The 6 Day War

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Crisis Director: James FaheyChair: Erika Walsh

Vice-Chair: Amani Ahmed

BACKGROUNDGUIDE 2012 The Day War

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FCMUN V The 6 Day War

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Hello Delegates!

My name is James Fahey, and I will be the chair of the Israeli side of the Joint CrisisCommittee on the six day war. I am also the author of your background guide. I am a freshman at theUniversity of Massachusetts and have been involved in Model U.N since I arrived on campus. I am

pursuing a double major in Journalism and Spanish, and my eventual goal is to become a foreignnews correspondent. I play golf and the guitar, and founded a club on UMasss campus designed tofacilitate collaboration between musicians on campus. But, enough of that on to the Six Day War!

The simulation is a Joint Crisis Committee, meaning that there will be two independentcommittees reacting to the same crisis. Newton famously said that for every action there is an equaland o pposite reaction, however in this case the reaction may be far from equal in magnitude. Eachseparate committee will be given the same crisis or issue to deal with; the decisions of one committeewill directly affect the other, and vice versa. Your decisions may set off a chain of reactionsunforeseeable and indeed irreversible. The Six Day War, for instance, was largely the result of small

actions resulting in large, disproportionate reactions and effects.In this committee, you will be divided into two sides: the side of the Israelis or the side of the

joint Arab states. The Israelis, obviously, are composed entirely of the new state of Israel (createdmerely 19 years before the Six Days War broke out), whereas the joint Arab states is trickier web ofalliances. They are mainly made up of Jordan, Syria, and Egypt (then known as the United ArabRepublic.) However, this is a simplification: the Arab Expeditionary Forces also lent their forces to theArab States, prominently including Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the Palestine Liberation Organization aswell as ostensibly at least six other Arab Countries.

Your characters will be assigned before you arrive at FCMUN 2012. Your characters are quitewell known and you will be able to find out more by researching on your own. You may be assignedMoshe Dayan, for instance, a man who men feared and women loved, sporting an eye patch from hisheroics in the 1956 Arab- Israeli war; or you may be assigned General Amer, one of the most brilliantmilitary commanders in Middle Eastern history. Once you arrive at FCMUN, you will be thrust into themilieu of terror and tense international relations immediately before the onset of the June 5th war.Both sides will be presented with a singular issue, and from there on, there is no telling what willsucceed. Because Joint Crisis committee is a very demanding mode of debate, you will have toresearch thoroughly so that you may faithfully portray your character or party (though, obviously,some leeway is given.)

It is important to keep in mind that the lines between political and military leaders was farmore blurred in the Middle East of the 1960s than we are accustomed to now. Leaders wereexpected to have military experience; indeed, leaders on both sides were needled if they weredeemed lacking in that area. Because of this, you are the unique position to make decisions thatseem to be only military matters but in fact have far reaching effects in the political realm as well.

Sincerely,James Fahey.

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The simulation is a Joint Crisis Committee, meaning that there will be twoindependent committees reacting to the same crisis. Newton famously said that forevery action there is an equal and opposite reaction, however in this case the reactionmay be far from equal in magnitude. Each separate committee will be given the samecrisis or issue to deal with; the decisions of one committee will directly affect the other,

and vice versa. Your decisions may set off a chain of reactions unforeseeable and indeedirreversible. The Six Day War, for instance, was largely the result of small actionsresulting in large, disproportionate reactions and effects.

In this committee, you will be divided into two sides: the side of the Israelis or theside of the joint Arab states. The Israelis, obviously, are composed entirely of the newstate of Israel (created merely 19 years before the Six Days War broke out), whereasthe joint Arab states is trickier web of alliances. They are mainly made up of Jordan,Syria, and Egypt (then known as the United Arab Republic.) However, this is asimplification: the Arab Expeditionary Forces also lent their forces to the Arab States,prominently including Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the Palestine Liberation Organization aswell as ostensibly at least six other Arab Countries.

Your characters will be assigned and short biographies will be provided to youbefore you arrive at FCMUN 2012. However, your characters are quite well known and itis likely that you will be able to find out more by researching on your own. You may beassigned Moshe Dayan, for instance, a man who men feared and women loved, sportingan eye patch from his heroics in the 1956 Arab-Israeli war; or you may be assignedGeneral Amer, one of the most brilliant military commanders in Middle Eastern h istory.

Once you arrive at FCMUN, you will be thrust into the milieu of terror and tenseinternational relations immediately before the onset of the June 5 th war. Both sides willbe presented with a singular issue, and from there on, there is no telling what willsucceed. Because Joint Crisis committee is a very demanding mode of debate, you willhave to research thoroughly so that you may faithfully portray your character or party(though, obviously, some leeway is given.)

It is important to keep in mind that the lines between political and military leaderswas far more blurred in the Middle East of the 1960s than we are accustomed to now.Leaders were expected to have military experience; indeed, leaders on both sides wereneedled if they were deemed lacking in that area. Because of this, you are the uniqueposition to make decisions that seem to be only military matters but in fact have farreaching effects in the political realm as well.

Geography:

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Figure 1: Political Map of the Middle East. Pay special attention to the Straits of Tiran (betweenYemen and Djibouti) and the Gulf of Aqaba (the Gulf directly below Eilat.)

Figure 2: Showing Gulf of Suez and Gulf of Aqaba. Egypt, Israel and Jordan are pictured (in thatorder from West to East.)

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Figure 3: Detailing the creation and expansion of the State of Israel from 1948 until present day.The seizure of Sinai, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights is pictured in the second panel; blueand white stripes denote areas where Palestinians and Israelis reside.

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Figure 5: Map of the Golan Heights and bordering Countries.

Figure 6: Map detailing the loss of Palestinian territory from 1946 until 2000.

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Figure 7: The Syrian FrontFigure 8: The Battle for Jersusalem

Understanding the Geography of the Middle East is paramount to understandingthe crisis that erupted there in June of 1967, and that had been simmering for at least19 years before that. The very land where these battles were fought was important toboth of the major religions that participated in the fighting Judaism and Islam as wellas the religion of the superpowers who backed the war to a certain degree, Christianity.The battles were fought in places you may have never heard of, such as the skirmish inthe Jordanian town of al- Samu or in the Sinais Jebel Libni, but Sherman Tanks and MiG -21 airplanes also patrolled the airs and rolled down the streets of Nazareth, Bethlehem,and even the old city of Jerusalem. The historical and religious importance of these sites

affected the fighting, where commanders would forgo or increase attacks based on therelative holiness of the sites. Shots were common around the outskirts of Jersusalem,for instance, but Israeli soldiers even removed the magazines from their Uzis while nearparticularly holy sites for fear of damaging them. i

More important, however, was the land and territory that had a particular role inthe economic and political functioning of the countries involved. The War of 1967 wasfought on 3 different fronts, and spanned vastly different environments and

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geographies. Because of this, the fighting and the policies of the governments wereaffected based on their goals and the geography they faced. Like all good armies, bothsides understood that certain areas would be more difficult to conquer, or required adifferent style of fighting. It is no coincidence that in the greatest Military treatise of alltime, The Art of War, by Sun Tzu, geography is the primary focus of the first and most

famous chapter. Indeed, the major reason that the Israelis won was not because ofgreater numbers, or indeed because they were better trained, but rather because theyunderstood where to spend their money before the war and how to best utilize theirresources during the war in terms of the geography they faced, particularly the Sinaipeninsula. Furthermore, one of the immediate causes of the War was the closing of theStraits of Tiran, a narrow passageway at the entrance of the Red Sea. The 1949Armistice Agreements, following the first Arab-Israeli War (the 1967 War was the third),determined that the Straits of Tiran were international waters, and that the closing ofthem could be seen as an act of War. ii Listed below are some of the major geographical

features that played a prominent role in the lead up and duration of the Six Day War.The Straits of Tiran: The Straits of Tiran are located at the passageway from the RedSea into the Gulf of Aqaba. The strait is incredibly narrow, averaging about eight mileswide, and can be blockaded relatively easily by Egypt from Sharm-al Sheikh. The straitsare Jo rdans only access to ocean shipping, through the port of Aqaba, and alsorepresent Israels only access to the Indian Ocean and ports east through the Indianocean. Sharm-al Sheikh is located on the western side of the straits; it is here that theEgyptians blockaded the Straits during the lead up to the 1967 War. Usage of the Straitsby the Israelis is debatable some historians claim that the port was rarely, if ever, usedand that the Israelis preferred to use their seaports on the Meditterranean rather thanthe smaller port of Eilat. However, records indicate that probably up to 500 ships dockedin the port of Eilat during the two years immediately preceding the war, though that isadmittedly but a small portion of the cargo ships which docked at Israeli controlled portsduring that time period. Nevertheless, this area was extremely contentious, and it wasthe blockade of these straits (as well as the expulsion of United Nations EmergencyForces by Nasser) that were the immediate Catalysts for the Six Days War.

The Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal: The gulf of Suez is located between Egyptian

mainland and the Sinai peninsula, and at its northern mouth it transforms into thefamous Suez Canal. The Suez Canal was prominent in the eponymous SuezCrisis/Second Arab-Israeli War of 1956, but was less relevant in the 1967 war. TheIsraelis stopped short of seizing the canal in 1967, much to the chagrin of some foreignleaders. The reasoning behind this was to prevent themselves from appearing as animperial power, and of categorizing the 1967 war as an expansionist war. Thenationalization of the Suez in 1956 led to Gamal Abdel Nassers fame and glorythroughout the Arab World; his expulsion of the French from his territory was viewed as

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one of the first Arab countries to break free from the shackles of imperialist colonialism.Nasser was revered and loved for his actions; it is possible that he believed himself farmore powerful than he was because of the great success of the 1956 war and thecapture of the Suez. In 1967, Nasser also renewed the prohibition of Israeli shipping intothe canal, largely a symbolic move but one which angered many Israeli politicians.

Sinai Peninsula: The Sinai Peninsula is a triangular shaped landmass, now owned byEgypt that spans the gap between Africa and Asia. It has long been a particularlycontentious region, due to its geopolitical significance: he who owns the Sinai owns theSuez Canal and thus the premier shipping route between Europe, Africa, and Asia. Thegeography of the Sinai is almost entirely desert, though there are numerous townsstrewn about the peninsula the total modern population is less than 500,000 people.However, it is also the site of Mount Sinai, one of the holiest sites of all of the Abrahamicreligions: where God gave the Ten Commandments to Moses. Indeed, there is both amosque and a Greek Orthodox Church located on the summit of Sinai. Because Sinai islargely desert, ground forces were far less relevant than Air Force Dominance. It wasthis fact that led to the success of Operation Focus on the first day of the war by theIsraeli Air Force.

Golan Heights: The Golan Heights is a large rocky plateau located in the Anti-Lebanonmountains in modern day Syria. Though internationally recognized as Syrian territory,the Israelis have occupied and administered the heights since their conquest in the SixDays War. The Heights contain landmarks such as Mount Hermon, the Yarmuk River, aswell as bordering the Sea of Gallilee in the southeast. The plateau is steeper and rockier

in the north, however, the south is far from level and presented a problem to invadingforces during the first phases of the Six Days War. The Golan Heights are extremelyfertile as they compose part of a volcanic plateau, as well as being a rich source of waterfrom the Jordan River: approximately fifteen percent of modern day Israelis drink fromwater found in the Golan Heights.

West Bank: The West Bank is one of the most famous and contentious areas in theMiddle East. Originally given to the Palestinian state in the two state solution of 1948,King Abdullah of Jordan (King Husseins father) annexed the West Bank in a moverecognized and accepted by the UK and the United Nations. It is located in the East ofIsrael, known as the West Bank because of its location relative to Jordan. The majorityof Palestinians reside in the West Bank, making it a particularly important region forensuring peace in the Middle East. The West Bank was conquered, along with the GazaStrip, Sinai Peninsula, and the Golan Heights during the 1967 war. Recent settlements inthe West Bank are considered illegal under the terms of the 1949 Armistice whichestablished The Green Line, likewise, controlling the West Bank would have been seenas impinging on the sovereignty of Jordan in 1967.

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Gaza Strip: The Gaza Strip is a narrow strip of land bordering Egpyts Sinai Peninsulaand Israel. It is approximately 25 miles long and around 5 miles wide. It is one of themost densely populated areas in the Middle East, containing nearly 2 million people inonly 125 square miles. The strip is not particularly fertile; it is subject to drought andfamine in particularly dry years. The Strip was conquered by the Israelis in the war; and

it was not until the Oslo Peace Accords of 1993 that plans were finally made for Israelievacuation of the strip, leaving it in control of the Palestinians. This will be one of themore contentious areas during peace talks.

History:

It is perhaps a fools errand to determine how far back in history we should travelin order to better understand the Six Days War. The consensus is that one must at leasthave some knowledge of the first two Arab-Israeli Wars, as well as the sporadic crisiswhich occupied the years between 1948 and 1967. Furthermore, it is beneficial to

understand the genesis of the state of Israel, which is where we will start.One of the most confusing aspects of the Middle East is the fact that Jewish

tradition does not clearly distinguish between religious, ethnic, political, or racialidentity. iii Because of this, it is difficult at times to determine what exactly wasresponsible for the genesis of the so called Zionist movement. The fact was that Jewsfelt a strong tie to the homeland, particularly the land of Canaan, or the traditional termof Eretz Yisrael. The bible makes numerous references to a final home for the Jews, aland of milk and honey where troubles will be forgotten and their suffering will berewarded with their ancestral home. In modern times this land became a symbol ofrefuge from the wrongs that had been inflicted on them. The movement of Zionism inthe late 20 th century was the first to name the exact region where they wanted toestablish their country: in the Holy Land, the land of Palestine. The Zionist movementwas hastened by the horrors of the Holocaust Jews would not truly be safe fromdestruction until they had their own land which they could defend. The murder of sixmillion of their own hung heavily on the minds of Jews during the following Arab-Israeliwars, who believed they were battling for their very existence as a people that may verywell be swept off the earth, as was almost accomplished a few years before.

The Zionist movement gained steam in the 20th

Century, and was viewedbeneficially by the Western Powers, the United Kingdom and the United States,specifically after the discovery of the concentration camps by victorious allied forcestowards the end of World War II. In 1923, the British Mandate of Palestine haddetermined that their should be a home for the Jews in Palestine, but stressed that themovement of Jews into greater Israel should not disrupt the Palestinian way of life. ManyJews moved to Palestine, but a national identity and government were not created until1948. In 1948, Britain proposed the division of the Holy Land as shown in Figure 6

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above, an alternative to the British Mandate of Palestine. It was a two state solutiondetermined by borders known as the Green Line. A civil war broke out between thePalestinians and Israelis, and, in May of 1948, Jewish leader David Ben-Gurion declaredIndependence. The fighting involved from a Civil War into a war between two sovereignstates when the Arab forces invaded Palestine(according to the United Nations) in what

would become known as the First Arab-Israeli War.iv

The monikers bestowed on this war by the belligerents is particularly telling: the

Arabs refer to it as The Catastrophe whereas the Israelis refer to it as either The Warof Independence or the War of Liberation. The war wa s considerably more back andforth than the following Wars: on the eve of Israeli independence, the joint forces ofEgypt, Syria, Transjordan (modern day Jordan), Lebanon, and Iraq all invaded Israel. Atthe outset, the Jews were beaten back and it seemed that their sovereign state would beone of the shortest lived in history. The Egyptians gained some territory in the Negev inthe south, and the Jordanians conquered all of Jerusalem conquered all of the Old City.As the fighting became more and more vicious with casualties mounting, the UnitedNations pushed for an immediate four week truce. Skirmishes occurred during this time,but largely the front was quiet. v The four week break benefitted the Israelis far more, asthey spent their time reorganizing militarily while the volatile alliance between the Arabstates caused bickering over the spoils of war and a general loss of focus. vi After thetruce, Israelis had managed to rally their forces and began beating back the Arab forces:though they were vastly outnumbered, their weapons from the United States and otherWestern powers were far superior to the Arabs. Another truce was imposed; this trucewas shorter lived and in August the Jews launched a ferocious assault, capturing themajor port of Haifa and prompting a massive Arab exodus. At this point, it was clear thatthe Jews had won the war; peace talks commenced and ended with the 1949 ArmisticeAgreements.

The 1949 Agreements were a point of contention during the 1967 war; both sidesinterpreted the agreements and the promises made therein in radically different ways.The agreements were particular in that Israel essentially signed four different peacetreaties, relating to its four neighbors: Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria. Between Egyptand Israel, there are two major points that were extremely relevant during the 1967

war: the creation of a small strip of land near the Mediterranean controlled by theEgyptians known as the Gaza Strip, and the fact that the armistice lines were notconsidered a political or territorial boundary. This meant that troops could pass overthese lines without technically violating the peace agreement: this hole in the agreementin part led to the 1967 war. The agreement with Lebanon was perhaps the most simpleand part of the reason why Lebanon played little part in the 1967 war. The Israelisagreed to withdraw from the Lebanese villages that they had occupied, and both sidesagreed that they would honor the Green Lines demarcations as set two years before by

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the United Nations plan. The agreement with Jordan concerned itself largely withterritory trading: the Jordanian forces maintained their presence in Eastern Jerusalem,including the Old City, as well as taking over positions in the West Bank which hadpreviously been occupied by allied Iraqi troops. In exchange, the Israelis received theWadi Area and the Little Triangle, and secured the removal of Jordanian troops from the

Plains of Sharon. The agreement with Syria was simply for Syria to withdraw from theoccupied territories, and return to the boundaries set before the war. Persistent terroristactivity and shots were fired for the following five years after this, but forces werelargely quiet until the second Arab-Israeli War in 1956, also known as the Suez Crisis.

The 1956 Arab-Israeli were is one of the most curious in history in that both theIsraelis and Arabs claim to have won the war; this claim is not at all far-fetched. Themilitary victory surely was enacted by the Israelis, who demonstrated their ability topush across the entire Sinai peninsula whilst barely enduring a dent in their defenses.On the side of the Egyptians, the crisis led to the rise of one of the most figures inmodern Middle Eastern history: President Gamal Abdel Nasser. His actions in this war ledto his meteoric rise to prominence as a champion of Arabs rights in an imperialist world.The war started with an incredibly bold move by the Egyptian president: he decided tonationalize the Suez Canal, a zone previously occupied and administered by the Frenchand British. This led the French and British to sign new agreements with Israel,strengthening Israels position in the region.

In October of 1956, directed by Moshe Dayan (later the defense minister andprimary commander of Israeli forces in 1967) invaded the Sinai Peninsula in a

devastating combination Air strike and ground raid.vii

British and French forces invadedthe Canal Zone, creating a pincer movement that essentially doomed the Egyptians to acatastrophic failure. These actions were internationally condemned by the UnitedNations, and in November a cease-fire was signed. Though Israel had captured Sharm-alSheikh, the Gaza Strip and the Suez Canal, they retreated for fear of internationalretribution. Though Egypt was dominated militarily, Nasser convinced his people that itwas his leadership that caused the Israeli forces to retreat, and that they were fighting arighteous war against Western Colonialism. By the end of the war, Nasser was one ofthe most popular figures in the region, beloved by his people and just self-delusional

enough to believe that he really had a direct role in how the second Arab-Israeli warended. The United Nations also permanently played their Emergency Forces (UNEF) inthe Sinai Peninsula and in ports around Egypt as a reaction to the events of the SuezCrisis.

In 1960, war nearly broke out again in the Sinai Peninsula in what was known asthe Rotem Crisis. This was prompted by an increase in Syria-Israeli tensions, tensionswhich would bubble over in the year immediately preceding the 1967 War. In a pattern

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imitated over and over, Moshe Dayans forces would cross the border into Syria in anarmored tractor, drawing enemy fire from the Syrians: they would then use this as anexcuse to attack in vicious retribution. Moshe Dayan himself later admitted thatapproximately 80% of the skirmishes in the Golan Heights (the border between Syriaand Israel) were the fault of the Israelis. viii Egypt began to believe that these repeated

strikes against Syria would soon boil over into all out war, and they amassed theirtroops along the Sinai/Israel border. Israel, not expecting war on the southern front,was caught unawares and nearly retaliated out of primal fear. However, Israelis perhapsshould have realized that attacks on the North could spark tensions in the South: Egyptand Syria formed the United Arab Republic in 1958, a political union of the twocountries. What was most important regarding the Crisis, however, were the lessonsthat both countries drew from the Crisis: Israel believed that the Egyptians would bemore cautious in massing their troops, because they knew how close they had come towar. Egypt, on the other hand, viewed the Rotem Crisis as a strategic success, as they

now knew they could mass their troops in the Sinai Peninsula without any fear ofretribution due to Israels newfound policy of deterrence. These miscalculations andmisunderstandings would set the stage for the war that broke out less than a decadelater.

Context:

The Six Day War commenced when Israel launched a surprise air strike againstthe Egyptians in the wee hours of June 5 th , 1967. The Israelis clearly struck first,however, there is furious debate over whether or not the air strike was a preemptive

strike or a response to Egyptian and Syrian aggression. Those who believe that theIsraeli attack was defensible point to numerous actions taken by Egypt and Syria againstIsrael in the months leading up to the June 1967 war. These actions were numerousstrikes by the PLO and al-fatah against northern Israeli settlements, the expulsion ofUNEF forces from Egypt, the blockade of the Straits of Tiran and the massing of Egyptianforces along the Sinai/Israeli border. Furthermore, the decision of Jordan to join the warwas largely due to the Israeli initiated fighting in the village of al-Samu in lateNovember, 1966.

Skirmishes between the Syrians of the Golan Heights and the Israelis started in1948 and continued until 1967, escalating in the period immediately before fightingbroke out in June of 1967. The fact that skirmishes had essentially been a fact of life forNorthern Citizens meant that these attacks may not have had a direct effect onlaunching Operation Focus (Israelis first strike), but they most certainly effecteddecision making during the war regarding the seizure of the Golan Heights on the latterdays of the war. As seen earlier, Israeli was in fact responsible for a large amount of theskirmishes in the Golan region. Because of this, Syrian aggression was not considered a

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legitimate reason to go to war against any of the surrounding Arab States. Instead,Israel turned against Jordan when increased Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)(specifically the al-Fatah faction) left dozens of citizens dead; the deaths were largelythe result of mine attacks. ix In a disproportionate and surprising response, Israellaunched an attack against the town of al-Samu in the West Bank. Surprising because,

for the three years preceeding the attack King Hussein had been meeting with foreignminister Golda Meir and deputy Prime Minister Abban Eban regarding continued peacebetween the two countries. However, on the fateful night of November 11 th , 3 Israelipolice officers were killed and six more were wounded when they drove over a mineplanted by Fatah. Hussein, fearing retribution, immediately sent a letter of condolence tothe Prime Minister in Tel Aviv through the American Embassy. However, in a cruel twistof fate, Barbour, the ambassador at the embassy in Tel Aviv did not believe the messageto be urgent and failed to forward it to Prime Minister Levi Eshkol in time. x The Israelis,falsely believing Hussein to be in collusion with the terrorists, struck back against the

village of al-Samu.xi

Eskhol was heavily criticized by the international community forstriking against Jordan instead of against Syria, the real seat of PLO power. Jordanfought vigorously against the Israelis largely because of this raid, believing that theIsraelis could not be trusted, and instead King Hussein turned to the Egyptians when thewar came. First, however, he jabbed at Nasser, claiming that the Egyptian president wascontent to hide behind UNEFs skirt. xii This particularly barbed comment may have ledto one of the most inflammatory actions in the lead up to the war.

The expulsion of UNEF forces from the Sinai Peninsula (they were placed thereafter the 1956 Suez Crisis) sent a clear message to Israel that another war wasimminent. Nasser had received false reports from Premier Kosygin of the Soviet Unionthat the Israelis were massing on the border; Nasser responded in kind, escalating aphantom war into a real conflict. On May 16 th of 1967, less than half a year after the al-Samu incident, Nasser drove into the Sinai peninsula, on the way expelling the UNEFforces from the Peninsula. The UNEF forces had previously rendered the Sinai essentiallya demilitarized zone, a remilitarization struck the Israelis as nearly an act of war. Theywere particularly concerned because of the 1960 crisis, they believed the Egypt wouldnot have massed on the border if they were not going to wage war. Miscommunicationand misinterpretation was the name of the game, both the Arab States and the Israelis

falsely believing that a war was unavoidable. In less than three days, Egyptian forcesrolled through the Sinai, expelling UNEF forces and seizing the port of Sharm al-Sheikh.The UNEF forces asked to be stationed in Israeli, Israel, for reasons still unknown deniedthem entrance.

Once Egyptian forces seized the port of Sharm al-Sheikh, they made the criticaldecision of closing the port of Aqaba to Israeli traffic. The port of Aqaba was Israels onlyaccess to the Indian ocean, and, according to the fateful 1949 Armistice agreements,

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Israel viewed the closing of the Straits of Tiran as an act of war, and that it gave themclearance to return in kind. They believed themselves to be backed into a corner, andnow they had the justification for the third Arab-Israeli War. UNEF forces were expelled,forces were massing at their border, al-Fatah had killed their citizens: they believed theywere completely justified in bring war to the Arabs. The only question was when to bring

it to them. A 3 week period known as The Waiting between Egyptian occupation of theSinai and the start of the June 1967 War passed; in which a National Unity Governmentwas formed and Moshe Dayan was given reign over the entire assembled Israeli forces.On June 4 th , a cabinet meeting, jointly led by Dayan and Eshkol, made the decision to goto war. The next day, the Israeli air-force launched Operation Focus, the first militarymove in the Six Day War.

Summary of the War:

At 7:10 in the morning, June 5 th , 1967, sixteen Magister Fouga jets took off from

an airfield located in the Jewish airfield of Hatzor, signaling the start of Operation Focus,the brainchild of Chief of Operations Ezer Weizman. xiii They turned their radios tofrequencies normally used by Mystere and Miraje jets, jets which the Egyptians knewperformed regular patrol missions near the Sinai Peninsula. These jets flew in regularpatrol patterns, but they were merely a decoy: soon after, more than 175 other aircraft,Mirages and Mystere and Ouragan Bombers took off from the same airfield, flyingincredibly low to avoid detection by Egyptian radar sites. The planes split, some headingoff to the Mediterranean before banking back towards the assembled Arab Forces whilethe others sped off towards targets deeper into Egypts interior.

They were not, however, completely undetected. Jordans rather facility at Ajlun,supplied by Britain, was far more sophisticated than any of Egypts rather detectionsites. At around 8:15 A.M, a mere hour after the Israeli jets took off, the radar screen at

Ajlun exploded into a terrifying assortment of dots and specks, each representing anIsraeli fighter jet bearing down on the Sinai peninsula. The radar operator relayed thecode word for war to command central in Amman, where General Riyad radioed theinformation to Defense Minister Shams Badran. However, in a bungling of epicproportions, the previous day the Egyptians had changed radio frequency withoutalerting the Jordanians. The planes flew onward, and around 9:00A.M Egyptian time theIsraeli planes reached their targets, turning belly up and rising to the altitude of 9,000feet. From there, the jets dove downward, bombing on their first run and returning 2 to3 times in order to strafe the scrambling pilots. The jets were completely exposed: thenational defense budget was running low and they did not believe that they could affordAirport hangars. This was perhaps the greatest tactical blunder of the entire war airplanes are great in the sky, fearsome eagles, but on the ground they were theproverbial sitting ducks. The bombs, specially made by the French, drove themselves

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into the pavement and created enormous holes in the airways that rendered themunusable. The Egyptians were caught completely off guard sixteen MiGs weredestroyed within the first three minutes of combat. Forty five minutes later, at 9:45 A.M,at least six major airways in the Sinai Peninsula were already destroyed, stranding thoseplanes still intact on the runway for the duration of the war. As time passed, the second

wave of Israeli fighters reached targets West of the Suez Canal and began bombing theirtargets, exceeding expected kill ratios by 100%. xiv The strike was a success of epicproportions: Egypt started the morning with 420 functional aircraft and ended with only134, essentially rendering the air force irrelevant for the duration of the war.

Egypt, however, instead of facing facts began broadcasting to their citizens thatthey were in fact victorious. Radio Cairo broadcast the message that With an aerialstrike against Cairo and across the UAR, Israel began its attack today at 9:00. Ourp lanes scrambled and held off the attack. xv They claimed that 86 Israeli aircraft weredestroyed while only 2 Egyptian pilots were killed. Though they suffered heavy losses inreality, Nasser still believed that the opening of hostilities was good news that theEgyptians still had a chance to mount a reaction and destroy the Zionist state. This wasbecause he himself was not informed of the actual situation: Amer, the General incommand of Egyptian forces, was unreachable and would not explain what hadhappened. Those around him who knew what had transpired feared to tell him becauseof this, the leader believed that the Egyptians had the upper hand until at least the earlyafternoon.

A mere hour after the final Israeli fighter jets had struck their intended targets,

the first Ugdah, under the command of General Tal, and composed of 250 tanks, 50guns, and a paratrooper brigade mobilized and headed towards the Egyptian forcesassembled in the Sinai. Egyptian intelligence believed that the tanks rolling forward wastheir own, and the Israelis were able to roll through the forces front lines without muchresistance. xvi The greatest advantage that the Israelis enjoyed, however, was the factthat their tanks were far more modern than the Egyptians Centurions and Pattons asopposed to recycled Shermans. Furthermore, Generals in the Egyptian army werelargely based on politicking whereas the Israelis placed a high value on experience in the1948 and 1956 wars, meaning their armies were extremely mobile and well

commanded. What began as a battle turned into a rout, as 2,000 Egyptians were killedand their forces rolled back deeper into the Sinai to Mitla Pass, a narrow road whichrepresented essentially the only way to the Suez Canal and to further into Egyptianterritory. The pass changed hand several times until the Israelis, under the leadership ofAriel Sharon, broke through in nearly pitch darkness at 10:00 in the evening. They werepoised to strike at dawn, further into the Sinai, when Sharon and Tal received the newsthat a new front had opened up along the Jordanian border. Here, the dominance of theIsraeli Air Force would be less relevant in vicious, pitched battle.

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Before the battle on June 5 th , it was unknown to what degree the Jordanians wouldsupport the Egyptians, and how vigorously they would fight the Israelis. At 11:15 A.M onDay 1 of the Six Day War, that question was answered: Howitzers launched nearly 6,000shells towards West Jerusalem, the area owned and occupied by the Israelis. This waspretext for the Israelis to attack the Air Forces of Amman and and Aljun; they were

neutralized with stunning efficiency in less than 9 minutes. From there on, Battle movedto the narrow streets of Jerusalem, around some of the holiest sites to 3 of the worldslargest religions. They were forced with the decision of whether or not to use heavyartillery in some of the holiest sites of the Abrahamic religions. After four hours offighting, the Israelis had suffered heavy losses but managed to navigate through thestone streets to the border of the Old City. No Israeli had set foot in the Old City, site oftheir holiest shrine, the Western Wall, since 1948. The question of whether or not toseize the Old City, and thus start to capture territory not under Israeli control before thewar, dominated the Israeli war cabinets discussion for the next twenty four hours.

The Western Bank of Israel is exceedingly mountainous, not at all suited to tankwarfare. Furthermore, so many holy sites were contained in a relatively small area thatair support was limited to strafing and tactical strikes; no widespread bombing was seenon the Western front. This favored the Jordanians though their air force was destroyed,they still possessed the superior defensive position and a well-trained military. Indeed,the Jordanians were heavily praised by their Israeli opponents by the end of the war fortheir spirit and tactics. However, Jordan may never have attacked Israel had Amer notsent a message to Hussein on the first day, urging him to escalate the war and create averitable second front as 75% of Israelis air force and ground forces had beendestroyed. xvii This, of course, was a lie, but Jordan sent their 11 infantry brigades andthe Iraqi expeditionary forces to defend the West Bank, and to engage Israeli forces inall out war. Jordanian forces, in fact, were the first to cross the 1949 Armistice Lines andtook Government House, the UN headquarters in Jerusalem. The Israelis responded,sending Uzi Narkiss to the Government House, where, after a fierce but brief battleensued, ending when the Jordanians fled. In the morning of the second day, the Israelislaunched an offensive to seize the village of Sur Baher, unremarkable except for the factthat control of the Sur Baher signified control of the road from Jerusalem to Bethlehemand Hebron. Jordanian forces requested backup, but the remaining Israeli air force

strafed all columns advancing towards the mountainous regions, far from the holy sites,and no reinforcements reached Jerusalem. Thus, at the end of the first day of fightingthe Jordanians, and faced two large tasks: clearing the Jordanians from the rest of theWest Bank, and storming and taking the Old City if they were given permission bydefense minister Dayan.

Meanwhile, Syr ias air force had been destroyed by sorties by the IAF to the basesof Dmair, Damascus, Saiqal, Marj Rial and T- 4, and Iraqs air force was also struck at H -

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3. xviii As with the Jordanians, shelling of the Golan started from Kibbutz settlements inthe North of Israel. Around 2:30, as shelling intensified, the first attempts at Diplomacyby Washington and Moscow were attempted. However, as both sides believed that theystill had a chance at striking a decisive victory in the war, neither side was willing toaccept a cease-fire. The Syrian front would remain quiet, in fact, for the first three days

of the war; Syria continued to rain artillery fire onto northern Israeli villages with little tono reply.

The dawn of the second day brought a sobering realization to the Egyptians theirforces had been routed, and another arm of the Israeli force was attempting to dividetheir force into two, leaving the forces of General Tal and Ariel Sharon to pick off theremaining Egyptians in a so called turkey shoot. During the early morning hours of thesecond day, General Sharon realized that the Egyptians, believing the sand dunesbetween the major cities of Rafah and Abu Agheila were impassable, had decided not tostation any soldiers there. As luck had it, the IAF had realized during the 1956 SuezCrisis that it was indeed possible to cross the Wadi dunes if tires were slightly deflatedand one proceeded cautiously. General Yoffe was tasked with the duty of bringing a thirdof the Israeli force through these dunes and around the rear, surprising reinforcementson their way to Rafah and Abu Agheila. The Israelis routed the reinforcements in more ofa massacre than a battle, and the cities of Rafah and Abu Agheila fell by nightfall. Thecities passed into Israeli control; the Israelis now had control of the Central Sinai andfrom there could mount their attacks into the rest of the Peninsula. Indeed, at this point,the battle for the Sinai was essentially over Commander Amer cracked under thepressure, ordering the full retreat of all forces to areas west of the Canal a day later,and 96 hours after the war in the Sinai begin it was functionally over. xix A separatemission was launched to topple Sharm al-Sheikh, however, no battle was fought thedefenders had already fled. The battle for the Sinai officially ended on the fourth day,but the third and fourth days were almost exclusively devoted to full retreat by theEgyptians with Israeli forces trailing behind, occasionally pestering the forces. By thetime the final Egyptian soldier had crossed the Suez Canal on the fourth day, 11,500Egyptian soldiers were killed at almost 50,000 were injured. The Israeli losses weresignificantly less 275 soldiers killed, and 800 were wounded. xx The Israelis had won theSouthern front: aside from the decision of whether or not to seize the canal, the Israeli

government could now deal with the other fronts: the Eastern front with Jordan, and theas of yet unmolested northern front, the Golan Heights and Syria.

The second day of f ighting in Jordan was known as The Battle for Jerusalem, andby the end of it Israelis had finally taken control of their holiest shrine, a shrine noIsraeli had seen in 19 years. Gurs forces started the festivities by taking control of theheavily defended Police School, during which his paratroopers crossed the MandelbaumGate, the division between East and West Jerusalem. Gurs forces then moved towards

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Ammunition Hill, the aptly named high ground that witnessed one of the bloodiestbattles of the entire Six Day War; 36 Israeli soldiers were killed as well as 76 Jordaniansoldiers. Eventually, however, the superior weaponry and numbers overwhelmed theoutgunned, smaller Jordanian force and the Israelis took Ammunition Hill. Gurs otherbattalions fough t a significantly less bloody fight near the American Colony, and they

eventually reached the walls of Old Jerusalem. However, suppressive fire from VictoriaHill, a ridge overlooking Jerusalem from the East, meant that they could not yet exposethemselves and capture the Old City. xxi They would have to wait until morning of thenext day in order to ensure paratrooper support that would allow them to take the city.

At 8:30 the next morning, paratroopers reached the Old City, and by the light ofday the Israeli forces launched a three-pronged assault to seize the Old City. Thedecision of whether or not to take the city was difficult to make eventually, the thoughtof finally controlling the holiest shrine, and to take full control of a city they intended tomake their city overwhelmed the Israeli cabinet. This decision was not an easy one, asthey were crossing the 1949 Armistice Lines and the battle could be viewed asimperialistic, one country greedily invading a sovereign nation merely to capture acountry holy to all Abrahamic religions, not merely Judaism. Two prongs attackedAugust Victoria hill from Mount Scopus and the valley below it, while forces personallyled by Gur broke through St. Stephens gate. August Victoria hill was taken by surpriseby su ch a bold offensive, and they fell at approximately the same time that Gurshalftracks bursted into the inner sanctuary of Jerusalem. Gur made a beeline to theWestern Wall, and radioed his commanders in what would become a famous message:

The Temple Mount is in our hands. The fighting in the other parts of the West Bank,particularly in Judea and Samaria, simmered down as Israeli air force arrived from thecompleted mission in Egypt and beat back the Arab League forces. xxii By 8 P.M on thethird day, June 7 th , 1967, a U.N cease-fire was reached between Israel and Jordan thatwould signal the end of fighting on the Eastern Front. The final three days of the Six DayWar were almost entirely fought in the Golan Heights.

Curiously enough, Syria was perhaps the Arab country most responsible for theoutbreak of the Six Day War. Though the immediate cause was the blockading of theStraits of Tiran and the expulsion of UNEF forces, among other actions by Egypt, Israel

probably would not have gone to war had it not been in a state of high tension due toSyrian terrorist attacks along its borders. This is not to say that this was a reasonablestate of mind to be in; the Israelis were in fact provoking the Syrians to strike back, andthe terrorist attacks could logically be justified as merely retaliatory. However, theSyrians were always engaged in inflammatory rhetoric, and once the war started theyshelled the Northern Israeli cities far harder than the perfunctory attacks by Jordan. Onthe second day, two infantry brigades were sent from Syria to attack Kibbutz Tel Dan inthe north, breaking over the Armistice Lines of 1948. xxiii The Israelis did not respond,

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largely because their forces were already occupied in Jordan and in Egypt. However, onthe fourth day, the Sinai and West Bank were essentially taken care of and the Israelisturned their attentions toward Syria.

As those offensives in the Sinai and the West Bank wound down, Israeli leadersstarted to support an offensive against Syria as punishment for the state that, in theirmind, had far more to do with the outbreak of war than Jordan did. Finally, the UnitedStates entered the fray when the US National Security Adviser contacted Abba Eban,asking him why he had yet to strike against Syria when they were the most belligerentand most irresponsible Arab state. xxiv With what essentially amounted to permissionfrom the dominant world power, the Israelis started an intense shelling in order to drivethe Syrians from the Golan Heights. Again, the Israelis demonstrated their militarycapability and the Syrians demonstrated their shocking inability to understand that theIsraelis would try to surprise them the major attacking force struck in the North. Thiswas surprising to the Syrians as the north was most advantageous to the defenders, asit was the most mountainous because of this, it was extremely lightly fortified. Thenorthern route was the largest, though it was not the only route, as four other attackingforces, each composed of at least two brigades, struck at different points on the GolanHeights all along different mountainous roads.

The fighting favored the defenders, as the narrow roads presented excellenttargets for the Syrian defense positions. xxv Indeed, in one brigade of 800 soldiersattacking the north (p roceeding towards the town of Qala), only four soldiers survivedwithout injury; the other 796 were killed or seriously injured. xxvi The fighting was fiercest

near the town of Qala, but after 5 and a half hours they made headway and overtookthe bunkers at the crest of the Golan Heights. Three out of the other four 2-brigadeforces made headway; another was beaten back across the border in one of the fewbattles won by the Arab forces during the entire war. However, most of the Syrian forcesfell within a matter of hours largely because the Syrian officers treated their soldierspoorly they did not wish to fight for commanders they did not respect, and many ofthose selfsame commanders fled without informing their soldiers where they had gone.Furthermore, after the Israelis came into close contact with the Syrians, their guns werefar better equipped to the situation. Close combat in the Golan Heights was expansive,

and the Uzi, a light submachine gun, was far better equipped than the AK-47, classifiedas a heavy assault rifle. By the night of June 9 th , eight of ten Israeli brigades hadreached the Golan Plateau, where they could be reinforced and replenished.

In fact, by June 10 th most of the fighting in the Golan Heights had already beenfinished. Two brigades joined in a pincer movement, however, when the two brigadescame together at the end of their maneuvering, neither one of them had fired a singleshot. As in the Sinai, the Syrians had realized that they would probably be destroyed

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and had instead fled deeper into the Golan. Indeed, Damascus Radio broadcasted thatthe crucial city Quenitra had fallen before Israeli forces had even reached the city. xxvii Soldiers heard this on their own radios, and morale fell drastically. It is surmised thatSyria broadcast this in an attempt to hasten a UN cease-fire before they were utterlydestroyed. On June 10 th , the Israelis stopped moving forward according to pre-arranged

cease-fire lines; the next day, they signed a cease-fire. The Six Day War had ended. Aftermath:

The war, according to anyones reckoning, was a great success for Israel. Theyseized the Golan Heights, parts of the West Bank including East Jerusalem, the GazaStrip and the Golan Heights. Aside from the Sinai Peninsula, the Israelis retainedpossession of all conquered territory indefinitely after the conclusion of the war. Partlybecause of their lack of willingness to give back these territories, during the KhartoumArab Summit, the Arab League steadfastly denied negotiation with Israel as a legitimate

state. During this summit, the Arabs issued a resolution which became famous for itsdeclaration of the 3 nos: that is, no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, nonegotiations with Israel. These policy of Arab rejectionism directly led to the Yom KippurWar of 1973, a failed attempt by the Joint Arab States to reclaim the area conqueredand controlled by Israel in 1967.

However, effects of the war were seen in more than just the diplomatic realm.During fighting in the West Bank, nearly 300,000 Palestinians fled in fear from Israelibullets to the state of Jordan, where the refugee problem contributed to growing unrestin the country with regards to King Hussein. xxviii Furthermore, there was an immenseloss of life during the conflict: between 776 and 983 Israeli soldiers were killed, withanother 4,517 wounded. The Arab states suffered far greater losses, as large amounts ofthem were gunned down by Israeli tanks even as they attempted to retreat or hadalready clearly lost the battle. Egypt alone suffered between 10,000 and 15,000 killed,the large discrepancy is the result of the fact that during the Egyptian retreatapproximately 5,000 soldiers went missing or fled their posts. It is assumed thatthousands of them died of dehydration in the Sinai desert. However, a far more sinisterexplanation has been put forward by numerous corroborating sources: that the Israelisoldiers murdered captured Egyptians after forcing them to dig their own graves. xxix Thistheory is lent some weight by the fact that a widely distributed cable was sent bycommander Moshe Dayan on the third day of the Six Day War: it stated that no EgyptianPOWs were to be mistreated or killed, and that any soldier found transgressing thisorder would be court-martialed. The fact that this widely understood humanitarian policyhad to be reissued and explained suggests that there was some problem with followingit. These supposed mistreatments are partially the reason that Egypt refused tonegotiate with the state of Israel.

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Overall, the war did little to settle any conflicts between states and in fact ensuredconflict for years to come. The Yom Kippur war of 1973 is viewed as a direct result ofthis war, and the conquered territories controlled by Israel are the main basis of theongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Only in 2005 did Israel withdraw from the Gaza strip;Israel left the West Bank according to the Oslo Peace Accords in 1978, but re-entered in

recent years. Indeed, Israeli settlements in the West Bank are growing and are perhapsthe most contentious issue in the entirety of the modern Middle East. Indeed, themilitant leader of Hamas, Mahmoud Zahar, claimed in May that the Arab countriesshould have accepted the 1967 borders and that even now there would be peacebetween Palestine and Israel if Israel drew back to said borders. xxx In the words ofhistorian Michael B. Oren, The 1967 war never truly ended. The reverberations of thiswar have been felt for 45 years, and will continue to be felt until there is lasting peace inthe Middle East. Perhaps in your simulation, you can find a way to lasting peace.

Pertinent Questions/Issues and Goals of the Committee:

The War was an overwhelming success for the Israelis, and an abject failure forthe assembled Arab States. The heat on Nasser was so intense that he actually resigned,before rescinding his offer to resign two days later. The Israelis increased their total landarea by approximately 30%, gaining the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, and large partsof the West Bank. However, the war did not have to end this way, with intensebloodshed and with complete failure of the Arab assembled forces. The goal of thiscommittee is to navigate this conflict that has never truly ended, not only the YomKippur War but the conflicts that plague the region to this very day. The simulation

starts essentially after the point of no-return, perhaps the conflict can be postponed butnearly all historians agree that the third Arab-Israeli conflict was an inevitability.

However, what occurred in this war is not an inevitably run this war over againwith slightly different positions, and it may have resulted in the success of the ArabStates, in a cease fire, in the complete destruction of the Israeli state. You are placed insuch a volatile situation that your decisions will intimately effect what occurs before,during, and after the war. The first question you will be faced with, on both sides, iswhether or not you should strike first: the Arabs clearly had the forces necessary toattack, but elected not to due to outside pressure, whereas the Israelis through cautionto the wind and struck first and struck decisively. Will you decide to do the same?Furthermore, throughout the crisis, you will be presented with specific military decisionsthat have vast political ramifications. You will need to be both a General and a diplomat;for these two positions were not as separate as they are today. Your final goal, and themost important, is to rectify the error that these two sides made upon the conclusion ofthe Six Day War: the lack of a peace agreement. The 1948 Armistice Agreementspostponed war for merely 8 years, but it marked a step in an attempt to solve the

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problem diplomatically. You have the benefit of hindsight, yes, but you must think as a1967 Israeli or Egyptian, a Syrian or a Jordanian. Your task is, quite simply, to createconditions that will foster peace in the Middle East. Or, if you are a war mongerer,perhaps you will simply try to make the world burn. I think I knew which you will pick.

Countries Involved:

Israel: Israel, as mentioned before, was a relatively new and reactionary country. Theyare driven by fear for their imminent destruction. They have no allies immediatelysurrounding them, they are at war or on the brink of war with nearly every countrysurrounding them. They are a Parliamentary democracy, the head of which is a PrimeMinister. During the 1967 war the Prime Minister was Levi Eshkol, member of the Mapaiparty. The government was divided i nto terms called Knessets, the 1967 War occurredduring the 5 th Knesset. It is possible to reform the government through a vote of noconfidence in the Prime Minister, at this point the Senators and Cabinet members will

attempt to reassemble and create a new functional government. The night before theSix Day War, the fifth Knesset formed a National Unity Government in light of theimminent war. Your characters are exclusively Senators or Cabinet members; you will allbe free to voice your opinion in our room, cozily named The Pit. Decisions will be madeby a vote or by general consensus (this can be changed during the simulation.)

Egypt: Egypt is the most important country on the side of the Arabs. They have thelargest standing army in the Middle East, though they are less well trained and less wellequipped than the Israelis. They are led by the charismatic president Gamal AbdelNasser, though he holds far more power than a normal President would, and heldincredibly sway over his people. Because Nasser was such a strong figure in hisgovernment, he only listened to the opinion of a few of his most trusted militarycommanders and aides. Because of this, a large amount of his cabinet has been left outin favor of other countries leaders. In this simulation, we will pretend that the jointlyassembled Arab Forces would all be able to meet in the same room and discuss matterswhich would affect each of their countries.

Jordan: Jordan in 1967 was a monarchy, ruled by their commander in chief KingHussein. He enjoyed complete power over the government, though lived in constant fear

of rebellion due to a failed assassination attempt when he was merely 15 years old.Decisions regarding Jordan ultimately go through King Hussein, though he was quitesusceptible to advice from his right hand man and his other military commanders.Jordan is located to the West of Israel and shares the largest border with them, thuspresenting one of the biggest threats to Israeli freedom in the mind of the Israelis. Theirmilitary is accomplished by far smaller than that of the Egyptians and Israelis.

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Syria: Syria is in a curious position in that though they were one of the main aggressorsagainst the Israelis, they only faced a very small faction of the extensive Israeli forcesduring the War. They are particularly important because the Golan Heights areinternationally recognized as being part of Syria, any peace agreement will have to takethis into account. In 1967 the Syrians had a Baathist democracy, headed by rebellious

commanders who ousted the Syrian government in a bloody 1966 coup. In Syria, thePLO enjoyed some amount of refuge: indeed, the vast majority of strikes against theNorthern Settlements of Israel were launched from Syria.

Characters:

Israeli Side

Levi Eshkol Prime Minister (played by James Fahey or Kevin Kirby, the chairs)

Yitzak Rabin Chief of State of Israeli Defense Forces

Moshe Dayan Commander of Southern Forces

Zvi Dinstein Deputy Defense Minister

Ezer Weizman Deputy Chief of Staff of IDF

Abba Eban Israeli Foreign Minister

Colonel Rafi Harlev Chief of Israeli Air Force

Major General Mordechai Hod Leader of Operation Focus

Yigal Allon Deputy Prime Minister

Haim Gvati Minister of Agriculture

Zerach Warhaftig Minister of Religions

Minister of Tourism Moshe Kol

Eliyahu Sasson Minister of Police

Haim-Moshe Shapira Minister of Internal Affairs

Ariel Sharon Major General and head of most powerful armored division

Zvi Dinstein Deputy Minister of Defense

Yosef Burg Minister of Welfare

Yaacov Herzog Special Emissary to Jordan

Egyptian and Arab States side:

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Gamal Abdel Nasser President of Egypt

Hussein bin Talal King of Jordan

Sharif Zaid ibn Shakr Commander in Chief of the Jordanian Military

Ali Sabri Vice President of Egypt

Abdel Hakim Amer Egyptian Military Leader a nd Nassers right hand man

Abdel Hamid Sarraj Head of Syrian security services

Muhammad Sidqi Mahmud Commanding General of the Egyptian Air Force

Anwar al-Qadi Deputy General

Anwar Sadat Prominent Aide, Friend of Nasser, Future president of Egypt

Yasser Arafat Leader of the Palestinian Liberation Organization

Hafez Al Assad Syrian Defense Minister

Salah al-Din al-Bitar--- Head of National Front Government (Baath regime)

Shams Badran Defense Minister of Egypt

Gamal Afifi Air Operations Chief General

Wo r k s C i t ed

Bron, Gabby. Egyptian POWs ordered to dig graves, then shot by the Israeli army. YediothAhronoth 17 Aug. 1995: n. pag. umass.edu. Web. 12 Mar. 2012..

Cohen, Stuart A. Israel, Army and Defense--A Dictionary. Tel-Aviv: n.p., 1976. Print.

Gelber, Yoav. Palestine, 1948: War, Escape and the Emergence of the Palestinian Refugee Problem.N.p.: Sussex Academic Press, 2008. Print.

http://www.sixdaywar.org//southernfront.asp. SixDayWar.org. N.p., n.d. Web. 22 Jan. 2012.

infoplease.com. N.p., n.d. Web. 22 Jan. 2012. .

Israel: A Campaign for the Books. time.com. Time Maga zine, n.d. Web. 22 Jan. 2012..

jihadwatch.org. N.p., n.d. Web. 12 Mar. 2012. .

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Meir, Golda. Statement to the General Assembly. United Nations. mfa.gov. Web. 17 Jan. 2012..

Morris, Benny. 1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War. New York: n.p., 2008. Print.

Oren, Michael B. Six Days of War. N.p.: Oxford University Press, 2002. Print.

Schemann, Serge. Generals Words Shed a New Light on the Golan. New York Times 5 May 1997:n. pag. The New York Times. Web. 21 Jan. 2012.

Segev, Tom. 1967: Israel, the War and the Year that Transformed the Middle East. New York: n.p.,2007. Print.

Zeitman, Solomon. The Jews. Race, Nation or Religion? Philadelphia: Dropsie College Press, 1936.Print.

i Six Days of War, Michael Oren, pg. 174.ii Statement to the General Assembly by Foreign Minister Meir, 1 March 1957 . iii Solomon Zeitlin , The Jews. Race, Nation, or Religion? (Philadelphia: Dropsie College Press, 1936). Citedin, Edelheit and Edelheit, History of Zionism: A Handbook and Dictionary iv Gelber, Yoav Palestine, 1948: war, escape and the emergence of the Palestinian refugee problem . 2nded. Sussex Academic Press, 2006 p. 138.v http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/history/A0856666.htmlvi Morris, Benny. 1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War .vii http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/history/A0856667.htmlviii Schmemann, Serge (1997-05-11). "General's Words Shed a New Light on the Golan" . The New York

Times . Retrieved 2010-05-03.ix Six Days of War, Michael Oren. 2005.x Michael Oren (2005). "The Revelations of 1967". Israel Studies 10 (2): 1 14.xi Israel, Army and defense - A dictionary, Zeev Schiff & Eitan Haber , editors, Zmora, Bitan, Modan, 1976,Tel-Aviv Hebrew xii Six Days of War, Michael Oren. pg. 110xiii Ibid, 171.xiv Ibid, 176.xv Ibid 177.xvi Ibid 180.xvii Ibid.xviii Ibid 195.xix http://www.sixdaywar.org/content/southernfront.aspxx Ibidxxi http://www.sixdaywar.org/content/easternfront.aspxxii Ibid.xxiiixxiii http://www.sixdaywar.org/content/northernfront.aspxxiv 1967: Israel, the War, and the Year that Changed the Middle East. Segev, Tom.xxv http://www.sixdaywar.org/content/northernfront.aspxxvi Ibid.xxvii "A Campaign for the Books" . Time . September 1, 1967.xxviii ^ "Distribution of the Palestinian Population And Jewish Settlers In the West Bank and Gaza Since1967"
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign+Relations/Israels+Foreign+Relations+since+1947/1947-1974/26+Statement+to+the+General+Assembly+by+Foreign+Mi.htmhttp://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign+Relations/Israels+Foreign+Relations+since+1947/1947-1974/26+Statement+to+the+General+Assembly+by+Foreign+Mi.htmhttp://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign+Relations/Israels+Foreign+Relations+since+1947/1947-1974/26+Statement+to+the+General+Assembly+by+Foreign+Mi.htmhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solomon_Zeitlinhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solomon_Zeitlinhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solomon_Zeitlinhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dropsie_Collegehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dropsie_Collegehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dropsie_Collegehttp://www.nytimes.com/1997/05/11/world/general-s-words-shed-a-new-light-on-the-golan.html?pagewanted=1http://www.nytimes.com/1997/05/11/world/general-s-words-shed-a-new-light-on-the-golan.html?pagewanted=1http://www.nytimes.com/1997/05/11/world/general-s-words-shed-a-new-light-on-the-golan.html?pagewanted=1http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zeev_Schiffhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zeev_Schiffhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zeev_Schiffhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eitan_Haberhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eitan_Haberhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eitan_Haberhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hebrewhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hebrewhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hebrewhttp://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,837237,00.htmlhttp://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,837237,00.htmlhttp://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,837237,00.htmlhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Time_%28magazine%29http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Time_%28magazine%29http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Time_%28magazine%29http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six-Day_War#cite_ref-84http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six-Day_War#cite_ref-84http://www.thejerusalemfund.org/www.thejerusalemfund.org/carryover/stats/dist_pop_67.htmlhttp://www.thejerusalemfund.org/www.thejerusalemfund.org/carryover/stats/dist_pop_67.htmlhttp://www.thejerusalemfund.org/www.thejerusalemfund.org/carryover/stats/dist_pop_67.htmlhttp://www.thejerusalemfund.org/www.thejerusalemfund.org/carryover/stats/dist_pop_67.htmlhttp://www.thejerusalemfund.org/www.thejerusalemfund.org/carryover/stats/dist_pop_67.htmlhttp://www.thejerusalemfund.org/www.thejerusalemfund.org/carryover/stats/dist_pop_67.htmlhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six-Day_War#cite_ref-84http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Time_%28magazine%29http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,837237,00.htmlhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hebrewhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eitan_Haberhttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zeev_Schiffhttp://www.nytimes.com/1997/05/11/world/general-s-words-shed-a-new-light-on-the-golan.html?pagewanted=1http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dropsie_Collegehttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solomon_Zeitlinhttp://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign+Relations/Israels+Foreign+Relations+since+1947/1947-1974/26+Statement+to+the+General+Assembly+by+Foreign+Mi.htm

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xxix Bron, Gabby 'Egyptian POWs Ordered to Dig Graves, Then Shot By Israeli Army' , Yedioth Ahronoth ,August 17, 1995xxx http://www.jihadwatch.org/2011/05/hamas-leader-well-accept-1967-borders-but-never-recognize-israel.html
http://www.umassd.edu/specialprograms/mideastaffairs/witness2.htmhttp://www.umassd.edu/specialprograms/mideastaffairs/witness2.htmhttp://www.umassd.edu/specialprograms/mideastaffairs/witness2.htmhttp://www.umassd.edu/specialprograms/mideastaffairs/witness2.htm

The 6 Day War

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