Record, 14 May 198 6, 12 1.

K463.01, 50. 83. Stanley Karnow, In Out Image-. kNetcra's Empilre In the63. Col Orlando Seeped, cited inManwaring and Prisk, 310. XXh~~ppnes (New York: Ballantine, 1989), 350.64. See Edwin Corr and Courtney Prisk, "El Salvador: 84. Flintham, 9-13.

Transforming Society toWin the Peace," inlawlmnensltt Contlict,. 85. Ibid., 326-37.Old Threats In a New 'World, Edwin Corr, ed. (Boulder, Colo.: 86. General Woerner interview, 19 January 1998.Westview Press, 1992), 223-53. 87. Bateman, 77.

65. Bacevich et al., 13. 88. General Woerner interview, 19 January 1998.66. Waghelstein, 42-45. See also ColJoseph Stringham, cited 89. Elliot Abrams, Con~cesslonaVl.ecord, 14 May 1986, 31.

in Manwaring and Prisk, 148-5 1. 90. See Wagheistein: Barcevich et al., 32; and Schwarz, 19.67. Col johnEllerson, cited in Manwaring and Prisk, 86-87. 91. Bacevich et al., 32.

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