TheAgentIntellectinAquinas:AMetaphysicalConditionofPossibilityofHumanUnderstandingasReceptiveof

ObjectiveContent

by

AndresAyala

AThesissubmittedtotheFacultyofTheologyattheUniversityofSt.Michael’sCollegeandtheGraduateCentreforTheologicalStudiesoftheTorontoSchoolofTheology.

InpartialfulfilmentoftherequirementsforthedegreeofDoctorofPhilosophyinTheology

awardedbytheUniversityofSt.Michael’sCollege.

©CopyrightbyAndresAyala2018

ii

TheAgentIntellectinAquinas:AMetaphysicalConditionof

PossibilityofHumanUnderstandingasReceptiveof

ObjectiveContent

AndresAyala

DoctorofPhilosophyinTheology

UniversityofSt.Michael’sCollege

2018

Abstract

ThefollowingisaninterpretationofAquinas’agentintellectfocusingonSummaTheologiae

I,qq.75-89,andproposingthattheagentintellectisametaphysicalratherthanaformala

prioriofhumanunderstanding.Aformalaprioriisresponsiblefortheintelligibilityas

contentoftheobjectofhumanunderstandingandisrelatedtoKant’sepistemological

views;whereasametaphysicalaprioriisresponsibleforintelligibilityasmodeofbeingof

thissameobject.WecanfindinAquinas’textmanyindicationsthattheagentintellectis

notproductiveoftheuniversalascontentbutis,rather,productiveoftheabstractedor

intelligiblemodeofbeingoftheuniversalnature.ThisisbecauseforAquinastheuniversal

nature,whichistheobjectofhumanunderstanding,ispresentinthethingsthemselvesbut

withadifferentmodeofbeing.

Chapter1isintendedtoestablishthefactwhichrequiresforAquinasanagentintellect,

andprovidestwoveryimportantprinciples:oneisthattheobjectofhumanunderstanding

(theuniversalnature)ispresentinthethingsthemselvesand,theother,thatitisnotinthe

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thingsthemselveswithamodeofbeingwhichmakesitavailabletotheintellectualeye.

ThesetwoprinciplesleadustothemainpointofChapter2,namelythedistinctionbetween

theintelligibleobjectanditsintelligiblemodeofbeing.Now,becauseknowingisreceptive

oftheintelligibleobject(Chapter3),whichispresentinthethingsthemselves(Chapter1),

theagentintellectisproductivenotoftheobject’sintelligiblecontent,butofitsabstracted

orintelligiblemodeofbeing(Chapter4).

iv

Acknowledgments

Behindthisdissertationand,oneachpage,Icanseethecontributionsofmanypeople.I

wanttothankparticularlyNancyMarrocco,fortheEnglishcorrectionsandinspirational

advice;AmandaWagnerfortheformatcorrections;PatFlemingandtheInstituteofthe

IncarnateWordfortheireconomicsupport;andJeremyWilkinsforhisadvicetowriteon

theagentintellect.Forhisconstantsupportandwiseadvice,IthankFr.GillesMongeau,SJ,

mysupervisor;IthankProfessorsR.Sweetman,J.Ginther,M.Levering,J.Berkman,Giulio

SilanoandDennisO’Harafortheirprecioussuggestionsandcorrections.Fortheirprayers

andtheirconstantencouragement,Iwouldlikealsotothankinparticulartheparishioners,

SistersandstaffofSt.Michael’s,Cobourg,andofSt.JohntheBaptistandSacredHeart,

Peterborough(theparisheswhereIservedaspastorduringthewritingprocess).Aspecial

thankyoutoRitaMarroccoandMargaretNewman.ThanksalsotoFr.GerardusHauwert,

IVEandDr.DonaldGraham,andmanyotherpriestsandprofessorsfortheiradviceand

support.Iwishtothankalsoallthosewho,duringmyyearsofformation,handedontome

sogenerouslythatwhichtheythemselveshadreceived.Finally,allthoseotherswhohave

supportedandhelpedme,thoughnotnamedhere,arenolessappreciated.

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TableofContents

Acknowledgments.......................................................................................................iv

TableofContents.........................................................................................................v

AbbreviatedReferences.............................................................................................vii

OpeningNote...............................................................................................................1

Introduction..................................................................................................................21)MainConcepts,MethodandProcedure..............................................................52)TheControversywithLatinAverroism...............................................................103)SomeRenownedScholars..................................................................................12ÉtienneGilson.....................................................................................................12JosephOwens.....................................................................................................16EleonoreStump..................................................................................................20ArmandA.Maurer..............................................................................................24W.NorrisClarke..................................................................................................32JohnF.X.Knasas.................................................................................................37

4)CornelioFabro....................................................................................................444.1.AMetaphysicalAPrioriinTheMetaphysicalNotionofParticipation........454.2.AMetaphysicalAPrioriinLaSvolta...........................................................474.3.IntellectualKnowingasReceptiveinFabro................................................50

5)OtherRelevantAuthors......................................................................................51

ChapterOne:TheThomisticFactandtheRoleoftheAgentIntellect.......................571)TheThomisticFact..............................................................................................572)TheObjectofIntelligenceinitsFormalAspect:TheUniversalasDifferentfrom

theParticular.....................................................................................................663)TheObjectofIntelligenceinitsRealAspect:TheUniversalisintheThings

Themselves........................................................................................................834)TheRoleoftheAgentIntellectanditsNecessity:ToMake IntelligibleinActtheUniversalinre................................................................102

ChapterTwo:TheThomisticDistinctionbetweentheObjectandtheModeofBeingoftheObject(resintellectaandmodusreiintellectae)...................1101)TheDistinctionin84,1,c.:The“PlatonicProblem”........................................1112)TheDistinctioninOtherTexts..........................................................................1153)TheTwoMeaningsofUniversal.......................................................................1193.1.IntheSumma.............................................................................................1203.2.TwoMeaningsof“Universal”inotherWorksofAquinas.........................123

4)TheDistinctionbetween“expartereiintellectae” and“exparteintelligentis”..............................................................................1295)ConcludingRemarks........................................................................................130

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ChapterThree:KnowingasReceptive......................................................................1351)TheMetaphysicalExplanationofKnowingasa“Remedy”..............................1372)AlterityandIdentityinHumanKnowing..........................................................1442.1.Alterity.......................................................................................................1442.2.Identity:WhatIdentityisNot....................................................................149

3)TheIdentityisbyMeansoftheSpecies...........................................................1513.1.TheAristotelianIdentity............................................................................1553.2.Species,IdentityandAlterity.....................................................................159

4)KnowingasReceptive.......................................................................................1715)TheComparisonbetweenIntelligenceandSensitivity.....................................1906)Corollaries:AgentIntellect,PossibleIntellectandWill....................................197

ChapterFour:TheThomisticAgentIntellectasaMetaphysicalAPrioriratherthanaFormalAPriori.......................................................................2091)TheTextofSt.Thomas:theAgentIntellectasaFormalAPriori?...................2101.1.InfinityintheHumanIntellect...................................................................2101.2.“Quodammodoomnia”..............................................................................2171.3.TheProcessofLearning.............................................................................2201.4.TheNaturalDesiretoKnow.......................................................................2221.5.“Naturaliternotavelindita”......................................................................2261.6.TheTextof84,6:materiacausae.............................................................2321.7.TheAgentIntellectas“actusintelligibilium”.............................................244

2)TheAgentIntellectasaMetaphysicalAPriori.................................................2572.1.Thetextusprinceps....................................................................................2592.2.NotaFormalbutaMetaphysicalAPriori..................................................2612.2.a.NotaFormalAPriori..............................................................................2612.2.b.TheOriginoftheIntelligibleContent.....................................................2652.2.c.AMetaphysicalAPriori...........................................................................2752.3.TheComparisonoftheAgentIntellectwithLight.....................................281

Conclusion................................................................................................................2931.Summary...........................................................................................................2932.Contributions....................................................................................................2943.LimitsandFutureLinesofResearch.................................................................296

Epilogue:KnowingafterKant...................................................................................303

Bibliography..............................................................................................................304A)St.ThomasAquinas..........................................................................................304B)OtherAuthors...................................................................................................305

Appendix:OtherAuthors,Excursus,LatinTextsandTranslations...........................308

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AbbreviatedReferences1

BT:Heidegger,Martin.BeingandTime.

CG:Aquinas.LiberdeveritatecatholicaeFideicontraerroresinfideliumseuSummacontra

Gentiles.

DeSpir.Creat.:Aquinas.Quaestiodisputatadespiritualibuscreaturis.

DeVer.:Aquinas.Quaestionesdisputataedeveritate.

EIA:Sellés,JuanFernando.Elintelectoagenteylosfilósofos:Venturasydesventurasdel

supremohallazgoaristotélicosobreelhombre.

InBoet.DeTrin.:Aquinas.SuperBoetiumDeTrinitate.

InDeAnima:Aquinas.SentencialibriDeanima.

InMet.:Aquinas.InduodecimlibrosMetaphysicorumAristotelisexpositio.

KRV:Kant,Immanuel.CritiqueofPureReason.

LS:Fabro,Cornelio.LaSvoltaAntropologicadiKarlRahner.

NMP:Fabro,Cornelio.LaNozioneMetafisicadiPartecipazionesecondoSanTommaso

d’Aquino.

PP:Fabro,Cornelio.PercezioneePensiero.

Q.D.DeAnima:Aquinas.Quaestionesdisputataedeanima.

RC:Gilson,Etienne.Réalismethomisteetcritiquedelaconnaissance.

RM:Gilson,Etienne.Leréalismeméthodique.

Summa:Aquinas.SummaTheologiae.

TTDV:Knasas,JohnF.X.“TranscendentalThomismandDeVeritateI,9.”

WLTL:Knasas,JohnF.X.“WhyforLonerganKnowingCannotConsistin'TakingaLook'.”

1Inalphabeticalorder.Cf.Bibliographyforeditions.

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OpeningNote

TheagentintellectisasealoftheDivinityinus.Itisproofofabeatifyingtruth,thetruththatalthoughweourselvesunderstand,understandingisagiftandeveniftheoriginofthegiftisintheOther,thisOtherdoesnotdiminishusbythegift,butraisesusuptoHimself.ThelightofunderstandingisaparticipationoftheUncreatedLight,andhumanbeingsarelivingimagesofthisLightbyanactofGod’slove.Godislove,humanbeingisloved.GodisCreator,humanbeingisgifted.Godisrich,humanbeingispoornolongerbecauseGodhaslookedwithfavouronthenothingnessofHisservant.Howrichishumanbeing?TowhatextentdoweresembleGod?Whatindependence,whatsubjectivitybestowedonusthisSubsistentFreedom?Theanswertothesequestionsisofthegreatestrelevance.Onlybyknowingourselvescanweachievethemeaningofourexistence.Butwemovebetweenindependenceandlimitation,betweenanunlimitedhorizonandanolessunlimitedthirst.Wheredoesourperfectioncomefrom?WhereisGod?IsGodtobefoundintheintimaterecessesofthesoul,orabovetheHeavens?Both!But,theradicalquestionisdifferent:isGodmywater,ormythirst?ButifGodismywater,whatisthewaytothewellspringofsalvation?IfGodismythirst,whatisthemeaningofallofthis?Itisnoteasytoseethewaybutthemodernhumanbeingshouldnotdespair.Isnottheagentintellect“likethelight”2agiftwhichhelpsustoseetheway?Asintheoriginalchaos,thedarknessisdispelledbyGod’scommand:“Lettherebelight!”

2Aristotle,DeAnimaIII,c.V,430a15.

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Introduction

ThedoctrineoftheagentintellectinAquinasisrelatedtotheproblemofthe

universals.3Fromagnoseologicalpointofview,theanswertothisproblemcantaketwo

forms.OneishistoricallyrepresentedbyPlatoandKant,theotherbySt.ThomasAquinas.

Theproblemoftheuniversalsisthathumanunderstandingisuniversaland

necessary,yetreality—becauseitisparticularandcontingent—doesnotseemtomatchthe

objectofourunderstanding.Whatisthevalueoftheuniversalconcept,then?Doesthe

universalconceptcorrespondtoanythinginreality?Or,isitasubjectiveevent—a

subjectivemodification—relatedsomehowtowhatisparticular?

Asuperficialapproachmaygivetheimpressionthat,actually,KantandPlatoarethe

mutuallyopposingalternatives.ForPlato,infact,theuniversalcorrespondstosomethingin

3Quotationswillbereferencedinbriefform,thoseformsprovidedintheindexcalled

“AbbreviatedReferences.”ForAquinas’works:Aquinas’nameisalwaysomitted,anabbreviatedformofthetitlebeginsthequotationandasimpleindicationoftheplacefollows,inlettersandnumbersofevidentmeaning.AnexceptiontothisarethequotationsfromtheSummaTheologiaeI,qq.75-89,themainsourceofthisdissertation:theyalwaysbegindirectlywiththenumberofquestion.AnotherexceptionistheCommentarytoAristotle’sDeAnima:IhaveusedtheLeonineedition,therefore,Iquotethebook,thechapterandthelinesbynumber.Theworksofotherauthorsarequotedinthisway:lastname,onewordorafewlettersindicatingthetitleofthework(onlywhenmorethanoneworkofthesameauthorisquotedinthisdissertation)andthepagenumber.Othermoreparticularindicationswillbegivenasneeded.

EmphasisinLatintextsisalwaysmine,unlessotherwiseindicated.Translations:Aquinas’textistranslatedusingthetranslationbytheFathersoftheEnglish

DominicanProvince,availableathttp://dhspriory.org/thomas/summa/index.html,unlessotherwiseindicated.Myeditingofthistranslationismadeevidentwithsquarebrackets.Whenthetranslationismine,thisisindicatedimmediatelyafterthetranslatedtext.TheLatintextofAquinasisalwaysprovidedinthefootnotes.AuthorsotherthanAquinasareofferedinEnglish(mytranslations,unlessanEnglisheditionisquotedinBibliography).

SeeAppendix(p.308)for24importantnotesallowingmorepreciseand/orexpandedreferenceonparticularpoints;thisAppendixcontainssomeLatintexts,theirtranslationsandcertainvaluableexcursus.

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reality,whichistheideain-itselfwhereas,forKant,theuniversalisasubjectiveevent

which—preciselybecauseofitscharacteristicasuniversal—cannotcorrespondformallyto

theparticularrealityofexperience.

Inbothcases,however,theuniversaldoesnotcorrespondtotheparticular.Andin

bothcases,Isubmit,itisforthesamereason:becausetheuniversalistakenasaneventof

consciousness,asanideawhich,exactlybecauseofitsabstractedcondition,canhave

nothingtodowiththerawmaterialofexperience.Forboth,PlatoandKant,universalityisa

subjectivecharacteristicofideasorthoughts,acharacteristicnotfoundintheparticular

reality.Now,forPlato,becauseourthoughtsmustcorrespondtoreality,thesolutionwasto

duplicateourideasinaworldofideas.ForKant,instead,becauseourideasrelatetothe

particularreality,andgrantedthattheiruniversalitycannotcomefromexperience,the

solutionistomakeuniversalitytheresultofasubjectivefunction.Universalityandnecessity

are,forKant,theresultofthesubject'sactivityontherawmaterialofexperience.Whereas,

forPlato,theuniversalistheresultofaparticipationfromtheidea,forKanttheuniversalis

theresultofasubjectiveactivityonthematerialofexperience.InbothPlatoandKant,the

factneedingexplanationistheideaasitisinthemind.

IsthiswhatAquinasthought?Inthisthesis,itwillbesuggestedthat,forAquinas,

becausethereisadistinctionbetweentheuniversalascontentandastheabstractedmode

ofbeingofthatcontent,thereisonesenseinwhichintelligibilityistheresultofasubjective

function,andanothersenseinwhichintelligibilityanduniversalitybelongtothethings

themselves.

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Whenwesaythattheagentintellectisametaphysicalapriori,wemeanthatthe

agentintellectproducesintelligibilityastheabstractedmodeofbeingoftheuniversal

content;wedistinguishthismetaphysicalapriorifromtheKantianformalapriori,whichis

sourceofintelligibilityascontentofanotherwiserawmaterialofexperience.Thatis,a

formalaprioriisthesubjectivefunctionbywhichintelligibilityis“produced”inthesensible

material.Inotherwords,aformalaprioriisthesourceofintelligiblecontent,whereasa

metaphysicalaprioriisthesourceoftheabstractedmodeofbeingofthecontent.Onthe

onehand,adoctrineoftheagentintellectasametaphysicalaprioripresupposesthatthe

intelligiblecontentbelongstothethingsthemselves;aformalapriori,ontheotherhand,

presupposesthattheintelligiblecontentistheresultoftheactivityofthesubjectonan

otherwisenon-intelligiblematerialofexperience.

ThereasonforbringingKantandPlatotogetheristobetterunderstandtheradical

differencebetweenAquinasandKant.Inotherwords,whatSt.ThomassaysofPlato,inthis

respect,appliestoKant.AndthereasonforshowingthedifferencebetweenSt.Thomasand

KantistomakeourinterpretationofSt.Thomasmoremeaningfulfortoday’sreflection.In

myview,ifSt.ThomasisconfusedwithKant,thecontributionofSt.Thomasislost.Such

confusionismadepossiblebythefactthatboththeThomisticagentintellectandthe

Kantianformalaprioricanbesaidtoprovideintelligibility,ortomakeintelligibletheobject

ofexperience.Whatissuggestedinthisdissertationisthat“intelligible”isusedineachcase

inadifferentsense.Inordertoavoidthisconfusion,twoessentiallyrelatedelementsare

suggested:first,theThomisticdistinctionbetweenresintellectaandmodusreiintellectae,

andsecondlytheThomisticdoctrineofthepresenceoftheuniversalinthethings

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themselves.Aswewillsee,thesetwoelements—aswellasotherrelatedelements—arenot

alwaysclearinmodernThomism.

WhatisproposedinthisthesisistheinterpretationofAquinas’agentintellectasa

“metaphysical”apriori,insofarasitproducesnottheintelligiblecontent,buttheintelligible

modeofbeingofthecontent.Thisclaimimpliesmanyassumptionswhichwillneedtobe

discussedintheirproperplaces,inthebodyofthisdissertation.

Mygoalinthisintroductionis,firstly,tooutlinethemainconcepts,methodand

procedureinwhatwillfollow;secondly,toreferbrieflytothemedievalcontroversywith

Averroesregardingtheagentintellect;thirdly,toexaminetheworkofsomerenowned

scholarsinordertoframethethesispositioninamoreunderstandablefashion;fourthly,to

brieflyintroduceCornelioFabro(inwhomwefirstfoundthisideaoftheagentintellectasa

metaphysicalratherthanaformalapriori),4inordertoshowhowandtowhatextenthis

workisthesourceofinspirationforthisthesis;fifthlyandfinally,toreportsomepertinent

findingsfromotherauthors.

1)MainConcepts,MethodandProcedure

BecauseoftheimportanceandsystematiccharacteroftheSummaTheologiae,5this

workwillbethefocus.OtherThomisticworkswillbebroughtintoplayinordertoconfirm

theinterpretationproposed,toshowAquinas’consistencyonthistopicthroughouthis

4Cf.CornelioFabro,LaSvoltaAntropologicadiKarlRahner,OpereComplete,volume25

(Segni:EDIVI,2011),52and116.5Cf.IªPars,qq.75-89.

6

career,and/ortoqualifythefindingsinsomeway.6Theconcernisnottoindicateallofthe

paralleltextsforeachreferenceoftheSumma.Particularlyimportantwillbethereference

toAquinas’CommentarytotheAristotelianDeAnima,7becauseofAquinas’constant

referencetoAristotleindealingwiththeagentintellect.8

6Cf.EleonoreStump,Aquinas(NewYork:Routledge,2003),1:“AlthoughAquinasis

remarkablyconsistentinhisseveraldiscussionsofthesametopic,itisoftenhelpfultoexamineparallelpassagesinhiswritingswhenfullyassessinghisviewsonanyissue”;JuanFernandoSellés,Elintelectoagenteylosfilósofos:Venturasydesventurasdelsupremohallazgoaristotélicosobreelhombre,[vol.]I,SiglosIVa.C.-XV,(Pamplona:EUNSA,2012),268:“ThomasAquinasexplainstheexistenceoftheagentintellectinthiswork,themostmature[i.e.,theSummaTheologiae],withthesameargumentasinhisfirstwritings”and270:“[Aquinas]maintainsuntiltheendofhisproductionthattheproperfunctionoftheagentintellectistoabstract.”

7Sellés(cf.EIA,23)saysthatthethirdbookoftheDeAnimaisthebookmostcommenteduponinthehistoryofPhilosophy,andthatthepassagethatregardstheagentintellectisthemostdiscussed.Sellés’researchinElIntelectoAgenteylosFilósofoshasthemeritofincluding52pagesofessentialbibliography,althoughtheauthor’sinterpretationoftheagentintellectinAristotleisgroundedinquestionableprinciples.Still,evenifhedisagreeswithalmostallinterpretationsofAristotleinhistory,includingAquinas’,hispresentationofthevariousauthorsisfairandwelldocumented.

8Schmidt(cf.CiroE.SchmidtAndrade,“SantoTomásyelDeAnima:ComentarioalosCaps.4y5delLibroIIIdelDeAnimadeAristóteles,”AnalogíaFilosófica:RevistaDeFilosofía8,no.1[1994]:124)veryinsightfullyproposesthatSt.ThomasgoesbeyondAristotlebutdoesnotcontradicthim(sameremarkinCornelioFabro,LaNozioneMetafisicadiPartecipazionesecondoSanTommasod’Aquino,OpereComplete,volume3[Segni:EDIVI,2005],276).ItisamostfittingcommentbecauseitgivesanaccountofAquinas’evidentintelligenceofAristotlebut,atthesametime,acknowledgesthatnoteverythingthatSt.ThomassaysisexplicitinAristotle.FortheAngelic,Isubmit,thefactthatsomethingisnotwritteninthebookdoesnotmeanthatAristotledidnothaveitinhismind.Still,tomakehiscase,St.Thomasalwaystriestofindtextualsupportforhisclaims,orherefershisinterpretationtoexplicitprinciplesthatAristotlemaintainsinotherplaces,orhestressestheinternalcoherenceofthetext.ItisnotdifficulttoagreewithStumpinthisregard:“InarecentvolumeofessaysonAristotle’sDeanima,MarthaNussbaumdescribesAquinas’sworkas‘oneoftheverygreatestcommentariesonthework’and‘veryinsightful.’T.H.Irwin,aleadinginterpreterofAristotle,acknowledgesthatatonepointintheSententialibriEthicorum(CommentaryonAristotle’sNicomacheanEthics),Aquinas‘actuallyexplainsAristotle’sintentionmoreclearlythanAristotleexplainsithimself’.SuchjudgmentsapplyprettygenerallytoAquinas’sAristoteliancommentaries,allofwhicharemarkedbyhisextraordinaryabilityasaphilosophicalcommentatortodiscernalogicalstructureinalmosteverypassageheexaminesineverysortoftext:notonlyAristotle’sbutalsothoseofothers,fromBoethiustoStPaul.”(Stump,8-9,cf.notes8and9).

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Theinterpretationbeingofferedisthattheagentintellectisametaphysicalapriori

ofhumanunderstandingasreceptiveofobjectivecontent.Anaprioriisaconditionof

possibility.Aconditionofpossibilitygivesintelligibilitytoafact.Thatiswhythestarting

point(Chapter1)willbetoidentifythefactthatrequiresanagentintellectasitscondition

ofpossibility.9Identifyingthisfactwillhelptoshowthatthedoctrineoftheagentintellect

isrelatedtotheproblemoftheuniversals,andthusrelatestothecriticalproblem.10The

fact,forAquinas(section1),isthatweknowthenaturesofbodies,butthosenaturesare

notinthebodieswithanintelligiblemodeofbeing;itisthisfactwhichresultsinthe

requirementofanagentintellect.Theimplicationisthat,forSt.Thomas,theobjectof

intelligenceinitsformalaspect(section2)istheuniversal,thenatureofthecorporealthing

initsabsoluteness,notthematerialofsensibility.Anotherimportantimplication(section3)

isthattheobjectofintelligence,theuniversal,subsistsinthecorporealthingandbelongsto

it.ItishopedthatallofthiswillallowustoconcludeChapter1(section4)withabetter

understandingoftheroleoftheagentintellectanditsnecessityinrelationshiptothe

problemoftheuniversals;thatis,theroleoftheagentintellectistomakeintelligibleinact

9Cf.TsenaySerequeberhan,“AquinasandKant:aComparativeStudy,”Dialogue:Journalof

PhiSigmaTau26(1984):43,“Thequestionoftheagentintellectisraisedandansweredinordertosatisfythefunctionbywhichactualunderstandingisacquired[…]Aquinasmovesfromwhattheintellectdoestowhatitneedsinordertoaccomplishwhatitactuallydoes.”

10ByproblemoftheuniversalsIunderstandtheanswertothequestion“Whatisitthatwepredicateofthemany?Isitaname,aconceptoranature?”BycriticalproblemIunderstandtheanswertothequestion,“Whatisthevalueoftheuniversalknowledgeofreality?Isitentirelygivenaposterioriorisitratheranaprioriadditiontothedataofexperience?”Thesecondproblempointsexplicitlytotheoriginofthecontentofconsciousness,thefirstonepointsrathertotheuniversal’spropermetaphysical“place.”TheThomisticconsiderationoftheuniversalasnature(andsouniversaleinre)leads,inmyview,toanswerthecriticalprobleminthedirectionofanaposteriorismoftheuniversalcontentofconsciousness.

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theuniversalinre,i.e.thenatureofthecorporealthings,sothattheymaybeseenbythe

possibleintellect.

Thefirstchapterwillopenthedoortomanyconsiderationswhichwilltaketheir

properplacesinthefollowingchapters.InChapter2theessentialdifferencebetweenSt.

ThomasandKantintheirrespectiveapproachestotheproblemoftheuniversalsisstudied;

namely,St.Thomasmakesadistinction(whichKantdoesnot)betweenthemodeofbeing

ofthe(intellectual)objectandtheobjectitself,betweentheresintellectaandthemodus

reiintellectae.Infact,claimingthattheagentintellectisametaphysicalaprioriistoclaim

thattheagentintellectproducesnottheresintellecta,butthemodeofbeingofthesame.

Inotherwords,to“producetheintelligible”(referredtotheagentintellect)doesnotmean

toproducethecontentofintellectualknowing,buttoproducethemodeofbeingofthat

content.Thecontentisnotproduced.Thecontentisalreadyinthethingsthemselves,

althoughwithadifferentmodeofbeing(whichisthepointofChapter1).Thecontentis

receivedandthisisthepointofChapter3.Chapter2iskeytotheinterpretationofAquinas’

textforthefollowingreason.Inordertounderstandwhatitmeans“tomakethe

intelligible”,adistinctionmustbedrawnbetweentwowaysinwhichtheterms“intelligible”

and“universal”areusedintheSumma.Thatis,onewayisasreferredtotheobject,andthe

otherwayisasreferredtoitsmodeofbeinginthemind.

Asanticipated,Chapter3treatsaveryimportantissuewhichunderliesthewhole

doctrineoftheagentintellectinAquinas:intellectualknowingisoriginallyreceptive,

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intentionalaspossessionoftheother,definedbyalterity.11Theintelligiblecontentis

received.Therefore,theroleoftheagentintellectinhumanunderstanding,activeby

definition,isnotproductiveofcontent.ForAquinas,ifanythingcomesfromthesubject,itis

notthecontentbecausethecontentperfectsthesubjectandis,originally,otherthanthe

subject.InthisChapter,ourdesignationofhumanunderstandingas“receptiveofobjective

content”willbecomemoreclear.Humanunderstandingimpliesanintentionalreceptionof

theperfectionofother(thecontent),whichiscommontobothsenseandintelligencein

theirfirstactuations(wheretounderstandisacertain“seeing”).Because,forSt.Thomas,

thecontentisreal(andinthatsense“objective”,asbelongingtotherealobject),the

“mediation”ofabstractiondoesnotimplylosinganycontactwithreality.12

If,forAquinas,intellectualknowingrefersinitiallytoauniversalobject,andifthat

universalisimbeddedintheparticular,andifknowingisreceivingthatuniversal,theagent

intellectcannotbeaformalapriori,responsiblefortheintelligiblecontent.Thisisthe

precisequestionofChapter4,whichwillhavetwomainsections.Thefirstsectionwill

includediscussionofthetextsseemingtosuggestthatAquinasadmitsaformalaprioriin

intellectualknowing,orthattheagentintellectisthisformalapriori.Inthesecondsection,

evidencewillbeofferedtotrytoshowthat,forAquinas,theagentintellectisnotaformala11Also,theroleofidentityinhumanknowingwillbeexploredinthisChapter.12Cf.InBoet.DeTrin.6,3,c.:“Thus,theintellectisabletoconceivewithoutmediationthe

quiddityofthesensiblething,butnotthequiddityofanintelligiblething.”(mytrans.)[Etsicimmediatepotestconcipereintellectusquiditatemreisensibilis,nonautemalicuiusreiintelligibilis.];DeVer2,3,ad3:“…fortobedirectedtothelikenessofathingisthesameastobedirectedtothethingwhichisknownthroughthislikeness.”[…idemesteiferriinsimilitudinemrei,etinremquaepertalemsimilitudinemcognoscitur.];SummaTheologiaeI,12,9,c.(Stump’stranslation,cf.Stump,256note50):“…tocognizethingsbymeansoftheirsimilitudesexistinginthecognizeristocognizethosethingsastheyareinthemselves,orintheirownnatures…”[…cognoscereresperearumsimilitudinesincognoscenteexistentes,estcognoscereeasinseipsis,seuinpropriisnaturis…]”

10

priori,butametaphysicalapriori,productivenotofthecontentbutoftheintelligiblemode

ofbeingoftheuniversalnaturesubsistinginreality.

2)TheControversywithLatinAverroism

Thedoctrineoftheagentintellectisfoundmanytimesinthecontextofthe

controversywithLatinAverroism13which,accordingtoSellés,hadgrowninrelevance

duringSt.Thomas’scareer.14AccordingtoSellés,whatSt.ThomascriticizedinAverroeswas

hisclaimthatboththepossibleandtheagentintellectarerespectivelyoneforallhuman

beings,inthatwaydenyingtheimmortalityofthesoul.15St.Thomastriestoshowhow

inconclusivearetheargumentstakenfromAristotle’sDeAnimatosupporttheAverroistic

claimthattheagentintellectdoesnotbelongtothesoul.16

SellésconsidersAquinas’interpretationofAverroestobebasicallycorrect,despite

thefactofitsbeingsaidthatAverroeswouldhavemaintainedtheimmortalityofthesoul,

amongotherreligiousprinciples.17HesuggeststhatthereasonfortheArabictendencyto

considertheintellectasoneisacertainsearchforAristotle’scompatibilitywithIslam,

whichcouldalsohaveaccountedfortheNeoplatonicreadingofthePhilosopher.18In

13IntheSumma,cf.79,4-5and88,1.14Cf.Sellés,EIA,200.HenoticesthatSt.AlberttheGreat’sDeunitateintellectus(1256)is

addressed“againstAverroes”whereasthesame-titledworkofSt.Thomas(1270)isaddressed“againstAverroists.”HequotesalsoSummaI-II,77,a.3,wherethefollowersofAverroesaresaidtobe“many.”

15Cf.JuanFernandoSellés,“LaCríticaTomistaalaInterpretaciónÁrabeyJudíadelIntelectoAgente,”Espíritu:CuadernosDelInstitutoFilosóficoDeBalmesiana52,no.128(2003):219;Stump,266.

16Cf.HernánMartínezMillán,“SunandLight,orontheAgentIntellect,”RevistaEspañolaDeFilosofíaMedieval20(2013):50.

17Cf.Sellés,EIA,211.18Cf.Sellés,EIA,181-186.

11

Stump’sview,St.Thomaswouldalsoadmitthathumanknowingmustderiveinsomesense

fromtheDivineintellect;this,however,doesnotleadhimtoagreewithAverroes,butto

postulatethattheagentintellectexistsineachhumanbeingasalightparticipatedfrom

God.19

Stumpsaysthat“[Aquinas’]naturalpreoccupationduringthisperiodwiththe

writingofSummaTheologiaeIªmayalsohelptoaccountforthefactthathisotherworkof

thattime20showsaspecialinterestinthenatureandoperationsofthehumansoul,the

subjectmatterofQuestions75–89ofIª.”21Itcouldcertainlybesuggestedthatthe

controversywithLatinAverroismwouldalsohavebeenastrongreasonforAquinas’focus

onthesetopics,particularlyifwekeepinmindthat,accordingtoStump,InDeAnimaishis

firstAristotelianCommentary.Heprobablyrealizedthatthebestwaytofacethechallenge

ofAverroes’followerswastoofferabetteralternativeregardingAristotelianinterpretation.

ThecontroversywithAverroescertainlyworksasthehistoricalframeworkforsome

ofthetextswewilldiscuss.Thefocusofthisdissertation,however,willbetheroleofthe

agentintellectregardingtheproblemoftheuniversals,whichwasnotthecontroversial

questionthen.AccordingtoCory,forexample,thereisa“growingscholarlyappreciationof

thesharedphilosophicaltraditionlinkingmedievalArabicandLatinphilosophers,showing

19Cf.Stump,266:“…[I]nrejectingtheAverroisticlinethattheremustbeonlyoneagent

intellectforallhumanbeings,[Aquinas]saysitmustnonethelessbethecasethatallourintellectsderivefromtheoneseparateintellectthatisGod,becauseallhumanbeingsshareacommonsetoffirstprinciples.”

20AccordingtoherdatingofSt.Thomas’works,Q.D.DeAnima(1265-1266),InDeAnima(1267-1268)andQ.D.DeSpirit.Creat.(1267-1268)belongtothisperiod(SummaIªpars,1266-1268).Cf.Stump,xvi-xx.

21Stump,10.

12

thatAquinas’scritiqueofAverroes’sseparateIntellectsdoesnotprecludehisappropriating

theconceptualframeworkofAverroes’sabstractiontheory.”22Theroleoftheagent

intellectintheabstractionoftheuniversalnatureispreciselythatwhichisrelevantforthe

presentpurposes:inthisway,thenecessityandthenatureofanagentintellectinAquinas

canbeseenfromamoresystematicpointofview.

3)SomeRenownedScholars

Toclarifyandthustounderstandthisparticularsystematicviewoftheagent

intellect’srole,someimportantscholarsintheirdiverseaccountsofknowingwillnowbe

studied.Thisstudywillbelimitedtothosepertinentissuesorpointsinotherscholarly

worksconsideredhelpful,eitherbysimilarityorbycontrast,inunderstandingtheview

beingproposedhere.

ÉtienneGilson

TheworkofÉtienneGilson(1884-1978)23isverymuchinthesamedirectionbeing

proposedhere,buthearticulateshispositionwithelementsthatareintensionwiththe

proposedinterpretationofSt.Thomas.Thepositiveelementswillbeacknowledgedand

thenthetensionswillbeexamined.

ForGilson,thesourceofuniversalcontentisnotaprioributaposteriori.Thisisthe

maindifferencebetweenAquinasandKant.24ForKant,theactofthesubjectisrequired,as

22ThereseS.Cory,“AverroesandAquinasontheAgentIntellect'sCausationof

Intelligibles,”RecherchesdeTheologieetPhilosophieMedievales82(2015):4.23Cf.EtienneGilson,Leréalismeméthodique(Paris:Téqui,1935),abbreviatedRM;Etienne

Gilson,Réalismethomisteetcritiquedelaconnaissance(Paris:Vrin,1939),abbreviatedRC.24Cf.RC151.Inthissection,referencestoGilson’sworkswillnotincludehisname.

13

conditionofpossibility,fortheobjectofintellectualknowledgetobeitself.Universalityand

necessityintheobjectcanhaveonlyanapriorisource,andthefacultiesofknowledgeare

consideredasapowerofunificationofthematterofexperience.25

AlsoinLeRéalismeMéthodique,theintellectualcontentcomesfromthethings

themselvesandnotfromthesubject.26Gilsonrejectstheprincipleofimmanence:thefact

thatanintellectualcontentisgiveninourknowledgedoesnotmeanthatknowledgeisthe

causeofthiscontent,andthefactthateveryobjectisgivenwithinourthoughtdoesnot

implythatitisreducedtoourthought.27Heaffirmstheoriginalalterityoftheobjectof

humanunderstanding28andrejectsanotionofepistemologyasthestudyofthinking

(wherethinkingisconsciousnessofacertainknowledge)infavorofastudyofknowledge

itself(asapprehensionofanobjectdistinctfromtheactofknowing).29

Moreparticularly,regardingourtopic,GilsonsaysthatKantisobligedtolocatethe

sourceoftheintelligibilityofexperienceinhumanknowingitself,becauseKanthad

rejectedthepossibilityofanintelligibledatum,ofsomethingexteriorthatcouldfecundate

rationalknowledge.30Inaratherhiddenreferencetotheagentintellect(rarelymentioned

inthetwoessaysexamined),Gilsonadmitsthatthelightoftheintellectplaysarolein

formingtheintellectualprinciples,butnotthattheircontentcomesfromit.Thecontentof

thefirstprincipleshasitssourceinthesensibledata,andGilsonisclearlyrejectingthe

25Cf.RC139-141.26Cf.RM82,101,106-107.27Cf.RM97.28Cf.RM66.29Cf.RM101-103.30Cf.RC168,173.

14

interpretationofAquinasthatwouldmakeofthefirstprinciplessomethinglikeapriorilaws

tobeappliedtosensibility.31

Gilsondeniestheagentintellectthecharacterofanaprioriconditionofhuman

knowingand,thus,mayseemtoopposethecurrentlyproposedviewoftheagentintellect

asametaphysicalapriori.Whatheactuallyopposes,however,istheagentintellectasa

Kantianandformalapriori;heaffirms,instead,thatthefacultiesofknowing,inatruly

ThomisticandAristotelianprospective,arepsychologicalfacultiesandthereforebeings.32

Now,inwhatsensedoesGilsonadmitthatthesourceofintellectualcontentisin

experienceratherthaninthesubjectitself?ForGilson,theuniversaliscausedby

experience,butitisnot“in”experience,becauseitisnotreal.Thatistosay,Gilsonbelieves

thatthereissomethingintheindividualobjectofexperience(itsnature)thatisthesource

oftheintelligiblecontent,notthoughinsofarasitisintuitedinsomeway,butinsofarasitis

thecauseofthesensiblemanifestations,whichareinturnthecauseofourconcept.The

intelligiblecontent(forGilson,thequidditas)isrelatedtothenaturethatisinreality,not

thoughasthatsamenatureinadifferentmodeofbeing,butasanintelligibleeffectofthat

natureinintelligence.33ThisiswhyGilsoncanrejecttheKantianapproach,sayingthatthe

sourceoftheuniversalisaposteriori,andatthesametimecandenytheuniversalas

contentanyexistenceinreality.ThedifferencebetweenGilson’sinterpretationandthe

currentoneproposedhereispreciselythefactthathedeniesanidentitybetweenthe

contentofourconceptandthenatureofthethingitself;thisdenialresults,itseems,from

31Cf.RC200-202.32Cf.RC137-138.33Cf.RC218-223.

15

hisoverlookingSt.Thomas’insistencethatthedifferentmodeofbeingofthesameobject

doesnotchangetheobjectitself.34

InthissenseGilsonaffirmsthattheintellectconceiveswhatitdoesnotperceive,

because“man”and“existence”aremerelyconceptsoftheintellect,andnotsomethingreal

andconcrete.35Still,heacknowledgeswithSt.Thomasthattheintelligibleisinthethings

themselves,andthatwethinkitinthephantasmbecauseitisthere.36Butinwhatsense,if

theyarejustconcepts,andonlythesingularexists?37Whatisthereisnotwhatweconceive

(quidditas)butthatfromwhichweconceive,theessence,andthatiswhywemaysaythat

weknowthequidditasofthesensiblenatures,andnotthenatureitself.38Classicrealism,

hesays,restsonthefactthatourknowledgetrulyattainsthereal,becauseitiscausedinus

bytherealitself,andnotbyanallegedintuitionoftheintelligible.39Thereason,forGilson,

thattheessencesofthesensiblethingscannotbeintuitedisthattheirformsare“purely

intelligible.”Thisstatementistrulysurprisinggiventhat,forSt.Thomas,thereasonthey

cannotbeseenintheirnaturalmodeofbeingispreciselytheopposite.Thereason,

accordingtoSt.Thomas,isthattheyarenotintelligibleinact,whichispreciselywhySt.

Thomasintroduces,withAristotle,theagentintellect.

34Idonotclaimthatthisintentionalidentityisperfect(itislimitedbytheprecisionofthe

phantasmineachsubjectandbythepossibilitiesofhumanexperience),butIdoclaimthatwhatisknownispreciselywhatthethingis.Onedoesnotneedtoknowsomethingperfectlytosaythatoneknowsit.

35Cf.RC204.36Cf.RC208.37Cf.RC210,RM73.38Cf.RC218-219.39Cf.RC222-223.Hewillsaythattheintellect“seesdirectly”theconcept(cf.RC215),but

becausehedoesnottake“concept”astherealthingitself.

16

TheveryvaluableinsightinGilson’sapproachisthattheintelligiblecontentcomes

fromthethingsthemselves.Thedifficulty,however,ishisinterpretationwithregardtothe

objectofintelligence.Thatis,becauseGilsondoesnotdifferentiatethemodeofbeingthe

objecthasinrealityfromthemodeofbeingtheobjecthasinthemind,hedeniesthe

identitybetweenthem,andunderstandsthecontentofknowingasaneffectofthenatures

ofthingsthroughtheirsensibleeffects.Inthisway,morethananintentionalidentity,he

seemstoproposeanintentional“proportion”betweenthecontentofknowingandthe

naturesofthings,theproportionbetweencauseandeffect.40Inthecurrentlyproposed

interpretationofSt.Thomas,instead,theagentobjectisanintelligibleinact(notthe

sensiblephantasm)whichrepresentsthethingitself,onlyinitsnature,abstractedfromthe

individualconditionsinthematter.

JosephOwens

JosephOwens(1908-2005),inhisCognition:AnEpistemologicalInquiry41intuitsthe

mostimportantelementsofThomisticGnoseology,includingthetwomodesofbeingthat

explaincognition,42thealterityoftheobjectofknowing,43theintentionalidentitybetween

objectandsubject,theoriginoftheuniversalcontentinsensiblethings.44Still,whenit

40Inthissensetheformalidentityorconvenientiainformabetweensubjectandobject

whichGilsonproposesinRM56-57maybeunderstood.IwillcomebacktothisinChapter3,whentreatingtheAristotelianidentity.

41Cf.JosephOwens,Cognition:AnEpistemologicalInquiry(Houston:CenterforThomisticStudies,1992).Inthissection,Iwillquoteonlythepagenumberofthiswork.

42Cf.38-40;45note22;351-353;357-358.43Cf.3;33-35;326-327.44Cf.70andnote5;82(interpretationdoesnotaddanyradicallynewcontent);334,cf.also

343note28.

17

comestohisfinalsynthesis,Owensdoesnotseemtocreateaconvincingsystem,45nordoes

heappeartorecreatetheThomistone.46

ThemaintensionbetweentheviewbeingproposedhereinandOwens’viewishis

lackofproperdistinctionbetweencontentandmodeofbeingofthecontent.Hedeniesthe

commonnature–initself–anyreality.47TheaforementionedlackofdistinctionleadsOwens

toaffirmthattheabstractedobjectisidenticalwiththewholeindividual,butwithout

explaininginwhatsense,then,theyaredifferent,oronwhatgroundsthereisanidentity.48

Inpp.324-325,Owensinitiallydeniesthenatureinitselfanykindofbeing,andthensays

thatoneandthesameobjecthasthetwokindsofbeing.Now,ifitisnothinginitself,how

canthenatureadmitevenonekindofbeing?Whathemeanstosayisevident;thatis,that

thenatureneverexistswithoutoneofthesetwomodesofbeing.However,thismeans

preciselythat,inbothmodesofbeing,thenatureitselfispresent,oneandthesame.In

otherwords,whatiscommontobothmodesofbeingispresentineachofthem.Whatis

45Forexample,Ifoundparticularlychallenginghisconclusionsontheproblemofthe

universals,cf.154-158.46Cf.140andnote2,whereheimpliesthattheissueoftheagentintellectisnotaconcern

inEpistemology.Now,Aquinas’recoursetotheagentintellectiscrucialtounderstandhisapproachtotheproblemoftheuniversals,whichisthemostimportantprobleminEpistemology.

47Cf.154ff,whereheclaimsthatthereisnothingcommonreallyexistingintheindividuals,becausethenatureexistsinthemindividualizedonly,notascommon;171,“Youcannotgiveauniversal,oranatureascommon,anyrealexistence”andOwensrefersheretop.163note19,wherewefindthetextofDeEnte,3.85-87Leonineed.:“…humannatureisnotfoundinindividualsasone…”(mytrans.)[…noninveniturinindividuisnaturahumanasecundumunitatem…]Inthatplace,however,St.ThomasisclearlyreferringtothePlatonicuniversal,whichisonenumericallyforalloftheindividuals.TheAristoteliannatureisonespecificallyinalloftheindividuals,andthereforetrulycommoninthatsense.Thepointisthat,forSt.Thomas,thereisarealdistinctionbetweentheessenceofathinganditsindividuatingprinciples,thoughnotarealseparation.Theyarenotthesamething(thing=co-principle,aswhenAristotlecallsmatteracertain“substance”),despitethefactthattheyaretogetherinthesamething(thing=substanceinitsfirstmeaning,therealparticularthing).Thisisoneofthemostimportantelementsinmyinterpretation.

48Cf.141-143.

18

this?Itisthecontent,whichisone.But,becauseOwens’viewconfusesthenumericalunity

oftheconceptwiththespecificunityofthecontent,hecannotadmitthatthenatureitself

isone.And,therefore,hesays:“anyexistencewhatsoeverwouldtieit[thenature]

inexorablytoeithertheparticularortheuniversalandwouldrenderimpossiblethe

thoroughgoingidentityofpredicatewithsubjectthatisrequiredforsayingtheoneisthe

other.”49ThisseemspreciselytheoppositeofwhatSt.ThomassaysinInMet.1,lect.10,

15850andSummaI,84,1,c.;thatis,St.Thomasholdsthatitisnotnecessaryforthething

understoodtoexistinrealitywiththesamemodeofbeingasithasintheintellect,asPlato

thought.ForAquinas,thesamethingadmitstwomodesofbeing.InOwens’interpretation,

thethingunderstoodcannotbeseparatedfromitsmodeofbeing,whichisthesame

problemfoundinPlato.

AnotherhermeneuticproblemapparentinOwensisacertainconfusionbetween

intentionalandrealidentityinhumanknowing,thatis,betweentheidentitysubject-object

(“animaestquodammodoomnia”),andtheidentityintellect-species(“intellectuminactu

estintellectusinactu”,whichherewillbecalledthe“Aristotelianidentity”).51InChapter3it

willbeshownhow,forAquinas,theyaredifferent.Theintellectinactandthespeciesby

whichitunderstands52areoneassubjectivepotencyanditsownsubjectiveact,i.e.,they

49350,myemphasis.50ThelastnumberinthequotesfromtheCommentarytotheAristotelianMetaphysicsisthe

paragraphnumberoftheeditionIused(cf.Bibliography).51Althoughboth“identities”canbereferredtoAristotle,weprefertocallafterthe

Philosophertheonethatistrulyanidentity(becausereal),whichisalsotheonethatmostfrequentlyconfusestheinterpretersofAquinas.

52Clearly,forSt.Thomas,itisnotthefacultywhichoperates,butthesubjectthroughthefaculty.Cf.DeSpirit.Creat.,a.10ad15:“Nowitmustnotbesaidthattheagentintellect

19

areoneandthesamerealthing.Buttheintellectandthethingunderstoodareoneina

differentway,onlyquodammodo,insofarastheperfectionofanotherthingispresentinthe

knower.Inotherwords,thespeciesistheintellectinactbuttheobject,representedinthe

species,isnottheintellectitself.Aswewillsee,this“confusionofidentities”isatworkin

otherinterpretationsofSt.Thomasaswell.53Connectedwiththislackofdifferentiationof

theidentitiesisthat,forOwens,bothsubjectandobjectareknownsimultaneously,

althoughtheknowerindirectly.54Thisconfusionjeopardizestheoriginalalterityofthe

objectofknowing.

ItisclearthatOwensintendstoopposetheviewofknowingwhichattributestothe

subjectalloftheresponsibilityfortheintellectualcontentofhumancognition.55Inthat

sense,Owensisverymuchinlinewiththecurrentlyproposedviewoftheagentintellectas

ametaphysicalapriori,ascauseofanintelligiblemodeofbeing,andnotoftheobjectitself.

Owensstates,“Thepercipientgivesexistencetotheactivitiesofsensiblecognitionand

perception,inwhichnonewobjectisproducedbutnewcognitionalexistenceisgiventoan

alreadyreallyexistentthing.Inintellectionthenaturesofthethingsareabstractedand

understandsinisolationfromthepossibleintellect,butthatthemanunderstandsbymeansofboth…”[Nonestautemdicendumquodintellectusagensseorsumintelligatabintellectupossibili:sedhomointelligitperutrumque…]Still,tosimplifytheexpression,manytimesthefacultywillbereferredtoastheone“doing”things.

53ForOwens,cf.41-43;142-143;348.AninterestingtextfromOwensquotedbyStump:“Youarethethingsperceivedorknown.Knowerandthingknown[…]becomeoneandthesameintheactualityofcognition.Fromthestrictlyepistemologicalstandpoint,thisthoroughgoingidentityofknowerandthingknownisthemostimportantandmostfundamentaltenetintheAristotelianconceptionofknowledge”(Stump,274,andinnote:“Owens1992,p.114.”ThequoteisnotfromhisCognition,althoughfromthesameyear).

54Cf.39;46;49:bothknown,thedifferencebeinginfocusonly,whichatfirstisontheobject;348:thereisaquestionofwhichoneisepistemologicallyprior.

55Cf.9;40;320.

20

givencognitionalexistencebytheknower.”56Still,ifthenaturesofthethingsarenotseen

astrulydistinctfromtheirindividualconditionsinthematter,theoriginoftheuniversal

contentisatriskofbeingseenasdependentonthefunctionsofthesubject,orperhaps

merelyaneffectoftheobjectofperception,57asinGilson.

EleonoreStump

EleonoreStump(1947-)58offersclearinsightintosomeofthemostimportant

elementsofThomisticEpistemology,butcertainprinciples,probablycomingfromher

philosophicalviews,canbeseenasinterferingwithanaccurateinterpretationofSt.

Thomas.

LetusbeginbyexaminingthepositiveelementsofStump’sinterpretation,as

follows.Knowingisverifiedbythereceptionofaspeciesinthefaculty,andthereisa

distinctionbetweenphantasmandintelligiblespecies.59Theintellect’sproperobjectisthe

particularthing’suniversalnature60andtheactoftheintellectisa“discovering”(rather

thancreatingorinventing)featuresoftheexternalworldthatareindependentfromthe

operationsoftheintellect;61inotherwords,thesourceofintelligiblecontentisinthethings

themselves.Assheherselfsays:“Aquinassupposesthatthecookiedoughofrealitycomes

56320.57Cf.40-43.58Cf.EleonoreStump,Aquinas(NewYork:Routledge,2003).Therelevantessaysare:

“FoundationsofKnowledge”(pp.217ff)and“TheMechanismsofCognition”(pp.244ff).Iwillquoteonlythepagenumber.

59Cf.17-18.60Cf.19.61Cf.231.

21

pre-cutintoparticularkindsofthings;and,unlikeKantians,Aquinasassumesthatweall

naturallyrecognizethoseverykindsofthingswiththenaturestheyreallyhave.”62

AmostinsightfulelementinStump’swork,intermsofAquinas’Epistemology,isher

recognitionoftheimportanceofdistinguishingthetwomodesofbeingoftheformofthe

known;thatis,respectively,itsmodeofbeinginrealityanditsmodeintheknower.Thatis

whytheonewhoknowstheformofathingdoesnotbecomeinrealitythatthingitself,but

onlycognitionally.Forher,however,thecognitionalreceptionofaformisstillamaterial

receptionoftheformoftheknown,accordingtowhatmightbecalledher“encoded

informationtheory.”63InStump’swords:

Thereceptionis“spiritual”or“immaterial”inthesensethat,forexample,thewayinwhichthematterofDNAcontainstheformsofhemoglobindoesnotturnthematteroftheDNAintohemoglobin.Or,asAquinaswouldputit,theDNAisassimilatedtotheproteinasregardstheformbutnotasregardsthematter.Aquinas’s“spiritual”receptionofformsisthuslikethecodingofmapsorblueprints.Thisis,ofcourse,alsothewayweourselvesthinksensationoccurs,encodedinformationbeingreceivedinvirtueofachangeinthematterofacorporealsenseorgan.64

Aftergiving,asanexample,thepresenceoftheformoftheproteinintheDNA,and

speakingaboutsensibleknowing,shesays:

WhatAquinasreferstoasthespiritualreceptionofanimmaterialform,then,iswhatwearemorelikelytocallencodedinformation[…]Scholarshavedisputedthepoint,butIthinkthatthetextsaredecisivelyinfavoroftheconclusionthat,forthesenses,thespiritualreceptionofsensiblespeciesisachangeinthematterofthebodilyorganofthesense.65

62265-266.63Cf.17;250-253.64254.65Cf.253.

22

Afewlineslater,sheinterpretsAquinas’textasifhehimselfweresuggestingthat

theintentionalreceptionisamaterialreception.66Sheclaimsalsothatthesenseswouldbe

madeintointellect,accordingtoAquinas,werewetoacceptanimmaterialreceptionofa

forminthesenses,andadds:“Itisthereforeclearlypossibleonhisviewforthespiritual

receptionofanimmaterialformtoconsistinthealterationofmatter.”67

Theseconceptsareappliedtotheintellectalsosince,forher,itisclearthatAquinas

“turnsouttohavebeenwronginhisviewthattheintellectusesnobodilyorgan.”68Atthe

conclusionofChapter8,shesays:

Inthemodeinwhichtheformisinthethingcognized,theformmakesthatthingwhatitis–awolf,say.Butinthemodeinwhichtheformisinthethingcognized[sic],69spirituallyorintentionally,asencodedinformation,itdoesnotmakethecognizerbeawolf.Althoughwhenitisinthecognizer,itisthesameformastheforminthewolf,thedifferenceofmodemakesitthecasethatthecognizerdoesnotliterallyturnintoawolfwhencognizingone.70

Apparently,Stumpdoesnotcarryallthewaytoitsfinalconsequencestheprinciple

ofintentionalityandofthetwomodesofbeing;instead,shereducestheThomistic

intentionalmodeofbeingtothematerialone(“encodedinformationtheory”),andthatis

whyshecanwonderwhetherthisThomisticprinciplemakesanysenseinthejustificationof

knowing.71Becausesheviewsthepresenceoftheformintheknowerasamaterialcopy,

66SheinterpretsAquinas’statement:“Andsoitmustbethatasensereceivescorporeally

andmateriallythesimilitudeofthethingwhichissensed.”(InDAII.12.377,cf.Stump,253),andasimilartextofQDVII.5ad2(cf.254note40)asifSt.Thomasweresaying“materially”intherealsense,andnot“withthematerialconditions”,whichisaqualificationofthecontent,notofthemodeofbeingofthecontentintheknower.

67Cf.254.68Cf.264.69Ithinkitisclearthatshemeansnot“thingcognized”but“cognizer.”70275,myemphasis.71Cf.275-276.

23

Stumpisnotconvinced;sheknowsthatforSt.Thomasthetwomodesofbeingarethe

explanation,andthisishergreathermeneuticinsightinAquinas;butbecauseherapproach

doesnotseemtofullyappreciatethemeaningandtheconsequencesofsuchadistinction,

shecannotseehowthiscanbeaplausibleexplanationofknowing.Thesuggestion72canbe

madethat,forAquinas,twomodesofbeingmeanspreciselytwomodesofbeing,suchthat

thetwocannotbereducedtoone.Thetheoryoftwomodesofbeingpresupposesthefact

ofknowingaspresenceoftheobjecttothesubject,ascommunionoftwo.Thedoctrineof

Aquinascanmakesenseonlyfromthat“Thomisticfact.”Whetherornotthatfactisgranted

isanotherstory.73

Finally,asregardsAquinas’text,Stumpappearsnottodifferentiatebetweenwhat

wecallintentionalidentity(subject–object,animaestquodammodoomnia)and

Aristotelianidentity(speciesandfacultyofknowing,intellectuminactuestintellectusin

actu).Shesays:“WearenowinapositiontounderstandAquinas’sfrequentlyrepeated,

frequentlycitednotionthat‘allcognitionarisesfromtheassimilationofthecognizertothe

thingcognized’,that‘theintellectinactisthethingunderstoodinact’,sothat‘thesoulis

allthings’.”74Aquinasmakesadistinctionbetweentheseidentities,aswewillseein

72InChapter2,IwillelaborateuponthistheoryofthetwomodesofbeinginAquinas.73RegardingotherEpistemologicalmattersingeneral,Stumpdoesnotbelievethatthe

EpistemologyofAquinascanholditselfwithoutrecoursetotheprinciplethatGodcreatedthefacultiesofknowingandthereforetheyfunctionproperlyandarereliable(cf.21,234,276).Shealsosupposesthat,forSt.Thomas,thefirstprinciplesarenotindubitable(cf.231);andthathisreliabilisticandoptimistictheoryofknowledgewouldnotbeabletoovercomeskepticaldoubts(cf.237).

74273.Cf.Stump,17,whereAquinas’viewofknowledgeissaidtoinvolve“…somesortofformalidentitybetweentheextramentalobject(O)andthecognizingfaculty(F)initsactuallycognizingO.However,Aquinastakesthat(Aristotelian)identityclaimtomeanonlythattheformofOissomehowinF[innote:85,2ad1].”IwouldsuggestthatSt.Thomasinthattextisnotapplying

24

Chapter3.Itistobenoted,however,thatsometimestheissuemaybeamatteronlyof

textualinterpretationbecausesomeauthors,whomisreadAquinas’text,dounderstand

thatthereisadifferencebetweenthespeciesandtheobjectknown,andthatthereisa

differencebetweenthetwowaysof“receiving”theform.Thisseemstobetrueinthecase

ofStump.75Still,itisimportanttonoticethistextualmisinterpretationbecauseitmayresult

inascribingtoSt.Thomasanidentitybetweensubjectandobjectwhichwouldbeforeignto

hismind.

ArmandA.Maurer

TheworkofArmandMaurer(1915-2008)76rendersaperfectunderstandingofthe

problemofintellectualknowledge,thatis,howitispossiblethatuniversaltruthscome

fromexperience.Hedoesnotbelievethattheuniversalessencehasanyotherkindof

existenceoutsidethemindandtherefore,forMaurer,universalitymustbeasubjective

aspectofhumanknowing,dependingonthespiritualityofthesubject,andgroundedin

somewayintherealityofexperience.Also,becausethehumansubjectishistorical,and

realityalsoissubjecttocontingency,thereisnosuchthingascreatedeternaltruth.Maurer

believesthatthisdoctrinecouldbesubstantiatedonThomisticprinciples,althoughhe

theAristotelianidentitytotheintentional,butsayingthattheformer(realidentityspecies-intellect)doesnotjeopardizethelatter(whichisakindofidentitywithsomethingotherthanourselves).

75Cf.249-250.76AllofthequotesarefromArmandA.Maurer,BeingandKnowing:StudiesinThomas

AquinasandLaterMedievalPhilosophers(Toronto:PontificalInstituteofMediaevalStudies,1990).Therelevantessaysare“St.ThomasandEternalTruths”(pp.43ff)and“St.ThomasandHistoricity”(pp.95ff).Wewillindicatepagenumberonlyinthissection.

25

realizesthetensionswiththeactualdoctrineofAquinas.Herebeginsamoredetailed

explorationoftheseissues.

TheproblemofknowledgeissetupinverycleartermsbyMaurer.Paraphrasing

Fackenheim,Maurerwrites:“Itmustbeinquiredwhether,andifsohow,theworldof

experience,whichishistorical,canprovideagroundforuniversalandtranscendenttruth.”

Maurer’sgoalisclearinhisstatement:“Myconcerninthepresentlectureis[…]howSt.

ThomasAquinasaccountsforuniversalandnecessaryphilosophictruthsdrawnfroma

changingworldbytemporallysituatedhumans.”77

ThegreatesttensionbetweenMaurer’sviewandtheviewcurrentlybeingofferedis

thelackofdistinctioninMaurer’sviewbetweentheuniversalityofthecontentand

universalityasamodeofbeingofthecontent,adistinctionwhichwillbeshowncrucialfor

amoreaccurateinterpretationofAquinas.78Duetothislackofdistinction,Maurerdenies

theuniversalanyexistenceoutsidethemind.Anexampleofthisisfoundinhissection“St.

ThomasandEternalTruths”,79thefirstsectionwewillexamine:

Truth,St.Thomascontends,isoneofthosenotionsthathaveafoundationinrealitybutreceivetheirformalcharacterandcompletionfromanactoftheintellect.Timeanduniversalsareotherexamplesofthistypeofnotion.Theydonotexistassuchoutsidethemind,thoughtheyhavesomebasisinreality.80

Nothingisstableinthechangingworld.Thisiswhy,forMaurer,theeternityoftruth

impliestherealimmutabilityofitssubject,whichisgivenonlyinGod.Maurerstates:“Ifwe

taketruthtobetheinherentmeasureoftruethings(thetruthwefindinthingsandin

7796-97,note3.78Cf.Chapter2.7943-58.8046.

26

createdintellectsandtheirpropositions),thentruthisnoteternal,forneitherthethings

themselvesnortheintellectsinwhichtruthinheresexistforalleternity.”81Andso,in

humanbeings,Maurertransformsthehistoricityofthesubjectiveintelligiblebeingintothe

historicityoftheintelligiblecontent.

AproblemarisesfromMaurer’snotdifferentiatingsufficientlybetweenwhat

Aquinassaysabouteternaltruths(adiscussionregardingthesubjectivebeingofjudgments

orideas)82andthenecessityoruniversalityoftruthingeneral,inreferencetothecontent

ofthosejudgmentsorideas.Maurerhimselfreferstheterm“eternity”toa“modeof

durationofbeing”which,assuch,belongstoGodalone.83ItisinthissensethatAquinas

deniestheexistenceofeternaltruthsoutsidethedivinemind.DoesMaurermeantosay

thesame?Maurer’sremarkstowardstheendofthearticleindicatethatheisgoingfurther:

Wehavealreadyremarkedthat[St.Thomas]doesnotascribeanessentialbeingtoessencestakenjustinthemselves.Thoughhegrantsthatessencesmaybeconsideredinthemselves,hedoesnotbelievetheyhaveabeingorentityinthemselves.Theonlybeingtheyhaveisthatofthesubjectinwhichtheyexist;inthemselvestheyaresimplynothing[…]ThereisnoroominSt.Thomas'thoughtforcreatedeternaltruths,forthiswouldimplythatGodcouldgivetruthseternalbeing,whichisreservedforhimalone[…]Onlyonthesuppositionthateternaltruthshaveakindofentityinthemselvesdoesthelatemedievalandearlymodernphilosophicaldiscussionconcerningtheirpossiblecreationornon-creation,andtheirpossibleindependenceofthedivinemindandwillmakesense[…].Butatthesametimedoesthisnoteliminatethedistinctionbetweennecessaryandcontingenttruths?Ifessencesperishwiththeexistencesofthings—iftheyhavenoessentialbeingoftheirowndistinctfromtheirexistentialbeing-sotoodonecessarypropositions,inwhichessentialpredicatesareattributedtoasubject.Thesepropositions,then,arenoteternalornecessarybutcontingenttruths.84

8148.82Cf.56.83Cf.56.8457,myemphasis.

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Maurerisnolongerspeakingmerelyofthesubjectivebeingofthetruth,butofthe

necessityofthepropositions.Maurer’sconclusionisascribedtoSt.Thomas,whosays

“Thereisnonecessarytruthincreatures.”85Maurerhimself,however,hadrecognizedthat,

inthesameplace,St.Thomasmakesanimportantdistinction.Thatdistinctionisbetween

thetwowaysofregardinganatureoressence,onewaybeinginitself,theotherwaybeing

eitherasitexistsinrealityorasitexistsinthemind.Maurerhadalsogranted,withSt.

Thomas,thatthenatureinitselfcouldbecalledeternal.86ThusMaurerappearstosuggest

thefollowingreasoning:theessenceinitselfdoesnotexistexceptinoneofthosetwo

modesofbeing(inrealityorinthemind);now,neitherofthosetwomodesofbeingis

eternal;therefore,noessenceiseternalornecessary,andsonotruthaboutessencescan

benecessary.

Thisreasoning,however,raisesaquestion:isthisnotexactlytheerrormadeby

Plato,againstwhichSt.ThomaslinesupwithAristotle?87St.Thomasjustifiesthe

universalityandnecessityofhumanknowingbydistinguishingbetweenthewaynatures

existinrealityandinthemind,andnotbydenyingthatthoseverynaturesexistinthe

particular,asPlatodid.AndAquinasjustifiesabstractionnotbysayingthattheessences

needtoexistabstractedfromtheparticulardeterminations,asPlatowould,butbysaying

that,inthefirstoperation,weknowtheessencewithoutconsideringitsparticular

determinations.ForAquinas,thethingsthatexisttogethercanbeknownseparately,

becauseoneisnottheother,evenifonecannotexistwithouttheother.ForAquinas,two

8557,quotingInISent.,d.19,q.5,a.3.86Cf.51.87Cf.SummaI,84,1,c..

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“things”cancomposeone“thing”,asdoessenceandesse,actandpotency,matterand

form,substanceandaccidents,etc..Nocreaturecanbesaidtobewithoutcomposition,

eveniftheelementsofsomeofthesecompositionscannotexistseparatelyincreatures.

Thisisthefoundationofabstraction.

ForAquinas,thereisnoabsolutenecessityandstabilityinhumanknowingas

subjectivecharacteristic,norassomethingcomingfromthesubject:inthissensethereare

noeternaltruths.Butthereisstabilityandnecessityinhumanknowingonthesideofthe

object,becausethereisstabilityintheparticularrealityweknow,byreasonofitsspeciesor

nature.88Whatcomesfromthesubject,namelyfromtheagentintellect,isnotthis

objectivestabilitybutanintelligiblemodeofbeing,whichcanbeasnecessary89oras

contingentasanyothercreatedmodeofbeing.

Thesection“St.ThomasandHistoricity”,90cannowbeexamined.Here,Maurer

recognizesthat,forSt.Thomas,thereissuchathingasapermanentnatureoressencein

things,butMaurerqualifieshisownstatement:“St.Thomasneverdoubtedthatwehavea

permanentnatureoressencethatspecifiesusashumanbeings,buthewasequally

convincedthatwedonotknowthisnatureinitself.”91

UnderstandingclearlywhatAquinasmeansbythetemporalityoftruth,inthesense

ofthesubjectivetemporalityofourjudgmentoftruth,Maurerstates:“Thetruthofthe

88Cf.SummaI,84,1,c.;Chapter2.89Imustmentionatleastthat,forAquinas,thereissuchathingasnecessityincreated

beings(separatesubstances)aswell,whichisnecessitystrictlyspeaking,evenifitisnotabsoluteinthewaythatthenecessityofGodisabsolute.

9095-116.91104.

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humanmind,onthecontrary,isnoteternalbuttemporal.St.Thomasleavesusinnodoubt

onthematter:‘Becauseourmindisnoteternal,neitheristhetruthofpropositionswhich

areformedbyuseternal,butithadabeginningintime.’”92Afewlineslaterhesays,

Humantruth,then,isnoteternal,andneitherisitunchangeable.OnceagainSt.Thomasisexplicit:"Thetruthofthedivinemindisunchangeable,butthetruthofourmindischangeable."Hedoesnotmeanthatatruth,sayofmetaphysicsormathematics,issubjecttochange,butthatthetruthofourintellectis.93

And,evenifMaurerdoesnotgivetothetruthanykindofexistenceoutsidethe

mind,hedoesnotconfoundthesubjectiveeternitywiththenecessityofthecontent

consideredjustinitself:

“Aretherenotinthemindofthemathematicianandmetaphysiciannecessarytruths,i.e.truthsthatcannotbeotherwise?St.Thomasdoesnotdenythis,orthat(asweshallsee)themindcanthinkaboutthesetruthsjustinthemselves,quiteapartfromtheirexistenceinanymind.Whatheisdenyingisthatanytruthexistsnecessarilyinacreatedmind.”94

However,thisisnotthequestionofhistoricityoftruth.ModernPhilosophyisnot

worriedabouttheeternityoftruthinthissense,butabouttheoriginofuniversalityand

necessityinhumancognitionasanobjectivecharacteristic,whichisalsoMaurer’sconcern

inthisarticle.95Forthisreason,onemaywonderwhyhedoesnotdistinguishbetweenthe

presenceofthenecessarycontentinthemindandinthethingsthemselves.Onemayalso

wonderwhyhesaysthatwe“canthinkaboutthesetruthsinthemselves,quiteapartfrom

theirexistenceinanymind,”anddoesnotadd“apartfromtheirexistenceinthethings

92109.93110.94111.95Cf.96-97,note3.

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themselves.”Itseemsclearthat,forMaurer,thereasonisthattherearenosuchthingsas

universalityortruthinthethingsthemselves,butonlyinthemind.

Afewpageslaterhesaysthatwehavethe“abilitytoabstractnaturesfromspatial

andtemporalconditions.Wecanformuniversalconceptsandmakeuniversaljudgments

aboutthethingsweexperiencewhicharetruealwaysandeverywhere.”96Regarding

judgments,hesaysthatwecan,

[T]hinkaboutthemjustinthemselves,orabsolutely,abstractingfromtheexistencetheyhaveinamind.Wecanfocusourattentiononthem,withoutconsideringwhethertheyexisttemporallyinusoreternallyinGod.Wecandothesamethingwithanatureoressencewhenwethinkofitjustinitself,orabsolutely,withoutconsideringwhetheritexistsasauniversalinthemindorasanindividualinreality.97

Butdothosethingsexistinrealityornot?“Becausetruthscanbeconsidered

absolutelyorinthemselves,itistemptingtothinkthattheyhaveakindofentityin

themselves,distinctfromthebeingofthemindinwhichtheyexist.”98Heascribesthaterror

tothePlatonicdistinctionbetweentheesseessentiaeandtheesseexistentiae,whichis

certainlyforeigntothespiritofSt.Thomas.ButMaurerdoesnotseemtorealizethatitis

alsoPlatonictothinkthattheuniversaldoesnothaveanyotherbeingdistinctfromthe

beingithasinthemind,becauseitisPlatonictonotdistinguishthemodeofbeingofthe

natureinthemindfromthemodeofbeingithasinreality.99

Afewlineslater,MaurerappliestotheobjectivecontentoftruththatwhichAquinas

saysaboutthesubjectiveeternityoftruth,bysayingthatwecanreach“universaltruths

96113.97113-114.98114.99Cf.InMet.1,lect.10,158;Chapter2.

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thattranscendthelimitsoftimeandmatter,whilefallingshortofeternity.”100Whatdoes

Maurermean?Universaltruths,thatis,objectiveuniversaltruths,arealesserdegreeof

eternity.However,theonlyeternitybeingdiscussedinAquinasisthesubjectiveeternityof

truth.InMaurer,therefore,thereappearstobeanidentificationbetweeneternityasa

conditionoftheobjectandasaconditionofthesubject,whichgoesbeyondtheintention

ofAquinas.Afterhavingdeniedanyexistenceoftheuniversalessenceoutsidethemind,

Maurerisaffirmingthatuniversalityisastateofhumanknowingdependentonthespecific

spiritualityofthehumansubject,whichisnoteternalbecausethehumanmindisnot

eternal.Inotherwords,thatbecausewehumanbeingssubjectivelytranscendmatterand

time,ouruniversalknowledgecanalsotranscendthem;101therefore,then,thatwhichgives

anaccountofthetranscendenceoftheobjectisthetranscendenceofthesubject.

Maurer’sunderstandingofAquinas’basicorientationisseenwherehesays,

“cognitionfromtheoutsetopensuponameaningfulworldbeyondcognition[…]onewhose

intelligibilityrevealsitselftothemindandwhichwecansharewithothers.”102These

remarksdonotnecessarilyimplythatheagreeswithSt.Thomas.Hetriestosupporta

theoryofhistoricityoftruthusingThomisticprinciples,namelythesubjectivetemporalityof

humantruthandthenon-existenceofessencesinastateofabstraction.However,Maurer

seemstooverlookamorefundamentalprinciple,thatbeingtheexistenceoftheuniversal

asnatureintheparticularthingsthemselves,theverybasisforSt.Thomas’position

regardingthisissue.Maurer,allthesame,hastherealmeritofdealingopenlyandclearly

100114.101Cf.113.102116.

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withthemostimportantquestionforThomismtoday,thatbeingitsanswertoHistoricism

andtheKantianturntothesubject.

W.NorrisClarke

W.NorrisClarke(1915-2008),103inhisresearchonthesourcesandoriginalityof

Thomism,linesupenthusiasticallywithFabro.ItisinterestingtonotehowClarke’sslight

preferenceforaviewdifferentfromtheItalianphilosopher’sinthefirstarticle(forClarke,

St.ThomasisanAristotelianismspecifiedbyNeoplatonismratherthanviceversa,asFabro

wouldpropose),104becomesanalmostcompleteagreementwithFabrointhesecond.105In

thissense,Clarke’sworkcanserveasaperfectintroductiontoFabro’soverallinterpretation

ofAquinas.

Asidefromthis,andforthepresentstudy,Clarke’smostimportantandpertinent

insighthastodowiththeroleofthemetaphysicalnotionofparticipationasregardsthe

problemoftheuniversalsandabstraction.ThisnotionhelpsAquinastoexplainthe

realizationoftheoneinthemany,insuchawaythatthereisarealcompositioninthe

manybetweenparticipatedperfectionandparticipant(participationalwaysimpliesa

composition)and,atthesametime,thereisanabsolutemetaphysicaldistinctionbetween

theparticipantsandtheseparateperfection(thatis,God).TheThomisticnotionof

participation,understoodinthisway,impliesadoublemetaphysicaldistinction:a

103Cf.W.NorrisClarke,SJ.,ExplorationsinMetaphysics:Person,God,Being(NotreDame:

UniversityofNotreDamePress,1994,reprinted2008).Therelevantessaysare:"TheLimitationofActbyPotencyinSaintThomas:AristotelianismorNeoplatonism?"(pp.65ff)and"TheMeaningofParticipationinSaintThomas"(pp.89ff).

104Cf.82.105Cf.98.

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distinctionintrinsictotheparticipant(betweenparticipatedformandparticipantpotency)

andadistinctionbetweenthebeingbyparticipationandtheintensiveunlimitedsource,the

beingperessentiam.CrucialtothisThomisticnotionisthat“participation”isapplied

analogicallytothedifferentmetaphysicallevels(esse–essence,form–matter,substance-

accident,etc.)andthatthereisalsoanalogybetweenitsmetaphysicalandlogicaluses.

Therelevanceforourtopiccomesfromthenotionofparticipationasthe

explanationorconditionofpossibilityoftherealpresenceoftheone(=thespecifically

common)inthemany.Theuniversalnatureispresentinalloftheindividualsthat

participateit.Andthis,inturn,willbetheconditionofpossibilityofabstraction,aswillbe

seen.Clarke,byinterpretingAquinas’notioninametaphysicalsense,agreesbasicallywith

theinterpretationofAquinasbeingproposedinthisthesis.

Clarke’sreadingofPlatoisveryhelpful,whereClarkesays:“Inadditiontothe

obviousdefectinthePlatonictheoryofitsconfusionbetweenthelogicalandthe

ontologicalorders,wewouldliketocallattentiontoanotherdeficiencytoofrequently

overlooked”,106adeficiencythat,inClarke’smind,isPlato’sinabilityto“expressthe

participationstructureintermsofthelimitedreceptionbytheparticipantsofaperfection

thatexistsinitssourceinastateofillimitationorinfinity.”107Inotherwords,whatis

“obvious”toClarkeisthatPlatowantstheontologicalordertoperfectlyparallelthelogical

order(lackofdistinctionbetweenthetwomodesofbeingoftheobjectofknowing)anda

furtherdefect(consequenceofthefirstone)isPlato’soverlookingthefactthatthesame

10690.10790.

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perfectionisrealizedintwodifferentwaysintheparticipantandinthesource.Thishelpsus

toseethat,forClarke,Thomisticparticipationimpliesthepresence(thoughlimited)ofthe

source’sperfectionintheparticular.

ClarkeseessimilardefectsinthetheoryofparticipationheldbyAquinas’

Neoplatonicsources,forexample,thetheory’s“lackofcleardistinctionbetweengenuine

ontologicalparticipationsandmerelogicalsubordinationofabstractconcepts.”108Clarke

continues:

St.Thomas’soriginalityhasconsistedintheskillwithwhich,guidedbyhiskeensenseofanalogyandofthedifferencebetweentheontologicalandtheconceptualorders(alwayssoblurredintheNeoplatonists),hehasadaptedthisframeworktoarealisticmetaphysicsofexistenceandanepistemologyofabstraction.109

Thisisaveryinsightfulremark.AsClarkeseemstoimply,whatallowsSt.Thomasto

givetheworldrealityistoadmitthatperfection(andthusbeing)canbelimited(andsoina

particularindividual),thankstothenotionofparticipation.Thereisnoneedtodenyor

diminishtherealityoftheparticular,becausetheperfectionoftheuniversalsubstancescan

befoundinthem,althoughinalimitedway.AndneitheristhereaneedforAquinasto

postulateaseparatesourceofintelligiblecontentthatcouldmatchtheuniversalityofour

concepts:thecontentofourconceptsisinthethingsthemselves(participatednature).For

thisreason,thatwhichexplainsknowingisabstractionfromtheindividual,andnotan

illuminationfromabove(inthesenseofaparticipationoftheagentobjectitself110).

ThedoctrineofparticipationisforClarke,

10891.10995.110InChapter4wewillseeinwhatsenseAquinasadmitsadivineilluminationinnatural

humanknowing,namelyasaparticipatedlightthat“makesintelligible.”

35

atheoryforrenderingintelligiblea“many”inanyorderintermsofahigherone,inotherwords,forexplainingthecommonpossessioninmanysubjectsofagivenattribute,whetherinthelogicalortheontologicalorder,byreferencetoahighersourcefromwhichallreceiveorparticipateinsomewaytheperfectiontheypossessincommon.111

NotehowClarkesupposesthattheperfectionisontologicallypossessedincommon

bythoseparticipatingit.Thesamecanbeinferredfromhisconsiderationofthe

participatedbeingasacompositeunity.ForClarke,Aquinasmanagestomakesenseofthe

unityoftheparticipatedbeingbystrengtheningtheNeoplatonicnotionofparticipation

withtheAristoteliantheoryofactandpotency;thisisbecause,intheend,whatrequiredan

explanationwastheunityoftheparticipatedbeing,notitscomposition.Clearly,Clarke

considersthat,forSt.Thomas,thereisacompositionofperfectionandlimitingpotency,

whichistosaythatbotharepresentyetdistinct:

Inotherwords,whatSt.ThomashasdoneistoputhisfingeronwhatwasperhapsthegreatestsingleweaknessoftheNeoplatonicdoctrinethroughoutitswholetradition,namely,thelackofanyadequatemetaphysicalexplanationtosafeguardtheintrinsicunityofthecompositionsresultingfromparticipation.112

ForClarke,whatispresentineachindividualcouldverywellbecalleda“common

nature,”presenttotallyandequallyineachmemberofthespecies:

Sinceeverymemberofaspeciesreceivesitsspecificformtotallyandequallyinthequalitativeorder,limitationherecanmeanonlyrestrictioninthespatial-quantitativeorderbycomparisonwithasourcewhichcanexistonlyintentionallyasanideainamind,whereitisendowedwithaninfinitythatisonlythenegativeinfinityofindeterminationofauniversalideaassuch.113

11192.11296.11397.IthinkitisevidentthatClarkeisnotsuggestingthattheuniversalinthehumanmind

isthesourceofthenatureintheindividuals,asifthepresenceintheindividualwereexplainedbyouractofjudgment,etc..Thecontextofthearticlediscouragessuchaninterpretation.Fabro

36

TheThomisticdoctrineofparticipationis“appliedwithaconsummatesenseof

analogytothedifferentordersbothofrealityandofideas.”114

ItisimportanttohavementionedClarkeatthebeginningofthisstudy,notonlyfor

hiscloseconnectionwithFabro,butparticularlyforraisingthenotionofparticipationin

relationtothetheoryofabstraction.115Clarkehelpsustoseethatthenotionof

participation,oncethelimitsofPlatohavebeenovercome,andoncethenotionitselfhas

beencompletedbytheAristotelianframeworkofactandpotency,isabletoresolvethe

problemoftheoneandthemany.Themanyareone,becausetheoneperfectionis

participated(partlyrealized)ineachofthem;buttheyarestillmanybecause,togetherwith

theparticipatedperfection,thereisapotencythatentersintocompositionwiththe

perfection.Theuniversalandnecessaryknowledge,then,correspondstorealitybecauseit

ispossibletoknowseparatelythethingsthatarereallydistinct(realcompositionofthe

participatedbeing),althoughnotreallyseparated(realunityofactandpotency).

Inotherwords,theThomistictheoryofabstraction,ascurrentlybeingproposed,

wouldnotmakeanysenseifitwerenotatleastplausiblethatsomethinglikeacommon

perfection,specificnatureoressenceexistsintheparticularindividual.Thisalonewould

makesenseofthecurrentclaimthat,forAquinas,theuniversalcontentcomesfrom

outsidethemind.Now,theThomisticnotionofparticipation,becauseitspeaksofasingle

(=oneascommon)perfectionthatisrealizedindifferentsubjects,seemstoofferthat

explainsthenotionandchallengesofpredicamentalparticipationandunivocalparticipationinNMP,143ff.

11498.115Cf.95,quotedabove.

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plausibleexplanationoftheonebeingpresentinthemany,andoftherealdistinctionof

theco-principlesintheindividualsubstance.

JohnF.X.Knasas

JohnKnasas(1948-)116sharesthebasicinterpretationofAquinasofferedinthis

thesis.KnasasconsidersAquinasanaposteriorism,holdingthattheintellectualcontent

comesfromthesensiblethings,andthatthecognitivepowersdonotformallyconstitute

theobject.FurtherinterpretationincommonwithKnasasincludesthealterityinknowing,

thedistinctionbetweentwomodesofbeingoftheobjectastheexplanationofknowing,

andtheunderstandingofintentionalidentityinknowing.

Knasasgivesus,asitwere,adefinitionofaformalaprioriasregardsintellectual

knowing.Forhim,TranscendentalThomismholds“therevisionistclaimthatAquinas’

understandingofthehumanintellectincludesacrucialaprioridimensionfunctioningasa

constitutivefactorinourconsciousnessofobjects.”117Infact,Knasassays:

Maréchal,Rahner,andLonerganallregardthedynamismoftheintellecttowardsBeingasaconstitutivefactorforourconsciousnessofbeings[later,quotingMaréchal]‘forthesubjectisreallyknowingassuchonlytotheextentthatheformallytakespartintheedificationoftheobject’.118

Theoppositeofthisaprioristvisionisexplainedinthefollowingterms:

BycallingAquinasanaposterioristIamnotdenyingtheelaboratestructureofknowingpowersinthehumansoul,e.g.,externalsenses,commonsense,imagination,agentandpossibleintellects.Isimplymeanthatinrelationtoactual

116Cf.JohnF.X.Knasas,“TranscendentalThomismandDeVeritateI,9,”inThomisticPapers

VI,ed.JohnKnasas(Houston:CenterforThomisticStudies,1994),229–250(abbreviatedTTDV);JohnF.X.Knasas,“WhyforLonerganKnowingCannotConsistin'TakingaLook,'”ACPQ78,no.1(2004):131–150(abbreviatedWLTL).InthereferencesofthissectionIwillomitKnasas’name.

117TTDV230,cf.232.118TTDV232,cf.WLTL132-133,note2.

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cognition,thesepowersarepureconditionsforknowledge.Thestructureoftheknowingpowerperformsnoconstitutiverolevis-à-vistheknownobject.119

Thatistosay,KnasasdoesnotdenyinAquinasan“activity”ofknowing,theevident

subjectiveaspectofknowing,buthedoesnotseethatactivityasconstitutiveoftheobject.

HowthisactiveaspectlooksinKnasas’accountcanbetakenfromhisremarks:“Inmy

opinion,thenature-as-finalityidea[ofMaréchal]asappliedtotheintellectneedmeanonly

theintellect’sordinationtoabstractintelligiblecontentfromthereal.Byitselftheideafails

tomeananyprojectionofcontentuponthedata.”120Inotherwords,forKnasas,the

oppositeofaformalaprioriisasubjectivitythattakesfromrealitytheintelligiblecontent.

Suchsubjectivityisabletotakefrom,nottoprojectupon,nortoproduce:

Whattheintellecthasofitselfisnotadrivetothenotionofbeingthatisthenusedconstitutivelyinregardtosense.Rather,theintellectofitselfisinclinedtoabstracttheratioentisfromthesensedatathatitcanappreciateasreal[…]LonerganandTranscendentalThomistsassumethateveryinclinationofapowerisaninclinationtoimposeatendency.Butinclinationcanalsobeaninclinationtoabstractratherthantoproject.121

Knasassays:“BothBoyerandmyselfunderstandthetruthjudgmentasbearingupon

amentalactwhosecontenttheintellecthasdrawnfromthesensiblereal.[…]No

constitutiveapriorifactorprecedestheformationoftheproposition.”122

Inanaposterioristictheory,Knasassays,“…whatisseeninthedataisthedecisive

epistemologicalmomentforassessingthecorrectnessofthejudgment.”123andquotes

Owensinconfirmation:“Thecauseandcriterionofthecertaintyistheexistencethatis119TTDV229-230note2.120TTDV230note2.121WLTL149-150.AsforKnasas’doctrineregardingjudgment,Idonotnecessarilyshareall

ofit.122TTDV245note27.123WLTL136.

39

apprehended.”124ForKnasasitisaproblemthat“thedataofsenseareaccordedrealityin

andthroughitsrelationtosomethingsubjective–themind’sintentionofbeing.”125Itis

clearthatforKnasas,injudgmentalso,theintelligiblecontentistakenfromthesensible.

HedoesnotbelievethatcertainpassagesoftheSummacouldbeusedtosupport

theoppositeview:

Angelshaveinnatespeciesofthings,andhumanshaveinnateknowledgeoffirstprinciples.Butthetextsadmittheinterpretationthatinourcasethefirstprinciplesareinbornbecausewearenaturallydisposedtoabstractthemsoeasily.Similarly,wesaythatsomeoneisanaturalbornbaseballplayer.Thisremarkdoesnotmeanthattheindividualisbornwiththeabilitytothrowacurveball.126

Althoughratheralongtext,thefollowingisusefulinmakingclearthat,forKnasas,

theagentintellectisnotaformalaprioriandtheintelligiblecontentcomesfromsensible

thingsbyabstraction:

Wilkinsends…byclaimingthattheefficientcauseofunderstandingistheagentintellect,whichhedescribesasthespiritofwonderandtheactiveorientationtowardstheunknown.CitingS.T.I-II,94,2,Dever.11,1c,andC.G.II,83,Wilkinsidentifiestheunknownwiththenotionofbeingwhichshouldbedistinguishedfromtheconceptofbeingasthemoreprimitivefromthederived.[…]Inmyopinion,thisistheThomisticAchilleshealofTranscendentalThomism.Thereisnodistinctionbetweenthenotionofbeingandtheconceptofbeing,paceRousselot.TakinguptheDever.I,1’sprimumcognitumdescriptionoftheratioentis,Dever.XXI,1c,characterizestheratioentisasthe“primaconceptiointellectus.”Also,atWilkins’scitedDever.XI,1c,theratioentis,againdescribedasoneof“primaconceptionesintellectus,”isnotregardedasbelongingtotheagentintellectbutasknownimmediatelybyabstractionfromsensiblethings.ContraLonergan,whatantedates

124QuotedagaininWLTL141.125WLTL137,cf.WLTL138.126WLTL139.TextslikethesewillbediscussedinChapter4.IfindKnasas’sinterpretation

verymuchinlinewithmyown.

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theconceptofbeingisnottheintendingofbeingbutsensiblethingsandanabstractionfromsensiblethings.127

Thefollowingtextmayhelptoexplainapreferenceforspeakingofintellectual

knowingasbeing“receptiveofobjectivecontent.”Hesays:“Sensationisnothingotherthan

adirectandimmediatepresenceofsomethingreal,orasAquinassaysatDeVer.2,2c:

“Existensperfectiounius,estnataesseinaltero.”128Whatisinterestingisthatinthistext,

Aquinasisdefiningnotonlysensation,butcognitioningeneral.Isuggestthat,insofarasthe

universalcontentisreal,andisimmediatelypresentthroughtheintelligiblespecies,the

simpleapprehensioncanbesaidtobe“receptiveofobjectivecontent,”assensationis.This

ismeantnotinsofarasthereisnomediationatall(whichwouldbethecasewithsensible

intuition),butinsofarasthereisnoobjectivemediation;whatisknownispreciselywhatis

“outthere,”the(common)nature,andtheintellecthasdirectcontactwithit.129

ItseemsapparentthatKnasasconsidersitcrucialtodistinguishthemodesofbeing

oftheknownperfectionintheexplanationofknowing:“formalreceptionofformassures

thatthereceivedformremainsnumericallyidenticalwiththeformoftherealthing.As

Owenssays:‘[…]Itisindividuallythesameform,actuatingbothchildandpercipientintwo

differentwaysofexisting.Itmakesthepercipientbetheindividualthatexistsinreality’”

andinnote,stillOwens:“Intheobject[ofsensation]therearethequidditativeand

127WLTL147.AnothertextfortheoriginoftheintelligiblecontentisinWLTL148:“The

experienceofanimalsdoesnotgeneratequestionsinthem,becauseanimalsdonotabstractbeingfromtheirexperience.”

128WLTL142.129Perhapsrelatedwiththeprevious,KnasasalsopointsoutthatAquinasdoesnotmind

speakingaboutintelligenceintermsofvision:“IhavenotedthatatInISent.d.19,q.5,a.1,ad7m,Aquinasislockedintoocularity.Aquinasdescribesthecharacterofthefirsttwooperationsas‘respicere.’”(WLTL146).

41

existentialfactors.Asimpressedpassivelyonthesentientpowerboththoseaspectsenter

intotheactuationofthefaculty.”130

Itake“formal”receptiontomean“intentional”reception.Ifindveryappealingthe

factthatKnasasconsiderstheidentity“numerical.”Thatis,itisagreatinsight,butatthe

sametime,itinvolvesagreatdanger.Theinsightisthat,ifwhatisknownispresentinthe

knowerinsomeway,therecanbeabsolutelynodifferencebetweentheknownoutthere

andtheknownpresentinthesubject,insofaraswespeakofthecontent.However,ifthe

distinctionbetweencontentandmodeofbeingofthecontentisnotmade,thereresults

eithertheproblemofidentifyinginrealitytheobjectwiththesubject(whichisoneofmy

concernswithsomeinterpretationsofAquinas)ortheproblemofnotexplainingproperly

thisidentity-in-alteritywhichknowingseemstobe.Inotherwords,itisnotenoughto

affirmthatthereisanidentityoftwothingsthatarenotthesame:weneedtoexplainthis

identity’sconditionofpossibility.Or,ifoneprefers,itisenoughtoaffirmthefactaslongas

thematterissetfordiscussion;butoncethisisdone,itisherethatEpistemologybegins.

Forthereasonspreviouslyexposed(particularlyhisapparentlackofinterestinthe

theoryoftheagentintellect)itdoesnotseemthatOwens,inhisCognition,givesthe

explanationthatisrequired.Ifthereisadifferentmodeofbeingofthesamething(the

object),thereneedstobeanexplanationofthisdifferentmodeofbeing,andthis

explanationistobefoundinthedoctrineoftheagentintellect.Knasasisverymuchin

130WLTL142,myemphasis.

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agreementwiththeEpistemologyofOwens,asKnasashimselfclaims,131butitisnotknown

tomeifKnasasgivesabetterexplanationelsewhere.ThepointIwouldsuggestisthatthe

emphasisontheefficiencyoftheobjectdoesexplainthepresenceofthecontent(insofaras

thepresenceofthelikeisexplainedbythelike),butitismissingtheexplanationofthe

differentmodeofbeingoftheobject,andparticularlyofthestateofabstractionthatthe

objectfindsinintelligence.Itmaybethat,becausethetextsquotedreferratherto

sensibility,thenecessityofanexplanationofthemodeofbeingdoesnotseemnecessary

(becauseanagentsenseisnotrequired).However,iftheeffectofthesensibleobjectisnot

onlyphysicalbutcognitional,dowenotneedtheThomisticcelestialbodiesorseparate

substancestomakesenseoftheintentionaleffect?Inwhatsense,otherwise,istherea

“numerical”identityofknownandknower?Thenaturalefficiencyisnotenough,because

theformswouldbeonly“specifically”identical.

Accusedoffallinginto“knowingbyconfrontation,”Knasassays:“Infact,sincemy

realismisimmediate,myrealismisknowledgebyidentityratherthanconfrontation.”132

Theproblemwiththeconfrontationparadigm,itissaid,isthatthereneedstobeabridge

toreachtheobject.ButthatbridgeisnotrequiredforKnasas,because“Therealisnotjust

‘theoutthere.’Therealisalso‘theouttherethatisinhere.’”133Wefindtheoutsideinside,

andthatiswhytheso-calledbridgeisnotneeded.Itisapowerfulexpositionofthefactof

131“IfWilkinsisinterestedintheentiresweepoftheepistemologyinwhichmyremarksare

embedded,hecouldreadJosephOwens’s,Cognition:AnEpistemologicalInquiryandPartThreeofhisElementaryChristianMetaphysics”(WLTL146).

132WLTL144.133WLTL144.

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knowing,andKnasasistalkingaboutidentityastheintentionalpresenceoftheobjectto

thesubject.

However,considerationshouldbegiventospeakingaboutthisasnotsimply

identity,inordertonotdilutetheothernessoftheobject.Thereisinknowinga

confrontation,insofarasthereisan“outthere”,andthereisalsoanidentity,insofarasthe

outthereis“inhere”or“immediatelypresent,”asKnasassays.“Intentionalidentity”or

“intentionalpresence”couldconveythesesamethoughtsinabetterfashion.Because

knowingisamodeofbeingas“presencein/totheother,”sayingonly“identity”may

obscurehalfofthemystery.This,however,ismoreamatteroftermsthanofdoctrine.

Knasassays:

Identityofsenseandsensibleisonlyhalfthestory.Asnotedabove,whensensereceivestheform,sensedoesnotsubjectivizetheform.Rather,sincethereceptionisformal[read:“intentional”],theothernessofthereceivedformisleftintact.Theobjectivityofsensationisguaranteed[…]Again,knowledgebywayofidentitymeansthattheknowerbecomesthereal.134

IagreewithKnasasinhisaposterioristicreadingofAquinasandhisdefinitionofa

formalapriori.WithgreaterexposuretoKnasas’works,itmightbepossibletoseewhether

heiselsewheremorespecificregardingtheexplanationofthedistinctionofthemodesof

beingoftheknown,andofidentityinknowing.However,hisunderstandingof

intentionalityandofthecognitionalfactareveryprecise,wherehesays:“Therealisnot

just‘theoutthere.’Therealisalso‘theouttherethatisinhere.’”135

134WLTL145-146,myemphasis.135WLTL144.MyinterpretationofDeVer.1,9isdifferentfromtheoneproposedbyKnasas

in“TranscendentalThomismandDeVeritateI,9.”Basically,andinmyview,Aquinasisfirsttalkingaboutthepresenceoftruthineveryjudgment(Consequitur,etc.),andsecondaboutthepresenceof

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4)CornelioFabro

Finally,wearriveatCornelioFabro(1911-1995),136thephilosopherwhoinspiredthis

discussionabouttheagentintellectasametaphysicalapriori.Althoughtheinterpretation

oftheagentintellectinthecurrentproposalisbasedonthesamegeneralepistemological

orientationasthatofFabro,theagentintellectasmetaphysicalaprioriisspokenof

somewhatdifferentlyinthecurrentviewthaninFabro’s.Tobegin,letusconsidersomeof

theprinciplesofhisEpistemology,andthenmoreparticularlyhisdoctrineontheagent

intellect.

Thealterityoftheobjectofknowing,theexplanationofknowingbythedistinction

ofthemodesofbeingoftheknownperfection,andtheoriginoftheintellectualcontentin

theobjectitself,areclearfeaturesofFabro’sdoctrineaboutknowingasparticipation:

Itseemsthereforethat“knowing”realizes,intherealmofnature,“participating”inthefullsenseoftheterm.Toknowistoassimilateandtobecomesimilar,istopossesstheactandtheformofanotherthinginsofarastheactandtheformare

truthasknowninMetaphysics(Cognoscitur,etc.).Thatiswhytheintellecthastoknowfirstitsownnature(aspartofthedefinitionoftruth,adaequatioreietc.);andthisisthereflectionSt.Thomasistalkingabout,ametaphysicalreflection,whichisthesameasthereditiocompletathatallowstheintellecttoknowitsessentiapropria.Inotherwords,wedonotneedtoknowtheessenceoftheintellecttoknowatruth,thatis,toknowthetruthregardingsomethingandtoaffirmit:inthiscase,weneedonlytoknow“what’sgoingon.”Butwedoneedtoknowtheessenceoftheintellectasthefacultyofknowingbeing,inordertoknowwhattruthis,asadaequatioreietintellectus.TheobjectionthatSt.Thomasisalsospeakingabouttruthinsensibility(inthefirstsense),shouldbeputintocontext,noticingthathespeaksaboutajudgmentinthesensesaswell,andthatthesensesknowthattheysense:heisthereforenotspeakingofanyfacultyofsense,butofaparticularoperationoftheinternalsenses,thatisanalogoustojudgment,andonlyinthatsensecanbesaidtopossessthetruth.Itshouldbeclearthat,forSt.Thomas,thetruthisadaequatioreietintellectusjudicantis,andthereforethesenses(andeventheintellectinsofarasitapprehends)areexcludedfrompossessingthetruth,properlyspeaking.

136ThefollowingremarksfocusonFabro,Cornelio,LaNozioneMetafisicadiPartecipazionesecondoSanTommasod’Aquino(NMP);andLaSvoltaAntropologicadiKarlRahner(LS),alreadyquoted.AsIhavebeendoingwithotherauthors,IwillomitFabro’snameinthereferencestohisworksinthissection.

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andremainoftheotherthing.Isitthecase,then,thatoneandthesameactis,atthesametimeandunderthesamerespect,actofdifferentsubjects,theknowerandtheknown?Yes,butThomisticAristotelismaddsimmediately,notinthesameway.Theactandtheformarepresentintheobjectknowninaphysicalandrealway,inthesubject,instead,inanobjectiveand“intentional”way,thatistosaybymeansofan“intermediary”,the“species”(impressa)whichisthequalitythatdisposesthesubjecttoenterintothatparticipation.Bymeansofthisqualitativemodification,whichhasallitsratio[italian:ragione]andstructurefromtheobjectandthatcomestoemergeuponthebeingoftheknowerasafloweruponthestem,itappearsclearthatknowingistrulya“participating.”137

RegardingAquinas’agentintellect,FabroinLaSvolta(cf.LS52and116)referstoit

asametaphysicalaprioriinoppositiontoRahner’sformalapriori.InLS,Fabrorefersto

whathehadwritteninhispreviousNMP(cf.272-273).Therespectivecontextsofthetwo

worksaredifferentfromeachother.Letusexamineeachofthem.

4.1.AMetaphysicalAPrioriinTheMetaphysicalNotionofParticipation

InLaNozioneMetafisicadiPartecipazione(NMP),FabroisdistinguishingthePlatonic

“objective”participationoftheintelligible(i.e.,thecontentofknowingasbestowedon

humanintelligence)fromtheThomistic“subjective”participationofalightmaking

intelligible.Fabroheredoesnotusetheterms“metaphysical”participationnor“apriori”

fortheagentintellect,butitisevidentthat1)theagentintellectis,forFabro,asubjective

participationinsofarasitisarealsubjectivefacultyderivedfromGodinordertomake

intelligible,andthat2)humanknowingisnotverifiedbyaparticipationoftheintelligible

contentinaPlatonicway.Although,inusingtheterm“intelligible,”Fabrodoesnot

differentiatebetweenthecontentanditsmodeofbeing,138itseemsclearthatheconsiders

137NMP270.138“Theagentintellectisprincipleproductive[fattivo]oftheintelligibleandthisintelligible

comestous,notbydirectparticipationfromGod,butbyacomplexworkofabstractionexercised

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thecontentoftheintelligibleascomingfromthesensiblethings,“byacomplexworkof

abstractionexercisedbytheparticipatedlight,theagentintellect,intherealmofthe

concreteanddiffuseparticipationofthesensibleworld”(thenhequotesthetextof

Aquinasat84,4ad1,inwhichthecontentofknowingissaidtocomefromtheformsof

sensiblethings).Withoutsayingitexplicitly,Fabrosuggeststwoparticipationsinintellectual

knowingandboth,ofcourse,asderivedfromGod.Thefirstisaparticipationofthelight

(subjectiveparticipation,theagentintellect)andthesecondisaparticipationofthe

content,whichalsocomesfromGod,notdirectly,butthroughtheformsofsensiblethings.

AndpreciselybecauseourdirectparticipationfromGodisnotofthecontent,butofthe

lightmakingintelligible,theagentintellectisasubjective,notanobjectiveparticipation.

ThecontentaswellcomesremotelyfromGod,asthesourceofalltruth,butonly(naturally)

throughtheconcreteparticipationsofHiseternalideasintheformsofthesensiblethings.

ForFabro,thecontentofintellectualknowingisthenatureexistinginthesensible

things.Infact,hesaysthatthehumanideaisnotanintensiveintelligible“totality”,likethe

infusedideaoftheangels,becauseitdoesnotcomeby(objective)participationbutby

abstraction.Andhecontinues:

Matter,whichinconcretebeingsisprincipleofontologicallimitationoftheform,becomesforourabstractingmindanobstacletointelligibility[…]Fromanobjectivepointofview,thatistosay,thepointofviewofthenoeticcontent,thehumanidea,possessedbyabstraction,issaidknowledgebyparticipationinthestrongsense[…]

bytheparticipatedlight,theagentintellect,intherealmoftheconcreteanddiffuseparticipationsofthesensibleworld”(NMP272-273,seethecompletetextinquestioninAppendix,Note22).Inmyview,thefirst“intelligible”isthespecieswithitscontent,butthesecondisratherthecontentofthespecies.Itisevidentthat,forFabro,whattheagentintellectproducescomesalso,inacertainsense,fromthesensiblethings,buthedoesnotmakeacleardistinction,intheuseoftheword“intelligible”,betweentheaspectthatisproducedandtheonethatis,rather,received.

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insofaras[it]“estsimilitudoformaetantum”;itdoesnotreachthematter,andsothehumanidea,assuch,willarrivealwaysatageneralandundeterminedcontent.139

FromNMPcanbeseenthattheagentintellectisasubjectiveparticipationinsofaras

itisnotaparticipationoftheintelligiblecontent(whichcomesfromthethingsthemselves)

butaparticipationofalightinthesubject,alightthat,byabstraction,makesintelligiblethe

formsoftherealthings.Thereisnotacleardistinction,inwhatFabrocallsthe“intelligible,”

betweencontentandmodeofbeingofthecontent,andsoitmaynotbesoclearinwhat

sensetheagentintellect“makesintelligible.”However,hedoessaythattheintelligible

species“hasallitsratio[ragione]andstructurefromtheobject”140andhealsodistinguishes

inthehumanideathe“pointofviewofthenoeticcontent”141inwhichthehumanideaisa

likenessoftheformofthesensiblethings.Therefore,evenifFabrodoesnotrefertothe

agentintellectexplicitlyasproductiveoftheintelligiblemodeofbeingofthecontent(that

whichImyselfcall“metaphysicalapriori”),hewouldsurelydenythatitisproductiveofthe

intelligiblecontentitself.Thecontentofhumanknowingisaparticipationoftheformof

sensiblethingsbywhichweareperfected,andnotaparticipationofourownlightinthem,

bywhichtheywouldreceiveintelligibilityascontent.

4.2.AMetaphysicalAPrioriinLaSvolta

InLaSvolta(LS),Fabrospeaksexplicitlyoftheagentintellectasametaphysicala

prioriinoppositiontoRahner’sformalapriori.Therearetwocleartexts,bothinfootnote:

LS52,andLS116.InthefirstFabroclaimsthat,inRahner,theagentintellectisaformala139NMP274.140NMP270.141NMP274.

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prioriinthesenseofaKantiantranscendental,andFabrousestheterm“metaphysical”to

expresshisownreadingoftheagentintellectinAquinas.142Inthesecond,Fabrodoesnot

usetheterm“metaphysical”but“productive”[fattivo].Hereheexplainsalittlemoreof

whathemeanstosay.However,becausethecontextsaresomehowdifferent,andhis

expressionsareverydense,itappearsnecessarytoofferanexplanationofwhatFabro

meant,inordertoshowthesimilaritiesanddifferencesbetweenhispositionandthe

positionbeingproposedinthisthesis.

InLS116,thecontextisthefollowing.ForFabro,Rahneridentifiesabstractio,

conversioandreditioinintellectualknowinginthisway:abstractio(toknowtheintelligible)

isreditio,i.e.,toknowoneself(theonlyintelligible)asbeingintheworld(conversioad

phantasmata);inotherwords,toknowtheintelligible(abstractio)isanactionofself-

consciousness(andsoareditio)uponthematerialofsensibility(conversio).Fabro,in

respondingtoRahner,uses84,6(thetextof“materiacausae”143)toshowthat,forAquinas,

therelationshipwithsensibilityisnotthatwhichaloneverifiesintellectualknowing,but

intellectualknowingisanoperationofahigherlevel,exerciseduponahigherobject.Atthis

pointcomes,inafootnote,Fabro’sobservationthatRahnerusesthesametext144todraw

theoppositeconclusion,thattheagentintellectisaformalapriorior,inotherwords,that

theactionofintelligenceisexercisedonthematerialofsensibilityinaKantianfashion.

142FabroquoteshereNMP272-273.143WewillexaminethisparticulartextinChapter4,section1.144SummaI,84,6.

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Fabroclaimsthat,forAquinas,theagentintellectisratheranaprioriaseffective[fattivo]

principle,asfaciensintelligibilia,andnotaformalorconstitutiveprinciple.145

Theagentintellect,forFabro,isnotthatwhichprovidesintelligibilitytothematerial

ofsensibility(andthereforeintelligibilityascontent),norisitaprojectionofconsciousness

(thefirst“object”ofintelligence)onthesensiblematerialfromexperience.Theagent

intellectis,instead,thatwhichmakestheintelligiblefromthesensible,andthatintelligible

isthefirstobjectofintelligence.WhatAquinassaysin84,6,forRahner,isthattheagent

intellectinformsthematerialofsensibilitywithintelligibilityascontentand,therefore,that

theactionoftheintellect(theknowingaction)isexercisedonthesensible;whereasfor

Fabro,Aquinasissayingtheopposite,thatis,thattheactofintelligenceisexercisednoton

matterbutonsomethinghigher(theuniversal),whichrequirespreciselytheactionofthe

agentintellectonthematerialofsensibility:not,though,asinformingitwithintelligible

content,butasmakingtheuniversalspecies.Itisthis“makingtheuniversal”whichrenders

theagentintellectanaprioriasproductiveprinciple,andnotaformalone,asifitwerea

formal(intelligible)“part”oftheobjectitself.

Therefore,wheninLS52Fabrospeaksof“metaphysicalapriori”,hemeansa

subjectiveparticipationwhichistheconditionofpossibilityofintellectualknowinginsofar

asitproducestheintelligiblespecies,whichistheagentobjectoftheknowingoperationof

intelligence.Asaformalapriori,instead,thelightoftheagentintellectconstitutesformally

theobjectofknowing,providingintelligibilityascontenttoanotherwisesensibleobject.

145Thedifferencebetween“productive”and“formal”isrelatedtothedifferencebetween

anefficientcauseandaformalcause.Theformalcauseconstitutesthe“formed”thingtogetherwiththematter,whereastheefficientcauseproducesthepresenceoftheforminthematter.

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Fabrodoesnotsay,therefore,thattheagentintellectisametaphysicalapriori

insofarasitproducestheintelligiblemodeofbeingofthecontent(whichisthewaythat

expressionisusedinthisthesis),butinsofarasitproducestheintelligiblespecies(without

furtherspecifications).However,Fabro’sdenialoftheagentintellectinAquinasasaformal

aprioriandhisaffirmationsregardingtheoriginofthenoeticcontentinthesensiblereality,

areverymuchinlinewiththeclaimpresentlybeingmade.

4.3.IntellectualKnowingasReceptiveinFabro

Wehaveconsideredtheuseoftheterm“metaphysicalapriori”inFabro.Now,in

thisdissertation,theintellectualapprehensionisportrayedasreceptionoftheuniversal

content,areceptionverifiedbyabstractionofthatcontentfromexperience,throughthe

workoftheagentintellect.Thisinterpretation,aswehavesaid,isameanstoopposethe

Kantiannotionofintellectualactivityas,insomeway,providingtheuniversalcontent.For

Fabro,inasimilarway,thedifferencebetweenAquinasandModernPhilosophyisthat

Aquinasmaintains,atthebeginningoftheprocessofintellectualknowing,anabstractive

absoluteapprehensionparalleltotheintuitiveabsoluteapprehensionwithwhichthe

processofsensibleknowingbegins.146Theinterpretationbeingofferedhereisinagreement

withFabro,insofarasforKanttheuniversalisaproductoftheintellectualactivity(asgiving

intelligibleformtotherawmaterialofexperience)whereas,forAquinas,itisthebeginning

ofthatactivity(asoriginalreceptionofintelligiblecontent).

146Cf.CornelioFabro,PercezioneePensiero,2ndRevisedEdition(Brescia:Morcelliana,

1962),423(abbreviatedPP).

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5)OtherRelevantAuthors

Althoughthecontributionsofcertainauthorswillbestudiedinthebodyofthis

dissertation,itseemsusefulthatthefollowingauthorsbegivenatleastabriefmentionin

theintroductiontothiswork.147

TsenaySerequeberhan,148asregardstheagentintellectinAquinasandtheKantian

categories,rightlyrelatesbothtothesolutionofthesameproblem,namely,theintellectual

anduniversalknowledgeofreality.However,Serequeberhanconsidersthatwhichisrather

asuperficialanalogybetweenthesetworealities(thefactthatbothareactiveintheir

respectivesystems)149tobeasharedfundamentalviewbetweenKantandAquinas.150What

isinterestingaboutthisarticleisthat,sinceSerequeberhanisnotdeceivedaboutKant’s

147ThreeotherworksarebrieflystudiedinAppendix,Note1:JohnHaldane,“Aquinasand

theActiveIntellect,”Philosophy(UK)67(1992):199-210;WayneJ.Hankey,“ParticipatioDiviniLuminis,Aquinas'DoctrineoftheAgentIntellect:OurCapacityforContemplation,”Dionysius22(2004):149-178;R.E.Houser,“PhilosophicalDevelopmentthroughMetaphor:LightamongtheGreeks,”ProceedingsoftheAmericanCatholicPhilosophicalAssociation64(1990):75-85.

148Cf.TsenaySerequeberhan,“AquinasandKant:aComparativeStudy,”Dialogue:JournalofPhiSigmaTau26(1984):40-48.Theauthors’namesareomittedinthissection’sreferences,aslongasthereferenceisunderthecorrespondingtitle.

149The“concepts”ofAquinasareseparatedbyKantfromtheiroriginal“paradigm”buttheyarepreservedwithanew“content”inKant’sownparadigm:“thepassiveintellectbecomestheFacultyofSensibility,whichisthereceptiveandpassivefacultyofthemind;theagentintellectbecomestheFacultyofUnderstanding,whichisthespontaneousandactivefacultyofthemind;andtheSoulbecomesTranscendentalApperception,whichisthegroundingofthewholecompositeofsensibilityandunderstanding”(44,cf.47-48).

150Serequeberhan,inhisconclusivephrase,saysthat“despitetheirradicallydifferingphilosophicalperspectives,theysharecertainfundamentalviewswhicharenotobvious”(48,myemphasis).Hedoesshowanunderstandingoftheradicaldifferencebetweenthetwo,butifwhatisradicalandwhatisfundamentalarebothdifferingandshared,Ireallywonderifthisdoesnotbetrayanattempttomixwaterandoil.Itneedstobeclarified,however,thatSerequeberhanwrotethisarticleveryearlyinhiscareer,andisnowspecializedinAfricanPhilosophy,soIcannotascertainbythisonearticlehisoverallphilosophicalposition.

52

andAquinas’151differingrespectiveviewsontheoriginoftheintellectualcontent,the

dangeroflikeningtheagentintellecttotheKantiantranscendentalismoreevidentand,for

aproperinterpretationofAquinas,thenecessityofadistinctionbetweenthatwhichthe

agentintellectproducesandthatwhichthecategoriescontributebecomesmorepressing.

HernánMartínezMillán152triestoshowhowtheanalogiesofthesunandthelight

areintegratedinAquinas’doctrine.Theanalogyofthesunsatisfiestheneedforafirst

causeinhumanknowing(somethingmoreChristianandPatristic),153andtheanalogyofthe

lightshowshowthenecessityofafirstcausedoesnottakeawayaproperlevelof

proximatecausalityinthecreature(somethingmoreAristotelianand,inMartínezMillán’s

view,“existentialist”,maybeintheanti-Platonicsenseofattributingrealbeingtothe

particularthings).ThesereflectionsseemhelpfulfortheinterpretationofAquinas,since

theyprovideaplausibleexplanationforthesystematicunityofelementscomingfrom

differentsources.

ChristopherCullen’s154worriesaboutaKantianinfluenceinTranscendentalThomism

areveryclear.OneofCullen’sconcernsistheideathattheoriginofintellectualcontentis

notinsensibleexperience:“Donceelevensays,‘ForTranscendentalThomism…beingis

contributedaprioribytheintellectitself.’Beingcomestousthroughthesensesbutinno151“Aquinasderivestheagentintellectfromthefactthathumanbeingsactuallyengagein

theprocessofabstraction[…]theformsofmaterialthings[…]donotexistasdistinctentities,butinhereinmatter[…]Humanintellect,whenitunderstandsmaterialthingsbygraspingtheir‘species,’doessobypenetratingthenaturesorformsofsensiblethings”(42-43).

152Cf.HernánMartínezMillán,“SunandLight,orontheAgentIntellect,”RevistaEspañolaDeFilosofíaMedieval20(2013):49-56.

153Cf.55.154Cf.ChristopherM.Cullen,S.J.,“TranscendentalThomism:RealismRejected”inThe

FailureofModernism:TheCartesianLegacyandContemporaryPluralism,ed.BrendanSweetman(AmericanMaritainAssociationPublications,1999),72-86.

53

wayfromthesenses.”155RegardingRahnerinparticular,Cullensays:“Rahneralsogives

muchemphasistotheimportanceofthejudgment,forheseeksanapriorigroundforall

affirmationoffiniteesse.Rahnerbelievesthatsensationcannotgrounduniversalityor

necessity.”156

CullenworriesthatthedoctrineoftheagentintellectisusedtoproduceaKantian

interpretationofAquinas.Cullensays:“RahnerisveryclearthatAquinasdoesnotthink

thereareanyinnateideas.Nevertheless,Rahnerdoesarguethatthereisanapriori

elementofknowledgeandthatthisapriorielementiscontributedbytheagent

intellect.”157“DonceelexplainsthatTranscendentalThomistsarguethattheagentintellect

contributes‘something’tosenseexperience.”158Toconsidertheagentintellectaformala

prioriis,forCullen,amisinterpretationofAquinas:

TheTranscendentalThomistshavemisinterpretedAquinas’sdoctrineoftheagentintellectinvariousways.First,theyhavemadethelightoftheagentintellecttobetheformalcauseofourknowledge.Secondly,theyhavemadethelightoftheagentintellecttobethehabitualknowledgeofthefirstprinciples(alwaysimplicitbutmadeexplicitinthescienceofmetaphysics)159directlycontradictingAquinas’steachinginhisDisputedQuestionsontheSoul[herefersq.5c,whichisQ.D.DeAnimaa.5,c.]160

Cullenalsosays:“ThismisinterpretationoftheagentintellectdoctrineinThomas

leadstheTranscendentaliststojustifytheirtranscendentalturn,whichinturnleadstotheir15575.15677.15778.15878.159Cf.Cullen,79:“Donceelarguesthatweare‘entitledtoconcludethatthelightofthe

agentintellectconsistspreciselyinthetruthofthefirstprinciples,’andthatthesefirstprinciplesare‘theaprioricontributionofourintellecttoeveryobjectweknow.’”

16083.Cf.Cullen,85:“ForSt.Thomasbeingisnotcontributedtoknowingbytheintellectnorisittheformalcauseofknowledge.Buttomakethetranscendentalturnistoisolatetheintellectwithintheintellectualorder.”

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fundamentalmetaphysicaldoctrines.”161Itisinterestingthat,forCullen,itisa

misinterpretationofSt.Thomas’agentintellectwhichleadstothe“justification”ofa

Kantianturntothesubject.NotethatCullendoesnotsaythattheagentintellectistakenas

an“excuse”fortheKantianturn.WhatCullen’sstatementarguablymeansisthat,oncethe

transcendentalturnistakenforgranted,thatis,astheonlyrationalwaytodophilosophy

today,Aquinas’doctrineoftheagentintellect,misinterpreted,canjustifytheturnfroma

Thomisticpointofview,giventheconcernsthatModernPhilosophyhasalwaysraisedin

Catholicenvironments.RegardlessofhisinterpretationofTranscendentalThomism,

Cullen’sstatementhelpsustoseetherelevanceofaninterpretationofAquinaswhich

distinguishesclearlytheThomistagentintellectfromaKantianformalapriori.Hopefully,by

tryingtoidentifyinAquinasandKanttwodifferingapproachestothesameproblem(thatof

theuniversals),somethingmorehelpfulwillbeofferedtomodernscholarshipthanwhat

couldbeofferedbyfocusingonotherauthors’interpretationsofAquinas.

ElenaBaltuta162seemstoproposethattheuniversalexistsintheextramentalthing

itself,andisabstractedfromitbytheagentintellect.163Althoughshedoesnotemphasize,

asisdoneherein,thattheuniversalcontentisthesamebutthemodeofbeingisdifferent

(inrealityorinthemind),shedoesleadtothispointbycomparingtheagentintellecttoan

16183-84.162Cf.ElenaBaltuta,“ThomasAquinasonBridgingtheGapbetweenMindandReality,”

RevueRoumaineDePhilosophie56,no.1(2012):147-60.163“Themarkoftheindividualitypresentintheimagesmustberemovedand,atthesame

time,theobject’suniversalessence,theinformationalcoreoftheextramentalobject,mustbekept.Thisisperformedbytheactionoftheagentintellect,whichilluminatesandabstractstheintelligiblespeciesfromtheimages”(151).

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x-rayapparatuswhichletshiddenthingsbeseenwhileleavingtherestinvisible.164Inmy

view,Baltutadoesnotmaintainthattheagentintellecthasacognitivecharacter,although

somepassagesfromherworkmayleadustothinkthatway.165ForBaltuta,rather,the

agentintellectseemstobeaconditionforthepossibilityoftheextramentalthings’

universalessenceshavingvisibility.

HéctorZagalArreguín,inhisarticle,166stronglycriticizesAquinas’interpretationof

theAristotelianagentintellect,pointingoutseveralinconsistenciesheperceivesinSt.

Thomas,bothinternal(lackofsystematiccoherence)andexegetical(lackoffaithfulnessto

Aristotle).InZagalArreguín’sappreciationofAquinasthereseemstobeacertainlackof

familiaritywiththemeaningofimportantThomisticmetaphysicalnotionsanddistinctions

(particularly,thenotionofparticipation,thedistinctionsbetweenactiveandpassive

potency,etc.).Moreacquaintancewiththesenotionswouldprobablyhelpthisauthorto

seeatleasttheinternalcoherenceofAquinas’doctrine.Still,inhisinterpretationof

Aquinas,ZagalArreguínexpressesverywelltheproposedportrayaloftheagentintellectas

ametaphysicalapriori,whenhesays,

Whatmakes[theagentintellect]thereforeinactwithrespecttointeligibleobjectsisthefactthatitisanactiveimmaterialforceabletoassimilateotherthingstoitself,164“Whatwasfirstvisibleonlyinpotency[…]becomesvisibleinactand,atthesametime,

theskin,itscolor[…]becomeinvisible.Actingjustlikesuchanapparatustheagentintellectdoesnotneedtheabilityto‘see’bothsensibleparticularsandimmaterialuniversalsforbeingabletoabstractthelatteronesfromtheimages”(157).

165“Theagentintellectremovestheindividualandmaterialcharacteristicsoftheobjectfromitsessence.Buthowcantheagentintellecttellthedifferencebetweenwhatisparticular(individual)andwhatisuniversalinanimage?[…]wouldwebeentitledtobelievethat,sinceithasthepowerofdiscriminatingandremovingindividualelementsfromuniversalones,ithasaccesstobothparticularanduniversalfeatures?”(155).

166Cf.HéctorZagalArreguín,“TheSeparateSubstancesandAquinas'IntellectusAgens,”RevistaPortuguesaDeFilosofia64,no.1(2008):359-377.

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i.e.,immaterializethem.Inthiswayitrendersactuallyintelligiblesomethingthatwasonlypotentiallyintelligible:likelight,whichwithoutcontaininganyparticularcolor,bringscolorsintoact.167Thisreviewofseveralauthorshashopefullymadeclearthetimelinessandpossible

benefitsofadiscussion,suchasthatbeingproposedinthisdissertation,abouttheroleof

theagentintellectinAquinas.SeveralissuesofinterpretationofAquinas’texthavebeen

raised,thosebeingthequestionofacommonnature,thedistinctionbetweenintelligibility

ascontentandasmodeofbeingofthecontent,thepropermeaningoftheAristotelian

identity,etc..Itishopedthatwhatfollowswillbehelpfulregardingtheseandotherrelated

questions.

167367.

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ChapterOne:TheThomisticFactandtheRoleoftheAgentIntellect

1)TheThomisticFact

InordertounderstandwhattheagentintellectisforSt.Thomas,itisimportantto

understandwhySt.Thomasrequiresanagentintellectinhumanintellectualknowing.The

precisetextinwhichhedealswiththispointintheSummais79,3.Theimmediatepurpose

istoshowhow,forSt.Thomas,thefactthatweknowtheuniversalaspectofcorporeal

things,theirnature,requiresanagentintellectasitsconditionofpossibility.Theagent

intellectisthe“light”makingintelligibleinactthenatureofcorporealthings.

Inthecorpus,St.Thomasbeginstomakehispointbyestablishingacontrastwith

thePlatonicdoctrineofideas:

AccordingtotheopinionofPlato,thereisnoneedforanactiveintellectinordertomakethingsactuallyintelligible[…]ForPlatosupposedthattheformsofnaturalthingssubsistedapartfrommatter,andconsequentlythattheyareintelligible:sinceathingisactuallyintelligiblefromtheveryfactthatitisimmaterial.Andhecalledsuchforms‘speciesorideas’.168

BothforAristotleandforPlato,theobjectofhumanunderstandingisthenatureor

formofcorporealthings.However,becauseinthePlatonicsystemthoseformsarealready

intelligibleinactintheirrealbeing,anagentintellectisnotneededforPlato,atleastnotin

thewayitisneededforAristotle:“ButsinceAristotledidnotallowthatformsofnatural

thingsexistapartfrommatter,andasformsexistinginmatterarenotactuallyintelligible;it

16879,3,c.:“SecundumopinionemPlatonis,nullanecessitaseratponereintellectum

agentemadfaciendumintelligibiliainactu[…]PosuitenimPlatoformasrerumnaturaliumsinemateriasubsistere,etperconsequenseasintelligibilesesse,quiaexhocestaliquidintelligibileactu,quodestimmateriale.Ethuiusmodivocabatspecies,siveideas…”Cf.InIDeAnima4,106-111.

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followsthatthenaturesorformsofthesensiblethingswhichweunderstandarenot

actuallyintelligible.”169

Thispointisimportant.ForSt.Thomas,itisafactthatweunderstandthenatureof

thesensiblethings.Thisisthereasonheinterruptstheflowofthephrasewiththerelative

sentence,“quasintelligimus.”Ontheotherhand,itisalsoafactthat,sincetheirrealbeing

isindividuatedinmatter,thoseformsarenotintelligibleinact.Thesetwofactsor,better

said,thisdouble-sidedfact,iswhatrequiresanagentintellectasitsconditionofpossibility:

Nownothingisreducedfrompotentialitytoactexceptbysomethinginact;asthesenses[are]madeactualbywhatisactuallysensible.Wemustthereforeassignonthepartoftheintellectsomepowertomakethingsactuallyintelligible,byabstractionofthespeciesfrommaterialconditions.Andsuchisthenecessityforanactiveintellect.170

Inotherwords,ifweunderstandthenatureofcorporealthingsitisbecausethey

areforusalreadyintelligibleinact.171Wewouldnotunderstandthosethingsinactifthey

16979,3,c.:“SedquiaAristotelesnonposuitformasrerumnaturaliumsubsisteresine

materia;formaeauteminmateriaexistentesnonsuntintelligibilesactu,sequebaturquodnaturaeseuformaererumsensibilium,quasintelligimus,nonessentintelligibilesactu.”

17079,3,c.:“Nihilautemreduciturdepotentiainactum,nisiperaliquodensactu,sicutsensusfitinactupersensibileinactu.Oportebatigiturponerealiquamvirtutemexparteintellectus,quaefaceretintelligibiliainactu,perabstractionemspecierumaconditionibusmaterialibus.Ethaecestnecessitasponendiintellectumagentem.”

171Cf.85,1,ob.4.Thereisametaphysicalpriorityoftheintelligibleinact(=speciesimpressa)overtheintellectinact(=speciesexpressa).Theresultoftheactionoftheagentintellectonthephantasmistheintelligibleinact,butnotyet“intellected”inact;theintelligibleinact,asagentobject,“causes”thepossibleintellecttounderstand,topassfrompotencytoactofunderstanding.Theagentintellectproducesthepassagefrompotencytoactofbeingintelligible(regardingthenatureofcorporealthings);theagentobject(alreadyintelligibleinact)producesthepassagefrompotencytoactofunderstanding.Thetwopassagesareclearforexamplein79,7,c.:“Neverthelessthereisadistinctionbetweenthepoweroftheactiveintellectandofthepassiveintellect:becauseasregardsthesameobject,theactivepowerwhichmakestheobjecttobeinactmustbedistinctfromthepassivepower,whichismovedbytheobjectexistinginact.”[Diversificaturtamenpotentiaintellectusagentis,etintellectuspossibilis,quiarespectueiusdemobiecti,aliudprincipiumoportetessepotentiamactivam,quaefacitobiectumesseinactu;etaliud

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werenotalreadyintelligibleinact(ourintellectisinpotencytoallintelligiblethings).But

becausethosenaturesdonotsubsistinthatway(intelligibleinact),thereisaneedfor

someefficientpowertomakethempassfromintelligibleinpotency172tointelligibleinact.

Hereinliesthenecessityforanagentintellect.Andbecausewhatpreventssomethingfrom

beingintelligibleinactismatter,thewaytomakeitpassfrompotentiallytoactually

intelligibleisasortofseparationofitsnaturefromitsindividualmatter;thisiscalled

abstraction.Itisthissortofactionwhichtheagentintellectwillbecalledtoperform.The

wholeofThomisticEpistemologyannouncesitself.Ourimmediateconcern,however,isto

establishasitwereapointofdepartureforthisdiscussion,orbettersaid,theThomistic

pointofdepartureor“Thomisticfact.”Nothingcanbeunderstoodifitisnotintelligiblein

act.Nothingisintelligibleinactifitisnotseparatedfrommatter.Now,wedounderstand

thenatureofcorporealthingsandcertainlytheyarenotseparatedfrommatter(thisisthe

“Thomisticfact”).Therefore,whatisrequiredisapowerwhichmakesintelligibleinactthe

natureofcorporealthings,bymeansofacertainseparationfromtheirindividualconditions

inmatter.173

potentiampassivam,quaemoveturabobiectoinactuexistente.]Cf.section4ofthisChapter,andChapter3,section4,wherethenatureofthis“movement”ofthepossibleintellectisalsoexplored.

172Themeaningofthisbeing“intelligibleinpotency”willbeexploredinmoredetailinChapter4,section2.

173AninterestingparallelregardingthenecessityoftheagentintellectinhumanbeingsisfoundinSummaI,54,4,c:“Thenecessityforadmittinganactiveintellectisduetothis—thatthenaturesofthematerialthingswhichweunderstanddonotexistoutsidethesoul,asimmaterialandactuallyintelligible,butareonlyintelligibleinpotentialitysolongastheyareoutsidethesoul.Consequentlyitisnecessarythatthereshouldbesomepowercapableofrenderingsuchnaturesactuallyintelligible.”[Necessitasautemponendiintellectumagentemfuit,quianaturaererummaterialium,quasnosintelligimus,nonsubsistuntextraanimamimmaterialesetintelligibilesinactu,sedsuntsolumintelligibilesinpotentia,extraanimamexistentes,etideooportuitessealiquamvirtutem,quaefaceretillasnaturasintelligibilesactu.]

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Asclearastheseissuesmayseem(atleastfromadirectreadingofAquinas’text),a

wholerangeofquestionsbeginstoarise.Someofthemwillbetreatedinthefollowing

pages,buttwoofthemcanbeproposednow.Firstly,doesthisdoctrinemakesense?Could

Aquinasreallymeanthat?Althoughthesecondquestionistheimmediateconcernofthis

dissertation,itisactuallythefirstwhichpreventssomeofAquinas’readersfrom

understandinghim.Still,itisbydirectlyfacingthesecondquestion,whichisaquestionof

interpretation,thatthepathfortheclarificationofthefirstquestionmaybeopen.Inother

words,ifaplausiblecasecanbemadethatAquinasreallymeantthedoctrinethatishere

suggestedand,ifacoherentreadingofthisdoctrinecanbeoffered,itwillbeeasierto

answerthequestionoffact,thatis,whetherthingsactuallyareasAquinasseemstothink.

Someothertextsmaybehelpfultocomplementthissection,andtopreparethe

groundforthefollowing.Rightfromthebeginning,St.Thomasinhistreatisepresupposes

thatweknowthenatureofcorporealthings.Inthecrucialtextof75,2c.,thisisthepoint

ofdepartureforarguingthesubsistenceofthehumansoul:“Foritisclearthatbymeansof

theintellectmancanhaveknowledgeof[thenaturesof]allcorporealthings.”174These

naturesareperfectionsofanother(“aliorum”)thataresomehowreceivedinthesubject175

throughknowledge:“Nowwhateverknowscertainthingscannothaveanyoftheminits

ownnature;becausethatwhichisinitnaturallywouldimpedetheknowledgeofanything

17475,2,c.:“Manifestumestenimquodhomoperintellectumcognoscerepotestnaturas

omniumcorporum.”175Lateron,inChapter3,thereceptivecharacterofknowledgewillbetreated,butitis

alreadysuggestedin75,2.Knowingisacertaininessethatwouldnotbepossibleiftheperfectiontobeknowninessetnaturaliteralready.

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else…”176ThisfactallowsAquinastodrawtheconclusionintended:thehumansouldoes

nothavethenatureofabody,becausewhatisabletoreceivethosenaturesinacognitive

waycannothavethatnaturemetaphysicallyinitself.Itisnotourpurposeheretoassessthe

strengthoftheThomisticargument,buttotakefromthistextthefollowingthree

suggestions.

1)ForAquinas,thenatureofabodyisametaphysicalpropertyofthings,i.e.,it

belongsmetaphysicallytothembutnottothehumansoul(thesoulisnotabody).

2)Thereisadifferencebetweenthecognitiveandthemetaphysicalpresenceofthe

natureofabody.Inthehumansoul,thelatterisdeniedwhereastheformerisadmitted

(thesoulisabletoknowthenatureofallbodies).

3)Thehumansoulisinpotencyofreceivingcognitivelythenatureofallbodies.

ThiscrucialtextofAquinas,therefore,supportsthefirstsideofwhatwehavecalled

theThomisticfact,namely,thatweknowthenatureofcorporealthings.

Whatweknowintellectuallyisthenatureofcorporealthings.Thenatureisoutside

themindbutnotwiththesamemodeofbeingwithwhichitisknown.Thenaturewe

understandisuniversal:

Butthereisthisdifference,accordingtotheopinionofAristotle,betweenthesenseandtheintelligence—thatathingisperceivedbythesenseaccordingtothedispositionwhichithasoutsidethesoul—thatis,initsindividuality;whereasthenatureofthethingunderstoodisindeedoutsidethesoul,butthemodeaccording

17675,2,c.:“Quodautempotestcognoscerealiqua,oportetutnihileorumhabeatinsua

natura,quiailludquodinesseteinaturaliterimpediretcognitionemaliorum…”

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towhichitexistsoutsidethesoulisnotthemodeaccordingtowhichitisunderstood.177

Whatweunderstandisnottheintelligiblespecies,butthethingitselfthroughits

likeness.Thespeciesistheformthroughwhichtheactionofknowingisperformed.Afew

linesbeforetheprevioustext,St.Thomassays:

Forwhatisunderstoodisintheintellect,notaccordingtoitsownnature,butaccordingtoitslikeness;for‘thestoneisnotinthesoul,butitslikenessis,’asissaid,DeAnimaiii,8.Yetitisthestonewhichisunderstood,notthelikenessofthestone;exceptbyareflectionoftheintellectonitself:otherwise,theobjectsofscienceswouldnotbethings,butonlyintelligiblespecies.178

ThislatterremarkclarifiesthemeaningofwhatwecalltheThomisticfact:toknow

thenatureofcorporealthingsmeanstoknowsomethingthatbelongstothethings

themselves,notsomethingthatpertainstothesubject.TheThomisticspeciesisasubjective

modificationthroughwhichtheintellecthasdirectcontactwiththething,notwithitself.179

ThisideaisrepeatedinoneofthemostrelevantarticlesforThomisticGnoseology:

Thereforeifwhatweunderstandismerelytheintelligiblespeciesinthesoul,itwouldfollowthateverysciencewouldnotbeconcernedwithobjectsoutsidethesoul,butonlywiththeintelligiblespecieswithinthesoul;thus,accordingtotheteachingofthePlatonistsallscienceisaboutideas,whichtheyheldtobeactuallyunderstood.180

17776,2ad4:“Sedhoctantuminterestintersensumetintellectum,secundumsententiam

Aristotelis,quodressentitursecundumillamdispositionemquamextraanimamhabet,insuaparticularitate,naturaautemreiquaeintelligitur,estquidemextraanimam,sednonhabetillummodumessendiextraanimam,secundumquemintelligitur.”Theobjectofunderstandingastheuniversalnature,andnotthethinginitsparticularity,willbethefocusofthenextsection.

17876,2ad4:“Idenimquodintelligiturnonestinintellectusecundumse,sedsecundumsuamsimilitudinem,lapisenimnonestinanima,sedspecieslapidis,utdiciturinIIIDeAnima.Ettamenlapisestidquodintelligitur,nonautemspecieslapidis,nisiperreflexionemintellectussupraseipsum,alioquinscientiaenonessentderebus,seddespeciebusintelligibilibus.”

179Cf.InIVSent.,d.49,q.2,a.1ad16;DeVer2,3,ad3.18085,2,c.:“Siigitureaquaeintelligimusessentsolumspeciesquaesuntinanima,

sequereturquodscientiaeomnesnonessentderebusquaesuntextraanimam,sedsolumde

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ThementionofPlatoremindsusofthefirsttextexamined181andisimportantfor

ourpurposes.Tosaythatthesubjectivemodificationassuch(thespecies)istheobjectof

humanunderstandingisasmistakenastosay,withPlato,thattheseparateideasarethe

objectofunderstanding.Inbothcases,infact,humanunderstandingwouldnotrefertothe

realthings,whicharethesensiblecorporealthings.Andinbothcases,themistake

accordingtoSt.Thomasisthesame.Thatis,itisamistaketothinkthattheobjectof

humanunderstandingneedstobeseparatedfrommatterinitsown(real)beingor,inother

words,tothinkthatthereisnothingintelligibleintheparticular,thatthereisnothing

universalsubsistinginthematter.Asweshallsee,St.ThomaswouldblameKantforthe

samemistake.Theneedoftheagentintellectarisesbecausethemodeofbeingofwhatwe

knowisnotintelligibleinact,notbecausethereisnothingintelligibleincorporealthings.182

In79,3ad3,Aquinassaysthattheintelligibleinactdoesnotexistinrealityassuch,

regardingthenatureofsensiblethings:“Nowtheintelligibleinactisnotsomethingexisting

speciebusintelligibilibusquaesuntinanima;sicutsecundumPlatonicosomnesscientiaesuntdeideis,quasponebantesseintellectainactu.”

18179,3.182Cf.InIDeAnima4,106-111:“Platotooktheobjectsknownbytheintellecttobethingsin

themselves,existingapartfrommatterinperpetualactuality,andthecausesofknowledgeandofbeinginthingsofsense.ForAristotlethisviewinvolvedsomanydifficultiesthathewascompelledtoexcogitatethetheoryofthe‘agentintellect’…”[Platoposuit,quodintelligibiliaessentpersesubsistenciaetseparataetessentsemperinactu,etessentcausacognitionisetesserebussensibilibus(quodAristotilestamquaminconveniensvolensevitare,coactusestponereintellectumagentem)…];InIIIDeAnima6,297-305:“Andthemindinactisitsobjectineveryway;for(asanobjectincludesmatterinitsnotionordoesnotincludeit,inthesamewaythisobjectisperceivedbytheintellect).AndjustbecausePlatooverlookedthisprocessofabstractionhewasforcedtoconceiveofmathematicalobjectsandspecificnaturesasexistinginseparationfrommatter;whereasAristotlewasabletoexplainthatprocessbytheagentintellect.”[Etomninointellectusinactuestresintellecta,quiasicutresinsuirationehabentmateriamvelnonhabent,sicabintellectupercipiuntur.EtquiahuncmodumabstractionisPlatononconsideravit,coactusfuitponeremathematicaetspeciesseparatas,lococuiusadpraedictamabstractionemfaciendamAristotelesposuitintellectumagentem.];Q.D.DeAnima,a.4,c..

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innature;ifweconsiderthenatureofthingssensible,whichdonotsubsistapartfrom

matter.”183Still,thenaturesofsensiblethings,whicharetheobjectofintelligence,are

distinguishedfromthematterinwhichtheysubsist(asisimpliedinthecorpus).184Thereis

aperfection,namelythenatureofcorporealthings,whichcannotsubsistwithoutmatter,

butisnotconfoundedwiththematteritself.St.Thomasalsodistinguishesthesenatures

fromothernaturesthatdonotneedmattertosubsistand,becauseofthat,areintelligible

inact(thisisthemeaningoftheclarification,“quantumadnaturamrerumsensibilium”).

ThefactthattheobjectofhumanintelligenceisnotinrealityintelligibleinactbringsSt.

Thomas,nottofindtheoriginoftheintelligiblecontentoutsiderealityandinthesubject

(likeKant),buttofindinthesubjectacapacityofabstractingtheintelligiblecontent(the

nature)fromitsindividualconditionsinthematter,thusmakingtheintelligibleinact(the

speciesrepresentingthisintellectualcontent).185ThatiswhySt.Thomasconcludesthe

previoustextwiththefollowing:“Andthereforeinordertounderstandthem,the

immaterialnatureofthepassiveintellectwouldnotsufficebutforthepresenceofthe

activeintellectwhichmakesthingsactuallyintelligiblebywayofabstraction.”186What

18379,3ad3:“Intelligibileauteminactunonestaliquidexistensinrerumnatura,quantum

adnaturamrerumsensibilium,quaenonsubsistuntpraetermateriam.”184Cf.79,3,c.:“ButsinceAristotledidnotallowthatformsofnaturalthingsexistapartfrom

matter,andasformsexistinginmatterarenotactuallyintelligible;itfollowsthatthenaturesofformsofthesensiblethingswhichweunderstandarenotactuallyintelligible.”[SedquiaAristotelesnonposuitformasrerumnaturaliumsubsisteresinemateria;formaeauteminmateriaexistentesnonsuntintelligibilesactu,sequebaturquodnaturaeseuformaererumsensibilium,quasintelligimus,nonessentintelligibilesactu.]

185Thedistinctionbetweenthetwomeaningsof“intelligibilis”and“universalis”(asintellectualcontentandasmodeofbeingofthecontent),whichisacrucialelementofourinterpretationofSt.Thomas,willbethefocusofChapter2.

18679,3ad3:“Etideoadintelligendumnonsufficeretimmaterialitasintellectuspossibilis,nisiadessetintellectusagens,quifaceretintelligibiliainactupermodumabstractionis.”

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Aquinasmeansisthat,inorderforintelligencetoreceivetheintelligibleinact,itisnot

enoughtobeitselfimmaterial(astheobjectionproposes),butwhatisalsonecessaryisan

intelligibleinactwhichcouldbereceived.Itisthefunctionoftheagentintellecttoproduce

thisintelligibleinact,forthereasonsexposedandinthesenseexplained.

Ourimmediatepurposewastosituatetheroleoftheagentintellectasthe

explanationoftheThomisticfact.Giventhatweknowthenaturesofcorporealthings,but

thesenaturesdonotsubsistinthecorporealthingsinawaythatwecantakeholdofthem,

thereneedstobeanagentintellectthatmakesthosenaturesavailabletothepossible

intellect,bymakingthemintelligibleinact.187Thenaturesofcorporealthingsareintelligible

onlyinpotency(becausetheyareimbeddedinmatter);ourintelligenceisalsoinpotencyof

understanding(becauseitistabularasa);inordertounderstand,weneedthosenaturesto

beintelligibleinact.Thisispreciselythefunctionoftheagentintellect:tomakethenature

ofcorporealthingsintelligibleinact,bymeansofanabstractionfrommatter.Inthisway,

thosenatureswillbeabletoactualizethepossibleintellect.188

187AsimilarinterpretationoftheThomisticfactcanbefoundinMartínezMillán,55-56:“As

AquinasnotesinDeAnima,AristotlewantedtoovercomethenegativeeffectsofPlatonicphilosophy,whichhadreducedsensiblethingstonothingmoretanshadows,objectsofopinionbutnotofknowledge[…].Aristotle[…]hadpostulatedtheagentintellectinordertosavethesensibleworldfromtheunknowable”;andSerequeberhan,42-43:“Aquinasderivestheagentintellectfromthefactthathumanbeingsactuallyengageintheprocessofabstraction[…]theformsofmaterialthings[…]donotexistasdistinctentities,butinhereinmatter.[Humanintellectunderstands]bypenetratingthenaturesorformsofsensiblethings.”

188Cf.InIIIDeAnima4,54-63:“ThereasonwhyAristotlecametopostulateanagentintellectwashisrejectionofPlato’stheorythattheessencesofsensiblethingsexistedapartfrommatter,inastateofactualintelligibility;[hence,]forPlatotherewasnoneedtopositanagentintellect.ButAristotle,whoregardedtheessencesofsensiblethingsasexistinginmatter[andnotintelligibleinact],hadtoinvokesomeabstractiveprincipleintheminditselftorendertheseessencesactuallyintelligible.”[InduciturautemAristotelesadponendumintellectumagentem,adexcludendumopinionemPlatonis,quiposuitquidditatesrerumsensibiliumesseamateria

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2)TheObjectofIntelligenceinitsFormalAspect:TheUniversalas

DifferentfromtheParticular

ThepurposeofthefollowingsectionsofthisChapteristoclarifytheThomisticfact.

Thepresentsectionintendstoshowhow,forSt.Thomas,theobjectofintelligenceisnot

thematerialofsensibility,northeparticularassuch,buttheuniversalasnatureofthe

corporealthing.

Aswehaveseen,theneedofanagentintellectcomesfromthefactthattheobject

ofintelligenceisnotintelligibleinactinreality.Theobjectofintelligence,forSt.Thomas,is

theuniversalasthenatureofcorporealthings.Themetaphysicalframeworkofthis

assertionisthefollowing:theuniversal,“theonethatissaidofthemany,”isinthefirst

placethenaturethatispredicatedofmanyindividualsofthesamespecies,becauseit

subsistsinallofthem.Thereforetheuniversalassuchisdistinguishedfromtheparticular

individualasacertain“part”fromthewhole.189Thenatureistheprinciplebywhichthe

individualiswhatitis(specifically);butinordertobethisindividualanotherprincipleis

required,namelythematter.Becausematteristhatwhichdifferentiatesindividuals,and

thenatureinsteadisthatwhichunitesthem,natureandprincipleofindividuationare

separatas,etintelligibilesactu;undenonerateinecessariumponereintellectumagentem.SedquiaAristotelesponit,quodquidditatesrerumsensibiliumsuntinmateria,etnonintelligibilesactu,oportuitquodponeretaliquemintellectumquiabstraheretamateria,etsicfacereteasintelligibilesactu.]

189Thenatureasthespecificperfectionofeachindividualcanbeconsideredapartofthewholethatisthisindividual.Buttheindividualitselfcanalsobeconsideredpartoftheother“whole”whichisthespeciesasthegroupofthosewhoparticipateinacommonspecificperfection.

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distinctintheindividual.190ForSt.Thomas,thenatureisthedirectobjectofhuman

understanding.

Thereisnoquestionthat,forSt.Thomas,thisistheobjectofintelligence:“Butsince

Aristotledidnotallowthatformsofnaturalthingsexistapartfrommatter,andasforms

existinginmatterarenotactuallyintelligible;itfollowsthatthenaturesofformsofthe

sensiblethingswhichweunderstandarenotactuallyintelligible.”191Heisnotshyof

repeatingitmultoties:“Thefirstobjectofourknowledgeinthislifeisthe‘quiddityofa

materialthing,’whichistheproperobjectofourintellect,asappearsaboveinmany

passages.”192

Thehumanintellectdoesnotacquireperfectknowledgebythefirstactofapprehension;butitfirstapprehendssomethingaboutitsobject,suchasitsquiddity,andthisisitsfirstandproperobject;andthenitunderstandstheproperties,accidents,andthevariousrelationsoftheessence.Thusitnecessarilycomparesonethingwithanotherbycompositionordivision…193

“Ourintellect'sproperandproportionateobjectisthenatureofasensiblething.”194

“Andthereisyetanother,namely,thehumanintellect,whichneitherisitsownactof

190WiththeseaffirmationsIdonotclaimtohavedemonstratedtheThomisticmetaphysical

framework.ImeantoofferitasahelpfulinterpretativekeythatmakessenseofAquinas’texts.19179,3,c.:“SedquiaAristotelesnonposuitformasrerumnaturaliumsubsisteresine

materia;formaeauteminmateriaexistentesnonsuntintelligibilesactu,sequebaturquodnaturaeseuformaererumsensibilium,quasintelligimus,nonessentintelligibilesactu.”

19288,3,c.:“Primumautemquodintelligituranobissecundumstatumpraesentisvitae,estquidditasreimaterialis,quaeestnostriintellectusobiectum,utmultotiessupradictumest.”;cf.84,7;85,8;87,2ad2.

19385,5,c.:“Intellectushumanusnonstatiminprimaapprehensionecapitperfectamreicognitionem;sedprimoapprehenditaliquiddeipsa,putaquidditatemipsiusrei,quaeestprimumetpropriumobiectumintellectus;etdeindeintelligitproprietatesetaccidentiaethabitudinescircumstantesreiessentiam.Etsecundumhoc,necessehabetunumapprehensumaliicomponereveldividere…”

19484,8,c.:“Propriumobiectumintellectuinostroproportionatumestnaturareisensibilis.”ThatthenaturesofcorporealthingscanbeintelligibleobjectscanbetakenalsofromCGII,99,par.

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understanding,norisitsownessencethefirstobjectofitsactofunderstanding,forthis

objectis[somethingextrinsic,thatis,]thenatureofamaterialthing.Andthereforethat

whichisfirstknownbythehumanintellectisanobjectofthiskind…”195

Thisintellectualobjectisclearlydistinguishedfromtheobjectofsensibility.Both

intelligenceandsensitivityareapprehensive,butasdifferentspeciesofthesamegenus:

“Indeed,thepassivepoweritselfhasitsverynaturefromitsrelationtoitsactiveprinciple.

Therefore,sincewhatisapprehendedbytheintellectandwhatisapprehendedbysense

aregenericallydifferent;consequently,theintellectualappetiteisdistinctfromthe

1-2:“Thus,throughtheintelligibleformsinquestionaseparatesubstanceknowsnotonlyotherseparatesubstances,butalsothespeciesofcorporealthings.Fortheirintellect,beingwhollyinact,isperfectinpointofnaturalperfection,and,therefore,itmustcomprehenditsobject—intelligiblebeing—inauniversalmanner.Now,thespeciesofcorporealthingsarealsoincludedwithinintelligiblebeing,andtheseparatesubstance,therefore,knowsthem.”[Perdictasigiturformasintelligibilessubstantiaseparatanonsolumcognoscitaliassubstantiasseparatas,sedetiamspeciesrerumcorporalium.Cumenimintellectusearumsitperfectusnaturaliperfectione,utpotetotusinactuexistens,oportetquodsuumobiectum,scilicetensintelligibile,universalitercomprehendat.Subenteautemintelligibilicomprehendunturetiamspeciesrerumcorporalium.Easigitursubstantiaseparatacognoscit.]

19587,3,c.:“Estautemaliusintellectus,scilicethumanus,quinecestsuumintelligere,necsuiintelligereestobiectumprimumipsaeiusessentia,sedaliquidextrinsecum,scilicetnaturamaterialisrei.Etideoidquodprimocognosciturabintellectuhumano,esthuiusmodiobiectum…”ItisnotourconcerntofocusonthevariouswordsthatAquinasuses,natura,formaorquidditas.ItcouldbegrantedthatSt.Thomasisalwaysspeakingoftheformaluniversalprincipleofamaterialindividualthing(cf.InMet.8,lect.3,1710,textonp.100).BergeralsosaysthataccordingtoSt.Thomas,thehumanintellectpossesesaproperobject:thenaturesorquidditiespresentincoporalmatter(cf.AndrédeDeusBerger,“Acondiçãodohomemnoestadodavidapresentecomodeterminanteparaateoríadoconhecimentotomasiana:SumadeTeologiaIª,84,”Kínesis:RevistaDeEstudosDosPós-GraduandosEmFilosofia2,no.3[2010]:35);cf.RichardT.Lambert,“ATextualStudyofAquinas’ComparisonoftheIntellecttoPrimeMatter,”NewScholasticism56(1982):87,“Matterreceivesitsformsbycontractingthem,toindividuality,whileformsareinthemindasuniversals[andhequotesDeSpir.Creat.,1].”Cf.Stump,270.

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sensitive.”196Inthenexttwotextsitisclearalsothatbothobjects,beingdifferent,are

neverthelessextrinsic,“outthere”:197

Thereisanothergenusinthepowersofthesoul,whichgenusregardsamoreuniversalobject—namely,everysensiblebody,notonlythebodytowhichthesoulisunited.Andthereisyetanothergenusinthepowersofthesoul,whichgenusregardsastillmoreuniversalobject—namely,notonlythesensiblebody,butallbeinginuniversal.Whereforeitisevidentthatthelattertwogeneraofthesoul'spowershaveanoperationinregardnotmerelytothatwhichisunitedtothem,butalsotosomethingextrinsic.198

Itfollowsofnecessitythatthissomethingextrinsic,whichistheobjectofthesoul'soperation,mustberelatedtothesoulinatwofoldmanner.First,inasmuchasthissomethingextrinsichasanaturalaptitudetobeunitedtothesoul,andtobebyitslikenessinthesoul.Inthiswaytherearetwokindsofpowers—namely,the"sensitive"inregardtothelesscommonobject—thesensiblebody;andthe"intellectual,"inregardtothemostcommonobject—universalbeing.Secondly,forasmuchasthesoulitselfhasaninclinationandtendencytothesomethingextrinsic.199

19680,2,c.:“…[I]psapotentiapassivapropriamrationemhabetexordineadsuumactivum.

Quiaigiturestalteriusgenerisapprehensumperintellectumetapprehensumpersensum,consequensestquodappetitusintellectivussitaliapotentiaasensitiva.”

197Theprecisemeaningof“extrinsic,”“outthere,”“outsidethemind,”“inre,”etc.,willhopefullybecomeclearinthefollowingsectionandchapters.Itistobenoted,fornow,thatitisAquinaswhosaysthattheobjectis“extraanimam.”Itmeansthatthecontentofourknowingisoutthere,evenifitisnotouttherewiththemodeofbeingithasinourfaculty.Inthatsense,theobjectisoutthereinact(itisthere)althoughitisnotthereinitscognitivemodeofbeing.Othernuances,therelevanttexts,etc.,willbeofferedlater.Cf.ourstudyofCGII,77par.2,attheendofChapter4;SummaI,79,4ad4;InBoet.DeTrin.5,3,c.(quotedonp.90)andInMet.8,lect.1,1687(seeAppendix,Note5).

19878,1,c.:“Estautemaliudgenuspotentiarumanimae,quodrespicituniversaliusobiectum,scilicetomnecorpussensibile;etnonsolumcorpusanimaeunitum.Estautemaliudgenuspotentiarumanimae,quodrespicitadhucuniversaliusobiectum,scilicetnonsolumcorpussensibile,seduniversaliteromneens.Exquopatetquodistaduosecundagenerapotentiarumanimaehabentoperationemnonsolumrespectureiconiunctae,sedetiamrespectureiextrinsecae.”

19978,1,c.:“Necesseestextrinsecamrem,quaeestobiectumoperationisanimae,secundumduplicemrationemadanimamcomparari.Unomodo,secundumquodnataestanimaeconiungietinanimaessepersuamsimilitudinem.Etquantumadhoc,suntduogenerapotentiarum,scilicetsensitivum,respectuobiectiminuscommunis,quodestcorpussensibile;etintellectivum,respectuobiecticommunissimi,quodestensuniversale.Alioveromodo,secundumquodipsaanimainclinaturettenditinremexteriorem.”

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Becausetheobjectofintelligenceisnotthesameastheobjectofsensitivity,and

becausebothfacultiesareapprehensive,“…thephantasmscannotofthemselvesaffectthe

passiveintellect,andrequiretobemadeactuallyintelligiblebytheactiveintellect…”200

“Sensitiveknowledgeisnottheentirecauseofintellectualknowledge.Andthereforeitis

notstrangethatintellectualknowledgeshouldextendfurtherthansensitiveknowledge.”201

“Furtherthansensitive”etc.meansthatwhatisunderstoodisanobjectformallydifferent

fromtheobjectofsensitivity.Theobjectwhichperfectshumanintelligenceisnotthe

phantasm(phantasmatanonsufficiunt),buttheintelligibleinact.202Moreaboutthiscrucial

textwillhavetobesaidlater.203

Thereis,however,aseriesoftextsthatseemstochallengethemainpointofthis

section,thatis,thattheobjectofintelligenceistheuniversalnature.ReferringtoAristotle’s

IIIDeAnima,St.Thomasaffirmsthat“…thephantasmistotheintellectwhatcoloristothe

20084,6,c.:“Sedquiaphantasmatanonsufficiuntimmutareintellectumpossibilem,sed

oportetquodfiantintelligibiliaactuperintellectumagentem…”20184,6ad3:“Sensitivacognitiononesttotacausaintellectualiscognitionis.Etideononest

mirumsiintellectualiscognitioultrasensitivamseextendit.”202Cf.InIIIDeAnima7,105-113:“[Aristotle]distinguishesbetweenintellectandimagination

[first,regardingthesecondoperation,andthenheshows]howtheprimaryintellectualnotions,theunderstandingofindivisibleobjects,differfromphantasms;andherepliesthatwhilethesearealwaysattendedbyphantasms,theydifferfromphantasms;[becausephantasmsarerepresentationsofparticulars,whereasthethingsunderstoodareuniversal,abstractedfromindividuatingconditions…]”[…ostenditdifferenciaminterfantasiaetintellectum(…)inquodifferantprimiintellectus,idestintelligentiaeindivisibilium,quodnonsintphantasmata.Etrespondet,quodnonsuntsinephantasmatibus,sedtamennonsuntphantasmata,quiaphantasmatasuntsimilitudinesparticularium,intellectaautemsuntuniversaliaabindividuantibuscondicionibusabstracta…]

203Cf.Chapter4,section1.Itcouldbearguedthattheagentintellectmakesthephantasmitselfintelligibleinact,inwhichcasethephantasmwouldbetheobjectperfectingthepossibleintellect,andtheagentintellectwouldtaketheroleofaformalapriori.However,itwillbeshownlaterthat,iftakenincontext,thepertinenttextofAquinascannotproducethisconclusion.

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sight.”204Itwouldseemthat,ifcolouristheobjectofvision,thenthephantasmof

sensitivityistheobjectofintelligence.205Tobeginwith,thesetextswillbeexaminedintheir

respectivecontextsandthenotherreferenceswillbeusedtocompletethevisionbeing

presented.

In75,2,St.Thomasisdemonstratingthesubsistenceoftheintellectualprinciple.In

ordertodothat,heshowsthatithasanoperationinwhichthebodydoesnotparticipate.

Therefore,becauseoperaresequituresse,theintellectualprincipledoesnotneedthebody

tosubsist,butsubsistsinitself.Tosaythatthebodydoesnotparticipateintheactivityof

understandingmeansthatthebodyisnotthefacultynortheinstrumentofunderstanding.

Itdoesnotmeanthatabodycannotbetheobjectofunderstanding(herethephantasm

comesintoplay).Whatdoesobjectmeanhere?Thisisthepointofconfusion.St.Thomas

saysintheAdTertium:

Thebodyisnecessaryfortheactionoftheintellect,notasitsoriginofaction,butonthepartoftheobject;forthephantasmistotheintellectwhatcoloristothesight.Neitherdoessuchadependenceonthebodyprovetheintellecttobenon-subsistent;otherwiseitwouldfollowthatananimalisnon-subsistent,sinceitrequiresexternalobjectsofthesensesinordertoperformitsactofperception.206

Itmustbenotedthatrationeobiectidoesnotnecessarilymeansicutobiectum

formale.Thefollowingcomparisonwiththesubsistenceofanimalsmaybeenlightening:an

animalsubsistsinitselfevenifitneedsexterioribussensibilibusinordertoknow.Colorad

20475,2ad3:“…[P]hantasmaenimcomparaturadintellectumsicutcoloradvisum.”Cf.76,

1,c.;54,4sc;asanobjectionin85,1ob.3;InIDeAnima2,60-69.205ThisseemstobeCory’sinterpretation.SeeAppendix,Note2.20675,2ad3:“Dicendumquodcorpusrequirituradactionemintellectus,nonsicutorganum

quotalisactioexerceatur,sedrationeobiecti,phantasmaenimcomparaturadintellectumsicutcoloradvisum.Sicautemindigerecorporenonremovetintellectumessesubsistentem,alioquinanimalnonessetaliquidsubsistens,cumindigeatexterioribussensibilibusadsentiendum.”

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visum,therefore,meansthecolourinthethingitself,notinthefacultyasperfectiveofit.In

thesameway,thephantasmisneededasthebodilyrepresentationoftheexternalthing,

notasanimageperfectingthefacultyitself.Rationeobiectimeans,therefore,thatthe

phantasmislikeamaterialobjectfortheintelligence,207insofarasitisrequiredinorderto

havesomethingtounderstand.208St.Thomas’pointintheAdTertiumisthis:theneedofa

bodytoperformanactionwouldimplythenon-subsistenceofthesoulonlyifthebody

wereneededasaninstrumentoftheaction;but,becausethebodyisneededonlyasa

materialobjectofthisaction,theargumentdoesnotconclude.209St.Thomasisnotstating

207ThesenseinwhichAquinasspeaksaboutobjectcanbeilluminatedwithInBoet.DeTrin.

6,2,ad5:“Thephantasmisprincipleofhumanknowing,asthatfromwhichtheintellectualoperationbegins:notthoughassomethingtemporary,butasacertainpermanentgroundoftheintellectualoperation,inthewaytheprinciplesofdemonstrationmustremainintheprocessofscience;thephantasms,infact,arerelatedtotheintellectasobjects,inwhichtheintellectseeseverything,eitherbyperfectrepresentationorbynegation.”(mytrans.)[…phantasmaestprincipiumnostraecognitionis,utexquoincipitintellectusoperationonsicuttransiens,sedsicutpermanensutquoddamfundamentumintellectualisoperationis;sicutprincipiademonstrationisoportetmanereinomniprocessuscientiae,cumphantasmatacomparenturadintellectumutobiecta,inquibusinspicitomnequodinspicitvelsecundumperfectamrepraesentationemvelpernegationem.]“Inquibus”isreferredtothematerialobjectivityofthephantasm,“quod”totheformalobjectivityoftheuniversal.

208ForAquinas,itseems,thecoloursandthephantasmshavethesamerelationshiptovisionandintelligenceinsofarastheystandfortheobjectinitsrealbeing.Itcouldbeobjectedthatthephantasmisjustanimage,butforAquinasthephantasmisanimagepreciselyinsofarasitrepresentstherealcontent.Whatweunderstandiswhatisrepresentedinthephantasm,i.e.,therealthing.

209ThefirstmentionofthisAristoteliantextinInDeAnimacanbehelpfulhere.ItisInIDeAnima2,60-69:“…[F]orunderstandingisnotaccomplishedwithabodilyorgan,thoughitdoesbearonabodilyobject;because,aswillbeshownlater,inBookIII,thephantasmsintheimaginationaretotheintellectascolourstosight:ascolours[aretheobjectsofsight,sophantasmsaretheobjectsoftheintellect…]”[…intelligereenimnonestperorganumcorporale,sedindigetobiectocorporali.SicutenimPhilosophusdicitintertiohuius,hocmodophantasmatasehabentadintellectum,sicutcoloresadvisum.Coloresautemsehabentadvisum,sicutobiecta:phantasmataergosehabentadintellectumsicutobiecta…]Cf.alsoInIIIDeAnima6,130-134:“…[I]fintellectisrelatedtophantasmsasthesensestotheirobject,thenjustasthesensescannotsensewithoutanobject,sothesoulcannotunderstandwithoutphantasms.”[…siphantasmatasehabentadanimam

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thattheformalobjectofintelligenceisthephantasm,orthatthephantasmperfectsthe

intelligenceasthecolour(=speciescoloris)perfectsthevision.

Thetextof76,1,c.isevenclearer.Thearticleisaboutthekindofunionbetween

thesoulandthebody.Afterdiscardingthepossibilitythatmanisonlyhissoul,St.Thomas

says:“ItfollowsthereforethattheintellectbywhichSocratesunderstandsisapartof

Socrates,sothatinsomewayitisunitedtothebodyofSocrates.”210Hethenexamines

Averroes’solution:

TheCommentatorheldthatthisunionisthroughtheintelligiblespecies,ashavingadoublesubject,inthepossibleintellect,andinthephantasmswhichareinthecorporealorgans.211Thusthroughtheintelligiblespeciesthepossibleintellectislinkedtothebodyofthisorthatparticularman.212

RememberthatforAverroesthepossibleintellectisoneforallhumanbeings.

AquinasrejectsAverroes’solution,andourtextcomesintoplayhere:

Butthislinkoruniondoesnotsufficientlyexplainthefact,thattheactoftheintellectistheactofSocrates.Thiscanbeclearlyseenfromcomparisonwiththesensitivefaculty,fromwhichAristotleproceedstoconsiderthingsrelatingtothe

intellectivamsicutsensibileadsensum;sicutsensusnonpotestsentiresinesensibili,itaanimanonpotestintelligeresinephantasmate.]

21076,1,c.:“RelinquiturergoquodintellectusquoSocratesintelligit,estaliquaparsSocratisitaquodintellectusaliquomodocorporiSocratisuniatur.”

211Inordertoclarifyinwhatsensethephantasmis“subjectum”forAverroes,cf.Q.D.DeAnima,a.2,c.:“Thusanintelligiblespecieshastwosubjects:oneinwhichitexistswithanintelligiblemodeofexisting,andthisisthepossibleintellect:anotherinwhichitexistswitharealmodeofexisting,andthissubjectisthephantasms.”[Sicigiturspeciesintelligibilishabetduplexsubiectum:unuminquoestsecundumesseintelligibile,ethocestintellectuspossibilis;aliudinquodestsecundumessereale,ethocsubiectumsuntipsaphantasmata.]

21276,1,c.:“HancautemunionemCommentator,inIIIDeAnima,dicitesseperspeciemintelligibilem.Quaequidemhabetduplexsubiectum,unumscilicetintellectumpossibilem;etaliudipsaphantasmataquaesuntinorganiscorporeis.Etsicperspeciemintelligibilemcontinuaturintellectuspossibiliscorporihuiusvelilliushominis.”

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intellect.Fortherelationofphantasmstotheintellectisliketherelationofcolorstothesenseofsight,ashesaysDeAnimaiii.213

HowdoesAquinasunderstandwhatAristotlesaid?

Therefore,asthespeciesofcolorsareinthesight,soarethespeciesofphantasmsinthepossibleintellect.Nowitisclearthatbecausethecolors,theimagesofwhichareinthesight,areonawall,theactionofseeingisnotattributedtothewall:forwedonotsaythatthewallsees,butratherthatitisseen.Therefore,fromthefactthatthespeciesofphantasmsareinthepossibleintellect,itdoesnotfollowthatSocrates,inwhomarethephantasms,understands,butthatheorhisphantasmsareunderstood.214

Whatneedstobeunderstoodisthemeaningofthewordshere.Phantasmataare

thephantasmssubsistingintheorgansofsensitivity,ascoloresarethecolourssubsistingin

thebodies(inpariete).Speciescolorumaretheobjectiverepresentationsofthecoloursin

thefacultyofvision,asspeciesphantasmatumaretheobjectiveintelligiblerepresentations

ofthephantasmsinthepossibleintellect.Thatiswhy,asthewalldoesnotseejustbecause

itpossessesthecolour,onedoesnotunderstandjustbecauseonepossessesthe

phantasms.Thevisionseesinsofarasitpossessesthespeciescoloris,andthepossible

intellectunderstandsinsofarasitpossessesthespeciesintelligibilis,herespecies

phantasmatum(inthesenseofspeciesreferringtothephantasms).215St.Thomasisnot

21376,1,c.:“Sedistacontinuatioveluniononsufficitadhocquodactiointellectussitactio

Socratis.Ethocpatetpersimilitudineminsensu,exquoAristotelesproceditadconsiderandumeaquaesuntintellectus.Sicenimsehabentphantasmataadintellectum,utdiciturinIIIDeAnima,sicutcoloresadvisum.”

21476,1,c.:“Sicutergospeciescolorumsuntinvisu,itaspeciesphantasmatumsuntinintellectupossibili.Patetautemquodexhocquodcoloressuntinpariete,quorumsimilitudinessuntinvisu,actiovisusnonattribuiturparieti,nonenimdicimusquodpariesvideat,sedmagisquodvideatur.Exhocergoquodspeciesphantasmatumsuntinintellectupossibili,nonsequiturquodSocrates,inquosuntphantasmata,intelligat;sedquodipse,veleiusphantasmataintelligantur.”

215MaybeinthissensecanbeunderstoodalsoInIDeAnima6,248-254,whereAquinassays:“…[A]sAristotlehasproved,theintellectualpotencyisbroughtintoactpreciselybymeansofthe[speciesofsensiblethings];sothatitismovedbytheminthisway.”[…sicutAristotilesprobat,

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sayingherethatthephantasmistheperfectionofintelligence,butpreciselytheopposite:

“Therefore,fromthefactthatthespeciesofphantasmsareinthepossibleintellect,itdoes

notfollowthatSocrates,inwhomarethephantasms,understands,butthatheorhis

phantasmsareunderstood.”216Hereitismostclearthatthespeciesphantasmatum,which

areinthe(separate)possibleintellect,aredistinctfromthephantasms,whicharein

Socrates.Speciesphantasmatumandphantasmata,inthistext,aredifferentnotions.217

TheAristotelianphraseisalsousedin85,1ob.3.Thearticleisaskingwhetherwe

understandcorporealthingsbymeansofabstractionfromphantasms:

ThePhilosophersays(DeAnimaiii,7)thatthephantasmistotheintellectualsoulwhatcoloristothesight.Butseeingisnotcausedbyabstractionofspeciesfromcolor,butbycolorimpressingitselfonthesight.Thereforeneitherdoestheactofunderstandingtakeplacebyabstractionofsomethingfromthephantasm,butbythephantasmimpressingitselfontheintellect.218

intellectuspossibilisreduciturperipsa,scilicetperspeciesrerumsensibilium,inactumetideooportetquodmoveaturabeishocmodo.]Itcouldbethatheisreferringinsteadtothephantasmintheaforementionedsense,asmaterialobject.ThecontextistheoppositiontoPlatoregardingtheroleofsensiblethingsinintellectualknowing.

21676,1,c.:“Exhocergoquodspeciesphantasmatumsuntinintellectupossibili,nonsequiturquodSocrates,inquosuntphantasmata,intelligat;sedquodipse,veleiusphantasmataintelligantur.”

217TheparallelintheInIIIDeAnima1,342-352isworthquoting:“[Theobjectofwhichthespeciespresentintheknowingfacultyisarepresentation,doesnottherebybecomeknower,butratherknown.]Iftheeyecontainsalikenessofacolouredwall,thisdoesnotcausethecolourtosee,but,onthecontrary,tobeseen.Thereforeiftheintelligibleideaintheintellectisasortoflikenessofourphantasms,itdoesnotfollowthatweperceiveanythingintellectually,butratherthatwe--ormorepreciselyourphantasms--areunderstoodbythatseparatedintellectualsubstance.”[Idenimcuiussimilitudoestspecies,invirtutealiquacognoscitivaexistens,nonexhocfitcognoscens,sedcognitum.Nonenimperhocquodspeciesquaeestinpupilla,estsimilitudocolorisquiestinpariete,colorestvidens,sedmagisestvisus.Perhocigiturquodspeciesintelligibilis,quaeestinintellectupossibili,estsimilitudoquaedamphantasmatum,nonsequiturquodnossumusintelligentes,sedquodnos,velpotiusphantasmatanostrasintintellectaabillasubstantiaseparate.]

21885,1ob.3:“InIIIDeAnimadiciturquodphantasmatasehabentadanimamintellectivamsicutcoloresadvisum.Sedvisiononfitperabstractionemaliquarumspecierumacoloribus,sedper

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Inotherwords,whatwouldperfecttheintellectisthephantasm,andnotanalleged

speciesabstractedfromit.Aquinas’responseisinlinewith76,1c.,bytakingcoloresand

phantasmataastheobjectsintheirparticularmaterialbeing,distinctfromtheirrespective

speciesorsimilitudines:“Colors,asbeinginindividualcorporealmatter,havethesame

modeofexistenceasthepowerofsight:thereforetheycanimpresstheirownimageonthe

eye.”219NoteAquinas’precisionregardingtheobjection:whatisimpressedinvisionisthe

similitudinem(species)ofthecolours,andnotthecoloursintheirrealbeing,proutsuntin

materiacorporaliindividuali,astheobjectioncouldhavesuggested(ob.3:“visiononfitper

abstractionemaliquarumspecierumacoloribus,sedperhocquodcoloresimprimuntin

visum”).Now,eundemmodumexistendimeansherethatboththepotencyofvisionand

thecolourinrealityareparticularandindividual.Thissamemodeofbeingallowsthe

colourstoimpressthepotencyofvisionbymeansoftheirspecies.Butthisdoesnotapply

tothephantasmsregardingthepotencyofunderstanding:“Butphantasms,sincetheyare

imagesofindividuals,andexistincorporealorgans,havenotthesamemodeofexistenceas

thehumanintellect,andthereforehavenotthepowerofthemselvestomakean

impressiononthepassiveintellect.”220Thephantasmisnotthatwhichperfectsthepotency

ofunderstanding.Whatisit,then?“Thisisdonebythepoweroftheactiveintellectwhich

hocquodcoloresimprimuntinvisum.Ergonecintelligerecontingitperhocquodaliquidabstrahaturaphantasmatibus,sedperhocquodphantasmataimprimuntinintellectum.”

21985,1ad3:“Adtertiumdicendumquodcoloreshabenteundemmodumexistendiproutsuntinmateriacorporaliindividuali,sicutetpotentiavisiva,etideopossuntimprimeresuamsimilitudineminvisum.”

22085,1ad3:“Sedphantasmata,cumsintsimilitudinesindividuorum,etexistantinorganiscorporeis,nonhabenteundemmodumexistendiquemhabetintellectushumanus,utexdictispatet;etideononpossuntsuavirtuteimprimereinintellectumpossibilem.”

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byturningtowardsthephantasmproducesinthepassiveintellectacertainlikenesswhich

represents,astoitsspecificconditionsonly,thethingreflectedinthephantasm.”221Hereit

seemsclearthatthephantasm(assensiblespecies)andtheintellectualspeciesaretwo

differentthings,onerepresentingtheparticularassuchandtheotherrepresentingthe

samething(whatelseifnot?)butonlyinitsnature,initsuniversalcontent.Therearetwo

differentspecieswithtwodifferentcontents,becausetherearetwodifferentfacultiesand

twoformallydifferentobjects:particularanduniversal.222

ThelasttexttobepresentedisactuallyoutsidethesectionoftheSummabeing

studied,butitmaybehelpful:

22185,1ad3:“Sedvirtuteintellectusagentisresultatquaedamsimilitudoinintellectu

possibiliexconversioneintellectusagentissupraphantasmata,quaequidemestrepraesentativaeorumquorumsuntphantasmata,solumquantumadnaturamspeciei.”Cf.Q.D.DeAnima,a.3,ad18:“Aphantasmmovestheintellect[insofarasitismadeintelligibleinact]bythepoweroftheagentintellect,towhichthepossibleintellectisrelatedaspotencyisto[itsrespectiveactivepower].Thisisthewayinwhichtheintellecthassomethingincommonwithaphantasm.”[Phantasmamovetintellectumproutestfactumintelligibileactu,virtuteintellectusagentisadquamcomparaturintellectuspossibilissicutpotentiaadagens,etitacumeocommunicat.];Q.D.DeAnima,a.3,c.:“Forspeciesareactuallyintelligibleonlybybeingabstractedfromphantasmsandbyexistinginthepossibleintellect.”[Speciesenimnonsuntintelligibilesactunisiperhocquodaphantasmatibusabstrahuntur,etsuntinintellectupossibili.];Q.D.DeAnima,a.2,ob.7:“Inasmuchasintelligibleformsinhereinthesoul,theyareindividuated;butasthelikenessesofthings,theyare[universal],representingthingsaccordingtotheircommonnatureandnotaccordingtotheirindividuatingprinciples.”[Formaeintelligibilesexillapartequainhaerentanimae,suntindividuatae;sedexillapartequasuntrerumsimilitudines,suntuniversales,repraesentantesressecundumnaturamcommunem,etnonsecundumprincipiaindividuantia.]

222Cf.DeSpirit.Creat.,a.10,ad17:“Aspecieswhichisintheimaginationisofthesamegenusasaspecieswhichisinasense,becausebothareindividualandmaterial.Butaspecieswhichisinanintellectbelongstoanothergenus,becauseitisuniversal.Andconsequentlyanimaginedspeciescannotimprintanintelligiblespeciesasasensitivespeciesimprintsanimaginedspecies;andforthisreasonanactiveintellectualpowerisnecessary,whereasanactivesensepowerisnot.”[Speciesquaeestinimaginatione,esteiusdemgeneriscumspeciequaeestinsensu,quiautraqueestindividualisetmaterialis;sedspeciesquaeestinintellectu,estalteriusgeneris,quiaestuniversalis.Etideospeciesimaginarianonpotestimprimerespeciemintelligibilem,sicutspeciessensibilisimprimitspeciemimaginariam;propterquodnecessariaestvirtusintellectivaactiva,nonautemvirtussensitivaactiva.]

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Thedistinctionofactiveandpassiveintellectinusisinrelationtothephantasms,whicharecomparedtothepassiveintellectascolorstothesight;buttotheactiveintellectascolorstothelight,asisclearfromDeAnimaiii.Butthisisnotsointheangel.Thereforethereisnoactiveandpassiveintellectintheangel.223

Thecomparisonheregoesbeyondthepossibleintellecttoincludeacomparison

withtheagentintellect.Thistextreinforcestheinterpretationpreviouslypresentedof

coloursandphantasmsasobjectsintheirconcreteandrealbeing,andnotasalready

perfectingthefaculty.Ifthecomparisonwiththepossibleintellectcouldhaveleftthings

ambiguous,thecomparisonwiththeagentintellectleaveslittleroomfordoubt.The

colourswhicharesubjecttotheinfluenceoflightarethecoloursintheirrealbeing,also

beforeknowledgehappens.Thephantasmwhichiscomparedwiththeagentintellect

representstheparticularthinginsofarasitisorcanbeilluminated,andthenintellectually

known.Theinfluenceoflightisanecessaryconditionofactualknowing,asmaking

knowabletherealobject.AccordingtoAquinas,therefore,colourandphantasminthe

Aristoteliantextstandfortheobjectsintheirrespectiverealities,andnotfortheperfective

objectsofvisionandofpossibleintellect.Theperfectiveobjectoftheintellect,ashasbeen

shown,isadifferentspeciesrepresentingthesamethingasisrepresentedinthephantasm,

butonlyinitsnature.224

22354,4,sc.:“Sedcontraestquodinnobisintellectusagensetpossibilisestper

comparationemadphantasmata;quaequidemcomparanturadintellectumpossibilemutcoloresadvisum,adintellectumautemagentemutcoloresadlumen,utpatetexIIIDeAnima.SedhocnonestinAngelo.ErgoinAngelononestintellectusagensetpossibilis.”

224AnothertextinwhichthisAristoteliantextisquotedisInBoet.DeTrin.6,3,c.:“Inthepresentstateoflife,ourintellectisnotabletoreferimmediatelytotheDivineessenceorotherseparatesubstances,sinceitrefersimmediatelytothephantasms,towhichtheintellectiscomparedassighttocolours,aswereadinIIIDeAnima.Inthisway,theintellectisabletoapprehendimmediatelyonlythequiddityofasensiblething,notthequiddityofanintelligiblething.”[Immediatequidemintellectusnosterferrinonpotestsecundumstatumviaeinessentiam

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ThissolutionisconsistentwithotherworksofAquinas,forexampleintheContra

Gentiles:

Now,thespeciesunderstoodiscomparedtothephantasmastheactuallyvisiblespeciestothecoloredthingoutsidethemind;indeed,Averroeshimselfusesthiscomparison,asdoesAristotle.Throughtheintelligibleform,therefore,thepossibleintellectisintouchwiththephantasminus,evenasthepowerofsightisintouchwiththecolorpresentinthestone.Butthiscontactdoesnotmakethestonetosee,butonlytobeseen.225

Deietinaliasessentiasseparatas,quiaimmediateextendituradphantasmata,adquaecomparatursicutvisusadcolorem,utdiciturinIIIDeAnima.Etsicimmediatepotestconcipereintellectusquiditatemreisensibilis,nonautemalicuiusreiintelligibilis.]Again,thatthephantasmisobjectdoesnotmeanthatthephantasmistheobjectquod.ComparewithInIIIDeAnima2,178-186:“…[W]ecouldnotmakeanycomparisonbetweentheuniversalandtheindividualifwehadnotafacultywhichperceivedboth[…].Theintellectthereforeknowsboth[…],butindifferentways.Itknowsthespecificnatureoressenceofanobjectby(reaching)outdirectlytothatobject;butitknowstheindividualthingindirectlyorreflexively,byareturntothephantasmsfromwhichitabstractedwhatisintelligible.”[…nonpossemuscognoscerecomparationemuniversalisadparticulare,nisiessetunapotentiaquaecognosceretutrumque.Intellectusigiturutrumquecognoscit,sedalioetaliomodo.Cognoscitenimnaturamspeciei,sivequodquidest,directeextendendoseipsum,ipsumautemsingulareperquamdamreflexionem,inquantumreditsuperphantasmata,aquibusspeciesintelligibilesabstrahuntur.]Inthissecondtext,thephantasmisconsideredinitssingularity,andthatiswhyitisnottheimmediateobjectofintelligence.Inmyview,inthesetexts,“immediate”and“direct”couldmeanthesame.

225CGII,59,par.10:“Speciesautemintellectacomparaturadphantasmasicutspeciesvisibilisinactuadcoloratumquodestextraanimam:ethacsimilitudineipse[Averroes]utitur,etetiamAristoteles.Similisigiturcontinuatioestintellectuspossibilisperformamintelligibilemadphantasmaquodinnobisest,etpotentiaevisivaeadcoloremquiestinlapide.Haecautemcontinuationonfacitlapidemvidere,sedsolumvideri.”Cf.alsoCGII,59,par.13:“Hence,thespeciesofathing,aspresentinphantasms,isnotactuallyintelligible,sinceinthisstateitisnotonewiththeintellectinact,butisonewithitaccordingasthespeciesisabstractedfromthephantasms.Justso,thespeciesofcolorisnotactuallyperceived[insofar]asit[is]inthestone,butonly[insofar]asit[is]inthepupil.”[Speciesigiturrei,secundumquodestinphantasmatibus,nonestintelligibilisactu:nonenimsicestunumcumintellectuinactusedsecundumquodestaphantasmatibusabstracta;sicutnecspeciescolorisestsensatainactusecundumquodestinlapide,sedsolumsecundumquodestinpupilla.]Cf.Stump,257note55.Theword“species”indicatesheresomethingthatisbothinrealityandinknowing,sonotsomuchthesimilitudobutratherthecontentofit.ItisonemoreexampleshowingthefreedomwithwhichAquinasusestheterms.

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InothertextsSt.Thomassaysexplicitlythattheperfectingobjectofintelligenceis

notthephantasm.226Inthatwhichfollows,thedifferencebetweenthespeciesofthe

sensesandoftheintellectisalsoclear.Thatis,numericallydifferentphantasmsreferto

onlyoneintelligiblespecies(species=cognitionalsimilitudo),becausethephantasms,and

thereforethethingsrepresented,areofthesamespecies(species=natureasmetaphysical

formalprinciple).

Butthephantasmitselfisnotaformofthepossibleintellect;itistheintelligiblespeciesabstractedfromthephantasmthatisaform.Nowinoneintellect,fromdifferentphantasmsofthesamespecies,onlyoneintelligiblespeciesisabstracted;asappearsinoneman,inwhomtheremaybedifferentphantasmsofastone;yetfromallofthemonlyoneintelligiblespeciesofastoneisabstracted;bywhichtheintellectofthatoneman,byoneoperation,understandsthenatureofastone,notwithstandingthediversityofphantasms.227

Ourintellectisabletoknowcorporealthings,notbymeansofcorporealimages

(phantasms)butbymeansofintelligiblespecies:

ThesewordsofAugustinearetobeunderstoodasreferringtothemediumofintellectualknowledge,andnottoitsobject.Fortheintellectknowsbodiesbyunderstandingthem,notindeedthroughbodies,northroughmaterialandcorporeal

226Cf.Q.D.DeAnima,a.2,c.:“…[A]phantasmisnotthesubjectofanintelligiblespecies

inasmuchas[it]is[whatis]actuallyunderstood.Onthecontrary,[whatisactuallyunderstoodismade]byabstractionfromphantasms.[Ontheotherhand,]thepossibleintellectisthesubjectofanintelligiblespeciesonlyinasmuchasanintelligiblespeciesisalreadyactuallyunderstoodandabstractedfromphantasms.”[…phantasmanonestsubiectumspecieiintelligibilissecundumquodestintellectuminactu,sedmagisperabstractionemaphantasmatibusfitintellectuminactu.Intellectusautempossibilisnonestsubiectumspecieiintelligibilis,nisisecundumquodestintellectaiaminactu,etabstractaaphantasmatibus.]ThecontextisalsothepolemicwithAverroes.

22776,2,c.:“Sedipsumphantasmanonestformaintellectuspossibilis,sedspeciesintelligibilisquaeaphantasmatibusabstrahitur.Inunoautemintellectuaphantasmatibusdiversiseiusdemspecieinonabstrahiturnisiunaspeciesintelligibilis.Sicutinunohomineapparet,inquopossuntessediversaphantasmatalapidis,ettamenabomnibuseisabstrahiturunaspeciesintelligibilislapidis,perquamintellectusuniushominisoperationeunaintelligitnaturamlapidis,nonobstantediversitatephantasmatum.”ItshouldbenotedthatthecontextistheimportantpolemicagainstAverroes’theoryofoneintellect.

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species;butthroughimmaterialandintelligiblespecies,whichcanbeinthesoulbytheirownessence.228

Theformalobjectofintelligenceisthenatureinitsabsoluteness,notinits

particularity:“Buttheintellectualsoulknowsathinginitsnatureabsolutely:forinstance,it

knowsastoneabsolutelyasastone;andthereforetheformofastoneabsolutely,astoits

properformalidea,isintheintellectualsoul.”229“Nowthereceptivepotentialityinthe

intellectualsoulisotherthanthereceptivepotentialityoffirstmatter,asappearsfromthe

diversityofthethingsreceivedbyeach.Forprimarymatterreceivesindividualforms;

whereastheintelligencereceivesabsoluteforms.”230

22884,1ad1:“DicendumquodverbumAugustiniestintelligendumquantumadeaquibus

intellectuscognoscit,nonautemquantumadeaquaecognoscit.Cognoscitenimcorporaintelligendo,sednonpercorpora,nequepersimilitudinesmaterialesetcorporeas;sedperspeciesimmaterialesetintelligibiles,quaepersuiessentiaminanimaessepossunt.”Cf.DeSpirit.Creat.,a.9,c.:“Norcanitbesaidthatmyactofunderstandingisdifferentfromyouractofunderstandingbyreasonofthediversityofthephantasms;becauseaphantasmisnotathingthatisunderstoodinact,butthislatterissomethingabstractedfromit,whichisheldtobeaword.Hencethediversityofthephantasmsisextrinsictointellectualactivity,andthuscannotcausedifferencesinit.”[Necpotestdiciquodintelligeremeumsitaliudabintelligeretuoperdiversitatemphantasmatum;quiaphantasmanonestintellectuminactu,sedidquodestabeoabstractum,quodponituresseverbum.Undediversitasphantasmatumestextrinsecaabintellectualioperatione;etsicnonpotestdiversificareipsam.]

22975,5,c.:“Animaautemintellectivacognoscitremaliquaminsuanaturaabsolute,putalapideminquantumestlapisabsolute.Estigiturformalapidisabsolute,secundumpropriamrationemformalem,inanimaintellectiva.”

23075,5ad1:“Estautemaliapotentiareceptivainanimaintellectiva,apotentiareceptivamateriaeprimae,utpatetexdiversitatereceptorum,nammateriaprimarecipitformasindividuales,intellectusautemrecipitformasabsolutas.”Cf.InIIIDeAnima1,323-329:“Thereforetheintelligibleideacannotbetheformoftheintellectualpoweruntilitisactually[intelligible];andthiscannothappenuntilitisdisengagedfromphantasmsbyabstraction.Hence,preciselyinthedegreethatitisjoinedtotheintellectitisremovedfromphantasms.Notinthiswaythereforecouldanintellectualpowerbeunitedwithus.”[Speciesigiturintelligibilisnonestformaintellectuspossibilis,nisisecundumquodestintelligibilisactu:nonestautemintelligibilisactu,nisisecundumquodestaphantasmatibusabstractaetremota.Manifestumestigitur,quodsecundumquoduniturintellectui,estremotaaphantasmatibus.Nonigiturintellectusperhocuniturnobiscum.]ThecontextisthepolemicwithAverroes.

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Thusitseemsclearthat,forSt.Thomas,theobjectofintelligenceinitsformal

aspectisdifferentfromtheobjectofsensitivity.231Itisdifferentinitscontent,anditis

knownthroughadifferentspecies.232Althoughtherehavebeensomeanticipations,the

subsistenceofthisobjectinrealityasaformalperfectionofcorporealthingsoutsidethe

mindwillbethefocusofthenextsection.Andthecharacteristicofknowingasreceptive,

andinthissensesimilartosensibility,willbethefocusofChapter3.

231Cf.InMet.12,lect.8,2540-2541:“Nowitsproperintelligibleobjectissubstance,since

theobjectoftheintellectisaquiddity.Hencehesaysthattheintellectisreceptiveofsomethingintelligibleandofsubstance.[…]Butitshouldbeborneinmindthatmaterialsubstancesarenotactuallyintelligiblebutonlypotentially;andtheybecomeactuallyintelligiblebyreasonofthefactthatthelikenessesofthemwhicharegottenbywayofthesensorypowersaremadeimmaterialbytheagentintellect.Andtheselikenessesarenotsubstancesbutcertainintelligibleformsreceivedintothepossibleintellect.ButaccordingtoPlatotheintelligibleformsofmaterialthingsareself-subsistententities.”[Intelligibileautemproprieestsubstantia;namobiectumintellectusestquodquidest;etpropterhocdicit,quodintellectusestsusceptivusintelligibilisetsubstantiae.(…)Sedsciendumestquodsubstantiaematerialesnonsuntintelligibilesactu,sedpotentia;fiuntautemintelligibilesactuperhocquodmediantibusvirtutibussensitivisearumsimilitudinesimmaterialesreddunturperintellectumagentem.Illaeautemsimilitudinesnonsuntsubstantiae,sedquaedamspeciesintelligibilesinintellectupossibilireceptae.SedsecundumPlatonem,speciesintelligibilesrerummaterialiumerantpersesubsistentes.]Theintelligiblespeciesiscalled“immaterial”andiscomparedwiththePlatonicidea,forwhichitcannotbethephantasm.Cf.Stump,248andnote12.

232Cf.Q.D.DeAnima,a.4,ad5:“…[T]hespeciesexistinginthemediumandinthesenseisaparticularandnothingmore.Thepossibleintellect,however,receivesspeciesofahighergenusthanthosepresentintheimagination;becausethepossibleintellectreceivesuniversalspecies,whereastheimaginationcontainsonlyparticularspecies.Thereforewerequireanagentintellectinthecaseofintelligiblethings…”[…cumspeciesinmedioetinsensunonsitnisiparticularis.Intellectusautempossibilisrecipitspeciesalteriusgenerisquamsintinimaginatione;cumintellectuspossibilisrecipiatspeciesuniversales,etimaginationoncontineatnisiparticulares.Etideoinintelligibilibusindigemusintellectuagente…]

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3)TheObjectofIntelligenceinitsRealAspect:TheUniversalisinthe

ThingsThemselves.

Thepurposeofthissectionistoshowthat,forSt.Thomas,theobjectofintelligence,

whichisformallydifferentfromtheobjectofsensibility,233subsistsinthecorporeal

things.234Inotherwords,theuniversals,asobjectsofunderstanding,areintheparticular

thingsthemselves,neitherinadifferentworldofPlatonicideas,norascomingfromor

belongingtothesubjectivity.

Twosections,alreadyquoted,of78,1,c.willhelptoshowthat,forSt.Thomas,both

sensibilityandintelligencerelatethesoultothatwhichisexternaltoit.Thisimpliesthatthe

universalissomethingextrinsic,somethingobjectiveas“outthere.”Afterspeakingabout

thevegetativepotenciesofthesoul,Aquinassays:

Thereisanothergenusinthepowersofthesoul,whichgenusregardsamoreuniversalobject—namely,everysensiblebody,notonlythebodytowhichthesoulisunited.Andthereisyetanothergenusinthepowersofthesoul,whichgenusregardsastillmoreuniversalobject—namely,notonlythesensiblebody,butallbeinginuniversal.Whereforeitisevidentthatthelattertwogeneraofthesoul'spowershaveanoperationinregardnotmerelytothatwhichisunitedtothem,butalsotosomethingextrinsic.235

233Cf.theprevioussectioninthisChapter.234Cf.InIDeAnima3,198-203;8,125-131.23578,1,c.:“Estautemaliudgenuspotentiarumanimae,quodrespicituniversalius

obiectum,scilicetomnecorpussensibile;etnonsolumcorpusanimaeunitum.Estautemaliudgenuspotentiarumanimae,quodrespicitadhucuniversaliusobiectum,scilicetnonsolumcorpussensibile,seduniversaliteromneens.Exquopatetquodistaduosecundagenerapotentiarumanimaehabentoperationemnonsolumrespectureiconiunctae,sedetiamrespectureiextrinsecae.”

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Afewlineslater,hestressesthatthisrelationshipwiththeextrinsicthingisverified

bymeansofanimage(similitudo)andisdifferentfromtherelationshipestablishedbythe

appetitivefaculties:

Itfollowsofnecessitythatthissomethingextrinsic,whichistheobjectofthesoul'soperation,mustberelatedtothesoulinatwofoldmanner.First,inasmuchasthissomethingextrinsichasanaturalaptitudetobeunitedtothesoul,andtobebyitslikenessinthesoul.Inthiswaytherearetwokindsofpowers—namely,the"sensitive"inregardtothelesscommonobject—thesensiblebody;andthe"intellectual,"inregardtothemostcommonobject—universalbeing.Secondly,forasmuchasthesoulitselfhasaninclinationandtendencytothesomethingextrinsic.236

Asintheprevioustext,ifthereisadifferencewithsensibility,thatdifferencedoes

notlieintheobjectofintelligencenotbeing“outthere”:

Butthereisthisdifference,accordingtotheopinionofAristotle,betweenthesenseandtheintelligence—thatathingisperceivedbythesenseaccordingtothedispositionwhichithasoutsidethesoul—thatis,initsindividuality;whereasthenatureofthethingunderstoodisindeedoutsidethesoul,butthemodeaccordingtowhichitexistsoutsidethesoulisnotthemodeaccordingtowhichitisunderstood.237

23678,1,c.:“Necesseestextrinsecamrem,quaeestobiectumoperationisanimae,

secundumduplicemrationemadanimamcomparari.Unomodo,secundumquodnataestanimaeconiungietinanimaessepersuamsimilitudinem.Etquantumadhoc,suntduogenerapotentiarum,scilicetsensitivum,respectuobiectiminuscommunis,quodestcorpussensibile;etintellectivum,respectuobiecticommunissimi,quodestensuniversale.Alioveromodo,secundumquodipsaanimainclinaturettenditinremexteriorem.”

23776,2ad4:“Sedhoctantuminterestintersensumetintellectum,secundumsententiamAristotelis,quodressentitursecundumillamdispositionemquamextraanimamhabet,insuaparticularitate,naturaautemreiquaeintelligitur,estquidemextraanimam,sednonhabetillummodumessendiextraanimam,secundumquemintelligitur.”

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ThisisthemeaningofrealismforSt.Thomas:ifthethingsweknowbyour

intellectualfacultywerenotoutthere,238ourknowingwouldnotrefertothethings

themselves.Immediatelypreceedingthequotationabove,Aquinassays:

Forwhatisunderstoodisintheintellect,notaccordingtoitsownnature,butaccordingtoitslikeness;for‘thestoneisnotinthesoul,butitslikenessis,’asissaid,DeAnimaiii,8.Yetitisthestonewhichisunderstood,notthelikenessofthestone;exceptbyareflectionoftheintellectonitself:otherwise,theobjectsofscienceswouldnotbethings,butonlyintelligiblespecies.239

Asimilarremarkoccursin85,2,c.,whereitisclearthat“outthere”forSt.Thomas

doesnotmeanoutsidetheworldofcorporealthings:

Thereforeifwhatweunderstandismerelytheintelligiblespeciesinthesoul,itwouldfollowthateverysciencewouldnotbeconcernedwithobjectsoutsidethesoul,butonlywiththeintelligiblespecieswithinthesoul;thus,accordingtotheteachingofthePlatonistsallscienceisaboutideas,whichtheyheldtobeactuallyunderstood.240

Whatweknowbymeansoftheintelligiblespeciesarethenaturesofcorporeal

things,andthatiswhyweneedconversioadphantasmata:“Weneedfurthertomakeuse

238Itisnotpossibletotreatthoroughlythemediationofthephantasminintellectual

knowing,butcertainprinciplesmayorientthereadertounderstandmyposition.SeeAppendix,Note3.

23976,2ad4:“Idenimquodintelligiturnonestinintellectusecundumse,sedsecundumsuamsimilitudinem,lapisenimnonestinanima,sedspecieslapidis,utdiciturinIIIDeAnima.Ettamenlapisestidquodintelligitur,nonautemspecieslapidis,nisiperreflexionemintellectussupraseipsum,alioquinscientiaenonessentderebus,seddespeciebusintelligibilibus.”

24085,2,c.:“Siigitureaquaeintelligimusessentsolumspeciesquaesuntinanima,sequereturquodscientiaeomnesnonessentderebusquaesuntextraanimam,sedsolumdespeciebusintelligibilibusquaesuntinanima;sicutsecundumPlatonicosomnesscientiaesuntdeideis,quasponebantesseintellectainactu.”

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ofthem[i.e.‘speciespreservedinthepassiveintellect’]inamannerbefittingthethingsof

whichtheyarethespecies,whichthingsarenaturesexistinginindividuals.”241

Particularlycleararethestatementsin85,2ad2,anditisworththelongquotation.

ForSt.Thomas,theobjectofknowingandthemodeofbeingofthisobjectintheknower

arenotthesame.Whatweknowisinthethingitself,althoughnotwiththesamemodeof

being,andthisapplieseventothesenses:

Inthesewords‘thethingactuallyunderstood’thereisadoubleimplication—thethingwhichisunderstood,and[itsbeing]understood.Inlikemannerthewords‘abstractuniversal’implytwothings,thenatureofathinganditsabstractionoruniversality.Thereforethenatureitselftowhichitoccurstobeunderstood,abstractedorconsideredasuniversalisonlyinindividuals;but[itsbeing]understood,abstractedorconsideredasuniversalisintheintellect.[Wecanseethepointbyacomparisonwiththesenses].Forthesightseesthecoloroftheappleapartfromitssmell.Ifthereforeitbeaskedwhereisthecolorwhichisseenapartfromthesmell,itisquiteclearthatthecolorwhichisseenisonlyintheapple:butthatitbeperceivedapartfromthesmell,thisisowingtothesight,forasmuchasthefacultyofsightreceivesthelikenessofcolorandnotofsmell.Inlikemannerhumanityunderstoodisonlyinthisorthatman;butthathumanitybeapprehendedwithoutconditionsofindividuality,thatis,thatitbeabstractedandconsequentlyconsideredasuniversal,occurstohumanityinasmuchasitisbroughtundertheconsiderationoftheintellect,inwhichthereisalikenessofthespecificnature,butnotoftheprinciplesofindividuality.242

24184,7ad1:“oportetquodeis[i.e.‘speciesconservataeinintellectupossibili’]utamur

secundumquodconvenitrebusquarumsuntspecies,quaesuntnaturaeinparticularibusexistentes.”

24285,2ad2:“Cumdiciturintellectuminactu,duoimportantur,scilicetresquaeintelligitur,ethocquodestipsumintelligi.Etsimilitercumdicituruniversaleabstractum,duointelliguntur,scilicetipsanaturarei,etabstractioseuuniversalitas.Ipsaigiturnaturacuiacciditvelintelligivelabstrahi,velintentiouniversalitatis,nonestnisiinsingularibus;sedhocipsumquodestintelligivelabstrahi,velintentiouniversalitatis,estinintellectu.Ethocpossumusviderepersimileinsensu.Visusenimvidetcolorempomisineeiusodore.Siergoquaeraturubisitcolorquividetursineodoremanifestumestquodcolorquividetur,nonestnisiinpomo;sedquodsitsineodoreperceptus,hocacciditeiexpartevisus,inquantuminvisuestsimilitudocolorisetnonodoris.Similiterhumanitasquaeintelligitur,nonestnisiinhocvelinillohomine,sedquodhumanitasapprehendatursineindividualibusconditionibus,quodestipsamabstrahi,adquodsequiturintentiouniversalitatis,

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Theobjectofintelligenceinitssubsistenceinrealityisthenatureasformalprinciple

ofthecorporealthing.Insofarasitisconsideredinitsabstraction,theuniversalis

principiumcognoscendi;butinsofarasitsubsistsinreality,itisprincipiumessendi:

Theuniversal,asunderstoodwiththeintentionofuniversality,is,indeed,inaway,aprincipleofknowledge,insofarastheintentionofuniversalityresultsfromthemodeofunderstandingbywayofabstraction.[…]Butifweconsiderthegenericorspecificnatureitselfasexistinginthesingular,thusinawayitisinthenatureofaformalprincipleinregardtothesingulars…243

Inthefollowingtext,theword“species”standsforformalprincipleinreality,and

notinthesenseofimage.Thereisinrealitysomethingthatallowsustosaythatvarious

individualsarenotdifferentintheirspecies,butonlyinnumber:“Thedifferenceofform

whichisdueonlytothedifferentdispositionofmatter,causesnotaspecificbutonlya

numericaldifference:fordifferentindividualshavedifferentforms,diversifiedaccordingto

thedifferenceofmatter.”244

accidithumanitatissecundumquodpercipiturabintellectu,inquoestsimilitudonaturaespeciei,etnonindividualiumprincipiorum.”

24385,3ad4:“Universale,secundumquodaccipiturcumintentioneuniversalitatis,estquidemquodammodoprincipiumcognoscendi,proutintentiouniversalitatisconsequiturmodumintelligendiquiestperabstractionem[…]Siautemconsideremusipsamnaturamgenerisetspecieiproutestinsingularibus,sicquodammodohabetrationemprincipiiformalisrespectusingularium…”

24485,7ad3:“Differentiaformaequaenonprovenitnisiexdiversadispositionemateriae,nonfacitdiversitatemsecundumspeciem,sedsolumsecundumnumerum;suntenimdiversorumindividuorumdiversaeformae,secundummateriamdiversificatae.”Thetwomeaningsof“species”(onerealandonegnoseological)canbeseenatworkin76,2,c.,inwhichvariousphantasmsaresaidtobeofthesamespecies:“Butthephantasmitselfisnotaformofthepossibleintellect;itistheintelligiblespeciesabstractedfromthephantasmthatisaform.Nowinoneintellect,fromdifferentphantasmsofthesamespecies,onlyoneintelligiblespeciesisabstracted;asappearsinoneman,inwhomtheremaybedifferentphantasmsofastone;yetfromallofthemonlyoneintelligiblespeciesofastoneisabstracted;bywhichtheintellectofthatoneman,byoneoperation,understandsthenatureofastone,notwithstandingthediversityofphantasms.”[Sedipsumphantasmanonestformaintellectuspossibilis,sedspeciesintelligibilisquaeaphantasmatibusabstrahitur.Inunoautemintellectuaphantasmatibusdiversiseiusdemspecieinonabstrahiturnisiunaspeciesintelligibilis.Sicutinunohomineapparet,inquopossuntessediversaphantasmata

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Ashasalreadybeenshownin79,3,andwillyetbeshownespeciallyinChapter2,

thefactthatthenatureofcorporealthingsisnotintelligibleinactdoesnotenableoneto

concludethatthenatureisnottherewithanothermodeofbeing.Todrawsucha

conclusionispreciselyPlato’serrorand—itwillbeargued—Kant’serroralso:“Having

observedthatallknowledgetakesplacethroughsomekindofsimilitude,hethoughtthat

theformofthethingknownmustofnecessitybeintheknowerinthesamemannerasin

thethingknown.[…]Whereforeheconcludedthatthethingswhichweunderstandmust

haveinthemselvesanexistenceunderthesameconditionsofimmaterialityand

immobility.”245

ForSt.Thomas,wemayconclude,thatwhichisknownbyintelligenceistheformal

principlesubsistingincorporealthings,theirnatureorspecies,theformalprincipleoftheir

being,whichsubsistsincompositionwiththeprincipleofindividuationinthethingitself.

Thissamenature,concretelysubsistentinthething,isknowninastateofabstraction.The

differentmodeofbeingdoesnotaffecttheobjectivityofthecontent.

AnexamenofotherworksofAquinasfollows.246Becausethetruthintheintellect

dependsonthethingsthemselves,theremustbesomethinginthethingsthatcorresponds

toourknowing:“…forourintellectualconceptionsaretrueinasmuchastheyactually

lapidis,ettamenabomnibuseisabstrahiturunaspeciesintelligibilislapidis,perquamintellectusuniushominisoperationeunaintelligitnaturamlapidis,nonobstantediversitatephantasmatum.]

24584,1c.:“…[C]umaestimaretomnemcognitionempermodumalicuiussimilitudinisesse,crediditquodformacognitiexnecessitatesitincognoscenteeomodoquoestincognito.[…]Etideoexistimavitquodoporteretresintellectashocmodoinseipsissubsistere,scilicetimmaterialiteretimmobiliter.”

246Ifollow,ingeneral,thechronologicalorderofferedbyStump,xvi-xx:DeVeritate(1256-1259),InBoet.DeTrin.(1257-1258),ContraGentiles(1259-1265),Q.D.DeAnima(1265-1266),InDeAnima(1267-1268),DeSpirit.Creat.(1267-1268),InMet.(1270-1273).

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representthethingknownbyacertainprocessofassimilation.Otherwisetheywouldbe

false,thatis,iftheycorrespondedtonothing.”247Thattheuniversalsubsistsinthethings

themselvesimpliesthatthereisacertainnecessityandstabilityinthem:

ThedifficultyofthisquestionobligedPlatotopostulatehisideas.Infact,because[…]hebelievedthatallofsensiblethingswerealwaysinmovement[…]andthereforehethoughtitwasimpossibletohavescienceofthem,hepostulatedcertainsubstancesseparatedfromsensiblethings,whichwouldbetheobjectsofthevarioussciencesandofdefinitions.Butthismisconceptioncamefromthefactthathedidnotdistinguishthatwhichbelongstosomethinginitselffromthatwhichisaccidental[…].AsitisdemonstratedinVIIMetaphysicae,giventhatinthesensiblesubstancewefindthewhole,thatis,thecomposite,andalsotheratio,thatis,itsform;wemustsaythatwhatisgeneratedandcorruptedinitselfisthecomposite,nottheratioorform,unlessbyaccident.[…]Now,anythingcanbeconsideredwithoutthosethingsthatdonotbelongtoitinitself.Thustheformsandrationesofthings,evensubjecttomovement,arewithoutmovementinsofarastheyareconsideredinthemselves.Itisinthiswaythattheyareobjectsofthevarioussciencesandofdefinitions,asthePhilosophersaysintheabovementionedplace.Andthesciencesofsensiblesubstancesarenotbasedontheknowledgeofsubstancesseparatedfromsensiblethings,asitisalsotheredemonstrated.248(mytrans.)

247DeVer.2,1,c.:“…[C]onceptioenimintellectusnostrisecundumhocveraest,prout

repraesentatperquamdamassimilationemremintellectam;aliasenimfalsaesset,sinihilsubessetinre.”

248InBoet.DeTrin.5,2,c.:“PropterdifficultatemhuiusquaestioniscoactusestPlatoadponendumideas.Cumenim[…]crederetomniasensibiliasemperesseinfluxu[…]etitaexistimaretdeeisnonposseessescientiam,posuitquasdamsubstantiasasensibilibusseparatas,dequibusessentscientiaeetdarenturdiffinitiones.Sedhicdefectusacciditexeoquodnondistinxitquodestperseabeoquodestsecundumaccidens[…]UtautemprobaturinVIIMetaphysicae,cuminsubstantiasensibiliinveniaturetipsumintegrum,idestcompositum,etratio,idestformaeius,persequidemgeneraturetcorrumpiturcompositum,nonautemratiosiveforma,sedsolumperaccidens[…]Unumquodqueautempotestconsiderarisineomnibushisquaeeinonpersecomparantur.Etideoformaeetrationesrerumquamvisinmotuexsistentium,proutinseconsiderantur,absquemotusunt.Etsicdeeissuntscientiaeetdiffinitiones,utibidemPhilosophusdicit.Nonautemscientiaesensibiliumsubstantiarumfundantursupercognitionealiquarumsubstantiarumasensibilibusseparatarum,utibidemprobatur.”Thisstabilityinmaterialthingsisaffirmedinothertextsaswell.Cf.InBoet.DeTrin.5,2,ob.6etad6(textinAppendix,Note4);InIDeAnima3,198-205(textinAppendix,Note4);DeSpirit.Creat.,a.10,ad8(textinAppendix,Note4);InMet.11,lect.6,2232.

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Themind’sdependenceonrealityinknowingtheabstracteduniversalisstressed

herealso:

Themathematicianinabstractingdoesnotconsiderhisobjectdifferentlythanitis.Infact,hedoesnotunderstandthelineasbeingwithoutsensiblematter,butratherheconsidersthelineanditspropertieswithoutconsideringsensiblematter.Inthisway,thereisnodiscrepancybetweentheintellectandthethingbecause,evenwithregardtothethingitself,thatwhichbelongstothenatureofthelinedoesnotdependonthatwhichmakesthemattertobesensible,butratherviceversa.Thusitisevidentthatthereisnofalsityregardingabstraction,asitissaidinIIPhysicorum.249(mytrans.)Thesimpleapprehensioncorrespondswiththenatureasametaphysicalprinciplein

thethingitself:

…[A]ccordingtothePhilosopherinIIIDeAnima,theintellecthastwooperations:onethatiscalledintelligenceoftheindivisible,bywhichtheintellectknowsofeachthingwhatitis;theotherone,bywhichtheintellectcomposesanddivides[…]Andthesetwooperationscorrespondtotwothingsthatareinthethingsthemselves.Thefirstoperationregardsthenatureitselfofthething,accordingtowhichthethingunderstoodobtainsacertaindegreeintherealmofbeings,beitacompletething,likeacertainwhole,oranincompletething,likeapartoranaccident.Thesecondoperationinsteadregardsthebeingitselfofthething,whichresultsfromthecongregationofthething’sprinciplesincomposites,oraccompaniesthething’ssimplenatureitself,asithappensinsimplesubstances.250(mytrans.)

249InBoet.DeTrin.5,3,ad1:“Mathematicusabstrahensnonconsideratremaliterquamsit.

Nonenimintelligitlineamessesinemateriasensibili,sedconsideratlineameteiuspassionessineconsiderationemateriaesensibilis,etsicnonestdissonantiainterintellectumetrem,quiaetiamsecundumremid,quodestdenaturalineae,nondependetabeo,quodfacitmateriamessesensibilem,sedmagiseconverso.Etsicpatetquodabstrahentiumnonestmendacium,utdiciturinIIPhysicorum.”

250InBoet.DeTrin.5,3,c.:“…[S]ecundumPhilosophuminIIIDeAnimaduplexestoperatiointellectus.Una,quaediciturintelligentiaindivisibilium,quacognoscitdeunoquoque,quidest.Aliavero,quacomponitetdividit[…].Ethaequidemduaeoperationesduobus,quaesuntinrebus,respondent.Primaquidemoperatiorespicitipsamnaturamrei,secundumquamresintellectaaliquemgraduminentibusobtinet,sivesitrescompleta,uttotumaliquod,siveresincompleta,utparsvelaccidens.Secundaverooperatiorespicitipsumesserei,quodquidemresultatexcongregationeprincipiorumreiincompositisvelipsamsimplicemnaturamreiconcomitatur,utinsubstantiissimplicibus.”

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Theuniversalasnatureissomethingwhichisknownseparatelyevenifitdoesnot

existseparatelyinthethingitself.Whatisactualinthecompositesubstanceallowsusto

knowitsnature:

…[B]ymeansofthefirstoperation,theintellectisabletoabstractthosethingsthatarenotseparateinreality;not,however,allofthem,butonlysome.Infact,sincesomethingisintelligibleinsofarasitisinact,aswereadinIXMetaphysicae,itisnecessarythatweunderstandthething’snatureorquiddityeitherinsofarasthenatureitselfisacertainact,asithappensinsimpleformsandsubstances,orinthatwhichisactofthatnature,asweunderstandcompositesubstancesbytheirforms…251(mytrans.)

Thatwhichensuresobjectivityinourintellectualknowingisthefactthat,aswiththe

senses,thatwhichisknownissomethingbelongingtothethingsoutsidethemind:

Consequently,intheactofunderstanding,theintelligiblespeciesreceivedintothepossibleintellectfunctionsasthethingbywhichoneunderstands,andnotasthatwhichisunderstood,evenasthespeciesofcolorintheeyeisnotthatwhichisseen,butthatbywhichwesee.Andthatwhichisunderstoodistheveryintelligibleessenceofthingsexistingoutsidethesoul,justasthingsoutsidethesoulareseenbycorporealsight.Forartsandscienceswerediscoveredforthepurposeofknowingthingsasexistingintheirownnatures.252

Thatwhichisapprehendedbytheintellectis“somethingone”becausethereis

“somethingone”inthethingitself.Again,knowingdependsonthings;whateverisin

knowingmustbesomethingthatisinthethingsthemselves:

251InBoet.DeTrin.5,3,c.:“…[S]ecundumprimamoperationempotestabstrahereeaquae

secundumremseparatanonsunt,nontamenomnia,sedaliqua.Cumenimunaquaequeressitintelligibilis,secundumquodestinactu,utdiciturinIXMetaphysicae,oportetquodipsanaturasivequiditasreiintelligatur:velsecundumquodestactusquidam,sicutacciditdeipsisformisetsubstantiissimplicibus,velsecundumidquodestactuseius,sicutsubstantiaecompositaepersuasformas…”

252CGII,75,par.7:“Habetseigiturspeciesintelligibilisreceptainintellectupossibiliinintelligendosicutidquointelligitur,nonsicutidquodintelligitur:sicutetspeciescolorisinoculononestidquodvidetur,sedidquovidemus.Idveroquodintelligitur,estipsaratiorerumexistentiumextraanimam:sicutetresextraanimamexistentesvisucorporalividentur.Adhoceniminventaesuntartesetscientiaeutresinsuisnaturisexistentescognoscantur.”

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Moreover,itproducestheseintelligiblesbyabstractingthemfrommatterandfrommaterialconditionswhicharetheprinciplesofindividuation.Andsincethenatureassuchofthespeciesdoesnotpossesstheseprinciplesbywhichthenatureisgivenamultipleexistenceamongdifferentthings,becauseindividuatingprinciplesofthissortaredistinctfromthenatureitself,theintellectwillbeabletoreceivethisnatureapartfromallmaterialconditions,andconsequentlywillreceiveitasaunity[i.e.,asaone-in-many].253

Theindivisibilityoftheintelligiblenatureinthethingitselfisthereasontoaffirmthe

indivisibilityoftheintellect(noteagainthereasoningfromtheobjecttothesubjective

conditions).Whatisrelevantforthepresentpurposesisthatthematerialityofathingdoes

notpreventitfromhavinganindivisiblenature.

NoticethatAristotleisimplyingherethatintellectisindivisibleofitsnature.Whatisintelligibleinanythingisitsessenceornature;whichispresentwhollyineverypartofit,asthespecificnatureiswhollypresentineachindividualofthespecies;thewholenatureofmanineachindividualman;andtheindividualassuchisindivisible.Hencewhatisintelligibleinanythingisindivisible;andthereforesoistheintellect254

253Q.D.DeAnima,a.4,c.:“Facitautem[intelligibiliainactu]perabstractionemamateria,et

amaterialibusconditionibus,quaesuntprincipiaindividuationis.Cumenimnaturaspeciei,quantumadidquodperseadspeciempertinet,nonhabeatundemultipliceturindiversis,sedindividuantiaprincipiasintpraeterrationemipsius;poteritintellectusaccipereeampraeteromnesconditionesindividuantes;etsicaccipieturaliquidunum.”Cf.Q.D.DeAnima,a.3,ad8:“…accordingtoAristotle,thefactthattheintellectunderstandsaone-in-manyinabstractionfromindividuatingprinciples,istobeattributedtotheintellectitself.Andthoughnothingabstractexistsinreality,theintellectisnotvoidofanyrealcontent,norisitmisrepresentativeofthingsastheyare;because,ofthosethingswhichnecessarilyexisttogether,onecanbetrulyunderstoodornamedwithoutanotherbeingunderstoodornamed.Butitcannotbetrulyunderstoodorsaidofthingsexistinginthisway,thatoneexistswithouttheother.Thuswhateverexistsinanindividualwhichpertainstothenatureofitsspecies,andinrespectofwhichitislikeotherthings,canbeknownandspokenoftrulywithouttakingintoconsiderationitsindividuatingprinciples,whichdistinguishitfromallotherindividuals.”[…secundumsententiamAristotelishocestabintellectu,scilicetquodintelligatunuminmultisperabstractionemaprincipiisindividuantibus.Nectamenintellectusestvanusautfalsus,licetnonsitaliquidabstractuminrerumnatura.Quiaeorumquaesuntsimul,unumpotestvereintelligiautnominari,absquehocquodintelligaturvelnomineturalterum;licetnonpossitvereintelligiveldici,quodeorumquaesuntsimul,unumsitsinealtero.Sicigiturverepotestconsiderarietdiciidquodestinaliquoindividuo,denaturaspeciei,inquosimileestcumaliis,absqueeoquodconsiderenturineoprincipiaindividuantia,secundumquaedistinguiturabomnibusaliis.]

254InIDeAnima8,123-131:“Etnotandum,quodhicAristotelesocculteostendit,quodintellectusdenaturasuanonestpartibilis,sedquidimpartibile.Intelligibileeniminunaquaquere

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ThemostcleartextinSt.Thomas’commentaryontheDeAnima,regardingthe

presenceoftheuniversalnatureinthethingsthemselves,seemstobethefollowing.The

differencebetweenSt.Thomas’viewandPlato’sisnotthattheobjectofknowingisextra

animambutthat,forSt.Thomas,itisnotseparatefromthematerialthings(asitisfor

Plato).Moreover,thepresenceoftheobjectinthematerialthingsisametaphysical

presence,totheextentthattheindividualconditionsaccompanytheuniversalnature:

Theintellect’sproperobjectisindeedtheessenceofthings;butnottheessencebyitself,inseparationfromthings,asthePlatoniststhought.Hencethis‘properobject’ofourintellectisnot,asthePlatonistsheld,somethingexisting,outsidesensiblethings;itissomethingintrinsictosensiblethings;andthis,eventhoughthemodeinwhichessencesaregraspedbytheminddiffersfromtheirmodeofexistenceinsensiblethings;fortheminddiscernsthemapartfromtheindividuatingconditionswhichbelongtothemintheorderofsensiblereality.255

estquidditas,etnaturareiesttotainqualibetparte,sicutnaturaspecieiesttotainquolibetindividuo:totaenimnaturahominisestinquolibetindividuo,ethocestindivisibile:undeilludquodestintelligibileinqualibetre,estindivisibile,etperconsequensintellectus.”

255InIIIDeAnima2,240-249:“…[P]ropriumobiectumintellectusestquidditasrei,quaenonestseparataarebus,utPlatoniciposuerunt.Undeillud,quodestobiectumintellectusnostrinonestaliquidextraressensibilesexistens,utPlatoniciposuerunt,sedaliquidinrebussensibilibusexistens;licetintellectusapprehendataliomodoquidditatesrerum,quamsintinrebussensibilibus.Nonenimapprehenditeascumconditionibusindividuantibus,quaeeisinrebussensibilibusadiunguntur.”Cf.InIIIDeAnima2,63-86:“AndwhilstPlatohadseparatedthequiddities(calledbyhim‘ideas’or‘species’)ofthingsfromthingsintheirsingularity,Aristotlewasconcernedtoshowthatquidditiesareonlyaccidentallydistinctfromsingularthings.Forexample,awhitemanandhisessencearedistinct[…]Andthesameistrueofanythingwhoseformexistsinmatter;thereissomethinginitbesidesitsspecificprinciple.Thespecificnatureisindividualisedthroughmatter;hencetheindividualisingprinciplesandindividualaccidentsarenotincludedintheessenceassuch.Thatiswhytherecanbemanyindividualsofthesamespecificnature—havingthisnatureincommon,whilsttheydifferinvirtueoftheirindividuatingprinciples.Hence,inallsuchthings,thethinganditsessencearenotquiteidentical.Socratesisnothishumanity.”[EtquiaPlatoponebatquidditatesrerumesseseparatasasingularibus,quasdicebatideas,velspecies;ideoostendit,quodquidditatesrerumnonsuntaliudarebusnisiperaccidens;utputanonestidemquidditashominisalbi,ethomoalbus(…)Hocautemcontingitinomnibushabentibusformaminmateria,quiaineisestaliquidpraeterprincipiaspeciei.Namnaturaspecieiindividuaturpermateriam:undeprincipiaindividuantiaetaccidentiaindividuisuntpraeteressentiamspeciei.Etideocontingitsubunaspecieinveniripluraindividua:quaelicetnondifferantinnaturaspeciei,differunttamensecundumprincipia

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Anothertextafewlineslatertellsusthattheobjectofintelligence,thequidditas,is

presentinthethingsthemselvesasmuchasistheobjectofsensibility.Becauseofthiswe

cansaythatscienceisofthethingsthemselves,andnotofthespeciesassubjective

modifications:

Furthermore,itisclearthattheintelligibleideasbywhichthepotentialintellectisactualisedarenotinthemselvestheintellect’sobject:fortheyarenotthatwhich,butthatbywhichitunderstands.For,aswithsighttheimageintheeyeisnotwhatisseen,butwhatgivesrisetotheactofsight(forwhatisseeniscolourwhichexistsinanexteriorbody),soalsowhattheintellectunderstandsistheessenceexistinginthings;itisnotitsownintelligibleidea,exceptinsofarastheintellectreflectsuponitself.Because,obviously,itiswhatthemindunderstandsthatmakesupthesubject-matterofthesciences;andallthese,apartfromrationalscience,haverealitiesfortheirsubject-matter,notideas.Clearlythen,theintellect’sobjectisnottheintelligibleidea,buttheessenceofintelligiblerealities.256

ThefollowingtextcanbetakenasaclearexpressionoftheThomisticfactashas

beendiscussedinsection1ofthisChapter.257Here,whatisrelevantisthatthequidditas

individuantia.Etpropterhocinomnibushabentibusformaminmateria,nonestomninoidem,etresetquodquidesteius.Socratesenimnonestsuahumanitas.]

256InIIIDeAnima2,264-279:“Manifestumestetiam,quodspeciesintelligibiles,quibusintellectuspossibilisfitinactu,nonsuntobiectumintellectus.Nonenimsehabentadintellectumsicutquodintelligitur,sedsicutquointelligit.Sicutenimspecies,quaeestinvisu,nonestquodvidetur,sedestquovisusvidet;quodautemvideturestcolor,quiestincorpore;similiterquodintellectusintelligitestquidditas,quaeestinrebus;nonautemspeciesintelligibilis,nisiinquantumintellectusinseipsumreflectitur.Manifestumestenimquodscientiaesuntdehisquaeintellectusintelligit.Suntautemscientiaederebus,nonautemdespeciebus,velintentionibusintelligibilibus,nisisolascientiarationalis.Undemanifestumest,quodspeciesintelligibilisnonestobiectumintellectus,sedquidditasreiintellectae.”

257Cf.inthesamesenseDeSpirit.Creat.,a.9,c.:“Andsimilarlyitwouldnotbenecessarytopositanagentintellectiftheuniversalswhichareactuallyintelligiblesubsistedofthemselvesoutsidethesoul,asPlatoasserted.ButbecauseAristotleassertedthattheseuniversalsdonotsubsistexceptinsensibleobjects,whicharenotactuallyintelligible,henecessarilyhadtopositsomepower,whichwouldmaketheobjectsthatareintelligibleinpotencytobeactuallyintelligible,byabstractingthespeciesofthingsfrommatterandfromindividuatingconditions;andthispoweriscalledtheagentintellect.”[Etsimiliternonessetnecesseponereintellectumagentem,siuniversaliaquaesuntintelligibiliaactu,persesubsisterentextraanimam,sicutposuitPlato.SedquiaAristotelesposuiteanonsubsisterenisiinsensibilibus,quaenonsuntintelligibiliaactu,necessehabuitponerealiquamvirtutemquaefaceretintelligibiliainpotentiaesseintelligibiliaactu,

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notbeingintelligibleinactgoestogetherwiththequidditasbeinginthematerialthings,

contrarytoPlato’sideaofthequidditasbeingseparatefromthematerialthings:

ThereasonwhyAristotlecametopostulateanagentintellectwashisrejectionofPlato’stheorythattheessencesofsensiblethingsexistedapartfrommatter,inastateofactualintelligibility.ForPlatotherewasclearlynoneedtopositanagentintellect.ButAristotle,whoregardedtheessencesofsensiblethingsasexistinginmatterwithonlyapotentialintelligibility,hadtoinvokesomeabstractiveprincipleintheminditselftorendertheseessencesactuallyintelligible.258

DeSpirit.Creat.,a.10,ad8shouldbequotedinitsentirety.259Inthecorpus,Aquinas

says:“Foroneparticularman,suchasSocratesorPlato,makesthingsintelligibleinact

abstrahendospeciesrerumamateriaetconditionibusindividuantibus;ethaecvirtusvocaturintellectusagens.]

258InIIIDeAnima4,54-63:“InduciturautemAristotelesadponendumintellectumagentem,adexcludendumopinionemPlatonis,quiposuitquidditatesrerumsensibiliumesseamateriaseparatas,etintelligibilesactu;undenonerateinecessariumponereintellectumagentem.SedquiaAristotelesponit,quodquidditatesrerumsensibiliumsuntinmateria,etnonintelligibilesactu,oportuitquodponeretaliquemintellectumquiabstraheretamateria,etsicfacereteasintelligibilesactu.”Cf.InIIIDeAnima6,274-276:“Thereforetheintellectabstractsthingspresentinthesense-objects,notunderstandingthemtobeseparate,butunderstandingtheminseparationanddistinctly.”(mytrans.)[Eaergoquaesuntinsensibilibusabstrahitintellectus,nonquidemintelligenseaesseseparata,sedseparatimetseorsumeaintelligens.];7,64-77:“…[T]hedoctrinejuststated[…]mightleadonetosupposethattheintellectdidnotdependonthesenses;aswouldbethecaseindeediftheintelligibleobjectsattainedbyourmindhadtheirexistenceapartfromsensiblethings,asthePlatoniststhought[…]First,then,heobservesthat,sincealltheobjectsofourunderstandingareincludedwithintherangeofsensiblethingsexistinginspace,thatistosay,thatnoneseemstohavethatsortofdistinctexistenceapartfromthingsofsensewhichparticularthingsofsensehaveapartfromoneanother,itfollowsthatalltheseintelligibleobjectshavetheirbeingsintheobjectsofsense…”[…possetaliquiscredere,quodintellectusnondependeretasensu.Ethocquidemverumessetsiintelligibilianostriintellectusessentasensibilibusseparatasecundumesse,utPlatoniciposuerunt(…)Dicitergoprimo,quodquianullaresintellectaanobis,estpraetermagnitudinessensibiles,quasiabeisseparatasecundumesse,sicutsensibiliavidenturabinvicemseparata:necesseestquodintelligibiliaintellectusnostrisintinspeciebussensibilibussecundumesse…]

259Cf.Appendix,Note4(partiallyquoted).Mostinterestingisthefinalphraseofthisresponse:“Nowitdoesnotmattermuchifwesaythatintelligiblethingsthemselvesareparticipated[…]fromGod,orthatthelightwhichmakesthemintelligibleisparticipated[…]fromGod.”[Nonmultumautemrefertdicere,quodipsaintelligibiliaparticipenturaDeo,velquodlumenfaciensintelligibiliaparticipetur.]Morethanaconciliatoryphrase(betweenSt.AugustineandAristotle),itseemstometheassumptionofthemostpowerfulintuitionoftheDoctorofHippo:in

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whenhepleases,thatis,byapprehendingauniversalformfromparticulars,whenhe

separatesthatwhichiscommontoallindividualmenfromthosethingswhicharepeculiar

toeach.”260Onceagain,thatwhichiscommonistakentoexistincompositionwiththe

individuatingfeatures,anditisdistinguishedfromthem.

ThetextinDeSpirit.Creat.,a.9,ad6willoccupyusmoredirectlyandextensivelyin

Chapter2,butashortreferencemayconfirmthepointathand:

ForthereisnodifferencebetweenAristotleandPlato,exceptinthis:thatPlatoassertedthatthethingwhichisunderstoodhasactualbeingoutsidethesoulinexactlythesamewayastheintellectunderstandsit,thatis,assomethingabstractanduniversal;butAristotleasserted"thatthethingwhichisunderstoodisoutsidethesoul,butinanotherway,becauseitisunderstoodintheabstractandhasactualbeingintheconcrete.[…]WhereasPlatosaidthatthescienceshavetodowithseparatedforms,Aristotlesaidthattheyhavetodowiththequidditiesofthingsthatexistinthosethings.261

SometextsfromAquinas’commentaryonAristotle’sMetaphysicswillbepresented

nowtoshowhow,forAquinas,theuniversal-natureexistsinthesingularmaterialthings.262

anycase,asSt.Augustinesawclearly,thereisaparticipationfromGod,Godmustbethesourceoftruth.Notthoughasprovidingthetruthascontent(astheholyDoctorseemstohaveproposed)butasprovidingwithnatureaninfalliblelighttodiscoverthetruthofthings.

260DeSpirit.Creat.,a.10,c.:“Unusenimhomoparticularis,utSocratesvelPlato,facitcumvultintelligibiliainactu,apprehendendoscilicetuniversaleaparticularibus,dumsecernitidquodestcommuneomnibusindividuishominum,abhisquaesuntpropriasingulis.”

261DeSpirit.Creat.,a.9,ad6:“NonenimestdifferentiainterAristotelemetPlatonem,nisiinhocquodPlatoposuitquodresquaeintelligitureodemmodohabetesseextraanimamquomodoeamintellectusintelligit,idestutabstractaetcommunis;Aristotelesveroposuitremquaeintelligituresseextraanimam,sedaliomodo,quiaintelligiturabstracteethabetesseconcrete.[…]Platoquidemdixitscientiasessedeformisseparatis,Aristotelesverodequidditatibusrerumineisexistentibus.”Cf.DeSpirit.Creat.,a.9,c..

262InmyinterpretationofInMetaphysicorum,theuniversalasthecommonnatureexistingintheconcretecoincideswiththequodquideratesse,whichforAquinasisfirstofalltheformalprinciple(withthematterofthespeciesincluded)oftherealmaterialsubstance(cf.InMet.7,lect.2,1275;lect.5,1379;lect.7,1422;lect.9,1470;lect.10,1491.1497;lect.11,1535).Thedefinitionisalsoofthequodquideratesse(sometimescalledalsoquodquidest)andthereisanidentityofcontentbetweentheobjectofdefinitionandthecommonnatureinreality.Thedifferenceisinthe

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Thefactthatthenaturealsoincludesmatter,inasense,doesnotmakeitless“universal”:

Aquinasdrawsadistinctionbetweenthematterthatbelongstothespeciesandthe

individualmatter.Whatisrelevantforusnowisthatthecommonspecies,matterandform,

belongstotheindividualandisdistinguishedfromitsindividualmatter;andthatitisthis

specieswhichistheobjectofdefinition:

For,aswassaidabove,whatthedefinitionsignifiesistheessence,anddefinitionsarenotassignedtoindividualsbuttospecies;andthereforeindividualmatter,whichistheprincipleofindividuation,isdistinctfromtheessence.Butinrealityitisimpossibleforaformtoexistexceptinaparticularsubstance.Henceifanynaturalthinghasmatterwhichispartofitsspecies,andthispertainstoitsessence,itmustalsohaveindividualmatter,whichdoesnotpertaintoitsessence.Therefore,ifanynaturalthinghasmatter,itisnotitsownessencebutissomethinghavinganessence;forexample,Socratesisnothumanitybutsomethinghavinghumanity.263

Whentheexistenceoftheuniversalsisdenied,itisonlyinthesenseofexistingas

such,asoneseparatefromthemany:

Hence,ifuniversalsasuniversalsarethings,theymustbedistinctfromsingulars,whicharenotuniversals.[…]However,forthosewhoclaimthatgeneraandspeciesarenotthingsornaturesdistinctfromsingularsbutarethesingularthings

modeofbeing(withtheindividualconditionsinreality,abstractedfromtheminthedefinitionoftheintellect).Thedefinitionisthespeciesexpressaofthesimpleapprehension,andthereforenotajudgment;andthedefinitionrepresentsthequodquideratesse,andnotthepropositionthatattributesthequodquideratessetoathing.ThesegeneralremarksmayassistinunderstandingforexampleSummaI,85,2ad3.

263InMet.7,lect.11,1535:“Sicutenimsupradictumest,quodquideratesseestidquodsignificatdefinitio.Definitioautemnonassignaturindividuis,sedspeciebus;etideomateriaindividualis,quaeestindividuationisprincipiumestpraeteridquodestquodquideratesse.Impossibileestauteminrerumnaturaessespeciemnisiinhocindividuo.Undeoportetquodquaelibetresnaturae,sihabeatmateriamquaeestparsspeciei,quaeestpertinensadquodquidest,quodetiamhabeatmateriamindividualem,quaenonpertinetadquodquidest.Undenullaresnaturaesimateriamhabeat,estipsumquodquidest,sedesthabensillud.SicutSocratesnonesthumanitas,sedesthumanitatemhabens.”

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themselves(forexample,thatthereisnomanwhoisnotthisman),itdoesnotfollowthatsecondsubstancesignifiesanaccidentormodification.264

Theuniversaldoesnotexistasone(separate)thing,butitdoesexistasacommon

thingintheparticulars:

Unityitselfcannotbepresentinmanythingsatthesametime;forthisisopposedtothenotionofunity,[solongaswearetalkingaboutaunitywhichexistsbyitselfasasubstance].Butwhatiscommonispresentinmanythingsatthesametime,forcommonmeanswhatmaybepredicatedofmanythingsandbepresentinmanythings.265Henceitisclearthatacommonunitycannotbeoneinthesensethatitisonesubstance.Furthermore,itisevidentfromallthepointsalreadydiscussed

264InMet.7,lect.13,1582f:“Siergouniversalia,inquantumuniversaliasunt,sintres

quaedam,oportebitquodsintaliaeresasingularibus,quaenonsuntuniversalia[…]Sedponentibusquodgeneraetspeciesnonsuntaliquaeresvelnaturaealiaeasingularibus,sedipsametsingularia,sicutquodnonesthomoquinonsithichomo,nonsequiturquodsecundaesubstantiaesignificentaccidensvelpassionem.”Cf.InMet.12,lect.4,2482andpassim.Everytimehesaysthattheuniversaldoesnotexist,hemeansthatthenatureofsensiblethingsdoesnotexistinrealityinastateofintellectualabstraction,inthePlatonicsense;inotherwords,thatitdoesnotexistseparatefromtheparticularthings.Cf.Q.D.DeAnima,a.4,c.:“Moreover,theintelligible[…]whichthepossibleintellectunderstandsdoesnotexistinreality(asanintelligible);forourpossibleintellectunderstandssomethingasthoughitwereaone-in-manyandcommontomany[…]However,suchanentityisnotfoundsubsistingin(sensible)reality,asAristotleprovesintheMetaphysics.”[Intelligibileautemperintellectumpossibilemnonestaliquidinrerumnaturaexistens,inquantumintelligibileest;intelligitenimintellectuspossibilisnosteraliquidquasiunuminmultisetdemultis.Taleautemnoninveniturinrerumnaturasubsistens,utAristotelesprobatinVIIMetaphys..]

265Cf.InMet.10,lect.3,1963-1964:“…nouniversalcanbeasubstancewhichsubsistsofitselfbecauseeveryuniversaliscommontomany.Auniversalalsocannotbeasubsistingsubstancebecauseotherwiseitwouldhavetobeonethingapartfromthemany,andthenitcouldnotbecommonbutwouldbeinitselfasingularthing[…]andthusitmustbeinsomewayaone-in-many,andnotsomethingsubsistingapartfromthem.”(underlinemine)[…nullumuniversaliumessepotestsubstantia,quaescilicetpersesitsubsistens;quiaomneuniversalecommuneestmultis.Necpossibileestuniversaleessesubstantiamsubsistentem;quiasicoporteretquodessetunumpraetermulta,etitanonessetcommune,sedessetquoddamsingulareinse(…)oportetquodaliquomodositunuminmultis,etnonseorsumsubsistensabeis.];InMet.10,lect.1,1930:“Forindistinctsingularthingsthereisnonaturenumericallyonewhichcanbecalledaspecies,buttheintellectapprehendsasonethatattributeinwhichallsingularsagree.Hencethespecies,whichisdistinctindistinctindividualsinreality,becomesundividedwhenapprehendedbytheintellect.”[Nonenimindiversissingularibusestaliquanaturaunanumero,quaepossitdicispecies.Sedintellectusapprehenditutunumidinquoomniainferioraconveniunt.Etsicinapprehensioneintellectus,speciesfitindivisibilis,quaerealiterestdiversaindiversisindividuis.]“Realiterdiversa”meansthateachindividualhasitsownnature,andthereforeisnotunanumero.Butthatnatureiscommon(unaformaliter),insofarasthereissomethinginwhichalloftheindividualsconcur(“conveniunt”).

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aboveinthischapterthatnouniversal—eitherbeingorunityorgeneraorspecies—hasaseparatebeingapartfromsingularthings.266

Thespeciesentersintorealcompositionwithindividualmatterand,becauseofthat,

therealparticularsubstanceiscorruptible.Noticehowthespeciesiscalled“rationem

conceptam”insofarasitisthecontentofdefinition:

AndIsaythatthesediffer;i.e.,‘thatthelatter,’whichissubstanceinthesenseoftheconcretewhole,issubstancetakenassomethinghavingitsintelligiblestructureconceivedwithmatter;buttheformer,whichistheformorintelligiblestructureoressenceofathing,istheintelligiblestructureorformingeneral,andthisdoesnothaveindividualmatterconnectedwithit.Thereforeallthosethingswhicharecalledsubstanceinthesenseofacompositearecapableofbeingcorrupted.267

266InMet.7,lect.16,1641:“…[H]ocipsumquodestunum,nonpotestapudmultasimul

inveniri.Hocenimestcontrarationemunius,sitamenponaturaliquodunumperseexistensutsubstantia.Sedilludquodestcommune,estsimulapudmulta.Hocenimestratiocommunis,utdemultispraedicetur,etinmultisexistat.Patetigiturquodunumquodestcommune,nonpotestessesicunumquasiunasubstantia.Etulteriuspalamestexomnibuspraedictisinhoccapitulo,quodnullumuniversale,necens,necunum,necgenera,necspecieshabentesseseparatumpraetersingularia.”AswithmanytextsinAquinas,theexistenceoftheuniversalintheparticularscouldbetakentomeanthattheyareintheparticularsinsofarastheyarepredicatedofthem,andsotheirin-existenceintheparticularwoulddependonasubjectivefunctionoraction.ButthiswouldbenottorealizethatwhatSt.ThomasisdoingispreciselypresentinganalternativetoPlato,withAristotle.Platohaddeniedthepresenceoftheuniversalobjectofunderstandinginthematerialthingsthemselves;St.Thomasisopposinghimonthatpoint,bymeansofadistinctionbetweenthemodeofbeingoftheuniversalinrealityandintheintellect,withtheintellectalwaysdependingonreality(cf.InMetI,lect.10,158;InMet.9,lect.11,1896-1898;InISent.d.2,q.1,a.3,c.).Inasense,thiswholedissertationismeanttoclarifythispointintheinterpretationofAquinas.

267InMet.7,lect.15,1606f:“Dicoautemeasessealterasquiahocquidem,scilicetsubstantia,quaeesttotum,sicestsubstantiasicuthabensrationemconceptamcummateria;illavero,quaeestsicutformaetratioetquodquideratesse,esttotaliterratioetformanonhabensmateriamindividualemadiunctam.Quaecumqueigiturdicuntursubstantiaehocmodosicutcomposita,eorumpotestessecorruptio.”

Thereasonforcallingthespeciesorformratio(cf.alsoInMet.12,lect.10,2595)canbetakenfromInMet.8,lect.1,1687(textinAppendix,Note5).Noticehow,althoughthenameratiocomesfromreason,whatisinreasoncomes(“sumitur”)fromreality.Noticealsohowtheformofthethingissomething“actu”:thecontentofintellectualknowingisalreadyactualinthissense;itisinpotencyonlyofitsintelligiblemodeofbeing.Thecontentofintellectualknowingistheperfectionofamaterialthingwhich,becauseofitscharacterasperfection,isalreadyinact.Thefactthatitisinmatterdoesnotmakeitintopotency,butratheritmakestheperfectionconcrete.

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Whatisknowninthesimpleapprehension(=“quodsignificatdefinitio”)isthesame

naturewhichispresentinthethingitselftogetherwiththeindividuatingprinciples.Notice

how,inthistext,quodquideratesseisequatedwithnaturaspeciei,quidditasandquod

quidestessesuum:

Thereasonforthispositionisthatessenceiswhatthedefinitionsignifies,andthedefinitionsignifiesthenatureofthespecies.Butifthereissomethingwhichiscomposedofmatterandform,theninthatthingtheremustbesomeotherprinciplebesidesthenatureofthespecies.Forsincematteristheprincipleofindividuation,theninanythingcomposedofmatterandformtheremustbecertainindividuatingprinciplesdistinctfromthenatureofthespecies.Hencesuchathingisnotjustitsownessencebutissomethinginadditiontothis.Butifsuchathingexistswhichisonlyaform,itwillhavenoindividuatingprinciplesinadditiontothenatureofitsspecies.Foraformthatexistsofitselfisindividuatedofitself.Thereforethisthingisnothingelsethanitsownessence.268

Theintellect’sfirstoperationischaracterizedasareachingouttograsp(attingere)

somethingofthethingitself,namelyitsquodquidestorquidest:

Theintellectisdeceivedaboutaquiddityonlyaccidentally;foreitherapersoncomesincontactwithathing’squidditythroughhisintellect,andthenhetrulyknowswhatthatthingis;orhedoesnotcomeincontactwithit,andthenhedoesnotknowwhatitis.Hence,withregardtosuchathingtheintellectisneithertruenorfalse.269

268InMet.8,lect.3,1710:“Ethuiusratioest,quiaquodquideratesseestidquodsignificat

definitio.Definitioautemsignificatnaturamspeciei.Siautemaliquaresest,quaesitcompositaexmateriaetforma,oportetquodinillaresitaliquidpraeternaturamspeciei.Cumenimmateriasitindividuationisprincipium,oportetquodinquolibetcompositoexmateriaetformasintprincipiaindividuantia,quaesuntpraeternaturamspeciei.Undehuiusmodiresnontantumestquidditassua,sedaliquidpraeterhoc.Siquaveroresest,quaesitformatantum,nonhabetaliquaprincipiaindividuantiapraeternaturamspeciei,cumipsaformaperseexistensperseipsamindividuetur.Etideoipsaresnihilaliudestquamquodquidestessesuum.”

269InMet.9,lect.11,1907:“Circaquodquidestnondecipiturintellectusnisiperaccidens:autenimperintellectumattingitaliquisquodquidestrei,ettuncverecognoscitquidestres;autnonattingit,ettuncnonapprehenditremillam.Undecircaeamnonverificaturnequedecipitur.”

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Stump,270Berger,271andBaltuta272seemtosharetheinterpretationhereinproposed

regardingthepresenceoftheuniversalnatureinthethingsthemselves.Forthereasons

previouslyexposed,Owensismorereticenttoaffirmsomethinglikethat,andinterprets

Aquinas’denialoftheexistenceoftheuniversalinreality273asadenialofacommonnature

inthethingsthemselves.274Corysays:“Thephantasm[…]ispotentiallyintelligibleand

individualthrough-and-through,whereasactuallyintelligible,universalhorsenessexists

onlyintheintellect”275andinnotegivesaninterestingclarification:

[QuotingQ.D.DeAnima,a.4]Intelligitenimintellectuspossibilisnosteraliquidquasiunuminmultisetdemultis.Taleautemnoninueniturinrerumnaturasubsistens.276ThisisnottodenyAquinas’srealismaboutessences;heholdsthatMarengoandotherhorsesreallydoshareacommonnature,althoughthisnatureexistsextramentallyonlyasinstantiatedasindividualhorses(hencethefamousstatementfromDeenteetessentia2[Leon.43.374:80–82]:[I]nSortenoninueniturcommunitasaliqua,sedquicquidestineoestindividuatum277).Whetherthis

270Cf.Stump,264:“By‘quiddity’hereAquinasmeansthatformofathingthatputitinto

oneratherthananotherspeciesorgenus,itsnatureoressence.Naturesdonotexistintheworldontheirown;intheworldtheyexistonlyasincorporatedintothethingsthathavenatures.”Andinnote“See,e.g.,InDAIII.8.705–706.”

271Cf.Berger,44:“Theintellectualactreferstothenaturesofthesensiblethings,understoodasimmaterialformsofmaterialthings.”

272Cf.Baltuta,151.273Cf.InMet.11,lect.2,2189:“Althoughuniversalsdonotexistofthemselves,itisstill

necessarytoconsideruniversallythenaturesofthingswhichsubsistofthemselves.”[Licetuniversalianonperseexistant,tamennaturaseorumquaepersesubsistuntestconsiderareuniversaliter.]

274Cf.theIntroductionofthisdissertation;Owens,134:“Thereasonweneedanexpressspeciesisbecausetheobjectdoesnotexistinuniversalfashioninthesensiblething.”

275ThereseCory,“RethinkingAbstractionism:Aquinas'sIntellectualLightandSomeArabicSources,”JournaloftheHistoryofPhilosophy53,no.4(2015):613.

276“Forourpossibleintellectunderstandssomethingasthoughitwereaone-in-manyandcommontomany.However,suchanentityisnotfoundsubsistinginreality”(Q.D.DeAnima,a.4,c.).

277“InSocratesthereisnocommonness,butwhateverisinhimisindividuated”(DeEnteetEssentia,2).

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positionisinfactconsistentwithrealismaboutessences,isnotwithinthescopeofthispaper.278

Now,inordertotrulyunderstandabstraction,isthisreallyaproblemwecanset

aside?Abstractionisnotsimplythespiritualizationofthephantasm,butanoperationthat

givesusadifferent(heterogeneous)content.The“scandal”ofabstractionisnotthatthe

phantasmreceivesadifferentmodeofbeing,butthatIknowauniversalnature,awhatness

inthephantasm,thatseemsnottoberealbecauseitisnotparticular.Isthatuniversal

contentrealornot?Thisismostrelevantbecausethisistheconditionofpossibilityof

abstraction.279

4)TheRoleoftheAgentIntellectanditsNecessity:ToMake

IntelligibleinActtheUniversalinre

IntheprevioussectionswehavetriedtoclarifywhatisforSt.Thomasthe

cognitionalfactrequiringanagentintellectasitsexplanation.Thefactisthatweknowthe

natureofthecorporealthing,thatis,itsuniversalaspect,butthisnatureisnotintelligiblein

act.Wehavealsoconsideredsomeofthepresuppositionsofthisfact,namely,thespecific

differencebetweentheobjectofintelligenceandtheobjectofsensibility,andalsothe

278Cory,Rethinking,613note21.279Isuggestthatamorehelpfulapproachtothecausalproblem(cf.Cory,Averroes,4)in

Aquinaswouldbetotakeasapointofdeparture,nottheimmaterialityoftheeffectofthephantasminthepossibleintellect,buttheuniversalityoftheknown(intelligibilityascontent),andthefactthatthiscontentispresentintheintellectwithamodeofbeingthat(thesamecontent)doesnothaveinitspresenceinthephantasm.Inotherwords,thepointofdepartureforthecausalproblem(whatIcallthe“Thomisticfact”)shouldbetheintelligiblemodeofbeingoftheuniversalcontent,nottheintelligiblemodeofbeingoftheparticularcontent(Cf.Section1ofthisChapter).IhavetheimpressionthatCory’spointofdepartureisthelatteralternative.Cf.Cory,Averroes,23:“TheAgentIntellectmustaccomplishsomesortofmetaphysicalchangethatmakesimagescapableofaffectingtheMaterialIntellect.”

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subsistenceoftheobjectofintelligence(theuniversal)intheparticularrealthings.Inlight

oftheseconsiderations,wenowturntostudymorecloselythatwhichSt.Thomassays

abouttheroleoftheagentintellect.Theviewhereinproposedisthattheroleoftheagent

intellectistomakeintelligibleinacttheuniversalinre,i.e.thenatureofthecorporeal

thing,sothatthisnaturemaybeseenbythepossibleintellect.

Theroleoftheagentintellectischaracterizedas“facereintelligibiliainactu.”In

ordertounderstandwhatSt.Thomasmeanswhenhespeaksaboutthis“facereintelligibilia

inactu,”whatmustbekeptinmindisaseriesofactualizationswhich,inAquinas’mind,

musttakeplaceinordertoexplainthefactthatwesimplyunderstand.Thisfactisalready

anactualization;thatis,wepassfromunderstandinginpotencytounderstandinginact.

Theperfectionwhichallowsustounderstand,thatwhichformallyactualizesourfaculty,is

theintelligiblenatureofacorporealthing,alreadyinactofbeingintelligible.Now,that

intelligibleisnotavailabletotheintelligence,insofarasthenatureofacorporealthingis

notouttherealreadyintelligibleinact;theintelligibleexistsonlyinthepotentialityofthe

phantasm.Inorderfortheintelligibleinpotency,whichisinthephantasm,tobecome

intelligibleinact,anagent,anefficientcauseisneeded.Therefore,itistheagentintellect

which,inanefficientway,actualizestheintelligibleinpotencysothatitbecomesintelligible

inact;butitistheintelligibleinactwhich,inaformalway,actualizesthepossibleintellect,

whichwaspreviouslyinpotency.280Wecouldgoevenfurtherbyaffirming,withSt.Thomas,

280ThenecessityoftheintelligibleinactinhumanunderstandingcouldbefoundinPlato

also,butnotthenecessityofanagentintellect(atleastnotintheAristoteliansense,cf.79,3).Cf.DeSpirit.Creat.,a.9,c.:“Andsimilarlyitwouldnotbenecessarytopositanagentintellectiftheuniversalswhichareactuallyintelligiblesubsistedofthemselvesoutsidethesoul,asPlatoasserted.

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apreviousactualization:thephantasm,againbytheactionoftheagentintellect,receives

theabilitythatfromitselfintelligiblespeciesmaybeabstracted;inotherwords,receives

thepotentialintelligibilityitself.281Thisisbecause,forSt.Thomas,itdoesnotseemrightto

ascribeanintelligiblepotentiality,whichisofadifferentorder,tosomethingmerely

material.282

ButbecauseAristotleassertedthattheseuniversalsdonotsubsistexceptinsensibleobjects,whicharenotactuallyintelligible,henecessarilyhadtopositsomepower,whichwouldmaketheobjectsthatareintelligibleinpotencytobeactuallyintelligible…”[Etsimiliternonessetnecesseponereintellectumagentem,siuniversaliaquaesuntintelligibiliaactu,persesubsisterentextraanimam,sicutposuitPlato.SedquiaAristotelesposuiteanonsubsisterenisiinsensibilibus,quaenonsuntintelligibiliaactu,necessehabuitponerealiquamvirtutemquaefaceretintelligibiliainpotentiaesseintelligibiliaactu…]

281Cf.85,1ad4:“Notonlydoestheactiveintellectthrowlightonthephantasm:itdoesmore;byitsownpoweritabstractstheintelligiblespeciesfromthephantasm.Itthrowslightonthephantasm,because,justasthesensitivepartacquiresagreaterpowerbyitsconjunctionwiththeintellectualpart,sobythepoweroftheactiveintellectthephantasmsaremade[…]fitfortheabstractiontherefromofintelligibleintentions.”[Phantasmataetilluminanturabintellectuagente;etiterumabeis,pervirtutemintellectusagentis,speciesintelligibilesabstrahuntur.Illuminanturquidem,quia,sicutparssensitivaexconiunctioneadintellectivamefficiturvirtuosior,itaphantasmataexvirtuteintellectusagentisreddunturhabiliautabeisintentionesintelligibilesabstrahantur.]

282Ispeakhereaboutintelligibilityasmodeofbeing,whichimpliesimmateriality(wewillseeespeciallyinChapter2thetwomeaningsofintelligibleanduniversalinAquinas).TheThomisticdoctrineofthecelestialbodies’influenceinsensibleknowingisinmyviewrelatedtothis.FabrotreatsthisissueinPP64-68,quotingextensivelyAquinas’DePotentia,q.5,a.8.InFabro’sreading,Aquinasaffirmsinthesensiblebodiesadoublecausalitybytheinfluenceofthecelestialbodies:onephysicalandtheotherintentional,bywhichthesensiblebodiesareabletoperfectthefacultiesofthesensesnotonlyphysicallybutalsocognitively.Itis,Isuggest,thesameprinciplethatAquinasusesin85,1ad4.Inorderforsomethingtobeknown,itmustbeknowableinact;forsomethingtobeknowableinact,itmustbeknowableinpotency,thatistosay,itneedstohavetheabilitytobeknowableinact.Butknowability,inpotencyorinact,isaqualitythatdoesnotbelongtoasensiblebodymerelyforbeingwhatitis.Thisisbecauseitimpliesacapacitytoperfectafacultyofknowing,aperfectionwhichforSt.Thomasisa“secondmodeofbeing”(cf.DeVer.2,2)differentfromthephysicalmodeofbeing.Whatproducesinthesensiblebodiesthiscapacityofproducingsensibleknowingisthe(secondkindof)influenceofthecelestialbodies;whatproducesinthephantasm(whichstandsfortheparticularsensiblething)thisabilityofbeingintelligibleinactistheagentintellectitself.Wedonotneedanagentsensebecause,grantedtheinfluenceofthecelestialbodies,theperfectiontobeknown(content)isalreadyparticular,andsosensibleinactinitsphysicalmodeofbeing.Wedoneedthesecondactionoftheagentintellectbecause,evengrantedthefirstactionofillumination,theperfectiontobeknown(inthephantasm)isstillmaterial,andsonotintelligible

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Therefore,whenSt.Thomassays“facereintelligibiliainactu”hemeansthatthe

agentintellectproducesfromthepotentialityofthephantasmanintelligiblespecies

representingthenatureofacorporealthing,aspecieswhichisable(becauseitisinact)to

perfectthepossibleintellectwiththeknowledgeofthatnatureitself.283

Letusnowreviewsometexts.Probablythebestisagain79,3,c.“Nownothingis

reducedfrompotentialitytoactexceptbysomethinginact;asthesensesaremadeactual

inactinitsphysicalmodeofbeing.Thecelestialbodiesandthefirstactionoftheagentintellecteffectintheconcretethingstheabilitytoproduceacognitivespeciesoutofthemselves(DePot.q.5,a.8:“atcommunicatingacertainlikeness[of]itsformtothe‘medium,’whichmaybecomparedtothespiritual‘intention’whichthingsimpressonthesensesorintelligence”[adquamdamdiffusionemsimilitudinisformaeinmediosecundumsimilitudinemspiritualisintentionisquaerecipiturdereinsensuvelintellectu];85,1ad4:“phantasmsaremade[…]fitfortheabstractiontherefromofintelligibleintentions”[phantasmata(…)reddunturhabiliautabeisintentionesintelligibilesabstrahantur])or,perhapsbettersaid,theabilityinordertoperfectcognitivelyafacultyofknowing.Inthesenses,becausetheperfectiontobeknownisalreadyparticular(sensibleinact),thisinfluenceisenoughtomaketheactofsensationpossibleregardingtheobject.Inintelligence,thisinfluenceisenoughtoelevatetheconcretethingtotheintentionalintelligiblerealmbutonlyasabeinginpotencyandnotinact.Inotherwords,thisinfluencegivestothephantasmasitwereanintelligiblequality,makingitintelligibleinpotency,i.e.abletobethesourceofanintelligiblespecies.Granted,asaconditionofpossibility,thisfirstactionofillumination,thesecondactionoftheagentintellectisrequiredtoproducetheintelligibilityinactofthecontent,bymeansofaseparationfromitsindividualconditionsinmatter.Thatacosmologyofcelestialbodiesistodayatleastquestionable,doesnottakeawaythemetaphysicalproblemthatAquinassees,northepossibilityofitssolutionbymeansoftheseparatesubstances’influence.IwillcomebackbrieflytothistopicinChapter4.

283Inthissection,wearenotfocusingontheactofabstractiondirectly,butontheroleoftheagentintellectintheprocessofunderstanding,particularlyitsrelationshiptotheactofthepossibleintellect.Abstractionandmakingintelligiblearecertainlyrelated.Cf.InIIIDeAnima4,50-53:“Theagentintellect,ontheotherhand,actualisestheintelligiblenotionsthemselves,[whichwerepreviouslyinpotency,]abstractingthemfrommatter:[itisinthiswaythattheyareintelligibleinact].”[Intellectusautemagensfacitipsaintelligibiliaesseinactu,quaepriuserantinpotentia,perhocquodabstrahiteaamateria;sicenimsuntintelligibiliainactu,utdictumest.]Itisveryimportanttokeepinmind,withCromp,thetwomeaningsofabstraction:asactionoftheagentintellectandasconsideration(orbetter“non-consideration”)ofthepossible(cf.GermaineCromp,L'intellectagentetsonrôled'abstraction[Canada?:1980],16ff.).St.Thomasspeaksaboutthisabstractionasnon-considerationin85,1,ad1andad2.

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bywhatisactuallysensible.”284Thesewordsrefertotheformalactualizationbymeansof

theintelligibleinact,astheparallelwiththesensessuggests.Butbecausetheobjectof

intelligenceisnotintelligibleinactinthecorporealthings,ashealreadysaysatthe

beginningofthecorpus,285St.Thomascontinues:“Wemustthereforeassignonthepartof

theintellectsomepowertomakethingsactuallyintelligible,byabstractionofthespecies

frommaterialconditions.Andsuchisthenecessityforanactiveintellect.”286Theactionof

theagentintellect,calledhere“abstraction,”isthatwhichallowstheactofthepossible

intellect,thatis,understanding.Thesearetwodifferentpassagesfrompotencytoact,by

twodifferentfaculties:“Neverthelessthereisadistinctionbetweenthepoweroftheactive

intellectandofthepassiveintellect:becauseasregardsthesameobject,theactivepower

whichmakestheobjecttobeinactmustbedistinctfromthepassivepower,whichis

movedbytheobjectexistinginact.”287Inthislattertext,thetwoaforementioneddistinct

processesofactualizationcanbeseenclearly.

28479,3,c.:“Nihilautemreduciturdepotentiainactum,nisiperaliquodensactu,sicut

sensusfitinactupersensibileinactu.”285Cf.also79,3ad3:“Nowtheintelligibleinactisnotsomethingexistinginnature;ifwe

considerthenatureofthingssensible,whichdonotsubsistapartfrommatter.Andthereforeinordertounderstandthem,theimmaterialnatureofthepassiveintellectwouldnotsufficebutforthepresenceoftheactiveintellectwhichmakesthingsactuallyintelligiblebywayofabstraction.”[Intelligibileauteminactunonestaliquidexistensinrerumnatura,quantumadnaturamrerumsensibilium,quaenonsubsistuntpraetermateriam.Etideoadintelligendumnonsufficeretimmaterialitasintellectuspossibilis,nisiadessetintellectusagens,quifaceretintelligibiliainactupermodumabstractionis.]

28679,3,c.:“Oportebatigiturponerealiquamvirtutemexparteintellectus,quaefaceretintelligibiliainactu,perabstractionemspecierumaconditionibusmaterialibus.Ethaecestnecessitasponendiintellectumagentem.”

28779,7,c.:“Diversificaturtamenpotentiaintellectusagentis,etintellectuspossibilis,quiarespectueiusdemobiecti,aliudprincipiumoportetessepotentiamactivam,quaefacitobiectumesseinactu;etaliudpotentiampassivam,quaemoveturabobiectoinactuexistente.”

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Anotherimportantpassageaboutthenatureandroleoftheagentintellect,in

polemicwithAverroes,is88,1,c.:

Aswasshownabove,theactiveintellectisnotaseparatesubstance;butafacultyofthesoul,extendingitselfactivelytothesameobjectstowhichthepassiveintellectextendsreceptively;because,asisstated(DeAnimaiii,5),thepassiveintellectis‘allthingspotentially,’andtheactiveintellectis‘allthingsinact.’Thereforebothintellects,accordingtothepresentstateoflife,extendtomaterialthingsonly,whicharemadeactuallyintelligiblebytheactiveintellect,andarereceivedinthepassiveintellect.288

Thedistinctionbetweenthetwofacultiesandtheirrespectiverolesisherevery

clear.Bothfacultiesrefertothesameobjectinsofaraswhatisreceivedbythepossible

intellectiswhatismadebytheagentintellect:anintelligibleinact.Butthesetwofaculties

differfromeachother,insofarastheactionoftheagentintellectisthatofan“efficient

causality”oractivepotency,andtheactofthepossibleintellectthatofa“materialcause”

orpassivepotency.289Thefactthatthepossibleintellectpresupposestheproductofthe

agentintellectinordertoact,makesevenmoreevidentthedistinction:itisnotjusta

temporaldistinction,butametaphysicalone.Thereisnowaywecanthinkofthe

28888,1,c.:“Supraostensumestquodintellectusagensnonestsubstantiaseparata,sed

virtusquaedamanimae,adeademactiveseextendens,adquaeseextenditintellectuspossibilisreceptive,quia,utdiciturinIIIDeAnima,intellectuspossibilisestquoestomniafieri,intellectusagensquoestomniafacere.Uterqueergointellectusseextendit,secundumstatumpraesentisvitae,admaterialiasola;quaeintellectusagensfacitintelligibiliaactu,etrecipiunturinintellectupossibili.”

28985,1ad4shouldbeunderstoodinthissamesensewhenspeakingonabstraction:“Furthermore,theactiveintellectabstractstheintelligiblespeciesfromthephantasm,forasmuchasbythepoweroftheactiveintellectweareable[totakeintoourconsiderationthespecificnaturewithouttheconditionsofindividuality,sincetheimageofthatspecificnature]informsthepassiveintellect.”[Abstrahitautemintellectusagensspeciesintelligibilesaphantasmatibus,inquantumpervirtutemintellectusagentisacciperepossumusinnostraconsiderationenaturasspecierumsineindividualibusconditionibus,secundumquarumsimilitudinesintellectuspossibilisinformatur.]Thecharacterizationoftheagentintellectisactive,whereasthepossibleintellectistheonewhichreceives(“accipere”)orisactualized(“informatur”)bythespeciesproducedbytheagentintellect.

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actualizationofthepossibleintellectifthereisnotanintelligibleinactand,therefore,

somethinglikeanagentintellectmakingtheintelligibleinact.Thepossibleintellectcannot

beactualizedwithanythingelse.

Inthefollowingtext,theseriesofactualizationsalsoisclear,andparticularlyclearis

thewayinwhichwecouldspeakoftheagentintellectactualizingthepossibleintellect:itis

bymeansoftheintelligiblespeciesproducedinabstraction.

[Ourintellect]understandsitselfaccordingasitismadeactualbythespeciesabstractedfromsensiblethings,throughthelightoftheactiveintellect,whichnotonlyactuatestheintelligiblethingsthemselves,butalso,bytheirinstrumentality,actuatesthepassiveintellect.Thereforetheintellectknowsitselfnotbyitsessence,butbyitsact.290

Theagentintellect,byanefficientcausalityonthematerialofsensibility,produces

anintelligibleinactwhichisthenabletoactualizethepossibleintellect.ForSt.Thomas,the

possibleintellectcanreceive—orbeinformedby—anintelligibleinactonly.Human

intelligence,i.e.,thefacultythatunderstands,isinpotencyoftheintelligible.Thatiswhy,if

somethinglikeintellectualknowinghappens,anintellectualagentisrequiredinorderto

makethatintelligibleinactandimpressitonthepossibleintellect.

Doesthisnotimplythattheagentintellectproducestheobject,oratleast

completesitformally?InthenextChapter,thecrucialdistinctionbetweenresintellectaand

modusreiintellectaewillbeexamined,andthetensionbetweenThomismandKantian

philosophywillbebroughtmoreclearlytothefore.

29087,1,c.:“…[C]onsequensestutsicseipsumintelligatintellectusnoster,secundumquod

fitactuperspeciesasensibilibusabstractasperlumenintellectusagentis,quodestactusipsorumintelligibilium,eteismediantibusintellectuspossibilis.Nonergoperessentiamsuam,sedperactumsuumsecognoscitintellectusnoster.”Themeaningoftheagentintellectas“actusipsorumintelligibilium”(cf.also87,1ad2)willbeexaminedlater,inChapter4,section1.

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ItmaybehelpfultocollectthefindingsofthisfirstChapterandassesswhatremains

tobediscussed.Sofar,thefactthatbringsAquinastointroduceanagentintellectinhuman

knowinghasbeenelucidated.Itisadouble-sidedfact.Onesideofthisfactisthatour

intelligenceknowsthenatureofcorporealthingsassomethingdistinctfromtheirsensible

contentandalsopresentinthethingsthemselves.Althoughalreadyimpliedinmanytexts,

thecharacterizationofintellectualknowingasreceptiveofthiscontent(thenaturepresent

inthethingitself)willbediscussedinmoredetailinChapter3.Theothersideofthis

Thomisticfactisthatthosenaturesweknowarenotintelligibleinact;thatistosay,they

cannotbeknownbyourintelligencewiththemodeofbeingtheyhaveinthethings

themselves.Therefore,thefactthatweactuallyknowthemnecessarilyimpliesthatthereis

anagentintellectproducingthatmodeofbeing,thatintelligibility,whichallowsthose

naturestobereceivedcognitivelybythepossibleintellect.However,thisThomistic

distinctionbetweenintelligiblecontentandintelligibilityasamodeofbeing,already

anticipatedtoacertainextent,willbetheprecisefocusofthenextChapter.

Asisclear,theintentionwasnottodemonstratetheThomisticfact,butto

demonstratethatthisisafactforAquinas,exactlythefactthat,inhismind,requiresan

agentintellectasaconditionofpossibility.Still,thedemonstrationsofarmaybefound

lacking,becausetheissuesindicatedinthepreviousparagraphhavenotbeendiscussedin

detail.Icanonlysaythattheissueathandisverycomplex,andonecouldhavebegunina

differentway,butastartingpointwasnecessary,anditseemedfairtobeginbythe“fact,”

inthisway,andsimplyanticipateforthereaderwhatwillbefoundinthenextchapters.

Hopefully,attheend,thereaderwillbesatisfiedregardingtheseanticipations.

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ChapterTwo:TheThomisticDistinctionbetweentheObjectandtheModeofBeingoftheObject

(resintellectaandmodusreiintellectae)

Itisherethatthequestionoftheagentintellectisseentoberelevanttothecritical

problem.AccordingtoKant,becauseinrealitythereisnothinguniversal(allrealityis

particular),theoriginoftheuniversalinscientificknowledgemustbethesubjectitself,291

nottherealityoutthere.Consideredcarefully,thislineofthinkingexposesthesameerror

asthatofPlato.Thatis,becauseKantdoesnotfind,inthe(particular)reality“outthere,”

theobjectofunderstandinginthewayitisinourconsciousness,Kantmustplacetheorigin

ofthisobject,notinanold-fashionedPlatonicworldofideas,butinamoremodern

conceptofsubjectivity.292LikePlato,Kantbelievesthattheobjectofunderstandingmust

existinthesamewayweknowit;inotherwords,Kantdoesnotdifferentiatebetweenthe

objectanditsmodeofbeing.293Becausematerialrealitycanhavenothingtodowithour

spirit(Descartes),becausetheparticularismerelymultipleandtheuniversalismerelyone,

andbecausenothinglikeauniversalcanbeseenintheparticular,ifthereisuniversalityin

291Cf.ImmanuelKant,CritiqueofPureReason,trans.GuyerandWood(NewYork:

CambridgeUniversityPress,1998),B1-4.292Cf.Owens,323-324,wherePlatoisportrayedasadmittingadoubleoriginforhuman

cognition,onebeingtheknowledgeofeverchangingthingscomingthroughthesenses,andtheotherbeingtheknowledgeofstablethingscomingfromsomewhereelse,byanamnesis.

293In84,2c.,thesameerrorisattributedtotheNaturalphilosophers(“Theythoughtthattheformofthethingknownisintheknowerinthesamemodeasinthethingknown.”[Existimabantautemquodformacognitisitincognoscenteeomodoquoestinrecognita.]),butinsteadofmakingimmaterialtheresintellectainitssubsistence,asdoesPlato,theymakethesoulitselfmaterial,orcomposedofthesameprinciplesofthematerialthings.Cf.InIDeAnima4,19-36;12,10-15(bothtextsinAppendix,Note6).

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ourknowing,itmustcomefromthesubjectitself;and,iftheuniversalisreferredtothe

particular,itmustbebyafunctionofthesubject.

St.Thomas,bycontrast,iscarefultodistinguishtheobjectthatisunderstoodfrom

themodeofbeingoftheobject.Healsorealizes,withPlatoandKant,thatnothinginreality

isintelligibleinact,andthatrealityisparticular;buthecannotdenythecognitivefactthat

weunderstandcorporealthings,thatweknowthemnotonlyintheirindividualitybutalso

intheirnature,intheirspecificperfection.Hecannotovercomethealterityoftheobjectof

understanding:itisforSt.Thomasafact.Therefore,iftheobjectofunderstandingisout

there(extraanimam),butnotinthewayweunderstandit,itisevidentforhimthatthere

mustbeadifferencebetweentheobjectandthewayinwhichtheobjectisknownor

receivedinourfacultiesofknowing.

Therefore,whatevertherelateddoctrinaldifficultiesmaybe,itseemsclearthat,for

Aquinas,becausewhatweunderstandistrulyimbeddedintheparticularthings

themselves,theresintellectaandthemodusreiintellectaecannotbethesame.Thisisthe

immediateconcernofthisChapter.Thealterityoftheobjectofknowinginsteadwillbe

treatedinthenextChapter.294

1)TheDistinctionin84,1,c.:The“PlatonicProblem”

IntheSumma,thepassagethatmostclearlyaddressesthisissueis84,1,c.The

questioniswhetherthesoulknowsthecorporealthingsbymeansofintelligence,andthe

pointislocatedpreciselyintheproblemoftheuniversals.Havingconsideredthosewho

294Thedistinctionbetweenthespeciesassubjectivemodificationandtheobjectofknowing

willbetreatedinChapter3,section3.

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deniedthepossibilityofascientificknowledgeofrealitybecauseofitsinstability,having

consideredalsoPlato,whoputstabilityoutsidethe“apparent”realityinatrue“worldof

reality”(his“ideas”),andhavingshowntheinconvenienceofPlato’ssolution,Aquinasgoes

totherootoftheproblem.Thetextwillbequotedextensively,andcommenteduponwhen

needed:

“NowitseemsthatPlatostrayedfromthetruthbecause,havingobservedthatall

knowledgetakesplacethroughsomekindofsimilitude,hethoughtthattheformofthe

thingknownmustofnecessitybeintheknowerinthesamemannerasinthething

known.”295Thisisthemainproblemintheformofageneralprinciple.296Thefollowingisan

explanationofPlato’serrorintheintellectualrealm:

Thenheobservedthattheformofthethingunderstoodisintheintellectunderconditionsofuniversality,immateriality,andimmobility:whichisapparentfromtheveryoperationoftheintellect,whoseactofunderstandinghasauniversalextension,andissubjecttoacertainamountofnecessity:forthemodeofactioncorrespondstothemodeoftheagent'sform.297Whereforeheconcludedthatthe

29584,1,c.:“VideturauteminhocPlatodeviasseaveritate,quia,cumaestimaretomnem

cognitionempermodumalicuiussimilitudinisesse,crediditquodformacognitiexnecessitatesitincognoscenteeomodoquoestincognito.”

296Cf.85,1ad2:“BecausePlatofailedtoconsiderthetwofoldkindofabstraction,asaboveexplained[…],heheldthatallthosethingswhichwehavestatedtobeabstractedbytheintellect,areabstractinreality”[EtquiaPlatononconsideravitquoddictumestdeduplicimodoabstractionis,omniaquaediximusabstrahiperintellectum,posuitabstractaessesecundumrem.]Cf.alsoInMet.1,lect.10,158;InIDeAnima4,30-33;InIIIDeAnima2,261-263.

297Cf.89,6,c.:“Actionofferstwothingsforourconsideration—itsspeciesanditsmode.Itsspeciescomesfromtheobject,wheretothefacultyofknowledgeisdirectedbythe(intelligible)species,whichistheobject'ssimilitude;whereasthemodeisgatheredfromthepoweroftheagent.Thusthatapersonseeastoneisduetothespeciesofthestoneinhiseye;butthatheseeitclearly,isduetotheeye'svisualpower.”[Inactuestduoconsiderare,scilicetspeciemactus,etmodumipsius.Etspeciesquidemactusconsideraturexobiectoinquodactuscognoscitivaevirtutisdirigiturperspeciem,quaeestobiectisimilitudo,sedmodusactuspensaturexvirtuteagentis.Sicutquodaliquisvideatlapidem,contingitexspecielapidisquaeestinoculo,sedquodacutevideat,contingitexvirtutevisivaoculi.]

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thingswhichweunderstandmusthaveinthemselvesanexistenceunderthesameconditionsofimmaterialityandimmobility.298

HeretheThomisticdistinctionbetweentheresintellectaandthemodeofbeingof

thesameisalreadyveryclear.St.ThomasproceedsbyshowingtheinconsistencyofPlato’s

principle,andhetriestomakeitmoreclearbyusinganinterestingprogression.Inhisfirst

step,heconsidersthesensiblerealminitsobjectivity:“Butthereisnonecessityforthis.For

eveninsensiblethingsitistobeobservedthattheformisotherwiseinonesensiblethanin

another:forinstance,whitenessmaybeofgreatintensityinone,andofalessintensityin

another:inonewefindwhitenesswithsweetness,inanotherwithoutsweetness.”299That

29884,1,c.:“Consideravitautemquodformareiintellectaeestinintellectuuniversaliteret

immaterialiteretimmobiliter,quodexipsaoperationeintellectusapparet,quiintelligituniversaliteretpermodumnecessitatiscuiusdam;modusenimactionisestsecundummodumformaeagentis.Etideoexistimavitquodoporteretresintellectashocmodoinseipsissubsistere,scilicetimmaterialiteretimmobiliter.”Cf.regardingtheerrorofPlato:InMet.7,lect.15,1606;InMet.12,lect.1,2423:“Theydidthisbecausetheyinvestigatedthingsfromtheviewpointofdialectics;fortheythoughtthatuniversals,whichareseparateaccordingtotheirmodeofdefinitionfromsensiblethings,arealsoseparateinreality,andthattheyaretheprinciplesofparticularthings.”[Ethocideo,quialogiceinquirebantderebus.Universaliaenim,quaesecundumrationemsuntabstractaasensibilibus,credebantetiaminrerumnaturaabstractafore,etprincipiaparticularium.];InMet.12,lect.2,2426:“Forjustasatwofoldmethodofseparatingisfoundinreason[…]inasimilarwaytheymaintainedthatbothuniversals,whichtheycalledseparateForms,andalsotheobjectsofmathematics,areseparateinreality.”[Sicuteniminvenitursecundumrationemduplexmodusseparationis(…)itaetsecundumremponebantetuniversaliaesseseparata,quaedicebantspecies,etetiammathematica.];InMet.8,lect.1,1683:“Certainparticularthinkers[…]claimthattheFormsandtheobjectsofmathematicshaveseparateexistence.Theyadoptedthispositionbecausetheythoughtthatforeveryabstractionoftheintellectthereisacorrespondingabstractioninreality.”[Quidamposueruntsingularitereas(substantias)esse,quiponuntspeciesetmathematicaseparatasecundumesse,volentesquodcuilibetabstractioniintellectus,respondeatabstractioinessererum.]Noteinthislasttexthowtheuniversalissaidtoexistsingulariter,insofaras,forPlato,itexistsinrealityasonething,separatedfromtheparticularthings.ThisiswhatAquinaswillalwaysdeny,andnottheuniversal’sexistenceinthesingular.Cf.Q.D.DeAnima,a.3,ad8whereitisalsoveryclearthepresenceofthecommonnatureintheparticularthing(textquotedinAppendix,Note7).

29984,1,c.:“Hocautemnecessariumnonest.Quiaetiaminipsissensibilibusvidemusquodformaaliomodoestinunosensibiliumquaminaltero,putacuminunoestalbedointensior,inalioremissior,etinunoestalbedocumdulcedine,inaliosinedulcedine.”

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istosay,therealaccidentalqualityalbedo,beingthesameineverywhitething,cansubsist

indifferentmodesindifferentwhitethings.St.Thomasistryingtoshowinthisfirststep

howeasyitisforustoconceivethatoneandthesamequalitymayexistindifferentmodes.

Thesecondstepisalreadyinthegnoseologicalrealm:“Inthesamewaythesensibleformis

conditioneddifferentlyinthethingwhichisexternaltothesoul,andinthesenseswhich

receivetheformsofsensiblethingswithoutreceivingmatter,suchasthecolorofgold

withoutreceivinggold.”300ItseemsthemainreasonSt.Thomasusesthesensesasan

examplehereistheeasewithwhichonecanacceptthat,whenweseethecolour,we

receivethecolournotasitsubsistsinreality(withthegoldincluded,intheexample),butin

anotherway.St.Thomasthusopensthewaytothesolution:

Soalsotheintellect,accordingtoitsownmode,receivesunderconditionsofimmaterialityandimmobility,thespeciesofmaterialandmobilebodies:forthereceivedisinthereceiveraccordingtothemodeofthereceiver.Wemustconclude,therefore,thatthroughtheintellectthesoulknowsbodiesbyaknowledgewhichisimmaterial,universal,andnecessary.301

Itseemsclearthat“quaesuntmaterialesetmobiles”referstotheplural“species”

andnotto“corporum,”whichisneutral.Itshouldalsobeclear,however,thatthespecies

arematerialinsofarastheysubsistinthematter,butnotasiftheywerenothingotherthan

matter.Thewholeargumentwouldbepointless.St.Thomasishighlightingpreciselythat,

eveniftheformdoesnotsubsistinthesamewayintheintellectasitdoesinreality,this

30084,1,c.:“Etperhuncetiammodumformasensibilisaliomodoestinrequaeestextra

animam,etaliomodoinsensu,quisuscipitformassensibiliumabsquemateria,sicutcoloremaurisineauro.”

30184,1,c.:“Etsimiliterintellectusspeciescorporum,quaesuntmaterialesetmobiles,recipitimmaterialiteretimmobiliter,secundummodumsuum,namreceptumestinrecipientepermodumrecipientis.Dicendumestergoquodanimaperintellectumcognoscitcorporacognitioneimmateriali,universalietnecessaria.”

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factdoesnotpreventtheintellectfromknowingthatsameform.St.Thomasisimplying

thatthestabilitydeniedbythenaturalphilosophers(regardingcorporealthings),and

projectedbyPlatoinaparallelworld,isactuallyimbeddedinthematerialthingsastheir

formorspecies,butnotintheimmaterialwayinwhichitisknown.302

2)TheDistinctioninOtherTexts

In85,2ad2,thedistinctionbetweenwhatisunderstoodanditsmodeofbeingis

alsoclear,indirectresponsetotheobjectionthatwhatisunderstoodinactdoesnot

subsistinthethingoutsidethesoul:

Inthesewords‘thethingactuallyunderstood’thereisadoubleimplication—thethingwhichisunderstood,and[itsbeing]understood.Inlikemannerthewords‘abstractuniversal’implytwothings,thenatureofathinganditsabstractionoruniversality.Thereforethenatureitselftowhichitoccurstobeunderstood,abstractedorconsideredasuniversalisonlyinindividuals;but[itsbeing]understood,abstractedorconsideredasuniversalisintheintellect.303

Itcannotbemoreclearthatthenaturethatweunderstandsubsistsinthethingout

there,totheextentthatitjust“happens”toitthatitisunderstood.304“Natura”ishere

302ThisstabilityinsensiblethingsisalsoaffirmedinInBoet.DeTrin.5,2,c.;InMet.11,lect.

6,2232(cf.othertextsquotedonp.87).MartínezMillántellsus:“InordertoovercomePlato’sTheoryofForms,Aristotlehastoemphasizeinmanydifferentwaysthepossibilitythatlivingthingscanbetheobjectsofknowledgedespitethefactthattheyaremovableandperishable”(MartínezMillán,50).“AsAquinasnotesinDeAnima,AristotlewantedtoovercomethenegativeeffectsofPlatonicphilosophy,whichhadreducedsensiblethingstonothingmoretanshadows,objectsofopinionbutnotofknowledge[…]Aristotle[…]hadpostulatedtheagentintellectinordertosavethesensibleworldfromtheunknowable”(Ibid.,55-56).

30385,2ad2:“Cumdiciturintellectuminactu,duoimportantur,scilicetresquaeintelligitur,ethocquodestipsumintelligi.Etsimilitercumdicituruniversaleabstractum,duointelliguntur,scilicetipsanaturarei,etabstractioseuuniversalitas.Ipsaigiturnaturacuiacciditvelintelligivelabstrahi,velintentiouniversalitatis,nonestnisiinsingularibus;sedhocipsumquodestintelligivelabstrahi,velintentiouniversalitatis,estinintellectu.”

304Cf.DeSpirit.Creat.,a.10,ad14:“Theuniversal,whichtheagentintellectcauses,isonethinginallthebeingsfromwhichitisabstracted;andhencetheagentintellectisnotdiversifiedon

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slightlydistinguishedfrom“universale,”theformerwithaclearmetaphysicalmeaning,the

latterwithamoregnoseologicalone.St.Thomas,again,drawsacomparisonwiththe

sensiblerealmtomakethesolutionmoreclear(thistimeonlyingnoseologicalterms):

[Wecanseethepointbyacomparisonwiththesenses].Forthesightseesthecoloroftheappleapartfromitssmell.Ifthereforeitbeaskedwhereisthecolorwhichisseenapartfromthesmell,itisquiteclearthatthecolorwhichisseenisonlyintheapple:butthatitbeperceivedapartfromthesmell,thisisowingtothesight,forasmuchasthefacultyofsightreceivesthelikenessofcolorandnotofsmell.305

Again,theresintellectaisinthethingitself,butitsabstractmodeofbeingdepends

onourunderstandingit.Becauseofthis,theuniversalasaspecies-imagereferstothe(real)

natureinthething,notdirectlytoitsconcreteness:

Inlikemannerhumanityunderstoodisonlyinthisorthatman;butthathumanitybeapprehendedwithoutconditionsofindividuality,thatis,thatitbeabstractedandconsequentlyconsideredasuniversal,occurstohumanityinasmuchasitisbroughtundertheconsiderationoftheintellect,inwhichthereisalikenessofthespecificnature,butnotoftheprinciplesofindividuality.306

thebasisoftheirdiversification.However,itisdiversifiedonthebasisofadiversityofintellects:becauseeventheuniversaldoesnotderiveitsonenessfromthestandpointofitsbeingunderstoodbymeandbyyou;foritisaccidentaltotheuniversalthatitisunderstoodbymeandbyyou.Andhencethediversityofintellectsdoesnotaffecttheonenessoftheuniversal.”[Universalequodfacitintellectusagens,estunuminomnibusaquibusipsumabstrahitur;undeintellectusagensnondiversificatursecundumeorumdiversitatem.Diversificaturautem[i.agens]secundumdiversitatemintellectuum:quiaetuniversalenonexeapartehabetunitatemquaestameetateintellectum;intelligienimameetateaccidituniversali.Undediversitasintellectuumnonimpeditunitatemuniversalis.]“Universal,”here,isthecontent-naturepresentinrealitytowhich“happens”tobeknown.Theunityoftheuniversalisobjective,notsubjective.Thistextalsohelpsustoseetheword“universal”asindicatingacontent,andnotdirectlyitsmodeofbeingintheintellect(cf.nextsection).

30585,2ad2:“Ethocpossumusviderepersimileinsensu.Visusenimvidetcolorempomisineeiusodore.Siergoquaeraturubisitcolorquividetursineodoremanifestumestquodcolorquividetur,nonestnisiinpomo;sedquodsitsineodoreperceptus,hocacciditeiexpartevisus,inquantuminvisuestsimilitudocolorisetnonodoris.”

30685,2ad2:“Similiterhumanitasquaeintelligitur,nonestnisiinhocvelinillohomine,sedquodhumanitasapprehendatursineindividualibusconditionibus,quodestipsamabstrahi,adquodsequiturintentiouniversalitatis,accidithumanitatisecundumquodpercipiturabintellectu,inquoestsimilitudonaturaespeciei,etnonindividualiumprincipiorum.”Cf.InIIIDeAnima2,240-249:

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AsimilartextintheContraGentilesdistinguishesalsotheobjectfromitsmodeof

being:

NorneedwefollowPlatoinholdingthat,becausescienceisaboutuniversals,universalsareself-subsistingentitiesoutsidethesoul.For,althoughthetruthofknowledgerequiresthecorrespondenceofcognitiontothing,thisdoesnotmeanthatthesetwomusthavethesamemodeofbeing.Forthingsunitedinrealityaresometimesknownseparately;inathingthatisatoncewhiteandsweet,sightknowsonlythewhiteness,tasteonlythesweetness.[…]Similarly,althoughthegenericnatureandthespecificnatureneverexistexceptinindividualthings,theintellectneverthelessunderstandsthosenatureswithoutunderstandingtheindividuatingprinciples;andtodothisistounderstanduniversals.Thus,thereisnoincompatibilitybetweenthefactthatuniversalsdonotsubsistoutsidethesoul,andthatinunderstandinguniversalstheintellectunderstandsthingsthatdoexistoutsidethesoul.307InearlierworksAquinas’doctrineisthesame.Despitethedifferenceinthemodeof

beingoftheknownandthemediationofthespecies,intelligenceisabletoreachdirectlyto

“Hencethis‘properobject’ofourintellectisnot,asthePlatonistsheld,somethingexisting,outsidesensiblethings;itissomethingintrinsictosensiblethings;andthis,eventhoughthemodeinwhichessencesaregraspedbytheminddiffersfromtheirmodeofexistenceinsensiblethings;fortheminddiscernsthemapartfromtheindividuatingconditionswhichbelongtothemintheorderofsensiblereality.”[Illud,quodestobiectumintellectusnostrinonestaliquidextraressensibilesexistens,utPlatoniciposuerunt,sedaliquidinrebussensibilibusexistens;licetintellectusapprehendataliomodoquidditatesrerum,quamsintinrebussensibilibus.Nonenimapprehenditeascumconditionibusindividuantibus,quaeeisinrebussensibilibusadiunguntur.]

307CGII,75,par.8:“Nectamenoportetquod,quiascientiaesuntdeuniversalibus,quoduniversaliasintextraanimampersesubsistentia:sicutPlatoposuit.Quamvisenimadveritatemcognitionisnecessesitutcognitioreirespondeat,nontamenoportetutidemsitmoduscognitionisetrei.Quaeenimconiunctasuntinre,interdumdivisimcognoscuntur:simulenimunaresestetalbaetdulcis;visustamencognoscitsolamalbedinem,etgustussolamdulcedinem[…]Similiterautem,licetnaturagenerisetspecieinunquamsitnisiinhisindividuis,intelligittamenintellectusnaturamspecieietgenerisnonintelligendoprincipiaindividuantia:ethocestintelligereuniversalia.Etsichaecduononrepugnant,quoduniversalianonsubsistantextraanimam:etquodintellectus,intelligensuniversalia,intelligatresquaesuntextraanimam.”

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thethingitself.308Thecontent,theobjectunderstood,isdistinguishedfromitsmodeof

being:

Corporealcreaturesarenotsaidtobeimmediatelyseen,unlessthatwhichinthemisabletobeunitedtosightisactuallyunited.Now,theyarenotabletobeunitedthroughtheirownessencebecauseoftheirmateriality.Thus,theyareimmediatelyseenwhentheirrepresentationsareunitedtotheintellect[…]Moreover,therepresentationofacorporealthingisreceivedinsightwiththesamecontentithasinthatthing,eventhoughthemodeofbeingisnotthesame;andforthisreason,thisrepresentationleadsdirectlytothethingitself.309(mytrans.)

Therefore,thesenotionsthusabstractedcanbeconsideredintwoways.Thefirstoneistoconsidertheminthemselves.Inthisway,theyareconsideredwithoutmovementanddesignatedmatter:thisisfoundintheaforementionednotionsonlywithregardtothebeingthattheyhaveintheintellect.Theotherwayistoconsiderthemwithregardtothethingsofwhichtheyarenotions,thingsthatcertainlysubsistinmatterandmovement.Andinthiswaythesenotionsareprinciplesofknowledgeofthosethings,becauseeverythingisknownbymeansofitsform.Thus,bymeansofthesenotions,immobileandconsideredwithoutparticularmatter,wehaveknowledge(innaturalscience)ofmobileandmaterialthingswhichexistoutsidethesoul.310(mytrans.)

308Cf.DeVer2,3,ad3:“Fortobedirectedtothelikenessofathingisthesameastobe

directedtothethingwhichisknownthroughthislikeness.”[...idemesteiferriinsimilitudinemrei,etinremquaepertalemsimilitudinemcognoscitur.]

309InIVSent.,d.49,q.2,a.1ad16:“[C]reaturaecorporalesnondicunturimmediatevideri,nisiquandoidquodineisestconjungibilevisui,eiconjungitur:nonsuntautemconjungibilesperessentiamsuamrationematerialitatis;etideotuncimmediatevidenturquandoeorumsimilitudointellectuiconjungitur[…]Etpraetereasimilitudoreicorporalisrecipiturinvisusecundumeamdemrationemquaestinre,licetnonsecundumeumdemmodumessendi;etideosimilitudoilladucitinillamremdirecte.”Inthistextwecanalsoseethecomparisonofintelligencewithsensitivity(cf.Chapter3,section5),tothepointthatSt.Thomasuses“vision”tospeakabouttheintellectualactofunderstanding.ThistextispartiallyquotedinStump,246note5(onpage527).

310InBoet.DeTrin.5,2,c.:“Possuntergohuiusmodirationessicabstractaeconsideraridupliciter.Unomodosecundumse,etsicconsiderantursinemotuetmateriasignata,ethocnoninveniturineisnisisecundumessequodhabentinintellectu.Aliomodosecundumquodcomparanturadres,quarumsuntrationes;quaequidemressuntinmateriaetmotu.Etsicsuntprincipiacognoscendiilla,quiaomnisrescognosciturpersuamformam.Etitaperhuiusmodirationesimmobilesetsinemateriaparticulariconsideratashabeturcognitioinscientianaturaliderebusmobilibusetmaterialibusextraanimamexsistentibus.”

119

“Theformsinourintellects,however,arereceivedfromthings.Hence,theydonot

excelthings,andare,asitwere,equaltothemasfarasrepresentationgoes,eventhough

theymayexceltheminmodeofbeingbecausetheir[being]isimmaterial.”311

3)TheTwoMeaningsofUniversal

TherearesometextsinwhichSt.Thomasspeaksabouttwomeaningsof“universal”

andtwomeaningsof“intelligible,”aswehavesomewhatanticipated.312Thisdistinguishing

oftwomeaningsrelatestothemainpointofthisChapter,becauseoneofthemeaningsof

“universal”isrelatedtothecontent,andtheotheroneisrelatedtothemodeofbeingof

thecontentinthemind.ThisdistinctionmakesusmorecarefulinhowweinterpretSt.

Thomaswherehesaysthattheagentintellect“makestheintelligible”;whatisbeing

proposedinthisdissertationisthattheagentintellect“makestheintelligible”insofarasit

producestheintelligiblemodeofbeingoftheintelligiblecontent,andnotinsofarasit

producestheintelligiblecontent.Inotherwords,theagentintellect’sactionreferstooneof

311DeVer.8,10ad3:“Sedformaeintellectusnostriaccipiunturexrebus;undenonsunt

superexcedentesrebussedquasiadequataequantumadrepraesentationem,licetsintexcedentesquantumadmodumessendiinquantumhabentesseimmateriale.”StumpbringsothertextsfromDeVer(hertranslation)wherewecanseethisdistinctionbetweentheobjectanditsmodeofbeinginthecognizer:“thesimilitudeoftwothingstooneanothercanbegroundedintwo[different]ways.Inoneway,insofarasthereissharingofanature(convenientiainnatura),andsuchasimilitudeisnotneededbetweenacognizerandwhatiscognized.Inanotherway,accordingtorepresentation,andthis[sortof]similitudeisneededonthepartofacognizerwithrespecttowhatiscognized.QDV2.3ad9”(Stump,255note48);“asimilitudeexistinginacognitivepowerisnotasourceofthecognitionofan[extramental]thinginaccordancewiththebeingwhichthesimilitudehasinthecognitivepower,butinaccordancewiththerelationshipwhichthesimilitudehastothecognizedthing.Andforthisreasonan[extramental]thingiscognizednotbymeansofthemodeinwhichthesimilitudehasbeingintheonecognizing,butratherbymeansofthemodeinwhichthesimilitudeexistingintheintellectisrepresentativeofthatthing.QDV2.5ad17”(Stump,272note119).

312Cf.85,2ad2,studiedinsection2ofthisChapter.

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themeaningsofuniversal,butnottotheother.Letusbeginbyseeingthisdistinctionin

sometextsoftheSumma,andthen,inotherworksofAquinas.

3.1.IntheSumma

Letusexaminethepassageof85,3ad4.Noteherehowtheword“universale”hasa

meaningwhichincludesconnotationsbothgnoseologicalandnatural(ormetaphysical).The

firstconnotationanalyzedisthegnoseologicalone:“Theuniversal,asunderstoodwiththe

intentionofuniversality,is,indeed,inaway,aprincipleofknowledge,insofarasthe

intentionofuniversalityresultsfromthemodeofunderstandingbywayofabstraction.”313

“Universale”isanotionthatmayimplyamodeofbeingwhichdependsonour

understanding:aswecansee,thedifferencebetweenresintellectaandmodusrei

intellectaeisalreadysuggested.Intheobjectionitisarguedthat,becausetheuniversalsare

certainprinciples,theyareknownposteriorlybytheireffects.Theconfusionisbetweenthe

principlesofbeingandtheprinciplesofknowing,andhereSt.Thomasclarifies:“Butwhatis

aprincipleofknowledgeisnotofnecessityaprincipleofexistence,asPlatothought:since

attimesweknowacausethroughitseffect,andsubstancethroughaccidents.”314Aquinas’

criticismofPlatoisthesameasin84,1,c.,asthenotesoftheOttawaeditionsuggest.

“Whereforetheuniversalthusconsidered,accordingtotheopinionofAristotle,isneithera

31385,3ad4:“Universale,secundumquodaccipiturcumintentioneuniversalitatis,est

quidemquodammodoprincipiumcognoscendi,proutintentiouniversalitatisconsequiturmodumintelligendiquiestperabstractionem.”

31485,3ad4:“Nonautemestnecessequodomnequodestprincipiumcognoscendi,sitprincipiumessendi,utPlatoexistimavit,cumquandoquecognoscamuscausampereffectum,etsubstantiamperaccidentia.”

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principleofexistence,norasubstance,ashemakesclear(Metaph.vii).”315“Universalesic

acceptum”isagainaclearindicationofthepossibilityofemployingtheterm“universal”in

adifferentway,asAquinasillustratesimmediatelyinourpassage:“Butifweconsiderthe

genericorspecificnatureitselfasexistinginthesingular,thusinawayitisinthenatureof

aformalprincipleinregardtothesingulars.”316St.Thomas,then,isshowingthedistinction

betweentheuniversalsasprinciplesofknowingandasprinciplesofbeing,becausethetwo

meaningsofuniversalareconfusedintheobjection.Whatisimportantforourpurposesis

that,forAquinas,thereissuchathingasauniversalinre(thenaturaproutestin

singularibus),whichisnottobeconfoundedwiththeuniversalcumintentione

universalitatis;butatthesametime,thedifferenceisbetweenmodesofbeingofthesame:

“intentiouniversalitatisconsequiturmodumintelligendiquiestperabstractionem.”

Thetwodifferentmodesofbeingoftheuniversalarealreadydistinguishedinthe

answertothefirstobjection:317“Theuniversalcanbeconsideredintwoways.First,the

universalnaturemaybeconsideredtogetherwiththeintentionofuniversality[…]Secondly,

theuniversalcanbeconsidered[regarding]thenatureitself—forinstance,animalityor

humanity,[insofarasitexists]intheindividual.”318Inthesectionomitted,St.Thomas

explainswhathemeansbyintentiouniversalitatis,anotionusedinbothAdunumandAd

31585,3ad4:“Undeuniversalesicacceptum,secundumsententiamAristotelis,nonest

principiumessendi,nequesubstantia,utpatetinVIIMetaphys.”31685,3ad4:“Siautemconsideremusipsamnaturamgenerisetspecieiproutestin

singularibus,sicquodammodohabetrationemprincipiiformalisrespectusingularium.”31785,3ad1.31885,3ad1:“Universaledupliciterpotestconsiderari.Unomodo,secundumquodnatura

universalisconsideratursimulcumintentioneuniversalitatis[…]Aliomodopotestconsiderariquantumadipsamnaturam,scilicetanimalitatisvelhumanitatis,proutinveniturinparticularibus.”

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quartum:“Andsincetheintentionofuniversality—viz.therelationofoneandthesameto

many—isduetointellectualabstraction,theuniversalthusconsideredisasecondary

consideration.Henceitissaid(DeAnimai,1)thatthe‘universalanimaliseithernothingor

somethingsecondary’.”319WhenAquinassays“intentiouniversalitatis,”“intentio”is

“referenceto,”“relationtowards,”inthesensethattheonemeaningisreferredtothe

manyparticulars.Now,inwhatsensedoesSt.Thomassaythattheuniversalisposterior

and,withAristotle,eithernothingorposterior?Aquinascertainlydoesnotmeantodeny

thatthereissomethingcommonintheparticulars;heaffirmsthisafewlineslater,aswe

havealreadyseen.Whathemeansisthatoneandthesamething(unumetidem)as

referredtothemany,isnotinrealityassuch(becauseeveryindividualthingactuallyhasits

ownnatureasanintrinsicprinciple,thoughonlynumericallydifferent)butfollowsthe

processofabstraction;abstractionproducesthisonething(theintelligibleinact)which

referstothemany,fromtheknowledgeofthemany(therealmoftheparticular);itisin

thissensethattheuniversalisposterior.Thisisalsorelatedtowhathemeansbyintentio

universalitatis:hemeansthereferenceoftheuniversalasknowntotheparticularsfrom

whichitisabstracted.Theuniversalasknown(inthestateofabstraction)isoneasone

thing(unumetidem),asoneuniqueprincipleofknowingthemany.Butthisdoesnotdeny

thattheuniversalsubsistsassomethingcommonintheparticulars,oneasformallyor

specificallyone,whichisthenatureofthedifferentindividualsofthesamespecies(“ipsam

naturam,scilicetanimalitatisvelhumanitatis,proutinveniturinparticularibus”).Inthe

31985,3ad1:“Etcumintentiouniversalitatis,utscilicetunumetidemhabeathabitudinem

admulta,proveniatexabstractioneintellectus,oportetquodsecundumhuncmodumuniversalesitposterius.UndeinIDeAnimadiciturquodanimaluniversaleautnihilest,autposteriusest.”

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conclusionofthispassage,Aquinasunderlinesoncemorethedifferencebetweenhisview

andPlato’s:“ButaccordingtoPlato,whoheldthatuniversalsaresubsistent,theuniversal

consideredthuswouldbepriortotheparticular,forthelatter,accordingtohim,aremere

participationsofthesubsistentuniversalswhichhecalledideas.”320Again,Plato’suniversal

ideaandSt.Thomas’universalnatureproutinveniturinparticularibusarebothreal.In

Plato,however,theideasubsistsinrealitycumintentioneuniversalitatis,i.e.,asonething

(unumetidem)referredtothemany,ashappensintheintellect.ForSt.Thomas,instead,it

isnotnecessarythatwhatisknownhaveinrealitythesamemodeofbeingasithasinthe

intellect.

3.2.TwoMeaningsof“Universal”inotherWorksofAquinas.

ConsiderInIDeAnima1,215-230,St.Thomas’examinationoftheAristotelian

“animalautemuniversale,autnihilest,autposterius.”Aquinas’explanationfollowsby

distinguishing,nottwo,butthreepossiblemeaningsofuniversal.Anumberingsystemhas

beeninsertedintothefollowingtextinordertomakemorecleartheremarksaboutit

whichcomeafter:

Wemustunderstandthatonecanspeakofa‘universalanimal’intwoways:either(1)asuniversal,i.e.asonenatureexistingin,orpredicatedof,manyindividuals;or(2)asanimal.[Asuniversal,again,it]canberegardedeither(1A)inrelationtoexistenceintherealworldor(1B)asexistinginthemind.Asregardsexistenceintherealworld,Platoheldthattheuniversalanimaldidsoexist(i.e.,1A)andexistedpriortoparticularanimals;because,ashasbeensaid,hethoughtthattherewereuniversalsandideaswithanindependentexistence.Aristotle,however,saidthatthe

32085,3ad1:“SedsecundumPlatonem,quiposuituniversaliasubsistentia,secundumhanc

considerationem[thatis,theuniversalcumintentioneuniversalitatis]universaleessetpriusquamparticularia,quaesecundumeumnonsuntnisiperparticipationemuniversaliumsubsistentium,quaedicunturideae.”

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universalassuchhadno[existenceintherealworld],andthatifitwasanythingatallitcameaftertheindividualthing(i.e.,1B).Butifweregardthenatureofanimalsfromadifferentpointofview,i.e.notasauniversal(i.e.,2),thenitisindeedsomethingreal[andprior,]asthepotentialprecedestheactual.321

Asitappears,(1)and(2)correspondtothedivisionof85,3ad1yad4(universal

regardedasnatureorastheabstractedmodeofbeingofthatnature)andthefurther

division(1Aand1B)isactuallythedoctrinaldivisionbetweenPlatoandAristotle(the

universalsubsistsinrerumnaturaforPlato,andforAristotleonlyintheintellectafterthe

processofabstraction,andbecauseofthis“posterius”).Buttheuniversalasnature(2)is

first,preciselybecausethenatureasabstractedcomesfromit;thatis,thenatureofthe

animalisinpotencyofbecominguniversalinthesecondsense(1B).Inthistext,then,the

natureinthethingitselfiscalleduniversalinonesense,andinpotencyofbeinguniversalin

asecondsense.

Inthefollowingtext,alsofromInDeAnima,thedivisionistheusual.Noticethe

duplexesseattributedtothenature(thetwomodesofbeingunderdiscussion):

Notethattheterm‘universal’canbetakenintwosenses.Itcanrefertothenatureitself,commontoseveralthings,insofarasthiscommonnatureisregardedinrelationtothoseseveralthings;oritcanrefertothenaturetakensimplyinitself.[…]Nowanature—say,humannature,—whichcanbethoughtofuniversally,hastwomodesofexistence:one,material,inthemattersuppliedbynature;theother,immaterial,intheintellect.[…]Nevertheless,thereisnodeceptionwhenthemindapprehendsacommonnatureapartfromitsindividuatingprinciples;forinthis321InIDeAnima1,215-230:“Sciendumest,quoddeanimaliuniversalipossumusloqui

dupliciter,quiaaut(1)secundumquodestuniversale(quodscilicetestunuminmultisautdemultis),aut(2)secundumquodestanimal;[sisecundumquodest]universale,ethocvel(1A)secundumquodestinrerumnatura,vel(1B)secundumquodestinintellectu.Secundumautemquodestinrerumnatura,Platovoluitanimaluniversalealiquidesse(i.e.,1A)etessepriusparticulari,quia,utdictumest,posuituniversaliaseparataetydeas;Aristotilesautem,quodnichilestinrerumnatura;etsialiquidest,dixitilludesseposterius(i.e.,1B).Siautemaccipiamusnaturamanimalisnonsecundumquodsubiacetintentioniuniversalitatis(i.e.,2),sicaliquidestetprius,sicutquodinpotentiapriusestquamilludquodestinactu.”

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apprehensiontheminddoesnotjudgethatthenatureexistsapart;itmerelyapprehendsthisnaturewithoutapprehendingtheindividuatingprinciples[…].Forthetruthofourconceptionsdoesnotrequirethat,merelyapprehendinganything,weapprehendeverythinginit.[…]Itisclear,then,thatuniversalitycanbepredicatedofacommonnatureonlyinsofarasitexistsinthemind:foraunitytobepredicableofmanythingsitmustfirstbeconceivedapartfromtheprinciplesbywhichitisdividedintomanythings.Universalsassuchexistonlyinthesoul;butthenaturesthemselves,whichareconceivableuniversally,existinthings.322

AlthoughAquinasseemstoprefertheword“universal”forthenatureinitsstateof

abstraction,itisimportanttonotethereasonforhisallowingalsothenatureinthething

itselftobecalled“universal.”Herefersthiswordmoretotheabstractednature,becauseit

isonlyinthissensethatatrulyone(witharealunity)issaidofthemany.However,the

reasonhecallsalsothenatureinitself“universal”isthathewantstoexplaintheobjectivity

ofknowing;thatis,thereasonthereisonlyoneformintheintellect,isthatthereisreallya

commonperfectioninthethingsthemselves,whichisformallyone.Inthisway,St.Thomas

safeguardsthecorrespondenceofthemindtothethingsthemselves.323

322InIIDeAnima12,95-147:“Considerandumest,quoduniversalepotestaccipidupliciter.

Unomodopotestdiciuniversaleipsanaturacommunis,proutsubiacetintentioniuniversalitatis.Aliomodosecundumse.[…]Istaautemnatura,cuiadvenitintentiouniversalitatis,putanaturahominis,habetduplexesse:unumquidemmateriale,secundumquodestinmaterianaturali;aliudautemimmateriale,secundumquodestinintellectu[…]Nectamenintellectusestfalsus,dumapprehenditnaturamcommunempraeterprincipiaindividuantia,sinequibusessenonpotestinrerumnatura.Nonenimapprehendithocintellectus,scilicetquodnaturacommunissitsineprincipiisindividuantibus;sedapprehenditnaturamcommunemnonapprehendendoprincipiaindividuantia[…]Nonenimexigituradveritatemapprehensionisquodquiapprehenditremaliquam,apprehendatomniaquaeinsuntei.[…]Sicigiturpatet,quodnaturaecommuninonpotestattribuiintentiouniversalitatisnisisecundumessequodhabetinintellectu:sicenimsolumestunumdemultis,proutintelligiturpraeterprincipia,quibusunuminmultadividitur.Underelinquitur,quoduniversalia,secundumquodsuntuniversalia,nonsuntnisiinanima.Ipsaeautemnaturae,quibusacciditintentiouniversalitatis,suntinrebus.”

323ThedistinctionofthetwomeaningsofuniversalisalsofoundinInMet.7,lect.13,1570ff.:“Fortheclarificationofthischapteritmustbenotedthatthetermuniversalcanbetakenintwosenses.First,itcanbetakentomeanthenatureofthethingtowhichtheintellectattributestheaspectofuniversality,andinthissenseuniversalssuchasgeneraandspeciessignifythesubstancesofthingsinasmuchastheyarepredicatedquidditatively;foranimalsignifiesthe

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Inthefollowingtext,Aquinaspreferstouse“universal”forthecontent,and

“intelligible”forthemodeofbeing.Theuniversalissomethinginthethingsthemselves,

somethingneedingtobeseparatedfrommatterbecauseitentersintocompositionwith

matter.Thisseparationfrommattermakestheuniversalintelligible:

Scientificknowledgeisonlyaboutuniversals.ButGodisnotauniversal,foreveryuniversalishadbyabstraction.TherecanbenoabstractionfromGod,however,sinceHeisperfectlysimple.Hence,GoddoesnotknowHimself.[…]Auniversalisintelligibleindirectproportiontoitsseparationfrommatter.Hence,thosethingswhichhavenotbeenseparatedfrommatterbyanactofourintellectbutare,inthemselves,freefromallmatter,aremostknowable.Consequently,Godismostknowable,eventhoughHeisnotauniversal.324

Thetwomeaningsof“universal”“and“intelligible”areatplayinothertexts,even

thoughthedistinctionisnotexplicit.Inthefollowingtext,theangelicinfusedspeciesare

called“intelligible”(anindicationoftheirmodeofbeing)andarethemeanstounderstand

notonlytheseparatesubstancesbutalsothespeciesofcorporealthings.Thesespeciesare

alsocalled“intelligible”(ascontent):

Thus,throughtheintelligibleformsinquestionaseparatesubstanceknowsnotonlyotherseparatesubstances,butalsothespeciesofcorporealthings.Fortheirintellect,beingwhollyinact,isperfectinpointofnaturalperfection,and,therefore,itmustcomprehenditsobject—intelligiblebeing—inauniversalmanner.Now,the

substanceofthethingofwhichitispredicated,andsoalsodoesman.Second,auniversalcanbetakeninsofarasitisuniversal,andinsofarasthenaturepredicatedofathingfallsundertheaspectofuniversality.”[Sciendumestautem,adevidentiamhuiuscapituli,quoduniversaledupliciterpotestaccipi.Unomodoproipsanatura,cuiintellectusattribuitintentionemuniversalitatis:etsicuniversalia,utgeneraetspecies,substantiasrerumsignificant,utpraedicanturinquid.Animalenimsignificatsubstantiameius,dequopraedicatur,ethomosimiliter.Aliomodopotestaccipiuniversaleinquantumestuniversale,etsecundumquodnaturapraedictasubestintentioniuniversalitatis.]

324DeVer.2,2,ob.4andad4:“[S]cientianonestnisideuniversali.SedDeusnonestuniversale:quiauniversaleomneestperabstractionem;aDeoautem,cumsitsimplicissimus,nonpotestfieriabstractio.ErgoDeusnoncognoscitseipsum[…]Universaleprotantoestintelligibile,quiaestamateriaseparatum;undeillaquaenonsuntperactumintellectusnostriamateriaseparata,sedperseipsasuntabomnimaterialibera,maximecognoscibiliasunt;etsicDeusmaximeintelligibilisest,quamvisnonsituniversale.”Cf.Q.D.DeAnima,a.2,ad5(textinAppendix,Note8).

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speciesofcorporealthingsarealsoincludedwithinintelligiblebeing,andtheseparatesubstance,therefore,knowsthem.325

Whatisnoteworthyisthattheintelligibilityofthespecies(=natures)ofmaterial

thingsisaffirmedand,affirmedalso,istheintelligibilityofthespecies(=subjective

representation)bywhichweknowthosenatures.Oneandthesameword,“intelligible”,is

beingusedintwodifferentways.

“Andsimilarlyitwouldnotbenecessarytopositanagentintellectiftheuniversals

whichareactuallyintelligiblesubsistedofthemselvesoutsidethesoul,asPlatoasserted.

ButbecauseAristotleassertedthattheseuniversalsdonotsubsistexceptinsensible

objects,whicharenotactuallyintelligible…”etc.,326whereitisclearthatauniversal(inre)

isnotintelligibleinact.ThetextoftheAdSextum,besidesshowingthisdistinctionatplay,

illustratesseveralpointsmadethusfarinthisthesis,aswellaspointingoutthealterityof

theobject(whichwillbetreatedsubsequentlyinmoredetail):

ForthereisnodifferencebetweenAristotleandPlato,exceptinthis:thatPlatoassertedthatthethingwhichisunderstoodhasactualbeingoutsidethesoulinexactlythesamewayastheintellectunderstandsit,thatis,assomethingabstractanduniversal;butAristotleassertedthatthethingwhichisunderstoodisoutsidethesoul,butinanotherway,becauseitisunderstoodintheabstractandhasactualbeingintheconcrete.Andjustas,accordingtoPlato,thethingitselfwhichisunderstoodisoutsidethesoulitself,soitisaccordingtoAristotle:andthisisclearfromthefactthatneitherofthemassertedthatthescienceshavetodowiththosethingswhichareinourintellect,aswithsubstances;butwhereasPlatosaidthatthescienceshavetodowithseparatedforms,Aristotlesaidthattheyhavetodowith325CGII,99,par.1-2:“Perdictasigiturformasintelligibilessubstantiaseparatanonsolum

cognoscitaliassubstantiasseparatas,sedetiamspeciesrerumcorporalium.Cumenimintellectusearumsitperfectusnaturaliperfectione,utpotetotusinactuexistens,oportetquodsuumobiectum,scilicetensintelligibile,universalitercomprehendat.Subenteautemintelligibilicomprehendunturetiamspeciesrerumcorporalium.Easigitursubstantiaseparatacognoscit.”

326DeSpirit.Creat.,a.9,c.:“Etsimiliternonessetnecesseponereintellectumagentem,siuniversaliaquaesuntintelligibiliaactu,persesubsisterentextraanimam,sicutposuitPlato.SedquiaAristotelesposuiteanonsubsisterenisiinsensibilibus,quaenonsuntintelligibiliaactu…”

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thequidditiesofthingsthatexistinthosethings.Butthecharacterofuniversality,whichconsistsincommonnessandabstractness,ismerelytheresultofthemodeofunderstanding,inasmuchasweunderstandthingsabstractlyanduniversally;butaccordingtoPlatoitisalsotheresultofthemodeofexistenceoftheabstractforms:andconsequentlyPlatoassertedthatuniversalssubsist,whereasAristotledidnot.327

ThedifferencebetweenPlatoandAristotleisnotadifferencebetweenknowingby

confrontationandknowingbyidentity:forbothofthemwhatisknownistheuniversal,and

itisoutsidethesoul.Thedifferenceisbetweenthemodesofbeingattributedbyeachto

theobjectofhumanunderstanding.TheoriginalityofAristotle,atleastinAquinas’

interpretation,isinestablishingthedifferencebetweenresintellectaandmodusrei

intellectae.

Sometextsmaygivetheimpressionthat,forAquinas,theuniversaldoesnotexistin

anywayinthethingsthemselves.Letusexamineonesuchtext.Itscontextisanapparent

contradictioninAristotle.Thatis,Aristotlebeginsbysayingthatthequodquideratesseand

thethingtowhichitbelongsareoneandthesamething,withoutexcludingmaterial

substances;butthenheexcludesthem,sayingthatonlyinseparatesubstancesdoesthe

speciescoincidewiththeindividual.WhydoesAristotlenotpreviouslyexcludethematerial

substances?St.Thomasexplainsthatthisisbecauseofadifferentconsiderationofthe

327DeSpirit.Creat.,a.9,ad6:“NonenimestdifferentiainterAristotelemetPlatonem,nisiin

hocquodPlatoposuitquodresquaeintelligitureodemmodohabetesseextraanimamquomodoeamintellectusintelligit,idestutabstractaetcommunis;Aristotelesveroposuitremquaeintelligituresseextraanimam,sedaliomodo,quiaintelligiturabstracteethabetesseconcrete.EtsicutsecundumPlatonemipsaresquaeintelligiturestextraipsamanimam,itasecundumAristotelem:quodpatetexhocquodneutereorumposuitscientiasessedehisquaesuntinintellectunostro,sicutdesubstantiis;sedPlatoquidemdixitscientiasessedeformisseparatis,Aristotelesverodequidditatibusrerumineisexistentibus.Sedratiouniversalitatis,quaeconsistitincommunitateetabstractione,sequitursolummodumintelligendi,inquantumintelligimusabstracteetcommuniter;secundumPlatonemverosequituretiammodumexistendiformarumabstractarum:etideoPlatoposuituniversaliasubsistere,Aristotelesautemnon.”

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natureofmaterialthings:whenthenatureisconsideredinitsstateofabstraction,thenitis

alsoonlyoneforeachspecies,ashappenswiththeseparatesubstances.Thetextsays:

Noweventhoughmandoesnotexistapartfromsingularmeninreality,neverthelessmanisseparableinhisintelligibleexpression,whichpertainstothedomainoflogic.Therefore,above,whereheconsideredessencefromtheviewpointoflogic,hedidnotexcludematerialsubstancesfrombeingtheirownessence;formanasauniversalisthesameashisessence,logicallyspeaking.Andnowhavingcometonaturalprinciples,whicharematterandform…328

Now,becauseitisconsideredinitsreality,thenaturecannotbesaidtobeoneand

thesamethingwiththattowhichitbelongs;ineachthing,togetherwiththecommon

nature,therearealsoindividuatingprinciples.Asitseemsclear,thetextissayingthatthe

universalisnotinrealityinitsstateofabstraction,butthesametextisimplyingthatthe

speciesisinrealitytogetherwiththeindividuatingprinciples.329

4)TheDistinctionbetween“expartereiintellectae”and“exparte

intelligentis”

ForSt.Thomas,thedifferencebetweentheresintellectaandthemodusrei

intellectaecanbeseenalsoinagroupoftextsreferringtothedistinction(regardingtheact

ofunderstanding)betweenwhatbelongstoitexpartereiintellectaeandexparte

intelligentis.Letussee,forexample,85,1ad1:

If,therefore,theintellectissaidtobefalsewhenitunderstandsathingotherwisethanasitis,thatisso,iftheword‘otherwise’referstothethingunderstood;forthe328InMet.7,lect.11,1536:“Licetautemhomopraetersingularianonsitinrerumnatura,

esttameninrationequaepertinetadlogicamconsiderationem.Etideosuperiusubilogiceconsideravitdequodquideratesse,nonexclusitsubstantiasmateriales,quininillisetiamessetidemquodquidest,cumeocuiusest.Homoenimcommunisestidemcumsuoquodquidest,logiceloquendo.Nuncautempostquamiamdescenditadprincipianaturaliaquaesuntmateriaetforma...”

329Cf.forexampleInMet.7,lect.11,1535.

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intellectisfalsewhenitunderstandsathingotherwisethanasitis;andsotheintellectwouldbefalseifitabstractedthespeciesofastonefromitsmatterinsuchawayastoregardthespeciesasnotexistinginmatter,asPlatoheld.Butitisnotso,iftheword"otherwise"betakenasreferringtotheonewhounderstands.Foritisquitetruethatthemodeofunderstanding,inonewhounderstands,isnotthesameasthemodeofathinginexisting:sincethethingunderstoodisimmateriallyintheonewhounderstands,accordingtothemodeoftheintellect,andnotmaterially,accordingtothemodeofamaterialthing.330

5)ConcludingRemarks

ForSt.Thomas,Plato’serrorishisdenyingtheuniversalnatureofcorporealthingsa

subsistenceinthematter.Kantmakesthesameerror.ThereasonPlatomakesthismistake

isthathefailstodistinguishtheresintellectafromthemodusreiintellectaeor,inother

words,hesupposesthattheobjectofknowledgemustsubsistinrealitywiththesame

modeofbeingasitdoesintheintellect.ThisisalsowhatKantdoes.OfPlato,Aquinassays:

33085,1ad1:“Cumergodiciturquodintellectusestfalsusquiintelligitremaliterquamsit,

verumestsilyaliterreferaturadremintellectam.Tuncenimintellectusestfalsus,quandointelligitremessealiterquamsit.Undefalsusessetintellectus,sisicabstraheretspeciemlapidisamateria,utintelligereteamnonesseinmateria,utPlatoposuit.Nonestautemverumquodproponitur,silyaliteraccipiaturexparteintelligentis.Estenimabsquefalsitateutaliussitmodusintelligentisinintelligendo,quammodusreiinexistendo,quiaintellectumestinintelligenteimmaterialiter,permodumintellectus;nonautemmaterialiter,permodumreimaterialis.”Cf.85,7,c.;DeVer2,2,ad9;DeSpirit.Creat.,a.10,ad12:“Thereisoneessenceofnumbersinallminds,justasthereisalsooneessenceofastone;andthisessenceisoneonthepartofthethingthatisunderstood,butnotonthepartoftheactofunderstanding,whichisnotessentialtothethingthatisunderstood;foritisnotessentialtoastonethatitbeunderstood.”[Sicestunarationumeroruminomnibusmentibus,sicutetunaratiolapidis;quaequidemestunaexpartereiintellectae,nonautemexparteactusintelligendi,quodnonestderationereiintellectae:nonenimestderationelapidisquodintelligatur.];DeSpirit.Creat.,a.9,ad6;InBoet.DeTrin.5,1,c.:“Somethingbelongstotheobjectofspeculation,whichisobjectofthespeculativepotency,withregardtotheintellectualpotencyandsomethingelsebelongstoitwithregardtothehabitofsciencebywhichtheintellectisperfected.Whatbelongstotheobjectofspeculationwithregardtotheintellectisitsbeingimmaterial,becausetheintellectitselfisimmaterial.Whatbelongstothisobjectwithregardtoscienceisitsbeingnecessary,becausescienceisofthenecessary,asitisdemonstratedinIPosteriorum.”[Speculabiliautem,quodestobiectumspeculativaepotentiae,aliquidcompetitexparteintellectivaepotentiaeetaliquidexpartehabitusscientiaequointellectusperficitur.Expartesiquidemintellectuscompetiteiquodsitimmateriale,quiaetipseintellectusimmaterialisest;exparteveroscientiaecompetiteiquodsitnecessarium,quiascientiadenecessariisest,utprobaturinIPosteriorum.]

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“ThePlatonistspositedIdeaschieflyinorderthattheymightapplythembothtodefinitions

anddemonstrations,whichhavetodowithwhatisnecessary,sinceallthesesensible

substancesseemedtobeinmotion.”331

ItmightbesaidthatthespeculativegeniusofPlatoandKantiscombinedwithano

lesssurprisingintellectual“adolescence.”Theirgeniusisseenintheirsafeguardingthe

rightsofintellectoversensibility;likeParmenides,theycannotgiveupthelifeofthespirit,

theydonotwanttosurrendertothetorrentofeverchangingreality.Atthesametime,

however,theycannotovercometheappearances;theycannotseeinrealityotherthan

change,becausetheycannotovercomethedataofsensibility.Thedataofsensibilitycause

themanxiety,asastormcauseschildrentobeafraid.Theyescapethestormonlytofind

refugeinthemselves;theycreateaworldofcategorieswhereeverythingcorrespondsto

theirconceptions,whereeverythingseemssafe...andKant(ifnotPlatoaswell)

engenderedforWesternculturealifewithoutrealadventure:theaprioriworld.

Itisnotamatterofgivinglifetothespiritoutofadesireforadventure:instead,itis

atruePhenomenologyofperceptionwhichwillhelpEpistemologytomatureandto

overcomeKantianbiases.Fabrodevotesmuchofhisresearchtothisissue.332Neitherisita

matterofdenyingthedepthofPlatoandKant,thesetwo“AristocratsoftheSpirit”;which

otherthinkershavemanaged,ashavethey,toinspiresomanyphilosophersand

theologiansafterthem?ThethrustoftheSpiritisfascinating...Buttheweaknessesin

331InMet.7,lect.15,1606:“Platoniciadhocpraecipueponebantideas,uteisadaptarentur

etdefinitionesetdemonstrationes,quaesuntdenecessariis,cumistasensibiliavideanturomniainmotuconsistere.”

332ParticularlyhisLaFenomenologiadellaPercezioneandPercezioneePensiero(cf.Bibliography).

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PlatoandKantmustberecognizedinordernottoconfoundinspirationwiththefinished

workofasolidsystem.Evidently,St.Thomas’certaintythattheuniversalbelongstothe

thing,andisnotaproductofsubjectivity,isrootedinhisunchangingconsiderationof

knowledgeasbeingdefinedbyalterity,knowledgeasanencounterwiththeother.Thisis

oneofthepointsinChapter3.

Itshouldbenoted,however,thattheexpresspurposeofthisdissertationisto

understandtheroleoftheagentintellectintheactofunderstandingforAquinas.The

necessityofdrawingthecomparisonwithKant(throughPlato)istoshowthattheefficiency

oftheagentintellect,forAquinas,isnot“formal,”asproductiveoftheuniversalnatureas

contentofknowledge(resintellecta),but“metaphysic”asproductiveofamodeofbeingof

theuniversalnaturethatistheobjectofunderstanding.333

Ifourreflectionssofarhavenotmissedthepoint,itisclearthatthenature(or

betterquidditas)ofcorporealthings,whichistheresintellectaortheproperobjectof

humanunderstanding,admitstwodifferentmodesofbeing:itssubsistenceinthe

particular,materialiter;anditspresenceintheintellect,cumintentioneuniversalitatisand

inastateofabstraction.334Theagentintellectisrequiredbecausethemodeofbeingofthe

333GermaineCromp(+1990)exemplifieshow,whenthedistinctionbetweenthetwo

meaningsof“intelligibility”isnotmade,theagentintellectnecessarilybecomesaformalapriori(cf.Cromp,204,167-168,192,201,206-208).Shesuggeststhatthecontentcomesinasensefromthephantasm(cf.200),andraisesthreetimesthequestionofhowthisispossible(cf.167,180,192);butbecauseshedoesnotdistinguishtheintelligiblecontentfromanaddedmodeofbeingofthephantasmbytheagentintellect,shedoesnotescapefrommakingtheagentintellectresponsiblefortheintelligiblecontent.

334Lambertseemstobewellorientedwhenhesays:“Humanabstractedconceptsareidenticalincontenttothingsintherealphysicalorderandinthatrespectarenevermorethantheequalofthings;theirsuperiorityliesexclusivelyintheirfunctionas“re-presentation”ofthosethingsinanimmaterialmode”(Lambert,98).Thoughwellorientedalsoinmanyotherrespects,hedoes

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naturesinthematterisnotproportionatetotheintellectualfaculty.Theagentintellectis

broughtintoplaytoproduceintelligibilityasamodeofbeing,andnotintelligibilityas

content(resintellecta).335Thedistinctionofthesetwomeaningsofuniversalandintelligible

inAquinasisexplicit,ashasbeenargued.Aswillbeshown,theagentintellectforAquinasis

requiredtoseparatetheresintellecta(orintelligenda)fromitsindividualconditionsinthe

matter,nottocompletethematterwithanintelligibleunitythatwouldnototherwisebe

there.

Whatstillneedstobeshowninmoredetailisthatintellectualknowing,forAquinas,

isoriginallyverifiedbythereceptionofthisabstractedquidditas.Havingbroughttothefore

thecrucialdistinctionbetweenthatwhichisunderstoodanditsmodeofbeing(andthe

relateddistinctionbetweenthetwomeaningsofuniversal),itnowbecomespossibleto

betterunderstandwhatAquinasmeanswhenhespeaksaboutreceptivity,alterityand

identityinhumanknowing.Brieflyput:ontheonehand,receptivityandalterityare

referredtotheresintellecta,insofaraswhatisreceivedbythepossibleintellectisthe

perfectionoftheknown(whichforAquinasis“other”initsrealmodeofbeing,subsistingin

notseemtomanagetodistinguishbetweenthetwomeaningsofintelligibility,consideringintelligibilitysolelyasarealmodeofbeing,asseparationfrommatter.Thispreventshimfromexpressingclearlyinwhatwaymaterialthingscanbeintelligible(cf.90-92,99).Healsoseemstoconfuseimmateriality,asreferringtoknowingingeneral,withspiritualimmateriality,riskingtheexclusionofsensibleknowingfromitsproperimmateriality.

335ThisdistinctioncouldalsoprovehelpfultoovercometheworriesofJuanF.Sellés(cf.Sellés,EIA,256nota72).Heacknowledgesthat,forSt.Thomas,theagentintellectiscognitiveonlyinsofarasitconcurswiththepossibleintellect,neitherbeforenorapartfromit.Butinevidentdisagreement,hewonders“…howisitthatsomethingwhichisnon-cognitiveisabletosubsequentlygenerateknowledgeinthepossibleintellect?”Mysuggestionwouldbethat,becauseintheobjectofknowledgeAquinasdistinguishesbetweenitscontentanditsmodeofbeing,theagentintellectgenerates(=makespossible)knowledgeinsofarisitproducestheintelligiblemodeofbeingofthecontent.“Intelligibility”isananalogousnotionthatdoesnotreferonlytothecontentofunderstanding,butalsotoitsmodeofbeinginthemind.

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thematter)inanintelligiblemodeofbeing.Ontheotherhand,identityisreferredtothis

intelligiblemodeofbeing,insofarastheintellectinitsoperationisoneandthesame,not

withtheresintellecta(whoseperfectionreceivesintentionallyandnotphysically)butwith

thespeciesassubjectivemodification,i.e.,withthespeciesasperfectingsubjectivelythe

intellect.ThesematterswillbetreatedinthenextChapter.

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ChapterThree:KnowingasReceptive

AtopicintroducedinChapter1istheconsiderationofintelligenceasacertain

“vision.”Thusarisesaveryimportantissueunderlyingthewholedoctrineoftheagent

intellectinAquinas;thatis,intellectualknowingisoriginallyreceptive,intentionalas

possessionoftheotherandevendefinedbyalterity.Inotherwords,tosaythattheagent

intellectisametaphysicalaprioriofintellectualknowingasreceptiveofobjectivecontent,

impliesthatunderstandingisnotacertain“perfecting”ofsomething,buta“being

perfected”bysomething;tounderstandisnottocommunicateaperfection,buttoreceive

aperfection.Therefore,theagentintellectwhichisbydefinitionsomething“perfecting,”is

notthefacultyofunderstanding,butsomethingrequiredbythepossibleintellectinorder

tounderstand(andinthatsenseapriori).Ifweshowthat,forAquinas,understandingis

originallyreceptiveoftheperfectionoftheotherassuch,whatbecomesmoreclearisthe

questionabilityofanyconceptionoftheagentintellectascontributingtheuniversalcontent

ofknowingorascompletingformallythematerialofsensibility.Ifknowingisnot

performance336oftheobjectbutreceptionoftheother,theagentintellectcannotbe

336Iuseboth“performative”and“productive”torefertotheformalapriori.Thefirstterm

seemstohaveamorecognitiveconnotation,thesecondseemsmore“physical”,andbecause“performative”hasbeenusedinotherinterpretations,aclarificationisinorder.Iamnotsuggestingthataformalaprioriissimplyaphysicalactivityoforganizationora“puttingtogether”aphysicalmaterialelement.WhatImeantosayisthat,if1)weconsidertheobjectofhumansciencelikea“composite”ofmatterandform(whichisalreadyalimitedanalogyfromthephysicalorder),2)weconsiderthe“matter”ofthisobjectthatwhichcomesfromexperience(particularincontent),3)weconsiderthe“form”ofthisobjectthe“unity”ofuniversalitywhichthismaterialfromexperiencefindsinhumanmind,and4)weconsiderthatthisunityofuniversalitydoesnotcomefromexperiencebutfromthehumanminditself,becausewetaketheuniversalityofthecontenttobeaneventofconsciousnessandnotadatumfromexperience,then5)wemaintainaformalapriorithat

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productiveoftheobject,butproductiveonlyoftheintelligiblemodeofbeingofthe

other.337

Thiscentralissuewillbeapproachedbyattendingtosixgroupsoftexts:

1. Passagesinwhichtheroleofknowingincreationischaracterizedasaremedyfor

thespecificimperfectionofcertaincreatures.

2. Textsreferringtoalterityandidentityinknowing,tryingtoestablishinwhat

senseAquinasspeaksofthesethings.

3. TextsshowinghowforAquinastheidentityinknowledgeisbasedonthe

species338andisnotanontologicalidentitywiththeknown.

4. Textsinwhichknowingispresentedasacertain“receiving,”whichreinforcesthe

ideaofalterityasacharacteristicofknowing.

5. Textsshowingthesofrequentcomparisonbetweenintelligenceandsensitivity

willbeanotherconfirmationofthealterityandreceptivityofknowing.

is“productive”oftheintellectualobject,insofarasuniversality,whichisconsideredthe“form”oftheobject,isacharacteristicoftheobjectcomingfromthemind.Iftheanalogy,insofarasitcomesfromthephysicalorder,doesnotmanagetoconveyperfectlytherealityofanepistemologicalformalapriori,itdoesallowtounderstandthat,asinthephysicalrealmwhateverisperfectinabodycomesfromtheagentcauseandnotfromthematter,inasimilarway,intheintentionalrealm,whateverisdefined(determined)intheobjectcomesfromthesubject,andnotfromexperience.

337WesupposeinthisChapterourpreviousfindings,particularlythattheobjectofunderstandingisthenaturesubsistingintheparticularandnottheparticularassuch.Thereforetheotherwearetalkingaboutisnotjustthematerialofsensibility.

338Imeanspeciesassubjectivemodification.Inthissense,thespeciesisnottheknown,butthemeansbywhichtheknownispresenttothemind.Aquinascanalsouse“species”inthesenseofnatureorcontentofknowing.Iwilltrytoavoidconfusionsinmyusageofthisword.

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6. Finally,asacorollaryofthepreviousreflections,ifknowingisneithera“tending

towards”nora“making,”itmeansthatthereis,forAquinas,acleardistinction

betweentheagentintellect,thepossibleintellectandthewill.

Therationaleofthisdivisionwillbemoreclearinwhatfollows.Itcouldbehelpfulto

notehowever,onthedoctrinalside,thatthetensionbetweenidentityandalterity,ashas

beenanticipatedinChapter2,willberesolvedbyreferringidentitytothespecies(andsoto

themodeofbeingoftheknownintheintellect),andalteritytotheknownperfectionitself.

1)TheMetaphysicalExplanationofKnowingasa“Remedy”

ForAquinas,knowingiswhatallowscertaincreaturestoremedytheirnatural

imperfection,eventothepointofobtainingalikenessofthesupremeperfectionofGod.

Thereasonforbringingthisideaof“remedy”intoourconsiderationsisthatitmayhelpto

establishknowingasabeingperfected,ratherthanasaperfectingactivity.

St.Thomasreferstothispointpreviously,inDeVer.2,2,c.Whatisinterestingabout

thispassageisthatitlocatesknowingaspartoftheuniversalplanofcreation;itgivesus,as

itwere,thereasonforknowledgetoexist.

Athingisperfectintwoways.First,itisperfectwithrespecttotheperfectionofits[being],whichbelongstoitaccordingtoitsownspecies.But,sincethespecific[being]ofonethingisdistinctfromthespecific[being]ofanother,ineverycreatedthing,[thiskindofperfectionineachthing]fallsshortofabsoluteperfectiontotheextentthatthatperfectionisfoundinotherspecies.Consequently,theperfectionofeachindividualthingconsideredinitselfisimperfect,beingapartoftheperfection

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oftheentireuniverse,whicharisesfromthesumtotaloftheperfectionsofallindividualthings.339

Thefirstmodeofperfectioncanbecallednatural,physicaloreven“real”being.The

secondisintentionalbeing,thebeingoftheknownintheknower.ForSt.Thomas,this

secondkindofpossessingaperfectionisacertainremedyfortheoriginalspecific

“imperfection”ofcreatures:

Inorderthattheremightbesomeremedyforthisimperfection,anotherkindofperfectionistobefoundincreatedthings.Itconsistsinthis,thattheperfectionbelongingtoonethingisfoundinanother.Thisistheperfectionofaknowerinsofarasheknows;forsomethingisknownbyaknowerbyreasonofthefactthatthethingknownis,insomefashion,inthepossessionoftheknower.340

Knowing,therefore,iswhatallowshumanbeingstoarriveatacertain“universal”

perfection.Anditshouldbestressedfromthebeginningthathumanbeingsdonotalready

possessthisuniversalperfectionbut,rather,thisperfectionissomethingtowhichhuman

beingsareinpotency.ThisisthemeaningoftheAristotelian“quodammodoomnia”:339DeVer.2,2,c.:“Resaliquainveniturperfectadupliciter.Unomodosecundum

perfectionemsuiesse,quodeicompetitsecundumpropriamspeciem.Sedquiaessespecificumuniusreiestdistinctumabessespecificoalteriusrei,ideoinqualibetrecreatahuiusmodiperfectioniinunaquaqueretantumdeestdeperfectionesimpliciter,quantumperfectionisinspeciebusaliisinvenitur;utsiccuiuslibetreiperfectioinseconsiderataesitimperfecta,velutiparsperfectionistotiusuniversi,quaeconsurgitexsingularumrerumperfectionibus,invicemcongregatis.”

340DeVer.2,2,c.:“Undeuthuicimperfectionialiquodremediumesset,invenituraliusmodusperfectionisinrebuscreatis,secundumquodperfectioquaeestpropriauniusrei,inalterareinvenitur;ethaecestperfectiocognoscentisinquantumestcognoscens,quiasecundumhocacognoscentealiquidcognosciturquodipsumcognitumestaliquomodoapudcognoscentem.”Cf.InIDeAnima4,18-26.InSummaI,78,3c.,St.Thomasdistinguishesinthesensesbetweennaturalandspiritualimmutatio,where“spiritual”referstothissecondmodeofbeing.AsStumpclarifies:“Aquinastendstouse‘immaterial’,‘intentional’,and‘spiritual’roughlysynonymouslytorefertothiskindofchangeorreceptionofform”(Stump,251,note35,cf.note36).Cf.InIDeAnima10,191-195:“Herethereisnomovementofthematerialsubstanceitself,butonlya‘spiritual’movementofcognition:forexample,theactofseeingisnotamaterialmodification;itis‘spiritual’receptionintotheeyeofsensibleforms.”[Inhisenimnonestmotussecundumessenaturae,sedsolumsecundumessespirituale,sicutpatetinvisucuiusoperationonestadessenaturale,sedspirituale:quiaestperspeciessensibilessecundumessespiritualereceptasinoculo.]

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Hence,itissaidinTheSoulthatthesoulis,‘insomemanner,allthings,’sinceitsnatureissuchthatitcanknowallthings.Inthiswayitispossiblefortheperfectionoftheentireuniversetoexistinonething.Theultimateperfectionwhichthesoulcanattain,therefore,is,accordingtothephilosophers,tohavedelineatedinittheentireorderandcausesoftheuniverse.Thistheyheldtobetheultimateendofman;[which,inourview,]consistsinthevisionofGod;for,asGregorysays:‘WhatistherethattheydonotseewhoseeHimwhoseesallthings?’341

AccordingtoSt.Thomas,then,itisbymeansofknowledgethat“possibileest”(not

actual)thatthisuniversalperfectionmayexistinthesoul;thisperfectionis“ultima

perfectio”atwhichthesoulmayarrive,notsomethingitpossessesfromthebeginning.Itis

clearthen,thatknowingissomethingallowingahumanbeingtoarriveathisorherfinal

perfectionbyanacquisitionoftheperfectionofotherthings,suchperfectionbeingfoundin

himorherwiththissecondmodeofbeing.Preciselybecauseeachcreaturedoesnothave

initselftheperfectionofothercreatures,thissecondmodeofbeingprovidessome

creatureswitha“remedy”forthis“imperfection”;knowingallowsthemtopossessthe

perfectionofothers,sothatacertainlikenesstothefirstprinciplemaybeattained.

Asimilartextisfoundin80,1,c.,whereAquinasisdealingwiththenecessityof

attributingappetitivepotenciestothehumansoul.Hesays:“Forinthosewhichlack

knowledge,theformisfoundtodetermineeachthingonlytoitsownbeing—thatis,toits

nature.Thereforethisnaturalformisfollowedbyanaturalinclination,whichiscalledthe

341DeVer.2,2,c.:“EtideoinIIIDeAnimadicitur,animaessequodammodoomnia,quia

nataestomniacognoscere.Etsecundumhuncmodumpossibileestutinunaretotiusuniversiperfectioexistat.Undehaecestultimaperfectioadquamanimapotestpervenire,secundumphilosophos,utineadescribaturtotusordouniversi,etcausarumeius;inquoetiamfinemultimumhominisposuerunt,quodsecundumnos,eritinvisioneDei,quiasecundumGregorium,“quidestquodnonvideantquividentemomniavident?”

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naturalappetite.”342ThisisthefirstmodeofbeingconsideredpreviouslyinthetextofDe

Veritate,thenaturalbeing.Thesecondmodeisintroducedimmediately:

Butinthosethingswhichhaveknowledge,eachoneisdeterminedtoitsownnaturalbeingbyitsnaturalform,insuchamannerthatitisneverthelessreceptiveofthespeciesofotherthings:forexample,sensereceivesthespeciesofallthingssensible,andtheintellect,ofallthingsintelligible,sothatthesoulofmanis,inaway,allthingsbysenseandintellect:andthereby,thosethingsthathaveknowledge,inaway,approachtoalikenesstoGod,‘inWhomallthingspre-exist,’asDionysiussays.343

WealsohaveherethereferencetotheAristotelian“quodammodoomnia”inthe

samesense;thatis,thosebeingswhoareabletoknowarecertainlydeterminedintheir

specificbeing,butinsuchawaythattheyarealsoabletoreceivetheperfection(here

“species”)ofotherbeings.Theword“receptivum”clearlyexpressesapassivepotentiality;

theword“appropinquant”alsoremindsusofthe“pervenire”inDeVeritate,inthesense

thatthereisaprogresstowardsan“ultimaperfectio,”whichishere“Deisimilitudinem.”We

shouldalsonotethecontrastbetweenhumanbeings,whomust“approach”thelikenessof

God,andGodhimself,inwhomallthingspre-exist,thatistosay,inwhomallofthese

perfectionsarealreadyactually(virtually)presentasintheirfirstcause.Inthistext,

knowingisthemeansbywhichhumanbeingsarriveattheirultimateperfection(distinct

34280,1,c.:“Inhisenimquaecognitionecarent,inveniturtantummodoformaadunumesse

propriumdeterminansunumquodque,quodetiamnaturaleuniuscuiusqueest.Hancigiturformamnaturalemsequiturnaturalisinclinatio,quaeappetitusnaturalisvocatur.”

34380,1,c.:“Inhabentibusautemcognitionem,sicdeterminaturunumquodqueadpropriumessenaturaleperformamnaturalem,quodtamenestreceptivumspecierumaliarumrerum,sicutsensusrecipitspeciesomniumsensibilium,etintellectusomniumintelligibilium,utsicanimahominissitomniaquodammodosecundumsensumetintellectum,inquoquodammodocognitionemhabentiaadDeisimilitudinemappropinquant,inquoomniapraeexistunt,sicutDionysiusdicit.”

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fromtheirnaturalinitialperfection),thatultimateperfectionbeingacertainlikenessto

God,inwhomallthingspre-exist.

Theword“remedy”isalsousedintheSummainatextthatmayilluminatethis

notionofknowingasameansofprogresstowardsperfection.Ahumanbeingisableto

attainhisorherultimateperfectionbymeansofmanyoperations,accordingtohisorher

statusinthescaleofbeings.Again,thedifferencebetweenusandGodisthat,forGod,this

ultimateperfectionisapossession,notsomethingtobeattainedbyoperations.Whatis

deniedinGod,however,isnottheoperationitself,butthe“tobeattained”element,which

ispropertocreatures.ThemetaphysicaldistinctionbetweenGodandhumanbeings

illuminateswhatiscreatedknowledgeforSt.Thomas,namely,asecondaryperfection,the

endorgoalofthedevelopmentoftheknowingcreature.

Ofnecessitywemustplaceseveralpowersinthesoul.Tomakethisevident,weobservethat,asthePhilosophersays(DeCoeloii,12),thelowestorderofthingscannotacquireperfectgoodness,buttheyacquireacertainimperfectgoodness,byfewmovements;andthosewhichbelongtoahigherorderacquireperfectgoodnessbymanymovements;andthoseyethigheracquireperfectgoodnessbyfewmovements;andthehighestperfectionisfoundinthosethingswhichacquireperfectgoodnesswithoutanymovementwhatever.Thusheisleastofalldisposedofhealth,whocanonlyacquireimperfecthealthbymeansofafewremedies;betterdisposedishewhocanacquireperfecthealthbymeansofmanyremedies;andbetterstill,hewhocanbyfewremedies;bestofallishewhohasperfecthealthwithoutanyremedies.Weconclude,therefore,thatthingswhicharebelowmanacquireacertainlimitedgoodness;andsotheyhaveafewdeterminateoperationsandpowers.Butmancanacquireuniversalandperfectgoodness,becausehecanacquirebeatitude.Yetheisinthelastdegree,accordingtohisnature,ofthosetowhombeatitudeispossible;thereforethehumansoulrequiresmanyandvariousoperationsandpowers.Buttoangelsasmallervarietyofpowersissufficient.InGodthereisnopoweroractionbeyondHisownEssence.344

34477,2,c.:“Necesseestponerepluresanimaepotentias.Adcuiusevidentiam,

considerandumestquod,sicutPhilosophusdicitinIIDeCaelo,quaesuntinrebusinfima,non

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InDeVeritate,the“illness”seemstobemoretherelativeimperfectionofeach

creatureregardingtheperfectionoftherest(andsoamore“static”imperfection),andin

theSummathe“illness”istheimperfectionoftheintellectualcreatureasabeingin

potencytowardsitsfinalend(andsoadynamicimperfection).Inthefirsttwotexts,St.

Thomasreferstobothsensibleandintellectualknowledge,whereasinthethirdtexthe

refersonlytointellectualknowing;thatisprobablywhyhepreferstospeaksimplyabout

Deisimilitudineminthesecondtextandofbeatitudineminthethird.Inallthreetexts,

finally,knowinginhumanbeingsisabeingtowardsGod,notabeing-in-the-world;itisa

meanstoobtaintheirfinalendbythegradualacquisitionofperfections,andisnota

perfectingactivityofanykind.345Inotherwords,knowingisabeingtowardsGodasanall-

inclusiveuniversalperfection;quodammodoomniaandDeisimilitudinemrefermore

universallytothelikenessofGod,attainablealsobysensibleknowingorbypurelynatural

knowledge;visioneDei,universalemetperfectambonitateminsteadaremorerestrictedto

thefinalendofintellectualcreaturesobtainedonlybygrace.

possuntconsequiperfectambonitatem,sedaliquamimperfectamconsequunturpaucismotibus;superioraverohisadipiscunturperfectambonitatemmotibusmultis;hisautemsuperiorasuntquaeadipiscunturperfectambonitatemmotibuspaucis;summaveroperfectioinveniturinhisquaeabsquemotuperfectampossidentbonitatem.Sicutinfimeestadsanitatemdispositusquinonpotestperfectamconsequisanitatem,sedaliquammodicamconsequiturpaucisremediis;meliusautemdispositusestquipotestperfectamconsequisanitatem,sedremediismultis;etadhucmelius,quiremediispaucis;optimeautem,quiabsqueremedioperfectamsanitatemhabet.Dicendumestergoquodresquaesuntinfrahominem,quaedamparticulariabonaconsequuntur,etideoquasdampaucasetdeterminatasoperationeshabentetvirtutes.Homoautempotestconsequiuniversalemetperfectambonitatem,quiapotestadipiscibeatitudinem.Esttameninultimogradu,secundumnaturam,eorumquibuscompetitbeatitudo,etideomultisetdiversisoperationibusetvirtutibusindigetanimahumana.Angelisverominordiversitaspotentiarumcompetit.InDeoverononestaliquapotentiavelactio,praetereiusessentiam.”

345TheHeideggerian“being-in-the-world”,inmyview,isindirectoppositiontoAquinas’viewofhumanunderstanding.

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Thelattertext346situatesknowinginAquinas’metaphysicalworld.ForAquinas,only

GodisHisownbeing,andonlyinHimarebeingandoperationthesame.Godiscomplete,

perfect,possessingHisownperfection.Allothercreaturesneedtoobtaintheirfinal

perfectionbymeansofoperations,whicharesecondaryperfectionsaddedtoasubstantial

primaryperfection.Whatisoneinthesourceismultipleinitseffects.Everycreatureisa

likenessofGod,insofaraseachhasreceivedfromGodaparticipationofGod’sgoodness.

Butthisoriginal“fall”347fromthesourceimpliesadistinctionbothatthestaticlevelof

being(essentia–esse)andatthedynamiclevel(essesubstantialis–operatio).Ifthissecond

distinctiondidnottakeplace,neitherwouldthefirstmakeanysense:ifacreaturewere

perfectjustbecauseofwhatitis,itwouldmeanthatitsessenceandbeingwouldalsobe

thesame,andthereforeitwouldnotbeacreaturebutGod.This,Isuggest,isthewayto

understandknowledgeinAquinas;thatis,knowingisoneoftheoperationsallowingcertain

creaturestoobtaintheirend,theirsecondaryperfection.Itisaremedytotheirsubstantial

imperfection,notanoverflowingoftheirperfectionontootherthings.348

AconnectionwithChapter2maybehelpfulatthispoint.Knowingisaremedyfor

theimperfectionoftheknowerinsofarastheperfectionoftheknowndoesnotbelong

specificallytotheknower;weare,therefore,talkingabouttheresintellecta.Thefactthat

34677,2,c..347Inthesensethatthecreature“fallsshortof”theperfectionoftheCreator,andthatthe

creaturecomesfromtheCreatorasacertain“descending.”Inotherwords,thecreatureparticipatesoftheCreatorinbothastaticsense(asalimitedrealizationofthedivinefullnessofperfection)andadynamicsense(asreceivinghispartialperfectionfromGod).Itisthisbeingperparticipationemthatisthereasonforthedifferentlevelsofcompositionincreatures.

348Animagesomewhatsimilartothatof“remedy”isthefigureof“food.”Cf.InIIDeAnima6,156-161(SeeAppendix,Note9).

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theagentintellect“remedies”thelackofintelligibilityoftheobjectisnotagainstthe

aforementionedbecause,inthiscase,“intelligibility”referstothemodusreiintellectae.The

knowerreceivesaperfectionascontent,whereastherealnatureintheobject(represented

inthephantasm)receivesaperfectionasamodeofbeing.349

2)AlterityandIdentityinHumanKnowing

2.1.Alterity

InAquinas,theoriginalalterityoftheobjectofknowingisclear.Forexample,in75,

2,c.:“Foritisclearthatbymeansoftheintellectmancanhaveknowledgeof[thenatures

of]allcorporealthings.Nowwhateverknowscertainthingscannothaveanyoftheminits

ownnature;becausethatwhichisinitnaturallywouldimpedetheknowledgeofanything

else.”350Preciselybecausetoknowistoreceivetheperfectionofothers,itisnecessarythat

thefacultyofknowingnotbealreadyperfectedwithanatural(andso“own”)perfectionof

349AninterestingtextinInDeAnimaalsosuggeststhatthe“remedy”whichhumanknowing

is(here“salus”)referstoreceivingtheperfectionoftheotherassuch(the“resintellecta”).Thisisrelatedtotheparticularkindofreceptivitythatknowledgeimplies,whichwewilldiscusslaterinsection4ofthissameChapter:“Inanotherandloosersensetheterm(passio)connotesanyreceptionofsomethingfromoutside.Andasareceiveristowhatitreceivesasapotencytoitsactuality;andasactualityistheperfectionofwhatispotential;sobeingactedupon(i.e.,passio)inthissenseimplies,[notthatacertaincorruptiontakesplace,but]ratherthatacertain[“salvation”]andperfectionofathinginpotencyisreceivedfromathinginact.”[Aliomodopassiocommuniterdicituretminusproprie,secundumscilicetquodimportatquamdamreceptionem.Etquiaquodestreceptivumalterius,comparaturadipsumsicutpotentiaadactum:actusautemestperfectiopotentiae;etideohocmododiciturpassio,nonsecundumquodfitquaedamcorruptiopatientis,sedmagissecundumquodfitquaedamsalusetperfectioeiusquodestinpotentia,abeoquodestinactu.](InIIDeAnima11,109-117).Humanknowingisthisreceivingtheperfectionofotherthingsasaremedyforouroriginalimperfection.

35075,2,c.:“Manifestumestenimquodhomoperintellectumcognoscerepotestnaturasomniumcorporum.Quodautempotestcognoscerealiqua,oportetutnihileorumhabeatinsuanatura,quiailludquodinesseteinaturaliterimpediretcognitionemaliorum.”

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thesamekind.Later,St.Thomasdesignatesalterityasacommonalitysharedbysensibility

andintelligence,despitethedifferenceineachasregardsthemodeofbeingoftheknown:

Butthereisthisdifference,accordingtotheopinionofAristotle,betweenthesenseandtheintelligence—thatathingisperceivedbythesenseaccordingtothedispositionwhichithasoutsidethesoul—thatis,initsindividuality;whereasthenatureofthethingunderstoodisindeedoutsidethesoul,butthemodeaccordingtowhichitexistsoutsidethesoulisnotthemodeaccordingtowhichitisunderstood.351

Whatisknown,theobject,is“extraanimam.”In84,2,c.(aparallelofDeVer.2,2),

inexplainingtheimmaterialityofknowing,St.Thomassays:“Thereasonofthisis,because

theactofknowledgeextendstothingsoutsidetheknower:forweknowthingseventhat

areexternaltous.”352Thereferencestotheexteriorityoftheknownareclearalsoin78,1,

c.,alreadyquoted.Referringtosensitiveandintellectualpotencies,hesays:“…[T]helatter

twogeneraofthesoul'spowershaveanoperationinregardnotmerelytothatwhichis

unitedtothem,butalsotosomethingextrinsic.”353Knowingisnodoubtrelatedtothething

“extraanimam,”althoughinadifferentwaythanaretheaffectivepotencies.354

35176,2ad4:“Sedhoctantuminterestintersensumetintellectum,secundumsententiam

Aristotelis,quodressentitursecundumillamdispositionemquamextraanimamhabet,insuaparticularitate,naturaautemreiquaeintelligitur,estquidemextraanimam,sednonhabetillummodumessendiextraanimam,secundumquemintelligitur.”Cf.DeSpirit.Creat.,a.9,ad6(quotedonp.96).

35284,2,c.:“Ethuiusratioest,quiaactuscognitionisseextenditadeaquaesuntextracognoscentem,cognoscimusenimetiameaquaeextranossunt.”

35378,1,c.:“…[I]staduosecundagenerapotentiarumanimaehabentoperationemnonsolumrespectureiconiunctae,sedetiamrespectureiextrinsecae.”

354Cf.78,1,c.:“Itfollowsofnecessitythatthissomethingextrinsic,whichistheobjectofthesoul'soperation,mustberelatedtothesoulinatwofoldmanner.First,inasmuchasthissomethingextrinsichasanaturalaptitudetobeunitedtothesoul,andtobebyitslikenessinthesoul.Inthiswaytherearetwokindsofpowers—namely,the"sensitive"[…]andthe"intellectual"[…].Secondly,forasmuchasthesoulitselfhasaninclinationandtendencytothesomethingextrinsic.”[Necesseestextrinsecamrem,quaeestobiectumoperationisanimae,secundumduplicemrationemadanimamcomparari.Unomodo,secundumquodnataestanimaeconiungiet

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Thereferencetotheexternalthingisdirect,despitethemediationofthespecies,as

wehavealreadyseenin76,2ad4.Tosaythat“lapisnonestinanima”isthesameastosay

thatitis“extraanimam.”355

Inthefollowingtext,Aquinasalmostdefinesunderstandingbyalterity.Thequestion

iswhethertheseparatesoulcanhaveanyknowledgeoftheseparatesubstances(other

separatesoulsorangels).Theanswerisaffirmative,buttheperfectionofthisknowledge

varies,dependingontheobject;otherseparatesoulscanbeknownperfectly;theangels,

instead,canbeknowninanimperfectway.Thereason,forSt.Thomas,isasfollows:“Now,

everyseparatesubstance‘understandswhatisaboveitselfandwhatisbelowitself,

accordingtothemodeofitssubstance’(DeCausisviii):forathingisunderstood[insofar]as

itisintheonewhounderstands;whileonethingisinanotheraccordingtothenatureof

thatinwhichitis.”356Theactofunderstanding,forSt.Thomas,isverifiedbythepresence

oftheobjectintheknowingsubject,whichisa“species”ofonethingbeingpresentin

inanimaessepersuamsimilitudinem.Etquantumadhoc,suntduogenerapotentiarum,scilicetsensitivum(…)etintellectivum(…)Alioveromodo,secundumquodipsaanimainclinaturettenditinremexteriorem.]Ashasbeenshownbefore,andhereagain,whatisextrinsicforSt.Thomasisnotonlytheobjectofsensitivity,butalsotheobjectofintelligence,i.e.,thenatureofthematerialthing.

35576,2ad4:“Forwhatisunderstoodisintheintellect,notaccordingtoitsownnature,butaccordingtoitslikeness;for‘thestoneisnotinthesoul,butitslikenessis,’asissaid,DeAnimaiii,8.Yetitisthestonewhichisunderstood,notthelikenessofthestone;exceptbyareflectionoftheintellectonitself:otherwise,theobjectsofscienceswouldnotbethings,butonlyintelligiblespecies.”[Idenimquodintelligiturnonestinintellectusecundumse,sedsecundumsuamsimilitudinem,lapisenimnonestinanima,sedspecieslapidis,utdiciturinIIIDeAnima.Ettamenlapisestidquodintelligitur,nonautemspecieslapidis,nisiperreflexionemintellectussupraseipsum,alioquinscientiaenonessentderebus,seddespeciebusintelligibilibus.]St.Thomasalsousestheexpression“extraanimam”inCGII,75,par.8(quotedonp.114).

35689,2,c.:“Estautemcommuneomnisubstantiaeseparataequodintelligatidquodestsuprase,etidquodestinfrase,permodumsuaesubstantiae,sicenimintelligituraliquidsecundumquodestinintelligente;estautemaliquidinalteropermodumeiusinquoest.”

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another.357Althoughwhatispresentintheother(other=theknower)isthethingitself,the

modeinwhichitispresentdependsontheknower.Thisisnottosaythatthethingwhichis

presentisnolongerthesameandbecomestheknower,butexactlytheopposite.St.

ThomasmakesthisverypointinDeVer.2,2,referringtoeveryknowledge:

Inorderthattheremightbesomeremedyforthisimperfection,anotherkindofperfectionistobefoundincreatedthings.Itconsistsinthis,thattheperfectionbelongingtoonethingisfoundinanother.Thisistheperfectionofaknowerinsofarasheknows;forsomethingisknownbyaknowerbyreasonofthefactthatthethingknownis,insomefashion,inthepossessionoftheknower…358

Althoughinthesetextsalterityisreferreddirectlytotheknower,itisobviousthat

theoppositeofthe“other”isalso“another.”Evenmore,itissignificantthatthefocusison

theperfectionoftheknown,andthatthe“other”isthesubjectasreceptiveofit;itisnot

theperfectionoftheknowerwhichisintheknown,buttheperfectionoftheknownwhich

isintheknower.

357Cf.Lambert,90:“Thenecessitythataknowingbeingbeabletoasumeotherformsis

expressedinthisdefinitionofknowledge,whichshowsimmaterialitytobeonlyonecomponent:‘Topossesssomethinginoneselfformallyandnotmaterially,inwhichknowingconsists,isamostnoblewayofpossessingorcontainingsomething’[mytrans.,originalLatinfollows:Sicutautemhaberealiquidinseformaliteretnonmaterialiter,inquoconsistitratiocognitionis,estnobilissimusmodushabendivelcontinendialiquid](InDeCaus,lect.18,n.339).”

358DeVer.2,2,c.:“Undeuthuicimperfectionialiquodremediumesset,invenituraliusmodusperfectionisinrebuscreatis,secundumquodperfectioquaeestpropriauniusrei,inalterareinvenitur;ethaecestperfectiocognoscentisinquantumestcognoscens,quiasecundumhocacognoscentealiquidcognosciturquodipsumcognitumestaliquomodoapudcognoscentem…”Cf.InIDeAnima4,19-36“Thetruth,infact,isthatknowledgeisverifiedbythepresenceofalikenessofthethingknownintheknower;fortheknownmustbeintheknowersomehow.”(mytrans.)[Veritasautemest,quodcognitiofitpersimilitudinemreicognitaeincognoscente:oportetenimquodrescognitaaliquomodositincognoscente.]

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Thisoriginalfact,thepresenceofsomethinginanother(theknower),isthatwhich

requiresadifferentmodeofbeingofthatperfection,359aswehaveseeninChapter2,and

weseehereagain:

Theperfectionofonethingcannotbeinanotheraccordingtothedetermined[being]whichithasinthethingitself.Hence,ifwewishtoconsideritinsofarasitcanbeinanother,wemustconsideritapartfromthosethingswhichdetermineitbytheirverynature.Now,sinceformsandperfectionsofthingsaremadedeterminatebymatter,athingisknowableinsofarasitisseparatedfrommatter.Forthisreason,thesubjectinwhichtheseperfectionsarereceivedmust[also]beimmaterial;for,ifitwerematerial,theperfectionwouldbereceivedinitaccordingtoadeterminate[being].Itwould,accordingly,notbeintheintellectinastateinwhichitisknowable,thatis,inthewayinwhichtheperfectionofonethingcanbeinanother.360

359Stumpoffersasimilarinterpretationwhenexplainingthis“distinctionofAquinas’s

betweentwodifferentwaysofreceivingaform”:“But[theform]istransferredinsuchawaythatitdoesnotconferontheeyethesubstantialoraccidentalcharacteristicsofastone.Apurplestonevisuallycognizeddoesnotmaketheeyepurpleeventhoughtheformofthestone’scoloristransferredtotheeye”(Stump,252).ThedistinctionofthetwomodesofbeingofDeVer2,2canbereadinthefollowingtextofInIIDeAnima14,262-268:“Imeanby‘materialchange’whathappenswhenaqualityisreceivedbyasubjectaccordingtothematerialmode(of)thesubject’sownexistence,ase.g.whenanythingiscooled,orheated,ormovedaboutinspace;whereasbya‘spiritualchange’Imean,here,whathappenswhenthelikenessofanobjectisreceivedinthesense-organ,orinthemediumbetweenobjectandorgan,asaform,causingknowledge,andnotmerelyasaforminmatter.Forthereisadifferencebetweenthemodeofbeingwhichasensibleformhasinthesensesandthatwhichithasinthethingsensed.”[Dicoautemimmutationemnaturalemproutqualitasrecipiturinpatientesecundumessenaturae,sicutcumaliquidinfrigidaturvelcalefitautmovetursecundumlocum.Immutatioverospiritualisestsecundumquodspeciesrecipiturinorganosensusautinmediopermodumintentionis,etnonpermodumnaturalisformae.Nonenimsicrecipiturspeciessensibilisinsensusecundumilludessequodhabetinresensibili.]

360DeVer.2,2,c.:“Perfectioautemuniusreiinalteroessenonpotestsecundumdeterminatumessequodhabebatinreilla;etideoadhocquodnatasitesseinrealtera,oporteteamconsiderariabsquehisquaenatasunteamdeterminare.Etquiaformaeetperfectionesrerumpermateriamdeterminantur,indeestquodsecundumhocaliquaresestcognoscibilissecundumquodamateriaseparatur.Undeoportetutetilludinquosuscipiturtalisreiperfectio,sitimmateriale;sienimessetmateriale,perfectioreceptaessetineosecundumaliquodessedeterminatum;etitanonessetineosecundumquodestcognoscibilis;scilicetut,existensperfectiounius,estnataesseinaltero.”Cf.Lambert,94:“Theimmaterialityofaknowingbeingbestowsonittheabilitytotranscendcontractionandisolationandtoappropriatetoitselfformsotherthanitsown.”

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Noticehow,intheend,beingasknown(“cognoscibilis”)isidentifiedwithbeingin

theotherasother(“existensperfectiounius,estnataesseinaltero”).Thereisnodifference

betweenthisdoctrineandtheSumma’s,exceptforthemoreexplicitexpressionsofalterity

inknowing.

2.2.Identity:WhatIdentityisNot

Butwhataboutidentity?Istherenotanidentityinknowing,asSt.Thomashimself

saysmanytimes?Whatthatidentityisnotwillbemorethefocusinthissection;inthe

next,thefocuswillbewhatthatidentitymeansforAquinas.

Tobeginwith,theidentityisnotabsoluteorperse,butquodammodoandby

participation:“Theintellectualsoulforasmuchasitisactuallyunderstanding,participates

thethingunderstood:for,inaway,theintellectinactisthethingunderstoodinact.”361

Then,ifthereisanidentity,itisnotanontologicalidentityatthelevelofthe

(substantial)beingoftheknower,ashasbeenshownattheendofsection1ofthisChapter.

Substantialbeingandcognitiveoperationaredistinctinallcreatures,evenintheangels.362

ForAquinas,thepotencyofbeing(essentia)cannotbethepotencyoftheoperation,

36184,4ob.1:“Animaintellectiva,secundumquodestactuintelligens,participatipsa

intelligibilia,intellectuseniminactu,quodammodoestintellectuminactu.”362Cf.77,1sc:“Dionysius(Coel.Hier.xi)saysthat‘heavenlyspiritsaredividedintoessence,

power,andoperation.’Muchmore,then,inthesoulistheessencedistinctfromthevirtueorpower.”[SedcontraestquodDionysiusdicit,XIcap.Caelest.Hier.,quodcaelestesspiritusdividunturinessentiam,virtutemetoperationem.Multoigiturmagisinanimaaliudestessentia,etaliudvirtussivepotentia.]and77,1,c.:“WhereforetheDivinepowerwhichistheprincipleofHisoperationistheDivineEssenceitself.Thiscannotbetrueeitherofthesoul,orofanycreature;aswehavesaidabovewhenspeakingoftheangels.”[UndeDeipotentia,quaeestoperationisprincipium,estipsaDeiessentia.Quodnonpotestesseverumnequeinanima,nequeinaliquacreatura;utsupraetiamdeAngelodictumest.]

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becausethatwouldmeananidentityof(substantial)beingandoperation(esseetoperare),

whichispropertoGodalone.

Letusnextexaminethetextwhichwilloccupyusmoredirectlyinthefollowing

section.Accordingto85,2ad1,anidentitybetweentheknowninactandtheintelligence

inactcannotmeanthattheintellectknowsitsownsubjective(natural)perfection,thatis,

thespeciesasperfectingthefacultysubjectively(accordingtothefirstmodeofbeingofDe

Ver.2,2).363Thisidentity(theAristotelian“intellectuminactuestintellectusinactu”)and

thepresenceoftheknownintheknower(bymeansofthespecies)aretwodifferent

concepts:

Thethingunderstoodisintheintellectbyitsownlikeness;anditisinthissensethatwesaythatthethingunderstood[inact]istheintellectinact,becausethelikenessofthethingunderstoodistheformoftheintellect,asthelikenessofasensiblethingistheformofthesenseinact.Henceitdoesnotfollowthattheintelligiblespeciesabstractediswhatisactuallyunderstood;butratherthatitisthelikenessthereof.364

ForAquinas,inknowledgetherearetworealmsofactualization:theactofthe

intellectasaccidentalfacultyinitsnaturalbeing,andtheactoftheintellectinsofarasit

understands.Thefirstperfectionisreal,anditisthespeciesinitsrealbeing(asaccidental

orsecondaryactoftheintellectasoperativepotency).Thesecondperfectionisintentional,

thatistosay,theperfectionoftheknownintheknower,bymeansofthespecies.The363ItischallengingtoindicatewithonetermthefirstmodeofbeingofDeVer2,2,and

therefore“subjective”,“real”,“natural”or“metaphysical”willbeusedalternatively,asseemsmorefitting.Noterm,inmyview,isexemptfrommisunderstanding,sincetheintentionalpresencecouldalsobereferredtoassomethingreal,metaphysical,andsoon.Ihopethat,bythecontextofoppositionwith“intentional”,thereaderwillhaveacleargraspofwhatismeant.

36485,2ad1:“Dicendumquodintellectumestinintelligentepersuamsimilitudinem.Etperhuncmodumdiciturquodintellectuminactuestintellectusinactu,inquantumsimilitudoreiintellectaeestformaintellectus;sicutsimilitudoreisensibilisestformasensusinactu.Undenonsequiturquodspeciesintelligibilisabstractasitidquodactuintelligitur,sedquodsitsimilitudoeius.”;cf.85,2,ob1.

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speciesasimagehas,then,adoubleaspect:itisarealbeingwhichrepresentssomething

else,likeaphotocontainingbothitsownbeingaspaperandthepresenceofsomeone(the

onewhosephotowastaken).Theknownisintheknowerintentionally(“Intellectumestin

intelligentepersuamsimilitudinem”),whereasthespeciesperfectstheintellectnaturally,

subjectively(“similitudoreiintellectaeestformaintellectus”).Thespeciesistherealbeing

(formaquo)whichallowstheknowertobeperfectedintentionally,bringingtotheknower

theperfectionoftheknown(formaquod)inamodeofbeingproportionatetothepotency.

Therefore,itmustbenotedfromthebeginningthattheidentityinthetextof

Aristotle,accordingtoSt.Thomas,isnotsimplytheidentityofintellectum(object)and

intellectus,buttheidentityofintellectuminactuandintellectusinactu.Intellectuminactu

connoteshere,forSt.Thomas,themodeofbeingoftheknownasknown(becauseitisnot

intelligibleinactinreality),andthereforeinthisphraseitsignifiesforSt.Thomasthe

speciesasreal(notintentional)perfectiveformoftheintellectasfaculty.Asaconsequence,

Intellectusinactumeansheretheintelligenceasoperativepotencyperfectedbyitsproper

formand,becausethisformistherealactoftheintellectasarealoperativepotency,

nothingpreventsusfromidentifyinga(real)thingwithitsown(real)perfection,here

respectivelytheintellectandthespecies.Morewillbesaidinthenextsubsection.

3)TheIdentityisbyMeansoftheSpecies

Ifknowledgeisoriginallyknowledgeoftheother,theonlysenseinwhichanidentity

withthisobjectcanbeconceivedisinsofarasthesubjectbecomessomehowtheobject.

Thesubjectisindeedperfected,insomeway,withtheperfectionthatispropertothe

object,butinsuchawaythatthisperfectionremainspropertotheobject.Thisperfectionis

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presentinthesubjectasbelongingtotheobject.Thatiswhyitissaidtobe“intentionally”

present,asanattempttoexpressinwordsanoriginalphenomenonthatdoesnotadmit

furtherresolutionorimages:itispresentinsofarasIamsubjectivelymodified,developed,

bythe“possession”ofanewperfection;butthispresenceis“intentional,”insofarasthat

presencedoesnotbringtheobjecttobephysicallyinme,butratheritisIwhoinsomeway

refertoit,itisIwhoenterintoanewrelationshipwiththeobject.Theobjectmodifiesme

insofarasIrefertoit.Butitisnotmyreferencethatperfectstheobject;rather,itisthe

objectthatperfectsme,orratherIwhogrowwiththeperfectionoftheobject,inmy

intendingofit.TheprobleminEpistemologyistounderstandthisfact,orrathertoaccept

it,insteadoftryingtoreduceittoaphysicalphenomenon,easiertotransformintoimages

ofphysicalcausality.St.Thomastookasapointofdeparturethisfact,andthatiswhy,

whereSt.Thomasisspeakingaboutknowing,hecannotbeunderstoodbythosewho

interprethiminphysicalterms.Whenonethingperfectsanotherinthephysicalrealm,the

perfectionoftheagentbecomestheperfectionofthepatient,andtheactofthepatientis

itsown.St.Thomassaysin85,2thatknowingisnotlikethat.Whenanobjectperfectsa

subjectintheintentionalrealm,theperfectionoftheobjectbecomestheperfectionofthe

subjectinsofarasitremainstheperfectionoftheobject,insofarasitbelongstotheother

(theobject)whichisdistinctfromthesubject.

This“identityinalterity”365inhumanknowingisverifiedbymeansofthespecies.

Thespeciesistherealmodificationofthesubjectthatallowshimorhertointendthe

365“Greekreason[…]wasabletoseethatthehumanintellect,inidentifyingitself

immaterially,intentionaliter,withthebeingofthings,trulyreachesthatwhichexistsoutsideour

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objectasother.Itisareal-subjectivebecomingormodificationthatallowstheintellectto

becomeintentionallywhattheknowingsubjectisnot(really-subjectively).366Itseemsthat

thebestexampleisapicture,367socommoninourhumanexperience.Weknowperfectly

wellthat,inthepicture,thepersonisnotreallypresent,andyet,thepictureenablesusto

knowtheperson,withourfullrealizationthatwhatweareseeingisonlyanimage.Wedo

nothaveanydifficultyinrecognizingthatthereisbothapictureandsomethingelsethatis

pictured,withallofthatinonerealpicture.Therealthingandthereferenceareboththere.

Tworealthingsarepresentthough;thatis,thepersonalsoisthere,althoughnotinthe

samewayasisthematerialofthepicture.Therealpersonispresenttherewithanother

modeofbeing.Thisisan“image”ofwhathappenswiththecognitivespecies.

Theimmediatepurposeofthissectionisnottoexplainthenatureofthespecies.It

shouldbeenoughtounderstandthatthespeciesisasubjectivequalityintheintelligence

thatallowsthisfacultytorefertoanobjectassuch.Itisverydifficulttosaymorewithout

fallingintoimagesfromthephysicalrealmthatmoreobscurethanclarifywhatknowingis.

Thebestthatcanbesaidaboutknowing,Isuggest,iswhatSt.ThomassaysinDeVeritate:

thatknowingisamodeofperfectiondifferentfromthenaturalmodeofbeing,accordingto

whichtheperfectionofonethingispresentinanotherasother.

Theimmediatepurposeofthissection,then,istoshowthatforAquinasthe

Aristotelian“intellectuminactuestintellectusinactu”referstothespecies,andnottoan

minds”(JaquesMaritain,ThePeasantoftheGaronne[NewYork:Hold,RinehartandWinston,1968],p.18inCullen,72).

366ThisisareferencetothefirstmodeofbeingofDeVer.2,2.367Owensusesthisexampleaswell:cf.Owens,37and127.

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ontologicalidentitybetweenknowerandknown.Severalreasonsforthishavealreadybeen

expressed.First,theontologicalbeingoftheknowerforSt.Thomasisdifferentfromthe

knower’soperation(aswehaveseenpreviously368).Secondly,knowingisnotperfectiveof

theobjectbutisperfectedbyit(whichisthepointofthiswholesection);ifknowingwere

theformoftheknownassuch,itwouldmakeperfectsensetosaythattheknowndoesnot

haveanyotherperfectionthantheactoftheknower.Thirdly,Aquinasneverdefines

knowingasarealidentitywiththeknown,369andhedoes,instead,characterizeknowingas

analteritybetweentheperfectionoftheknowerandtheknown(aswasshowninthe

previoussection).Itremains,however,todealmoredirectlywiththetextwherethe

Aristotelianidentityisexplicitlytreated370andtoexploreothertextsthatmayenlightenthe

roleofthespeciesregardingtheidentityinknowing.

Someremarksmaybehelpfulinordertosummarizetheproposedinterpretation.

ForAquinas,thereiscertainlyanidentitybetweenintellectandspecies(asubjective

identityofactualizedpotencyanditsownact);but,becausewhatisknownisnotthe

species,thisrealidentitydoesnottakeawaythealterityofknowing,thatistosay,the

referenceoftheintellecttotheother;rather,thespeciesistheformalprinciple(principium

quo)ofthereferenceoftheintellecttotherealobject.

Thepresenceoftheknownintheknowerisnotcalledidentitybutrathera“being

in”,presencein,beingintheother,etc.,whichisverifiedbymeansofthespecies.The

368Cf.section2ofthisChapter.369ThefactthatAquinasacknowledgesacertainknowingthatimpliestheidentityofknower

andknown(atleastintheseparatesubstances),doesnotmeanthathecharacterizesknowingasessentiallyanidentity.

37085,2ad1.

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mediationofthespeciesdoesnottakeawaythedirectcontactwiththeobject.Itwould

takeitaway,ifthemediationwere“objective”;thatistosay,ifthespecieshadtobeknown

firstinordertoknowthethingitself.ButforSt.Thomas,thespeciesisasubjective

mediation,asubjectivemodificationthatmakesthedirectobjectivereferencepossible.

Thereisadistinctioninthespeciesbetweenthespeciesitselfandwhatisrepresented,

betweenitsrealbeingassubjectivemodificationandthecontentitpossessesasimage.The

faculty,bymeansofthissubjectivemodification,hasaccesstothethingrepresented,as

onewhoseesapicturerecognizesthepersonhimorherself,andnotnecessarilythe

materialsofthepicture.

3.1.TheAristotelianIdentity

LetusnowexaminesometextsthatmayshowmoreclearlythepositionofSt.

Thomasinthesematters.Aquinas’specificinterpretationoftheAristotelian“Thething

understoodinactistheintellectinact”(“Intellectuminactuestintellectusinactu”)has

beenanticipatedintheprevioussection.In85,2ob.1,itissuggestedthatthepresenceof

theobjectintheintellectisthesameasthepresenceofthespeciesinitasitsperfection;

therefore,speciesandobjectoftheintellectarethesamething.371Theargumentisthe

Aristoteliantext,totheauthorityofwhichSt.Thomaswillnotobject.ButAquinassaysin

37185,2ob.1:“Itwouldseemthattheintelligiblespeciesabstractedfromthephantasmis

relatedtoourintellectasthatwhichisunderstood.Fortheunderstoodinactisintheonewhounderstands:sincetheunderstoodinactistheintellectitselfinact.Butnothingofwhatisunderstoodisintheintellectactuallyunderstanding,savetheabstractedintelligiblespecies.Thereforethisspeciesiswhatisactuallyunderstood.”[Videturquodspeciesintelligibilesaphantasmatibusabstractae,sehabeantadintellectumnostrumsicutidquodintelligitur.Intellectumeniminactuestinintelligente,quiaintellectuminactuestipseintellectusinactu.Sednihildereintellectaestinintellectuactuintelligente,nisispeciesintelligibilisabstracta.Ergohuiusmodispeciesestipsumintellectuminactu.]

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theAdUnum:“Thethingunderstoodisintheintellectbyitsownlikeness.”372Noticehow,

fromthebeginning,heisnottalkingabout“intellectuminactu”butabout“intellectum”,

whichstandsfortheobjectitselfandnotforthespecies(here“similitudinem”);thisisthe

confusionintheobjection.Aquinascontinues:“Anditisinthissensethatwesaythatthe

thingunderstood[inact]istheintellectinact,becausethelikenessofthethingunderstood

istheformoftheintellect,asthelikenessofasensiblethingistheformofthesensein

act.”373ThisisthepreciseinterpretationoftheAristoteliantextforAquinas.Thatis,the

identity(“est”canbeinterpretedinthatwaytosomeextent)istheidentityofanactualized

operativepotency(intellectusinactu=intellectusformatum)withitsperfectiveform

(similitudoreiintellectae=intellectuminactu).ThismaynotbeAquinas’interpretationof

theAristoteliantextinothercontexts,anditmayalsobeamisinterpretationofAristotle;

however,forAquinas,here,intellectuminactudoesnotmeanobjectoftheintellect(quod

actuintelligitur).Therefore,hecanconclude:“Henceitdoesnotfollowthattheintelligible

speciesabstractediswhatisactuallyunderstood;butratherthatitisthelikeness

thereof.”374ThespeciesiscertainlytheperfectiveformoftheintellectforAquinas,andstill

itisnotwhatisunderstood,butarepresentationofwhatisunderstood.Thatiswhy,ifan

identityissupportedwiththisAristoteliantextinAquinas,itisnottheidentitybetween

37285,2ad1:“Intellectumestinintelligentepersuamsimilitudinem.”37385,2ad1:“Etperhuncmodumdiciturquodintellectuminactuestintellectusinactu,

inquantumsimilitudoreiintellectaeestformaintellectus;sicutsimilitudoreisensibilisestformasensusinactu.”

37485,2ad1:“Undenonsequiturquodspeciesintelligibilisabstractasitidquodactuintelligitur,sedquodsitsimilitudoeius.”

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objectandknower,northeidentitybetweenthebeingoftheobjectandthebeingofthe

knower,buttheidentityoftheintellectwithitsspeciesasperfectiveform.375

OtherworksofAquinascanhelpustoconfirmourinterpretation:“Theknownisa

perfectionoftheknower,notbyitssubstance(forthethingisoutsidetheknower),but

ratherbythelikenessbywhichitisknown;foraperfectionexistsintheperfected—andthe

likenessofthestone,notthestone,existsinthesoul.”376Inthefollowingtext“species”

standsfortheperfectionthatisknown:

Hence,thespeciesofathing,aspresentinphantasms,isnotactuallyintelligible,sinceinthisstateitisnotonewiththeintellectinact,butisonewithitaccordingasthespeciesisabstractedfromthephantasms.Justso,thespeciesofcolorisnotperceived[inactinsofar]asitexistsinthestone,butonly[insofar]asitexistsinthepupil.377

Whatisinterestingisthatthespeciesissomethingthatispresentinthethingitself,

butinthethingitselfisnotunitedtothefaculty(andthereforeisnotknowninact).Whatis

unitedtothefacultyistheabstractedspecies(inthecaseoftheintellect),nottherealities

themselvesintheirnaturalbeing.Althoughitisclearthattheperfectionitselfisonewith

theintellectinactandthatSt.ThomasisreferringtotheAristotelianidentity,itiseven

moreclearthatthisidentitydoesnotcomeaboutonaccountofthecontent,buton

accountofthemodeofbeingofthecontent.Inotherwords,thenatureofthestoneinits

375ThesameinterpretationcanbeseenclearlyinothertextsandworksofAquinas:cf.CGII,

98,par.14-19;Ibid.,99,par.5-7;InIIIDeanima7,37-48;SummaI,14,2(seeAppendix,note10).376DeVer.2,3ad1:“Intellectumnonestperfectiointelligentissecundumillamremquae

cognoscitur(resenimillaestextraintelligentem),sedsecundumreisimilitudinemquacognoscitur,quiaperfectioestinperfecto;lapisautemnonestinanima,sedsimilitudolapidis.”

377CGII,59,par.13:“Speciesigiturrei,secundumquodestinphantasmatibus,nonestintelligibilisactu:nonenimsicestunumcumintellectuinactusedsecundumquodestaphantasmatibusabstracta;sicutnecspeciescolorisestsensatainactusecundumquodestinlapide,sedsolumsecundumquodestinpupilla.”Cf.par.10.

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abstractedmodeofbeing,i.e.,thespecies(=representation)ofthenatureofthestone(=

universalcontent),istheperfectionoftheintellectinact.Thisisthesamedoctrineasthat

oftheSumma.

ItseemsthatInDeAnimausestheword“species”moresotoindicatethecognitive

representation:“Buttheseintelligibleideasarenotpreciselywhatthemindunderstands;

theyareonlythelatter’slikenesspresentinthesoul;henceitisquitepossibleformany

intellectstopossesslikenessesofoneandthesameobject,sothatonethingisunderstood

byall.”378Inthefollowingtextwehaveanalternative

expressionoftheAristotelianidentity:Scientia=intellectusinactuandscibileinactu

=intellectuminactu.379Speciesisagaintherepresentationofthethingknown.Thetext

says:“Speculativeknowledgeandwhatisknowable‘inthisway’(i.e.inact)areidentical.

Thereforethe[species]oftheactuallyunderstoodthingisalso[thespecies]ofthe[intellect

itself],throughwhichthelattercanunderstanditself.”380Becausetherepresentationofthe

378InIIIDeAnima2,285-289:“Nonenimestspeciesintelligibilis,ipsumintellectum,sed

similitudoeiusinanima:etideosisuntpluresintellectushabentessimilitudinemuniuseteiusdemrei,eriteademresintellectaapudomnes.”

379Inthesamewayshouldbeunderstoodthefollowingtext,althoughthewordingisslightlydifferent.InIIIDeAnima4,173-176:“Hestatesthreepropertiesofintellectinact.First,itsactualknowledgeisidenticalwiththethingknown;whichisnottrueofintellectaspotential.”[Tresponitconditionesintellectusinactu:quarumprimaest,quodscientiainactu,estidemreiscitae.Quodnonestverumdeintellectuinpotentia.]Cf.InIIIDeAnima5,263-269:“Herepeatswhathehassaidofintellectinact,thatactualknowledgeisonewith(thethingknowninact).”[Resumitquiddamquodsupradictumestdeintellectusecundumactum(…)etdicitquodscientiasecundumactumesidemreiscitesecundumactum.”](myunderline,Leon.emphasis)InthislattertextSt.Thomashimselfclarifiesthatthefirsttextreferredtotheintellectuminactu,andnotsimplytotheresintellecta.Cf.InMet.12,lect.11,2620.

380InIIIDeAnima3,78-82:“Ipsaenimscientiaspeculativaetsicscibile,idestscibileinactu,idemest.Speciesigiturreiintellectaeinactu,estspeciesipsiusintellectus;etsicpereamseipsumintelligerepotest.”(Leon.emphasis)Cf.InMet.12,lect.8,2539:“Foranintellectbecomesintelligiblebyreasonofthefactthatitapprehendssomethingintelligible.Hence,sincetheintellect

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thingknownistheform(“species”assubjectiveactuality)oftheintellectitself,bymeansof

thisspecies(representation)ofthethingalreadyunderstood(“reiintellectae”)theintellect

cansubsequentlyknowitself(“seipsumintelligerepotest”).ForAquinas,thefirstobjectof

humanunderstandingisnottheintellectitself,butthenatureofcorporealthings,anditis

bytheknowledgeofthemthattheintellectbecomesintelligibleinactand,thus,objectof

itsownunderstanding.381

3.2.Species,IdentityandAlterity

Letusnowexaminesometextsabouttheroleofthespeciesconcerningthe

aforementioned.Indoingso,wearetryingtoemphasizethat,forAquinas,thereisa

distinctionbetweenspeciesandobjectofknowledge.Identityinknowingreferstothe

species,whereasalterityreferstotheobject.Thattheobjectisnotthephantasmbuta

universalcontentabstractedfromitsindividualconditionsinmatterhasalreadybeen

discussed.382

becomesintelligiblebyconceivingsomeintelligibleobject,itfollowsthattheintellectanditsintelligibleobjectarethesame.”[Fitenimintellectusintelligibilisperhocquodattingitaliquodintelligibile.Etideo,cumipseintellectusfiatintelligibilisconcipiendoaliquodintelligibile,sequeturquodidemsitintellectusetintelligibile.]

381Thefactthatitisalreadyanimmaterialreality(andsoinact,inasense)doesnottakeawaythefactthatthehumanintellectisinpotencyregardingitsproperact(beforethesubjectunderstandssomething,thehumanintellectistabularasa)andthereforetheintellectcannotbeknowninitself,becausewhatisknownisknowninsofarasitisinact.Therealityoftheintellectbeforethesubjectunderstandsisimmaterial,andsoitcouldbeintelligibleforsomeonewhoseobjectofunderstandingistheseparatesubstances.Butourintellectiscompletelypotential,anditismovedtounderstandbyanagentobject(thenatureofcorporealthings):onlythendoesitpassfrompotencytoactofunderstanding,andsobecomesactualandintelligibleforus.Inotherwords,thepresenceoftheintellecttoitself,whileitisinpotencyofunderstanding,doesnotproduceknowledgeofitself,becausewhatisinpotencycannotbeknownassuch,norbeanagentobject.Cf.InMet.12,lect.8,2539,justquoted.ForotherstudiedtextsinsupportofourinterpretationoftheAristotelianidentity,comingfromInMetaphysicorum,seeAppendix,Note11.

382Cf.Chapter1,sections2and3.

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ForAquinas,thespeciesisprincipiumquo(nottheobject)ofknowing,forboth

senseandintellect.Forexample:“Theintelligiblespeciesistotheintellectwhatthe

sensibleimageistothesense.Butthesensibleimageisnotwhatisperceived,butrather

thatbywhichsenseperceives.Thereforetheintelligiblespeciesisnotwhatisactually

understood,butthatbywhichtheintellectunderstands.”383Principiumquomeansthatthe

speciesisaformorperfectionbywhichacertainoperationisaccomplishedormadereal.384

Similarlyin89,6,c.,intalkingabouttheactofunderstandingintheseparatesoul,the

speciesisclearlyprincipiumquoandnottheobject:

Actionofferstwothingsforourconsideration—itsspeciesanditsmode.Itsspeciescomesfromtheobject,wheretothefacultyofknowledgeisdirectedbythe(intelligible)species,whichistheobject'ssimilitude;whereasthemodeisgatheredfromthepoweroftheagent.Thusthatapersonseeastoneisduetothespeciesofthestoneinhiseye;butthatheseeitclearly,isduetotheeye'svisualpower.385

38385,2,sc.:“Speciesintelligibilissehabetadintellectum,sicutspeciessensibilisadsensum.

Sedspeciessensibilisnonestilludquodsentitur,sedmagisidquosensussentit.Ergospeciesintelligibilisnonestquodintelligituractu,sedidquointelligitintellectus.”Thisdistinctionbetweenspeciesandobjectcanbeseeninothertextsaswell:cf.DeVer2,3,ad2,ad3andad10;CGII,75,par.7and9;Q.D.DeAnima,a.2,ad5;Q.D.DeAnima,a.3,ad7;DeSpirit.Creat.,a.9,ad6;DeSpirit.Creat.,a.10,ad12.(seeAppendix,Note12).

384Cf.85,2,c.:“Thereisatwofoldaction(Metaph.ix),onewhichremainsintheagent;forinstance,toseeandtounderstand;andanotherwhichpassesintoanexternalobject;forinstance,toheatandtocut;andeachoftheseactionsproceedsinvirtueofsomeform[…]Hencethatbywhichthesightseesisthelikenessofthevisiblething;andthelikenessofthethingunderstood,thatis,theintelligiblespecies,istheformbywhichtheintellectunderstands.”[Cumenimsitduplexactio,sicutdiciturIXMetaphys.,unaquaemanetinagente,utvidereetintelligere,alteraquaetransitinremexteriorem,utcalefacereetsecare;utraquefitsecundumaliquamformam(…)Undesimilitudoreivisibilisestsecundumquamvisusvidet;etsimilitudoreiintellectae,quaeestspeciesintelligibilis,estformasecundumquamintellectusintelligit.]

38589,6,c.:“Inactuestduoconsiderare,scilicetspeciemactus,etmodumipsius.Etspeciesquidemactusconsideraturexobiectoinquodactuscognoscitivaevirtutisdirigiturperspeciem,quaeestobiectisimilitudo,sedmodusactuspensaturexvirtuteagentis.Sicutquodaliquisvideatlapidem,contingitexspecielapidisquaeestinoculo,sedquodacutevideat,contingitexvirtutevisivaoculi.”

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Thespeciesistherealactoftheintellectasoperativepotencyand,becauseofthis,

itisthespeciesthatcanmaketheintellectanobjectofknowinginitself:“[Theintellect]

understandsitselfaccordingasitismadeactualbythespeciesabstractedfromsensible

things,throughthelightoftheactiveintellect,whichnotonlyactuatestheintelligible

thingsthemselves,butalso,bytheirinstrumentality,actuatesthepassiveintellect.”386This

takesustotheimportantdifferenceinthespeciesbetweenwhatitisandwhatit

representsasimage.Thespeciesmakestheintellectintelligibleinactbecauseofwhatthe

speciesisinitself387but,asimage,thespeciesmakesknowndirectlytherepresented

object.Thatiswhy,forSt.Thomas,thespeciesinitselfisknownonlyinasecondmoment,

byreflection:“Butsincetheintellectreflectsuponitself,bysuchreflectionitunderstands

bothitsownactofintelligence,andthespeciesbywhichitunderstands.Thusthe

intelligiblespeciesisthatwhichisunderstoodsecondarily;butthatwhichisprimarily

understoodistheobject,ofwhichthespeciesisthelikeness.”388Theendofthecorpus

reinforcesthesamepoint,thatthespeciesisaforminthesoul(realbeing)thatmakesus

knowthethingoutsidethesoul(intentionalbeing):

Thisalsoappearsfromtheopinionoftheancientphilosophers,whosaidthat‘likeisknownbylike.’Fortheysaidthatthesoulknowstheearthoutsideitself,bytheearthwithinitself;andsooftherest.If,therefore,wetakethespeciesoftheearthinsteadoftheearth,accordingtoAristotle(DeAnimaiii,8),whosays‘thatastoneis

38687,1,c.:“Consequensestutsicseipsumintelligatintellectusnoster,secundumquodfit

actuperspeciesasensibilibusabstractasperlumenintellectusagentis,quodestactusipsorumintelligibilium,eteismediantibusintellectuspossibilis.”

387Cf.InMet.12,lect.8,2539(quotedonp.158atfootnote380)andfootnote381.38885,2,c.:“Sedquiaintellectussupraseipsumreflectitur,secundumeandemreflexionem

intelligitetsuumintelligere,etspeciemquaintelligit.Etsicspeciesintellectasecundarioestidquodintelligitur.Sedidquodintelligiturprimo,estrescuiusspeciesintelligibilisestsimilitudo.”

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notinthesoul,butonlythelikenessofthestone’;itfollowsthatthesoulknowsexternalthingsbymeansofitsintelligiblespecies.389

Knowingisofthethingsoutsidethesoul,notofthespecies:“Thereforeifwhatwe

understandismerelytheintelligiblespeciesinthesoul,itwouldfollowthateveryscience

wouldnotbeconcernedwithobjectsoutsidethesoul,butonlywiththeintelligiblespecies

withinthesoul.”390

Thefollowingtexthasalreadybeenquoted,butitalsoshowshowtherealpresence

ofthespeciesinthemindisperfectlycompatibleforAquinaswiththereferencetothe

thingoutsidethemind.Thethingisinthemindbymeansofthespecies:“Itfollowsof

necessitythatthissomethingextrinsic,whichistheobjectofthesoul'soperation,mustbe

relatedtothesoulinatwofoldmanner.First,inasmuchasthissomethingextrinsichasa

naturalaptitudetobeunitedtothesoul,andtobebyitslikenessinthesoul.”391

Significantly,itisthethingthatisinthemind,andnotthemindinthething,whichisthe

characteristicofthesecundaratioaccordingtowhichthemindiscomparedtotheexternal

thing.

38985,2,c.:“Ethocetiampatetexantiquorumopinione,quiponebantsimilesimilicognosci.

Ponebantenimquodanimaperterramquaeinipsaerat,cognosceretterramquaeextraipsamerat;etsicdealiis.Siergoaccipiamusspeciemterraelocoterrae,secundumdoctrinamAristotelis,quidicitquodlapisnonestinanima,sedspecieslapidis;sequeturquodanimaperspeciesintelligibilescognoscatresquaesuntextraanimam.”This“doublebeing”ofthespecies,i.e.,itsrealbeingassubjectivemodificationandits“representative”being,canbeseeninothertexts:cf.DeVer2,3,ad9;InBoet.DeTrin.5,2,c.;Q.D.DeAnima,a.2,ob.7(seeAppendix,Note13).

39085,2,c.:“Siigitureaquaeintelligimusessentsolumspeciesquaesuntinanima,sequereturquodscientiaeomnesnonessentderebusquaesuntextraanimam,sedsolumdespeciebusintelligibilibusquaesuntinanima…”

39178,1,c.:“Necesseestextrinsecamrem,quaeestobiectumoperationisanimae,secundumduplicemrationemadanimamcomparari.Unomodo,secundumquodnataestanimaeconiungietinanimaessepersuamsimilitudinem.”

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Knowing,ifnotbyidentity,canbesaidtobebylikeness.392Butthislikenessimplies

preciselythedistinctionbetweenknowerandknown;likenessimpliesa“formal”oneness,

notasubstantialone.393Inthefollowingtext,forexample,thematerialthings,evidently

differentfromtheknower,arethemainobject.Moreover,knowingdoesnotimplya

physicallikeness,asthenaturalphilosopherssupposed.Inthecaseofourknowingof

materialthings,knowingimplies,instead,adistinctionbetweenthemodeofbeingofthe

knowninthemind(“similitudinibus…aphantasmatibusabstractis”)andoutsidethemind

(“materialia”).Inknowingthereisalikenessbecausethesameperfectionispresent,but

notinaphysicalway:itispresentbymeansofaspecies,whichisnottheknownbuta

likenessoftheknown.

Thelikenessofnatureisnotasufficientcauseofknowledge;otherwisewhatEmpedoclessaidwouldbetrue—thatthesoulneedstohavethenatureofallin

392Attheconclusionofthissectionwewillseeinwhatsensewecouldstillspeakaboutan

identityinknowing(namelyasintentionalidentity).Iprefernottospeakaboutidentityasaprimordialcharacteristicofknowinginsofarasidentitymeans(ingeneralandinthetextoftheAristotelianidentity)anontologicaloneness.Aswehaveseen,inhumanknowingthepriority,phenomenologicallyspeakingandforAquinas,belongstoalterity,insofarasthe(ontological)identitybetweenthespeciesandtheintellectisthemeansbywhichthismoreoriginalidentity-in-alterityisexplained.Inotherwords,identitycomestoexplainthepresenceoftheotherinthesubject.AssuggestsGillesMongeau(TSTprofessor),“likeness”refersto(theperfectionof)theobjectaspresentbythespecies,and“identity”tothespeciesasperfectingtheintellect;knowingbylikenessandnotbyidentitymeans,therefore,thatwhatispropertoknowingisnotthatweareonethingwithourspecies(realidentity),butthattheobject(originallyother)ispresenttousbymeansofitsspecies.

393By“formal”onenessIsimplymeanhere“intentional.”SeemyremarksonKnasas’“numerical”identityonp.40ff.Theintentionalidentitycouldbecalled“numerical”inawidesense,insofarasthereisnodistinctionbetweencontentofknowingandthethingthatisknown;anditcouldbealsocalled“formal”identity,againinawidesense,insofarasthereisacertaindistinctionbetweenthethingitself(whichisnotinthemindinitsrealbeing)andthecontentinitscognitivemodeofbeing.Butbecausebothwordsexpressimperfectlythephenomenonofknowing,“intentional”seemstobethebestwordtoindicatethisidentity-in-alterity.ThisiswhyIthinkthatthephenomenonofknowing(theintentionalidentity)cannotbereducedto(meta)physicalcategories,suchas“formal”or“numerical”identity.

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ordertoknowall.Butknowledgerequiresthatthelikenessofthethingknownbeintheknower,asakindofformthereof.Nowourpassiveintellect,inthepresentstateoflife,issuchthatitcanbeinformedwithsimilitudesabstractedfromphantasms:andthereforeitknowsmaterialthingsratherthanimmaterialsubstances.394

Thespecies,eveninthecaseofthesecondintellectualoperation,isneveran

objectiveintermediarythatwouldblockthewaytotheextra-mentalreality.395Thepointis

worthnotingbecause,inthecaseofjudgment,whatisrepresentedisactuallynotinreality

assuch;thatis,theaffirmationisanactofthemindthatisnotfoundinreality.396Still,

becausetheaffirmationreferstoreality,theenunciationsalsorefertorealitythroughthe

species,andnotprimarilytothespeciesthemselves.Thisisanotherindicationthat,forSt.

Thomas,thedirectcontactwithrealitydoesnotneedtorelyonarealidentitywiththe

known.Rather,itisthemediationofthespeciesthatensuresthecontactwithreality.

Inthefollowingpassage,thedistinctionbetweentheknown(eaquaecognoscit)and

thespeciesbywhichitisknown(eaquibus)isclear,anditcanalsobeseenthatthe

39488,1ad2:“Dicendumquodsimilitudonaturaenonestratiosufficiensadcognitionem,

alioquinoporteretdicerequodEmpedoclesdixit,quodanimaessetdenaturaomnium,adhocquodomniacognosceret.Sedrequirituradcognoscendum,utsitsimilitudoreicognitaeincognoscentequasiquaedamformaipsius.Intellectusautemnosterpossibilis,secundumstatumpraesentisvitae,estnatusinformarisimilitudinibusrerummaterialiumaphantasmatibusabstractis,etideocognoscitmagismaterialiaquamsubstantiasimmateriales.”Here,thatwhichhasbeendiscussedinChapter1regardingtheformalobjectofintelligenceisveryclear.Thespeciesisalikenessofthematerialthings(becauseitisalikenessoftheirnature)andatthesametimeitisabstractedfrommatter(theintelligiblespeciesthatinformstheintellectisnotthephantasm).Thespeciesisnotareferenceoftheintellecttothephantasm,butalikenessofthequidditasofthatphantasm.Theconversiowillthereforebethereferenceoftheabstractedspecies(asactofthepossibleintellect)tothephantasm.

395Cf.85,2ad3;85,5,sc.FabrodistinguishesbetweenthespeciesofDemocritus(objective–objective:perceptionisreducedtoaphysicalrelationshipandcausalitybetweenobjectandfaculty,cf.PP40-44),thespeciesofidealism(subjective–subjective:thesubjectknowsonlyhisorhersubjectivemodification)andtheThomisticspecies(subjective–objective:arealmodificationinthesubjectthatmakesintentionallypresenttheperfectionoftheobject).Cf.PP463-476,especiallypage472.

396Cf.DeVeritate,q.1,a.3c..

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distinctionbetweenthemodeofbeingofthespeciesandthemodeofbeingoftheknown

isnotanobstacletotheobjectivityofknowing:

ThesewordsofAugustinearetobeunderstoodasreferringtothemediumofintellectualknowledge,andnottoitsobject.Fortheintellectknowsbodiesbyunderstandingthem,notindeedthroughbodies,northroughmaterialandcorporealspecies;butthroughimmaterialandintelligiblespecies,whichcanbeinthesoulbytheirownessence.397

Thefactthatmanythingscanbeknownbymeansofonespecies398isanotherway

tosaythat,inthespecies,thereisadifferencebetweenitsrealbeing(one)andwhatit

represents(inthiscase,themany).Becausetheintellectisone,andthespeciesisreally-

subectivelyperfectiveofthatintellect,therecanbenomorethanonespeciesatagiven

time.Butthesamedoesnotapplytotheobject,atleastnotforthesamereason.Again,

whatisunderstoodisnotthespeciesinitsidentitywiththeintellect,butthethingitself

throughthespecies.

In84,7,thereasonfortheconversioadphantasmataisthereferenceofthe

intelligiblespeciestothematerialthingoutsidethemind.IntheAdUnum,wecanseeagain

39784,1ad1:“DicendumquodverbumAugustiniestintelligendumquantumadeaquibus

intellectuscognoscit,nonautemquantumadeaquaecognoscit.Cognoscitenimcorporaintelligendo,sednonpercorpora,nequepersimilitudinesmaterialesetcorporeas;sedperspeciesimmaterialesetintelligibiles,quaepersuiessentiaminanimaessepossunt.”

398Cf.85,4,c.:“Theintellectcan,indeed,understandmanythings[asaunity],butnotasmany:thatistosaybyonebutnotbymanyintelligiblespecies.Forthemodeofeveryactionfollowstheformwhichistheprincipleofthataction.Thereforewhateverthingstheintellectcanunderstandunderonespecies,itcanunderstandatthesametime[…]Thereforeitisimpossibleforoneandthesameintellecttobeperfectedatthesametimebydifferentintelligiblespeciessoasactuallytounderstanddifferentthings.”[Intellectusquidempotestmultaintelligerepermodumunius,nonautemmultapermodummultorum,dicoautempermodumuniusvelmultorum,perunamvelpluresspeciesintelligibiles.Nammoduscuiusqueactionisconsequiturformamquaeestactionisprincipium.Quaecumqueergointellectuspotestintelligeresubunaspecie,simulintelligerepotest(…)Impossibileestergoquodidemintellectussimulperficiaturdiversisspeciebusintelligibilibus,adintelligendumdiversainactu.]

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adoubleaspectinthespecies.Oneaspectallowspresenceandpossession,insofarasthe

speciesiskeptinthepossibleintellect(identity).Anotheraspectallowsobjectivity,insofar

asitrepresentsthenaturessubsistingintheparticular(alterity).Thetextsays:“Weneed

furthertomakeuseoftheminamannerbefittingthethingsofwhichtheyarethespecies,

whichthingsarenaturesexistinginindividuals.”399

“Species”maysometimesrefermoretotheobjectthantotheimageinits

subjectivebeing:

Inthesamewaythesensibleformisconditioneddifferentlyinthethingwhichisexternaltothesoul,andinthesenseswhichreceivetheformsofsensiblethingswithoutreceivingmatter,suchasthecolorofgoldwithoutreceivinggold.Soalsotheintellect,accordingtoitsownmode,receivesunderconditionsofimmaterialityandimmobility,thespeciesofmaterialandmobilebodies:forthereceivedisinthereceiveraccordingtothemodeofthereceiver.400

Inthefollowingtext,also,theword“species”in“naturamspeciei”refersto

somethingrealinthethingwhereas,in“speciemintelligibilem,”thesamewordhasthe

meaningofformoftheintellect.Thespeciesasformoftheintellectisrepresentativeofthe

universalnaturesubsistentintheparticular,asthephantasmisrepresentativeofthe

individualprinciplesofthesamething:“Thisiswhatwemeanbyabstractingtheuniversal

fromtheparticular,ortheintelligiblespeciesfromthephantasm;thatis,byconsideringthe

39984,7ad1:“…oportetquodeis[speciesconservataeinintellectupossibili]utamur

secundumquodconvenitrebusquarumsuntspecies,quaesuntnaturaeinparticularibusexistentes.”

40084,1,c.:“Etperhuncetiammodumformasensibilisaliomodoestinrequaeestextraanimam,etaliomodoinsensu,quisuscipitformassensibiliumabsquemateria,sicutcoloremaurisineauro.Etsimiliterintellectusspeciescorporum,quaesuntmaterialesetmobiles,recipitimmaterialiteretimmobiliter,secundummodumsuum,namreceptumestinrecipientepermodumrecipientis.”

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natureofthespeciesapartfromitsindividualqualitiesrepresentedbythephantasms.”401

SimilarlyintheAdTertium:

Thisisdonebythepoweroftheactiveintellectwhichbyturningtowardsthephantasmproducesinthepassiveintellectacertainlikenesswhichrepresents,astoitsspecificconditionsonly,thethingreflectedinthephantasm.Itisthusthattheintelligiblespeciesissaidtobeabstractedfromthephantasm…402

Thisinterpretationoftheword“species”here,however,couldbeconsidered

questionable.Therefore,animportantclarificationisinorder.Ashasbeenshown,the

speciesorsimilitudoiscertainlycalledquodintelligiturandintellectuminactubyAquinas.

WhatAquinasmeansisnotthattheintellectknowsitsownsubjectiveperfection,butthatit

knowsthenatureofthecorporealthinginsofarasitispresentinanintelligiblemodeof

beinginthespecies.Inotherwords,thespeciesisquodintelligiturinsofarasitisthenature

understood(intellectum)inamodeofbeingproportionatetothefaculty(inactu,i.e.,inact

ofbeingintelligible).Forthesamereason,theobjectofintelligenceseems,atleastinthe

twoprevioustexts,tobecalledspeciesintelligibilis.WhatAquinasmeansisnotthatwe

knowthespeciesassubjectivemodification,butthatweknowthespeciesofthething(=

therealnaturesubsistinginthething)inanintelligiblemodeofbeing.403Inanycase,and

40185,1ad1:“Ethocestabstrahereuniversaleaparticulari,velspeciemintelligibilema

phantasmatibus,considerarescilicetnaturamspecieiabsqueconsiderationeindividualiumprincipiorum,quaeperphantasmatarepraesentantur.”

40285,1ad3:“Sedvirtuteintellectusagentisresultatquaedamsimilitudoinintellectupossibiliexconversioneintellectusagentissupraphantasmata,quaequidemestrepraesentativaeorumquorumsuntphantasmata,solumquantumadnaturamspeciei.Etperhuncmodumdiciturabstrahispeciesintelligibilisaphantasmatibus…”

403StumpalsoacknowledgesasimilartensioninAquinas’useof“species”,particularlyinsensibleknowing:“Itisimportanttoemphasizethatasensiblespeciesisnotitselfwhatissensed.Insteaditisthemeansbywhichthesensessenseextramentalthings.Thereisroomforconfusionhere,becauseAquinasdoestalkaboutthesensorypowerapprehendingthesensiblespecies,andlocutionsofthissortcangivethemistakenimpressionthatwhatthesensessense,onAquinas’s

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hopefullyenoughevidencehasbeenofferedforthis,Aquinasdoesnotconfuseobjectwith

species,hedeniesexplicitlythattheobjectofknowingisthespecies,andhedoesnot

explaintheAristotelianidentityasanidentitybetweenknowingsubjectandwhatis

understood(object),butasanidentitybetweenknowingsubjectandthespeciesasa

perfectiveform(intellectuminactuinthesenseexplained,notsimplyintellectum).

Itcouldbeobjectedthatsuchanaccountdoesnotrelysomuchonthewordsof

Aquinasasitdoesontheinterpretationofthewords.Thisisexactlythepoint.Thewordsof

Aquinascanbeusedinanysense(ashasbeendoneforcenturiesevenwiththeBible).But

aninterpretationofhiswordsmustlookfortheunitythatwasinhismind.Itwouldbevery

difficulttosubstantiateaclaimthatAquinaschangeshismindinthespaceoffifteen

questionsoftheSumma.Granted,then,thathemaintainsthesameEpistemologyallthe

waythrough,itisnecessarytolookforcoherenceinhisstatements.Explicitstatements

needtobeusedtoclarifythemoreobscure.If,then,Aquinasdoesnotexplicitlydenythat

whichheexplicitlyaffirmsseveraltimes,andifhismoreobscuretextsfindaplausible

explanation,wemayhaveahumanhopeofreachinghismind.Thatahumanworkis

perfectibleandevenfallibleshouldnotmakeusshyawayfromofferingthefruitsofour

work.

AfinalremarkontheimportanceoftheintellectualcognitivespeciesinAquinas

wouldnotbeoutofplace.Althoughtheintellectisaparticipationoftheuncreatedlight,in

which(intheuncreatedlight)theeternalreasonsarecontained,westillneedspecies

view,isinfactthesensiblespecies,contrarytowhatIjustclaimed”(cf.Stump,249);andshequotesAquinas:“Tocognizethingsbymeansoftheirsimilitudesexistinginthecognizeristocognizethosethingsastheyareinthemselves,orintheirownnatures”(cf.256,innote:STIa.12.9).

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comingfromthecorporealthingsinordertoknowthem.Thespeciesisthusessentialin

Thomisticgnoseology,anditisnottobeconfoundedwiththelightoftheintellect:“But

sincebesidestheintellectuallightwhichisinus,intelligiblespecies,whicharederivedfrom

things,arerequiredinorderforustohaveknowledgeofmaterialthings;thereforethis

sameknowledgeisnotduemerelytoaparticipationoftheeternaltypes…”404Wewilllater

discussmoreextensivelythispassage.405

Itseemsclear,then,thatforAquinastheidentityintheAristotelianphrase

“intellectuminactuestintellectusinactu”isreferredtothespeciesinitssubjective,real

beingasactoftheintellect,andnottotheobject,asifitwereanidentityofknowerand

known.Itistheidentitybetweenoperativepotencyanditsownformaquo,thelatter

carefullydistinguishedbySt.Thomasfromtheobject(formaquod).

Ifacertainidentitywiththeobjectitselfweretobeaffirmed,itshouldbefirstofall

clearlydistinguishedfromarealidentity(theonenessinsubstance,orinthenaturalbeing);

then,itshouldbeestablishedonthebasisofthespeciesaslikeness(andsoonthebasisof

acertainformalorqualitativeoneness);finally,itcouldbecalledan“intentionalidentity,”

providedthattheterms“natural”and“intentional”areclearlydistinguished(asinDe

Veritate)andthattheword“intentional”impliesthemoreoriginalalterityoftheobject.

ThebestformulatospeakaboutthisidentitysecundumquidisalsoAristotelian,andSt.

Thomasembracesit:“animaestquodammodoomnia.”Thesoulcanbeallthings,atleastin

40484,5,c.:“Quiatamenpraeterlumenintellectualeinnobis,exigunturspeciesintelligibiles

arebusacceptae,adscientiamderebusmaterialibushabendam;ideononpersolamparticipationemrationumaeternarumderebusmaterialibusnotitiamhabemus…”

405Cf.Chapter4,section2.

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asense,insofarasbyknowingthemitbecomestheotherthings,itdoesreceivetheir

perfection.Butbecausethatperfectionisnotreceivedsubjectively,thatis,becausethe

becomingisnot“real”,theidentityisquodammodo,onlyinacertainsense.406Whenwesay

“intentionally,”Isuggest,wedonotsaymuchmorethanthis,norareweabletosaymuch

more.407

ItisnotuncommontofindacertainconfusioninThomismbetweentheAristotelian

“intellectusinactuestintellectuminactu”andtheintentionalidentitybetweenobjectand

subject.408InthecaseofGilson,suchconfusionappearstobeattheleveloftextual

interpretationonly;GilsonusestheAristotelianphrasetoindicatetheintentionalidentity

betweenknowerandknown,butatthesametimehedistinguishestheintentional

presenceoftheobjectfromitssubjective-realbeing.409Hesaysthattheidentitybetween

theactualityofsubjectandobjectisnotnumerical,butformal.Itisnotnumerical,because

thebeingofeachthinginitselfispreservedwhenweknow(alterityinknowing).Itisformal

because,forGilson,thereisnootheridentitybetweentheformoftheobjectitselfandof

theobjectasknown.Thisformalidentityisactuallytheidentitybetweenthespeciesas

suchandthethingitself.Now,thisidentityisnottheAristotelianidentity,firstlybecause406ThefollowingtextinInDeAnimaputstogetherbeautifullythesetwo“identities.”InIIDe

Anima12,76-79:“Now,allknowledgeimpliesthatthethingknownissomehowpresentintheknower,thatis,presentbyitssimilitude.Theknowerinact,infact,isthethingknowninact.”(mytrans.)[Cognitioautemomnisfitperhoc,quodcognitumestaliquomodoincognoscente,scilicetsecundumsimilitudinem.Namcognoscensinactu,estipsumcognituminactu.]Theknowerpossessesinacertainsensetheknown,becausetherepresentationoftheknownisreallyonewiththeknower.

407ForaninterestingtextinwhichSt.Thomasspeaksaboutthisintentionalidentitywithoutquodammodo,cf.InIIIDeAnima6,297-305(seeAppendix,Note14).

408AsimilaruseoftheAristotelianphrasetoindicateanidentitybetweensubjectandobjectcanbeseeninCromp,37.

409Cf.RM56-57.

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thelatterisnumerical(asapotencyisonewithitsownact)andsecondlybecausethis

identityisnotbetweenthespeciesandtheobjectinitsrealbeing,butbetweentheintellect

inactandtheabstractedspecies.Still,isthisformalidentityenoughtoexpressthe

intentionalpresenceoftheobjecttothesubject,andisthisformalidentitynotmakingof

thespeciesanobjectiveintermediarybetweentheintellectandthethingitself(i.e.,

somethingtobeknownfirst,beforethethingitself,andnotsomethingthatmakesknown

immediatelythethingitself,asSt.Thomassuggests)?410Postulatingasimplyformalidentity

betweenthespeciesandtheobjectinitsrealbeingmayleadtotheproblemofthebridge

andtoconsideringtruthasacopyofreality.

4)KnowingasReceptive

Atthispoint,itmaynotbeoutofplacetorecalltheaimofthisresearch.Ithasbeen

importanttoclarifyinwhatsenseAquinasspeaksofidentityandalterityinknowing,in

ordertoshowthat,forhim,intellectualknowingisnottoprovideintelligiblecontenttothe

object,buttoreceiveitfromtheobject;thatis,knowingisabeingperfectedbya

410Cf.Gilson,Thomisme:IntroductionalaPhilosophiedeSaintThomasd’Aquin,Cinquième

ÉditionRevueetAugmentée,Paris:Vrin,1944,p.320inBerger,36:“Itiscrucialtounderstandthatitisnotthatthespeciesofanobjectisonething,andtheobjectitselfanotherthing;thespeciesistheobjectitselfasspecies,thatis,theobjectconsideredinitsactionandinitsefficacywhichitexercisesonasubject.Onlyinthissensecanitbesaidthatitisnotthespeciesoftheobjectthatwhichispresentinthinking,buttheobjectitselfthroughitsspecies;andinthesamewaythattheobject’sformistheobject’sactiveanddeterminantprinciple,itisalsotheobject’sformwhichbecomes,byitsspecies,theintellectthatunderstandsit”(myemphasis).AsIhavesuggestedintheIntroduction,itseemstomethatagreaterdistinctionbetweencontentandmodeofbeingofthecontentcouldhavemadethingsmoreclear:thespeciesistheobjectinsofarasitrepresentsit,anditisnottheobjectinsofarasitisasubjectivemodificationofthesubject.Myworryisthattheagency(“efficace”)inGilsonisnottheintentionalagencyoftheagentobject(thespeciesimpressa)onthepossibleintellect,butacertain“real”causalityoftheobjectinitselfontheintellect,wheretheobjectproducessomethingsimilartoitself(therepresentation).

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perfectionbelongingtotheobjectandlackinginthesubject.Theagentintellectthen,ifitis

toprovideanintelligibilityofsomesort,itwillbeintherealmofwhathasbeencalled

intelligibilityasmodeofbeing,notascontent.Thatwhichshouldalsobeclearisthereason

forstressingtheinterpretationoftheAristotelianidentityinAquinasasanidentity,not

betweenintellectandobject,butbetweenintellectandspecies;ifthesubjectiveperfection

oftheintellect(intellectusinactu)andtheperfectionoftheobjectascontentwerethe

same,thatis,ifunderstandingitselfweretheformoftheknown,itwouldbepossibleto

considerintelligibilityasaneffectoftheintellect,andtoascribetotheagentintellectthis

activefunction.Now,because,forAquinas,theperfectionoftheknownascontentisits

own,the“materiaprima”whichisactualizedwiththeformoftheknownisthepossible

intellect.Theagentintellectperfectsthephantasmwithintelligibilityasamodeofbeing,

butthisisaconditionofpossibilityofknowing,notknowingitself,andthisimpliesthatthe

contentisalreadypresentinthematerialthing,andisdistinctfromitsindividual

conditions.411

Thepresentsectionisdevotedtothosetextsinwhichknowing(bothingeneraland

asintellectual)ispresentedasakindofreceiving.Thispresentationofknowingasreceiving

willreinforcetheideaofalterityasacharacteristicofknowing,aswellastheideathat

understandingcannotbeidentifiedwiththeactivityoftheagentintellect;andasa

consequence,thenotionofknowingasabeingperfected,andnotaperfectingactivity.That

theagentintellectisnotaformalbutametaphysicalapriorimeans,infact,thattheagent

intellectisnotresponsiblefortheperfectionoftheknownascontent,butratherallowsthis

411Cf.Chapter1.

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perfectionoftheknowntobeintentionallyperfectiveoftheknower(initspossible

intellect).

TheintellectischaracterizedfromthebeginningofAquinas’treatiseonhuman

beingasareceptivepotency:“Nowthereceptivepotentialityintheintellectualsoulisother

thanthereceptivepotentialityoffirstmatter,asappearsfromthediversityofthethings

receivedbyeach.Forprimarymatterreceivesindividualforms;whereastheintelligence

receivesabsoluteforms.”412

Thecomparisonwiththemateriaprimadeservessomeattention,asthereareboth

similaritiesanddifferences.In84,3,Aquinasisdenyingthatweknowbymeansofinnate

ideas.Thesecondobjectionsays:“Theintellectualsoulismoreexcellentthancorporeal

primarymatter.ButprimarymatterwascreatedbyGodundertheformstowhichithas

potentiality.ThereforemuchmoreistheintellectualsoulcreatedbyGodunderintelligible

species.Andsothesoulunderstandscorporealthingsthroughinnatespecies.”413The

41275,5ad1:“Estautemaliapotentiareceptivainanimaintellectiva,apotentiareceptiva

materiaeprimae,utpatetexdiversitatereceptorum,nammateriaprimarecipitformasindividuales,intellectusautemrecipitformasabsolutas.”ThesenseinwhichAquinasspeaksaboutpassivityinhumanknowingcanbetakenfromInIIDeAnima11,109-117(quotedonp.144atfootnote349);cf.InIDeAnima10,202-208:“In[theactoftheintellect]thereisnomovementofthematerialsubstance,asinthecaseofvegetativeactivities,norevenanyalterationof[amaterial]subject,asinthecaseofsense-awareness.Thereisonlyanactivitywhichiscalledmovementsimplybecausethemindgoesfrompotencyintoact.”[Naminoperationeintellectusnonestmutatiosecundumessenaturale,sicutestinvegetabili,necsubiectumnaturalequodimmutetur,sicutestinsensibili.Sedestibiipsaoperatio,quaequodammododiciturmotus,inquantumdeintelligenteinpotentiafitintelligensinactu.];InIIDeAnima11,173-179;Q.D.DeAnima,a.6,c.:“Toreceive,tobeasubject,andotherthingsofthissort,arenotfoundinthesoulandinprimematterinthesamespecificway.”[Recipereetsubjicietaliahuiusmodinonsecundumeamdemrationemconveniuntanimaeetmateriaeprimae.];Q.D.DeAnima,a.6,ad5(thelasttwoquotesalsoinLambert,87-88).

41384,3ob.2:“Animaintellectivaestnobiliorquammateriaprimacorporalis.SedmateriaprimaestcreataaDeosubformisadquasestinpotentia.Ergomultomagisanimaintellectivaest

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comparisonisestablishedonthebasisthatbothmatterandintellectarepotenciesof

certainrealperfectiveforms(firstmodeofbeingofDeVeritate).St.Thomasdoesnotdeny

thatthespeciesarerealperfectionsoftheintellect;theyarenot,however,itssubstantial

perfection,butratheraccidentalones.Thecomparisonintheobjectiondoesnotwork:

“Primarymatterhassubstantialbeingthroughitsform,consequentlyithadneedtobe

createdundersomeform:elseitwouldnotbeinact.Butwhenonceitexistsunderone

formitisinpotentialitytoothers.Ontheotherhand,theintellectdoesnotreceive

substantialbeingthroughtheintelligiblespecies;andthereforethereisnocomparison.”414

Again,thedifferencewiththemateriaprimaisnotinthepotentialityregardingtheforms;

St.Thomas,inthisarticle,isdenyingpreciselythattheseformsarealreadypresentinthe

intellect.Thedifferencebetweenmateriaprimaandintellectlieshereinthemetaphysical

“level”oftherealperfectionsthattheyreceive:themateriaprimaisinpotencyto

substantialforms,whereastheintellect,asaccidentaloperativefacultyandalreadyexisting

inasubstantialsubject,canbeinpotencyonlytoaccidentalforms(thespecies);also,the

differenceliesinthefactthatthemateriaprimaisinpotencyofothersubstantialforms,

butitalreadyhasitsown;whereastheintellect,existingalreadyasanaccidentalfaculty,is

inpotencytoallforms,havingoriginallynone.415Finally,itisclearinthearticlethatthe

speciesistherealsubjectiveformbywhichtheknowledgeofcorporealthingsisattained.

creataaDeosubspeciebusintelligibilibus.Etsicanimaintelligitcorporaliaperspeciessibinaturaliterinditas.”

41484,3ad2:“Materiaprimahabetessesubstantialeperformam,etideooportuitquodcrearetursubaliquaforma,alioquinnonessetinactu.Subunatamenformaexistens,estinpotentiaadalias.Intellectusautemnonhabetessesubstantialeperspeciemintelligibilem;etideononestsimile.”

41584,3,sc.:“tabularasa.”

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Thereasonfordenyingtheoriginal(innate)presenceintheintellectofspeciesasformaquo

ofknowingthings,isthefactthatthisknowingitselfisoriginallyinpotency,andtherefore

wearealsoinpotencyofthoseformsbywhichknowingisverified.416Thereisnoconfusion

betweenobjectofknowingandspecies,evenifbotharestrictlyrelated.417

Thecomparisonbetweenintellectandmateriaprimaregardingtheirreceptivity

appearsagainin87,1,c.:“Nowthehumanintellectisonlyapotentialityinthegenusof

intelligiblebeings,justasprimarymatterisapotentialityasregardssensiblebeings;and

henceitiscalled‘possible’.”418Inthisandintheprevioustext,419however,theintellectis

consideredinpotencyofthespeciesassubjectiveform;in75,5ad1,instead,the

potentialityseemsrathertorefertotheformoftheknown(content).Inbothcases,still,it

isclearthattheintellectisinpotencyofknowingotherthingsand,thus,receptiveoftheir

contentaswell.

Intellectandsensibilityareconsidered“apprehensive”faculties.420Inthefollowing

text,theapprehensivefaculty(here“apprehensive”iscognitiveasopposedtoappetitive)is

416Cf.84,3,c..417Moreaboutthisrelationshipwillbesaidinthefollowing,cf.p.182.41887,1,c.:“Intellectusautemhumanussehabetingenerererumintelligibiliumutensin

potentiatantum,sicutetmateriaprimasehabetingenerererumsensibilium,undepossibilisnominatur.”

41984,3.420“Apprehension”orsimilarwordsareusedinothertextsaswell.Cf.80,2,c.:“Indeed,the

passivepoweritselfhasitsverynaturefromitsrelationtoitsactiveprinciple.Therefore,sincewhatisapprehendedbytheintellectandwhatisapprehendedbysensearegenericallydifferent;consequently,theintellectualappetiteisdistinctfromthesensitive.”[…ipsapotentiapassivapropriamrationemhabetexordineadsuumactivum.Quiaigiturestalteriusgenerisapprehensumperintellectumetapprehensumpersensum,consequensestquodappetitusintellectivussitaliapotentiaasensitivo.];83,4,c.,studiedbrieflyinAppendix,Note15.

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broughttoactinthereceptionofsomething.HereSt.Thomaspreferstosayactusrather

thanactio,thelatterreservedfortheappetitiveact:

Fortheactoftheapprehensivepowerisnotsoproperlycalledamovementastheactoftheappetite:sincetheoperationoftheapprehensivepoweriscompletedintheveryfactthatthethingapprehendedisintheonethatapprehends:whiletheoperationoftheappetitivepoweriscompletedinthefactthathewhodesiresisbornetowardsthethingdesirable.421

Buthesaysexactlythesamething,usingthewordsactio–actusintheexact

oppositeway:“Foraswehavesaidabove,theactionoftheintellectconsistsinthis—that

theideaofthethingunderstoodisintheonewhounderstands;whiletheactofthewill

consistsinthis—thatthewillisinclinedtothethingitselfasexistinginitself.”422Inboth

cases,however,heisstressingthatunderstandingisverifiedbythepresenceofthething

understoodinthesubject.

Theword“apprehension”inreferencetoknowingappearsalsointhefollowing

text,423whereitisclearthattoapprehendmeanstheoppositeofpossessingaform

naturally.Theformpossessednaturally(beitaccidental,asafaculty,424orsubstantial)is

followedbyanaturalappetite,whereastheformthatisapprehendedisfollowedbya

differentkindoftendency,whichiscalled“appetitivefaculty.”Thus,itissuggestedagain

thatknowingisreceptiveofaformwhichisnotnaturallyinthesubject:

42181,1,c.:“Actusenimapprehensivaevirtutisnonitapropriediciturmotus,sicutactio

appetitus,namoperatiovirtutisapprehensivaeperficiturinhoc,quodresapprehensaesuntinapprehendente;operatioautemvirtutisappetitivaeperficiturinhoc,quodappetensinclinaturinremappetibilem.”

42282,3,c.:“Utenimsupradictumest,actiointellectusconsistitinhocquodratioreiintellectaeestinintelligente;actusverovoluntatisperficiturinhocquodvoluntasinclinaturadipsamremproutinseest.”

42380,1,c..424Cf.80,1ad3.

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Therefore,asformsexistinthosethingsthathaveknowledgeinahighermannerandabovethemannerofnaturalforms;somusttherebeinthemaninclinationsurpassingthenaturalinclination,whichiscalledthenaturalappetite.Andthissuperiorinclinationbelongstotheappetitivepowerofthesoul,throughwhichtheanimalisabletodesirewhatitapprehends,andnotonlythattowhichitisinclinedbyitsnaturalform.425

Knowingisverifiedbythepossessionofaform,butnotasaformalreadypossessed

naturally.Theintellectisinformed(isperfected)byintelligibleimagesofthingsabstracted

fromthesenses:

Thelikenessofnatureisnotasufficientcauseofknowledge;otherwisewhatEmpedoclessaidwouldbetrue—thatthesoulneedstohavethenatureofallinordertoknowall.Butknowledgerequiresthatthelikenessofthethingknownbeintheknower,asakindofformthereof.Nowourpassiveintellect,inthepresentstateoflife,issuchthatitcanbeinformedwithsimilitudesabstractedfromphantasms:andthereforeitknowsmaterialthingsratherthanimmaterialsubstances.426

Thelanguageofreceptivity,thistimeinexplicitcomparisonwiththeagentintellect,

isalsousedin88,1,c.Inthistext,thedistinctionbetweenpossibleintellectandagent

intellectisasclearasitcanbe:

Aswasshownabove,theactiveintellectisnotaseparatesubstance;butafacultyofthesoul,extendingitselfactivelytothesameobjectstowhichthepassiveintellect

42580,1,c.:“Sicutigiturformaealtiorimodoexistuntinhabentibuscognitionemsupra

modumformarumnaturalium,itaoportetquodineissitinclinatiosupramoduminclinationisnaturalis,quaediciturappetitusnaturalis.Ethaecsuperiorinclinatiopertinetadvimanimaeappetitivam,perquamanimalappeterepotesteaquaeapprehendit,nonsolumeaadquaeinclinaturexformanaturali.”

42688,1ad2:“Similitudonaturaenonestratiosufficiensadcognitionem,alioquinoporteretdicerequodEmpedoclesdixit,quodanimaessetdenaturaomnium,adhocquodomniacognosceret.Sedrequirituradcognoscendum,utsitsimilitudoreicognitaeincognoscentequasiquaedamformaipsius.Intellectusautemnosterpossibilis,secundumstatumpraesentisvitae,estnatusinformarisimilitudinibusrerummaterialiumaphantasmatibusabstractis,etideocognoscitmagismaterialiaquamsubstantiasimmateriales.”Cf.DeVer2,3,ad9.Theword“perfici”orientsusinthesamesense(knowingasreception),forexamplein85,4,c.:“Thereforeitisimpossibleforoneandthesameintellecttobeperfectedatthesametimebydifferentintelligiblespeciessoasactuallytounderstanddifferentthings.”[Impossibileestergoquodidemintellectussimulperficiaturdiversisspeciebusintelligibilibus,adintelligendumdiversainactu.]

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extendsreceptively;because,asisstated,427thepassiveintellectis‘allthingspotentially,’andtheactiveintellectis‘allthingsinact.’Thereforebothintellects,accordingtothepresentstateoflife,extendtomaterialthingsonly,whicharemadeactuallyintelligiblebytheactiveintellect,andarereceivedinthepassiveintellect.428

Inotherplaces,St.Thomasreferstointellectualknowingasakindofvision,

perception,etc..In84,7,c.,preciselyreferringtotheintellect’sconversiontothe

phantasms,hesays:“And,therefore,fortheintellecttounderstandactuallyitsproper

object,itmustofnecessityturntothephantasmsinordertoperceivetheuniversalnature

existingintheindividual.”429Theverb“speculari”isusedinplaceof“intelligere.”Theverb

“percipere”isusedinreferencetounderstandingimmediatelyafterbeingusedforsensible

knowledgein85,2ad2:

427DeAnimaiii,5.42888,1,c.:“Sexto,quiasupraostensumestquodintellectusagensnonestsubstantia

separata,sedvirtusquaedamanimae,adeademactiveseextendens,adquaeseextenditintellectuspossibilisreceptive,quia,utdiciturinIIIDeAnima,intellectuspossibilisestquoestomniafieri,intellectusagensquoestomniafacere.Uterqueergointellectusseextendit,secundumstatumpraesentisvitae,admaterialiasola;quaeintellectusagensfacitintelligibiliaactu,etrecipiunturinintellectupossibili.”ItisinterestingthatSt.Thomasisnotshyofcallingtheactionoftheagentintellect“intelligere”,althoughinahypotheticalstatement,inthetextimmediatelyfollowing:“Henceinthepresentstateoflifewecannotunderstandseparateimmaterialsubstancesinthemselves,eitherbythepassiveorbytheactiveintellect.”[Undesecundumstatumpraesentisvitae,nequeperintellectumpossibilem,nequeperintellectumagentem,possumusintelligeresubstantiasimmaterialessecundumseipsas.]Finally,inwhatotherwaycouldtheactionofanintellectbedescribed?ButfromheretosayingthatunderstandingforSt.Thomasisanactiveperformance,thereisalongdistance.Forlanguageof“receptivity”,cf.alsoQ.D.DeAnima,a.4,ad5:“…[T]hespeciesexistinginthemediumandinthesenseisaparticularandnothingmore.Thepossibleintellect,however,receivesspeciesofahighergenusthanthosepresentintheimagination;becausethepossibleintellectreceivesuniversalspecies,whereastheimaginationcontainsonlyparticularspecies.Thereforewerequireanagentintellectinthecaseofintelligiblethings…”[…speciesinmedioetinsensunonsitnisiparticularis.Intellectusautempossibilisrecipitspeciesalteriusgenerisquamsintinimaginatione;cumintellectuspossibilisrecipiatspeciesuniversales,etimaginationoncontineatnisiparticulares.Etideoinintelligibilibusindigemusintellectuagente…]

42984,7,c.:“Etideonecesseestadhocquodintellectusactuintelligatsuumobiectumproprium,quodconvertatseadphantasmata,utspeculeturnaturamuniversaleminparticulariexistentem.”

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[Wecanseethepointbyacomparisonwiththesenses].Forthesightseesthecoloroftheappleapartfromitssmell[…]butthatitbeperceivedapartfromthesmell,thisisowingtothesight,forasmuchasthefacultyofsightreceivesthelikenessofcolorandnotofsmell.Inlikemannerhumanityunderstoodisonlyinthisorthatman;butthathumanitybeapprehendedwithoutconditionsofindividuality,thatis,thatitbeabstractedandconsequentlyconsideredasuniversal,occurstohumanityinasmuchasitis[perceivedby]theintellect,inwhichthereisalikenessofthespecificnature,butnotoftheprinciplesofindividuality.430

ThefactthatSt.Thomasusestheword“percipere”forbothsensibleandintellectual

knowingisonemoreindicationthatforhimknowingisreceptive,abeingperfected,and

notaperfectingactivity.

Theobjectisthatwhichperfectsthefacultyofknowing:“Theremustneedsbesome

proportionbetweentheobjectandthefacultyofknowledge;suchasoftheactivetothe

passive,andofperfectiontotheperfectible.Hencethatsensibleobjectsofgreatpowerare

notgraspedbythesenses,isduenotmerelytothefactthattheycorrupttheorgan,but

alsototheirbeingimproportionatetothesensitivepower.”431Nothingcanbemoreclear

thanthecharacterizationofknowingingeneralasa“beingperfected”:

Nownothingisreducedfrompotentialitytoactexceptbysomethinginact;asthesenses[are]madeactualbywhatisactuallysensible.Wemustthereforeassignonthepartoftheintellectsomepowertomakethingsactuallyintelligible,by

43085,2ad2:“Ethocpossumusviderepersimileinsensu.Visusenimvidetcolorempomi

sineeiusodore[…]sedquodsitsineodoreperceptus,hocacciditeiexpartevisus,inquantuminvisuestsimilitudocolorisetnonodoris.Similiterhumanitasquaeintelligitur,nonestnisiinhocvelinillohomine,sedquodhumanitasapprehendatursineindividualibusconditionibus,quodestipsamabstrahi,adquodsequiturintentiouniversalitatis,accidithumanitatissecundumquodpercipiturabintellectu,inquoestsimilitudonaturaespeciei,etnonindividualiumprincipiorum.”Cf.84,1,c.,wheresimilarexpressionsoccur(quotedonp.166).

43188,1ad3:“Requirituraliquaproportioobiectiadpotentiamcognoscitivam,utactiviadpassivum,etperfectionisadperfectibile.Undequodexcellentiasensibilianoncapianturasensu,nonsolaratioestquiacorrumpuntorganasensibilia;sedetiamquiasuntimproportionatapotentiissensitivis.”

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abstractionofthespeciesfrommaterialconditions.Andsuchisthenecessityforanactiveintellect.432

Theactoftheintelligenceistheactofapassivepotencyneedinganagentpowerin

ordertobeactualized:“Ourpassiveintellectisreducedfrompotentialitytoactbysome

beinginact,thatis,bytheactiveintellect,whichisapowerofthesoul,aswehavesaid;

andnotbyaseparateintelligence,asproximatecause,althoughperchanceasremote

cause.”433

Thesameideacanbeseenregardingthepossibleintellect(inthefollowingtext),

butheretheword“agent”isreferringmoredirectlytotheintelligiblespecieswhichcanbe

impressedintheintellect:“Nownothingcorporealcanmakeanimpressiononthe

incorporeal.Andthereforeinordertocausetheintellectualoperationaccordingto

Aristotle,theimpressioncausedbythesensibledoesnotsuffice,butsomethingmorenoble

isrequired,for‘theagentismorenoblethanthepatient,’ashesays.”434

Thetextof84,4ad3(justquoted)raisesaninterestingquestion.Couldwesaythat

theintellectreceivesnottheobjectitself,northespecies,butrathertheintellect’saction

ontheobject?IsitnotwhatAquinasmeans,whenhesaysthattheagentintellect

43279,3,c.:“Nihilautemreduciturdepotentiainactum,nisiperaliquodensactu,sicut

sensusfitinactupersensibileinactu.Oportebatigiturponerealiquamvirtutemexparteintellectus,quaefaceretintelligibiliainactu,perabstractionemspecierumaconditionibusmaterialibus.Ethaecestnecessitasponendiintellectumagentem.”

43384,4ad3:“Dicendumquodintellectusnosterpossibilisreduciturdepotentiaadactumperaliquodensactu,idestperintellectumagentem,quiestvirtusquaedamanimaenostrae,utdictumest,nonautemperaliquemintellectumseparatum,sicutpercausamproximam;sedfortesicutpercausamremotam.”Thedistinctionbetweenagentintellectandpossibleintellectwillbeapproachedinsection6ofthisChapter.

43484,6,c.:“Nihilautemcorporeumimprimerepotestinremincorpoream.Etideoadcausandamintellectualemoperationem,secundumAristotelem,nonsufficitsolaimpressiosensibiliumcorporum,sedrequirituraliquidnobilius,quiaagensesthonorabiliuspatiente,utipsedicit.”

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actualizesthepossible?Isitnotinthissensethatthepossibleintellectisapassivepotency?

Letusproceedwithsomeorder.Wehavealreadyshownthattheobjectofintelligence,as

universalcontent,isotherthantheintellectandisreceivedasaremediumofitsoriginal

poverty.435Therefore,itcannotbedeniedthat,forSt.Thomas,theintellectisreceptiveof

theperfectionoftheobject.Aswell,wehaveshownthattheintellectisalsoinpotencyof

itsown(subjective)act,whichisthespecies(initsrealbeing).Wehavealsoshownthat

speciesandobjectarenotthesame,suchthatweunderstandtheobject,notthespecies.436

Still,aquestionmayremain.Isthespeciesdifferentfromtheactionoftheintellect?Insofar

asthespeciesistheformbywhichweunderstandsomething,thatis,ifweconsiderthe

specieswithoutitscontent,thereisnodifferencebetweenspeciesandactionofthe

intellect;indeed,theactionoftheintellectistheactbywhichweunderstandanobject,

whichisalsothedefinitionofthespecies.437Now,wemaydistinguishtheminfieri

(intelligereistheactofunderstandingasproceedingfromthefacultytowardstheobject,

speciesistheactofunderstandingascompleted),438butbecausetheactionoftheintellect

isnotamovement,fieriandfactumarenotdistinctinreality.Now,isthisintelligere

producedbytheagentintellect?Wecouldaskthesamequestioninotherwords:isthe

435Cf.section1ofthisChapter.436Cf.section2and3ofthisChapter.437AndthisisexactlythemeaningoftheAristotelianidentity,aswehaveseeninsection3

ofthisChapter.438Orratherthedistinctionisbetweentheoperationassuch,initsessence(intelligere),

abstractedfromtheobject,andtheoperationinfactoesse,whereitcannotbeseparatedfromthespeciesoftheobject,whichisthesubjectiveformoftheintellectinact,andsotheoperationitself.Weneedtokeepalwaysinmindthatunderstandingisanintentionaloperation,andthereforeitsactisonanobjectassuch:itisnotaphysicaloperationthatproducesamodificationinanobjectbymeansofitsownmovement,butratheritistheobjectthatmovesthepotencytoattainitasobject,asother,asitis.

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agentintellectthecauseofthespeciesinthepossible?Inordertoanswer,weneedto

distinguishspeciesimpressaandexpressaand,inbothspecies,bothcontentandthe

subjectivebeingofthespecies.439Innocaseistheagentintellectcauseofthecontent;

instead,theagentintellectiscauseoftheabstractedmodeofbeingofthecontent.440Isthe

agentintellectcauseofthespeciesimpressainitssubjectivebeing?Yes,itis:theresultof

theprocessofabstractionistheintelligible(notyetintellected)inactwhich,precisely

becauseofitsabstractionfrommatter,isabletobeunderstoodbythepossibleintellect.441

Thisspeciesimpressa,however,isnottheactofthepossibleintellect,butthe“catalyst”of

thisact,theagentobjectwhichisabletoactualizethepossibleintellectandwilldoso.Is

theagentintellectthecauseofthespeciesexpressa?Itiscauseoftheagentobject(the

speciesimpressa),andtheagentobjectiscauseoftheactoftheintellectpreciselyasagent

439Cf.Stump,267:“Althoughtheabstractingofanintelligiblespeciesisthebeginningor

sourceofanactofintellection,thatactofintellectionisnotcompleteuntiltheintellecthasusedtheintelligiblespeciestoformanintention”(shequotesextensivelyinsupportCGI,53);Stump,268-269:“Theresulting[fromabstraction]intelligiblespeciesarereceivedspirituallybythepotentialintellect.Actualizedinthiswaybytheintelligiblespecies,theintellectengagesinafurtheract,transformingtheintelligiblespeciesintoamentalconcept”;FrancisA.Cunningham,“ATheoryonAbstractioninSt.Thomas,”ModernSchoolman:AQuarterlyJournalofPhilosophy35(1958):253,“Itisthefunctionofthepossibleintellecttoreceivetheseintelligiblespeciesandconceivethecorrespondingverbum”;CGII,59,par.14:“Forcolorsexistingoutsidethesoulareinthepresenceoflightactuallyvisible,ashavingthepowertomovethesight;butarenotactually(seen)inthesenseofbeingactuallyperceivedastheresultofbecomingonewiththesensepowerinact.Andsimilarly,phantasmsaremadeactuallyintelligiblebythelightoftheagentintellect,sothattheyareabletomovethepossibleintellect;butnotsoastobeactuallyunderstood,throughunionwiththepossibleintellectactualized.”[Coloresenimextraanimamexistentes,praesentelumine,suntvisibilesactuutpotentesmoverevisum:nonautemutactusensata,secundumquodsuntunumcumsensuinactu.Etsimiliterphantasmataperlumenintellectusagentisfiuntactuintelligibilia,utpossintmovereintellectumpossibilem:nonautemutsintintellectaactu,secundumquodsuntunumcumintellectupossibilifactoinactu.]

440Cf.Chapter1,especiallysection1and4,andChapter2;still,itisthemainpointofthedissertation,andsoitwillbeshownmoreclearlyinChapter4.

441Cf.79,3,c..

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object.442Theagentintellectdoesnotneedtomovethepossibleintellectinanyotherway

becausethepossibleintellectisalreadytranscendentallyorderedtoitsownobject.Itisthe

possibleintellectitselfthatunderstands,thatembracesintentionally(andthuspossesses)

theobjectwhichhasbeenpresentedbytheagentintellect.443Itdoesnotseemnecessaryto

addadivinepre-motiontothepossibleintellect,butunderstandingshouldbeconsidered

asanintentionalpotency(thatis,movedbyitsproperobject)andnotasaphysicalpotency,

needingtobemovedbyacauseinorderto“reach”or“affect”theobject.Inanycase,a

divineinfluenceshouldbesupposedonthesideoftheagentintellectandoftheagent

object.

Thattheagentintellectisnotthecauseofanallegedactionofthepossibleintellect

onthephantasmhasalreadybeenprecludedbythefactthat,forAquinas,theactionofthe

possibleintellectisnotonthephantasm:understandingisoftheuniversalnature,notof

thephantasm;444andtheconversioadphantasmataisnottheactofunderstanding,buta

modeoftheactofunderstandingtheuniversalnature.445Theagentintellectcouldbe

442Cf.87,1,c.:“[Ourintellect]understandsitselfaccordingasitismadeactualbythe

speciesabstractedfromsensiblethings,throughthelightoftheactiveintellect,whichnotonlyactuatestheintelligiblethingsthemselves,butalso,bytheirinstrumentality,actuatesthepassiveintellect.Thereforetheintellectknowsitselfnotbyitsessence,butbyitsact.”[…consequensestutsicseipsumintelligatintellectusnoster,secundumquodfitactuperspeciesasensibilibusabstractasperlumenintellectusagentis,quodestactusipsorumintelligibilium,eteismediantibusintellectuspossibilis.Nonergoperessentiamsuam,sedperactumsuumsecognoscitintellectusnoster.]

443AsfarasIcansee,itisnotthatthepossibleintellectproducestheexpressaasadifferentspecies,butratheritonly“embraces”thespecies(theimpressa)thatisalreadythere:inthissense,theimpressa“becomes”theexpressawhenitisunderstood.

444Cf.Chapter1,section2.445Cf.84,7,c.:“And,therefore,fortheintellecttounderstandactuallyitsproperobject,it

mustofnecessityturntothephantasmsinordertoperceivetheuniversalnatureexistingintheindividual.”[Etideonecesseestadhocquodintellectusactuintelligatsuumobiectumproprium,quodconvertatseadphantasmata,utspeculeturnaturamuniversaleminparticulariexistentem.]

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consideredasmuchcauseoftheconversioasitiscauseoftheactofunderstanding,thatis,

onlyinsofarasitproducesthespeciesimpressaand,strictlyspeaking,onlyinsofarasit

producestheabstractedmodeofbeingoftheuniversalnature.446

SometextsinwhichAquinasseemstocharacterizeknowinginanactivewaywill

nowbeexaminedbut,first,amore“methodological”remarkneedstobemade.Thatis,St.

Thomasisnotoverlyconcernedabouttechnicalwordsandexpressions.Herespectsthe

normaluseofwords;wordscanbeusedindifferentsenses,aslongasacertaincoreof

meaningisrespected.Normally,onedoesnotsay“cold”whenreferringto“heat”,butmay

say“cold”torefernotonlytotheweather,butalsotoananswer,orapersonality.St.

Thomas,byrespectingthisfact,makeshiswritingsnotmoreobscure,butmoreclear.Ifhe

hadlockedhimselfupinaworldoftechnicalexpressions,hewouldhavehadtospend

countlessanduselesspagesdefininghistechnicalities,andthenalwayswiththeriskofnot

beingunderstood.Instead,trustingintheunderstandingofthereader,hesimplyspeaks

humanly.Hesometimessaysthesamethingtwice,usingdifferentwords;hemayusea

comparison,orhemayuseanopposition,tomakesurethatthereaderunderstandswhat

hemeans;andmostimportantly,healwaysbeginsbytellingthereaderwhatheistalking

about,whattheproblemis,andwhatthesolutionisnot,sothatthereader,bythe

combinationofsomany“phantasms”,mayarriveatunderstandinghim.Thisisnotto

suggestthatunderstandingSt.Thomasisparticularlyeasy,northatpreparationisnot

neededtoapproachhistext.However,onecannottakeaphrasefromSt.Thomastomakea

446Thetextin89,5,c.,referringtoscienceas“acquired”andtothespeciesremaininginthe

separatesoul,mayalsohelptoshowthereceptivecharacterofknowing.

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statement,andthensaythatitisso“becauseSt.Thomashassaidthatitisso.”Because

whatSt.Thomasmeansisnotboundtothewordsheuses,butisfree,onemustfollowthe

livingcurrentofhisthinking,andthenexpress,notone’spreferredthoughtabouthim,but

whatAquinasisactuallysaying,inwordsmeaningfultooneselfandone’sowntime.This

implies,ofcourse,thatthereisameaningbehindthewords,andthatwe,humanbeings

thatweare,havetheabilitytogetbehindthewordsanddiscoverthatmeaning.Nowadays,

manypeoplethinkthatthisisnotthecase.However,St.Thomasappearstohave

composedhisworksthinkingthatthisispreciselythecase.

Inthefollowingtext,then,St.Thomasreferstounderstandingasanactionbut,at

thesametime,notanactionthatperfectsanotherthing.Heisnotdenyingthatknowing

referstoanotherthingasobject,ashesaysinotherplaces.However,ifthereisareference

toanother,thatreferenceisperfectiveofthesubject,notoftheobject.Itwouldbevery

difficulttousethistexttoaffirmthatknowing,forSt.Thomas,isactive,ortoaffirmthat

knowingdoesnotimplyalterity.Theformerisexplicitlydenied,andthelatterisnotsaid

anddoesnotfollow.

Secondly,becausesinceSocratesisanindividualinanatureofoneessencecomposedofmatterandform,iftheintellectbenottheform,itfollowsthatitmustbeoutsidetheessence,andthentheintellectis[to]thewholeSocratesasamotortothethingmoved.Whereastheactofintellectremainsintheagent,anddoesnotpassintosomethingelse,asdoestheactionofheating.ThereforetheactionofunderstandingcannotbeattributedtoSocratesforthereasonthatheismovedbyhisintellect.447

44776,1,c.:“Secundoquia,cumSocratessitquoddamindividuuminnaturacuiusessentia

estuna,compositaexmateriaetforma;siintellectusnonsitformaeius,sequiturquodsitpraeteressentiameius;etsicintellectuscomparabituradtotumSocratemsicutmotoradmotum.Intelligere

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Asimilartextfollows,inwhichSt.Thomasusesart(arsfactibilium)ratherthan

calefactiotodifferentiatebetweenimmanentandtransientoperations.Again,thedenialof

alterityisdenialinthesensethatknowingisnotanactivityperfectinganotherbut,rather,a

beingperfected:“Nowtheultimateperfectionoftheintellectconsistsinitsownoperation:

forthisisnotanacttendingtosomethingelseinwhichliestheperfectionofthework

accomplished,asbuildingistheperfectionofthethingbuilt;butitremainsintheagentas

itsperfectionandact,asissaid[in]Metaph.ix.”448Again,inthistext,inalmostthesame

context,Aquinasuses“actio”forthetransientactions,and“actus”insteadfortheintellect.

Thattheperfectionoftheintellectis,inonesense,thespeciesand,inanother

sense,theobjectknown,hasalreadybeensaid,butitbearsrepetition:epistemologically,

speciesandobjectarestrictlydependentoneachother.Thespecies,however,isforthe

sakeoftheobject,andnottheobjectforthesakeofthespecies;itisunderstandingas

receivingtheperfectionofotherthingswhichisthepurposeofknowing(understandingas

remedium).Still,itistheperfectionofthesubjectwhichisthepurposeofknowing;

however,thisisnotaperfectionbestowed,butaperfectionrealizedintheintentional

receptionandpossessionoftheother.Finally,theultimateperfectionofthesubjectisnot

inunderstandingthematerial-otherbutinunderstanding,throughthecorporealthings,the

Authoroftheuniverse,atleastintheAuthor’sexistenceasfirstcause.

autemestactioquiescensinagente,nonautemtransiensinalterum,sicutcalefactio.NonergointelligerepotestattribuiSocratipropterhocquodestmotusabintellectu.”

44887,3,c.:“Ultimaautemperfectiointellectusesteiusoperatio,nonenimestsicutactiotendensinalterum,quaesitperfectiooperati,sicutaedificatioaedificati;sedmanetinoperanteutperfectioetactuseius,utdiciturinIXMetaphys..”

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Othertextsmaygivethesameimpressionofunderstandingasanactivity.449The

intellectcanbesaidtobetheactiveprincipleofthesensibilityinametaphysicalsense,

becausewhateverismoreperfectisprincipleoftheimperfect,andtheintellectis

essentiallymoreperfectthanthesenses.Inacognitionalsense,orasreceptiveprinciples,

however,themoreimperfectpotenciesareprinciplesofthehigherones,insofarasthey

provide,asitwere,thematerialfortheactofthelatter:

Butsincetheessenceofthesouliscomparedtothepowersbothasaprincipleactiveandfinal,andasareceptiveprinciple,eitherseparatelybyitself,ortogetherwiththebody;andsincetheagentandtheendaremoreperfect,whilethereceptiveprinciple,assuch,islessperfect;itfollowsthatthosepowersofthesoulwhichprecedetheothers,intheorderofperfectionandnature,aretheprinciplesoftheothers,afterthemanneroftheendandactiveprinciple.Forweseethatthesensesareforthesakeoftheintelligence,andnottheotherwayabout.Thesenses,moreover,areacertainimperfectparticipationoftheintelligence;wherefore,accordingtotheirnaturalorigin,theyproceedfromtheintelligenceastheimperfectfromtheperfect.Butconsideredasreceptiveprinciples,themore[imperfect]powersareprincipleswithregardtotheothers;thusthesoul,accordingasithasthesensitivepower,isconsideredasthesubject,andas[acertain]materialwithregardtotheintelligence.450

IsAquinastalkingaboutthematerial(“materialequoddam”)foraperfecting

activity?Here,St.Thomasisspeakingnotoftheintellectasactiveandevenagentprinciple

ofthesenses(asinthefirstpartofthearticle),butasreceptiveprinciple.Heisalsovery

449Besidesthefollowingtexts,seeAppendix,Note16.45077,7,c.:“Sedquiaessentiaanimaecomparaturadpotentiasetsicutprincipiumactivum

etfinale,etsicutprincipiumsusceptivum,velseorsumpersevelsimulcumcorpore;agensautemetfinisestperfectius,susceptivumautemprincipium,inquantumhuiusmodi,estminusperfectum,consequensestquodpotentiaeanimaequaesuntprioressecundumordinemperfectionisetnaturae,sintprincipiaaliarumpermodumfinisetactiviprincipii.Videmusenimquodsensusestpropterintellectum,etnoneconverso.Sensusetiamestquaedamdeficiensparticipatiointellectus,undesecundumnaturalemoriginemquodammodoestabintellectu,sicutimperfectumaperfecto.Sedsecundumviamsusceptiviprincipii,econversopotentiaeimperfectioresinveniunturprincipiarespectualiarum,sicutanima,secundumquodhabetpotentiamsensitivam,consideratursicutsubiectumetmaterialequoddamrespectuintellectus.”

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carefulinadding“quaedam”,“quoddam”and“quodammodo”throughout,inordernotto

bemisunderstood.Aquinas’goalhereistoshowtheinterdependencebetweenthehuman

potenciesintwoways.First,inametaphysical–staticway,theunityofthesoulrequires

thatthelessperfectoriginatesfromthemoreperfectand,thus,thereisadependencein

therealmofbeingandnaturalperfection.Second,inadynamic–operativeway,theactof

thelowerpotenciesisprior,andbecauseofthat,acertainprincipleoftheactofthehigher

potencies;thus,theactofthesensesisaconditionofpossibilityoftheactofthe

intelligence.Thisisthepoint.Aquinaslaterclarifiesthatthematerialcauseofthesensesis

notenough,andanagencyonthepartoftheintellectisrequired.451However,thisdoesnot

maketheintellectlessreceptiveasaknowingfaculty,aswehaveseenandwillseeagain.

Onearticlejustpriortotheintroductionoftheagentintellect,St.Thomasrefersto

theintellectasapassivepotencywithregardtoeveryuniversalbeing,makingacontrast

betweenthispassivepotencyandotherpotencieswhichareactive:

Theagentisnoblerthanthepatient,iftheactionandthepassionarereferredtothesamething:butnotalways,iftheyrefertodifferentthings.Nowtheintellectisapassivepowerinregardtothewholeuniversalbeing:whilethevegetativepowerisactiveinregardtosomeparticularthing,namely,thebodyasunitedtothesoul.Whereforenothingpreventssuchapassiveforcebeingnoblerthansuchanactiveone.452

ThistexthelpstoshowthattheagentintellectisnotthepotencyofwhichSt.

Thomasisspeakinghere(hewilllatercharacterizebothpotenciesasregardingthesame

451Cf.84,6.45279,2ad3:“Agensestnobiliuspatiente,siadidemactioetpassioreferantur,nonautem

semper,siaddiversa.Intellectusautemestvispassivarespectutotiusentisuniversalis.Vegetativumautemestactivumrespectucuiusdamentisparticularis,scilicetcorporisconiuncti.Undenihilprohibethuiusmodipassivumessenobiliustaliactivo.”

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butindifferentways,oneactivelyandtheotherpassively);453andthattheintellectis

receptiveofsomethingdifferentfromtheparticular;andthatthepassivityoftheintellect

doesnotmakeitalesserpotencyinthehumansoul.454

Wemaythenconcludethat,forAquinas,knowingisnotaperfectingactivity,butan

activityinwhichtheperfectionofsomethingotherthanthesubjectperfectsthesubject

itself,makingthelatteracquireaperfectionitdidnothave,inawaythatisnotphysicalbut

intentional.Theperfectionoftheobjectisreceived“passively”,insofarasthesubjectgrows

withaperfectionthatdidnotbelongtoit,aperfectionregardingwhichitwasinpotency,

where“potency”meansacapacityofreceivingintentionally.Thefactthatthis“passivity”

cannotmeananabsoluteindifference—adeadopennessintowhichanythingcouldenter—

canbeexplainedbywhatAquinassaysaboutthenaturalappetiteofthepotency,bythe

proportionbetweenpotencyandproperobject,andmainlybythespecificnatureof

knowingasopposedtophysicalprocesses.455

453Cf.88,1,c.454Aquinashascharacterizedknowing(andparticularlyunderstanding)asreceptiveinother

worksaswell.SeeAppendix,Note17.455Cf.p.149ff.andp.177,footnote330.Otherauthorssupportourinterpretationof

knowinginAquinasasreceptive.Gilsonwouldcomplainaboutanidealisticcontaminationofterms.“Invention”inhumanknowingdoesnotmean“creation”,butrathersomethinglikean“encounter”(cf.RM110).Cf.Lambert,85(aftertalkingabouttheinfusedknowledgeofangels):“Thepossibleintellect,ontheotherhand,knowsnothingnaturallyandmustacquireeachoneofitsspeciesseparately”;93:“Thehumanintellectisoriginallyemptyandsomustacquirethespecieswhichactuateit.”

Sellés,instead,saysthatAquinasdoesnotadmitthepreceedinginterpretationsoftheAristotelianagentintellectbecauseallofthemconceivehumanknowingaspassive,whichinthemindofSellésisunacceptablebecauseknowingisanact(cf.Crítica,224;EIA,200,246).Iwouldsuggestthatoneshoulddistinguishbetweenactasperfectionreceivedandactasperfectionbestowed,i.e.,betweentheactofaperfectedpassivepotencyandtheactofaperfectingactivepotency(cf.InIIDeAnima6,123-138);andshouldalsodistinguishbetweenthenaturalpassivityof

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5)TheComparisonbetweenIntelligenceandSensitivity

ThefollowinggroupoftextsregardsthesofrequentcomparisoninAquinasbetween

sensitivityandintelligence.ForKant,theintuitionofthesensesasreceptionofthematerial

ofexperienceisthewaytoensurecontactwithrealityand,thus,theobjectivityofhuman

understanding.ObjectivityforKanthastodowithextramentalreality,whichisonly

particular,andthecontactwiththatrealityisbymeansofsensibleintuition.Nowhuman

scienceisuniversal;universalconceptsdonotcomefromexperience,becauserealityis

particular;butuniversalconceptsareappliedtotheparticular.Therefore,inKant’smind,

humansciencehastobeasubjectivefunction,anactivity,anapplicationofsubjectivea

prioricategoriestotheobjectiverealityofexperience.

Aswehaveseen,St.Thomasdoesnothavethesamepointofdepartureandso,for

him,sensibilityandintelligencearenotunderstoodinthesameway.ForAquinas,both

sensibilityandintelligencearereceptiveoftheobject–content.Andforthisreason,he

doesnothesitatetoconstantlycompareintelligencewithsensibilityregardingthemost

importantcharacteristicsofknowing:alterity,receptivity,species,identitywithregardsto

thespecies,objectivity,etc..Onceagain,thegoalhereistoshowhowdifferentisAquinas’

approachfromanyKantianapproachtoEpistemology,andhowforSt.Thomasknowinghas

nothingtodowithaperfectingactivity.

Thetextsinthissectionshowthat,forAquinas,sensibilityandintelligencerealiseor

fulfilthesamebasicnotionofknowing,inwhichthecontentisaposteriori,thatistosay,

matterandtheintentionalreceptivityoftheknowingfaculties.PassionandactareanalogousconceptsinthemindofAquinas.

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hasitsorigininexperience.Becauseofthis,itseems,intellectualandsensibleknowingare

constantlylikenedtoeachotherinmanyaspects.

In85,2ad2severalsimilaritiesbetweensensesandintelligencecanbeseen.The

firstisthattheobjectofknowingisinrealitybut,insofarasitisknown,possessesanother

modeofbeinginthefaculty:“…thenatureitself[…]isonlyinindividuals;but[itsbeing]

understood[…]isintheintellect.”456and“…thecolorwhichisseenisonlyintheapple:but

thatitbeperceivedapartfromthesmell,thisisowingtothesight.”457Thesecondisthat

knowingisverifiedbymeansofaspecies,animage,thatispresentinthefaculty:“…the

facultyofsightreceivesthelikenessofcolorandnotofsmell.”458and“…in[theintellect]

thereisalikenessofthespecificnature,butnotoftheprinciplesofindividuality.”459The

thirdisthat,inbothcases,knowingiscalled“perception”:“…thatitbeperceivedapart

fromthesmell,thisisowingtothesight…”460and“inasmuchasitis[perceivedby]the

intellect…”461Thetextflowsnicelyinitscompleteform.462

Helpfulinshowinganotherinterestingcomparisonbetweensensibilityand

intelligenceisourothertextusprinceps,79,3.Bothfacultiesarereceptiveandinpotencyof

theirrespectiveobjects;moreover,thesimilaritywithvisiongoesevenfurthersince,for

bothintellectandvision,alightisrequiredfortheobjecttobevisible.Fromthefirst456“Ipsaigiturnatura[…],nonestnisiinsingularibus;sedhocipsumquodestintelligi[…]est

inintellectu.”457“Colorquividetur,nonestnisiinpomo;sedquodsitsineodoreperceptus,hocacciditei

expartevisus.”458“…[I]nvisuestsimilitudocolorisetnonodoris.”459“…[P]ercipiturabintellectu,inquoestsimilitudonaturaespeciei,etnonindividualium

principiorum.”460“…[Q]uodsitsineodoreperceptus,hocacciditeiexpartevisus…”461“…[S]ecundumquodpercipiturabintellectu…”462Cf.85,2ad2,quotedonp.86.

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objectionthecomparisonisexplicit:“Forasthesensesaretothingssensible,soisour

intellecttothingsintelligible.”463Granted,however,asimilaritytosomeextent,anagent

senseisnotrequired:“Sensiblethingsarefoundinactoutsidethesoul;andhencethereis

noneedforanactivesense.”464Infact,althoughinbothcasesthefacultyisinpotency,and

althoughbothfacultiesarereducedtotheirproperactbysomethinginact(thesensibleor

theintelligibleobject),inthecaseofintelligencetheobjectisnotintelligibleinactand,for

thisreason,anagentintellectisrequired:

Nownothingisreducedfrompotentialitytoactexceptbysomethinginact;asthesenses[are]madeactualbywhatisactuallysensible.Wemustthereforeassignonthepartoftheintellectsomepowertomakethingsactuallyintelligible,byabstractionofthespeciesfrommaterialconditions.Andsuchisthenecessityforanactiveintellect.465

Letusnowconsidertheresponsetothesecondobjection.Ifthefirstopinion

regardingtheroleoflightinvisionisaccepted,thenvisionandintelligencearesimilarin

onemorerespect,thatbeingthenecessityofalightmakingtheirrespectiveobjects

knowableinact.St.Thomassays:“Therearetwoopinionsastotheeffectoflight.Forsome

saythatlightisrequiredforsight,inordertomakecolorsactuallyvisible.Andaccordingto

thistheactiveintellectisrequiredforunderstanding,inlikemannerandforthesame

46379,3,ob.1:“Sicutenimsehabetsensusadsensibilia,itasehabetintellectusnosterad

intelligibilia.”46479,3ad1:“Sensibiliainveniunturactuextraanimam,etideononoportuitponere

sensumagentem.”46579,3,c.:“Nihilautemreduciturdepotentiainactum,nisiperaliquodensactu,sicut

sensusfitinactupersensibileinactu.Oportebatigiturponerealiquamvirtutemexparteintellectus,quaefaceretintelligibiliainactu,perabstractionemspecierumaconditionibusmaterialibus.Ethaecestnecessitasponendiintellectumagentem.”

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reasonaslightisrequiredforseeing.”466Regardlessofthedoctrineoflight,whichwillbe

examinedinmoredetaillater,itisclearthatthesimilaritybetweentheintentional

receptivityofintelligenceandofvisionisthegreatestpossible.

In78,1,c.,467bothpotenciesaresaidtorefertotheextra-mentalreality,andin

bothcasesthisreferenceisverifiedbymeansofaspecies.

TheAristotelianidentity(which,forSt.Thomas,aswehaveseen,regardsthe

identityofthespecieswiththefaculty)appliestobothintelligenceandsensibility:“The

thingunderstoodisintheintellectbyitsownlikeness;anditisinthissensethatwesaythat

thethingunderstood[inact]istheintellectinact,becausethelikenessofthething

understoodistheformoftheintellect,asthelikenessofasensiblethingistheformofthe

senseinact.”468Theroleofthespeciesis,inbothcases,thesame:“Theintelligiblespecies

istotheintellectwhatthesensibleimageistothesense.Butthesensibleimageisnotwhat

isperceived,butratherthatbywhichsenseperceives.Thereforetheintelligiblespeciesis

notwhatisactuallyunderstood,butthatbywhichtheintellectunderstands.”469Theactof

visionandtheactofunderstandingareconsideredequallyimmanentactions:“Thereisa

twofoldaction(Metaph.ix),onewhichremainsintheagent;forinstance,toseeandto

understand;andanotherwhichpassesintoanexternalobject;forinstance,toheatandto46679,3ad2:“Circaeffectumluminisestduplexopinio.Quidamenimdicuntquodlumen

requirituradvisum,utfaciatcoloresactuvisibiles.Etsecundumhoc,similiterrequiritur,etpropteridem,intellectusagensadintelligendum,propterquodlumenadvidendum.”

467Textquotedandtranslatedp.69.46885,2ad1:“Intellectumestinintelligentepersuamsimilitudinem.Etperhuncmodum

diciturquodintellectuminactuestintellectusinactu,inquantumsimilitudoreiintellectaeestformaintellectus;sicutsimilitudoreisensibilisestformasensusinactu.”Cf.ob.1.

46985,2,sc.:“Speciesintelligibilissehabetadintellectum,sicutspeciessensibilisadsensum.Sedspeciessensibilisnonestilludquodsentitur,sedmagisidquosensussentit.Ergospeciesintelligibilisnonestquodintelligituractu,sedidquointelligitintellectus.”

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cut;andeachoftheseactionsproceedsinvirtueofsomeform.”470St.Thomastakesthe

similarityevenfurtherassertingthat,inbothsensibilityandintelligence,thereisa“double

operation”,onewhichisstrictlyreceptiveandanotherwhichisformativeandmoreactive:

Therearetwooperationsinthesensitivepart.One,inregardofimpressiononly,andthustheoperationofthesensestakesplacebythesensesbeingimpressedbythesensible.Theotherisformation,inasmuchastheimaginationformsforitselfanimageofanabsentthing,orevenofsomethingneverseen.Bothoftheseoperationsarefoundintheintellect.471

Aclarificationisinorder.Althoughthetextjustquotedshowshowsimilararesense

andintellectforAquinas,itseemsthatthistextshouldbeunderstoodnotasreferringto

thereceptivityofthecontentbut,rather,tothereceptivityofthespeciesasagentobject

(speciesimpressa).Inthatcase,definitionisunderstoodastheformationofthespecies

expressabythepossibleintellectinthesimpleapprehension.Thiswouldbeinlinewiththe

considerationofthedefinitionassimple.472Itwouldalsoimplythatthefirstspecies

expressainsensitivityisformednotintheexternalsenses,butintheimagination.Ifwe

wanttosaythatAquinasrefers“formation”onlytojudgment,thenAquinasimpliesinthis

textthatthedefinitionalreadypresupposesacomposition(ofspecificdifferenceand

genus);butthetextseemstoopposeratioandcompositio.Inanycase,theword

“formation”cannotbetakentomean“activity”inthesenseofprovidingcontentbut,

47085,2,c.:“Cumenimsitduplexactio,sicutdiciturIXMetaphys.,unaquaemanetin

agente,utvidereetintelligere,alteraquaetransitinremexteriorem,utcalefacereetsecare;utraquefitsecundumaliquamformam.”

47185,2ad3:“Inpartesensitivainveniturduplexoperatio.Unasecundumsolamimmutationem,etsicperficituroperatiosensusperhocquodimmutaturasensibili.Aliaoperatioestformatio,secundumquodvisimaginativaformatsibialiquodidolumreiabsentis,veletiamnunquamvisae.Etutraquehaecoperatioconiungiturinintellectu.”

472Thisismoreevident,forexample,inInVIIMetaphysicorum,lect.11,n.1528;lect.12,1537,1541,1554-1556.

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rather,theintentionalactualizationofthefacultybymeansoftheagentobject.Onlyinthis

secondmoment(offormation,notimpression)doesthe“reception”(aspossession)ofthe

contenttakeplace.Knowingisthisintentional“activityofreception”andthedifficultyof

Epistemologyistograspthisfactasdifferentfromphysicalactivitiesandreceptions.

Letusexamineothertexts.473Bothkindsoffacultiesareapprehensivebuttheir

respectiveobjectsareformallydifferent:“Indeed,thepassivepoweritselfhasitsvery

naturefromitsrelationtoitsactiveprinciple.Therefore,sincewhatisapprehendedbythe

intellectandwhatisapprehendedbysensearegenericallydifferent;consequently,the

intellectualappetiteisdistinctfromthesensitive.”474

Theclearacknowledgementofthedifferencesbetweenintellectandsensedoesnot

conflictwiththeaforementionedsimilarities.WhatSt.Thomassaysin84,4ad2:“Material

things,astothebeingwhichtheyhaveoutsidethesoul,maybeactuallysensible,butnot

actuallyintelligible.Whereforethereisnocomparisonbetweensenseandintellect.”475is

473ForSt.Thomas,bothfacultiesareequallyinpotencytotheirrespectiveobjects,insucha

waythattheAristotelianquodammodoomniaappliestoboth.Cf.84,2ad2:“Aristotledidnotholdthatthesoulisactuallycomposedofallthings,asdidtheearlierphilosophers;hesaidthatthesoulisallthings,‘afterafashion,’forasmuchasitisinpotentialitytoall—throughthesenses,toallthingssensible—throughtheintellect,toallthingsintelligible.”[…Aristotelesnonposuitanimamesseactucompositamexomnibus,sicutantiquinaturales;seddixitquodammodoanimamesseomnia,inquantumestinpotentiaadomnia;persensumquidemadsensibilia,perintellectumveroadintelligibilia.]Thequodammodoomniareferredtobothfacultieshadalreadyappearedin80,1,wheretheyarealsosimilarintheiralterity,inthereceptionofspeciesoftheirobjectsandinbeingapprehensivefacultiesasopposedtoappetitivefaculties(cf.80,1,c.,ob.2yad2).

47480,2,c.:“Ipsapotentiapassivapropriamrationemhabetexordineadsuumactivum.Quiaigiturestalteriusgenerisapprehensumperintellectumetapprehensumpersensum,consequensestquodappetitusintellectivussitaliapotentiaasensitive.”

47584,4ad2:“Resmateriales,secundumessequodhabentextraanimam,possuntessesensibilesactu;nonautemactuintelligibiles.Undenonestsimiledesensuetintellectu.”

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clearlyunderstoodbywhatwehavealreadyseenin79,3(thenecessityofanagent

intellect)andothertexts,forexample:

Butthereisthisdifference,accordingtotheopinionofAristotle,betweenthesenseandtheintelligence—thatathingisperceivedbythesenseaccordingtothedispositionwhichithasoutsidethesoul—thatis,initsindividuality;whereasthenatureofthethingunderstoodisindeedoutsidethesoul,butthemodeaccordingtowhichitexistsoutsidethesoulisnotthemodeaccordingtowhichitisunderstood.476

Why,then,doesSt.Thomassayin84,4ad2that“thereisnocomparisonbetween

senseandintellect”?Thesecondobjectionisbasedontheallegedparallelbetweensense

andintellectregardingtherelationshipoftheobjecttothepotency.Thisparallel,however,

ismisconstruedinthefollowingway:asthesensibleinact(therealcorporealthing,object

ofknowledge)isthecauseofthesensiblespeciesactualizingthesense(asformaquo),in

thesamewaytheintelligiblespeciesactualizingtheintellectmustbecausedbythe

intelligibleinact(understoodasrealspiritualbeingsexistingoutsidethemind).St.Thomas’

answerputsthingsinorder:theobjectofhumanknowledgeisthecorporealthing,notthe

separatesubstances.Thecorporealthingshaveamodeofbeingoutsidethemindwhich

allowsthemtobesensibleinactand,therefore,thecorporealthingscanactualizethe

sensesasobjects.However,becausethesecorporeal,realthingsarenotintelligibleinact,

theycannotactualizetheintelligenceinthesameway.ForAquinas,thatwhichisdissimilar

isnottherelationshipbetweenobjectandpotency(oncetheobjectisinact,bothpotencies

areactualizedbytheobjectinthesameway),buttheconditionoftheobjectinreality(i.e.

47676,2ad4:“Sedhoctantuminterestintersensumetintellectum,secundumsententiam

Aristotelis,quodressentitursecundumillamdispositionemquamextraanimamhabet,insuaparticularitate,naturaautemreiquaeintelligitur,estquidemextraanimam,sednonhabetillummodumessendiextraanimam,secundumquemintelligitur.”

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itsmodeofbeing).ThatiswhySt.Thomassaysin76,2ad4thatthis(i.e.,themodeof

beingoftheobjectinreality)isthe“only”differencebetweensenseandintelligence.

Thetextsreportedreinforcetheideaofhumanunderstandingasintentionally

receptive,andnotdifferentfromthesenseinthisrespect.Knowing,forAquinas,certainly

hastwospecies(sensibleandintelligible),oreventwolevelsofperfectioninhumanbeing,

butacommongenericcharacteristicwhichisknowingasabeingperfectedbytheformal

perfectionofthereal-otherasother.Inorderforthatformalperfectiontoperfectthe

knower,ithastobeknowableinact.Inthecaseoftheobjectofintelligence,becauseit

doesnotsubsistasknowableinact,therearisestheneedforanagentintellect.477

6)Corollaries:AgentIntellect,PossibleIntellectandWill

Thenotionsofintellectualknowingasanactivityandoftheagentintellectasa

formalaprioritendtoblurthedistinctionsbetweenthepossibleintellect,theagent

intellectandthewillitself.Thereasonsarenotdifficulttounderstand.

Onarathersuperficiallevel,ifunderstandingisactiveasperformative,thepossible

intellect(Thomisticallythefacultyofunderstanding)necessarilyceasestobereceptive;

unlessby“reception”somethinglikean“encounter”withthesensiblematerialismeant,

andtherefore“reception”and“conversiontotheparticular”actuallymeanthesamething.

Thepathfortheidentificationofagentintellectwithpossibleintellectisthusopen.Also,

becausetendingtowardsreality-in-itselfistheThomisticpropertyoftheappetite,and

becausethereisnorealityotherthantheoneencounteredbythespiritinitsopennessto

477ForthecomparisonbetweenintellectandsensesinotherworksofAquinas,see

Appendix,Note18.

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the(material)world,itisnotdifficulttoseehowthis“being-in-the-world”isatthesame

time“understanding”and“tendingtowardsreality,”“conversion”and“decision.”

Onadeeperlevel,thereasonfortheeffacementofthedistinctionbetweenthe

potenciesistheeffacementofthedistinctionbetweenbeingandoperation,orthe

reductionofbeingtoaction.Being(ens)becomesfirstbeingknown:thisisModern

Philosophy’sapproachtobeing,thatis,thereductionofbeingtobeingofconsciousness.

Thisbeingknown,then,turnsouttobetheresultofanactiveperformance(knowingis

performanceoftheobject),andtheonly“being”(esseutactus)lefttothisobjectof

consciousnessisthatperformance(action)itself.Inotherwords,thebeingknown(the

objectofconsciousness)isacompositeofmaterialofsensibilityplusperformanceor

intellectualactivity;478intelligibilityistheactionofintelligenceonthephantasm.Theunity

oftheactofunderstandingistheunityoftheobject.Thebeingofjudgmentisthebeingof

theobject,andsobeing(esseutactusobjecti)isaction(esseutactiosubjecti).479

Onemorestep.Ifbeingismerelybeingaffirmed,whatisthebeingofthesubject,if

notthisaffirmationitself?Thesubjectisnotlikeotherbeings,butisinitselfthis

performance:being-in-the-world.Inthisway,thebeingofthesubjectalsoisreducedtoits

ownaction.Now,thisidentificationofbeingandoperationisforeigntothemindofSt.

Thomas:itispreciselyAquinas’distinctionbetweenessenceandbeing,andtheconsequent

distinctionbetweenesseandoperari,thatisthecharacteristicofcreatedbeing.Inanycase,

478ThethrustofthisdoctrinecanbefoundinKant,KRV,B1-2.479Thisis,inmyview,oneofthereasonswhytheAristotelianidentityisinterpreted

sometimesasidentitysubject-object.

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thishasbeensaidinordertotrytoshowwhy,inModernPhilosophy,thedistinction

betweenintellectualpotenciestendstodisappear.

Theimmediatepurposeofthissectionistohighlighttheexplicitdistinctionin

Aquinasamongagentintellect,possibleintellectandwill,thisdistinctionbeingsimplya

consequenceofwhathasbeensaidsofarregardingthenatureofhumanunderstandingas

intentionallyreceptiveoftheperfectionoftheother.Thereiscertainlyaplaceforactivity

(asopposedto“receptivity”asitisunderstoodinthisChapter)inAquinas,butthisactivity

isnotoriginallythecapacitytounderstand.Thisactivityisprevious,asametaphysical

conditionofpossibilityofunderstanding,inthecaseoftheagentintellect;anditis

posterior,asaninclinationtotheapprehendedform,inthecaseofthewill.

Letusshowfirstsometextsaboutthedistinctionbetweenintellectandwill,and

thenbetweenthepossibleintellectandtheagentintellect.

-Distinctionbetweenintellectandwill.Treatingtheappetitivepotenciesin

general,Aquinasisclearinstatingthattheymustbedistinctfromthecognitivepotencies,

despitethefactthattheobjectsmightbethesameinreality.Whatnecessitatesa

distinctionofpotenciesistheformaldistinctionoftheobjects.In80,1,thesecond

objectionsays:“Powersaredifferentiatedbytheirobjects.Butwhatwedesireisthesame

aswhatweknow.Thereforetheappetitivepowerisnotdistinctfromtheapprehensive

power.”480Theanswer:“Whatisapprehendedandwhatisdesiredarethesameinreality,

butdifferinaspect:forathingisapprehendedassomethingsensibleorintelligible,

48080,1,ob.2:“Potentiaedistinguuntursecundumobiecta.Sedidemestquodcognoscimus

etappetimus.Ergovimappetitivamnonoportetessealiampraetervimapprehensivam.”

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whereasitisdesiredassuitableorgood.”481Theappetitivepotencyisdistinctalsobecause

itsactismadepossiblebytheactoftheapprehensivefaculty.Inotherwords,the

apprehendedformistheconditionofpossibilityoftheappetitiveinclination;butthis

apprehendedformimpliesthatthecognitiveactisalreadycompletedandperformed;

thereforethecapacityofthisinclinationdependsessentiallyontheperformedactof

cognition,forwhichtherespectivecapacities,thoughessentiallyrelated,mustbe

essentiallydistinct.Anotherwaytoseethisistounderstandtheconcepts:toapprehendis

anactfinishinginthesubject,whereasaninclinationisanactfinishinginthethingoutside

themind;thereasontheknowercantendtowardsthethingisthatthethinghasentered

theknower’shorizonofpossibilities.This“entrance”ofthethingisknowing,andthe

tendencytowardstheknownthingistheappetite.Inthefollowingpassage,forexample,

wecansee1)thedistinctionbetweenthesubstantialformandthecognitiveform(being

andoperation),andtheconsequentdistinctionbetweennaturalappetiteandtheappetite

thatfollowscognition;and2)theactofknowingasconditionofpossibilityoftheactofthe

appetite(“theanimalisabletodesirewhatitapprehends”):

Therefore,asformsexistinthosethingsthathaveknowledgeinahighermannerandabovethemannerofnaturalforms;somusttherebeinthemaninclinationsurpassingthenaturalinclination,whichiscalledthenaturalappetite.Andthissuperiorinclinationbelongstotheappetitivepowerofthesoul,throughwhichtheanimalisabletodesirewhatitapprehends,andnotonlythattowhichitisinclinedbyitsnaturalform.482

48180,1ad2:“Idquodapprehendituretappetitur,estidemsubiecto,seddiffertratione,

apprehenditurenimutestenssensibilevelintelligibile;appetiturveroutestconveniensautbonum.”

48280,1,c.:“Sicutigiturformaealtiorimodoexistuntinhabentibuscognitionemsupramodumformarumnaturalium,itaoportetquodineissitinclinatiosupramoduminclinationis

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ThefactthatbothknowingandappetitearepassivepotenciesforAquinas483does

noterasethedistinctionbetweenapprehendingandtheactoftheappetite.Infact,what

movestheappetiteistheobjectasapprehended.Thisissomuchsothattheconditionof

theobjectas(already)apprehended(intellectuallyorsensibly)qualifiesanddistinguishes

theappetitivepotencies.484ForAquinas,becausethereisaformaldifferencebetweenthat

whichthesubjectapprehendsthroughintelligenceandthatwhichthesubjectapprehends

throughsense,thereisalsoadistinctionbetweentheintellectualappetiteandthesensitive

appetite.

Despitethefactthatbotharepassive,andaspassivecanbesaidtobe“moved”by

theirobjects,thequalificationof“movement”doesnotfitsowelltheactofknowingasit

doestheactoftheappetite.Thereisacleardistinctionbetweentheoperations:

Fortheactoftheapprehensivepowerisnotsoproperlycalledamovementastheactoftheappetite:sincetheoperationoftheapprehensivepoweriscompletedintheveryfactthatthethingapprehendedisintheonethatapprehends:whiletheoperationoftheappetitivepoweriscompletedinthefactthathewhodesiresisbornetowardsthethingdesirable.485

naturalis,quaediciturappetitusnaturalis.Ethaecsuperiorinclinatiopertinetadvimanimaeappetitivam,perquamanimalappeterepotesteaquaeapprehendit,nonsolumeaadquaeinclinaturexformanaturali.”

48380,2,c..484Cf.also80,2,ob.1andad1.48581,1,c.:“Actusenimapprehensivaevirtutisnonitapropriediciturmotus,sicutactio

appetitus,namoperatiovirtutisapprehensivaeperficiturinhoc,quodresapprehensaesuntinapprehendente;operatioautemvirtutisappetitivaeperficiturinhoc,quodappetensinclinaturinremappetibilem.”Cf.82,3,c.:“Foraswehavesaidabove,theactionoftheintellectconsistsinthis—thattheideaofthethingunderstoodisintheonewhounderstands;whiletheactofthewillconsistsinthis—thatthewillisinclinedtothethingitselfasexistinginitself.”[Utenimsupradictumest,actiointellectusconsistitinhocquodratioreiintellectaeestinintelligente;actusverovoluntatisperficiturinhocquodvoluntasinclinaturadipsamremproutinseest.]

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Theexplicitdistinctionbetweenapprehensiveandappetitivefaculties,forAquinas,

isnotafigureofspeech,nortwowaysofspeakingofthesamereality,noreventwoaspects

ofthesamephenomenon.Theactoftheappetitepresupposesandfollowstheactofthe

apprehensivefaculty;theobjectsareformallydifferent,andtheactsthatreachouttothose

objectsarealsoformallydifferent,andevenopposed.ForAquinas,“toapprehend”and“to

tendtowards”arenotthesameand,therefore,thefacultiesthatregardthoseoperations

needtobedistinct.

-Distinctionbetweenagentintellectandpossibleintellect.Thedistinctionbetween

agentintellectandpossibleintellectisalsoexplicitinAquinas:“Neverthelessthereisa

distinctionbetweenthepoweroftheactiveintellectandofthepassiveintellect:becauseas

regardsthesameobject,theactivepowerwhichmakestheobjecttobeinactmustbe

distinctfromthepassivepower,whichismovedbytheobjectexistinginact.”486Itisclear

thattheactionofthepassivepotencycanbeginwhentheactionoftheactivepotency

finishes;oncetheobjectisavailable(bytheactionoftheagentintellect),theotherpotency

canbemovedbyit.

48679,7,c.:“Diversificaturtamenpotentiaintellectusagentis,etintellectuspossibilis,quia

respectueiusdemobiecti,aliudprincipiumoportetessepotentiamactivam,quaefacitobiectumesseinactu;etaliudpotentiampassivam,quaemoveturabobiectoinactuexistente.”Sotheremustbetwopotenciesinthissense,butclearlynottwoapprehensivepotenciesintheintelligence,cf.82,5,c.:“Andthereforeinthewill,whichistheintellectualappetite,thereisnodifferentiationofappetitivepowers,sothattherebeintheintellectualappetiteanirasciblepowerdistinctfromaconcupisciblepower:justasneitheronthepartoftheintellectaretheapprehensivepowersmultiplied,althoughtheyareonthepartofthesenses.”[Etideonondiversificanturinipsa,quaeestappetitusintellectivus,aliquaepotentiaeappetitivae,utsitinappetituintellectivoaliapotentiairascibilis,etaliaconcupiscibilis,sicutetiamexparteintellectusnonmultiplicanturviresapprehensivae,licetmultiplicenturexpartesensus.]

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Letusexploresimilartexts:“Ourpassiveintellectisreducedfrompotentialitytoact

bysomebeinginact,thatis,bytheactiveintellect,whichisapowerofthesoul,aswehave

said;andnotbyaseparateintelligence,asproximatecause,althoughperchanceasremote

cause.”487Itisobviousthatwhatisattributedtotheagentintellectisthecapacityof

actualizingtheintellectwhichispassive,somethingwhich,ifitdoesnotneedtobe

attributedtoanotherseparateintellect,cancertainlynotbeattributedtothesamefaculty

ofunderstanding;St.Thomasintroducestheagentintellectasafacultyofthesoulprecisely

becausewhateverisinpotencycannotbereducedtoactifnotbysomethingthatisactual.

Moreover,theagentintellectdoesnotevendirectlyactualizethepossibleintellect,but

doessothroughthespecies.Theagentintellectistobeconsideredmorepreciselytheact

oftheintelligible(inanefficientsense,producingtheintelligiblemodeofbeing)andthe

species(impressae)themselvesthatwhichactualizethepossibleintellectasagentobject:

[Ourintellect]understandsitselfaccordingasitismadeactualbythespeciesabstractedfromsensiblethings,throughthelightoftheactiveintellect,whichnotonlyactuatestheintelligiblethingsthemselves,butalso,bytheirinstrumentality,actuatesthepassiveintellect.Thereforetheintellectknowsitselfnotbyitsessence,butbyitsact.488

Thepointofthearticleistodenythattheintellectcanunderstanditselfbyitself,

preciselybecauseitisinpotency.Theagentintellect,instead,whichcouldbeconsidered

“act,”isnotitselftheobjectbutrathertheactiveprincipleofthetrulyintelligibleobjects:48784,4ad3:“Dicendumquodintellectusnosterpossibilisreduciturdepotentiaadactum

peraliquodensactu,idestperintellectumagentem,quiestvirtusquaedamanimaenostrae,utdictumest,nonautemperaliquemintellectumseparatum,sicutpercausamproximam;sedfortesicutpercausamremotam.”

48887,1,c.:“…consequensestutsicseipsumintelligatintellectusnoster,secundumquodfitactuperspeciesasensibilibusabstractasperlumenintellectusagentis,quodestactusipsorumintelligibilium,eteismediantibusintellectuspossibilis.Nonergoperessentiamsuam,sedperactumsuumsecognoscitintellectusnoster.”

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Theessenceofanangelisanactinthegenusofintelligiblethings,andthereforeitisbothintellectandthethingunderstood.Henceanangelapprehendshisownessencethroughitself:notsothehumanmind,whichiseitheraltogetherinpotentialitytointelligiblethings—asisthepassiveintellect—oristheactofintelligiblethingsabstractedfromthephantasms—asistheactiveintellect.489

Itisclearthatneitherthepossibleintellectnortheagentintellectare“anactinthe

genusofintelligiblethings”becauseSt.Thomasisopposingthehumanintellect(andhere

heincludesbothfaculties)totheangelicintellectinthatrespect.But,thedistinction

betweenthetwohumanfacultiesisalsoclear:thepossibleintellectisabsolutelyinpotency

regardingtheintelligibleobjects,inpotencyofreceivingthem;andtheagentintellectis

“act”inacertainsense,butnotinsofarasitisitselfintelligible(intelligibiliumispluralhere),

butinsofarasitistheactiveprincipleoftheintelligibleobjects.490

In83,4,ob.3andad3,weseeagaintheword“intellectus”appliedtothe

intellectualfacultiesingeneraland,atthesametime,theirdistinctionas“twopotencies”:

“Thewillistheintellectualappetite.Butintheintellecttherearetwopowers—theactive

andthepassive.”491Theobjectionisnotchallengedinthatregard;thepossibleintellect

needsamovingobjectwhichisnotinactunlesstheagentintellectactualizesit;forthis

reason,therearetwopotenciesintheintellectualpartofthemind.Butregardingthewill,

anotherpotencyisnotrequiredbecausethemovingobjectisalreadyintheintellect:“The

48987,1ad2:“Essentiaangeliestsicutactusingenereintelligibilium,etideosehabetetut

intellectus,etutintellectum.UndeAngelussuamessentiamperseipsumapprehendit.Nonautemintellectushumanus,quivelestomninoinpotentiarespectuintelligibilium,sicutintellectuspossibilis;velestactusintelligibiliumquaeabstrahunturaphantasmatibus,sicutintellectusagens.”

490TheagentintellectasactusintelligibiliumwillbetreatedinmoredetailinChapter4,section1.

49183,4,ob.3:“Voluntasestappetitusintellectivus.Sedexparteintellectussuntduaepotentiae,scilicetagensetpossibilis.”

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intellectiscomparedtothewillasmovingthewill.Andthereforethereisnoneedto

distinguishinthewillanactiveandapassivewill.”492

Inthesameway,thementionof“two”potenciesrecursin85,1,ob.4,theobjection

whichgivesSt.Thomastheopportunitytodistinguishtwo“activities”intheagentintellect

itself(illuminationandabstraction).St.Thomas,inhisanswer,doesnotchallengethe

distinctionoftwopotencies,northedenialoftheattributionofabstractiontothepossible:

headdstotheagentintellectonemoreactivity,otherthantheonealreadyattributedin

theobjection.Theobjectionsays:

ThePhilosophersays(DeAnimaiii,5)therearetwothingsintheintellectualsoul—thepassiveintellectandtheactiveintellect.Butitdoesnotbelongtothepassiveintellecttoabstracttheintelligiblespeciesfromthephantasm,buttoreceivethemwhenabstracted.Neitherdoesitseemtobethefunctionoftheactiveintellect,whichisrelatedtothephantasm,aslightistocolor;sincelightdoesnotabstractanythingfromcolor,butratherstreamsontoit.Thereforeinnowaydoweunderstandbyabstractionfromphantasms.493

Theanswerbegins:“Notonlydoestheactiveintellectthrowlightonthephantasm:

itdoesmore;byitsownpoweritabstractstheintelligiblespeciesfromthe

phantasm.”494TherestofthisinterestingpassagewilloccupyusinthenextChapter.What

isimportantisthatSt.Thomasacceptsthechallengeoftheobjection;thatis,thatthereare

onlytwopotencies;now,ifneitherofthemdoesthejob,thereisnoabstraction.The49283,4ad3:“Intellectuscomparaturadvoluntatemutmovens.Etideononoportetin

voluntatedistinguereagensetpossible.”49385,1,ob.4:“UtdiciturinIIIDeAnima,inintellectivaanimasuntduo,scilicetintellectus

possibilis,etagens.Sedabstrahereaphantasmatibusspeciesintelligibilesnonpertinetadintellectumpossibilem,sedreciperespeciesiamabstractas.Sednecetiamvideturpertinereadintellectumagentem,quisehabetadphantasmatasicutlumenadcolores,quodnonabstrahitaliquidacoloribus,sedmagiseisinfluit.Ergonullomodointelligimusabstrahendoaphantasmatibus.”

49485,1ad4:“Phantasmataetilluminanturabintellectuagente;etiterumabeis,pervirtutemintellectusagentis,speciesintelligibilesabstrahuntur.”

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solutionisthatoneofthemdoesit,andallowstheothertobeactualizedwiththefruitof

itsown(theagentintellect’s)work.495

TherealdistinctioninAquinasissustainedbymetaphysicalprinciples,notbya

figureofspeech.496Potenciesaredistinctwhentheirformalobjectsaredistinct.Potencies

aredistinctwhenoneisproductiveofsomethingthattheotheronlyreceives.St.Thomas

speaksabout“duo.”Itistruethatthesouldoesnothavematter,forAquinas,andtherefore

thesetwodistinctpotenciescannotbepicturedasdifferentplacesorinstrumentsina

machine;however,neithercanonesurrendertothetemptationofimaginingthemasjust

onebigcurrenttowardstheworld.Theyaredifferent,accidental,formalperfectionsofthe

onesoul,unitedsubstantiallyinthesoulandhavingbetweenthemacertainorderwhich

preservesinadditionanoperationalunity.Butthereisarealdistinction.Distinctionsin

Aquinasareimportantand,sometimes,real.Forhim,forexample,thedistinctionbetween

essenceand(created)beingisreal,althoughitisimpossibletoseparatetheminreality.The

reasonforarealdistinction,then,isnotthattwothingscannotbeimaginedseparately

fromeachother,butthatoneofthemcannotbetheother;arealdistinctionisgroundedin

theessenceofeachmemberandintheprincipleofnon-contradiction.Forthisreason,if

oneunderstandswhateachofthesepotenciesmeansforAquinas,onerealizesthatthey

cannotbethesamefaculty,althoughtheysubsistinthesameintellectualsoul.

495Thedistinctionbetweenagentintellectandpossibleintellectispresentinotherworksof

Aquinas.SeeAppendix,Note19.496Inadifferentcontext,butperhapsrelevanttothepoint,cf.InIDeAnima6,92-94:“Now

inanyself-movertherearetwothingstobeconsidered,thethingmoving,andthethingmoved;andtheformercannotassuchbethesameasthelatter.”[Inmoventeetiamseipsumduosunt:unummovens,etaliudmotum:etimpossibileestquodilludquodestmovensmoveaturperse.]

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***

InthepresentChapter,theintentionhasbeentoshowthereceptivecharacterof

knowinginthesenseofareceptionofanobject–contentand,therefore,knowingas

perfectiveofthesubjectinitsradicaloriginalimperfection.Theconnectionwithour

previousfindingsisnotdifficulttosee.Theobjectofintelligenceistheintelligiblenatureof

things,whichisaperfectionsubsistingmateriallyinthecorporealthingsthemselves,and

differentfromtheirprincipleofindividuation.Thisintelligibleperfection,evenifitisnot

intelligibleinact,ispresentinthethingsthemselves;thekeytounderstandingthisisthe

distinctionbetweenintelligibleasperfection–content(distinctinturnfromthesensible

content)andintelligibleasmodeofbeingofthecontent.Thisisalsothesenseinwhich

knowingisreceptive:becausetheperfection–contentbelongstothethingitself,nottothe

intellect,thesoulisinpotencyofthiskindofperfectionand,therefore,growswithits

reception.

Allofthisneededtobesaidinordertoshowthat,forAquinas,theagentintellectis

notaformalapriori,whichwouldbeseenintheobjectasitsperfection–content.Hadit

notbeenshownthattheintelligibleisaperfectionbelongingtothethingitselfanddifferent

fromitssensiblecontent,itwouldnothavebeenclearthattheobjectofintelligenceis,at

thesametime,theparticularthingandtheuniversal(becausetheuniversalascontent

subsistsintheparticularthing).HaditnotbeenshownthatintelligibleinAquinasis

understoodintwosenses(thestateofabstractionandthequidditas),itwouldnothave

beenclearinwhatsenseanintelligibleperfectionsubsistsinamaterialthing.Atthesame

time,haditnotbeenshownthatunderstandingisreceptiveoftheintelligibleascontent,it

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couldhavebeensaidthattheintelligiblecontentispresentinthematerialthingas

belongingtoitbecauseoftheactivityofunderstanding.

Atthesametime,asseemsclear,thesefindingshelpinexplainingtheagentintellect

asametaphysicalaprioriofintellectualknowingasreceptiveofobjectivecontent,thatis,

asproductiveoftheintelligiblemodeofbeingoftheintelligiblecontent.Whatremainsto

besaidwillbeintroducedinthenextChapter.

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ChapterFour:TheThomisticAgentIntellectasaMetaphysicalAPrioriratherthanaFormalAPriori

Thisisthemomenttotakeadvantageofthepreviousclarificationstoaddressmore

directlythemainquestionofthisresearch:istheagentintellecttobeunderstoodasa

formalaprioriofknowingasanactivityofperformanceor,rather,asametaphysicala

prioriofintellectualknowingasreceptiveofobjectivecontent?Thatintellectualknowingin

Aquinasisnotproductivebutintentionallyreceptivehasalreadybeenaddresseddirectly.

Whatmustnowbeaddressedistheprecisecharacterizationoftheagentintellectinthe

textofAquinasasametaphysicalratherthanaformalapriori.

Aformalaprioriinintellectualknowingisbasicallyproductiveoftheuniversal–

intelligiblecontentassuch.Itisasubjectivefunctionwhich“makes”or“creates”the

intellectualobjectofknowingbyacertainorganizationorin-formationofthematerialdata

ofsensibleexperience.Itgives“form”tothe“matter”providedbythesenses,itorganizes

therawmaterialofsensibleexperienceandso,inthissense,makesitintelligible.Thebasic

assumptionisthattheunitythatcharacterizestheobjectofhumanunderstandingcannot

comefromexperience,forthesimplereasonthatexperienceisconsideredaphenomenon

withoutunity,asinKant.Theoriginofthatunityisthereforeapriori,andtheone

responsibleforthatunityisthesubject.Theuniversal,theoneinthemany,istheresultofa

subjectivefunction.ItseemsthatthissubjectivefunctioncouldberelatedtotheThomist

agentintellect.Thequestionbeforeusis:canthisrelationshipbegroundedinthetextofSt.

Thomas?

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ThisChapterisdividedintotwosections.Inthefirst,wewillexaminesometexts

thatmayseemtosupporttheclaimofAquinas’agentintellectasaformalapriori.Inthe

second,wewillexaminesomeofthetextsthatsupporttheviewofthisresearch,thatthe

agentintellectisametaphysicalapriori.

1)TheTextofSt.Thomas:theAgentIntellectasaFormalAPriori?

Wewillpresenttwogroupsoftexts.Thefirstgroupregardsseveral

characterizationsofthehumanintellectthatmayseemtosupporttheclaimofaformala

prioriinhumanunderstanding(ingeneral).Thesecondgroupdealsdirectlywithtextsthat

mayseemtosuggestthatthisformalaprioriisspecificallytheagentintellect.

1.1.InfinityintheHumanIntellect

Theintellectisinfiniteinacertainsense.Isthisinfinitya“virtual”infinity,pre-

containinginitselftheperfection-contentoftheknown?ItdoesnotseemsoinAquinas’

text.

Thehumanintellectcanbesaidtobe“infinite”onlyinpotency,andinpotencyof

receiving:“Thereforeinfinityispotentiallyinourmindthroughitsconsideringsuccessively

onethingafteranother:becauseneverdoesourintellectunderstandsomanythings,thatit

cannotunderstandmore.”497Thereisnothinglikeahabitualknowingoftheinfinite,

becauseitwouldsupposetheactualknowingoftheinfinite,whichforSt.Thomasis

impossible:

49786,2,c.:“Etideoinintellectunostroinveniturinfinituminpotentia,inaccipiendoscilicet

unumpostaliud,quianunquamintellectusnostertotintelligit,quinpossitpluraintelligere.”

211

Forthesamereasonwecannothavehabitualknowledgeoftheinfinite:becauseinushabitualknowledgeresultsfromactualconsideration:sincebyunderstandingweacquireknowledge,asissaidEthic.ii,1.Whereforeitwouldnotbepossibleforustohaveahabitofaninfinityofthingsdistinctlyknown,unlesswehadalreadyconsideredtheentireinfinitythereof,countingthemaccordingtothesuccessionofourknowledge:whichisimpossible.498

InObjectionFour,thefactthattheintellectisaninfinitevirtue(infinite=not

determinedbymatter,subsistentinitself)istakentoimplythatitisaninfinitevirtueina

differentsense,i.e.,asactivelyinfinite,withaninfiniteactivepotentialoninfinitethings.In

theanswer,St.Thomasconcedesthefirstpointoftheobjection,butclarifiesinwhat

precisesensethatinfinity(asnon-determinationbymatter)impliesaninfinityintheobject:

becausetheobjectalsoisnon-determinedbymatter(thequidditasinitsabstraction),itcan

becalled“infinite”,insofarasitcanbeunderstoodorpredicatedofinfiniteindividuals.The

infinityofthisuniversalisnotan“intensive”infinity(includinginitselfalltheperfectionsof

theindividuals)butaninfinityofindetermination(itisnotdeterminedtothisorthat

individual,butitcanrefertoallofthem).ThecompletetextoftheAdquartumsays:

Asourintellectisinfiniteinpower,sodoesitknowtheinfinite.Foritspowerisindeedinfiniteinasmuchasitisnotterminatedbycorporealmatter.Moreoveritcanknowtheuniversal,whichisabstractedfromindividualmatter,andwhichconsequentlyisnotlimitedtooneindividual,but,consideredinitself,extendstoaninfinitenumberofindividuals.499

49886,2,c.:“Eteademrationenonpossumusintelligereinfinitainhabitu.Innobisenim

habitualiscognitiocausaturexactualiconsideratione,intelligendoenimefficimurscientes,utdiciturinIIEthic.Undenonpossemushaberehabituminfinitorumsecundumdistinctamcognitionem,nisiconsideravissemusomniainfinita,numerandoeasecundumcognitionissuccessionem,quodestimpossibile.”

49986,2ad4:“Sicutintellectusnosterestinfinitusvirtute,itainfinitumcognoscit.Estenimvirtuseiusinfinita,secundumquodnonterminaturpermateriamcorporalem.Etestcognoscitivusuniversalis,quodestabstractumamateriaindividuali,etperconsequensnonfinituradaliquodindividuum,sed,quantumestdese,adinfinitaindividuaseextendit.”

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Therefore,infinityinhumanintellectcouldbeunderstoodintwosenses:first,asan

infinitepotencyofreceiving;second,asapotencyofreceivingsomethinginfinite,meaning

nowbyinfinite“undeterminedtothisorthatindividual.”

Itcouldbehelpfultoconsiderthat,forAquinas,theonlypotencythatpre-contains

virtuallyallperfection(asanactiveprinciple,asefficientcause)istheessenceofGod:“The

FirstActistheuniversalprincipleofallacts;becauseItisinfinite,virtually‘precontainingall

things,’asDionysiussays(Div.Nom.v).”500TheessenceofGodis,forSt.Thomas,distinct

fromcreatures,insofarasGodisintensivefullnessofperfection,andthecreatures

participatethatperfection.Thetextjustquotedcontinues:

WhereforethingsparticipateofItnotasapartofthemselves,butbydiffusionofItsprocessions.Nowaspotentialityisreceptiveofact,itmustbeproportionatetoact.ButtheactsreceivedwhichproceedfromtheFirstInfiniteAct,andareparticipationsthereof,arediverse,sothattherecannotbeonepotentialitywhichreceivesallacts,asthereisoneact,fromwhichallparticipatedactsarederived;forthenthereceptivepotentialitywouldequaltheactivepotentialityoftheFirstAct.501

Itisinthissense,asoneintensiveactwhichthemultiplethingsparticipate,thatGod

ispureactandthatthecreaturesareimperfectacts,mixedwiththeirrespective(multiple)

potencies.Thetext,oncethemisconceptionof“(one)purepotency”hasbeendiscarded,

continuesbydistinguishingtheintellectualpotencyfromthemateriaprima,as(both)

receptive(but)ofdifferentkindsofforms:“Nowthereceptivepotentialityinthe

intellectualsoulisotherthanthereceptivepotentialityoffirstmatter,asappearsfromthe50075,5ad1:“Primusactusestuniversaleprincipiumomniumactuum,quiaestinfinitum,

virtualiterinseomniapraehabens,utdicitDionysius.”50175,5ad1:“Undeparticipaturarebus,nonsicutpars,sedsecundumdiffusionem

processionisipsius.Potentiaautem,cumsitreceptivaactus,oportetquodactuiproportionetur.Actusverorecepti,quiproceduntaprimoactuinfinitoetsuntquaedamparticipationeseius,suntdiversi.Undenonpotestessepotentiaunaquaerecipiatomnesactus,sicutestunusactusinfluensomnesactusparticipatos,alioquinpotentiareceptivaadaequaretpotentiamactivamprimiactus.”

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diversityofthethingsreceivedbyeach.Forprimarymatterreceivesindividualforms;

whereastheintelligencereceivesabsoluteforms.”502Whatisimportantforusisthe

distinctionbetweentheactivepotencyofGod,containingvirtualiterallperfection,andany

othercreatedpotency,characterizedasreceptive(insofarascreatedpotenciesparticipate

thefirstintensiveact);andtheprecisecharacterizationoftheintellectasreceptiveof

absoluteforms,thatistosay,theuniversals.

Thereforetheinfinityofpossibilitiesofthehumanintellectregardsfirstofallthe

possibilityofalwaysreceivingmoreintime:“…throughitsconsideringsuccessivelyone

thingafteranother:becauseneverdoesourintellectunderstandsomanythings,thatit

cannotunderstandmore.”503Then,itimpliestheformalinfinityoftheuniversalreceived,

thatinitselfcanbereferredtoinfiniteindividuals:“Moreoveritcanknowtheuniversal,

whichisabstractedfromindividualmatter,andwhichconsequentlyisnotlimitedtoone

individual…”504Itisinanycaseaninfinitecapacityofreception,andnotanactiveorvirtual

potentiality,pre-containingtheperfectionoftheknown.505Itshouldbeclear,however,that

50275,5ad1:“Estautemaliapotentiareceptivainanimaintellectiva,apotentiareceptiva

materiaeprimae,utpatetexdiversitatereceptorum,nammateriaprimarecipitformasindividuales,intellectusautemrecipitformasabsolutas.”

50386,2,c.:“…inaccipiendoscilicetunumpostaliud,quianunquamintellectusnostertotintelligit,quinpossitpluraintelligere.”

50486,2ad4:“Etestcognoscitivusuniversalis,quodestabstractumamateriaindividuali,etperconsequensnonfinituradaliquodindividuum…”

505WhenIspeakaboutthisobjective“pre-containing”Icertainlyhaveinmindthelanguageofpre-apprehensioninsomeinterpretationsofAquinas,butIamnotaddressingthemdirectly.Inordertoaddressthem,aclarificationofwhatismeantby“pre-apprehension”intheseinterpretationswouldbenecessary,andthatisnotthepurposeofthisdissertation.Itisimportant,forexample,tounderstandinwhatsensetheyspeakofobject,whichcannotbesimplyidentifiedwithcontent:“Nowthispre-apprehensionitselfdoesnotattaintoanyobject[andnote27]Coreth:‘Knowingaboutsomethingelse,aboutanobjectintheoppostitionofsubjectandobjectisaderivative,nottheoriginalsenseofknowing’”(Cullen,77).Wewouldalsoneedtounderstanda

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St.Thomasisherespeakingofthepossibleintellect.But,becausetheagentintellectis

sometimesnotproperlydistinguishedfromthepossibleintellect,andthetextsthemselves

canbeusedtosupportthecounterclaim,theclarificationseemsuseful.

OtherworksofAquinasmayhelptoconfirmtheproposedinterpretation.Inthe

followingtextoftheContraGentiles,noseparatesubstance(exceptGodHimself)canbea

sufficientprincipleoftheknowledgeofallthings.Theangelsthemselvesneedtoreceive

intelligiblecontentfrominfusedspeciesinordertoknowthingsotherthanthemselves.This

doctrinestronglysuggeststhattheagentintellectdoesnotprecontaininsomesortall

intelligiblecontent.

Wemust,therefore,considerthat,sincenoneofthesesubstancesisbyitsessenceasufficientprincipleoftheknowledgeofallotherthings,theremustaccruetoeachofthem,overandaboveitsownsubstance,certainintelligiblelikenesses,wherebyeachofthemisenabledtoknowanotherinitspropernature.[…]Butsuchalikenessofallbeing,canbenothingotherthananinfinitenature:anaturenotdeterminedtosomespeciesorgenusofbeing,buttheuniversalprincipleofallbeingandthepowerproductiveofallbeing;andthis,aswasshowninBookI,isthedivinenaturealone.Indeed,noothernaturecanbetheuniversallikenessofallbeing,sinceeverynatureexceptGodislimitedtosomegenusandspeciesofbeing.506

St.Thomasdenies,aswehaveseen,anyactualityofthespeciestotheintellectin

itself:“Itfollowsthatthesoulasawholeisnotthe‘place’offorms,butonlythatpartofit

notionofbeingthatisinsomewaysubjective:“Inposingthisquestion,however,Rahneralsoarguesthatmanisalreadywithbeinginitstotality.Ifmanwerenot,hecouldnotaskaboutbeing”(Cullen,74).

506CGII,98,par.8-9:“Considerandumestigiturquod,cumnullahuiusmodisubstantiarumsecundumsuamessentiamsitsufficiensprincipiumcognitionisomniumaliarumrerum,unicuiqueearum,suprapropriamsubstantiam,oportetsuperadderequasdamintelligibilessimilitudines,perquasquaelibetearumaliaminproprianaturacognoscerepossit[…]Talisautemsimilitudototiusentisessenonpotestnisinaturainfinita,quaenondeterminaturadaliquamspeciemvelgenusentis,sedestuniversaleprincipiumetvirtusactivatotiusentis:qualisestsolanaturadivina,utinprimoostensumest.Omnisautemalianatura,cumsitterminataadaliquodgenusetspeciementis,nonpotestesseuniversalissimilitudototiusentis.”

215

whichlacksabodilyorgan,i.e.theintellect;andeventhispartdoesnot,assuch,possess

themactually,butpotentiallyonly.”507ItwouldbePlatonictoaffirmthatthesoulpossesses

allsciencealready,asifitwerehabitually:“Thisisagainst[…]Plato’sopinionthatthe

humansoulisbynatureinpossessionofauniversalknowledgewhichonlyitsunionwith

thebodyhascausedittoforget.(ThistheoryisimplicitinPlato’sreductionoflearningto

remembering.)”508

Thattheagentintellectdoesnotprecontaintheknowncanbetakenfromthe

followingtextalso.Theobjectionprovidesthecontextforthefollowinganswer:

Further,inordertohaveactivity,anagentandapatientalonearenecessary.Therefore,ifthepossibleintellect,whichisthepatientincognition,isapartofoursubstantialprinciple,aswaspreviouslyshown,andtheagentintellectisalsoapartofoursoul,itseemsthatwepossesswithinourselveseverythingnecessaryinorderthatwemaybeabletounderstand.509

Althoughoursoulpossessesanagentandapossibleintellect,neverthelesssomethingextrinsicisrequiredsothatwemaybeabletounderstand.Firstofall,indeed,weneedphantasms,derivedfromsensiblethings,bymeansofwhichthelikenessesofparticular(determinatarum)thingsarepresentedtotheintellect.Fortheagentintellectisnotanactinwhichthedeterminatespeciesofallthings[arepresentinordertoknow],anymorethanlightcan[determinesighttoparticular

507InIIIDeAnima1,233-236:“Nondicendumest,quodtotaanimasitlocusspecierum,sed

solumparsintellectiva,quaeorganumnonhabet.Necitaestlocusspecierum,quodhabeatactuspecies,sedpotentiatantum.”

508InIIIDeAnima3,53-60:“Etperhocexcluditur[…]opinioPlatonis,quiposuitnaturaliteranimamhumanamhabereomnemscientiam,sedesseeamquodammodooblitam,propterunionemadcorpus:dicens,quodaddiscerenihilaliudestquamreminisci.”Wewillexaminelaterthemeaningofthesoulas“quodammodoomnia.”

509Q.D.DeAnima,a.5,ob.6:“Adactionemaliquamnonrequiriturnisiagensetpatiens.Siigiturintellectuspossibilis,quisehabetutpatiensinintelligendoestaliquidsubstantiaenostrae,utpriusmonstratumest,etintellectusagensestaliquidanimaenostrae;videturquodinnobissufficienterhabeamusundeintelligerepossimus.”

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(determinatas)kindsofcolors,unlessthosesamecoloursdeterminingsightarepresent.]510

Thefollowingtext511isaveryclearindicationthat,forAquinas,theagentintellect

doesnotprecontaintheintelligiblecontent.Thequestioniswhethertheagentintellectis

oneforallhumanbeingsoreachhashisorherownagentintellect.Theobjectionwantsto

relatetheactualityoftheagentintellecttotheactualityoftheintelligiblecontent:either

theagentintellectpossessesthecontentwhichwillbeimpressedonthepossibleintellect

(andsothereisnoneedofabstraction),oritdoesnot;butifitdoesnotpossessthe

content,itcannotproducethecontentbyabstractionbecause,inordertofindwhatoneis

searchingfor,thereneedstobesomepreviousidea(=content)ofit.

Iftheagentintellectisapartofthesoul,itmusteitherbecreatedclothedorfilledwithspecies:andinthatcaseitplacesthosespeciesalsointhepossibleintellect,andwillnotneedtoabstractintelligiblespeciesfromthephantasms;orelseitiscreatednakedandlackinginspecies:andinthatcaseitwillnotbeeffectuallyabletoabstractspeciesfromphantasms,becauseitwillnotrecognizethatspecieswhichitisseeking,afterithasabstractedit,unlessitpreviouslyhadsomenotionofit.512

Aquinas’answerexplicitlyrejectstheideathattheagentintellectberelatedtothe

content.Topossessthecontentornotispropertotheknowingfaculty,whichisnotthe

510Q.D.DeAnima,a.5ad6:“Dicendumquodlicetinanimanostrasitintellectusagenset

possibilis,tamenrequirituraliquidextrinsecumadhocquodintelligerepossimus.Etprimoquidemrequirunturphantasmataasensibilibusaccepta,perquaerepraesententurintellectuirerumdeterminatarumsimilitudines.Namintellectusagensnonesttalisactusinquoomniumrerumspeciesdeterminataeaccipipossintadcognoscendum;sicutneclumendeterminarepotestvisumadspeciesdeterminatascolorum,nisiadsintcoloresdeterminantesvisum.”

511DeSpirit.Creat.,a.10,ob.15etad15.512DeSpirit.Creat.,a.10,ob.15:“Siintellectusagensestaliquidanimae,oportetquodvelsit

creatusvestitusseuopulentusspeciebus,etsicillasspeciesponitetiaminintellectumpossibilem,etnonindigebitabstraherespeciesintelligibilesaphantasmatibus;autcreatusestnudusetcarensspeciebus,etsicnoneritefficaxadabstrahendumspeciesaphantasmatibus,quianoncognoscetillamquamquaerit,postquameamabstraxerit,nisipriusaliquamrationemhabuerit.”

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agentintellectbutthepossibleintellect.ForAquinas,theagentintellectdoesnotinany

wayprecontaintheintelligiblecontent:513

Itisincorrecttosaythattheagentintellectisnakedorclothed,fullofspeciesoremptyofthem.Fortobefilledwithspeciesischaracteristicofthepossibleintellect,buttocausethemischaracteristicoftheagentintellect.Nowitmustnotbesaidthattheagentintellectunderstandsinisolationfromthepossibleintellect,butthatthemanunderstandsbymeansofboth…514

1.2.“Quodammodoomnia”

ThisAristotelianphrasecouldalsobeusedtosupporttheideathattheintellectpre-

containsinsomewaytheknown.Somerecurrencesofthisphrasewillbenoted,with

Aquinas’correspondingexplanations.Themostimportant,perhaps,isthefollowing

becauseitrelatesthischaracteristicofhumanknowingtoGodaspre-containingthe

perfectionofeverything:

Butinthosethingswhichhaveknowledge,eachoneisdeterminedtoitsownnaturalbeingbyitsnaturalform,insuchamannerthatitisneverthelessreceptiveofthespeciesofotherthings:forexample,sensereceivesthespeciesofallthingssensible,andtheintellect,ofallthingsintelligible,sothatthesoulofmanis,inaway,allthingsbysenseandintellect:andthereby,thosethingsthathaveknowledge,inaway,approachtoalikenesstoGod,‘inWhomallthingspre-exist,’asDionysiussays.515

513Thattheoriginofthecontentisinsensibilitywillbemorespecificallytreatedinthis

Chapter,section2.514DeSpirit.Creat.,a.10ad15:“Inconvenienterdiciturintellectusagensnudusvelvestitus

plenusspeciebusvelvacuus.Implerienimspeciebusestintellectuspossibilissedfacereeasestintellectusagentis.Nonestautemdicendumquodintellectusagensseorsumintelligatabintellectupossibili:sedhomointelligitperutrumque…”

51580,1,c.:“Inhabentibusautemcognitionem,sicdeterminaturunumquodqueadpropriumessenaturaleperformamnaturalem,quodtamenestreceptivumspecierumaliarumrerum,sicutsensusrecipitspeciesomniumsensibilium,etintellectusomniumintelligibilium,utsicanimahominissitomniaquodammodosecundumsensumetintellectum,inquoquodammodocognitionemhabentiaadDeisimilitudinemappropinquant,inquoomniapraeexistunt,sicutDionysiusdicit.”

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Ashasalreadybeensuggested,516itisclearthatquodammodoomniaimplies

specificallythecapacityofreceivingallsensibleandintelligibleperfectionsproportionateto

thesepotencies.Itisalsoclearthat,inthisway,thebeingspossessingknowledgecome

closertotheperfectionofGodinsofarastheyprogressfromthepossessionoftheirown

specificformonlytothepossessionofotherformsaswell.Thesimilarity(quodammodo)

comesfromthefactthatthoseperfections,nowintentionallypresentintheknower,were

alreadyvirtuallycontainedinGod.

Itseemsbettertointerpretthistextastalkingabouttheactualreceptionofthe

knownperfections,ratherthanastalkingaboutmerelythepotencyofreceivingthem.If

thisisthecase,thenthetextmeans“utsicanimahominissitomniaquodammodo,”thatis

tosay,“sic”=byreceivingthespeciesofallsensibleandintelligibleobjects.This

interpretationwouldmakebettersenseofthesimilaritywithGod“inquoomnia

praeexistunt”inact(becausethemerelypotentialsimilaritywouldbealessersimilarity)

andoftheprogressimpliedbytheword“appropinquant”(althoughitcouldalsomeana

static-metaphysicalproximity).

ThisAristotelianphrase,however,isusedbyAquinasinotherinstanceswiththe

precisemeaningofthesoulbeingallthingsinpotency.In84,2,ObjectionTworequiresthat

thesoulknowsthecorporealthingsbyitself.Thereasonisthatthesoulisallthingsand,

therefore,hasalsothenatureofthecorporealthings,andsinceknowingisbythelike,ergo:

“ThePhilosophersays(DeAnimaiii,8)that‘thesoul,afterafashion,iseverything.’Since,

therefore,likeisknownbylike,itseemsthatthesoulknowscorporealthingsthrough

516Cf.Chapter3,sections1,3and5.

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itself.”517ButAristotle,accordingtoAquinas,doesnotmeantosaythatthesoulisall

thingsasifitwouldhavetheperfectionofallthingsinact:

Aristotledidnotholdthatthesoulisactuallycomposedofallthings,asdidtheearlierphilosophers;518hesaidthatthesoulisallthings,‘afterafashion,’forasmuchasitisinpotentialitytoall—throughthesenses,toallthingssensible—throughtheintellect,toallthingsintelligible.519

ForAquinas,themistakemadebytheNaturalPhilosophersisnotonlythatthe

knownisactualintheknower,butthatthisactualityis“natural,”thatistosay,thatthe

perfectionoftheknownisintheknowerwitharealandnaturalbeing(thefirstmodeof

beingofDeVer.2,2).Still,Aquinas’pointisthatthesoul,inknowing,isallthingsonlyin

potency,andasmuchinpotencyofthesensibleasoftheintelligible.Thatthispotencyis

potencyofreceivingratherthananactivepotencyhasalreadybeenshownintheprevious

text.Inanycase,theAristoteliantextasusedbyAquinasdoesnotsupporttheideaofthe

intellectas“pre-containing”inacertainwaytheperfectionoftheknown:potencyof

receivingcontent(eveneverypossiblecontent)impliespreciselythatthecontentisnotyet

inthepotencyitself.ForAquinas,thepossibleintellectcanalsobe“tabularasa”exactly

becauseitisallthingsonly“quodammodo.”Thattobeinpotencyofsomethingistopre-

51784,2,ob.2:“Philosophusdicit,inIIIDeAnima,quodanimaquodammodoestomnia.

Cumergosimilesimilicognoscatur,videturquodanimaperseipsamcorporaliacognoscat.”518Cf.InIDeAnima12,8-16.51984,2ad2:“Aristotelesnonposuitanimamesseactucompositamexomnibus,sicut

antiquinaturales;seddixitquodammodoanimamesseomnia,inquantumestinpotentiaadomnia;persensumquidemadsensibilia,perintellectumveroadintelligibilia.”

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containit,inacertainsense,mightalsobesaid,butsuchanexplanationdoesnotseemto

fosterabetterunderstandingofAquinas.520

That,forAquinas,theintellectis“tabularasa”insofarasitdoesnotprecontainany

ofitsobjects,canbetakenfromotherworksaswell.521Itisnotdifficulttofindagreement

withotherauthors.522

1.3.TheProcessofLearning

Isnottheprocessoflearningaproofthatscience(aswhatisknownobjectively)

comes,inacertainsense,fromourselves?Infact,whenwelearn,wedonotreceiveinfused

520Thatthesoulis“quodammodoomnia”inpotencyonlyisclearalsoinInIIIDeAnima7,

28-36;cf.InIIIDeAnima7,54-61(wherethecomparisonwiththesensesinthereceptivityoftheformsofallthingscanalsobeseen);InIIIDeAnima1,170-180(seetextinAppendix,Note23).

521Cf.InIIIDeAnima1,131-139:“Anythingthatisinpotencywithrespecttoanobject,andabletoreceiveitintoitself,is,assuch,withoutthatobject;thusthepupiloftheeye,beingpotentialtocoloursandabletoreceivethem,isitselfcolourless.Butourintellectissorelatedtotheobjectsitunderstandsthatitisinpotencywithrespecttothem,andcapableofbeingaffectedbythem(assenseisrelatedtosensibleobjects).Thereforeitmustitselflackallthosethingswhichofitsnatureitunderstands.”(translator’sparentheses)[Omneenim,quodestinpotentiaadaliquidetreceptivumeius,careteoadquodestinpotentia,etcuiusestreceptivum;sicutpupilla,quaeestinpotentiaadcolores,etestreceptivaipsorum,estcarensomnicolore:sedintellectusnostersicintelligitintelligibilia,quodestinpotentiaadeaetsusceptivuseorum,sicutsensussensibilium:ergocaretomnibusillisrebusquasnatusestintelligere.];InIIIDeAnima3,45-53:“And[thereisalso]thechangewhichimpliesnothingmorethanareceptionofformsfromoutsidethechangedthing.Themind,then,iscalledpassivejustinsofarasitisinpotency,somehow,tointelligibleobjectswhicharenotactualinituntilunderstoodbyit.Itislikeasheetofpaperonwhichnowordisyetwritten,butmanycanbewritten.Suchistheconditionofthe[possible]intellect,solongas[nothingoftheintelligibleobjectsisactualinit,butonlyinpotency].”[Etestaliquodpati,quoddicitursecundumreceptionemtantum.Intellectusigiturdiciturpati,inquantumestquodammodoinpotentiaadintelligibilia,etnihilestactueorumantequamintelligat.Oportetautemhocsicesse,sicutcontingitintabula,inquanihilestactuscriptum,sedplurapossuntineascribi.Ethocetiamacciditintellectuipossibili,quianihilintelligibiliumestineoactu,sedpotentiatantum.];Q.D.DeAnima,a.2,ob.17;DeSpirit.Creat.,a.9,c.(thesetwolasttextsinAppendix,Note24).

522Cf.Lambert,85(aftertalkingoftheinfusedknowledgeofangels):“Theposibleintellect,ontheotherhand,knowsnothingnaturallyandmustacquireeachoneofitsspeciesseparately”;93:“Thehumanintellectisoriginallyemptyandsomustacquirethespecieswhichactuateit”;Sellés(cf.EIA,272)placesamongthe“Thomisticnegationsregardingtheagentintellect”theclaimthatit“doesnothaveinitselfanyintelligiblespecies.”

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speciesfromourteacher.Ifthosenewideasdonotcomefromourselves,wheredothey

comefrom?WewillrefertotwotextsofAquinasthatmaybeenlightening.

ThefirstoneisfromthearticlewhereAquinasdeniesthatweunderstandthingsby

innateideas.Thethirdobjectionwillpointoutthat,bymeansofquestionsinanorderly

fashion,apersonwhohadnotpreviouslyacquiredcertainknowledgerespondstruly(as

oneknowing)aboutwhatisbeingquestioned.TheanswerofSt.Thomasisthefollowing:“If

questionsbeputinanorderlyfashiontheyproceedfromuniversalself-evidentprinciplesto

whatisparticular.Nowbysuchaprocessknowledgeisproducedinthemindofthelearner.

Whereforewhenheanswersthetruthtoasubsequentquestion,thisisnotbecausehehad

knowledgepreviously,butbecausehethuslearnsforthefirsttime.”523Thetextseemsto

suggestthatthequestionsprovoketherightphantasmwhichallowsthediscipletolearnex

novowhathedidnotknowbefore.Theothertextappearstopointinthesamedirection:

Secondly,anyonecanexperiencethisofhimself,thatwhenhetriestounderstandsomething,heformscertainphantasmstoservehimbywayofexamples,inwhichasitwereheexamineswhatheisdesirousofunderstanding.Forthisreasonitisthatwhenwewishtohelpsomeonetounderstandsomething,welayexamplesbeforehim,fromwhichheformsphantasmsforthepurposeofunderstanding.524

ForAquinas,itseemsevidentthat,becausethelightoftheagentintellectis

connaturalandcannotfail,yetrequiresasensiblephantasmtoabstract,trueunderstanding

ofthingsispossibleonlyaslongastherightphantasmisformed.Thephenomenonof52384,3ad3:“Ordinatainterrogatioproceditexprincipiiscommunibuspersenotis,ad

propria.Pertalemautemprocessumscientiacausaturinanimaaddiscentis.Undecumverumrespondetdehisdequibussecundointerrogatur,hocnonestquiapriuseanoverit;sedquiatunceadenovoaddiscit.”

52484,7,c.:“Secundo,quiahocquilibetinseipsoexperiripotest,quodquandoaliquisconaturaliquidintelligere,formataliquaphantasmatasibipermodumexemplorum,inquibusquasiinspiciatquodintelligerestudet.Etindeestetiamquodquandoaliumvolumusfacerealiquidintelligere,proponimuseiexempla,exquibussibiphantasmataformarepossitadintelligendum.”

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teachingisnotexplainedbythepresenceofinnateideas,norbytheinfusionofspecies;

rather,teachingistheartofhelpingthelearnertoformtherightphantasm,sothatthe

learner’sowninteriorlight(theagentintellect)abstractstheideawhichwasalreadyinthe

mindoftheteacher,andispresent,bywayofthelatter’sart,inthephantasmproducedfor

thelearner.Inanycase,thereisnoindicationthatAquinasissuggestingapre-

comprehensionorimplicitknowledgeofthingsinthesetexts.525

1.4.TheNaturalDesiretoKnow

OnemightbetemptedtousethenaturaldesiretoknowinAquinas’textasabasis

forsuggestingaformalapriori.Itistruethatwhatisdesiredmustbeknowninacertain

senseand,therefore,anaturaldesiretoknowthingsdoesseemtoimplyacertain

knowledgeofthem.

Aquinasalwaysmakesacleardistinctionbetweenthenaturalappetiteandthe

appetitewhichfollowsanapprehension:

Someinclinationfollowseveryform:forexample,fire,byitsform,isinclinedtorise,andtogenerateitslike.Now,theformisfoundtohaveamoreperfectexistenceinthosethingswhichparticipateknowledgethaninthosewhichlackknowledge.Forinthosewhichlackknowledge,theformisfoundtodetermineeachthingonlytoits

525Cf.alsothetextpreviouslystudied(title:“Infinityinthehumanintellect”),DeSpirit.

Creat.,a.10,ob.15etad15.InCGII,75,par.15wefindsimilarreflections:“Andbyproposingsensibleexamples,fromwhichthephantasmsnecessaryforthedisciple’sunderstanding[maybeformed]inthesoul.Andsincetheoutwardactionoftheteacherwouldhavenoeffectwithouttheinwardprincipleofknowledge,whosepresenceinusweowetoGod…”[Proponendoexemplasensibilia,exquibusinanimadiscipuliformenturphantasmatanecessariaadintelligendum.Etquiaexterioroperatiodocentisnihiloperareturnisiadessetprincipiumintrinsecumscientiae,quodinestnobisdivinitus…]Thelatterprincipiumistheagentintellect,whichisnecessaryonthesideofthesubjectinordertomakethephantasmsintelligible.

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ownbeing—thatis,toitsnature.Thereforethisnaturalformisfollowedbyanaturalinclination,whichiscalledthenaturalappetite.526

Thenaturalappetiteisthatwhichfollowsthenaturalform:itisacertaintendency

towardspreservingthatform’sbeing,andtowardsthethingsthatarenaturaltothatform

(forthefiretogoup,intheexample).Theappetitefollowinganapprehensionisthe

tendencytowardstheapprehendedform,notasknown(inwhichsenseitisalready

possessed)butasreal,astheperfectionoftheotherwhichisfittingtothesubject.

Moreover,thenaturalappetitefollowseverynaturalform,bethatformsubstantialor

accidental.Thatiswhythenaturalappetitebelongsaswelltotheintellectualfaculty:

intelligencedesiresitsownperfectionwithnaturalappetite.Aquinassays:

The‘naturalappetite’isthatinclinationwhicheachthinghas,ofitsownnature,forsomething;whereforebyitsnaturalappetiteeachpowerdesiressomethingsuitabletoitself.Butthe‘animalappetite’resultsfromtheformapprehended;thissortofappetiterequiresaspecialpowerofthesoul—mereapprehensiondoesnotsuffice.Forathingisdesiredasitexistsinitsownnature,whereasintheapprehensivepoweritexistsnotaccordingtoitsownnature,butaccordingtoitslikeness.Whenceitisclearthatsightdesiresnaturallyavisibleobjectforthepurposeofitsactonly—namely,forthepurposeofseeing;buttheanimalbytheappetitivepowerdesiresthethingseen,notmerelyforthepurposeofseeingit,butalsoforotherpurposes.Butifthesouldidnotrequirethingsperceivedbythesenses,exceptonaccountoftheactionsofthesenses,thatis,forthepurposeofsensingthem;therewouldbenoneedforaspecialgenusofappetitivepowers,sincethenaturalappetiteofthepowerswouldsuffice.527

52680,1,c.:“Quamlibetformamsequituraliquainclinatio,sicutignisexsuaformainclinatur

insuperioremlocum,etadhocquodgeneretsibisimile.Formaauteminhisquaecognitionemparticipant,altiorimodoinveniturquaminhisquaecognitionecarent.Inhisenimquaecognitionecarent,inveniturtantummodoformaadunumessepropriumdeterminansunumquodque,quodetiamnaturaleuniuscuiusqueest.Hancigiturformamnaturalemsequiturnaturalisinclinatio,quaeappetitusnaturalisvocatur.”

52778,1ad3:“Adtertiumdicendumquodappetitusnaturalisestinclinatiocuiuslibetreiinaliquid,exnaturasua,undenaturaliappetituquaelibetpotentiadesideratsibiconveniens.Sedappetitusanimalisconsequiturformamapprehensam.Etadhuiusmodiappetitumrequiriturspecialisanimaepotentia,etnonsufficitsolaapprehensio.Resenimappetiturproutestinsua

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Also,inthislattertext,itisclearboththatthenaturalappetitedoesnotimplya

distinctfaculty,andthattheappetitefollowingapprehension,infact,needsadistinct

faculty.Further,thereisnoconfusionbetweenthenaturalappetiteoftheobjectandthe

appetitivefaculty,becausewhatisdesiredineachcaseisformallydifferent:theobjectin

ordertoknow(theperfectionofthecognitivefacultyitself),versustheobjectinitself(the

perfectionoftheobjectasfittingtothesubjectalsoinotherrespects).Significantly,the

appetitivefacultycanalsodesiretoknowsomething,butinthiscaseknowingisdesiredas

aparticulargoodofthesubject,ratherthanforthegoodofthefacultyitself.Similar

reflectionsarefoundinthefollowingtext:

Eachpowerofthesoulisaformornature,andhasanaturalinclinationtosomething.Whereforeeachpowerdesiresbythenaturalappetitethatobjectwhichissuitabletoitself.Abovewhichnaturalappetiteistheanimalappetite,whichfollowstheapprehension,andbywhichsomethingisdesirednotassuitabletothisorthatpower,suchassightforseeing,orsoundforhearing;butsimplyassuitabletotheanimal.528

Whatistheperfectiondesiredbyintelligencewithnaturalappetite?Itisitsnatural

perfectionasfaculty,thatistosay,tounderstand.Theintellectdesirestoknow;thewill,

instead,desireswhatisknown,onceitisknown.Theintellectdesirestoknowasa

subjectiveperfection(naturalappetite);thewilldesirestheknownasanobjective

natura,nonestautemsecundumsuamnaturaminvirtuteapprehensiva,sedsecundumsuamsimilitudinem.Undepatetquodvisusappetitnaturalitervisibilesolumadsuumactum,scilicetadvidendum,animalautemappetitremvisampervimappetitivam,nonsolumadvidendum,sedetiamadaliosusus.Siautemnonindigeretanimarebusperceptisasensu,nisipropteractionessensuum,scilicetuteassentiret;nonoporteretappetitivumponerespecialegenusinterpotentiasanimae,quiasufficeretappetitusnaturalispotentiarum.”

52880,1ad3:“Dicendumquodunaquaequepotentiaanimaeestquaedamformaseunatura,ethabetnaturaleminclinationeminaliquid.Undeunaquaequeappetitobiectumsibiconveniensnaturaliappetitu.Supraquemestappetitusanimalisconsequensapprehensionem,quoappetituraliquidnonearationequaestconveniensadactumhuiusvelilliuspotentiae,utpotevisioadvidendumetauditioadaudiendum;sedquiaestconvenienssimpliciteranimali.”

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perfection(appetitefollowingapprehension).Theintellect’stranscendentalorientationto

knowand,inthatsense,toknowthings,issimplyitsnature,thatwhichmakesit“intellect.”

Thenaturaldesireortendency,then,comesfromthefactthattheintellectisabletoknow,

apotencyofknowing.Thisnaturaltendencydoesnotimplythattheintellectalready

knows;thetendencyistherefromthebeginningwhiletheintellectstilldoesnotknow,and

isstillthereonceithasknown.529

Moreover,thisnaturaldesiretoknowshouldnotbeconfoundedwiththeconscious

desirewhichonemayhavetoalwaysknowmore.530InthemindofAquinas,althoughthis

latterdesirecouldbecalled“natural,”insofarasitisaccordingtohumannature,it

evidentlypresupposesknowledge.Theonlynaturalintellectualdesirepreviousto

knowledgeisthenaturalappetite,andthisnaturalappetite,inthetextofAquinas,doesnot

implyanyformalanticipationoftheobject.Inotherwords,forAquinas,theappetitewhich

impliesknowledgeisnotthenaturalappetiteoftheintellect,butthewill;andthenatural

appetiteoftheintellectisnottheappetiteoftheobjectinitself,buttheappetiteofthe

faculty’sperfection.Thedistinctionbetweencontentandmodeofbeinginthespecieshere

provescrucialinunderstandingthemindofSt.Thomas.529Thisistrueinsofarasthenaturalappetiteappliesalsototheformthatispossessed.530Afurtherdistinctionmaybemadebetweenthedesireofknowingmoreaboutanobject

(say,moreaboutMathematics)orofsimplyknowingmore,being“morelearned.”Inbothcases,thisappetiteimpliesknowledge,andalthoughthisisaccordingtothenaturalappetite,itseemstomethatknowingisdesiredmoreasagoodofthesubjectthanasagoodofthefacultyitself.Inthefirstcase,thedrivetoknowmoreabouttheobjectseemsmorelikeanaturaldesire(asadesireofknowingMathematics);butbecausewhatisdesiredisknowingMathematicsassomethinggood,orbettersaid,thegoodofknowingMathematics(say,forthe“pleasure”itimplies),Ithinkitwouldbemoreaccuratetosaythatitisanelicitdesireofthewill.Itcouldbegranted,still,thatthefacultywhichknowsMathematicswillalso“desire”toknowmoreofitwithnaturalappetite,andwill“repose”inthepossessionofitsknowledge;butitdoesnotseemthatthisdesirecanbeidentifiedwiththeconsciousorelicitdesire.

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1.5.“Naturaliternotavelindita”

Despitetheclearindicationsthat,forAquinas,therearenoinnateideas,his

affirmationofprinciplesnaturallyknownor“included”(indita)inthemindmayraisethe

questionofacertain“objective”presenceofthoseprinciplesintheintellectprevioustoany

actofknowing.Relevanttextstobeexaminednowfollow.

In79,12,c.,itisclearthat,forSt.Thomas,therearesomenaturallyknown

principlesfromwhichreasoningmustbegin:

Man'sactofreasoning,sinceitisakindofmovement,proceedsfromtheunderstandingofcertainthings—namely,thosewhicharenaturallyknownwithoutanyinvestigationonthepartofreason,asfromanimmovableprinciple—andendsalsoattheunderstanding,inasmuchasbymeansofthoseprinciplesnaturallyknown,wejudgeofthosethingswhichwehavediscoveredbyreasoning.[…]Thereforewemusthave,(imprintedin)usbynature,notonlyspeculativeprinciples,butalsopracticalprinciples.531

Now,inthistext,itissaidthatthoseprinciplescomewithoutinvestigation,not

withoutabstraction.Amovement,aspassagefrompotencytoact,requiressomethingin

actinordertohappen.Therefore,thebeginningofreasoningasmovementcannotbe

reasoningitself,butmustbesomethingimmobile,anactualperfection(here,thefirst

principles).Grantedthatthefirstbeginningofamovementcannotbetheresultofa

specificallyequalmovement,itmaywellbetheresultofanotherkindofpassagefrom

53179,12,c.:“Ratiocinatiohominis,cumsitquidammotus,abintellectuprogreditur

aliquorum,scilicetnaturaliternotorumabsqueinvestigationerationis,sicutaquodamprincipioimmobili,etadintellectumetiamterminatur,inquantumiudicamusperprincipiapersenaturaliternota,dehisquaeratiocinandoinvenimus[…]Oportetigiturnaturaliternobisesseindita,sicutprincipiaspeculabilium,itaetprincipiaoperabilium.”

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potencytoact,suchasabstraction.Thefactthatthosefirstprinciplesareprinciples,ina

certainsense,doesnotmeanthattheyarenotaresultinadifferentsense.532

Moreover,itissaidthatthesefirstprinciplesare“naturallyknown,”notthatthey

areinnate.“Naturallyknown”maysimplymeanknownaccordingtonature,accordingto

thenaturaloperationofthehumanfaculties.

Atthesametime,includedorinditadoesnotnecessarilymean“innate”,butitmay

refertothepresenceofthoseprinciplesinthemind.Ifknowingisreceptive,“naturally

included”and“naturallyknown”meanthesamething;oncesomethingisknown,itis“in”

themindbymeansofthespecies.

ThislineofinterpretationismoreconsistentwithwhatSt.Thomassaysfour

questionslater:

532InthissenseshouldbeunderstoodInIIDeAnima11,224-231:“Whenamanacquires

knowledge[…]therearetwoprinciplesinvolved:anintrinsicone,whichamanuseswhenhefindsthingsoutforhimself;andanextrinsicone,aswhenhelearnsfromothers.Butinbothcasesapotencyisactualisedbysomethingalreadyinact.Thelightoftheagentintellectgivesamanimmediateactualknowledgeofthefirstprincipleswhichweknowbynature…”[Homoenimacquiritscientiam,etaprincipiointrinseco,duminvenit,etaprincipioextrinseco,dumaddiscit.Utrobiqueautemreduciturdepotentiainactum,abeoquodestactu.Homoenimperlumenintellectusagentis,statimcognoscitactuprimaprincipianaturalitercognita…]BesidesthefactthatSt.Thomasissaying“statim”,andthereforedoesnotnecessarilyimplyapre-containingoftheprinciples,hispointhereisthattheactualityoftheprinciplesalreadyknownallowsthe“inveniens”todrawconclusionsfromthem.Whatisprincipleinacertainsense(oftheconclusions),canbearesultinadifferentsense(oftheagentintellect’sactiononthephantasms).Cf.InIIDeAnima12,17-26:“Now,asasubjectmovesfromprimarypotencyintoprimaryactualitywhenitacquiresknowledgethroughteaching,sotooasubject’sprimarypotencytothepossessionofasense-facultyisactualisedbyhisbirth.Butwhereasasense-facultyisnaturaltoeveryanimal,—sothatintheactofbeinggenerateditacquiresasense-facultyalongwithitsownspecificnature—thecaseisnotthesamewithintellectualknowledge;thisisnotnaturallyinborninman;ithastobeacquiredthrough[investigation]anddiscipline.”[Sicutautemdepotentiaprimaaliquidmutaturinprimumactum,dumacquiritscientiamperdoctrinam;itadeprimapotentiaadsensum,aliquidmutaturinactum,utscilicethabeatsensumpergenerationem.Sensusautemnaturaliterinestanimali:undesicutpergenerationemacquiritpropriamnaturam,etspeciem,itaacquiritsensum.Secusautemestdescientia,quaenoninesthominipernaturamsedacquiriturperinventionemetdisciplinam.]

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Thecognitivesoulisinpotentialitybothtotheimageswhicharetheprinciplesofsensing,andtothosewhicharetheprinciplesofunderstanding.ForthisreasonAristotle(DeAnimaiii,4)heldthattheintellectbywhichthesoulunderstandshasnoinnatespecies,butisatfirstinpotentialitytoallsuchspecies.533

Afterdenyingthepresenceofspecies“naturallyincluded”,however,St.Thomas

doesnothesitatetospeakaboutthingsthatareknownnaturally,preciselythefirst

principles.InshowingtheinconsistencyofPlato’sposition,thatthesoulisnaturally(from

thebeginning)endowedwithspecies,St.Thomassays:“Because,ifthesoulhasanatural

knowledgeofallthings,itseemsimpossibleforthesoulsofartoforgettheexistenceof

suchknowledgeasnottoknowitselftobepossessedthereof:fornomanforgetswhathe

knowsnaturally;that,forinstance,thewholeislargerthanthepart,andsuchlike.”534

St.Thomas,therefore,isaffirmingthepresenceofprinciples“naturaliterindita”and

thendenyingthepresenceofspecies“naturaliterindita.”ItisnotrelevantherethatSt.

Thomasspeaksinitiallyofprinciplesandthenofspeciesbecause,forAquinas,thespecies

arethemeanstounderstandeverything.Theuseofthesamewording,however,shouldnot

confusewhomeverisattentivetotheclearcontextinwhicheachofthestatementsoccurs.

Inthefirsttext,535St.Thomasisnotspeakingabouttheoriginoftheprinciples,butabout

theoriginofreasoning.Reasoningisamovementoftheintellectfromsomethingalready

knowntosomethingunknown,andthereforeitimpliessomethingknownasprinciple.The53384,3,c.:“Oportetdicerequodanimacognoscitivasitinpotentiatamadsimilitudines

quaesuntprincipiasentiendi,quamadsimilitudinesquaesuntprincipiaintelligendi.EtpropterhocAristotelesposuitquodintellectus,quoanimaintelligit,nonhabetaliquasspeciesnaturaliterinditas,sedestinprincipioinpotentiaadhuiusmodispeciesomnes.”

53484,3,c.:“Sihabetanimanaturalemnotitiamomnium,nonvideturessepossibilequodhuiusnaturalisnotitiaetantamoblivionemcapiat,quodnesciatsehuiusmodiscientiamhabere,nullusenimhomoobliviscitureaquaenaturalitercognoscit,sicutquodomnetotumsitmaiussuaparte,etaliahuiusmodi.”

53579,12.

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knownwhichisprincipleofthismovementcannotbethefruitofreasoning,exactlybecause

itisitsprinciple.Theknownmust,then,betheresultofthefirstnaturalactualizationofthe

intellect,andnotofthemovementoftheintellectasalreadyperfect.ThatiswhySt.

Thomassays:“naturaliternotorumabsqueinvestigationerationis.”Here,naturallymeans

“withoutinvestigation,”becauseSt.Thomasisdealingwiththeprincipleofinvestigationas

movement.Naturallyalsomeansthatitisanactualizationaccordingtonature,insofarasit

depends,notontheperfectionofaparticularsubject,butontheperfectionofnatureitself,

andheretheperfectionoftheintellectualfacultiesinordertoknowreality.Here,principles

naturaliterinditasimplymeansprinciplesthatarepresentinthemind,notasaresultofthe

movementoftheintellectinact,butasaresultofthenaturalfirstactualizationofthe

intellect.

Inthesecondtext,St.Thomasisexpresslydenyingthattheknowledgewehaveof

corporealthingscomesfromspeciesincludednaturally(=exnaturaasfromthefirstorigin)

inthemind.Laterinthequestion,St.Thomasaffirmsthatthisknowledgecomesfrom

speciesthatareabstractedfromthephantasm.Thatistosay,thespeciesthatarethe

meansofhumanknowledgearenotready-madeinthemind,butneedtobeabstracted

fromthephantasmofsensitivity.WhatAquinasaffirmshereisthatthereasonforthelack

ofspecies“naturallyincluded”isthattheintellectisinpotencyofspecieslikethis:ifthey

werenaturallyincluded,theintellectwouldnotbetabularasaorinpotency,butinactorat

leastinhabitofpossessingscience.ForSt.Thomas,thisisclearlynotthecase.Therefore,

whatisdeniedhere(“speciesnaturaliterindita”)isthattheintellectisalreadyinactby

nature(thatistosay,bybeingwhatitis).Thereasontodenythisisthattheintellectisby

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natureinpotencyofspecieslikethis.Whatisaffirmedorsupposedintheprevioustextis

thatthefirstactualizationoftheintellectisaccordingtonature,andnotaresultofthe

reasoningactivityoftheintellectitself,whichisstillnotinact.

Therefore,itshouldbeclearthat,forAquinas,thereisoriginallynothinginthemind

allowingustosaythatthemindisinact,oreveninthehabitofknowinganything.Thefact

thattheactualizationofthemindisnaturalinthefirstplace(firstconceptsandfirst

judgmentsdependingonthoseconcepts)doesnotnegatethefactthattheintellectisin

purepotencyofallthesethings,andpassivepotency,aswehaveseen.

ThesamedoctrinecanbeseeninotherworksofAquinas.Aclearinstanceisthe

followingtext.Here,theexplanationofthe“naturaliter”knownisthatthelightbywhich

thoseprinciplesaremadeintelligibleis“natural”inhumanbeings.Again,theuniversal

principlesknownnaturallycomenaturallyfromexperience:

Inspeculativesciences,everyconsiderationisreferredbacktocertainprimarythings,whichmancertainlydoesnotneedtolearnnorfindout(otherwisehewillneedtogoontoinfinity):manpossessesnaturallythecognitionoftheseprimarythings.Ofthiskindaretheindemonstrableprinciplesofdemonstration[…]andalsothefirstconceptionsoftheintellect,suchasthenotionofbeing,one,andthelike[…].Suchnaturallyknownthingsaremadeknowntomanthroughtheverylightoftheagentintellect,whichisnaturaltoman,bywhichlightsomethingismadeknowntous,onlyinsofarasbytheagentintellectthephantasmsaremadeintelligibleinact.Thisisinfacttheactoftheagentintellect,asissaidinIIIDeAnima.Now,thephantasmscomefromthesenses;fromthis,itfollowsthattheprincipleofcognitionoftheaforementionedprinciplesisinthesensesandthememory,asthePhilosopherdemonstratestowardstheendofPosteriorum.536(mytrans.)

536InBoet.DeTrin.6,4,c.:“Omnisconsideratioscientiarumspeculativarumreduciturin

aliquaprima,quaequidemhomononhabetnecesseaddiscereautinvenire,neoporteatininfinitumprocedere,sedeorumnotitiamnaturaliterhabet.Ethuiusmodisuntprincipiademonstrationumindemonstrabilia[…]etetiamprimaeconceptionesintellectus,utentisetuniusethuiusmodi[…]Huiusmodiautemnaturalitercognitahominimanifestanturexipsolumineintellectusagentis,quod

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InthetextofInIIIDeAnima4,26-35,St.Thomasisdenyingthattheagentintellect

bethehabitusofthefirstprinciplesinsofarasthiswouldimplythatthesoulalready

understandsinactthetermsoftheseprinciples,andsothatthosetermsarenotacquired

bytheactionoftheagentintellect.ItisevidentthatforAquinasthereisnothingnaturally

precontainedinthesoul,regardingthecontentofunderstanding:

Thislastphrasehasledsometosupposethattheagentintellectisonewiththe‘intellect’whichisahabitualapprehensionoffirstprinciples.Butitisnotso;forthelatter‘intellect’presupposes[somethingsalreadyunderstoodinact,namelythetermsofthoseprinciples],inunderstandingwhichweapprehendthetruthoffirstprinciples.Sotheviewinquestionwouldimplythattheagentintellectwasnot,asAristotleheremaintains,theprimarysource,forus,oftheactualintelligibilityofanything.537

Thatthefirstprinciplesarealsoknownfromexperienceand,therefore,nottobe

confoundedwiththeagentintellect,isexplicitinthefollowingtext.Fromtextslikethisitis

esthomininaturale,quoquidemluminenihilmanifestaturnobis,nisiinquantumperipsumphantasmatafiuntintelligibiliainactu.Hicenimestactusintellectusagentis,utdiciturinIIIDeAnima.Phantasmataautemasensuaccipiuntur;undeprincipiumcognitionispraedictorumprincipiorumestexsensuetmemoria,utpatetperphilosophuminfinePosteriorum.”ThesamereferencetothePosterioraisfoundinanothercleartextDeVer10,6,sc2:“Atfirst,allourcognitionconsistsintheknowledgeoffirstundeducibleprinciples.Butthecognitionofthesearisesinusfromsense,asisclearfromthePosteriorAnalytics.Therefore,allourknowledgearisesfromsense.”[Omnisnostracognitiooriginaliterconsistitinnotitiaprimorumprincipiorumindemonstrabilium.Horumautemcognitioinnobisasensuoritur,utpatetinfinePoster.Ergoscientianostraasensuoritur.]Whatisoriginalascontentinhumanunderstandingisnotprecontainedbutacquiredfromexperience.

537InIIIDeAnima4,26-35:“Huiusautemverbioccasione,quidamposueruntintellectumagentemidemessecumintellectuquiesthabitusprincipiorum.Quodessenonpotest:quiaintellectus,quiesthabitusprincipiorum,praesupponitaliquaiamintellectainactu:scilicetterminosprincipiorum,perquorumintelligentiamcognoscimusprincipia:etsicsequeretur,quodintellectusagensnonfaceretomniaintelligibiliainactu,uthicphilosophusdicit.”ThetextcontinuesexplaininginwhatsenseAristotlesaysthattheagentintellectisa“habitus”:“ThereforeIholdthattheterm[‘habit’]isusedhereinthesenseinwhichAristotleoftencallsanyformornaturea[‘habit’],todistinguishitfromaprivationorapotency.Inthiscasetheagentintellectiscalleda[habit]todistinguishitfromtheintellectinpotency.”[Dicendumestergo,quodhabitus,sicaccipitursecundumquodphilosophusfrequenterconsuevitnominareomnemformametnaturamhabitum,prouthabitusdistinguiturcontraprivationemetpotentiam,utsicperhocquodnominateumhabitumdistinguateumabintellectupossibili,quiestpotentia.]

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clearalsothatthefirstprinciplesarenotnaturallypresentintheintellect,inthesenseof

previoustotheagentintellect’sactiononthephantasms:

Indeed,somementhoughtthattheagentintellectdoesnotdifferfromourhabitusofindemonstrableprinciples.Butthiscannotbethecase,becausewecertainlyknowindemonstrableprinciplesbyabstractingthemfromsingulars,asthePhilosopherteachesinthePosteriorAnalytics.538

1.6.TheTextof84,6:materiacausae

ThefactthatAquinasmentionssensibilityasnotthetotalandperfectcauseof

intellectualknowing,butratherasthematterofthe(total)cause(“materiacausae”),may

seemtoimplythattheformofthecause(theuniversalcontent)isprovidedbythe(agent)

intellect.Inthisway,AquinaswouldbesuggestinganEpistemologyinlinewithKant’s,in

whichthesensesprovidethematterandintelligencetheform.Isthisactuallywhatthetext

suggests?Whichothertextscouldshedlightonacorrectinterpretation?

538Q.D.DeAnima,a.5,c.:“Quidamverocredideruntintellectumagentemnonessealiud

quamhabitumprincipiorumindemonstrabiliuminnobis.Sedhocessenonpotest,quiaetiamipsaprincipiaindemonstrabiliacognoscimusabstrahendoasingularibus,utdocetphilosophusinIPoster.”Amongthe“Thomisticnegationsregardingtheagentintellect”,Sellésincludesthatitisnotreceptiveofhabits(innate,acquiredorinfused)anditisnottobeconfoundedwiththehabitofthefirstprinciples(cf.Sellés,EIA,272).Inafootnote,Fabrosaysthefollowing:“‘Praeexistunteniminipsa(naturahumana)naturaliterprincipiademonstrationumpersenota,quaesuntseminaquaedamsapientiae,etprincipiaquaedamiurisnaturalisquaesuntseminaquaedamvirtutummoralium’[Forself-evidentprinciplesofdemonstrations,whichareseedsofthecontemplationofwisdom,naturallypreexistin(thatnature),asdoprinciplesofnaturallaw,whichareseedsofthemoralvirtues](DeVeritate,q.XIV,a.2;cfr.q.XI,a.1ad5um;q.XVIII,a.6).Elsewhereitisexplicitlysaidthatthefirstprinciplesare‘innatiquodammodo’[innate,inasense(mytrans.)].Cfr.InIISent.,Dist.24,q.II,a.3;InIVSent.,Dist.49,q.I,a.3,Sol.III;DeVeritate,q.X,a.6ad6um.Thisterminology,whichwasincommonwiththeAgostinians(v.MATTHAEUSABAQUASPARTA,QQ.DeFideetcognition,AdAquasClaras,1903,q.1,p.53)disappearsintheThomisticworksofmaturity,wheretheoriginofthefirstprinciplesisabsolutelyentrustedtothe[Greek]epagogué,whichtakesthemfromexperience,notonlyregardingthecontentoftheisolatedtermsbutalsoregardingtheirconnection.Onthisquestioncfr.C.Fabro,[Englishintheoriginal]KnowledgeandPerceptioninthearistotelic-thomisticPsychology,in:‘ThenewSholasticism’XII(1938),pp.337-365”(Fabro,NMP,277.AneweditionofthecitedarticleisinourBibliography).Regardlessoftheterminology,IthinkitisclearthatthedoctrineofAquinasontheoriginofthefirstprincipleshasnotchanged.

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Letustakeacloserlookat84,6.Thequestioniswhetherornotthesoulacquiresits

intellectualknowledgefromthesensiblethings,andtheanswerispositive,butwitha

distinction.Throughouttheentirearticleitseemsclearthatknowingisreceptiveandnot

active,sincetheissueofthesourceofknowingisreferredtotheprincipleofa

proportionatecause,bywhichknowledgeisproducedinthefaculty.Inotherwords,the

agentobjectofintellectualknowingmustbedifferentfromtheoneofsensibility,because

theremustbeaproportionbetweeneffect(here,thedifferentknowing)andagent.539In

thethirdobjection,infact,St.Thomasargues:“Aneffectdoesnotsurpassthepowerofits

cause.Butintellectualknowledgeextendsbeyondsensiblethings:forweunderstandsome

thingswhichcannotbeperceivedbythesenses.Thereforeintellectualknowledgeisnot

derivedfromsensiblethings.”540Intheobjection,then,thereasonthatourintellectual

knowledgedoesnotcomefromsensiblethingsisbecausetheyarenot,assensible,

proportionatecauseforourknowledgeofintellectualthings.Senseknowledgehereis

clearlyperception,andintellectualknowledgeisallegedlytoo.AsFabronotes,541St.

539Asimilarapproachtothequestion,thatis,theprincipleofaproportionatecause,maybe

seeninDeSpirit.Creat.,a.10,ad17:“Aspecieswhichisintheimaginationisofthesamegenusasaspecieswhichisinasense,becausebothareindividualandmaterial.Butaspecieswhichisinanintellectbelongstoanothergenus,becauseitisuniversal.Andconsequentlyanimaginedspeciescannotimprintanintelligiblespeciesasasensitivespeciesimprintsanimaginedspecies;andforthisreasonanactiveintellectualpowerisnecessary,whereasanactivesensepowerisnot.”[…speciesquaeestinimaginatione,esteiusdemgeneriscumspeciequaeestinsensu,quiautraqueestindividualisetmaterialis;sedspeciesquaeestinintellectu,estalteriusgeneris,quiaestuniversalis.Etideospeciesimaginarianonpotestimprimerespeciemintelligibilem,sicutspeciessensibilisimprimitspeciemimaginariam;propterquodnecessariaestvirtusintellectivaactiva,nonautemvirtussensitivaactiva.]

54084,6,ob.3:“Effectusnonseextenditultravirtutemsuaecausae.Sedintellectualiscognitioseextenditultrasensibilia;intelligimusenimquaedamquaesensupercipinonpossunt.Intellectualisergocognitiononderivaturarebussensibilibus.”

541Cf.LS,116,footnote.

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Thomasinrespondingdoesnotrejecttheprinciplesoftheobjection:“Sensitiveknowledge

isnottheentirecauseofintellectualknowledge.Andthereforeitisnotstrangethat

intellectualknowledgeshouldextendfurtherthansensitiveknowledge.”542Thatis,itistrue

thattheeffectdoesnotgobeyondthecause:theremustbeproportion.However,because

whatisperceivedbythesensesisnotthetotalcauseofintellectualknowing,butisthe

causeonlyinacertainsense(materially),wecanstillsaythatintellectualknowingcomes

fromsensiblethings,evenifitisnotreducedtothecontentofsensiblecognition.

Thepointis,then,thattheremustbeaproportionatecausethatproduces

intellectualknowledgeinthepossibleintellect(i.e.,theintelligibleinact),asthesensiblein

actisproportionatecauseofsensibleknowledge.Thecorpusisbetterunderstoodinthis

sense:”AndthereforeinordertocausetheintellectualoperationaccordingtoAristotle,the

impressioncausedbythesensibledoesnotsuffice,butsomethingmorenobleisrequired,

for‘theagentismorenoblethanthepatient,’ashesays.”543Hereagensdoesnotreferto

theagentintellectdirectly,buttotheintelligibleinactproducedbytheagentintellect,as

thefollowingcomparisonwiththePlatonicideaandthereferenceto“intelligibiliainactu”

suggest:

Not,indeed,inthesensethattheintellectualoperationiseffectedinusbythemereimpressionofsomesuperiorbeings,asPlatoheld;butthatthehigherandmorenobleagentwhichhecallstheactiveintellect,ofwhichwehavespokenabove,544

54284,6ad3:“Adtertiumdicendumquodsensitivacognitiononesttotacausaintellectualis

cognitionis.Etideononestmirumsiintellectualiscognitioultrasensitivamseextendit.”54384,6,c.:“Etideoadcausandamintellectualemoperationem,secundumAristotelem,non

sufficitsolaimpressiosensibiliumcorporum,sedrequirituraliquidnobilius,quiaagensesthonorabiliuspatiente,utipsedicit.”

544TheOttawaeditionrefersto79,3and4.

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causesthephantasmsreceivedfromthesensestobeactuallyintelligible,byaprocessofabstraction.545

Inotherwords,intellectualknowledgecannotbecausedbythemereimpressionof

sensiblethings(forlackofproportionatecause),norisitcausedbytheimpressionofa

Platonicidea(forthesourceofknowledgemustbeinthesensiblethings,whicharethetrue

reality),butbytheimpressionoftheintelligibleinact,producedfromthephantasmbythe

agentintellectandimpressedinthepossibleintellect.

Accordingtothisopinion,then,onthepartofthephantasms,intellectualknowledgeiscausedbythesenses.Butsincethephantasmscannotofthemselvesaffectthepassiveintellect,andrequiretobemadeactuallyintelligiblebytheactiveintellect,itcannotbesaidthatsensibleknowledgeisthetotalandperfectcauseofintellectualknowledge,butratherthatitisinawaythe[matterofthe]cause.546

Quodammodomateriacausae,therefore,meansthatthephantasmisthe“matter”

outofwhichtheagentintellectproducestheintelligibleinactbymeansofitsillumination,

andthatsameintelligibleinactwillbetheproportionatecauseofintellectualknowing.

IsthisnotpreciselywhatleadssomereadersofAquinastoreducesensibleknowing

toprovidingthematterforthecompletingactivityofintelligence?Itisimportantto

54584,6,c.:“Nontamenitaquodintellectualisoperatiocauseturinnobisexsola

impressionealiquarumrerumsuperiorum,utPlatoposuit,sedilludsuperiusetnobiliusagensquodvocatintellectumagentem,dequoiamsupradiximus,facitphantasmataasensibusacceptaintelligibiliainactu,permodumabstractioniscuiusdam.”Cf.InIIIDeAnima4,76-77,whereSt.ThomasinterpretstheAristotelianphrase:“theagentismorenoblethanthepatient”(mytrans.)[honorabiliusestagenspaciente]intheDeAnima’stextontheagentintellectasreferredtotheagentintellectitself.IdonotthinkthatthischallengesmyinterpretationoftheSumma,forthereasonsexposedabove,andforwhatwewillsayabouttheagentintellectasactusintelligibilium,i.e.,inwhatsensetheagentintellectcouldbesaidtobethatwhichactualizes“formally”theobjectofunderstanding.

54684,6,c.:“Secundumhocergo,expartephantasmatumintellectualisoperatioasensucausatur.Sedquiaphantasmatanonsufficiuntimmutareintellectumpossibilem,sedoportetquodfiantintelligibiliaactuperintellectumagentem;nonpotestdiciquodsensibiliscognitiosittotalisetperfectacausaintellectualiscognitionis,sedmagisquodammodoestmateriacausae.”

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rememberthatinquestion84,Aquinasistryingtoexplainhowintelligenceworks(inthis

life),notdirectlywhatitknows,whichisalreadypresupposed.Inotherwords,theproblem

isnotwhetherweunderstandcorporealthings,buthow.Thefirstarticletellsusbywhich

facultyweunderstand(preciselymakingtheimportantdistinctionbetweenresintellecta

andmodusreiintellectae),whereasthefollowingarticlestellusbywhichagentobject.That

iswhy,afterdenyingthatknowledgeofcorporealthingsisverifiedbymeansofintelligible

“ready-made”intermediaries(theintellect’sownessence,innatespecies,infusedspecies,

ortheessenceofGod),Aquinasgoestotheother“extreme”,thesensiblethings,inorderto

showinwhatsensesomethingthatisnotactuallyintelligiblecanbethesourceofthe

intellectualoperation;inthisway,Aquinasfinallyarrivesattheabstractedspeciesasagent

object.Therefore,inthiscontext,thatsensibleknowingisinacertainsensethematterof

intellectualknowingshouldbeunderstoodoftheoperation(how),notofthecontent

(what),i.e.,ofintelligibilityasamodeofbeing,notofwhatisunderstood.St.Thomasisnot

sayingthatthephantasmisthematterofwhatisunderstood,butthatthemodeofbeingof

thephantasmisnotproportionatetobetheagentobjectofintellectualknowing,and

therefore,initsparticularity,thephantasmworksonlyasa“matter”fromwhichtheagent

intellectproducestheagentobject,whichistheintelligibleinact.Inotherwords,heisnot

sayingthatsensiblethingsareamatterthatobtainsintelligibilityascontentwhentheagent

intellectilluminatesthem;heissayingthatthephantasmislikeamatterthatobtains

intelligibilityasamodeofbeingwhenitisilluminatedbytheagentintellect.Aswehave

seen,forAquinas,sensiblethingsarewhatisunderstood,insofarastheuniversalnature

subsistinginthecorporealthingsistheobjectofunderstanding.

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Theagentobjectisnecessarilyanintelligibleinact.Thatiswhythesensiblethings

cannotbetheagentobjectofintellectualknowing.Butbecauseouragentobjectdoescome

fromsensiblethings,theycanbesaidtobeinacertainsensethesourceofourintellectual

knowing.Theagentintellectproducestheintelligibleinactfromthephantasm,andforthis

reason,thephantasmcanbeconsideredacertain“matter”oftheagentobject,inthesense

of“thatoutofwhich”theintelligibleinactcomesinsomeway.

Inwhatway?Aquinasmentionsit:“permodumabstractioniscuiusdam.”Theway

thephantasmismadeintelligibleinactbytheagentintellectis“byacertainabstraction,”

thatis,notbypreservingthephantasm’sparticularity,norbyborrowingacertaincontent,

butbytheintellect’s“takingfrom”thephantasm.Aquinashaspreviouslyexplained

abstractionasa“separation”oftheuniversalobjectfromitsindividualconditionsinthe

matter.547

547Cf.79,3,c.:“Wemustthereforeassignonthepartoftheintellectsomepowertomake

thingsactuallyintelligible,byabstractionofthespeciesfrommaterialconditions.”[Oportebatigiturponerealiquamvirtutemexparteintellectus,quaefaceretintelligibiliainactu,perabstractionemspecierumaconditionibusmaterialibus.];79,4,c.:“…weperceivethatweabstractuniversalformsfromtheirparticularconditions,whichistomakethemactuallyintelligible.”[…percipimusnosabstrahereformasuniversalesaconditionibusparticularibus,quodestfacereactuintelligibilia];andafterwardsin85,1ad3:“Thisisdonebythepoweroftheactiveintellectwhichbyturningtowardsthephantasmproducesinthepassiveintellectacertainlikenesswhichrepresents,astoitsspecificconditionsonly,thethingreflectedinthephantasm.Itisthusthattheintelligiblespeciesissaidtobeabstractedfromthephantasm…”[Sedvirtuteintellectusagentisresultatquaedamsimilitudoinintellectupossibiliexconversioneintellectusagentissupraphantasmata,quaequidemestrepraesentativaeorumquorumsuntphantasmata,solumquantumadnaturamspeciei.Etperhuncmodumdiciturabstrahispeciesintelligibilisaphantasmatibus…]ThatSt.Thomasconsidersabstractionmorea“consideration”thana“separation”(cf.85,1ad1)doesnottakeawaythefactthatheconsidersthespecies“takenfrom”thephantasm(cf.InIDeAnima2,261:“plane-surfaces[…]whichcanbeconsideredbythemindapartfromthematter”[superficies,quaerationepossuntsepararianaturalimateria]).Thecontextshouldberegardedineachcase:whenabstractionrefersmoretotheproductionoftheintelligibleinactasagentobject,itmeanssomethingmorelike“separation”,becausetheintelligiblespeciesisreallyseparatefromthephantasm,astwodifferent

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ThefollowingseemstobethepassagethatwouldmisleadAquinas’readers:“causes

thephantasmsreceivedfromthesensestobeactuallyintelligible,byaprocessof

abstraction.”548Itdoesseemthatwhatisunderstoodisthephantasmitself,modifiedin

somewaybytheagentintellect,andsoperhapsprovidedwithintelligibilityascontent.But

abstraction,whichisexplicitlythewayinwhichthephantasmismadeintelligibleinact,

doesnotsupportthatassumption.Weshouldrathersaythatthephantasmiswhatismade

intelligibleinact,insofarasitisthesubjectmatteroftheactionoftheagentintellect.

Thereisanotherindicationinthetextthatmaysupportareadinginlinewiththe

restoftheproposedinterpretation.Intellectualknowledgeinthelastparagraphisequated

withtheimmutatioofthepossibleintellectbytheagentobject,andnotwiththeagent

intellect’sactivity,whichistheconditionoftheimmutatio.Thetwopotenciesandtheir

respectiveoperationsarenotconfused,aswehaveseen,andknowingisnotportrayedas

anactivityonsensibilitybutasareceptivityconditionedbysuchactivity(agentintellectas

metaphysicalaprioriofintellectualknowingasreceptiveofobjectivecontent).Wehave

agentobjects(cf.DeSpirit.Creat.,a.10,c.:“Foroneparticularman,suchasSocratesorPlato,makesthingsintelligibleinactwhenhepleases,thatis,byapprehendingauniversalformfromparticulars,whenheseparatesthatwhichiscommontoallindividualmenfromthosethingswhicharepeculiartoeach.”[Unusenimhomoparticularis,utSocratesvelPlato,facitcumvultintelligibiliainactu,apprehendendoscilicetuniversaleaparticularibus,dumsecernitidquodestcommuneomnibusindividuishominum,abhisquaesuntpropriasingulis.]);butwhenitregardstheuniversalcontentofthespecies,asdistinctfromthesensible,St.Thomaspreferstospeakabout“consideration”,becausethecontent,thoughabsolutelyspeakingdistinct(andthereforeknowablewithouttheother),isnotreallyseparatefromtheparticular(cf.InIIIDeAnima6,274-276:“Thereforetheintellectabstractsthingspresentinthesense-objects,notunderstandingthemtobeseparate,butunderstandingtheminseparationanddistinctly.”[mytrans.][Eaergoquaesuntinsensibilibusabstrahitintellectus,nonquidemintelligenseaesseseparata,sedseparatimetseorsumeaintelligens.])Thisisclearlyrelatedtothedistinctionbetweenabstractionasactoftheagentintellectandasactofthepossibleintellect(cf.Cromp,16ff.;Chapter1,section4;Chapter4,section2).

54884,6,c.:“…facitphantasmataasensibusacceptaintelligibiliainactupermodumabstractioniscuiusdam.”

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alreadyseenthatthisactivityimpliesthatthecontentisalreadypresentintheparticular,

andthereforereferstothemodeofbeingofthecontent.

Forthereasonsexplained,itdoesnotseemthatanotionofexperiencethat

providesonlytherawmaterialfortheinformativeactivityofintelligencecanbegrounded

onthistext.Iwouldaddthatthe“quodammodo”shouldbetakenmoreseriously,and

thereforelessasaprecisereferencetoa“rawmaterial.”Itmustbeadmittedthatthis

particulartextisnotasclearasothers;inanycase,however,themeaningofmoreobscure

statementsshouldbeclarifiedbypayingattentiontotherestofthetreatise,sinceitisnot

plausiblethatSt.Thomasdeniesherewhatheaffirmselsewhere.Thethreeprevious

chaptersareintendedtoprovidethatcontext.

InotherpassagesSt.Thomasreferstothis“material”roleofsensibilityinother

ways.

In77,7,c.,aswehaveseenpreviously,Aquinassaysthatifweconsiderthesoul

insofarasitisreceptive,thelowerpotenciesactasprinciplesofthehigherones.Thus,the

sensesprovideasitwerethesubjectmatterfortheworkoftheintellect:“Butconsidered

asreceptiveprinciples,themore[imperfect]powersareprincipleswithregardtothe

others;thusthesoul,accordingasithasthesensitivepower,isconsideredasthesubject,

andas[acertain]materialwithregardtotheintelligence.”549Itisimportanttonotethat

thesensesareconsideredasacertain(againquoddam)matterfortheintellect,butinsofar

astheintellectisconsideredacertaincapacityofreception,andnotasanactiveprinciple

54977,7,c.:“Sedsecundumviamsusceptiviprincipii,econversopotentiaeimperfectiores

inveniunturprincipiarespectualiarum,sicutanima,secundumquodhabetpotentiamsensitivam,consideratursicutsubiectumetmaterialequoddamrespectuintellectus.”

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whatsoever.Thefirstpartofthearticle,instead,dealswiththeintellectasacertainactive

principleofthelowerpotencieswithregardstotheirbeing(“sicutimperfectuma

perfecto”).550However,thisactivityisnotreferredtotheactivityoftheagentintellect.In

thesecondpartofthearticleSt.Thomasisdealingwiththefacultiesintheiroperation,551

andinthatexactcontexttheintellectisconsideredasareceptive–knowingfaculty,whose

subjectmatterisprovidedbythesenses.This,ofcourse,doesnottakeawaythenecessity

ofanagentintellectactingonthephantasmofsensitivity,butitdoesshowhowthefact

thatSt.Thomasconsiderstheproductofsensitivityacertainmatteroftheintellectual

operation,doesnotmeanthatheconsiderstheintellectualoperationasanactivity.Asin

theinterpretationofthephantasmasobject,theimportantpointistounderstandtherole

ofthesensesinhumanknowingasprovidingtherealinits“real”modeofbeing,inits

particularity,andthereforeputtingthesoulincontactwithitsobject.Insofarasthesenses

providewhatistobeknownintellectually,theymaybesaidtoprovidethe“object”of

humanunderstanding;thatis,weunderstandparticularthings.But,insofarastheproper

objectofhumanunderstandingisthequidditasofthecorporealthings,whichisnotactually

intelligibleinthephantasm,thesensesaresaidtoprovidethe“material”ofhuman

understanding,thatistosay,notthe“form”thatisunderstood,butthe“materialfrom

which”thatformwillcome,supposedtheactionoftheagentintellect.Thetranslation

“subjectmatter”seemstoconveyaccuratelywhatAquinasmeansby“materiale

550Wesetasidetheotherwayinwhichthehigherpotenciesareprinciplesofthelower:by

finality.551Asinquestion84,thematerialroleofthesensesisinthecontextoftheoperation.

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quoddam”552and“quodammodomateriacausae”,553insofarasthematterherecontains

whatistobeunderstood.

Arelatedunderstandingoftheroleofthesenseswithregardstotheintellectual

operationcanbetakenfrom89,5,c.:“Butastheintellectualactresideschieflyand

formallyintheintellectitself,whilstitresidesmateriallyanddispositivelyintheinferior

powers,thesamedistinctionistobeappliedtohabit.”554Theactoftheintellectismainly

andformallyintheintellectitselfinsofarastheintellectistheplaceoftheintelligible

species(“locusspecierum”555);itismateriallyand“inawaythatcreatestheconditions”

(“dispositive”)intheinferiorfaculties,insofarastheintellectturnstotheirphantasmsin

ordertosee(speculari)itsownintelligibleobjects(asexistingintheconcrete)556St.Thomas

isspeakingdirectlyoftheactoftheintellectaftertheabstractionhashappened,and

thereforethe“materiality”ofthesensibleobjectacquireshereadifferentsense.

AbstractionandconversionaredistinctforSt.Thomas.Thesensibleobjectisnotherea

“matterfromwhich”theobjectwillbetaken,ora“subjectmatter”onwhichtheagent

55277,7.55384,6.55489,5,c.:“Sedsicutactusintellectusprincipaliterquidemetformaliterestinipso

intellectu,materialiterautemetdispositiveininferioribusviribus,idemetiamdicendumestdehabitu.”

555Cf.InIIIDeAnima1,226-236:“Wecanseethepointoftheoldsayingthatthesoulisthe‘place’offorms,—meaningthatitreceivestheseintoitself[…]Itfollowsthatthesoulasawholeisnotthe‘place’offorms,butonlythatpartofitwhichlacksabodilyorgan,i.e.theintellect;andeventhispartdoesnot,assuch,possessthemactually,butpotentiallyonly.”[Iampotestverificaridictumillorum,quidixerunt,quodanimaestlocusspecierum:quodpersimilitudinemdicitur,eoquodestspecierumreceptiva(…)Etideonondicendumest,quodtotaanimasitlocusspecierum,sedsolumparsintellectiva,quaeorganumnonhabet.Necitaestlocusspecierum,quodhabeatactuspecies,sedpotentiatantum.]

556Cf.84,7,c.:“…[I]nordertoperceivetheuniversalnatureexistingintheindividual.”[…utspeculeturnaturamuniversaleminparticulariexistentem.]

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intellectwillrealizeitsoperation;itisratherlikea“ground”or“support”fortheintellectual

activity,thatwhichkeepstheintelligiblespeciesboundtoreality.Thesensibleobjectis

whatallowstheintellecttoseetheuniversalnatureasitis,as(existing)intheconcrete.The

actofintelligenceshouldbetrulyunderstoodasan“intus–legere,”areadingtheuniversal

natureintheconcretereality.Thisis,inmyview,whatAquinasmeansbyconversioad

phantasmata.Theabstraction,instead,isstillnota“readinginto”becauseitisthe

“production”ofwhatistoberead(theimage)“outof”thephantasm.Andthepointofthis

dissertationistoshowthatwhattheagentintellectproducesisnotwhatistobereadinits

content,butinitsintelligiblemodeofbeing:theagentintellectproducesthespecies,the

imageofthenaturethatexistsintheconcrete.Justasthelightdoesnotpaintthedifferent

coloursbutmakesthemallvisible,theagentintellectmakesvisiblethedifferentnaturesof

particularthings.Finally,itisimportanttonotethatthematerialroleofthesenses,inthis

text,isnotrelatedtoanactivityofin-formationbytheintelligence,buttothenecessityofa

connexionwiththerealthroughtheconversioadphantasmataoftheintellectinact.The

phantasmisnottheobjectoftheintellect,becauseitissensible;however,thewayinwhich

theintellectcontemplatesitsintelligibleobjectisbyconvertingtothephantasm(the

sensibleobject).And,althoughitwouldbeimpossibletomaintainthattheintellectbeholds

twoobjects,itisnotimpossibletomaintainthat,whileonlyoneofthemactualizesit

formally,theotherqualifiestheoperation.Intheend,theintellectisthecauseofthe

cognitivepowerofthesenses,andtheyareforit,asAquinassays.Theirmetaphysical

interconnectionmayhelpinunderstandingthepossibilityofthiscooperationinthe

operativerealm.

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Thedistinctionbetweentherespectiveformalobjectsofthesensesandintelligence,

andtheinterconnectionbetweenthem,isalsomentionedin78,4ad4:“Althoughthe

operationoftheintellecthasitsorigininthesenses:557yet,inthethingapprehended

throughthesenses,theintellectknowsmanythingswhichthesensescannotperceive.In

likemannerdoestheestimativepower,thoughinalessperfectmanner.”558Althoughthere

isnoexplicitmentionofmateriality,theideaoftheobjectofthesensesasa“matterfrom

which”(“oriaturasensu”)andtheideaoftheintellectknowingitsobjectintheobjectof

thesenses(“inreapprehensapersensum”)arepresent.Atthesametime,thecomparison

betweentheestimativefacultyandtheintellectreassuresusthatSt.Thomasistalking

aboutbothas“perceptive”(receptive)faculties.Theestimativefaculty,indeed,isableto

perceivethingsthattheexternalsensesdonot(thesensibleperaccidens),andinthisitis

similartotheintellect,which“perceives”thequidditasofthecorporealthing.

Aquinas’“materiacausae”in84,6doesnotseemtosupportaKantianreadingofhis

doctrine.St.Thomasissayingthatthesensesprovidetheobjectassubjectmatter,they

presenttherealinitsrealmodeofbeing,theyprovidethenecessarycontactwiththereal

fortheintellectualoperationtohappen.But,forthatoperationtohappen,somethingelse

isrequired.Therealinitsrealmodeofbeingcannotactualizetheintelligence:onlyan

intelligibleinactcandothat.Theagentintellectilluminatesthephantasmandmakesits

quidditasvisibletotheeyeofintelligence.Morepowerfulthantheeyeofthesensesisthe

557Thematerialroleofthesensesisagainrelatedtotheintellectualoperation.55878,4ad4:“Licetintellectusoperatiooriaturasensu,tameninreapprehensapersensum

intellectusmultacognoscitquaesensusperciperenonpotest.Etsimiliteraestimativa,licetinferiorimodo.”Cf.84,6,ob.3andad3.

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eyeoftheintelligence,butintelligencestillneedsalighttoseeitsproperobject(andthisis

theagentintellect)aswellasneedingtherealobjectitself(andthisistheroleofthe

senses).Itisalwaysinthephantasmthattheeyeofintelligencecanseeitsproportionate

object,whichistheuniversalquidditasofthisphantasmasobjectiverepresentationofthe

corporealthing.Thephantasm,therefore,isthematterofthecauseinsofarastheefficient

cause(theagentintellect)producestheagentobject(theintelligiblespecies)fromthe

phantasm,makingthelatter(whichstandsfortheparticularrealthing)intelligibleinactby

meansofabstraction.559

1.7.TheAgentIntellectas“actusintelligibilium”

ThenexttaskistostudythetextsinAquinaswhichseemtospeakmoredirectly

abouttheagentintellectasacertainformoftheobjectofintelligence.

AccordingtoSt.Thomas,wecannotsaythatthereareintelligiblespeciesready-

madeinthemind.However,wecannotdenythattheagentintellectisready-madeinthe

559ThereseCory,approachinginsteadtheadmissionofaformalaprioriinintellectual

knowing,interpretsthistextdifferentlythanIdo.NoticehowsheusesalmostthesamewordsIusetospeakofametaphysicalapriori,butinadifferentsense:“[O]nemightarguethatAPM3[‘ActivePrincipleModel3’,herproposalforaninterpretationoftheactionoftheagentintellectinAquinas]isnotempiricistenough,becausetheintellectuallightaddssomethingtotheintellectthatwasnot‘firstinthesenses,’thatis,theformofintelligibility.Indeed,Aquinasagreesthat‘thesensesarenotthetotalcauseofintellectualcognition.’Nevertheless,thisdoesnotseemtobeofmajorconcern,sinceinAPM3theintellectuallightdoesnotaddanycontent,butonlyanewmodeofexisting,thatofintelligiblebeing.”Andinnotesheclarifies:“Atleast,itdoesnotaddnewcontentrelevantforunderstandingtheessenceoftheextramentalobject.AsIhaveargued,Aquinasholdsthatallactuallyintelligiblebeingisself-intelligible,sobecausetheagentintellectgrantsactuallyintelligiblebeingtothepossibleintellectthroughtheintelligiblespecies,thereisasenseinwhichtheveryintelligibilityoftheintelligiblespeciesisakindofcontentthatallowstheintellecttocognizeitselfwhenitiscognizinganythingelse(AquinasonHumanSelf-Knowledge,ch.6)”(Cory,Rethinking,639,myunderline).Cf.mypreviousremarksonCoryinChapter1.Foraratherstrangeinterpretationofthepassage,seeBerger,38,43.Herefersthemateriacausaetothematerialityoftheexternalsensesevenwithregardtotheinternalsenses.

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subject(i.e.somethingbelongingtothesoul).Now,Aquinassaysthattheagentintellectis

the“actoftheintelligible”objectsinthemind.Mightthismeanthattheagentintellectis

theform(act,perfection)ofeverythingweunderstand,andthereforewhatisunderstoodin

everyactofintelligence?MightthisbeaclearThomisticindicationoftheagentintellectas

aformalaprioriofhumanunderstanding?

Letusbeginwithanexplicitoccurrenceof“actusintelligibilium”:

Butasinthislifeourintellecthasmaterialandsensiblethingsforitspropernaturalobject,asstatedabove,itunderstandsitselfaccordingasitismadeactualbythespeciesabstractedfromsensiblethings,throughthelightoftheactiveintellect,which[…]actuatestheintelligiblethingsthemselves,[and]also,bytheirinstrumentality,actuatesthepassiveintellect.Thereforetheintellectknowsitselfnotbyitsessence,butbyitsact.560

Inwhatsenseistheagentintellecttheactoftheintelligible(objects)?First,letus

examinewhatSt.Thomasistalkingabout,thenwhatthoseintelligiblesare,andfinallythe

meaninghereof“act.”

1)St.Thomasissayingthattheintellectcannotbecomeanobjectofknowledge

unlessitissubjectively(asarealbeing)inact.Thisisbecause,evenifitisabeinginthe

realmoftheintelligible,itisinthatrealmtheleast,insofarasitisonlyinpotency,likethe

materiaprimaintherealmofcorporealthings.Now,whatmakesthepossibleintellect

subjectivelyinactisthespeciesassubjectivemodification.

56087,1,c.:“Sedquiaconnaturaleestintellectuinostro,secundumstatumpraesentisvitae,

quodadmaterialiaetsensibiliarespiciat,sicutsupradictumest;consequensestutsicseipsumintelligatintellectusnoster,secundumquodfitactuperspeciesasensibilibusabstractasperlumenintellectusagentis,quodestactusipsorumintelligibilium,eteismediantibus[Ottawaeditionadds:“intelligit”]intellectuspossibilis.Nonergoperessentiamsuam,sedperactumsuumsecognoscitintellectusnoster.”

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2)Therefore,whenSt.Thomassaysthattheagentintellectistheactofthe

intelligible(objects)heisdirectlyreferringtothisaspectoftheintelligiblespecies(itsreality

asformaquo),nottotheintentionalpresenceoftheobject.Inotherwords,theagent

intellectis“actoftheintelligible”initsintelligiblemodeofbeing,notinitscontent.

3)Whatdoesitmeanthattheagentintellectistheactofthespeciesand,through

it,ofthepossibleintellect?Actistheprinciplebywhichsomethingisperfectinsomesense,

belongingintrinsicallytothethingitself.Theagentcauseisnot“actofthething”inthis

sense.But,ifwetakeas“actofthething”thatwhich“perfects”thethingitselfby

participatingsomeperfection,thenitcertainlyincludestheagentcausebutwewould,

then,beusingtheword“actus”inananalogicalandbroadersense.IsthiswhatAquinasis

doing?Letusseewhetherornotthissuggestioncanbegroundedinthetext.

IfthecorrectionoftheLeonineeditionisright,theagentintellectwouldbeboththe

actofthespeciesandtheactofthepossibleintellectthroughthespecies.561Thatmeans

561Cf.CGII,76,par.15:“Now,manisthemostperfectofalllowermovers,andhisproper

andnaturaloperationisunderstanding,whichisnotaccomplishedwithoutacertainpassivity,inthattheintellectispassivetotheintelligible;noragain,withoutaction,inthattheintellectmakesthingsthatarepotentiallyintelligibletobeactuallyso.Therefore,theproperprinciplesofboththeseoperationsmustbeinman’snature,normusteitherofthemhavebeinginseparationfromhissoul.Andtheseprinciplesaretheagentandthepossibleintellects.”[Homoautemestperfectissimusinteromniainferioramoventia.Eiusautempropriaetnaturalisoperatioestintelligere:quaenoncompletursinepassionequadam,inquantumintellectuspatiturabintelligibili;etetiamsineactione,inquantumintellectusfacitintelligibiliainpotentiaesseintelligibiliainactu.Oportetigiturinnaturahominisesseutriusquepropriumprincipiumscilicetintellectumagentemetpossibilem;etneutrumsecundumesseabanimahominisseparatumesse.]AfewparagraphslaterAquinasclarifiesthattheformsactualizingthepossibleintellectaretheintelligiblespeciesthemselves,nottheagentintellect.ThisisthemeaningoftheAristoteliancomparisonoftheagentintellecttoart,forexampleinCGII,76,par.18:“Fortheagentintellectstandsinthesamerelationtotheintelligiblespeciesreceivedintothepossibleintellectasarttotheartificialformswhichitproducesinmatter,astheexampleusedbyAristotleinDeanimaIII[…]makesclear.”[Comparaturenimintellectusagensadspeciesintelligibilesreceptasinintellectupossibili,sicutarsadformas

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thespeciesarethatwhichdirectlyactualizethepossibleintellect.Now,ifwetake“species”

hereasagentobject(asspeciesimpressa),St.Thomaswouldbesuggestingthatthespecies

areactofthepossibleintellectinsofarastheyareitsagentobject.Thiswouldalsobeinline

withwhatAquinashasjustsaid:“[intellectus]fitactuperspeciesasensibilibusabstractas

perlumenintellectusagentis.”Thepreposition“per”isnormallyusedfortheagentcause:

herethespeciesisagentasagentobject(intellectus“fitactuper”)andtheagentintellectis

agentastheoneabstracting(=faciensintelligibilia)thespeciesfromthesenses

(“abstractasper”).Isuggestthatthereisaclearconnectionbetweenthe“fitactuper”and

“eismediantibusintellectuspossibilis,”andbetween“abstractasper”and“actusipsorum

intelligibilium.”Inbothcases,theagentintellectiscauseofsomething(speciesimpressa)

thatinturniscauseoftheactoftheintellect.Theuseoftheword“actus”hastodowith

thefactthatSt.Thomasislookingforasubjectiveactualityintheintellect(itsownactus)

thatwouldallowittobeobjectofknowing;thissubjectiveintelligibility,orintelligibilityas

modeofbeinginthepossibleintellect,istheintelligibilityofthespeciesbecause,ofitself,

theintellectisinpotency(intelligiblespeciesasactusintellectus);thisintelligiblemodeof

beingofthespeciesisinturntheperfectionoftheagentintellectsince,ofitself,thespecies

artificialesquaeperartemponunturinmateria:utpatetexexemploAristotelisinIIIDeAnima.]AlsoforSellés(cf.EIA,254,272)theagentintellecthasafunctionofactontheintelligiblespecies,notdirectlyonthepossibileintellect.AndhequotesAquinas(translationfollows):“Etsiquisrecteconsideret,intellectusagens,secundumeaquaePhilosophusdeipsotraditnonestactivumrespectuintellectuspossibilisdirecte,sedmagisrespectuphantasmatum,quaefacitintelligibiliaactu,perquaeintellectuspossibilisreduciturinactumquandoaspectuseiusinclinaturadinferioraexunionecorporis.”[Andifoneconsidersrightly,hewillseethat,accordingtothePhilosopher’sowntreatmentofthematter,theagentintellectisnotactivedirectlywithrespecttothepossibleintellect,butratherwithrespecttophantasmswhichtheagentintellectmakesactuallyintelligible.Anditisbythephantasmsthusactualizedthatthepossibleintellectisactualizedwhen,asaresultofitsunionwiththebody,itsvisionisturnedtoinferiorthings.](Q.D.DeAnima,a.18,ad11,inSellés,EIA,254)

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(=nature)initsrealmodeofbeingisparticular(agentintellectas“actusipsorum

intelligibilium”).Inbothcases,however,oneisactusoftheotherinsofarasagent,andnot

asintrinsicallyperfectingtheother:butbecausetheperfectionreceiveddoesnotbelong

originallytotherecipient,itmakessensetocallthecause“act”ofit,tounderlinethe

potentialityoftherecipient.Thislatterisexactlythepointofthearticle:becausethe

essenceofthesoulisinpotency,itcannotbeknownbyitself,butbyitsoperation.

Ifthepreviousreflectionsseemcomplicated,itshouldbegrantedthatitisdifficult

tocalltheagentintellect“actoftheintelligible”inanyothersense.Thattheagentintellect

isnotthecauseoftheintelligiblecontenthasalreadybeendiscussed(insofarasthe

intelligiblecontentisnotsomethingthatneedstobemade,butitisready-madeinthe

thingitselfasitsnature).Forthisreason,theagentintellectcannotbetheactofthe

intelligibleasitsformalcontent.Thattheagentintellectcannotbeconfoundedwiththe

intelligiblemodeofbeingofeachspecies,maybeconcludedfromthefactthatanagent

causeisnotidentifiedwithitseffect;iftheagentintellectisresponsibleforthemodeof

beingoftheobjectspecificallyasagentofthismodeofbeing,thenagentintellectand

modeofbeingoftheobjectarenotthesamething.Forthisreason,theagentintellect

cannotbeactoftheintelligibleasitsintelligiblemodeofbeing.Thiscanbetakenfromthe

followingtwotextsaswell.

In79,4ad3,theroleofagentobjectisdeniedtheagentintellect:thelatterisnot

the(agent)object,butthefacultymakingthatobjectinact.Bothsenseandintelligenceare

showntobeactualizedbytheirrespectiveobjectsinact:

Iftherelationoftheactiveintellecttothepassivewerethatoftheactiveobjecttoapower,as,forinstance,ofthevisibleinacttothesight;itwouldfollowthatwe

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couldunderstandallthingsinstantly,sincetheactiveintellectisthatwhichmakesallthings(inact).Butnowtheactiveintellectisnotanobject,ratherisitthatwherebytheobjectsaremadetobeinact…562

Theroleoftheobjectasagent(heremovens)anditsdistinctionfromtheagent

intellectarepresentagainin79,7,c.:“Neverthelessthereisadistinctionbetweenthe

poweroftheactiveintellectandofthepassiveintellect:becauseasregardsthesame

object,theactivepowerwhichmakestheobjecttobeinactmustbedistinctfromthe

passivepower,whichismovedbytheobjectexistinginact.”563

Clearly,theagentintellectisnotactoftheintelligibleasintrinsicperfectionofthe

intelligibleinanysense:neitherasitscontent,norasitsmodeofbeing.

Theinterpretationbeingproposedisthefollowing.Theprinciplebywhich(the

natureof)therealthingisintelligibleinactistheagentintellect.Now,thisdoesnotmean

thattheagentintellectcommunicatesintelligibilityasuniversalcontent,butthatitisthe

principleofintelligibilityasamodeofbeing.Inotherwords,theagentintellectisnotan

objectiveactofthematerialofsensibility,butanagentprincipleoftheintelligibilityofthe

abstractedspecies.Thatiswhy,in87,1,c.,thatwhichactualizesthepossibleintellect

directly,asaformofit,isthe(already)intelligiblespecies,nottheagentintellect.Theagent

intellectasactisnotperfectiveofthepossibleintellectinitself,butoftheabstracted

56279,4ad3:“Dicendumquod,siintellectusagenscomparareturadintellectumpossibilem

utobiectumagensadpotentiam,sicutvisibileinactuadvisum;sequereturquodstatimomniaintelligeremus,cumintellectusagenssitquoestomniafacere.Nuncautemnonsehabetutobiectum,sedutfaciensobiectainactu…”

56379,7,c.:“Diversificaturtamenpotentiaintellectusagentis,etintellectuspossibilis,quiarespectueiusdemobiecti,aliudprincipiumoportetessepotentiamactivam,quaefacitobiectumesseinactu;etaliudpotentiampassivam,quaemoveturabobiectoinactuexistente.”

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speciesand,then,notinsofarasitgivesthemobjectiveintelligibility,butinsofarasitgives

themintelligibilityasamodeofbeing.

Theexpression“actusintelligibilium”recursintheresponsetoObjectionTwo.St.

Thomasishereexplainingwhythehumanintellectisnotinactintherealmofthe

intelligiblethings:“…notsothehumanmind,whichiseitheraltogetherinpotentialityto

intelligiblethings—asisthepassiveintellect—oristheactofintelligiblethingsabstracted

fromthephantasms—asistheactiveintellect.”564Therefore,theagentintellect(though

actusintelligibilium)isnotareasonforthehumanintellecttobeintelligibleinact,because

itisthereasonforthenatureofcorporealthingstobeintelligibleinact.Itisnotalightthat

isseeninthecorporealthings,butratheralightthatallowsthecorporealthingstobeseen.

Itisnotanactintheobjectivesense(intelligible),butinanagentsense(makingintelligible);

thatis,iftheagentintellectwereintelligibleinanobjectivesense,itwouldallowthe

intellecttobeknownbyitself,whichiswhatAquinasisheredenying.Theagentintellect

perfectsthephantasmbymakingitintelligibleinact:inthissenseitisitsact.Itisalsoact

becauseeveryactivepotencyisactiveinsofarasitisabletocommunicateaperfectionand

this,inturn,impliesacertainperfection(nothingcangivewhatitdoesnothave).

Thoughthefollowingtextreferstotheactofthepossibleintellect,itishelpfulto

seewhatSt.Thomasthinksaboutallofthesethings.Theactoftheintellectisnotthe

perfectionthatisunderstood:

56487,1ad2:“Nonautemintellectushumanus,quivelestomninoinpotentiarespectu

intelligibilium,sicutintellectuspossibilis;velestactusintelligibiliumquaeabstrahunturaphantasmatibus,sicutintellectusagens.”

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Theintelligentactofthehumanintellectisnottheactandperfectionofthematerialnatureunderstood,asifthenatureofthematerialthingandintelligentactcouldbeunderstoodbyoneact;justasathinganditsperfectionareunderstoodbyoneact.Hencetheactwherebytheintellectunderstandsastoneisdistinctfromtheactwherebyitunderstandsthatitunderstandsastone;andsoon.565

Grantedthatitisnotthepossibleintellect,itwouldbereallydifficulttosuggestthat

this“actusetperfectionaturaeintellectaematerialis”istheagentintellectbecause,for

Aquinas,itmeans“naturareimaterialis”and“lapidem.”Ashasbeenshownpreviously,the

objectofthepossibleintellectistheuniversalnatureofthecorporealthing.

Inthefollowingsectionof88,1,c.,AquinasisexplainingAverroes’doctrineabout

theunionoftheseparateagentintellectwiththehumanintellect.ForAverroes,theagent

intellectislikeaformofthethingsthatareunderstood:

Forsinceweunderstandbymeansofboththeactiveintellectandintelligibleobjects[…]itisclearthattheactiveintellectmustbecomparedtotheobjectsunderstood,eitherastheprincipalagentistotheinstrument,orasformtomatter.Foranactionisascribedtotwoprinciplesinoneofthesetwoways;toaprincipalagentandtoaninstrument,ascuttingtotheworkmanandthesaw;toaformanditssubject,asheatingtoheatandfire.Inboththesewaystheactiveintellectcanbecomparedtotheintelligibleobjectasperfectionistotheperfectible,andasactistopotentiality.566

Notethesmoothtransitionfromagentandinstrumenttoactandpotency.Aquinas

rejectstheoveralldoctrine,buthedoesnotseemtorejectthisuseoftheterm“act”,aswill

56587,3ad2:“Dicendumquodipsumintelligerehumanumnonestactusetperfectio

naturaeintellectaematerialis,utsicpossitunoactuintelliginaturareimaterialisetipsumintelligere,sicutunoactuintelligiturrescumsuaperfectione.Undealiusestactusquointellectusintelligitlapidem,etaliusestactusquointelligitseintelligerelapidem,etsicdeinde.”Theeditionofwww.corpusthomisticum.orghas“inde.”

56688,1,c.:“Cumenimnosintelligamusperintellectumagentemetperintelligibiliaspeculata[…]necesseestquodintellectusagenscompareturadintellectaspeculatavelsicutagensprincipaleadinstrumenta,velsicutformaadmateriam.Hisenimduobusmodisattribuituractioaliquaduobusprincipiis,principaliquidemagentietinstrumento,sicutsectioartificietserrae;formaeautemetsubiecto,sicutcalefactiocalorietigni.Sedutroquemodointellectusagenscomparabituradintelligibiliaspeculatasicutperfectioadperfectibile,etactusadpotentiam.”

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beseen.Thepartialargumentconcludesthat,supposingknowingtobereceptive,and

becausewhatisreceivedisreceivedwithitsperfection,boththeintellectualobjectandthe

intellectuallightarereceivedinthepossibleintellect,astheperfectthingwithits

perfection.“Nowasubject[receiveswhatisperfectand]itsperfectionatoneandthesame

time,asthereceptionofwhatisactuallyvisiblesynchronizeswiththereceptionoflightin

theeye.Thereforethepassiveintellectreceivestheintelligibleobjectandtheactive

intellecttogether.”567

Thisistheway,forAverroes,inwhichthehumanintellectisabletouniteitselfin

somewaytotheseparateagentintellectandso,throughit,understandtheotherseparate

substances,thusattainingbeatitude.Here,thepointofinterest,however,iswhatAquinas

saysaboutthisunionoftheagentintellectwiththepossibleintellect,i.e.,howhequalifies

it.Istheagentintellectaperfectionoftheobjectinsofarasit(theagentintellect)isseen?Is

itreceivedobjectively?

Itwouldseemthat,evenforAverroes,thisunionoftheseparateagentintellectand

thehumanintellectdoesnotsomuchallowthehumanintellecttoknowtheagentintellect

(asobject),butratherallowsthehumanintellecttoknowwhatisknownbytheagent

intellect(andbecauseofthis,intheend,toknowtheagentintellectitself).Inanycase,itis

clearthatforAquinastheagentintellectisnotwhatisknownbecause,inthislife,boththe

agentintellectandthepossibleintellectarereferredtothematerialthings.Also,inthis

56788,1,c.:“Simulautemrecipiturinaliquoperfectumetperfectio;sicutvisibileinactuet

lumeninpupilla.Simuligiturinintellectupossibilirecipiunturintellectaspeculataetintellectusagens.”

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article,theagentintellectaslightisnottheobject,butaprincipleoftheunderstandingof

theobject.

Secondly,[…]becauseintheaboveexplanation,theactiveintellect,supposingittobeaseparatesubstance,wouldnotbejoinedtousinitssubstance,butonlyinitslight,asparticipatedinthingsunderstood;and[thisbeingconjoined]wouldnotextendtotheotheractsoftheactiveintellectsoastoenableustounderstandimmaterialsubstances;justaswhenweseecolorssetoffbythesun,wearenotunitedtothesubstanceofthesunsoastoactlikethesun,butitslightonlyisunitedtous,thatwemayseethecolors.568

ForAquinas,inthehypothesisofaseparateagentintellect,somethingsimilarto

whathappensinocularvisionwouldbethecase.Thesunisalsoaseparatelight.The

coloursare“illuminatos”asthelightoftheagentintellect“isparticipated”bythe

intellectualobjects(“intellectisspeculativis”).569ButSt.Thomasalsosaysthatthelight,in

bothcases,isunitedtous(“unieturnobis”fortheintellect,“nobisunitur”forocularvision).

So,isthelightactoftheobjectoractofthefaculty?Inbothcases,Aquinasunderstandsthe

lightassomethingunitedtothefacultyinordertoknowotherthings,andparticipatedin

somewayintheobjectsinordertoknowtheobjectsthemselves.So,evenacceptingthat

thelightissomehowactoftheobjects,hedoesnottakeithereasanobjectiveperfection.

56888,1,c.:“Secundoquia,secundummodumpraedictum,intellectusagens,siest

substantiaseparata,nonunietur[www.corpusthomisticum.orghas:“uniretur”]nobissecundumsuamsubstantiam;sedsolumlumeneius,secundumquodparticipaturinintellectisspeculativis;etnonquantumadaliasactionesintellectusagentis,utpossimusperhocintelligeresubstantiasimmateriales.Sicutdumvidemuscoloresilluminatosasole,nonuniturnobissubstantiasolis,utpossimusactionessolisagere;sedsolumnobisuniturlumensolisadvisionemcolorum.”

569Theeditionofwww.corpusthomisticum.orghas“speculatis.”TheOttawaeditionhas“speculativis”whichgivesthepossibilityofreading“speculativeintellects”aswell.Itwouldnotaffectdramaticallythemeaningofthetext,butthisalternativereadingseemslessaccurate,becausethisparticipationseemstobethe“counterbalance”ofthe“illuminatos”referredtothecolours.Inotherwords,Aquinasmeansherethatwhatparticipatesthelightistheobject,nottheintellect,althoughhealsosaysthatthelightisunitedtothefaculty(“nobis”).

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Theagentintellectandthepossibleintellect,asprinciplesofunderstanding,are

referredonlytomaterialthingsbytheirmodeofactioninthislife.Attheendofthecorpus,

Aquinassaysclearlythattheagentintellectisreferredtothematerialthingsasactive,as

makingthemintelligible.

Aswasshownabove,theactiveintellectisnotaseparatesubstance;butafacultyofthesoul,extendingitselfactivelytothesameobjectstowhichthepassiveintellectextendsreceptively;because,asisstated,570thepassiveintellectis‘allthingspotentially,’andtheactiveintellectis‘allthingsinact.’Thereforebothintellects,accordingtothepresentstateoflife,extendtomaterialthingsonly,whicharemadeactuallyintelligiblebytheactiveintellect,andarereceivedinthepassiveintellect.Henceinthepresentstateoflifewecannotunderstandseparateimmaterialsubstancesinthemselves,eitherbythepassiveorbytheactiveintellect.571

Thatwhichismadeintelligibleisalsothatwhichisreceived:“materialiasola.”572St.

Thomasistalkingabouttheresintellecta;wedonotunderstandseparatesubstancesbut

materialthings(=naturascorporum).Inotherwords,hedoesnotmeanthatwhatis

receivedinthehumanintellectisthephantasminitsparticularity(materialiter),butthat

the(real)proportionateobjectofthehumanintellectisnottheseparatesubstancesin

themselves(thisisthepointofthearticle),butthematerialthings(materialia).Whathe

saysisthatwhatismadeintelligiblebytheagentintellectisthematerialthingsthemselves,

andthesesamematerialthings(i.e.,theirnature),inanintelligiblemodeofbeing,arewhat

isreceivedinthepossibleintellect.St.Thomasisreferringheretowhathehassaid570DeAnimaiii,5.57188,1,c.:“Sexto,quiasupraostensumestquodintellectusagensnonestsubstantia

separata,sedvirtusquaedamanimae,adeademactiveseextendens,adquaeseextenditintellectuspossibilisreceptive,quia,utdiciturinIIIDeAnima,intellectuspossibilisestquoestomniafieri,intellectusagensquoestomniafacere.Uterqueergointellectusseextendit,secundumstatumpraesentisvitae,admaterialiasola;quaeintellectusagensfacitintelligibiliaactu,etrecipiunturinintellectupossibili.Undesecundumstatumpraesentisvitae,nequeperintellectumpossibilem,nequeperintellectumagentem,possumusintelligeresubstantiasimmaterialessecundumseipsas.”

572Thisisalsothesenseof“omniafacere”and“omniafieri”,atleastinthiscontext.

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previously,573andheisnottalkinganylongerabout“act”butabout“makingintelligible”

thematerialthings.

ItseemsclearthattheagentintellectasactusintelligibiliumdoesnotmeanforSt.

Thomasthattheagentintellectissomethingthatisunderstood,butratherthatitisa

principleofunderstandingotherthings.Canitbesaidtobeaformalprinciple?St.Thomas

saysactus,butactusisananalogousnotion.Aquinaswouldsaythatthelightofthesunis

theactofthecoloursinsofarasitmakesthemvisible.Itisinthecolours,butmakingthem

visible,notmakingitselfvisible.Thereasonweknowthereisnolightisthatwecannotsee

anything:“Turnthelighton,please!”Thelightdoesnotmodifythecolours,butmakes

themvisible;thelightisnotthecolour,itisnotwhatisseen,butthatbywhichwesee.

These,ofcourse,arenotscientificclaims,buttheexampleSt.Thomasusestoenableusto

understandthingswhichdependonprinciples.Thepointisthatthelightisnottheobjectof

vision,astheagentintellectisnottheobjectofunderstanding.Theagentintellectisactas

makingintelligibleinitsmodeofbeingtheuniversalnatureofcorporealthings,andnotas

providingintelligibilityascontent.Thelightdoesnotconstitutetheknowninits

universality,butmakesthisuniversalityvisibletotheeyeofintelligence.574

573Cf.79,4.574Cf.InISentd.3,q.4,a.5,c.:“Accordingtothephilosophers,thereisanotherwayto

understandthatthehumansoulunderstandsalwaysitself,insofaraseverythingthatisunderstoodmustbeilluminatedbytheagentintellectandreceivedinthepossibleintellect.Hence,justasineverycolourisseenthecorporeallight,soineveryintelligibleisseenthelightoftheagentintellect:not,however,asobject,butasameansbywhichknowinghappens.”(mytrans.)[Aliotamenmodo,secundumphilosophos,intelligiturquodanimasemperseintelligit,eoquodomnequodintelligitur,nonintelligiturnisiillustratumlumineintellectusagentis,etreceptuminintellectupossibili.Undesicutinomnicolorevideturlumencorporale,itainomniintelligibilivideturlumenintellectusagentis;nontameninrationeobjectisedinrationemediicognoscendi.];DeVer14,8,ad4:“Insomesenselightistheobjectofsightandinanothersensenot.For,sincelightisseenbyoursight

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Therefore,ifwhatismeantis“act”as“activeprinciple”,insofarastheactive

principleinasenseparticipatesitsownperfection,orwhatismeantis“formalprinciple”in

thesamesense,thentheagentintellectcan—inaThomisticsensealso—becalled“act”and

“formalprinciple”oftheobjectofknowing,insofarasitcontributesintelligibilityasamode

ofbeing.Aquinashimselfusesthisexpression,andheappearstodosointhesense

explained.But,ifbyformalprinciplewhatismeantisthattheintelligiblecontentof

knowingiscontributedtothematerialofsensibilitybytheagentintellect,thenwhatis

beingsaidisnolongeraboutAquinas’notionofagentintellect.575

Twogroupsoftextshavebeenexamined;namely,sometextswhichseemto

suggestaformalaprioriinhumanunderstanding,asisrequiredinaKantianepistemology;

andafewothertextswhichcouldbeinterpretedassayingthattheagentintellectisa

formalaprioriofintellectualknowingasperformative.Thereisnotenoughevidenceinany

ofthemtosupporttheclaimthatAquinasconsiderstheagentintellectaformalapriori,in

thesenseofcontributingintelligibilityascontent.Thefollowingtextsshouldhelptoshow

moreclearlythat,forAquinas,theagentintellectisthatwhichprovidesintelligibilityasa

onlyifthroughreflectionorinsomeotherwayitisunitedtoabodyhavingasurface,itisnotcalledtheessentialobjectofsight.Thisis,rather,color,whichisalwaysinabodyhavingasurface.However,insofarasnothingcanbeseenexceptbyreasonoflight,lightitselfissaidtobethefirstvisiblething…”[Lumenquodammodoestobiectumvisusetquodammodonon.Inquantumenimluxnonvideturnostrisvisibusnisiperhocquodadaliquodcorpusterminatum,perreflexionem,velaliomodoconiungitur,diciturnonessepersevisusobiectum,sedmagiscolor,quisemperestincorporeterminato.Inquantumautemnihilnisiperlucemvideripotest,luxprimumvisibileessedicitur…]

575HereisaninterestingtextfromZagalArreguín,inwhichtheauthorexpressesverywellwhatismeantherebyametaphysicalapriori,andbytheagentintellectasactoftheintelligible:“Whatmakesitthereforeinactwithrespecttointeligibleobjectsisthefactthatitisanactiveimmaterialforceabletoassimilateotherthingstoitself,i.e.,immaterializethem.Inthiswayitrendersactuallyintelligiblesomethingthatwasonlypotentiallyintelligible:likelight,whichwithoutcontaininganyparticularcolor,bringscolorsintoact”(ZagalArreguín,367).

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modeofbeingandis,therefore,ametaphysicalaprioriofintellectualknowingasreceptive

ofobjectivecontent.

2)TheAgentIntellectasaMetaphysicalAPriori

Althoughmuchhasalreadybeenanticipated,andmuchofwhatwillherebesaid

dependsonthepreviousreflections,itistimetoaddressmoredirectlythecharacterization

oftheagentintellectasametaphysical,notaformal,aprioriofintellectualknowing.

Introductoryremarksareofferedtobeginwith,followedbyanexaminationofthetexts.

Theagentintellect,forAquinas,isametaphysicalaprioriofintellectualknowingas

receptiveofobjectivecontent.Bythisismeantthattheagentintellectisresponsiblenotfor

theintelligiblecontent,norfortheuniversalobject,butfortheintelligiblemodeofbeingof

theuniversalcontent.Theobjectofunderstandingissomethingrealoutsidethemind,but

initsrealmodeofbeingisnot“available”toourintellectualfaculty.Tothisobjecttheagent

intellectgivestheintelligiblemodeofbeinginactby“separating”therealnaturefromthe

individualconditionsofmatter.

Thisseparationisnothingotherthanamakingvisibleofthespecificperfectionby

divestingitfromtheparticularrealizationinthisindividual(doctrineofparticipation);it

shouldnotbeunderstoodasaseparationinreality,i.e.,aseparationofthecontentinits

existence.576Theuniversalcontentisabstracted(=madevisible)bytheagentintellectbutit

isunderstood(=seen)inthephantasm,i.e.,itis“read–into”theparticular.577The

576Cf.85,1ad1;InIIIDeAnima6,261-271.577Thisisrelatedagaintotheissueofthedistinctionbetweenabstractionasactofthe

possibleintellectandoftheagentintellect(cf.Cromp,16ff.;Chapter4,section1).

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separationoftheagentintellectisnotaseparationofthecontent,butamakingvisibleof

theuniversalcontentofthephantasm;andalthoughitimpliestheproductionofaseparate

species(theimpressa),itscontentisreadintothephantasm(=conversioadphantasmata

asmodusintelligendi).Theagentintellectseparatesthenatureinitsmodeofbeing,butin

suchawaythatthenatureitselfmaybeseeninthephantasm(bythepossibleintellect).

Thenatureisseeninaseparatemodeofbeing,butnotasseparatefromthephantasm.

Whatisseenisthequidditasofthephantasm.Thecontentisdistinctindeed,notinsofaras

itexistsorcouldexistseparatelyfromthesensiblecontent,butinsofarasitisacommon

perfectionthatisnotidentifiedwithitsparticularrealizationinthematter.Matterisasign

oflimitation,whichimpliesthelimitationofaperfection;aperfectionofitselfdoesnotsay

limitation;thereforetheperfectionthatislimitedisdifferentfromitslimitation,andcanbe

consideredwithoutreferencetoitslimitation(i.e.,initselfor“absolutely”).

Whichtextssupportthisinterpretationoftheagentintellect?Insubsection2.1,

following,isthetextusprinceps578whichwillbere-examinednowmindfulofourprevious

path;then,in2.2,areothertextshelpfulinstressingthattheagentintellectcannotbe

interpretedasaformalapriori,butsolelyasametaphysicalapriori;finally,in2.3,aretexts

helpfulinunderstandingthesenseinwhichAquinasseestheagentintellectasalight,

whichwillbestudiedinconnectionwiththeinterpretationathand.

57879,3,c..

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2.1.Thetextusprinceps

In79,3,theproblemiswhetherornotthereisaneedtopostulateanagentintellect

inthehumansoul.AcomparisonwithPlatoclarifiesthepoint:

AccordingtotheopinionofPlato,thereisnoneedforanactiveintellectinordertomakethingsactuallyintelligible;butperhapsinordertoprovideintellectuallighttotheintellect,aswillbeexplainedfartheron.ForPlatosupposedthattheformsofnaturalthingssubsistedapartfrommatter,andconsequentlythattheyareintelligible:sinceathingisactuallyintelligiblefromtheveryfactthatitisimmaterial.579

Itisevidentthattheroleoftheagentintellectistomake(theobject)intelligiblein

act;itisalsoevidentthat,forAquinas,theobjectofhumanunderstandingforbothPlato

andAristotleistheform(nature,species)ofcorporealthings.St.Thomaswillnothere

(again)showthereasonsforhisdisagreementwithPlato.Theimportantpointisnowthat,

becausePlatoconsiderstheobjectofhumanunderstandingasseparatefrommatterinits

realmodeofbeing,thatobjectis–forPlato–alreadyintelligibleinactand,therefore,no

needofanagentintellectinthesensementionedpreviously(asmakingintelligibleinact)

arisesforhim.Thisisthereasonfortheclarification“sedforteadpraebendum”etc.:the

needofanagentintellectasmakingintelligibleinactmakesnosenseinthesystemof

Plato,becausetheobjectofhumanunderstandinginitsrealbeingisalreadyseparatefrom

matterand,therefore,alreadyintelligibleinact.

Aristotle’spositionisclearlystated:“ButsinceAristotledidnotallowthatformsof

naturalthingsexistapartfrommatter,andasformsexistinginmatterarenotactually

57979,3,c.:“SecundumopinionemPlatonis,nullanecessitaseratponereintellectum

agentemadfaciendumintelligibiliainactu;sedforteadpraebendumlumenintelligibileintelligenti,utinfradicetur.PosuitenimPlatoformasrerumnaturaliumsinemateriasubsistere,etperconsequenseasintelligibilesesse,quiaexhocestaliquidintelligibileactu,quodestimmateriale.”

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intelligible;itfollowsthatthenaturesofformsofthesensiblethingswhichweunderstand

arenotactuallyintelligible.”580Theobjectofhumanunderstandingforbothphilosophers,

atleasthereforAquinas,isthesame:theformsofthecorporealthings.Theprinciplefor

resolvingthequestionisexactlythesame:somethingisintelligibleinactonlyifitis

separatefrommatter.Thedifferencebetweenthetwophilosopherscannotbemoreclearly

established:therespectivemodesofbeingoftheobjectofhumanunderstandingdiffer

because,whereasforPlatoitisintelligibleinact,forAristotleitisimbeddedinthematter

and,therefore,notintelligibleinact.

Aquinascontinues:“Nownothingisreducedfrompotentialitytoactexceptby

somethinginact;asthesenses[are]madeactualbywhatisactuallysensible.”581Here“ens

actu”istheintelligibleinact,asthecomparisonwiththesensesmakesclear,andalsothe

context:St.Thomashasjustsaidthatthenatureswhicharetheobjectofourunderstanding

arenotintelligibleinact.Whatheissayingnowisthis:weunderstandthenaturesofthings,

buttheyarenotintelligibleinact;now,ifunderstandingistohappen(asthepassageofthe

intellectfrompotencytoact),thosenaturesneedtobeintelligibleinact.Therefore,he

concludesthattheconditionofpossibilityofhumanunderstandingisafacultymaking

intelligibleinacttheproportionateobjectofhumanunderstanding:“Wemusttherefore

assignonthepartoftheintellectsomepowertomakethingsactuallyintelligible,by

58079,3,c.:“SedquiaAristotelesnonposuitformasrerumnaturaliumsubsisteresine

materia;formaeauteminmateriaexistentesnonsuntintelligibilesactu,sequebaturquodnaturaeseuformaererumsensibilium,quasintelligimus,nonessentintelligibilesactu.”

58179,3,c.:“Nihilautemreduciturdepotentiainactum,nisiperaliquodensactu,sicutsensusfitinactupersensibileinactu.”

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abstractionofthespeciesfrommaterialconditions.Andsuchisthenecessityforanactive

intellect.”582

Theagentintellect,therefore,isametaphysicalaprioriinsofarasitisanefficiency

previoustoknowingitself,affectingthemodeofbeing(notthecontent)oftheobjectof

humanunderstanding.Itisapriori,notinsofarasitisanarbitraryinventionprevioustothe

analysisofthefactofhumanknowing,butpreciselyinsofarisitexplainstheThomisticfact

ofhumanunderstandingasithappens.Ifwedounderstandthenatureofcorporealthings

butthesenaturesarenot,intheirsubsistence,intelligibleinact,theremustbesomething

whichexplainsthefactthatweunderstandthem.Thisisthenecessityandtheroleofthe

agentintellectforAquinas.

2.2.NotaFormalbutaMetaphysicalAPriori

Othertextscanhelpustoconfirmandtoqualifythisinterpretation:first(2.2.a),

thosesuggestingthattheagentintellectisnotaformalapriori;second(2.2.b),those

referringtheoriginoftheintelligiblecontenttoexperience;finally(2.2.c),textsfromother

worksandauthorsportrayingtheagentintellectasametaphysicalapriori.

2.2.a.NotaFormalAPriori

Inthefollowing,theagentintellectisnotaformalapriori:

Iftherelationoftheactiveintellecttothepassivewerethatoftheactiveobjecttoapower,as,forinstance,ofthevisibleinacttothesight;itwouldfollowthatwecouldunderstandallthingsinstantly,sincetheactiveintellectisthatwhichmakesall

58279,3,c.:“Oportebatigiturponerealiquamvirtutemexparteintellectus,quaefaceret

intelligibiliainactu,perabstractionemspecierumaconditionibusmaterialibus.Ethaecestnecessitasponendiintellectumagentem.”

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things(inact).Butnowtheactiveintellectisnotanobject,ratherisitthatwherebytheobjectsaremadetobeinact…583

Thisisanimportanttext.First,theagentintellectisdeniedaformalobjectivity;that

is,theagentintellectinnowayiswhatisunderstood(itisnottheintelligibleasthatwhich

actualizesthefacultyofunderstanding).However,thereasonforwhichitcannotbethe

intelligibleobjectisevenmoreimportant:theagentintellectisthatbywhicheverythingis

made(intelligible).Ifthiscapacity,orrathervirtuality,ofmakingeverythingintelligiblewere

tobeunderstoodinaformalsense,orobjectively,theformalcontentofeveryactof

understandingwouldbealreadyincludedintheagentintellect,andsowewould

understandeverythingimmediately.Instead,theagentintellectisnottobeunderstoodas

object(thusformallyperfectingthefaculty)but,rather,asmetaphysicallyperfectingthe

object(insofarastheagentintellectmakesitintelligibleinact).ForAquinas,tobethe

objectofunderstandingandtomakethisobjectintelligiblearetwodifferentthings.

Asimilartextis88,3ad1.Hereagaintheagentintellectisnottheobjectof

knowing,butitsprinciple.Thistextcouldberelatedtothepreviousone,inthesensethat

Aquinasdeniesthatthevirtualityoftheagentintellect(hereasaparticipationoftheFirst

58379,4ad3:“Siintellectusagenscomparareturadintellectumpossibilemutobiectum

agensadpotentiam,sicutvisibileinactuadvisum;sequereturquodstatimomniaintelligeremus,cumintellectusagenssitquoestomniafacere.Nuncautemnonsehabetutobiectum,sedutfaciensobiectainactu…”LetmealsogivethepartialtranslationofStump(cf.256-257,hersquarebrackets):“Iftheactiveintellectwererelatedtothepossibleintellectasanactiveobjectisrelatedtoapower...,itwouldfollowthatwewouldimmediatelyunderstandallthings...But,asitis,theactiveintellectisrelatednotasan[active]object,butratheraswhatactualizes[cognitive]objects.”Cf.InIIIDeAnima4,147-162.Thefollowingtextisnotspeakingdirectlyoftheagentintellectbutmaybehelpful,InIIIDeAnima1,170-180:“Theearlyphilosophers’[said]thatintellectmustbecompoundedofallthingsifitcanknowallthings.Butifitknewallthings,ascontainingthemallinitselfalready,itwouldbeanever-actualintellect,andnevermerelyinpotency…”[Dicebantenimeumadhocquodcognosceretomnia,essecompositumexomnibus.Siautemessetcognoscitivusomniumquiahaberetinseomnia,essetsemperintellectusinactuetnunquaminpotential…]

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Truth)issomethingobjective.If,intheprevioustext,itisdeniedthatweknoweverything

(whichwouldbethecaseiftheagentintellectweretheobjectofunderstanding),hereitis

deniedthatGodisthefirstobjectofknowing,whichcouldbethecaseifthelightbywhich

weknoweverythingwereitselfknown.St.Thomaspointsoutalsothat,inhuman

understanding,thelightasprincipleofunderstandingisnotGodHimselfbutaperfection

participatedfromGod.

Weseeandjudgeofallthingsinthelightofthefirsttruth,forasmuchasthelightitselfofourmind,whethernaturalorgratuitous,isnothingelsethan[acertain]impressionofthefirsttruthuponit,asstatedabove.Hence,asthelightitselfofourintellectisnottheobjectitunderstands[butthatbymeansofwhichitunderstands],muchlesscanitbesaidthatGodisthefirstobjectknownbyourintellect.584

Thattheagentintellectisametaphysicalapriori,insofarasitisprevioustoknowing

itself,couldbetakenfromthefollowingpassageaswell:“Neverthelessthereisadistinction

betweenthepoweroftheactiveintellectandofthepassiveintellect:becauseasregards

thesameobject,theactivepowerwhichmakestheobjecttobeinactmustbedistinctfrom

thepassivepower,whichismovedbytheobjectexistinginact.”585

Althoughinthefollowingtextsintellectusstandsforthepossibleintellect,itisstill

relevantforthepresentpurposesthattheperfectionoftheobjectofhumanunderstanding

isnottheintellectualoperationitself,butthenatureofthecorporealthing.Thisisrelated

58488,3ad1:“Inluceprimaeveritatisomniaintelligimusetiudicamus,inquantumipsum

lumenintellectusnostri,sivenaturalesivegratuitum,nihilaliudestquamquaedamimpressioveritatisprimae,utsupradictumest.Undecumipsumlumenintellectusnostrinonsehabeatadintellectumnostrumsicutquodintelligitur,sedsicutquointelligitur;multominusDeusestidquodprimoanostrointellectuintelligitur.”Itseemsclearthatthislumenistheagentintellect.Cf.DeSpirit.Creat.a.10ad1,andS.Th.I,54,4.

58579,7,c.:“Diversificaturtamenpotentiaintellectusagentis,etintellectuspossibilis,quiarespectueiusdemobiecti,aliudprincipiumoportetessepotentiamactivam,quaefacitobiectumesseinactu;etaliudpotentiampassivam,quaemoveturabobiectoinactuexistente.”

264

tothecharacterizationofhumanunderstandingnotasperformativeoftheobjectbutas

receptive:

Theintelligentactofthehumanintellectisnottheactandperfectionofthematerialnatureunderstood,asifthenatureofthematerialthingandintelligentactcouldbeunderstoodbyoneact;justasathinganditsperfectionareunderstoodbyoneact.Hencetheactwherebytheintellectunderstandsastoneisdistinctfromtheactwherebyitunderstandsthatitunderstandsastone;andsoon.586

“Nowtheultimateperfectionoftheintellectconsistsinitsownoperation:forthisisnotanacttendingtosomethingelseinwhichliestheperfectionoftheworkaccomplished,asbuildingistheperfectionofthethingbuilt;butitremainsintheagentasitsperfectionandact,asissaid[in]Metaph.ix.”587

Clearly,forAquinas,itisnottheobjectthathastobe(objectively)perfectedbythe

intellectualoperation,butitistheintellectthatisperfectedbytheobject.Theactionofthe

agentintellect,therefore,mustbeconceivedasperfectingtheobjectinanotherway

(metaphysically,thatistosay,initsmodeofbeing)andthisactivitymustbeplaced

previoustounderstandingitself(withapriorityofnature,notonlytemporal).Thetextof

76,2ad4pointsusinthesamedirection:becausetheobjectofunderstandinghasan

autonomousexistence,theactionoftheagentintellecthasnothingtodowithitscontent

butwithitsmodeofbeing:“…whereasthenatureofthethingunderstoodisindeed

58687,3ad2:“Dicendumquodipsumintelligerehumanumnonestactusetperfectio

naturaeintellectaematerialis,utsicpossitunoactuintelliginaturareimaterialisetipsumintelligere,sicutunoactuintelligiturrescumsuaperfectione.Undealiusestactusquointellectusintelligitlapidem,etaliusestactusquointelligitseintelligerelapidem,etsicinde.”

58787,3,c.:“Ultimaautemperfectiointellectusesteiusoperatio,nonenimestsicutactiotendensinalterum,quaesitperfectiooperati,sicutaedificatioaedificati;sedmanetinoperanteutperfectioetactuseius,utdiciturinIXMetaphys..”

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outsidethesoul,butthemodeaccordingtowhichitexistsoutsidethesoulisnotthemode

accordingtowhichitisunderstood.”588

Thattheagentintellectisnotaformalapriori,asoriginoftheintelligiblecontent,

relatestoAquinas’rejectingtheidentificationbetweentheagentintellectandthehabitof

firstprinciples.589

2.2.b.TheOriginoftheIntelligibleContent

Thefollowingtext590isimportantbecauseitshowsclearlythedifferencebetween

theagentintellectasametaphysicalapriori(andprincipiumquo)andtheaposteriorityof

thespecies,andso,oftheobjectofhumanunderstanding.Onecanreadbetweenthelines

manyhistoricalissuesrelatedtotheimportanceofSt.Augustineinthescholarlymilieuof

thetime,buttheseneednotdistractfromtheimmediatepurpose.Thequestioniswhether

weknoweverythinginrationibusaeternis.St.Thomasgivesanaffirmativeanswer,butfirst

clarifieswhatitmeansinthiscasetoknow“in”something.Inthiscase,itdoesnotmeanto

knowinrationibusaeternisasinanobjectofvision(aswhoeverlooksatamirrorcanseein

themirrorallthatistherereflected).ThisitcouldmeanforPlato,accordingtowhomwe

participateobjectivelyintheeternalideasinthepresentstateoflife.St.Thomaswantsto

proposeinsteadasubjectiveparticipation:theparticipationofthelightbywhichtheobjects

areseen.“Secondly,onethingissaidtobeknowninanotherasinaprincipleofknowledge:

58876,2ad4:“…[N]aturaautemreiquaeintelligitur,estquidemextraanimam,sednon

habetillummodumessendiextraanimam,secundumquemintelligitur.”589Cf.inthisChapter,section1.5,“Naturaliternotavelindita.”59084,5,c..

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thuswemightsaythatweseeinthesunwhatweseebythesun.”591Theshiftfrom“in”to

“per”fromthebeginningissignificant;thatis,“in”canembraceseveralmeanings,but“per”

ismorerestricted.“Andthuswemustneedssaythatthehumansoulknowsallthingsinthe

eternaltypes,sincebyparticipationofthesetypesweknowallthings.”592Thissecond

precisioniscrucial.St.Thomashasalreadysaidthattheeternalideasareonewiththe

divineessenceand,therefore,justastheycannotbethedirectobjectofvisioninthislife,

neitheraretheydirectlytheprinciplebywhichwesee.Wepossessaparticipationofthe

uncreatedlight,anditisonlyinthatsensethatweknowbythedivinelight:“Forthe

intellectuallightitselfwhichisinus,isnothingelsethanaparticipatedlikenessofthe

uncreatedlight,inwhicharecontainedtheeternaltypes.”593

Thismentionofthefactthatthedivinelightcontainstheeternalideasmayleadone

tothinkthattheparticipatedlightwouldalsocontain,atleastinsomeway,theideasofall

things.TwothingsactuallypreventusfrommisreadingAquinas.Thefirstistoremember

that,forhim,intellectuallifeisrealizedincreationbydegrees,theleastofwhichisthe

humansoul.Thesoulparticipatesonlya“power”tounderstand,whichisinpotencyofall

oftheintelligibleobjects,anda“light”whichisalsoinpotencyofmakingintelligiblethe

natureofcorporealthings.Weparticipate[from]theintelligenceofGodinsofaraswehave

thecapacitytoknow,butweactuallyknownothing“bynature,”i.e.,fromthebeginning.

59184,5,c.:“Aliomododicituraliquidcognosciinaliquosicutincognitionisprincipio;sicutsi

dicamusquodinsolevidentureaquaevidenturpersolem.”59284,5,c.:“Etsicnecesseestdicerequodanimahumanaomniacognoscatinrationibus

aeternis,perquarumparticipationemomniacognoscimus.”59384,5,c.:“Ipsumenimlumenintellectualequodestinnobis,nihilestaliudquam

quaedamparticipatasimilitudoluminisincreati,inquocontinenturrationesaeternae.”

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ThesecondthingmakingitmoredifficulttomisreadSt.Thomasissimplytherestofthe

passage,whereheclearlysaysthat,besidesthislightasparticipationoftheeternalideas,

weneedintelligiblespeciescomingfromthethingsthemselves:

Whenceitiswritten[inPsalm4],‘Manysay:Whoshowethusgoodthings?’whichquestionthePsalmistanswers,‘ThelightofThycountenance,OLord,issigneduponus,’asthoughheweretosay:Bytheseal594oftheDivinelightinus,allthingsaremadeknowntous.Butsincebesidestheintellectuallightwhichisinus,intelligiblespecies,whicharederivedfromthings,arerequiredinorderforustohaveknowledgeofmaterialthings;thereforethissameknowledgeisnotduemerelytoaparticipationoftheeternaltypes,asthePlatonistsheld,maintainingthatthemereparticipationofideassufficedforknowledge.595

Itisclear,then,thattheparticipationinthedivineideas,hereandforAquinas,ison

thepartoftheagentintellectandnotonthepartoftheintelligiblespecies.Ofcourse,the

speciesthemselves,insofarastheycomefromthethings,whichareinturnparticipationsof

thedivineideasbycreation,[thespecies]couldalsobeconsidered“participations”ofthe

eternalideas.596Butthisparticipationisnot“direct,”sotospeak,asitisdirectinthecaseof

theagentintellect(atleastinsofaraswereceiveitfromGodincreation).Thatiswhy

Aquinassays“nonpersolamparticipationemrationumaeternarum,”thatistosay,notby

meansoftheagentintellectalone,becauseweneedtheintelligiblespeciesalso.

594Theword“sigillationem”herestandsforparticipation,inthesenseofacreatedeffect

fromGodinthehumansoul(“innobis”).Bythislight,allthingsareshowntous,insofarasthelightmakesvisibletheobjects.

59584,5,c.:“UndeinPsalmoIV,dicitur,multidicunt,quisostenditnobisbona?CuiquaestioniPsalmistarespondet,dicens,signatumestsupernoslumenvultustui,domine.Quasidicat,peripsamsigillationemdiviniluminisinnobis,omniademonstrantur.Quiatamenpraeterlumenintellectualeinnobis,exigunturspeciesintelligibilesarebusacceptae,adscientiamderebusmaterialibushabendam;ideononpersolamparticipationemrationumaeternarumderebusmaterialibusnotitiamhabemus,sicutPlatoniciposueruntquodsolaidearumparticipatiosufficitadscientiamhabendam.”

596Cf.84,4ad1,quotedonthenextpage.

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Finally,itmaynotbeoutofplacetoremarkthatAquinasconsiderstheagent

intellecttobedistinctfromtheintelligiblespecies,theagentintellectcomingfromGodand

theintelligiblespeciescomingfromthethingsthemselves.Itismostsignificantbecause

thatwhichcomesfromthethingsisnotjustthephantasm,asthematerialofsensibilityto

beinformed,buttheintelligiblespecies.Therefore,someintelligibleaspectcomesfromthe

thingsthemselves.Whichaspect?Itistheobjectiveaspectand,therefore,whatherehas

beencalledtheintelligiblecontentasopposedtotheintelligiblemodeofbeing.Thismust

besobecausethepurposeofAquinasinthearticleistoshowthatwedonotparticipate

fromGodtheobjectofunderstanding,butalightthatisprincipleofunderstandingthe

objects.Inordertoknow,then,itisnotenoughtohavelight,butweneedthethingsthat

areseen.Thesethings,ofcourse,implythecompletedactionoftheagentintellect,not

howeverinordertobethemselves,butinordertobeseen.Theintelligibilityofthespecies,

asamodeofbeing,doescomefromtheagentintellect,andnotfromthethings

themselves;butwhatisintelligiblecomesfromthethings,andinthatsense,theintelligible

speciescomefromthethingsthemselves.

Thisinterpretationseemsconfirmedbythefollowingtextfromthepreviousarticle:

“Theintelligiblespecieswhichareparticipatedbyourintellectarereduced,astotheirfirst

cause,toafirstprinciplewhichisbyitsessenceintelligible—namely,God.Buttheyproceed

fromthatprinciplebymeansofthesensibleformsandmaterialthings,fromwhichwe

gatherknowledge,asDionysiussays.”597Aquinasisheretryingtodenythatwereceive

59784,4ad1:“Speciesintelligibilesquasparticipatnosterintellectus,reducuntursicutin

primamcausaminaliquodprincipiumpersuamessentiamintelligibile,scilicetinDeum.Sedabillo

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intelligiblespeciesfromtheseparatesubstances.Again,whatisatstakeisacertain

objectiveparticipationinknowing.But,thistimeAquinas’concernistoshowthat,ifwecan

speakofacertainparticipationfromGodregardingthecontentofknowing,this

participationis“indirect,”throughtheformsofthenaturalthingsfromwhichwereceive

sciencedirectly.Inotherwords,whatweknowisnotwhatispresentedtousbythe

separatesubstances,butthenatureofcorporealthings:ourfacultycannotknownaturally

byinfusedspecieswhichexceeditsintelligiblepower.Ourfacultycanbeperfectedonlyby

theintelligibleperfectionofmaterialthings,bytheirform,whichinitsrealmodeofbeingis

poorinintelligiblecontentandcommontomany.598Thisperfectioniswhatwecansee

thankstothepoorlightoftheagentintellect.Therefore,thepoorintelligibilitybestowedby

thecreativewisdomofGodonmaterialcreaturesisparticipatedbyourpossibleintellect,

thankstoanintellectuallight(theagentintellect)participatedfromtheDivineLight.The

participatedlightcomesfromGod,buttheperfectionoftheobjectasknowncomesnot

directlyfromGod,butfromthematerialthings.BytheimpressionofHislight(ourown

participatedlight),GodallowsustoseetheintelligibilityHebestowedonmaterialcreatures

principioproceduntmediantibusformisrerumsensibiliumetmaterialium,aquibusscientiamcolligimus,utDionysiusdicit.”AnothertextwiththesamereferencetoDionysiusis76,5,c.:“Nowtheintellectualsoul,aswehaveseenabove[…]intheorderofnature,holdsthelowestplaceamongintellectualsubstances;inasmuchasitisnotnaturallygiftedwiththeknowledgeoftruth,astheangelsare;buthastogatherknowledgefromindividualthingsbywayofthesenses,asDionysiussays(Div.Nom.vii).”[Animaautemintellectiva,sicutsuprahabitumest,secundumnaturaeordinem,infimumgraduminsubstantiisintellectualibustenet;intantumquodnonhabetnaturalitersibiinditamnotitiamveritatis,sicutAngeli,sedoportetquodeamcolligatexrebusdivisibilibusperviamsensus,utDionysiusdicit,VIIcap.deDiv.Nom.]

598Aboutthedegreesofcognitivepowerandtheproportionbetweencognitivepowerandobject,cf.85,1,c.;aboutthedegreesinintellectualpower,76,5,c.(seepreviousfootnote)and55,2,c.;aboutthedivisionintheintellectualrealmasaconsequenceofthelowerstatusinthescaleofbeings,cf.89,1,c.;Fabro,NMP,268ff.

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insofarasitisinthem,andnotinsofarasitisinHisdivineideas.Intheend,theintellectual

contentofourknowingcancomefromthematerialthingsbecause,forAquinas,thereis

somethingintelligibleinthematerialthingsinsofaras,intheirnaturalperfections,they

participateofthecreativewisdomofGod.Thisiswhythereisnoneedofaformalapriori

forAquinas.

Afinaltextregardingtheoriginoftheintelligiblecontentis76,2,c.St.Thomasis

tryingtoconfutetheopinionofthosewhopostulateonlyoneseparateintellectforall

humanbeings.Here,heisdealingparticularlywiththeCommentator,whosuggeststhatthe

reasonweascribetodifferentsubjectstheintelligenceofthesamething(astone,inthe

example)isthenumericaldiversityofphantasms.Butthisdiversity,forAquinas,doesnot

implyanumericaldistinctionofintellectualoperations.Thediversityofphantasmsdoesnot

preventourintelligencefromunderstandingwithoneoperation(andthereforewithone

intelligiblespecies)theonenatureofstone,becausethephantasmsare“ofthesame

species.”Whatisinterestingforthepresentpurposesisthis:thereasonthattheintelligible

speciesisoneisthatthephantasmsareofthesamespecies(i.e.,allofthemarephantasms

ofstones,theyallpossessthesamenature)andtherefore,fromallofthem,wecanabstract

onlyoneintelligiblespeciesbywhichweknowtheonenatureofstone.Again,the

intelligiblecontentcomesfromthecorporealthingsthemselvesastheyarerepresentedby

thephantasmofsensibility:

Butthephantasmitselfisnotaformofthepossibleintellect;itistheintelligiblespeciesabstractedfromthephantasmthatisaform.Nowinoneintellect,fromdifferentphantasmsofthesamespecies,onlyoneintelligiblespeciesisabstracted;asappearsinoneman,inwhomtheremaybedifferentphantasmsofastone;yetfromallofthemonlyoneintelligiblespeciesofastoneisabstracted;bywhichthe

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intellectofthatoneman,byoneoperation,understandsthenatureofastone,notwithstandingthediversityofphantasms.599

Thattheoriginoftheintelligiblecontentcomesfromexperienceandisthenature

subsistinginsensiblethingsisadoctrinethatcanbefoundinbothearlierandlaterworksof

Aquinas.Wewillbeginwiththeearliertexts,andquoteinfootnotesomecorresponding

latertexts.

Thefollowingtextalsohelpsustounderstandthattheformsweknowgofromthe

mindofGodtoourmindsthroughthethingsthemselves,insuchawaythattheyimpress

theirformsinus:

ThatstatementofAlgazelistobeunderstoodofourknowledge,whichisacquiredbythe[thingsimpressingtheirlikenesses]uponoursouls.TheoppositeistrueofGod’scognition,foritisfromHisintellectthatformsflowintocreatures.Ourknowledgeistheimpressingofthingsinoursouls;buttheformsofthingsare[acertain]impressingofthedivineknowledgeinthings.600

The“active”roleofthethingsthemselvesinintellectualknowingisclearinthe

followingtextalso.This“activity”regardsthecontentofknowing,insofarasthethings

themselves“provide”intelligencewiththeperfectionoftheirforms.Onlyinthecaseof

artifactsdothethingsthemselves“receive”theirformalperfectionfromintelligence.

59976,2,c.:“Sedipsumphantasmanonestformaintellectuspossibilis,sedspecies

intelligibilisquaeaphantasmatibusabstrahitur.Inunoautemintellectuaphantasmatibusdiversiseiusdemspecieinonabstrahiturnisiunaspeciesintelligibilis.Sicutinunohomineapparet,inquopossuntessediversaphantasmatalapidis,ettamenabomnibuseisabstrahiturunaspeciesintelligibilislapidis,perquamintellectusuniushominisoperationeunaintelligitnaturamlapidis,nonobstantediversitatephantasmatum.”

600DeVer.2,1ad6:“VerbumilludAlgazelisintelligendumestdescientianostra,quaeinnobisacquiriturperhocquodresimprimuntsimilitudinessuasinanimasnostras;sedincognitioneDeiesteconverso,quiaabeiusintellectueffluuntformaeinomnescreaturas;undesicutscientiainnobisestsigillatioreruminanimabusnostris,itaeconversoformaererumnonsuntnisiquaedamsigillatiodivinaescientiaeinrebus.”

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Now,thisform,whichisotherthantheintellect,issometimesthecauseofthethingwhoselikenessitis.Wehaveanevidentexampleofthisinthepracticalintellect,whoseformisthecauseofthethingdone.Butsometimesthisformistheeffectofthething,asisclearlythecasewithourspeculativeintellectwhenitreceivesitsknowledgefromthings.601Therefore,wheneveranintellectknowsathingthroughalikenesswhichisnottheessenceoftheknower,thentheintellectisperfectedbysomethingotherthanitself;butifthatlikenessshouldhappentobethecauseofthething,inthatcasetheintellectwillbeperfectedonlybythelikeness,andnotatallbythethingwhoselikenessitis.Forexample,ahouseisnottheperfectionoftheartisticconception,butratherthecontrary.Ontheotherhand,ifthelikenessiscausedbythething,thentheperfectionoftheintellectwillbe,asitwere,thethinginanactivesense,butitslikenessinaformalsense.602

601Cf.Q.D.DeAnima,a.2,ad15:“Itisnaturaltothehumansoultoapprehendintelligible

truthinamannerinferiortothatpropertosuperiorspiritualsubstances,namely,by[receivingit]fromsensiblethings…”[Istemoduscognoscendiestnaturalisanimae,utpercipiatintelligibilemveritateminframodumquopercipiuntspiritualessubstantiaesuperiores,accipiendosciliceteamexsensibilibus…];SummaI,51,1inLambert,85:“Itbelongstothehumansoultobeunitedtoabody,becauseitisimperfectandexistspotentiallyinthegenusofintellectualsubstances,nothavingthefulnessofknowledgeinitsownnature,butacquiringitfromsensiblethingsthroughthebodilysenses.”[Humanaeanimaecompetituniricorpori,quiaestimperfectaetinpotentiaexistensingenereintellectualiumsubstantiarum,nonhabensinsuanaturaplenitudinemscientiae,sedacquirenseampersensuscorporeosasensibilibusrebus.]

602DeVer.2,3,ad1:“Haecautemforma,quaeestaliudabintellectu,quandoquequidemcomparaturadremcuiusestsimilitudo,utcausaeius:sicutpatetinintellectupractico,cuiusformaestcausareioperatae;quandoqueautemesteffectusrei,sicutpatetinintellectunostrospeculativoaccipientecognitionemarebus.Quandocumqueergointellectuscognoscitremaliquampersimilitudinemquaenonestintelligentisessentia,tuncintellectusperficituraliquoalioase;sedsiillasimilitudositcausarei,perficieturtantumsimilitudine,etnullomodorecuiusestsimilitudo,sicutdomusnonestperfectioartis,sedmagiseconverso.Siautemsiteffectusrei:tuncresetiameritquodammodoperfectiointellectusactivescilicet,similitudoveroeiusformaliter.”Cf.InMet.7,lect.6,1404-1405:“And[Aristotle]doesthisbecausetheformpresentinthematterofthingsmadebyartproceedsfromtheformpresentinthemind.Inthecaseofnaturalthings,however,theoppositeistrue.Nowtheformpresentintheminddiffersfromtheonepresentinmatter;forinmattertheformsofcontrariesaredifferentandopposed,butinthemindcontrarieshaveinasensethesameform.Andthisistruebecauseformspresentinmatterexistforthesakeofthebeingofthethingsinformed,butformspresentinthemindexistaccordingtothemodeofwhatisknowableorintelligible.”[Ethocideo,quiaaformaquaeestinanimanostra,proceditformaquaeestinmateriainartificialibus;innaturalibusautemecontrario.Haecautemformaquaeestinanima,differtaforma,quaeestinmateria.Namcontrariorumformaeinmateriasuntdiversaeetcontrariae,inanimaautemestquodammodounaspeciescontrariorum.Ethocideo,quiaformaeinmateriasuntpropteressererumformatarum:formaeauteminanimasuntsecundummodumcognoscibilemetintelligibilem.]Theforminthethingitselfisthesourceoftheforminthemind,asinthetextofDeVeritate,andherethedifferentmodeofbeingoftheformisalsosuggested.

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St.Thomasparallelssensesandintelligenceregardingtheoriginofthecontent.This

suggestsalsothatthedifferenceinthecontent(sensibleandintelligible)doesnotmeana

differenceinthereceptivityofknowing.Bothfacultiesreceivetheircontentfromthethings

themselves:“Whatisunderstoodorsensedmovesthesenseorintellectonly[insofaras]

thesenseknowledgeorintellectualknowledgeisreceivedfromthings.Divinecognitionis

notofthiskind;hence,theargumentdoesnotfollow.”603Thedifferenceinthemodeof

being(alreadystudied)isthatwhichallowsSt.Thomastospeaksimultaneouslyofthis

receptionofcontentandofitsorigininthesensibleexperience.Thatistosay,whatisinthe

intellectwaspreviouslyinthesenses,notinsofarasthesamephantasmhasadifferent

modeofbeing,butinsofarasthedifferentintelligiblecontentsubsistedinthesensible

thingwithadifferentmodeofbeing:

Thataxiomistobeunderstoodasapplyingonlytoourintellect,whichreceivesitsknowledgefromthings.Forathingisledbygradualstepsfromitsownmaterialconditionstotheimmaterialityoftheintellectthroughthemediationoftheimmaterialityofsense.Consequently,whateverisinourintellectmusthavepreviouslybeeninthesenses.This,however,doesnottakeplaceinthedivineintellect.604

603DeVer.2,3,ad14:“Intelligibileetsensibilenonmoventsensumvelintellectumnisi

secundumquodcognitiosensitivavelintellectivaarebusaccipitur;nonestautemtalisdivinacognitio;etideorationonprocedit.”Cf.ad15.

604DeVer.2,3,ad19:“Verbumilludestintelligendumdeintellectunostro,quiarebusscientiamaccipit;gradatimenimresasuamaterialitateadimmaterialitatemintellectusdeducitur,scilicetmedianteimmaterialitatesensus;etideooportetutquodestinintellectunostro,priusinsensufuerit;quodinintellectudivinolocumnonhabet.”Cf.DeVer8,6,c.inLambert,83:“Similarly,ourpossibleintellectcanunderstandnothingbeforeitisbroughtintoactbyanintelligibleform.Onlythencanitunderstandthatthingtowhichthisformbelongs.Moreover,itcanunderstanditselfonlybymeansofanintelligibleformthatactuallyexistsinitself.”[Itaintellectuspossibilisnosternihilpotestintelligereantequamperficiaturformaintelligibiliinactu:tuncenimintelligitremcuiusestillaforma;necpotestseintelligerenisiperformamintelligibilemactuinseexistentem.]Inthistext“form”standsforthecontentofintellectualknowing:initsintelligiblemodeofbeing(“in

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AnotherpassagefromDeVeritatetellsusclearlythattheintelligiblespeciescomes

fromthethingsthemselvesregardingthecontent,notregardingitsmodeofbeinginthe

mind:“Theformsinourintellects,however,arereceivedfromthings.Hence,theydonot

excelthings,andare,asitwere,equaltothemasfarasrepresentationgoes,eventhough

theymayexceltheminmodeofbeingbecausetheir[being]isimmaterial.”605Asalready

shown,everyintellectualcontentcomesfromexperience,includingthefirstprinciplesand

firstnotions:“…fromwhichitfollowsthattheprincipleofcognitionoftheaforementioned

principlesisinthesensesandthememory,asthePhilosopherdemonstratestowardsthe

endofPosteriorum…”606(mytrans.)

actu”)andinitsrealbeing(“remcuiusestillaforma”).Whatperfectsthepotencyistheformofthesensiblethinginanintelligiblemodeofbeing.

605DeVer.8,10ad3inLambert,98:“Sedformaeintellectusnostriaccipiunturexrebus;undenonsuntsuperexcedentesrebussedquasiadequataequantumadrepraesentationem,licetsintexcedentesquantumadmodumessendiinquantumhabentesseimmateriale.”Regardingthecontent,thesameideaof“adequacy”betweenthethingandthemindcanbeseeninthefollowingpassage,InMet.10,lect.2,1957:“Therefore[scienceandsense]arecalledmeasuresfiguratively,becauseinrealitytheyaremeasuredratherthanmeasure.Foritisnotbecauseweperceiveorknowathingthatitissoinreality;butitisbecauseitissoinrealitythatwehaveatrueknowledgeorperceptionofit,asissaidinBookIX[…]Thusitfollowsthatinperceivingandknowingsomethingwemeasureourknowledgebymeansofthethingswhichexistoutsidethemind.”[Sicigiturperhancsimilitudinemdicunturmensurae,quiasecundumreiveritatemmagismensuranturquammensurent.Nonenimquianosaliquidsentimusautscimus,ideosicestinrerumnatura.Sedquiasicestinrerumnatura,ideoveroaliquidscimus,autsentimus,utdiciturnonoMetaphysicorum.Etsicacciditnobis,quodinsentiendoetsciendomensuramurperresquaeextranossunt.]Thenotionof“measure”alsoimpliesacertainformalidentityandinbothpassagestheroleofpatternisfulfilledbytheformsinthethingsthemselves.

606InBoet.DeTrin.6,4,c.:“…undeprincipiumcognitionispraedictorumprincipiorumestexsensuetmemoria,utpatetperPhilosophuminfinePosteriorum…”Cf.Q.D.DeAnima,a.5,c.:“Indeed,somementhoughtthattheagentintellectdoesnotdifferfromourhabitusofindemonstrableprinciples.Butthiscannotbethecase,becausewecertainlyknowindemonstrableprinciplesbyabstractingthemfromsingulars,asthePhilosopherteachesinthePosteriorAnalytics.”[Quidamverocredideruntintellectumagentemnonessealiudquamhabitumprincipiorumindemonstrabiliuminnobis.Sedhocessenonpotest,quiaetiamipsaprincipiaindemonstrabiliacognoscimusabstrahendoasingularibus,utdocetphilosophusinIPoster..]

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2.2.c.AMetaphysicalAPriori

ThefollowingtextsconfirmourinterpretationoftheSummawithsimilarormore

clearstatementsfromotherworksofAquinas.Thefocusnowisonthecharacterizationof

theagentintellectasproductiveofanintelligiblemodeofbeingoftheuniversalcontent.

Buttheactionoftheagentintellectdoesnotmakeintelligiblethosethingswhichareofthemselvesintelligible,suchastheessencesoftheangels,butthingswhichofthemselvesarepotentiallyintelligible,suchastheessenceofmaterialthings,whicharereceivedthroughsenseandimagination…607

IfSt.Thomas’referenceto“essences”istakenasareferencetothecontent,and

theirsubsistenceaseitherintelligibleinactorinpotencyasareferencetotheirmodeof

being,theninthistexttheagentintellectistobeinterpretedasametaphysicalapriori,

insofarasitproducestheintelligiblemodeofbeingoftheessenceofthematerialthing.

Thefollowingpassagemaybeconfusingif“formal”and“material”arenotproperly

understood:“Theintelligiblespecieshasthatwhichisformalinit,throughwhichitis

actuallyintelligible,fromtheagentintellect,whichisahigherpowerthanthepossible

intellect,althoughthatwhichismaterialinitisabstractedfromphantasms.”608“Whatis

material”shouldbeunderstoodastheuniversalcontentoftheintelligiblespecies,sinceitis

607DeVer.18,5,c.inSellés,EIA,247:“Actioneautemintellectusagentisnonfiunt

intelligibiliaeaquaesuntdeseipsisintelligibilia,cuiusmodisuntessentiaeangelorum,sedeaquaesuntdeseipsisinpotentiaintelligibilia,qualiasuntessentiaererummaterialium,quaepersensumetimaginationemcapiuntur…”

608DeVer.18,8,ad3inSellés,EIA,248:“Speciesintelligibilisidquodineaformaleest,perquodestintelligibilisactu,habetabintellectuagente,quiestpotentiasuperiorintellectupossibili;quamvisidquodineamaterialeest,aphantasmatibusabstrahatur.”Thewholeresponserevisitsotherpointsreferredtopreviously,andconfirmsevenmoreourreading.

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“abstracted”fromthephantasm.Whatisformalinthespeciesisitsimmaterial(andso

“superior”)modeofbeing,andthisiswhatthespeciesreceivesfromtheagentintellect.609

ThefollowingpassagescomefromtheContraGentiles.Theagentintellectisthe

causeoftheimmaterialcondition(=modeofbeing)ofthespecies,whichenablesthe

intelligiblespeciestorepresenttheuniversal(=content):

Theintellect’sunderstandingofthegenericorspecificnatureapartfromtheindividuatingprinciplesisduetotheconditionoftheintelligiblespeciesreceivedintoit,forthespeciesisimmaterializedbytheagentintellectthroughbeingabstractedfrommatterandmaterialconditionswherebyaparticularthingisindividuated.Consequently,thesensitivepowersareunabletoknowuniversals;theycannotreceiveanimmaterialform,sincewhateverisreceivedbythemisalwaysreceivedinacorporealorgan.610

Thefollowingtextisoneofthemostexplicitregardingtheagentintellectasa

metaphysicalapriori:

609Cf.DeVer20,2ad5:“Fortheagentintellectneedsnohabitforitsactivity,becauseit

doesnotreceiveanythingfromintelligiblethings,butgivesitsownformtothembymakingthemactuallyintelligible.Thepossibleintellect,however,hasjusttheoppositerelationtointelligiblethings.”[Quodenimintellectusagenshabitunonindigeatadsuamoperationem,exhoccontingitquodintellectusagensnihilrecipitabintelligibilibus,sedmagisformamsuameistribuit,faciendoeaintelligibiliaactu;intellectusautempossibilisecontrariosehabet.]

610CGII,75,par.8:“Quodautemintelligatintellectusnaturamgenerisvelspecieidenudatamaprincipiisindividuantibus,contingitexconditionespecieiintelligibilisinipsoreceptae,quaeestimmaterialiseffectaperintellectumagentem,utpoteabstractaamateriaetconditionibusmateriae,quibusaliquidindividuatur.Etideopotentiaesensitivaenonpossuntcognoscereuniversalia:quianonpossuntrecipereformamimmaterialem,cumrecipiantsemperinorganocorporali.”Cf.CGII,76,par.3:“Thepurposeforwhichtheagentintellectrendersthespeciesactuallyintelligibleisnotthattheymayserveasmeansofunderstandingonitspart,especiallyasaseparatesubstance,becausetheagentintellectisnotinastateofpotentiality;thispurpose,onthecontrary,isthatthepossibleintellectmayunderstandbythosespecieswhichtheagentintellecthasmadeactuallyintelligible.Thus,thefunctionoftheagentintellectinregardtotheintelligiblespeciesissimplytorenderthemfitvehiclesforthepossibleintellect’sunderstanding.Now,theagentintellectmakesthemtobesuchasitisitself;foreveryagentproducesitslike.”[Intellectusagensnonfacitspeciesintelligibilesactuutipsepereasintelligat,maximesicutsubstantiaseparata,cumnonsitinpotentia:sedutpereasintelligatintellectuspossibilis.Nonigiturfaciteasnisitalesqualescompetuntintellectuipossibiliadintelligendum.Talesautemfaciteasqualisestipse:namomneagensagitsibisimile.]

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Thatwhichexistsinthesoul,however,differsfromwhatisfoundinnaturalagents.Forinthelatter,onethingisinpotentialitytosomethingaccordingtothesamemannerofbeingasthatofitsactualpresenceinsomethingelse;thematterofairisinpotentialitytotheformofwaterinthesamewayasitisinwater.Thatiswhynaturalbodies,whichhavematterincommon,aremutuallyactiveandpassiveinthesameorder.Ontheotherhand,theintellectivesoulisnotinpotentialitytothe[species]ofthingsinthephantasms,accordingtothemodeoftheirpresencetherein,butaccordingastheyareraisedtoahigherlevelbyabstractionfrommaterialindividuatingconditions,thusbeingmadeactuallyintelligible.Theactionoftheagentintellectonthephantasm,therefore,precedesthereceptionbythepossibleintellect,sothatoperationalprimacyhereisascribednottothephantasms,buttotheagentintellect.AndforthisreasonAristotlesaysthattheagentintellectisrelatedtothepossibleintellectasarttoitsmatter.611

Thepossibleintellectisinpotencyofthese“similitudinesrerumquaesuntin

phantasmatibus”butnotwiththemodeofbeingtheyhaveinthephantasms:

“similitudines”shouldherebetranslatedas“species”ratherthanas“representation”,

because“species”betterindicatesthecontentinsofarasitisrepresented.Inthatway,this

representedcontentbelongstothethingitselfinonemodeofbeing,butitisnotreceived

bythepossibleintellectwiththatsamemodeofbeing.Inanycase,itisclearthattheagent

intellectisresponsiblefortheabstractedmodeofbeingofsomethingthatispresentinthe

phantasmwithadifferentmodeofbeing.Moreover,thefactthatthisactionoftheagent

intellectprecedesthereceptionbythepossibleintellectmakestheagentintellecta

metaphysicalconditionofpossibilityoftheactofunderstanding.611CGII,77,par.3:“Differttamenhocquodinveniturinanima,abeoquodinveniturin

agentibusnaturalibus.Quiaibiunumestinpotentiaadaliquidsecundumeundemmodumquoinalteroactuinvenitur:nammateriaaerisestinpotentiaadformamaquaeeomodoquoestinaqua.Etideocorporanaturalia,quaecommunicantinmateria,eodemordineaguntetpatiunturadinvicem.Animaautemintellectivanonestinpotentiaadsimilitudinesrerumquaesuntinphantasmatibuspermodumillumquosuntibi:sedsecundumquodillaesimilitudineselevanturadaliquidaltius,utscilicetsintabstractaeaconditionibusindividuantibusmaterialibus,exquofiuntintelligibilesactu.Etideoactiointellectusagentisinphantasmatepraeceditreceptionemintellectuspossibilis.Etsicprincipalitasactionisnonattribuiturphantasmatibus,sedintellectuiagenti.PropterquodAristotelesdicitquodsehabetadpossibilemsicutarsadmateriam.”

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ThereisanotherveryexplicittextinthecommentarytotheDeAnima:

Andfromthispointofviewtheagentintellectisnotinact.Foriftheagentintellectassuchincludedthedefiniteformsofallintelligibleobjects,thepotentialintellectwouldnotdependuponphantasms;itwouldbeactualisedsimplyandsolelybytheagentintellect;andthelatter’srelationtointelligibleobjectswouldnotbethatofamakertosomethingmade,asthePhilosopherheresays;foritwouldsimplybeidenticalwiththem.Whatmakesitthereforeinactwithrespecttointelligibleobjectsisthefactthatitisanactiveimmaterialforceabletoassimilateotherthingstoitself,i.e..toimmaterialisethem.Inthiswayitrendersthepotentiallyintelligibleactuallyso(likelightwhich,withoutcontainingparticularcolours,actuallybringscoloursintoact).612

Thetextdeniesthattheagentintellectisactiveregardingthecontent(Aquinassays

previouslythatthepossibleintellectisinpotencypreciselyinthatregard),andaffirms

insteadthatitsactivityisacertainmetaphysicalcausality,a“facienssibisimile”,a

participationofitsownmodeofbeing(immaterial)totheintelligibleinpotency.The

exampleoflightisusedtounderlinethefactthattheagentintellectdoesnotproducethe

content,evenifitproducestheintelligibleinact.Also,theword“intelligible”seemstobe

usedinboththesenseofcontent(“determinationumomniumintelligibilium”isexactly

whattheagentintellectdoesnothave,andthereforewhattheagentintellectcannot

produce)andinthesenseofmodeofbeing(“aliasibisimiliafacere,scilicetimmaterialia[…]

facitintelligibiliaactu”).Thetwosensesaredistinguished,inordertoavoidconfusion:the

agentintellectactivatesintelligibilityinonesense,butnotintheothersense(thecontent612InIIIDeAnima4,147-162:“Quantumautemadhoc,intellectusagensnonestinactu:si

enimintellectusagenshaberetinsedeterminationemomniumintelligibilium,nonindigeretintellectuspossibilisfantasmatibus,sedpersolumintellectumagentemreducereturinactumomniumintelligibilium;etsicnoncomparareturadintelligibiliautfaciensadfactum,utPhilosophushicdicit,sedutexistensipsaintelligibilia.Comparaturigiturutactusrespectuintelligibilium,inquantumestquaedamvirtusimmaterialisactivapotensaliasibisimiliafacere,scilicetimmaterialia,etperhuncmodum,eaquaesuntintelligibiliainpotencia,facitintelligibiliaactu:sicenimetlumenfacitcoloresinactu,nonquodipsumhabeatinsedeterminationemomniumcolorum.”

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comesfromthephantasms).613Finally,itwouldbeamistakesimplytoconsidertheagent

intellectasanatural-realefficientcauseandnothingelse,evenifthetextmaygivethat

impression.This“makingimmaterial”isnotsimplythenaturalbestowingofapower,nor

thephysicalcommunicationofaperfection,butpreciselytheabstractionofthecontent

fromthephantasm.614

ItisinthissensethatthefollowingtextoftheQ.D.DeAnimaorientsus:“The

intellectgivesuniversalitytotheformsknowninasmuchasitabstractsthemfrommaterial

individuatingconditions.Consequentlyitisnotnecessarythattheintellectbeuniversal,but

thatitbeimmaterial.”615“Togiveuniversality”inthistextmeansthesameas“tomake

intelligible”inothertexts.St.Thomasisrespondingtoanobjectionthatportraysvery

simplytheproblemoftheuniversals:

613Cf.Q.D.DeAnima,a.5,c.:“Thereforepotentialitywithrespecttophantasmsmustbe

foundwithinoursoulsofarasthesephantasmsarerepresentativeofdeterminatethings.Thisbelongstothepossibleintellectwhichis,byitsverynature,inpotencytoallintelligibleobjects,butisactuatedby[determinaturad]thisorthatobjectthroughspeciesabstractedfromphantasms.Oursoulmustalsopossesssomeactiveimmaterialpowerwhichabstractsthephantasmsthemselvesfrommaterialindividuatingconditions.Thisbelongstotheagentintellect,sothatitis,asitwere,apowerparticipatedfromthesuperiorsubstance,God.”[Estergoinanimanostrainvenirepotentialitatemrespectuphantasmatum,secundumquodsuntrepraesentativadeterminatarumrerum.Ethocpertinetadintellectumpossibilem,qui,quantumestdese,estinpotentiaadomniaintelligibilia;seddeterminaturadhocvelaliudperspeciesaphantasmatibusabstractas.Estetiaminanimainvenirequamdamvirtutemactivamimmaterialem,quaeipsaphantasmataamaterialibusconditionibusabstrahit;ethocpertinetadintellectumagentem,utintellectusagenssitquasiquaedamvirtusparticipataexaliquasubstantiasuperiori,scilicetDeo.]

614Cf.Q.DeAnima,a.6,ad5inLambert,88:“Inlikemanner,theactionoftheagentintellectisnotofthesamemodeastheactionofnaturalforms,fortheactionoftheagentintellectconsistsinabstractingformsfrommatter,whereastheactionofnaturalagentsconsistsinimpressingformsonmatter.”[Etsimiliteractiointellectusagentis,nonesteiusdemmodicumactioneformarumnaturalium.Namactiointellectusagentisconsistitinabstrahendoamateria,actioveroagentiumnaturaliuminimprimendoformasinmateria.]

615Q.D.DeAnima,a.2ad6:“Intellectusdatformisintellectisuniversalitatem,inquantumabstrahiteasaprincipiismaterialibusindividuantibus;undenonoportetquodintellectussituniversalis,sedquodsitimmaterialis.”

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Auniversalformdoesnotacquireitsuniversalityfromthethingexistingoutsidethesoul,becauseallformsexistinginsuchthingsareindividuated.Thus,iftheformsintheintellectareuniversal,theymustacquirethisuniversalityfromtheintellectivesoul.Consequentlytheintellectivesoulisnotanindividuatedform,andthereforeisnotunitedtothebodysofarasits[being]isconcerned.616

Theobjectorconfusesuniversalitywithintelligibilityasamodeofbeing.St.Thomas

wouldgrantthattheuniversalcannotbeintelligibleinactasitisinthethingsthemselves

andso,ifitisactuallyintelligible,thismustbebytheactionofthesoul.Whathecorrectsis

thesenseinwhichthesoulmakes“universal”orintelligibleinact,thatisbymaking

immaterial,byabstractingfrommatterwhatisinmatterunderindividualconditions.Ashe

saysinotherinstances,whatmakessomethingintelligibleinactisnotthefactthatitis

universal(acontentabstractedfromindividuals),butthefactthatitisimmaterial,whichis

amodeofbeing.617Theagentintellectdoesnotmakethecontent,buttheabstractionof

thecontent;itmakes“immaterial.”Therefore,itdoesnotneedtobeuniversal,but

immaterial.618

616Q.D.DeAnima,a.2ob.6:“Formauniversalisnonhabetquodsitintellectivaarequaeest

extraanimam;quiaomnesformaequaesuntinrebusextraanimam,suntindividuatae.Siigiturformaeintellectussintuniversales,oportetquodhochabeantabanimaintellectiva.Nonergoanimaintellectivaestformaindividuata;etitanonuniturcorporisecundumesse.”

617Cf.Q.D.DeAnima,a.2,ad5:“Thehumansoulisanindividuatedformandsoalsoisitspowerwhichiscalledthepossibleintellect,aswellastheintelligibleformswhicharereceivedinthepossibleintellect.Butthisdoesnotpreventtheseformsfrombeingactually[understood],forathingisactually[understood]becauseitisimmaterial,notbecauseitisuniversal.Indeed,theuniversalisintelligiblebecauseitisabstractedfrommaterialindividuatingconditions.”[Animahumanaestquaedamformaindividuata;etsimiliterpotentiaeiusquaediciturintellectuspossibilis,etformaeintelligibilesineoreceptae.Sedhocnonprohibeteasesseintellectasinactu:exhocenimaliquidestintellectuminactuquodestimmateriale,nonautemexhocquodestuniversale;sedmagisuniversalehabetquodsitintelligibileperhocquodestabstractumaprincipiismaterialibusindividuantibus.]

618Cf.DeSpirit.Creat.,a.10,ad6:“Itmustbesaidthatthisveryfactthatthelightoftheagentintellectisnotanactofanycorporealorganthroughwhichitactsissufficientforitsbeingabletoseparateintelligiblespeciesfromphantasms;sincetheseparatenessofintelligiblespecies,

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2.3.TheComparisonoftheAgentIntellectwithLight

Theagentintellectislikealight.WhatdoesthismeanforAquinas?Thefirst

importanttexttokeepinmindis79,3ad2.Aquinasisawarethattheroleoflightinthe

sensiblerealmissubjecttodifferingopinions,butheknowsinwhatdefinitesenseheis

usingit(asametaphor)regardingintellectualknowing:

Therearetwoopinionsastotheeffectoflight.Forsomesaythatlightisrequiredforsight,inordertomakecolorsactuallyvisible.Andaccordingtothistheactiveintellectisrequiredforunderstanding,inlikemannerandforthesamereasonaslightisrequiredforseeing.Butintheopinionofothers,lightisrequiredforsight[,]notforthecolorstobecomeactuallyvisible;butinorderthatthemediummaybecomeactuallyluminous,astheCommentatorsaysonDeAnimaii.Andaccordingtothis,Aristotle'scomparisonoftheactiveintellecttolightisverifiedinthis,thatasitisrequiredforunderstanding,soislightrequiredforseeing;butnotforthesamereason.619

Thatistosay,whateveropiniononemayholdabouttheeffectoflightisofno

consequencetoAquinas.Thefactis,theagentintellectisrequiredsothatthenatureof

corporealthingsismadeintelligibleinact.Themetaphorismorehelpfultousifwe

understandsensiblelightinthesameway;thenecessityandtheroleoftheagentintellect,

whicharereceivedinthepossibleintellect,isnotgreaterthantheseparatenessoftheagentintellect.”[Hocipsumquodlumenintellectusagentisnonestactusalicuiusorganicorporeiperquodoperetur,sufficitadhocquodpossitsepararespeciesintelligibilesaphantasmatibus;cumseparatiospecierumintelligibiliumquaerecipiunturinintellectupossibili,nonsitmaiorquamseparatiointellectusagentis.]St.Thomas’pointistoshowthattheeffectisproportionatetothecause,andallhesaysreferstothemodeofbeingofthecontent,nottothecontent.Thecontent,infact,isnotseparatefromthethingsthemselves(cf.85,1ad1),buttheabstractedspeciesis.

61979,3ad2:“Circaeffectumluminisestduplexopinio.Quidamenimdicuntquodlumenrequirituradvisum,utfaciatcoloresactuvisibiles.Etsecundumhoc,similiterrequiritur,etpropteridem,intellectusagensadintelligendum,propterquodlumenadvidendum.Secundumaliosvero,lumenrequirituradvidendum,nonproptercolores,utfiantactuvisibiles;sedutmediumfiatactulucidum,utCommentatordicitinIIDeAnima.Etsecundumhoc,similitudoquaAristotelesassimilatintellectumagentemlumini,attenditurquantumadhoc,quodsicuthocestnecessariumadvidendum,itailludadintelligendum;sednonpropteridem.”Cf.InIIDeAnima14,356ff.;InIIIDeAnima4,43-53;Q.D.DeAnima,a.4,ad4(seeAppendix,Note20).

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however,donotdependonthemetaphor,butontheprinciplesexposedinthecorpus:

becausethepossibleintellectmustbeactualizedbyanintelligibleinact,andtheobjectof

understandingisnotintelligibleinactinitsnaturalmodeofbeing,theremustbeanagent

powerthatmakesitintelligibleinact.620

Amoreobscuretextis85,1ad4.Whatisinterestingaboutthispassageisthat

Aquinasspeaksoftwoactionsoftheagentintellect:onehecalls“illumination”,anactionof

theagentintellectuponthephantasm,anactionofwhichhedoesnotspeakanywhereelse

inthetreatise;andtheotherhecalls“abstraction,”referringtotheusualefficiencyofthe

agentintellectasmakingtheintelligibleinact:

Notonlydoestheactiveintellectthrowlightonthephantasm:itdoesmore;byitsownpoweritabstractstheintelligiblespeciesfromthephantasm.Itthrowslightonthephantasm,because,justasthesensitivepartacquiresagreaterpowerbyitsconjunctionwiththeintellectualpart,sobythepoweroftheactiveintellectthephantasmsaremade[…]fitfortheabstractiontherefromofintelligibleintentions.Furthermore,theactiveintellectabstractstheintelligiblespeciesfromthephantasm,forasmuchasbythepoweroftheactiveintellectweareable[totakeintoourconsiderationthespecificnaturewithouttheconditionsofindividuality,sincetheimageofthatspecificnature]informsthepassiveintellect.621

620Cory(cf.Averroes,11-12)distinguishesbasicallytwotheoriesoflight(L1andL2).

Averroesinterpretstheroleoflightasnotactualizingthevisibleobjectitself(L1),butasmakingthemediumabletoreceivetheinfluenceofthecolour(L2).AverroesattributesthistheorytoAristotle.AboutSt.Thomasshesays:“AlthoughlaterinlifehediscardedtheL1TheoryofphysicallightinfavorofL2,hecontinuedtoinsistthatL1providestheappropriatemodelfortheagentintellect’sabstractivefunction;seeQDDA,4,ad4;ST,I,79,3,ad2”(Cory,Averroes,42).

62185,1ad4:“Phantasmataetilluminanturabintellectuagente;etiterumabeis,pervirtutemintellectusagentis,speciesintelligibilesabstrahuntur.Illuminanturquidem,quia,sicutparssensitivaexconiunctioneadintellectivamefficiturvirtuosior,itaphantasmataexvirtuteintellectusagentisreddunturhabiliautabeisintentionesintelligibilesabstrahantur.Abstrahitautemintellectusagensspeciesintelligibilesaphantasmatibus,inquantumpervirtutemintellectusagentisacciperepossumusinnostraconsiderationenaturasspecierumsineindividualibusconditionibus,secundumquarumsimilitudinesintellectuspossibilisinformatur.”

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NoticeAquinas’freedominhisuseofwordsbut,atthesametime,hisprecisionin

conveyingwhathemeans.Thefactthatheisnowusing“illumination”forsomethingthatis

notabstractiondoesnotmeanthathecannotuse“illumination”or“light”tosignifythe

agentintellectinsofarasitabstracts.622Butherethereisareasonforusingtheword

“illumination,”andthisiswhatisimportant.

ObjectionFourplayswiththe“material”meaningofthetwowordsthatareusually

relatedtotheactionoftheagentintellect:abstractionandlight.Whereaslightseemstobe

somethingactive,inthesenseofacertaininfluenceonwhatisilluminated(weseethe

effectofthelightontheobject),thewordabstraction,thoughactiveaswell,seemsrather

tobeakindof“takingfrom”itsobject.Therefore,iftheagentintellect“illuminates,”itdoes

not“takefrom.”

TheobjectiongivesAquinastheopportunitytoroundoffhisEpistemology.Theissue

isnotasecondaryone:isthephantasmintelligibleinpotency?Itiseasytoadmitthat

somethingmaterialisnotintelligibleinact,butthisisnotthesameassayingthatitis

intelligibleinpotency.Iftheagentintellectmakesthephantasmintelligibleinact,itis

becausethephantasmisalreadyintelligibleinpotency.Now,tobeintelligibleinpotencyis

to“actually”possessapotentialityofbecomingintelligibleinact.Doesthephantasmhave

thispotentiality?

622Thishedoes,forexample,in79,3ad2(quotedabove)and79,4,c.Cf.DeSpirit.Creat.,

a.10,ad4:“…butyetitactuallypossessesanimmateriallightwhichhasthepowerofabstractingthosethingswhichareabletobeabstractedinpotency.”[…sedtamenactuhabetlumenimmaterialehabensvirtutemabstrahendiquaesuntabstrahibiliainpotential.]

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Itwouldnotbeoutofplaceinitiallytoclarifyinwhatsensethephantasmissaidto

be“intelligibleinpotency”:itisinpotencyinthesamesensethatitwillbeinact,because

wearetalkingaboutpotencyandactofthesamething.Therefore,iftobeintelligibleinact

means—fortheobjectofunderstanding—acquiringanewmodeofbeing,thisisalsothe

kindofpotentialitywearetalkingabout.Itisapotentialitythatregardsthemodusrei

intellectae,andnottheobjectitselfassuch(resintellecta).Infact,theobjectassuchisin

act,notinpotency:thenatureofthecorporealthingisthespecificperfectionofthe

corporealthing,thatwhichmakesittobewhatitis,aformalperfectionreceivedinthe

matterandactualizingthematter.

Wehavesaidalsothattopossessthepotentialityofbecomingintelligibleinactis

notthesameasnottobeintelligibleinact.Anexamplemayclarifythepoint.Itmaybesaid

that,inacertainsense,atableis“inpotency”ofbecomingaman.Butifatablewillbecome

aman,firstitmustsuffertheactionofmanyagentsbeforefinallybecomingsomethingthat

isinproximatepotencyofbecomingaman.Intherealmofnature,noteverythingcomes

fromeverything,butthereisanorderintheprocessesofthings.Atableisnotaman(in

act),butthisdoesnotsimplyimplythatitisinpotencyofbecomingaman.

Inasimilarway,ifsomethinginintellectualknowingcomesfromtheobject(the

universalcontentinanintelligiblemodeofbeing),theobjectmustbeabletocontributeto

thiseffect,atleastundertheinfluenceofanagentpower.

Nowthephantasm(whichrepresentstheobject)asamaterialthingcannotproduce

morethannaturaleffects(thefirstmodeofbeingofDeVer.2,2).Ifanintentionaleffect

(secondmodeofbeing)istocomefromthephantasm,thatabilitycannotbeproducedby

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itsnaturalprinciplesbecausecauseandeffectmustbeproportionate.ThisiswhyAquinas

introducestheinfluenceofthecelestialbodiesinordertoexplainsensibleknowing.There

mustbeanintentionalinfluenceonthematerialthingsinordertoexplainhowsensible

knowingmaycomefromthem.623

Here,itappearsthatAquinasistryingtoexplainhowtheintelligiblespecies624may

comefromthephantasmundertheabstractiveinfluence(secondaction)oftheagent

intellect.Thephantasmismadeable,byacertainintentionalcausalityoftheagentintellect

calledhere“illumination,”tobesubjecttotheagentintellect’sabstractiveactivity,bywhich

623Anotionofclaritas,asapropertyofthenaturalformwhichfunctionsastheconditionof

possibilityoftheform’sperception(asproposedbyKevinE.O’Reilly,AestheticPerception:AThomisticPerspective[Portland:FourCourtsPress,2007],24ff.)wouldnotreplace,inmyview,theThomistictheoryofthecelestialbodies,althoughifitisunderstoodinacertainsense,itcouldbetakenasacomplementarynotion.O’Reillyunderstandsclaritasasanobjectivepropertythatisactualizedonlybytheactualizationofsubjectivity(“[aesthetic]visioinactuestclaritasinactu”)andherelateshisclaimtotheAristotelianidentity(i.e.,intellectusinactuestintellectuminactu)interpretedasanidentitybetweensubjectandobject(aninterpretationIconsiderforeigntoAquinas,asIhavearguedinChapter3).Now,iftheprincipleofactualizationofacontent-propertyoftheobjectisonthesideofthesubject,O’ReillyisproposingwhatIamrejecting,whichisaformalaprioriinperception,asformallyconstitutiveoftheobjectofknowing.Inotherwords,ifclaritasiswhatisknownbytheaestheticvisio,andreceivesitsactualityfromvisioitself,itmeansthatitisonlypotentiallyintheformitself,andactualinthesubject’sactivity.Understoodinthissense,therefore,thenotionofclaritascannotreplacetheThomistictheoryofcelestialbodiesbecauseitbeginsfromprinciplesforeigntoSt.Thomas(inmyinterpretation).Inotherwords,ifwesaythattheobjectisnotactualindependentlyfromtheactivityofthesubject(cf.25),butwedonotdistinguishtheobjectfromitsmodeofbeing,wearegivingtothesubjectaresponsibilityoverthecontentthatthesubjectdoesnothaveinAquinas.Inmyview,becauseinknowingthereisalwaysadistinctionbetweentheobjectinitselfandinitsknowablemodeofbeing,acauseforthatknowablemodeofbeingisalwaysneeded,bothatthelevelofsensibleandintelligibleknowing.Now,O’Reillymentionsthat“clarityis[…]apropertyofform,forallformparticipatesinthedivineclarity”(24).IfweunderstandthispropertyasaparticipationonGod’sknowability,aparticipationthat,intheThomisticsystem,couldverywellarriveatmaterialthingsthroughthemediationofothercreatures,thenIdonotseeatensionwiththeThomistictheoryofcelestialbodies,butIsee,rather,thecoreofit.Thisknowability,intheintellectualrealm,isrelatedtowhatwehavecalledtheintelligiblemodeofbeingand,inourinterpretation,theactivityoftheagentintellectisrelatedtothismodeofbeing.

624Intelligiblespecies,i.e.,theuniversalcontentinitsintelligiblemodeofbeing.

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thephantasm’snaturebecomesintelligibleinact.Inotherwords,bythisillumination,the

phantasmismadeintelligibleinpotency;whereas,byabstraction,thephantasmismade

intelligibleinact.And,becausebothactionsoftheagentintellectregardthemodusrei

intellectae,itcannotbesaidthattheintelligiblecontentcomesfromanyoftheseactions.

Rather,theintelligiblecontent(resintellecta)isabletoberenderedintelligible(modusr.i.)

bytheactionoftheagentintellect.

Aquinascouldhaveascribedthistypeofcausalitytoaseparatesubstance,ashe

ascribedtothecelestialbodiestheintentionalcausalityofthematerialthings.Buthedid

notwanttomultiplycauseswithoutnecessity.Thereisalreadyinthehumanbeingan

activeintellectivepowerwhichisaparticipationofthedivinelightandso,forAquinas,this

poweristhecauseofthispotentialityinthephantasm.625

Theactionoflightissometimesrelatedtotheverbresultareasopposedto

transmutatio:“Theemanationofproperaccidentsfromtheirsubjectisnotbywayof

transmutation,butbyacertainnaturalresultance;thusonethingresultsnaturallyfrom

another,ascolorfromlight.”626Theactionoflightdoesnotproducethecolours(asina

transmutatiowhereonethingcausestheother)but,rather,makesthecoloursvisible.In

thefollowingtext,resultareisagainopposedtotransmutatio:“Asthepowerofthesoul

flowsfromtheessence,notbyatransmutation,butbyacertainnaturalresultance,andis

625Cromp(cf.188)doesnotseemtoconsiderthisdistinctionrelevantinthetextofAquinas.62677,6ad3:“Emanatiopropriorumaccidentiumasubiectononestperaliquam

transmutationem;sedperaliquamnaturalemresultationem,sicutexunonaturaliteraliudresultat,utexlucecolor.”

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simultaneouswiththesoul,soisitthecasewithonepowerasregardsanother.”627

Resultareisawayof“being-originated,”differentfromphysicalalterationandnotimplying

timeofitself.St.Thomasusesresultarefortheagentintellectinthefollowingtext:

Thisisdonebythepoweroftheactiveintellectwhichbyturningtowardsthephantasmproducesinthepassiveintellectacertainlikenesswhichrepresents,astoitsspecificconditionsonly,thethingreflectedinthephantasm.Itisthusthattheintelligiblespeciesissaidtobeabstractedfromthephantasm…628

WemaysaythatthisisoneofthetextsinwhichAquinasseemstospeakof

abstractionasan“illumination.”Butwhatisclearisthat,byusing“resultat,”heis

suggestingthattheactionoftheagentintellectisnotproductiveoftheobject,butletsthe

objectbeseen.Themetaphoroflightandtheuseofresultareseemalsotodiscouragean

understandingoftheagentintellectasaformalapriori.

Themetaphoroflightisusedclearlyfortheagentintellectinsometexts(cf.84,5,

c.;88,3ad1).ButthisdoesnotpreventSt.Thomasfromusingittosignifytheseparate

intellects(especiallythedivineintellect).TheintellectuallightinGodissimple,butthe

moredistantfromitsfirstsource,themoredividedwillwefindthislight:

EveryintellectualsubstancepossessesintellectivepowerbytheinfluenceoftheDivinelight,whichisoneandsimpleinitsfirstprinciple,andthefartheroffintellectualcreaturesarefromthefirstprinciplesomuchthemoreisthelight

62777,7ad1:“Sicutpotentiaanimaeabessentiafluit,nonpertransmutationem,sedper

naturalemquandamresultationem,etestsimulcumanima;itaestetiamdeunapotentiarespectualterius.”

62885,1ad3:“Sedvirtuteintellectusagentisresultatquaedamsimilitudoinintellectupossibiliexconversioneintellectusagentissupraphantasmata,quaequidemestrepraesentativaeorumquorumsuntphantasmata,solumquantumadnaturamspeciei.Etperhuncmodumdiciturabstrahispeciesintelligibilisaphantasmatibus…”

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dividedanddiversified,asisthecasewithlinesradiatingfromthecentreofacircle.629

Thedivineintelligenceisalsocalled“light”inrelationshiptotheknowledgeofthe

separatesoul,whenthereisnoabstraction:“Butthesoulwhenseparatedunderstands

singularsbyspeciesderivedfromtheDivinelight,whichisindifferenttowhatisnearor

distant.Henceknowledgeintheseparatedsoulisnothinderedbylocaldistance.”630The

divineintelligenceiscalledlightbecauseitmakespossibletheactofunderstanding,not

insofarasitphysicallymovesthefacultytounderstand,butinsofarasitbestowsanagent

object,theintelligibleinact.Itiswhattheagentintellectdoesinthislife,insofarasit

producestheagentobject,theintelligibleinact,bymeansofabstractionfromthe

phantasm.ThedifferenceisthatGoddoesnotmakeintelligiblesomethingthatisnot(i.e.,

initsmodeofbeing),butmakestheintelligibleitself(theintelligiblespecieswithits

content)asaparticipationofitsowntruth.Godcertainlymakestheobjectvisible,not

thoughastheobjectisinitself,butasitisinGodHimself.Thatiswhythecontentofthe

infusedspeciesis“intensive”andnotproportionatetothehumanintellect.

Thereare,asitwere,threeintelligibilities:intelligiblepower,intelligibleobjectand

intelligiblemodeofbeingoftheobject(theseparationfrommatterthatallowsittobe

understood).InGod,thethreethingsareoneandthesame.Intheangel,theproportionate

objectisalreadyinanintelligiblemodeofbeing.Inhumanbeings,thisisnotthecase;here,62989,1,c.:“Inomnibusenimsubstantiisintellectualibusinveniturvirtusintellectivaper

influentiamdiviniluminis.Quodquideminprimoprincipioestunumetsimplex;etquantomagiscreaturaeintellectualesdistantaprimoprincipio,tantomagisdividiturilludlumenetdiversificatur,sicutacciditinlineisacentroegredientibus.”

63089,7,c.:“Intelligitautemanimaseparatasingulariaperinfluxumspecierumexdivinolumine,quodquidemlumenaequalitersehabetadpropinquumetdistans.Undedistantialocalisnullomodoimpeditanimaeseparataecognitionem.”

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theobjectisnot“light”(intelligibilityasmodeofbeing)butneedstobe“illumined.”Thisis

theneedforandthenatureoftheagentintellect.

***

AtextfromtheContraGentiles631canserveasasummaryofmanyoftheconcepts

thatformthecoreofourargument.ForAquinas,itisnotdifficulttoseehowanagent

intellectandapossibleintellectmaycoexistinonesoul:

Fornothingpreventsonethingfrombeinginonerespectpotentialinrelationtosomeotherthing,andactualinanotherrespect,asweobserveinthingsofnature;airisactuallydampandpotentiallydry,andthereverseistrueofearth.Now,thissameinterrelationshipobtainsbetweentheintellectivesoulandthephantasms.632

Thatistosay,thephantasmisinactofsomethingofwhichthesoulispotency,and

thesoulisinactofsomethingdifferentofwhichthephantasmispotency:“Forthe

intellectivesoulhassomethingactualtowhichthephantasmispotential,andispotentialto

somethingpresentactuallyinthephantasm.”633Whatarethesedifferentthings?Aquinas

beginsbyexaminingtheactualityandthepotentialitywithregardstothesoul:

“[S]incethesubstanceofthehumansoulispossessedofimmateriality,and,asisclearfromwhathasbeensaid,itthereforehasanintellectualnature—everyimmaterialsubstancebeingofthiskind.Butthisdoesnotmeanthatthesoulisnow[determinately]likenedtothisorthatthing,asitmustbeinordertoknowthisorthatthingdeterminately;forallknowledgeisbroughtaboutbythelikenessofthethingknownbeingpresentintheknower.Thus,theintellectualsoulitselfremainspotentialwithrespecttothedeterminatelikenessesofthingsthatcanbeknownby

631II,77,par.2;Cf.79,4ad4.632CGII,77,par.2:“Nihilenimprohibethocrespectuilliusessesecundumquidinpotentia

etsecundumaliudinactu,sicutinrebusnaturalibusvidemus:aerenimestactuhumidusetpotentiasiccus,terraautemeconverso.Haecautemcomparatioinvenituresseinteranimamintellectivametphantasmata.”

633CGII,77,par.2:“Habetenimanimaintellectivaaliquidinactuadquodphantasmaestinpotentia:etadaliquidestinpotentiaquodinphantasmatibusactuinvenitur.”

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us,namely,thenaturesofsensiblethings.Itisthephantasmswhichpresentthesedeterminatenatures[ofsensiblethings]tous.634

Thesoulisinactofbeingimmaterial(itpossessesimmateriality),butisinpotencyof

determinatespeciesofitsobject.Speciesisherethecontentasrepresented,andnotsimply

thespeciesasameans;thisisbecausethespeciesasameansisactinthesamesenseas

thesoulisact(immateriality),andhereAquinasistryingtoshowthatpotentialityand

actualityarereferredtodifferentthings.Thesoulisinpotencyofsomethingwhichwill

perfectitinawaydifferentfromthewayinwhichthesoulisalreadyperfect.Thesoulisin

potencyofreceivingtheperfectionofthething,notofbeingimmaterial;butthe

determinatespeciesofthething(here,thephantasm),thoughitpossessestheperfectionof

thething,isinpotencyofbeingimmaterial,asAquinassays:

Butthesephantasmshavenotyetacquiredintelligibleactuality,sincetheyarelikenessesofsensiblethingsevenastomaterialconditions,whicharetheindividualproperties,and,moreover,thephantasmsexistinmaterialorgans.Consequently,theyarenotactuallyintelligible.Theyare,however,potentiallyintelligible,sinceintheindividualmanwhoselikenessthephantasmsreflectitispossibleto[conceive]theuniversalnaturestrippedofallindividuatingconditions.Andso,thephantasmshaveintelligibilitypotentially,whilebeingactuallydeterminateaslikenessesofthings.Intheintellectivesoultheoppositewasthecase.635

634CGII,77,par.2:“Habetenimsubstantiaanimaehumanaeimmaterialitatem,et,sicutex

dictispatet,exhochabetnaturamintellectualem:quiaomnissubstantiaimmaterialisesthuiusmodi.Exhocautemnondumhabetquodassimileturhuicvelillireideterminate,quodrequirituradhocquodanimanostrahancvelillamremdeterminatecognoscat:omnisenimcognitiofitsecundumsimilitudinemcognitiincognoscente.Remanetigituripsaanimaintellectivainpotentiaaddeterminatassimilitudinesrerumcognoscibiliumanobis,quaesuntnaturaererumsensibilium.Ethasquidemdeterminatasnaturasrerumsensibiliumpraesentantnobisphantasmata.”Cf.Q.D.DeAnima,a.5,ob.6etad6.

635CGII,77,par.2:“Quae[i.e.phantasmata]tamennondumperveneruntadesseintelligibile:cumsintsimilitudinesrerumsensibiliumetiamsecundumconditionesmateriales,quaesuntproprietatesindividuales,etsuntetiaminorganismaterialibus.Nonigitursuntintelligibiliaactu.Ettamen,quiainhochominecuiussimilitudinemrepraesentantphantasmata,estacciperenaturamuniversalemdenudatamabomnibusconditionibusindividuantibus,suntintelligibiliain

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InwhatbetterwaycouldAquinashavesaidthatthecontentofwhichthesoulisin

potencyisinactinsomesense,andyetisinpotencyinanothersense(whichisexactlythe

pointoftheparagraph)?Theword“determinatio”seemstobeameanstoexpressthis

“potentialactuality”or“actualpotentiality”ofthenatureintheconcretesubstance.

Aquinas’pointcannotbesimplythatthephantasmisinactofrepresentingthethinginits

particularity.Thisisbecausethesoulisnotinpotencyofthatactuality,butinpotencyof

theuniversalnaturewhichisactuallypresentinthethingitself(asismostclearinthe

passagejustquoted),636butnotinthemodeofbeingwhichwillmakeitknowable.Thatis

whytheagentintellectandthepossibleintellectarenotonlydistinctfacultiesinthesame

soul,insofarastheiractivitesregarddifferentpotentialities(asisevidentintheconclusion

oftheparagraph),buttheworkofonerequirestheworkoftheotherasaconditionof

possibility.Aquinasconcludes:“Hence,thereisinthatsoulanactivepowervis-à-visthe

phantasms,makingthemactuallyintelligible;andthispoweriscalledtheagentintellect;

whilethereisalsointhesoulapowerthatisinpotentialitytothedeterminatelikenessesof

sensiblethings;andthispoweristhepossibleintellect.”637These“determinatas

potentia.Sicigiturhabentintelligibilitateminpotentia,determinationemautemsimilitudinisreruminactu.Econtrarioautemeratinanimaintellectiva.”

636Noteinparticularhowthephantasmsaresaidtobe“similitudinesrerumsensibiliumetiamsecundumconditionesmateriales.”Thisimpliesthatthenatureisalsoinsomewayrepresentedinthephantasm.Thisisnotsurprisingifweadmitthat,forAquinas,thenatureispresentintheparticularthing:iftheuniversalnaturecanbepresentintheparticularthing,itcanalsobepresentintherepresentationofthatparticularthing,insomeway.ThatiswhyAquinassaysthat“Whateverisinourintellectmusthavepreviouslybeeninthesenses.”[Oportetutquodestinintellectunostro,priusinsensufuerit.](DeVer2,3,ad19).

637CGII,77,par.2:“Estigiturinanimaintellectivavirtusactivainphantasmata,facienseaintelligibiliaactu:ethaecpotentiaanimaevocaturintellectusagens.Estetiamineavirtusquaeestinpotentiaaddeterminatassimilitudinesrerumsensibilium:ethaecestpotentiaintellectuspossibilis.”

292

similitudinesrerumsensibilium”arenotthephantasms,buttheabstractedspeciesinsofar

astheyrepresentthesensiblethingsintheirnature.And“facienseaintelligibiliaactu”

impliestheimmaterializationoftheuniversalnature,andsothecontributionofamodeof

being(“denudatam”)toit.

***

Withthisendstheexplanationofthetextssupportingtheproposedinterpretation

oftheagentintellectinSt.Thomasasametaphysicalapriori.Ascanbeseen,this

explanationdependsheavilyonthepreviousreflections.Ifwedistinguish,withAquinas,

betweenintelligibleasresintellectaandasmodusreiintellectae(Chapter2)andwethen

understandthepassivityofhumanunderstandingasareceptionoftheintelligibleas

content(Chapter3),itbecomespossibletounderstandtheefficiencyoftheagentintellect

asrelatingtothemodeofbeingofthecontentand,therefore,tounderstandtheagent

intellectasametaphysicalapriori.

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Conclusion

Weconcludethisdissertationbyofferingabriefsummaryofthetopic,themain

contributions,limitsandfuturelinesofresearch.

1.Summary

FocusingonthetreatiseonhumanbeingintheSummaTheologiae,Ihave

substantiatedmyinterpretationofAquinas’agentintellectasametaphysicalapriori.The

mentionofametaphysicalapriorirefersbycontrasttoaformalapriori,acrucialnotionin

ModernPhilosophy.

InAquinas,themeaningofthings(theirnatureorintelligibility)isnotdeterminedby

theagentintellect,butresidesinthethingsthemselves.Theagentintellectgivesthe

commonnatureanintelligiblemodeofbeing,sothatthespecificperfectionofthingsmay

becomesomehowtheperfectionofourintelligence.Intelligence(i.e.,thepossibleintellect)

receivestheperfection-contentofthings;itisinthissensethatthepossibleintellectisin

potencybeforeknowing.Theperfection-contentreceivesanintelligiblemodeofbeing;itis

inthatsensethattheagentintellectperfectstheobjectofknowing.Theagentintellect

givestothespecificnaturesofsensiblethingstheabilitytoactasagentobjects;theagent

intellectdoesnotprovidetheircontent.Theagentintellectisthus,forAquinas,notaformal

butametaphysicalaprioriofhumanunderstanding.AKantianformalapriori,instead,is

sourceofintelligiblecontentandconstitutiveoftheknown.

BymakingAquinasdialoguewithKant,Ihaveintendedtopointouttheradical

differencebetweenthetwosystems,therebyhighlightingthedifficultiesofunderstanding

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Aquinas’agentintellectasaformalapriori.Thiswasrequiredformyinterpretationof

Aquinasinordertodistinguishitclearlyfromotherinterpretationsthatmayconsiderthe

agentintellectasfulfillingtheroleofaKantiantranscendental.ThatiswhyIthoughtit

importanttobringforththetensionbetweenAquinasandKant,andtotakethattensionto

itsroot:thedifferingKantianandThomistic“facts,”whichworkastheirrespectivepointsof

departureandrequire,asconditionsofpossibility,theirrespectiveapriorielements.

ThedialoguewithKantwasalsohelpfulinconnectingAquinas’thoughtwith

meaningfulreflectionfortodaysince,despitetheirdifferingapproaches,Isuggestseeing

boththinkers(KantandSt.Thomas)asfacingthesamequestion:thetensionbetween

contentofexperienceanduniversalknowing.Thisismyreasonforhavingplacedthe

doctrineoftheagentintellectinitsnaturalcontext,theproblemoftheuniversals.

Itshouldbeclearthatmypointwasnotsomuchtoofferanoverallinterpretationof

Kant(aboutwhosecontributionsfutureconversationsoughttohappen),asitwastotryto

“catch”Kant’sapproachtotheproblemoftheuniversalsattheverybeginningandtoshow,

thus,thetensionwithSt.Thomas’sapproach.Thisapproach,inmyview,isKant’slegacyto

ModernPhilosophy,anditispreciselyherethattherelevantdistinctionbetweenAquinas

andKantislocated,particularlyinreferencetoAquinas’doctrineoftheagentintellect.

2.Contributions

Mymaincontribution,ratherthanbeingtheparticularcharacterizationoftheagent

intellect(aviewthatcanactuallybefoundinotherauthorsaswell)is,instead,the

argumentproducedtosupportthischaracterization.Thisargumentisrelatedtothe

particularconnectionamongthefirstthreechapters,explainedseveraltimesinthe

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dissertation.Chapter1establishesthefactwhichrequiresforAquinasanagentintellect,

anditgivesustwoveryimportantprinciples:oneistheobjectofhumanunderstanding(the

universalnature)aspresentinthethingsthemselves,andtheotherthatitisnotinthe

thingsthemselveswithamodeofbeingthatmakesitavailabletotheintellectualeye.

ThesetwoprinciplesleadustothemainpointofChapter2,namelythedistinctionbetween

theintelligibleobjectanditsintelligiblemodeofbeing.Now,becauseknowingisreceptive

oftheintelligibleobject(Chapter3),whichispresentinthethingsthemselves(Chapter1),

theagentintellectisactive,notoftheintelligiblecontent,butofitsabstractedorintelligible

modeofbeing(Chapter4).

Anothercontributionisshowingtheconnectionbetweentheinterpretationofthe

AristotelianidentityinAquinas(cf.Chapter3)andthedistinctionbetweenresintellectaand

modusreiintellectae(Chapter2).ThenotunusualmisunderstandingoftheAristotelian

identityinAquinas(asifitwereanidentitybetweensubjectandobject)isrelatedtothe

lackofdistinctionbetweentheaforementionedtwomeaningsofintelligible.Itisan

importantpoint,inmyview,becausesomeauthorsmaystumbleinthismisunderstanding

oftheAristotelianidentityinAquinasandthenthinkthatforAquinas,asforKant,the

content-perfectionoftheknownistheactoftheknower.WhatIproposeisthatthe

objectiveaspectoftheAristotelianidentity(intellectuminactu)cannotbetakenassimply

thecontent,butthatitactuallyreferstotherepresentationofthecontent,andsotothe

content,yes,butinitscognitivemodeofbeing.

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3.LimitsandFutureLinesofResearch

Someofthelimitationsofthisdissertationhavetodowithitsmethodology,and

havealreadybeenmentionedintheIntroduction,orinthepreviouspointsofthis

conclusion.

Onanothernote,itisalwayschallengingtoexpressone’sownviewtoscholarswho

comefromdifferentinterpretationsand/orphilosophicalbackgrounds.OneofthewaysI

thoughtimportanttoovercomethisdifficultywastofocusnotsomuchonthedefinitionof

terms,asonthedefinitionoftheproblemsandtheapproaches.

Ontheonehand,thespecificityofatopiccanmakeitdifficulttofindrelevant

scholarlyworkaddressingtheissueasdirectlyasneeded.Ontheotherhand,manymore

generalworksonAquinas’Epistemologyandothermoreparticularstudiestreatmanyof

thepointsIhavemadeindealingwithmyprecisetopic,andtheyhavenotbeenexpressly

referenced.Ihavesoftenedthissilencebyengagingafewmorerelevantauthors,butIlook

forwardtoengagingotherviews,particularlyinTranscendentalThomism.

Inthemain,thisinvestigationhasallowedmetobetterworkoutmyownposition

and,Ihope,hasmadeitunderstandable;furtherengagementinabroaderandconstructive

dialoguecouldcertainlyfosterabetterunderstandingofAquinas.Inparticular,mysilence

regardinginterpretationsofAquinasinTranscendentalThomismisduemainlytothe

impossibilityofadequatelyengagingintheinterpretationofseveralauthorsatthesame

time.MyinterpretationofSt.Thomascouldbetakenaspreparationforestablishingamore

fruitfulengagementwiththisparticularschool.

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AdetailedstudyoftherestoftheSumma,withregardstotheoutcomesofthis

dissertation,couldproveofthegreatestrelevanceforassessingmyinterpretationon

severalpoints,particularlythetreatiseontheTrinity(forexample,thenotionofverbum),

thereferencestoother“lights”inintellectualknowing(suchasthelumengloriaeandfaith),

otherexplicitreferencestotheagentintellect,thehumanknowledgeofChrist,andalong

etcetera.NottomentionthestudyofthosesametopicsintherestofAquinas’works.

Thesefindingscouldalsohelpustoreadsuchtextsinanewlight.

Forexample,inthetextintheSummaTheologiae,I,q.34,a.1ad3,thedistinction

betweenresintellectaandmodusreiintellectae,andtheconsequentdistinctionbetween

speciesandobject,mayhelpustobetterunderstandthedistinctionbetweenthetwo

aspectsoftheVerbumintheHolyTrinity:oneaspectaccordingtowhichtheVerbumis

absolutelythesameasregardsthewholeTrinity(thewholeTrinityissaidthroughthe

Verbum,thewholeTrinityisunderstoodbytheThreeDivinePersonsintheoneVerbum)

andanotheraspectinwhichtheVerbumisdistinct(onlyoneVerbumissaidbytheone

Father).WhatisunderstoodisnotonlytheSpecies,butthewholeTrinityintheSpecies

because,forSt.Thomas,speciesandobjectaretwodifferentnotions.Inthecaseofthe

Trinity,thereisactuallyanabsolutecompleteidentitybetweenintellectusandintellectum

(=object),butnotbetweenintellectumandVerbum(insofarastheVerbumandalsothe

otherpersonsoftheTrinityandothercreaturesarewhatisunderstood).

TheVerbumintheTrinitywouldbethatwhichwehavecalledspeciesexpressaas

regardshumanunderstanding—thatis,thesubjectivemodificationofthehumanintellect

astheintellect’sreferencetothatwhichisunderstood.ThespeciesimpressaisGod

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Himself,alreadyintelligibleinact,andthecontentofthisspeciesissimplythedivine

essence.Thereisanabsoluteidentitybetweenintellectandthingunderstood,becauseGod

ispureintellectandunderstandsHimselfbyHimself(byHimselfasspeciesimpressa:Godis

intelligiblebyHimself;Hedoesnotneedanagentintellect).ButHeunderstandsHimselfby

meansofaVerbumasspeciesexpressa,whichproceedsfromtheFatherandwhosecontent

isthewholeDivinity.

Nowif,aswehavesuggested,theactofthehumanintellect(asverbum)proceeds

fromtheintellectitself(asfacultyinpotency)bytheagencyofanintelligibleinact(the

speciesimpressa),itismoreclearhowthenotionofverbumismostfittingtospeakof

distinctionintheTrinity:thenotionofverbum,infact,containsprocessionoforigin(which

intheTrinityistheonlywaytodistinctions)andallowsidentityofsubstance(insofarasthe

verbum’scontentcanbetheveryself,inthosewhodonothavematterandarealready

intelligibleinact,andinsofarastheverbumhasnootherbeingthanthebeingofthe

intellectitself).638

Itwouldbeinterestingtostudytherelationshipofthesupernaturallightstothe

agentintellect.Infact,faithdoesnotseemtomakeintelligible(“visible”)itsproperobject:

faithmakesusjudgeaboutthingswhicharenotevident.Themetaphoroflight,then,

acquiresanewsignificance,asthatwhichallowsustojudgewithcertaintyabout

something.Astudyofthefunctionoftheagentintellectinhumanjudgmentandofthe

possibilityofreferringtocertain“objects”ofknowing—suchasthefirstprinciples—as

638ThislatteristhatwhichwehaveconsideredtheThomisticinterpretationofthe

Aristotelianidentity,intellectusinactuestintellectuminactu.

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“light”becomesnecessary.Moreover,the“light”metaphormayalsosufferadjustmentsin

itsuseforthelumengloriae,sincethislightdoesnotaffectsomuchtheobject(theDivine

Essence)asthehumansubjectitself.Itislight,itseems,asthatwhichallowsustosee,not

thoughasaffectingtheobject(asinintellectualhumanknowing)northemedium(asin

sensiblevision)but,rather,asaffectingthepotencyitself.

RegardingthehumanknowledgeofChrist,ourfindingscanhelpusbetter

understandhow,forSt.Thomas,therecanbeinChristadistinctknowingofeverything

fromHisconceptionand,atthesametime,aprogressioninHisknowing.Thedivine

essenceandtheinfusedspeciesare“intelligibles”inactwhichassuchareagentobjects,

respectively,ofChrist’sscienceofvisionandinfusedscience.Scienceisheretheparticular

referenceofHispossibleintellecttotheobjectsbytheagencyofanintelligibleinactand,

therefore,areferencetotheobjectrepresentedinthespecies,totheobjectthroughthe

species(impressa).TheaforementionedspeciesareinJesussincethemomentofHis

conception,butnotsothespeciesimpressaeresultingfromtheactionoftheagentintellect

onthephantasms.Theselatterspeciesprovokeanewreferenceofthepossibleintellect

(because,evenifaspeciesregardsanobjectthatJesusalreadyknowswithanotherscience,

thespeciesitself,initssubjectivemodeofbeing,isdifferent—asanumericallydifferent

speciesimpressa),andthereforethereisanewscience(acquiredknowledge),whichis

progressiveduetothetemporalsuccessionofexperienceandtheconsequentsuccessionof

newphantasms,speciesimpressaeandexpressae.Itreallyseemsasifthedistinctionof

speciesimpressaandexpressa,thoughnotexplicitinAquinas,isveryhelpfulin

understandingwhathemeanshere.Butthesespeciesshouldbeunderstood,Ibelieve,not

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astwodifferentimages,butastwodifferentmomentsofthesamecontent,asavailable

initiallyandas“embraced”later.Thespeciesexpressaisthusareferencetotheimpressain

itscontent(or:tothecontentoftheimpressa),areference“produced”bythepresenceof

theimpressatothefaculty.

ThesignificanceofthequestionsofknowingandbeinginTheologycanneverbe

overemphasized,atleastfromaThomisticpointofview.Fromthefirstarticleofthe

Summa,Aquinasdistinguishesbetweenwhatcanbeknownbythelightofreasonandwhat

isbeyonditsreach.Humanbeinghasbeengivenanendwhichsurpassesthelightofreason

and,therefore,adifferentknowledgemustbeaddedtotheoneobtainedbypurelynatural

means.Inotherwords,thedifferentkindofbeingoftheobjectrequiresadifferentkindof

knowing:thisisthereasonforaSacredDoctrine.Finitereasoncanknowfinitebeing,and

canrealizethatthereisaninfinitebeingwhichisthecause.Finitereasoncan“see”that

theremustbeaninfinitebeing,can“see”thatinfinitebeingisnotlikeotherbeings,but

cannotseethisinfinitebeing—andfinitereasonremainsoutsidethecastle—hopingthat

someonewilllowerthedrawbridgetowardshappiness.However,itisalwaysthesame

humanbeingwhoiscalledtoenterthecastleand,therefore,humannaturalpowersarenot

leftoutside,butinvitedin,whereanewlight—thelightofthecastle—willallowhuman

intelligencetoseetheKing.Thisnotionofknowingasencountermayproveveryhelpfulin

understandingAquinas’approachtobothphilosophicalandtheologicalquestions.

Onequestionthatcouldbeaddressedfurtheristhemorepreciseunderstandingof

theactionoftheagentintellect.Infact,mycharacterizationoftheagentintellectasana

prioriwhichismetaphysicalcouldhavegiventheimpressionthattheagentintellect

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producestheintelligiblemodeofbeingas“bestowing”or“adding”somethingphysicalto

theobject.Although,inAquinas,itdoesseemthattheagentintellectbestowssomething

realonthephantasmitself(the“firstaction”oftheagentintellectin85,1ad4),the

abstractive(second)actionproperlyspeakingseems,rather,tobean“extraction”ofthe

content.Inotherwords,itseemsthattheactionoftheagentintellectshouldbe

understoodmoreasa“dematerialization”(efficientintakingfrom)thanasa

“spiritualization”(efficientinprovidingperfection),althoughbotharecorrectinasense.On

theonehand,Ithinkitismoreadematerializationbecausethespiritualityofthecontentis

nothingotherthanitsbeingseparatedfromitsindividualconditionsinthematter.Onthe

otherhand,itcanstillbesaidtobea“spiritualization”becausethecontentinitsstateof

abstraction“subsists”spiritually,participatinginsomewaythemodeofbeingoftheagent

intellect.

Whatismostimportant,however,istounderstandthemethodologicalproblem;

thatis,althoughwedoneedmaterial“parables”tounderstandourcapacityfor

understanding,wemusttranscendthem;andtheactionoftheagentintellectisoneof

thoseinstancesinwhichtheuseofimagesandevenwordsseemstodisappointusthe

most.This“makingintelligible”seemstobeacertain“letting[acontent]beseen”bythe

separationofthecontentfromitsindividualconditionsinthematter.Now,thisseparation

isnotphysical,becausecontentandindividualconditionsarenotphysicallyseparatedin

thesensiblething.Theseparationcomesaboutbyanelevationofthatcontenttoa

differentmodeofbeing.Thatdifferentmodeofbeingmustbepresentinthepotentialityof

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thephantasm,andthisiswhySt.Thomasmakesadistinctionbetweenthetwoactionsof

theagentintellect.

Myfocusonthesimpleapprehensionallowedmetosayverylittleaboutjudgment.

AnexplicitconsiderationofjudgmentinAquinasinconnectionwithmyreflectionsonthe

roleoftheagentintellectcouldproveveryfruitfulinordertorefineourfindingsandoffera

morecompleteviewofhumanunderstanding.

Becauseminewasaneffortofinterpretation,thequestionsofjudgmentneedstillto

beaddressed.AretheepistemologicalprinciplesreferredheretoAquinasstillrelevant

today?WouldtheymakeanysenseinamodernEpistemology?Ithinkaveryfruitfullineof

investigationcouldbethestudyofthenotionofalterityasabasicoriginalconditionofthe

objectinhumanknowing.Thenotionsofencounter,remedy,subjectiveoriginal

imperfection,etc.,shouldbeconjoinedtoaseriousphenomenologicalanalysisofhuman

knowing.Myemphasisonalterityisrelatedtotheviewthatthecontributionofsubjectivity

is(essentiallyandoriginally)notrelatedtothecontent,buttoitsmodeofbeing.Our

subjectivestorageofexperienceorpersonalhistorywillcertainlyandgreatlyinfluencelater

perceptions,andthiscanbetakenasacognitivefact.Butisthisfactoriginal?Isitnotbased

preciselyonmoreoriginalfacts?Andwhataretheconditionsofpossibilityofthoseoriginal

facts,andoftheverydevelopmentofexperience?TheworkofCornelioFabro,deeply

imbuedinboththePhenomenologyofPerceptionandtheMetaphysicsofKnowledge,can

beahelpfultoolforresearchinthisdirection.

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Epilogue:KnowingafterKantWearemeanttoknow;wearesobynature.Theperfectionoftheknown,however,isnotexpectedasafriendwealreadyknow,butasthefoodwedonothave.

Wedoneedfood,andthisisthetranscendentalorientationofapotencytoitsparticularobject.Thisneed,however,doesnotperfectitselfinanyway,butrathercallsfortheperfectionofanother.Foodperfectsthehungrystomach,buthungerwillnottransformastoneintobread.Theimageoffood,however,cannotbetakenmuchfurther,becauseitisjustanimage,andknowingisdifferentfromthat,morethanthat.Thehungrystomachwillactuallytransformthefoodintosomethingbelongingtothebody.Theknower,instead,willnoteathisorhervisitors,butwillwelcomethemastheyare.Theknownstayshomeasavisitor,alwaysdifferent,alwaysinteresting,alwaysother.ForAquinas,asIreadhim,thereismeaninginthethingsthemselvesandheis,inthissense,differentfromKant.IfSt.Thomasisright,thereisaneedtofaceagainthemoreoriginalquestionsofEpistemology,namelytheproblemoftheuniversalsandtheverycharacterizationofknowing.Thereisaneedtogetawayfromskepticalbiasesandunfruitfuldialectics.ThealternativetoKantisnotagoingbacktothethingsthemselveswhichleavesthesubject,sotospeak,staringspeechlessataworldofobjects.AnEpistemologysensitivetothepsychologicaldevelopmentofthehumansubject,the(Thomistic)factofknowinginitsmetaphysicalessence,andtheconditionsofpossibilityforbothis,inmyview,thewayforwardtoamorehelpfulphilosophicalaccountofhumanknowing.

Otherwise,bydissolvingthemeaningofthingsinourdealingswiththem,werisklosingalsothemeaningofourownexistence.Theexistentialvoidistheemptinessofasoulwhodidnotwelcomethingsastheyare—withtheirowncapricesandbeauty—asoulwhothusremainedaloneintheself-madeprisonofhisorherownworldofideasandvalues.Then,whenthedoortotheworldisclosed,thepathtoHeavencannotbefound.Godishiddenbehindthetrees,behindthebeautiesHemade.ItisonlybyencounteringothersthatwecanhearaboutGod.639Itisgoodforneithermannorwomantobealone.Lethumanity,then,beopentotheadventureofknowing.

639A“philosophicaltranslation”ofthisparagraphcanbefoundintheAppendix,Note21.

304

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Knasas,JohnF.X.“WhyforLonerganKnowingCannotConsistin'TakingaLook'.“ACPQ78,no.1(2004):131–150.Lambert,RichardT.“ATextualStudyofAquinas’ComparisonoftheIntellecttoPrimeMatter.”NewScholasticism56(1982):80-99.Lindbeck,George.“AGreatScotistStudy.”TheReviewofMetaphysics7,no.3(1954):422-435.MartínezMillán,Hernán.“SunandLight,orontheAgentIntellect.”RevistaEspañolaDeFilosofíaMedieval20(2013):49-56.Maurer,ArmandA.BeingandKnowing:StudiesinThomasAquinasandLaterMedievalPhilosophers.Toronto:PontificalInstituteofMediaevalStudies,1990.Therelevantessaysare:“St.ThomasandEternalTruths”(pp.43ff)andSt.ThomasandHistoricity”(pp.95ff).O’Reilly,KevinE.AestheticPerception:AThomisticPerspective.Portland:FourCourtsPress,2007.Owens,Joseph.Cognition:AnEpistemologicalInquiry.Houston:CenterforThomisticStudies,1992.SchmidtAndrade,CiroE.“SantoTomásyelDeAnima:ComentarioalosCaps.4y5delLibroIIIdelDeAnimadeAristóteles.”AnalogíaFilosófica:RevistaDeFilosofía8,no.1(1994):123-136.Sellés,JuanFernando.“LaCríticaTomistaalaInterpretaciónÁrabeyJudíadelIntelectoAgente.”Espíritu:CuadernosDelInstitutoFilosóficoDeBalmesiana52,no.128(2003):207-26.Sellés,JuanFernando.Elintelectoagenteylosfilósofos:Venturasydesventurasdelsupremohallazgoaristotélicosobreelhombre.[Vol.]I(SiglosIVa.C.-XV).Pamplona:EUNSA,2012.Serequeberhan,Tsenay.“AquinasandKant:aComparativeStudy.”Dialogue:JournalofPhiSigmaTau26(1984):40-48.Stump,Eleonore.Aquinas.NewYork:Routledge,2003.Therelevantessaysare:“FoundationsofKnowledge”(pp.217ff)and“TheMechanismsofCognition”(pp.244ff).ZagalArreguín,Héctor.“TheSeparateSubstancesandAquinas'IntellectusAgens.”RevistaPortuguesaDeFilosofia64,no.1(2008):359-377.

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Appendix:OtherAuthors,Excursus,LatinTextsandTranslations

Note1:OtherRelevantAuthors(Introduction)

AccordingtoJohnHaldane,640St.ThomasusestheAristoteliantexttoexplainhis(Aquinas’)

theory.Aristotle’sconcernismoremetaphysicalinthattheagentintellectexplains,forhim,

theintellectualfaculty’spassagefrompotencytoact.Aquinas’concernismore

gnoseologicalinthatAquinasistryingtoexplainthefactthatweknowbymeansof

universalconcepts.Inotherwords,forHaldane,St.Thomasismakingsenseoftheproblem

oftheuniversals,whereasAristotleisconcernedwiththefactthatweknowafternot

havingknown.

Again,accordingtoHaldane,thewaySt.ThomasusestheAristotelianagentintellecttofit

hispurposesisbymakingitaformalapriori.IntheAvicennianPlatonism,theuniversal

formswouldseemtocomefromacertainilluminationfromabove.ButAquinasreacts

againstthisEpistemology:

[Aquinas]maintainsthattheactualityoftheagentintellectconsistsintheuniversalcontentofitsacts,anditisthiswhichconfersgeneralityuponthethoughts(speciesexpressa)ofthepassivemind.Withouttheworkoftheformernoconceptswouldbeavailable;andwithoutthesecognitioncouldnottakeplace,forthesensuouspresentationoftheenvironmentcouldnotbeordered.641

Haldane’ssuggestionisthat,forAquinas,theagentintellectisactiveregardingthe

universalityascontentand,inthisway,Aquinassubscribestoatheoryofaformalapriori.

ForHaldane,theThomisticalternativetoPlatonism(formscomingfromabove)istheforms

comingfrominside,becausetheycannotcomefromexperience.

Finally,Iwouldliketosuggestthattheepistemologicalandmetaphysicalconcerns,as

Haldaneconceivesthem,neednotbeseenasopposingeachotherinAristotleandAquinas.

Rather,itisinordertoexplainboththefactoftheuniversalactualityofthecontentandthe640Cf.JohnHaldane,“AquinasandtheActiveIntellect,”Philosophy(UK)67(1992):199-210.641205.

309

possibleintellect’sconsequentpassagefrompotencytoactthattheagentintellectiscalled

tothescene.Inotherwords,thepossibleintellectwouldnotpassfrompotencytoactif

therewerenotanintelligibleinact,andthenatureofthesensiblethingwouldnotbe

intelligibleinactiftherewerenotanagentintellect.Thepointofdepartureisthatweknow

thosenaturesafternothavingknownthem.

WayneHankey’s642pointistoestablishthecontinuitybetweennaturalandsupernatural

knowledgebymeansofadoctrineoftheagentintellectasaformalapriori.Becausethe

agentintellectisalreadyacertainparticipationinthecontentofthedivinelight(implicit

knowledgeofthetranscendentalnotions),itisnotsodifficulttounderstandhowgracecan

elevatethispotencytoaknowingofGodthatisexplicit.Thiswouldalsobethereasonfora

more“positive”knowledgeofGodbyfaith(asopposedtoanemphasisonthevianegativa).

InhisunderstandingoftheagentintellectinAquinasasaformalapriori,i.e.,asproviding

intelligiblecontenttosenseexperience,HankeyrefersextensivelytoSmit,643withwhomhe

agrees,644andconfirmshisowninterpretationwithsomeofSt.Thomas’textswhichare

discussedinthebodyofthethesis.

R.E.Houser,645inhisstudyonthemetaphoroflightamongtheGreeks,ascribestothe

agentintellectinSt.Thomasnotjustitsdistinctionfromthepossibleintellectbutits

separationfromthesubject.InhisunderstandingofAquinas,Houserseemsalsoto

confoundthelightoftheagentintellectwiththelightofgrace.646Finally,Housersuggests

thattheefficientcausalityoftheagentintellectisnotaformalcauseanddoesnotadd

content,becauselightmustbetransparent.647However,Houserdoesnotindicateinwhat

642Cf.WayneJ.Hankey,“ParticipatioDiviniLuminis,Aquinas'DoctrineoftheAgentIntellect:

OurCapacityforContemplation,”Dionysius22(2004):149-178.643Cf.163,162andpassim.644Cf.173.645Cf.R.E.Houser,“PhilosophicalDevelopmentthroughMetaphor:Lightamongthe

Greeks,”ProceedingsoftheAmericanCatholicPhilosophicalAssociation64(1990):75-85.646Cf.83-85.647Cf.81.

310

way,then,lightproducesintelligibilityinthingsthatareonlypotentiallyintelligibleand

cannotexistasuniversal,unchangingandnecessary.648Inotherwords,despitethefactthat

hewouldarguablyrejecttheconsiderationoftheagentintellectasaformalapriori,Houser

doesnotdistinguishbetweenintelligibilityascontentandasmodeofbeing.

Note2:OnCory’sInterpretation(Footnote205)

ThisseemstobeCory’sinterpretation.AbstractionforAquinaswouldbe“theobject’s

[read:“thephantasm’s”]causingitsintelligiblelikenessintheintellectbythepowerofthe

agentintellect”;649“Quasiformedbythisimmaterializingpower,imagesareintelligible

merelyinthesensethattheycanperformtheproperactofactuallyintelligibleentities,

withoutbeingintelligibleentities.”650Forher,theagentobjectisthesensibleimageunder

theinfluenceoftheagentintellect,notthoughasinstrumentalbutassecondarycause;she

proposesthattherelationshipbetweenagentintellectandphantasmissimilartothe

relationshipbetweenuniversalandparticularcause.Basically,forCory,theagentintellect

causestheintelligiblemodeofbeingofthephantasm,notanintelligiblespeciesdifferent

fromit,northeintelligiblemodeofbeingofanintelligiblecontent(thelatter,asIpropose).

Note3:TheMediationofthePhantasm(Footnote238)

Itisnotpossibletotreatthoroughlythemediationofthephantasminintellectualknowing,

butcertainprinciplesmayorientthereadertounderstandmyposition.WhatIproposeis,

basically,thatthecontentofthephantasmisoutthere,butnotinthesamemodeofbeing

asitisinthephantasm.Relatedtothis,Iproposealsothatthephantasmisforintelligence

theparticularitself,insofarasitscontentisreal(wedonotknowthephantasm,butthe

thingitselfthroughitsphantasm).Iacknowledgethefactthatthephantasmiscomposedof

elementsfrommemoryandimagination;thisfact,however,givesthephantasmmore

objectivity,andnotless,becausethis“subjective”compositionrepresentswhatisoutthere

64883-84.649Cory,Averroes,40.650Ibid.51,cf.23,47.

311

moreaccuratelythanarepresentationofonlythepresentfeaturesofaparticularthing.The

subjectiveactivityofcompositionisnatural,andhereappliestheprinciplethatnaturedoes

notfailinwhatisproper.Thatthissubjectiveactivity,thoughnatural,isnotarbitrarybut

basedonthedataofexperiencethemselves,aswellasmanyotherproblemsconnected

withperception,cannotbetreatedhere,butcf.Fabro,PercezioneePensiero.Thatwhichis

mostimportant,inmyview,istodistinguishthecontentofthephantasmfromthemodeof

beinginwhichthisrealcontentispresentinthefaculty.Inthiscognitivemodeofbeingthe

contentisnotoutthere,butwhatisknownisthecontentitself,andabstractionhappens

withregardtothecontent.

Note4:TheStabilityinMaterialThings(Footnote248)

Cf.InBoet.DeTrin.5,2,ob.6etad6:

Noteveryobjectofnaturalphilosophyissubjecttomovement[…]Thesoulandtheothernaturalforms,eveniftheydonotmoveinthemselves,theydomovewithregardstosomethingelse,andbesidesthis,theyareperfectionsofmobilethings:itisinthissensethattheyfallundertheconsiderationofnaturalphilosophy.651

Thattheformsaremovedperaccidensimplythattheyareinwhatismoved(cf.corpus).

Democritushadalsodeniedstabilitytomaterialthings:

Hetookintellecttobe,notthefacultyforknowingtruthandunderstandingintelligibleobjects,butameresense-faculty.Onlythesensible,hethought,couldbeknown,sinceonlythesensibleexisted.Andbecausethelatteriscontinuallychangingtherecouldbeno[determinate]truthaboutanything.652

Seeinthesamecontext:“Aristotle,however,proceededalonganotherway.Forfirsthe

showedinmanywaysthatthereissomethingstableinsensiblethings.”653

651InBoet.DeTrin.5,2,ob.6etad6:“Nonomnia,dequibusestphysica,suntinmotu[…]

animaetaliaeformaenaturales,quamvisnonmoveanturperse,moventurtamenperaccidens,etinsupersuntperfectionesrerummobilium,etsecundumhoccaduntinconsiderationenaturalis.”

652InIDeAnima3,198-205:“[Ipse]nonutebaturintellectuquiestcircaveritatem,idestvirtuteintellectivaquaanimaintelligitintelligibilia,sedsolumvisensitiva,etquodnichilcognoscereturnisisensibile,cumnichilponeretinrerumnaturanisisensibile;undecumsensibiliasintincontinuomotuetfluxu,opinatusestnullamveritatemdeterminatamesseinrebus.”

653DeSpirit.Creat.,a.10,ad8:“Aristotelesautemperaliamviamprocessit.Primoenim,multipliciterostenditinsensibilibusessealiquidstabile.”Cf.InMet.11,lect.6,2232.

312

Note5:TheReasonforCallingtheSpeciesorFormratio(Footnote267)

Thereasonforcallingthespeciesorformratio654canbetakenfromthefollowingtext:

Andform,whichisalsotermedtheintelligiblestructurebecausetheintelligiblestructureofthespeciesisderivedfromit,iscalledsubstance[…]inasmuchasitissomethingactual,and[…]inasmuchasitisseparablefrommatterinthoughtbutnotinreality[…]Andalthoughthecompositeisseparableinanabsolutesense,yetsomeoftheotherthingswhicharecalledsubstancesareseparableinthoughtandsomearenot.Foraformisseparableinthoughtbecauseitcanbeunderstoodwithoutunderstandingindividuatingsensiblematter;butmattercannotbeunderstoodwithoutunderstandingform,sinceitisapprehendedonlyinasmuchasitisinpotentialitytoform.655

Note6:TheErroroftheNaturalPhilosophers(Footnote293)

In84,2c.,thesameerrorisattributedtotheNaturalPhilosophers.Seealso:

Like,theysaid,mustbeknownbylike.Ifthenthesoulistoknowallthingsitmustcontainalikenessofallthingsaccordingtotheirnaturalmodeofbeing.Theycouldnotdistinguishbetweenthemodeofexistencethatathinghasinthemindortheeyeortheimaginationfromthatwhichithasinitself.656

“Theyexpressedthisbysayingthatthereasonwhythesoulknewallthingswasthatallthingsenteredintoitscomposition,andthatthesoulpossessedthelikenessofallthingsaccordingtothemodeofexistence,i.e.acorporealone,whichthingshaveinthemselvesoutsideit.”657

Note7:TextofQ.D.DeAnima,a.3,ad8(Footnote298)

654Cf.alsoInMet.12,lect.10,2595.655InMet.8,lect.1,1687:“Formavero,quaeetrationominatur,quiaexipsasumiturratio

speciei,dicitursubstantiaquasiensaliquidactu,etquasiensseparabilesecundumrationemamateria,licetnonsecundumrem[…]Etlicetcompositumsitseparabilesimpliciter,tamensecundumrationem,aliorumquaedicuntursubstantiae,quaedamsuntseparabilia,etquaedamnon.Formaenimestseparabilisratione,quiapotestintelligisinemateriasensibiliindividuante;materiaverononpotestintelligisineintellectuformae,cumnonapprehendaturnisiutensinpotentiaadformam.”

656InIDeAnima4,19-36:“Dicebantenimquodoportebatsimilesimilicognosci;undesianimacognoscatomnia,oportet,quodhabeatsimilitudinemomniuminsesecundumessenaturale,sicutipsiponebant.Nescieruntenimdistinguereillummodum,quoresestinintellectu,seuinoculo,velimaginatione,etquoresestinseipsa.”

657InIDeAnima12,10-15:“Dicebantanimam,adhocquodomniacognosceret,essecompositamexomnibus;etquodsimilitudorerumomniumessetinanimasecundumpropriummodumessendi,scilicetcorporalem.”

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AccordingtothePlatoniststhereasonwhysomethingisunderstoodasaone-in-many[i.e.,universally],isnottobeattributedtotheintellect,buttothething.Theyarguethat,becauseourintellectknowsathingasaone-in-many,itwouldapparentlybeemptyofanyrealcontentunlesstherewereonereal(thing)sharedbymanyindividuals.Forinthatcasetheintellectwouldhaveinitselfnothingcorrespondingto(…)reality.HencethePlatonistsfeltobligedtopositIdeas,byparticipationinwhichbothnaturalthingsaregiventheirspecificnature,andourintellectsmadecognizantofuniversals.ButaccordingtoAristotle,thefactthattheintellectunderstandsaone-in-manyinabstractionfromindividuatingprinciples,istobeattributedtotheintellectitself.Andthoughnothingabstractexistsinreality,theintellectisnotvoidofanyrealcontent,norisitmisrepresentativeofthingsastheyare;because,ofthosethingswhichnecessarilyexisttogether,onecanbetrulyunderstoodornamedwithoutanotherbeingunderstoodornamed.Butitcannotbetrulyunderstoodorsaidofthingsexistingtogether,thatoneexistswithouttheother.Thuswhateverexistsinanindividualwhichpertainstothenatureofitsspecies,andinrespectofwhichitislikeotherthings,canbeknownandspokenoftrulywithouttakingintoconsiderationitsindividuatingprinciples,whichdistinguishitfromallotherindividuals[ofthesamespecies].658(Parenthesismine,squarebracketstranslator’s.Latinfollowshere)

SecundumPlatonicoscausahuiusquodintelligiturunuminmultis,nonestexparteintellectus,sedexparterei.Cumenimintellectusnosterintelligataliquidunuminmultis;nisialiquaresessetunaparticipataamultis,videreturquodintellectusessetvanus,nonhabensaliquidrespondenssibiinre.Undecoactisuntponereideas,perquarumparticipationemetresnaturalesspeciemsortiuntur,etintellectusnostrifiuntuniversaliaintelligentes.SedsecundumsententiamAristotelishocestabintellectu,scilicetquodintelligatunuminmultisperabstractionemaprincipiisindividuantibus.Nectamenintellectusestvanusautfalsus,licetnonsitaliquidabstractuminrerumnatura.Quiaeorumquaesuntsimul,unumpotestvereintelligiautnominari,absquehocquodintelligaturvelnomineturalterum;licetnonpossitvereintelligiveldici,quodeorumquaesuntsimul,unumsitsinealtero.Sicigiturverepotestconsiderarietdiciidquodestinaliquoindividuo,denaturaspeciei,inquosimileestcumaliis,absqueeoquodconsiderenturineoprincipiaindividuantia,secundumquaedistinguiturabomnibusaliis.

Note8:TextofQ.D.DeAnima,a.2,ad5(Footnote324)

Thehumansoulisanindividuatedformandsoalsoisitspowerwhichiscalledthepossibleintellect,aswellastheintelligibleformswhicharereceivedinthepossibleintellect.Butthisdoesnotpreventtheseformsfrombeingactually(understood),forathingisactually(understood)becauseitisimmaterial,notbecauseitisuniversal.

658Q.D.DeAnima,a.3,ad8.

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Indeed,theuniversalisintelligiblebecauseitisabstractedfrommaterialindividuatingconditions.659

Note9:TheFigureof“Food”(Footnote348)

Animagesomewhatsimilartothatof“remedy”isthefigureof“food”:

Weought,therefore,toreachconclusionsaboutobjectsbeforeactivitiesforthesamereasonasleadsustodefineactivitiesbeforepotencies.The‘objects’inquestionare[likefoodtothevegetativefaculty,boththesensibleobjectwithrespecttothesense,andtheintelligibleobjectwithrespecttotheintellect.]660

Clearalsoisthesimilaritybetweensenseandintellectinthatregard.661Thereferenceto

foodinthetextabove,however,couldalsobeinterpretedassimplyacomparisonbetween

therelationshipsofeachobject(food,thesensibleandtheintelligible)toitscorrespondent

faculty.

Note10:TheSameInterpretationoftheAristotelianIdentityinotherTexts(Footnote

375)

ThesameinterpretationcanbeseenclearlyinothertextsandworksofAquinas,for

exampleinCGII,98,par.14-19;Ibid.,99,par.5-7,especially:

Butsincetheintellectinperfectactisthethingunderstoodinact,someonemaythinkthataseparatesubstancedoesnotunderstandmaterialthings;foritwouldseemincongruousthatamaterialthingshouldbetheperfectionofaseparatesubstance.Rightlyconsidered,however,itisaccordingtoitslikenesspresentintheintellectthatthethingunderstoodistheperfectionoftheonewhounderstandsit;foritisnotthestoneexistingoutsidethesoulthatisaperfectionofourpossibleintellect.Now,thelikenessofthematerialthingisintheintellectofaseparate

659Q.D.DeAnima,a.2,ad5:“Animahumanaestquaedamformaindividuata;etsimiliter

potentiaeiusquaediciturintellectuspossibilis,etformaeintelligibilesineoreceptae.Sedhocnonprohibeteasesseintellectasinactu:exhocenimaliquidestintellectuminactuquodestimmateriale,nonautemexhocquodestuniversale;sedmagisuniversalehabetquodsitintelligibileperhocquodestabstractumaprincipiismaterialibusindividuantibus.”

660InIIDeAnima6,156-161:“Undeetpriusoportebitdeterminaredeobiectisquamdeactibus,proptereamdemcausam,propterquametdeactibuspriusdeterminaturquamdepotentiis.Obiectaautemsuntsicutalimentumrespectuvegetativi,etsensibilerespectusensus,etintelligibilerespectuintellectus.”

661Cf.Chapter3,section5.

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substanceimmaterially,accordingtothelatter’smode,notaccordingtothatofamaterialsubstance.Hence,thereisnoincongruityinsayingthatthislikenessisaperfectionoftheseparatesubstance’sintellect,asitsproperform.662(Latinfollowshere).

Cumautemintellectusinactuperfectositintellectuminactu,potestalicuivideriquodsubstantiaseparatanonintelligatresmateriales:inconveniensenimvideturquodresmaterialissitperfectiosubstantiaeseparatae.Sedsirecteconsideretur,resintellectaestperfectiointelligentissecundumsuamsimilitudinemquamhabetinintellectu:nonenimlapisquiestextraanimam,estperfectiointellectuspossibilisnostri.Similitudoautemreimaterialisinintellectusubstantiaeseparataeestimmaterialiter,secundummodumsubstantiaeseparatae,nonsecundummodumsubstantiaematerialis.Undenonestinconvenienssihaecsimilitudodicaturesseperfectiointellectussubstantiaeseparatae,sicutpropriaformaeius.

Cf.alsoInIIIDeanima7,37-48:

Hesaysthatifthesoulisindeedallthings,itmustbeeithersimplyidenticalwithallthingsoraformallikenessofallthings.TheformerviewwasthatofEmpedocleswhomadeoutthatwe,beingearth,knowearth,andbeingwaterweknowwater,andsoon.Butobviouslythesoulisnotsimplyidenticalwiththethingsitknows;fornotstoneitself,butitsformallikenessexistsinthesoul.Andthisenablesustoseehowintellectinactiswhatitunderstands(inact);theformoftheobjectistheformofthemindinact.663

Finally,cf.SummaI,14,2.

Note11:OtherStudiedTextsinSupportofourInterpretationoftheAristotelianIdentity,

fromInMetaphysicorum(Footnote381)

InInMet.12,lect.11,2617,theobjectiontothedoctrinethatGodknowshisown

intelligenceisawrongtranspositionofwhathappensinhumanunderstandingtothe

divine:toknowtheotherseemstobefirst,andtoknowoneselfisderivative.Therefore,if

theobjectofGod’sunderstandingwereGodhimself,hisknowingwouldnotbetheutmost.

662CGII,99,par.6-7.663InIIIDeanima7,37-48:“Etdicit,quodsianimaestomnia,necesseestquodsit,velipsae

resscibilesetsensibiles,sicutEmpedoclesposuitquodterraterramcognoscimus,etaquaaquam,etsicdealiis;autsitspeciesipsorum.Nonautemanimaestipsares,sicutilliposuerunt,quialapisnonestinanima,sedspecieslapidis.Etperhuncmodumdiciturintellectusinactuesseipsumintellectuminactu,inquantumspeciesintellectiestspeciesintellectusinactu.”

316

Theanswerissimplythatintheseparatesubstancestheintellectinactandwhatis

understoodarenotdifferent,andthereforeinGodtheyarethesame.664Whatisrelevant

forourpurposesisthattheAristotelianidentity,whichforAquinasappliestoevery

intellect,impliesidentitywiththeobjectinitselfinsomecases,butisalwaysanidentity

withtheobjectinitsintelligiblemodeofbeing.665

Thefollowingtextcanhelpustoseethat,inunderstanding,thereisidentityinonesense

andalterityinanothersense.“Inthecaseofthespeculativesciencesitisevidentthatthe

concept,whichdefinesthethingitself,isthethingunderstoodandthescienceor

knowledgeofthatthing.Foranintellecthasknowledgebyreasonofthefactthatit

possessestheconceptofathing.”666Thisiswhatwehavecalledthealternativeexpression

oftheAristotelianidentity:theintellectisonewiththethinginitsabstractedmodeofbeing

(theactoftheintellectistherationemrei,notthethingitselfinitsnaturalbeing).Thetext

continues:

Therefore,sinceinthecaseofallthosethingswhichdonothavemattertheintellectwhenactuallyunderstandingdoesnotdifferfromthethingunderstood,theninthecaseofthefirstsubstance,whichisseparatefrommatterinthehighestdegree,theactofunderstandingandthethingunderstoodareevidentlythesameinthehighestdegree.Hencethereisjustoneactofunderstandingpertainingtothething

664Cf.InMet.12,lect.11,2620.665Cf.Q.D.DeAnima,a.5,ad1:“ForafterAristotlehaddeterminedtheroleofthepossible

andagentintellect,hehadtodeterminetheroleoftheintellect-in-act.Hefirstdistinguishesitinrelationtothepossibleintellect,becausethepossibleintellectandthethingknownarenotoneandthesame.However,theintellectorscience-in-actisthesameasthethingactuallyknown.Aristotlehadsaidthesamethingaboutsense,namely,thatsenseandwhatispotentiallysensibledifferfromeachother,butthatsenseandwhatisactuallysensedareoneandthesame.”[NampostquamAristotelesdeterminavitdeintellectupossibilietagente,necessariumfuitutdeterminaretdeintellectuinactu,cuiusprimodifferentiamostenditadintellectumpossibilem.Namintellectuspossibilisetresquaeintelligitur,nonsuntidem;sedintellectussivescientiainactuestidemreiscitaeinactu,sicutetdesensuidemdixerat,quodsensusetsensibileinpotentiadifferunt,sedsensusetsensibileinactusuntunumetidem.];DeSpirit.Creat.,a.10,ad3:“Theintellectinpotencyisnotthethingthatisunderstoodinpotency,buttheintellectinact,orknowledgeinact,isthethingthatisunderstoodorknowninact.”[…intellectusinpotentianonestintellectuminpotentia;sedintellectusinactu,sivescientiainactu,estresintellectavelscitainactu.]

666InMet.12,lect.11,2620:“Inspeculativisveroscientiismanifestumest,quodipsaratiodefinitivareiestresscita,etestipsascientiasiveintelligentia.Perhocenimestsciensintellectus,perquodhabetrationemrei.”

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understood;thatis,theactofunderstandingthethingunderstoodisnotdistinctfromthatofunderstandingtheactofunderstanding.667

Theclarification“inhisquaecumquemateriamnonhabent”comesbecausetheobjection

pointsouttheoriginalalterityoftheobjectinhumanunderstanding.St.Thomasdoesnot

challengetheobjectioninthatsense,butclarifiesthatitdoesnotapplytothedivine.The

textatleastsuggeststhattherecanbealterityregardingtheobject,althoughthereis

alwaysidentityinadifferentsense.

Note12:TheDistinctionbetweenSpeciesandObject(Footnote383)

Othertextsshowthisdistinctionbetweenspeciesandobject:668

Averroes’secondargumentfailsbecauseitdoesnotdistinguishbetweenthatbywhichoneunderstandsandthatwhichisunderstood.Thespeciesreceivedintothepossibleintellectisnotthatwhichisunderstood;for,sinceallartsandscienceshavetodowiththingsunderstood,itwouldfollowthatallsciencesareaboutspeciesexistinginthepossibleintellect.Andthisispatentlyfalse.669

Butinorderthattherebeonethingunderstood,theremustbealikenessofoneandthesamething;andthisispossibleiftheintelligiblespeciesarenumericallydistinct.Forthereisnoreasonwhythereshouldnotbeseveraldifferentimagesofonething;itisthusthatonemanisseenbyseveral.670

Consequentlywemustunderstandthat,althoughtheintelligiblespeciesreceivedinthepossibleintellectareindividuatedinasmuchastheyexistinthepossibleintellect,stilltheuniversal,whichisconceivedbyabstractionfromindividuating

667InMet.12,lect.11,2620:“Cumigiturintellectusinactuetintellectumnonsitalterum,in

hisquaecumquemateriamnonhabent,manifestumestquodinsubstantiaprima,quaemaximeremotaestamateria,maximeidemestintelligereetintellectum.Etsicunaestintelligentiaintellectitantum,etnonestaliudintelligentiaintellecti,etaliudintelligentiaintelligentiae.”

668Cf.forexampleDeVer2,3,ad2(differenceindivineknowingbetweenwhatheknowsandthemeansbywhichheknows),ad3andad10.

669CGII,75,par.7:“Secundaveroratioipsiusdeficit,exhocquodnondistinguitinteridquointelligitur,etidquodintelligitur.Speciesenimreceptainintellectupossibilinonhabetseutquodintelligitur.Cumenimdehisquaeintelliguntursintomnesartesetscientiae,sequereturquodomnesscientiaeessentdespeciebusexistentibusinintellectupossibili.Quodpatetessefalsum.”

670CGII,75,par.9:“Sedoportet,adhocquodsitunumintellectum,quodsituniuseteiusdemsimilitudo.Ethocestpossibilesispeciesintelligibilessintnumerodiversae:nihilenimprohibetuniusreifieripluresimaginesdifferentes;etexhoccontingitquodunushomoapluribusvidetur.”

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principles,isknowninthesespeciesinasmuchastheyareimmaterial.Foruniversalswithwhichthesciencesareconcerned,arewhatareknown(throughintelligiblespecies)andnottheintelligiblespeciesthemselves.671(Translator’sparentheses)

Theintelligiblespeciesthroughwhichtheintellectunderstandsformally,ispresentinthepossibleintellectofthisandofthatparticularman,andforthisreasonitfollowsthattherearemanypossibleintellects.Neverthelessthequiddity(quod)knownthroughsuchaspeciesisone,ifweconsiderthisquiddityinrelationtothethingknown;becausetheuniversalwhichisunderstoodbybothofthesemenisthesameinallthethings(ofwhichitistheuniversalrepresentation).672(Translator’sparentheses)

Wemustsaythatthethingwhichisunderstoodisnotrelatedtothepossibleintellectasanintelligiblespecieswherebythepossibleintellectisactuated,butthatspeciesisasaformalprinciplewherebytheintellectunderstands[…]Andhencethespecieswhichmakesseeingpossibleisnotasathingwhichisseen,butasthatwherebytheobjectisseen.Andthesameistrueofthepossibleintellect[…]Accordingly,athingthatisunderstoodbytwointellectsisinawayoneandthesamething,andinawayitismanythings:becauseonthepartoftheobjectwhichisknownitisoneandthesamething;butonthepartoftheknowledgeitselfitistwodifferentthings.673

Note13:The“DoubleBeing”oftheSpecies(Footnote389)

This“doublebeing”ofthespecies,i.e.,itsrealbeingassubjectivemodificationandits

“representative”being,canbeseeninothertexts:

671Q.D.DeAnima,a.2,ad5:“Quamvisspeciesreceptaeinintellectupossibilisint

individuataeexillapartequainhaerentintellectuipossibili;tamenineis,inquantumsuntimmateriales,cognoscituruniversalequodconcipiturperabstractionemaprincipiisindividuantibus.Universaliaenim,dequibussuntscientiae,suntquaecognoscunturperspeciesintelligibiles,nonipsaespeciesintelligibiles.”

672Q.D.DeAnima,a.3,ad7:“Licetspeciesintelligibilisquaintellectusformaliterintelligit,sitinintellectupossibiliistiusetilliushominis,exquointellectuspossibilessuntplures;idtamenquodintelligiturperhuiusmodispeciesestunum,siconsideremushabitorespectuadremintellectam;quiauniversalequodintelligiturabutroque,estideminomnibus.”

673DeSpirit.Creat.,a.9,ad6:“Oportetdicerequodresintellectanonsehabetadintellectumpossibilemutspeciesintelligibilis,quaintellectuspossibilissitactu;sedillaspeciessehabetutprincipiumformalequointellectusintelligit[…]Undespeciesvisibilisnonsehabetutquodvidetur,sedutquovidetur.Etsimileestdeintellectupossibili[…]Resigiturintellectaaduobusintellectibusestquodammodounaeteadem,etquodammodomultae:quiaexpartereiquaecognosciturestunaeteadem,exparteveroipsiuscognitionisestaliaetalia.”Cf.DeSpirit.Creat.,a.10,ad12.

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Therearetwowaysofconsideringthemutuallikenessbetweentwothings.First,wecanconsidertheminasmuchastheyagreeinacommonnature.Suchalikenessbetweentheknowerandtheknownisnotrequired;indeed,wesometimesseethatthesmallerthelikeness,thesharperthecognition.Forexample,thereislessresemblancebetweentheintellectuallikenessofastoneandthestonethanthereisbetweenthesenselikenessandthestone,fortheintellectuallikenessisfartherremovedfrommatter;yettheintellectknowsmoreprofoundlythansense.Secondly,thelikenessbetweentwothingscanbeconsideredfromthepointofviewofrepresentation.Suchalikenessoftheknowertothethingknownisnecessary.674(Latinfollowshere)

Similitudoaliquorumduorumadinvicempotestdupliciterattendi.Unomodosecundumconvenientiaminnatura;ettalissimilitudononrequiriturintercognoscensetcognitum;immovidemusquandoquequod,quantotalissimilitudoestminor,tantocognitioestperspicacior;sicutminorestsimilitudosimilitudinisquaeestinintellectuadlapidem,quamilliusquaeestinsensu,cumsitmagisamateriaremota;ettamenintellectusperspicaciuscognoscitquamsensus.Aliomodoquantumadrepraesentationem;ethaecsimilitudorequiriturcognoscentisadcognitum.

Therefore,thesenotionsthusabstractedcanbeconsideredintwoways.Thefirstoneistoconsidertheminthemselves.Inthisway,theyareconsideredwithoutmovementanddesignatedmatter:thisisfoundintheaforementionednotionsonlywithregardtothebeingthattheyhaveintheintellect.Theotherwayistoconsiderthemwithregardtothethingsofwhichtheyarenotions,thingsthatcertainlysubsistinmatterandmovement.Andinthiswaythesenotionsareprinciplesofknowledgeofthosethings,becauseeverythingisknownbymeansofitsform.Thus,bymeansofthesenotions,immobileandconsideredwithoutparticularmatter,wehaveknowledge(innaturalscience)ofmobileandmaterialthingswhichexistoutsidethesoul.675

674DeVer2,3,ad9.675InBoet.DeTrin.5,2,c.:“Possuntergohuiusmodirationessicabstractaeconsiderari

dupliciter.Unomodosecundumse,etsicconsiderantursinemotuetmateriasignata,ethocnoninveniturineisnisisecundumessequodhabentinintellectu.Aliomodosecundumquodcomparanturadres,quarumsuntrationes;quaequidemressuntinmateriaetmotu.Etsicsuntprincipiacognoscendiilla,quiaomnisrescognosciturpersuamformam.Etitaperhuiusmodirationesimmobilesetsinemateriaparticulariconsideratashabeturcognitioinscientianaturaliderebusmobilibusetmaterialibusextraanimamexsistentibus.”

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“However,itmightbesaidthatinasmuchasintelligibleformsinhereinthesoultheyare

individuated;butasthelikenessesofthingstheyareuniversalsrepresentingthings

accordingtotheircommonnatureandnotaccordingtotheirindividuatingprinciples.”676

Note14:IntentionalIdentitywithoutquodammodo(Footnote407)

ForaninterestingtextinwhichSt.Thomasspeaksaboutthisintentionalidentitywithout

quodammodo,seethefollowing:

Andthemindinactisitsobject;forprecisely[as]theobjectisorisnotmaterial,[inthesamewayitis]perceivedbythemind.AndjustbecausePlatooverlookedthisprocessofabstractionhewasforcedtoconceiveofmathematicalobjectsandspecificnaturesasexistinginseparationfrommatter;whereasAristotlewasabletoexplainthatprocessbytheagentintellect.677

TheitalicsoftheLeonineeditionindicatethetermsofAristotlethatAquinasquotes.The

contextmakesclearthatthisisnotanexplanationofthe“Aristotelianidentity,”butofthe

objectivityofknowing,insofaraswhatweconceivecorrespondstothethingsthemselves.

Lambertsays:“Humanabstractedconceptsareidenticalincontenttothingsinthereal

physicalorderandinthatrespectarenevermorethantheequalofthings;theirsuperiority

liesexclusivelyintheirfunctionas‘re-presentation’ofthosethingsinanimmaterial

mode.”678

Note15:Apprehensionin83,4,c.(Footnote420)

In83,4,c.,theoriginalapprehensivequalityoftheintellectisopposedtothetensive(as

“tendingtowards”)aspectofthewill.Wequoteonlythebeginningofthecorpus:

676Q.D.DeAnima,a.2,ob.7:“Seddicebatquodformaeintelligibilesexillapartequa

inhaerentanimae,suntindividuatae;sedexillapartequasuntrerumsimilitudines,suntuniversales,repraesentantesressecundumnaturamcommunem,etnonsecundumprincipiaindividuantia.”

677InIIIDeAnima6,297-305:“Etomninointellectusinactuestresintellectae,quiasicutresinsuirationehabentmateriamvelnonhabent,sicabintellectupercipiuntur.EtquiahuncmodumabstractionisPlatononconsideravit,coactusfuitponeremathematicaetspeciesseparatas,lococuiusadpraedictamabstractionemfaciendamAristotelesposuitintellectumagentem.”

678Lambert,98.

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Theappetitivepowersmustbeproportionatetotheapprehensivepowers,aswehavesaidabove.Now,asonthepartoftheintellectualapprehensionwehaveintellectandreason,soonthepartoftheintellectualappetitewehavewill,andfree-willwhichisnothingelsebutthepowerofchoice.Andthisisclearfromtheirrelationstotheirrespectiveobjectsandacts.Fortheactof‘understanding’impliesthesimpleacceptationofsomething;whencewesaythatweunderstandfirstprinciples,whichareknownofthemselveswithoutanycomparison.Butto‘reason,’properlyspeaking,istocomefromonethingtotheknowledgeofanother:wherefore,properlyspeaking,wereasonaboutconclusions,whichareknownfromtheprinciples.679

Notehow“potentiasappetitivas”aredistinguishedfrom“potentiisapprehensivis,”andthe

descriptionofintelligere(herethefirstoperationoftheintelligence)isdescribedas

“simplicemacceptionemalicuiusrei.”Significantly,eventhemovementofratiofromthe

principlestotheconclusionsisascribedtothe“intellectualapprehension”:“exparte

apprehensionisintellectivaesehabentintellectusetratio.”

Note16:UnderstandingasanActivity(Footnote449)

Thereisatendencyofeverypotencytoitsproperobject,asortof“transcendental

orientation,”towhichAquinasrefersas“naturalappetite.”Thisisnomorethanthe

metaphysicaltendencythat,aseveryform,thefacultiesofthesoulhavetotheirown

perfections.Itiscomparabletothetendencyofeverybeingtobewhatitis,anditisnot

enoughtomakethesefaculties“active”or“tendential”potencies.ForAquinasthe

appetitivepotenciesarenecessaryinthehumansoul680andarenottobeconfoundedwith

thenaturalappetite:

Eachpowerofthesoulisaformornature,andhasanaturalinclinationtosomething.Whereforeeachpowerdesiresbythenaturalappetitethatobjectwhich

67983,4,c.:“Respondeodicendumquodpotentiasappetitivasoportetesseproportionatas

potentiisapprehensivis,utsupradictumest.Sicutautemexparteapprehensionisintellectivaesehabentintellectusetratio,itaexparteappetitusintellectivisehabentvoluntasetliberumarbitrium,quodnihilaliudestquamviselectiva.Ethocpatetexhabitudineobiectorumetactuum.Namintelligereimportatsimplicemacceptionemalicuiusrei,undeintelligidicunturproprieprincipia,quaesinecollationeperseipsacognoscuntur.Ratiocinariautemproprieestdevenireexunoincognitionemalterius,undepropriedeconclusionibusratiocinamur,quaeexprincipiisinnotescunt.”

680Cf.80,1.

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issuitabletoitself.Abovewhichnaturalappetiteistheanimalappetite,whichfollowstheapprehension,andbywhichsomethingisdesirednotassuitabletothisorthatpower,suchassightforseeing,orsoundforhearing;butsimplyassuitabletotheanimal.681

Note17:KnowingasReceptive(Footnote454)

Aquinashascharacterizedknowing(andparticularlyunderstanding)asreceptiveinother

worksaswell:“Ourpossibleintellectcanunderstandnothingbeforeitisbroughtintoactby

a[…]form[intelligibleinact.]”682;“…[T]heintellectispassivetotheintelligible…”683;“Our

possibleintellectismerelyinpotencyintherealmoftheintelligible;itisactualisedthrough

anideadrawnfromsensibleimages.”684(mytrans.);thespecies“isimpressed”685onthe

possibleintellect.Knowingis“apprehensive”686,“receptive”687;“perceptive”688;

“accipere.”689

Note18:TheComparisonbetweenIntellectandSenses(Footnote477)

68180,1ad3:“Dicendumquodunaquaequepotentiaanimaeestquaedamformaseu

natura,ethabetnaturaleminclinationeminaliquid.Undeunaquaequeappetitobiectumsibiconveniensnaturaliappetitu.Supraquemestappetitusanimalisconsequensapprehensionem,quoappetituraliquidnonearationequaestconveniensadactumhuiusvelilliuspotentiae,utpotevisioadvidendumetauditioadaudiendum;sedquiaestconvenienssimpliciteranimali.”

682Cf.DeVer8,6inLambert,83:“Intellectuspossibilisnosternihilpotestintelligereantequamperficiaturformaintelligibiliinactu.”

683CGII,76,par.15:“…[I]ntellectuspatiturabintelligibili…”684InIIDeAnima6,173-190:“Intellectusnosterpossibilisestinpotentiatantuminordine

intelligibilium:fitautemactuperformamaphantasmatibusabstractam.”685DeSpirit.Creat.,a.10,ad17.Cf.InMet.9,lect.8,1864-1865.686Cf.InBoet.DeTrin.6,2,c..687Cf.InISentd.3,q.4,a.5,c.;InIIIDeAnima1,131-139;DeSpirit.Creat.,a.9,c.;Q.D.De

Anima,a.4,ad8:“Theactivityofthepossibleintellectconsistsinreceivingintelligibles,whereasthatoftheagentintellectconsistsinabstractingthem.”[Actusintellectuspossibilisestrecipereintelligibilia;actioautemintellectusagentisestabstrahereintelligibilia.]andad9;a.5,c.;a.13,c..

688Cf.InIIIDeAnima4,100-104:“Moreover,justasthepotentialintellect’sfunctionofreceivingintelligibleobjectsisattributedtotheindividualmanasitssubject,soalsoistheworkoftheagentintellect,theabstractingofsuchobjectsfrommatter.”[Videmusetiam,quodsicutoperatiointellectuspossibilis,quaeestpercipereintelligibile,attribuiturhomini,itaetoperatiointellectusagentis,quaeestabstrahereintelligibilia.];Q.D.DeAnima,a.2,ad15.

689Cf.Q.D.DeAnima,a.2,ad15;DeVer8,10ad3inLambert,98;Q.D.DeAnima,a.4,c..

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ThecomparisonbetweenintellectandsensescanbeseeninotherworksofAquinas.InIn

Boet.DeTrin.6,2,c.,forexample,bothimplyanapprehensivemoment.IntheContra

Gentiles:

Consequently,intheactofunderstanding,theintelligiblespeciesreceivedintothepossibleintellectfunctionsasthethingbywhichoneunderstands,andnotasthatwhichisunderstood,evenasthespeciesofcolorintheeyeisnotthatwhichisseen,butthatbywhichwesee.Andthatwhichisunderstoodistheveryintelligibleessenceofthingsexistingoutsidethesoul,justasthingsoutsidethesoulareseenbycorporealsight.690

InInIIIDeAnima1,56ff.,botharepassiveandreceptive,preciselyinthecontextofthe

distinctionofthefaculties;InIIIDeAnima2,264-279issimilartothetextquotedofContra

Gentiles;inInIIIDeAnima10,20-27bothimplyacertain“apparition”andknowinginthe

absenceofthethingsknown,forwhichsomeofthenamespropertoeachfacultymay

sometimesbeusedinterchangeably;inInIIIDeAnima5,233-238intellectandsightarenot

deceivedintheirproperobjects,quodquidestandcolour.“Foritisevidentthattheactof

intellectionhasitsorigininthepossibleintellectasthefirstprinciplewherebywe

understand,justastheoperationofsensinghasitsorigininasentientpower.”691Notehow

inthislasttexttheactofunderstandingischaracterizedasacertain“comingout,”andso

allegedlyasactive,butonlyinthesamewaythattheactofthesensescouldbe

characterizedasactive.St.Thomasissimplytalkingaboutthespontaneityofknowing,in

thesensethat“weknow”:knowingisanactofthesubject.InInMet.11,lect.7,2253both

areoperationsthatremainintheagent.“Nowasthesenseisdirectlyinformedbythe

likenessofitsproperobject,soistheintellectbythelikenessoftheessenceofathing.

Hencetheintellectisnotdeceivedabouttheessenceofathing,asneitherthesenseabout

690CGII,75,par.7:“Habetseigiturspeciesintelligibilisreceptainintellectupossibiliin

intelligendosicutidquointelligitur,nonsicutidquodintelligitur:sicutetspeciescolorisinoculononestidquodvidetur,sedidquovidemus.Idveroquodintelligitur,estipsaratiorerumexistentiumextraanimam:sicutetresextraanimamexistentesvisucorporalividentur.”

691Q.D.DeAnima,a.3,c.:“Manifestumestenimquodhaecoperatio,quaeestintelligere,egrediturabintellectupossibilisicutaprimoprincipio,perquodintelligimus;sicuthaecoperatiosentireegrediturapotentiasensitiva.”

324

itsproperobject.”692Stumpcomparesthemintheroleofthespecies(“Likesensiblespecies

andphantasms,theintelligiblespeciesareimmaterialformsthataremeansofcognition

andsimilitudesofthingsoutsidethemind”)693andonpage263sheprovidesothertextsof

Aquinasinwhichthesimilaritiesbetweenintellectandsensecanbeseen.

Note19:Thedistinctionbetweenagentintellectandpossibleintellect(Footnote495)

Thedistinctionbetweenagentintellectandpossibleintellectispresentinotherworksof

Aquinas.“NeitherdoIsaythatthesetwopotencies,namelytheagentintellectandthe

possibleintellect,areactuallyoneandthesamepotencydifferentlynamedaccordingto

differentoperations;infact,wheneverdifferentactionsarereducedtocontraryprinciples,

itisimpossibletoreducethoseactionstothesamepotency.”694(mytrans.)“Now,the

possibleintellectiscomparedtotheagentintellectasitsproperpatientorrecipient,

becausetheagentintellectisrelatedtoitasarttoitsmatter.”695

Note,inthislasttext,thatthepossibleintellect“receives”theagentintellectasactive

cause,notasitsownactorform:otherwisethecomparisonwouldbenotwiththeart,but

withtheformoftheartefact.ThisiswhatSt.ThomasinterpretedintheAristoteliantext.

“Fortheagentintellectstandsinthesamerelationtotheintelligiblespeciesreceivedinto

thepossibleintellectasarttotheartificialformswhichitproducesinmatter,asthe

692SummaI,17,3(inStump,233note90):“Sicutautemsensusinformaturdirecte

similitudinepropriorumsensibilium,itaintellectusinformatursimilitudinequidditatisrei.Undecircaquodquidestintellectusnondecipitur:sicutnequesensuscircasensibiliapropria.”

693Stump,262.694InIISentd.17,q.2,a.1,c.:“Neciterumdico,haecduo,scilicetintellectumagentemet

possibilem,esseunampotentiamdiversimodenominatamsecundumdiversasoperationes;quiaquaecumqueactionesreducunturincontrariaprincipia,impossibileesteasreducereineamdempotentiam.”

695CGII,76,par.2:“Intellectusautempossibiliscomparaturadagentemutpropriumpassivumsivesusceptivumipsius:habetenimseadeumagenssicutarsadmateriam,utdiciturinIIIDeAnima.”

325

exampleusedbyAristotleinDeanimaIII[…]makesclear.”696Coryquotesaninteresting

textofAverroesfromhisLongCommentarytoDeAnima,wheretheCommentator

prospectsthelimitsoftheanalogyofart,pointingoutthattheagentintellectisnotthe

absoluteoriginofthecontent,becauseinthatcasethephantasmswouldnotbe

required.697

MoreAquinas’textsforthedistinctioncouldbequoted.698Sellés699statesthatforAquinas

theactionoftheagentintellectprecedesthereceptionofthepossibleintellect,quotingCG

II,77,n.3.Stumpspeaksofadistinctionofpartsintheintellect:“Aquinasthinksofthe

intellectasdividedintoanactivepartandapassivepart.Theactivepart,generallycalled

‘theagentintellect’,abstractstheintelligiblespeciesfromthephantasmsanddeposits

theminthepassivepartoftheintellect,whichisgenerallycalled‘thepotentialintellect’or

‘thepossibleintellect.’”700

Note20:OnthetwoOpinionsastotheEffectofLight(Footnote619)

“Therearetwoopinionsastotheeffectoflight…”701

Hence,following[Aristotle’s]opinion,Isaythatlightisnecessaryforseeing,notbecauseofcolour,inthatitactualisescolours(whichsomesayareinonlypotencysolongastheyareindarkness),butbecauseofthetransparentmediumwhichlightrendersactual,asthetextstates.702

696CGII,76,par.18:“Comparaturenimintellectusagensadspeciesintelligibilesreceptasin

intellectupossibili,sicutarsadformasartificialesquaeperartemponunturinmateria:utpatetexexemploAristotelisinIIIDeAnima[cap.V,1;430a].”

697Cf.Averroes,LCDA,III,18inCory,Averroes,25.698Cf.CGII,76,par.15;Q.D.DeAnima,a.4,ad8etad9;a.5,c.:“Thereforetheremustexist

withinusaformalprinciplethroughwhichwereceiveintelligiblespecies,andonewherebyweabstractthem.Theseprinciplesarecalledthepossibleandtheagentintellectrespectively.”[Oportetigituresseinnobisaliquodprincipiumformalequorecipiamusintelligibilia,etaliudquoabstrahamusea.Ethuiusmodiprincipianominanturintellectuspossibilisetagens.];InIIIDeAnima4,1-7;100-104;DeSpirit.Creat.,a.10,c..

699Cf.Sellés,EIA,251.700Cf.Stump,264.70179,3ad2.702InIIDeAnima14,356ff.:“UndesecundumsententiamAristotelisdicendumest,quod

lumennecessariumestadvidendum,nonexpartecoloriseoquodfaciatcoloresesseactu,quos

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InInIIIDeAnima4,43-53thelightdoesnotmakeinactastheagentintellectmakesinact.

Cf.alsothefollowing:

Forthisreasonothersofferadifferentandmoreacceptableexplanation,namely,thatlightisnecessaryforsightinasmuchasitperfectsthemedium[…]Consequentlythecomparisonbetweenlightandtheagentintellectdoesnotholdinallrespects,becausetheagentintellectisnecessaryforthisreason,thatitmaymakethepotentiallyintelligibletobeactuallyintelligible.AristotlepointedthisoutintheDeanima,(BookIII)whenhesaidthattheagentintellectislikelightinsomerespects.703

Note21:“PhilosophicalTranslation”oftheSecondLastParagraphoftheEpilogue

Otherwise,bydissolvingthemeaningofthingsinourdealingswiththem,werisklosingalsothemeaningofourownexistence.Theexistentialvoidistheemptinessofasoulwhodidnotwelcomethingsastheyare—withtheirowncapricesandbeauty—asoulwhothusremainedaloneintheself-madeprisonofhisorherownworldofideasandvalues.Then,whenthedoortotheworldisclosed,thepathtoHeavencannotbefound.Godishiddenbehindthetrees,behindthebeautiesHemade.ItisonlybyencounteringothersthatwecanhearaboutGod.

This“philosophicaltranslation”doesnotintendtoconveythesamemeaningasthe

previousimages,butdoesintendtohelpintheunderstandingofsomeoftheprincipleson

whichthoseimagesdepend.Animagemaysometimesconveymorethanoneidea,andcan

sometimeshelpintheunderstandingofdeeperideasthancanmerephilosophical

expression.Theuseofimagesservesalsoasascholarlydevice,insofarasitcanhelpthe

readertoformtherightphantasminordertounderstand.Atthesametime,thelimitation

ofanimagemaycomefromtheimpossibilityofitsadaptingperfectlytothemeaningittries

toconvey,and/orfromalackofartintheonewhocreatestheimage.

Atthebeginningofthisparagraph,IimplythataKantianformalaprioritendsto“dissolve

themeaningofthingsinourdealingswiththem,”insofarasthemeaningpassesfrombeing

quidam,tantumdicuntesseinpotentia,cumsuntintenebris;sedexpartediaphani,inquantumfacitipsumesseinactu,utinliteradicitur.”

703Q.D.DeAnima,a.4,ad4:“Etideoaliialiterdicunt,etmelius,quodlumennecessariumestadvidenduminquantumperficitdiaphanum[…]Comparatioergoluminisadintellectumagentemnonestquantumadomnia;cumintellectusagensadhocsitnecessariusutfaciatintelligibiliainpotentiaesseintelligibiliaactu.EthocsignificavitAristotelesinIIIDeAnima,cumdixit,quodintellectusagensestquasilumenquoquomodo.”

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somethinginthethingsthemselves(Thomisticprospective)tobeingsomethingbestowed

onthingsbythesubject’sactivity(Kantianprospective).

By“existentialvoid”Imeanthelackofmeaninginhumanexistence,insofarasthesubject

findsnoreason,nopurpose,noanswerinlifeand,thus,facesdespair.Thesubjectrealizes

that,ifeverythingdependsonhimorher,theneverythingparticipatesthesubject’s

contingency,imperfectionandfinitude,andthusfallsintonothing.Thereisnohopeof

perfection(=happiness),becausetheonewhoacknowledgesone’sownneedanddesire

forperfection,findsoneselfasbeingtheperfectionofeverythingelse.

Thisexistentialvoidisproduced,inmyview,bytheattitudeofrejectingthingsashavinga

meaninginthemselves(“notwelcomingthingsastheyare”).Itissimilartowhathappens

whenone,insteadoflisteningtotheotherperson,isalwaystryingtohearonlywhatone

wantstohear.Whenthesubjectdoesnotacceptthelimitthatathingbringswithitself,

whenthesubjectdoesnotwelcomesomethingas“other,”buttriestoseehisorherown

utilityinthatthing,thesubjectremainsalone,havingthingstodealwithbutnothingto

receive.

Theattitudeof“humility”or“welcoming,”instead,isthatwhichopensthedoortoa

meaningfulworld.Butoncethisdoorisopen,thelimitsofthingsandtheirbeing-there-

before-usinspiresthesearchforacause.Participatedbeingisbynecessityacausedbeing.

Ameaningful,independentworldpresentsitselfasamystery,asabigquestion.Thisiswhy

itissaidthat“whenthedoortotheworldisclosed,thepathtoHeavencannotbefound.”

“Heaven”canherebeunderstoodasultimatemeaning,happinessorGodHimself.When

thedoortotheworldisopen,wemayfindthepathtowardsGod,becausethehumanway

toarriveattheknowledgeofGodisascendingtowardsHimbymeansoftheknowledgeof

creatures.

ThatiswhyIsay“Godishiddenbehindthetrees.”Theimage“behindthetrees”canmean

severalthings.Firstofall,Godisnot“within”thetreesbut“behind”them,insofarasGodis

not“part”ofcreation,nordoesGodbelongtocreationasitsintimateenergyorform;God

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is,rather,tobeconsidered“beyond”creation.ThedistinctionbetweenGodandcreatures,

however,isnotspatial(“hereistheworldandthereisGod”);Godiseverywhere.Instead,

thedistinctionbetweenGodandcreaturesismetaphysical.Godisactualfullnessof

perfection,apureactincludingintensivelyandsimply(withoutdifferentiation)allofthe

perfectionofbeing,whereaseachcreatureislimited,possessingaspecificperfectionanda

limitedcorrespondingactofbeing.Godiseverywhere,therefore,insofarasGodcauses

eachgramofbeingintheuniverse.Inthisway,“behindthetrees”pointstothedistinction

betweenGodandcreatures,theessential“otherness”ofGod.704

“Behindthetrees”isalsoafigureofakindofplaybetweenGodandhumanbeings.The

purposeofGodincreationistobefoundbyhumanbeingswhorejoiceinfindingGodas

thosewhowinagame.HumanbeingsaresupposedtolookforGod.Godishiddenbecause

GodwantshumanbeingstolookforHim,notbecauseGoddoesnotwanttobefound.God

wantstobefound,andGodwantstobefoundinsuchawaythatthosewhofindHimmay

behappywiththeirown“cleverness.”God,however,canbefoundonlybythosewhoget

outofthemselves,andrecognizetheirneeds.Inasense,itisonlybyacceptingthe

limitationimposedonusbythethingsthemselves(“welcomingthingsastheyare”),andby

acceptingourownlimitationandneed(“goingouttoplaythegame”),thatweopen

ourselvestotheunlimitedhappinessoffindingGod.

“ItisonlybyencounteringothersthatwecanhearaboutGod.”Thislastlinemeanswhat

hasalreadybeensaidregardingthenecessityofascendingtoGodbymeansofcreatures.

ThereasonIsay“hear”isbecausebymeansofcreatureswecannot“see”God,butwecan

certainly“hear”GodinHiscreatedeffects;theeffectsmakeusrealizethatthereisacause,

inthesamewayasthesoundofthebellmakesusrealizethatsomeoneisatthedoor.

704ThispositionisdifferentfromconsideringGodanaprioriofhumanunderstanding,for

tworeasons:first,becausewefindGodnotbyreflectingonourselvesandourmodeofknowing,butbyreflectingonthelimitsofcreatures;andsecond,becausewecannotknowourselvesbeforeknowingcreaturesinthemselves.WedonotdenythattheknowledgeofourselvesbecrucialorevenneededinordertoknowGod.

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ThislinecanalsomeanthatonlybyencounteringthosewhopreachtheGospelcanwe

hearaboutGod,insofaras“NoonehaseverseenGod;theonlySon,whoisinthebosomof

theFather,hehasmadehimknown.”705Thatis,thenaturalknowledgeofGodisobtained

byencounteringcreaturesandreasoningfromthem;thesupernaturalknowledgeofGodis

obtainedbyencounteringthedivinemessengersandwelcomingtheirmessage.

Note22:TheCompleteTextofFabroinNMP272-273

CertainlyGod,whoisthe‘ipsumintelligeresubsistens’,istheintelligiblesunofthespiritsandthefirstcauseofeverytruth;but,asinthesensiblerealmitisnotnecessarythattheeyeseesitsobjectsturningdirectlytothesun,butitisenoughthattheybeseeninsofarastheyarerenderedevidentbythelightderivedfromthesun–likewise,inthecreatedintelligiblerealm,itisenough,andevenfitting,thatthecreatureseesitsobjectsinsofarastheyarerenderedevidentbyalightparticipatedfromthedivinesun.706Thislightisformantheagentintellect,whichAristotlehassaidtobeinnoi[Greek]‘likethelight’707andwhichSt.Thomasdescribesalwaysasthehighestparticipationandtheinmostseal(inthenaturalorder)ofthedivinityinus.Theagentintellectisprincipleproductive[fattivo]oftheintelligibleandthisintelligiblethat708comestousnotbydirectparticipationfromGod,butthroughacomplexprocessofabstractionaccomplishedbytheparticipatedlight,theagentintellect,intherealmoftheconcreteanddiffuseparticipationsofthesensibleworld:‘Theintelligiblespecieswhichareparticipatedbyourintellectarereduced,astotheirfirstcause,toafirstprinciplewhichisbyitsessenceintelligible—namely,God.Buttheyproceedfromthatprinciplebymeansofthesensibleformsandmaterialthings,fromwhichwegatherknowledge,asDionysiussays.’”709

Note23:TextofInIIIDeAnima1,170-180(Footnote520)

Theearlyphilosophers’principle[was]thatintellectmustbecompoundedofallthingsifitcanknowallthings.Butifitknewallthings,ascontainingthemallinitselfalready,itwouldbeanever-actualintellect,andnevermerelyinpotency.Inthe

705John1:18.706DeVeritate,q.XVIII,a.1.707DeAnima,Gamma,5,430,a.15.708Thiswordshouldprobablybeomittedintheoriginal.709Fabro,Cornelio,LaNozioneMetafisicadiPartecipazionesecondoSanTommasod’Aquino,

inCornelioFabro:OpereComplete,vol.3(Segni:EDIVI,2005),272-273.ThetextwhichFabroquotesfromAquinasis84,4ad1:“Speciesintelligibilesquasparticipatnosterintellectus,reducuntur,sicutinprimamcausam,inaliquodprincipiumpersuamessentiamintelligibile,scilicetinDeum.Sedabilloprincipioproceduntmediantibusformisrerumsensibiliumetmaterialiumaquibusscientiamcolligimus,utDionysiusdicit.”(LatintextusedbyFabro)

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samewayhehasremarkedalreadyofthesenses,thatiftheywereintrinsicallymadeupoftheobjectstheyperceive,theirperceptionswouldnotpresupposeanyexteriorsensibleobjects.710

Note24:TheIntellectas“tabularasa”inOtherWorks(Footnote521)

“Theintellectisinpotencytoallintelligibleformshavingnoneactually,justasprimematter

isinpotencytoallsensibleformshavingnoneactually.”711Theobjectionisnotchallenged

inthatregard.Seealsothefollowing:

Itwouldfollowthatthepossibleintellectwouldnotreceiveanyspeciesthatareabstractedfromourphantasms,ifoneintellectbelongstoallthosewhoareandwhohavebeen.Because,nowthatmanymenwhoknewmanythingshavealreadygonebeforeus,itwouldfollowthatwithrespecttoallthosethingswhichtheyknewthepossibleintellectwouldbeinactandnotinpotencytoreceivethem,becausenothingreceiveswhatitalreadyhas.712

710InIIIDeAnima1,170-180:“Dicebant[antiqui]enimeum[i.e.intellectusanimae]adhoc

quodcognosceretomnia,essecompositumexomnibus.Siautemessetcognoscitivusomniumquiahaberetinseomnia,essetsemperintellectusinactuetnunquaminpotentia:sicutsupradixitdesensu,quodsiessetcompositusexsensibilibus,nonindigeretsensibilibusexterioribusadsentiendum.”

711Q.D.DeAnima,a.2,ob.17:“Intellectusestinpotentiaadomnesformasintelligibiles,nullamearumhabensinactu;sicutmateriaprimaestinpotentiaadomnesformassensibiles,etnullamearumhabetinactu.”

712DeSpirit.Creat.,a.9,c.:“Sequereturquodintellectuspossibilisnonreciperetaliquasspeciesaphantasmatibusnostrisabstractas,sisitunusintellectuspossibilisomniumquisuntetquifuerunt.Quiaiamcummultihominespraecesserintmultaintelligentes,sequereturquodrespectuomniumillorumquaeillisciverunt,sitinactuetnonsitinpotentiaadrecipiendum;quianihilrecipitquodiamhabet.”