The 2006 IsraelHezbollah War and the Palestinian Connection...Introduction to the July War, and...
Transcript of The 2006 IsraelHezbollah War and the Palestinian Connection...Introduction to the July War, and...
The 2006 IsraelHezbollah War and the Palestinian Connection
By Mark Tynan
Table of Contents
1. Overview of the July War, and Hezbollah’s Objectives,
Successes, Failures, and Post War Influence.
2. Israel’s Perspective, Reaction, and Regional Consequences
3. The Impact of the War on Lebanon
4. Victims of Violence: Palestinian Refugee’s in Lebanon
5. The War, Hamas, and Future Implications.
Chapter I Introduction to the July War, and Hezbollah’s Objectives, Successes,
Failures, and Post‐War Influence.
In July 2006, Israel and Hezbollah fought a 33‐day war that altered both regional
and global perceptions of the Arab‐Israeli conflict. The July War showed Hezbollah’s
regional power, and exploited the ‘erosion of Israeli deterrence."1 Despite being militarily
inferior, Hezbollah fighters successfully resisted Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). By
“marketing itself as victorious,” Hezbollah won “the war of the narratives,” and claimed
legitimacy amongst numerous regional state and non‐state actors.2 For Israel, the war
illustrated its militaristic culture, and historic sensitivity towards Islamic resistance.
On the morning of July 12, 2006, Hezbollah initiated Operation “True promise,” a
military assault against Israeli soldiers along the Lebanon‐Israel border. Hezbollah sought
to kidnap Israel Defense Force (IDF) members in order to set up a prisoner exchange with
the Israeli government.3 By nightfall, Hezbollah’s Secretary General, Sheik Hassan
Nasrallah, confirmed the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers. Nasrallah also stated that “…
Hezbollah had no intention to start a war, but if Israel initiates a war they will pay a price.”4
Hezbollah’s aggression stemmed from its then current role within Lebanese politics.
At the time, Hezbollah felt enormous political pressure from Lebanese leadership and
parties. Following the assassination of Lebanon’s Former Prime Minister, Rafiq al‐Hariri, in
1 Shai Feldman, "The Hezbollah‐Israeli War: A Preliminary Assessment," Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University, September 2006: 3. 2 Shai Feldman, "The Hezbollah‐Israeli War: A Preliminary Assessment,” 3. 3 Gregory D. Parsons, Israel Versus Hezbollah 2006: Assessing Israeli Strategy, Unclassified (Montgomery: Air War College, 2008) 1. 4 Gregory D. Parsons, Israel Versus Hezbollah 2006: Assessing Israeli Strategy, 1.
February 2005, Syria became a target of Lebanese rage, and agreed to fully withdrawal
from Lebanon. With a new Lebanese anti‐Syrian government, western powers anticipated
that weakening of Hezbollah’s political role. Hezbollah felt that if it successfully liberated
Lebanese prisoners from Israel, it could re‐establish its political influence within Lebanon
and throughout the Middle East.5 In addition, Hezbollah, through social services, managed
to capture the “hearts and minds” of the Shi’a Muslim population in southern Lebanon.6
This enabled Hezbollah to recruit young, enthusiastic fighters to strengthen its military
capabilities.7
Israel’s military assault in response to “True Promise” forced Hezbollah to alter both
its goals and strategic objectives. Despite months of preparation, Nasrallah “insisted that
the number of Israelis killed was far higher than anticipated, resulting in Israel’s surprising
harsh response.”8 Hezbollah’s primary focus became survival. Nasrallah, in an interview on
al‐Jazeera T.V declared, “The victory we are talking about is when the resistance survives”.9
Despite Israel’s superior military, Hezbollah managed to demonstrate its strength and
resilience. Hezbollah targeted the IDF by releasing rockets and executing “…counterattacks
against Israeli troops and tanks.”10 Despite Israeli counterstrikes, Hezbollah continued to
operate its Command and Control systems, resupplied ammunition, and captured Israeli
spies in order to deliver to Israel “…false information about its fighters and positions…”11
5 Nakhleh, H. T. (2007). The 2006 Israeli War on Lebanon: Analysis and Strategic Implications. The U.S. Army War College , 4. 6 Parsons, G. D. (2008). Israel Versus Hezbollah 2006: Assessing Israeli Strategy, 18. 7 Ibid, 19. 8 Feldman, S. (2006, September). The Hezbollah‐Israeli War: A Preliminary Assessment. Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University , 2. 9 Nakhleh, H. T. (2007). The 2006 Israeli War on Lebanon: Analysis and Strategic Implications. The U.S. Army War College , 5. 10 Nakhleh, H. T. (2007). The 2006 Israeli War on Lebanon: Analysis and Strategic Implications, 7. 11 Ibid, 8.
While Hezbollah successfully resisted Israeli forces, it also failed in many areas.
First, despite its ability to force Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, Hezbollah’s arms failed to
prevent widespread Israeli attacks throughout Lebanon. Second, by attacking Israel outside
the designated Shab’a Farms area, it broke a six‐year agreement with Israel based on
informal rules of engagement. This decision helped justify Israel’s violent retaliation, and
angered the Lebanese population who suffered throughout the conflict. Finally, Hezbollah’s
declaration of “divine victory” contradicted the level of damage upon Lebanese homes and
infrastructure. For many, the death of 1,200 Lebanese civilians overshadowed Hezbollah’s
victorious rhetoric.12
The outcome of the July War presented Hezbollah with an opportunity to enhance
its regional credibility. Hezbollah’s objective focused not on defeating Israel, but to gain
legitimacy by defying the regional’s most power military. After Israel and Lebanon agreed
to the U.N. Resolution 1701 peace settlement, Hezbollah focused on its communications
campaign. It assisted war victims while preventing other agencies from delivering aid. The
strategy led to Arab support and recognition of Hezbollah’s social efforts, and elevated its
status throughout the Middle East.13
Overall, the July War allowed Hezbollah to discredit Israel and enhance it regional
perception. The group increased its leverage amongst Lebanon’s Shi’a population, and
gained respect throughout much of the Arab world.
12 Ibid, 9. 13 Gregory D. Parsons, Israel Versus Hezbollah 2006: Assessing Israeli Strategy, 22‐23.
Chapter II
Israel’s Perspective, Reaction, and Regional Consequences
For Israel, the July War served as an opportunity to display its military power and
enhance its national security. Many neighboring states and Islamic resistant groups refuse
to recognize Israel’s right to exist. Therefore, Israel embodies a militaristic culture and
perceives current events through its war torn history. Israel encompasses “a constant state
of hostility, [and is] accustomed to quick and decisive military victories.”14
Israel’s decision to combat Hezbollah resulted from its desire to establish a “new
order in Lebanon, one in which Hezbollah would lose its de facto ministate in the south and
the Lebanese government would finally extend its sovereignty over that region.”15 Israel
anticipated that Lebanon would disarm Hezbollah if the country endured Israel’s military
power. Israel also sought revenge for its humiliating withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000.
Finally, for the first time, Prime Minister Olmert and Defence Minister Peretz sought to
demonstrate their military capabilities.16
Israel’s initial military objectives targeted Hezbollah headquarters, bases, and
strategic positions in southern Lebanon. In order to weaken Hezbollah’s support base,
Israel bombarded Beirut’s international airport. Israel believed that an air assault could
eliminate Hezbollah’s ability to launch long‐range missiles into Israel. It assumed air power
alone could guarantee victory.17
14 Dov Waxman, "Between Victory and Defeat: Israel after the War with Hizballah," The Washington Quarterly (The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technololy), 27. 15 Dov Waxman, "Between Victory and Defeat: Israel after the War with Hizballah," 29. 16 Hany T. Nakhleh, "The 2006 Israeli War on Lebanon: Analysis and Strategic Implications," 6. 17 Gregory D. Parsons, Israel Versus Hezbollah 2006: Assessing Israeli Strategy, 11.
As the war progressed, Israel’s military success deteriorated. Israel failed to contain
Hezbollah’s missile assaults on Israeli cities. Hezbollah forced the Israeli population to take
refuge in shelters, or settle in safer parts of the country. Hezbollah’s military success also
forced Israel to send IDF troops into Lebanon. The IDF targeted small Hezbollah
strongholds north of the border. This policy violated Israel’s defense doctrine, and had little
influence on the war.18
After thirty‐four days of bloodshed, the U.N. officially terminated the conflict.
Hezbollah claimed it survived and defeated the Israeli military, and Israel claimed it
achieved its pre‐war objectives. The Israeli government boasted the performance of the
Israeli Air Force (AIF), emphasizing the amount of rockets and infrastructure it destroyed.
However, despite the numbers, Hezbollah managed to launch rockets into Israel, and
replenish its stockpile with Syrian and Iranian assistance. In regards to Israeli ground
forces, poor military leadership and an emphasis on reducing hostilities led to unsuccessful
IDF operations. Inadequate intelligence gathering also hurt Israel’s military campaign
against Hezbollah. Israel underestimated Hezbollah’s sophisticated military, especially its
coastal defense capabilities. Overall, while Israel did not lose the war, it certainly did not
prevail.19
In the early post‐war period, Israel endured many domestic and regional
consequences. The public blamed the government for Hezbollah’s ability to acquire more
than 12,000 missiles. Further, the military’s technological advantage over neighboring
18 Shai Feldman, "The Hezbollah‐Israeli War: A Preliminary Assessment," 3‐4. 19 Gregory D. Parsons, Israel Versus Hezbollah 2006: Assessing Israeli Strategy, 13‐17.
forces appeared obsolete. Lastly, Israel’s deterrence capability against non‐state resistance
seemed diminished.20
In the Middle East, the war “…overshadowed events in the Palestinian arena to the
point that Israel’s military imprisoned Hamas officials in Gaza and arrested suspected
terrorists with very little media coverage”21 For Syria, Hezbollah’s survival ensured that
Syria possessed the means to destabilize Lebanon. For Iran, the war elevated its regional
influence and showed its ability to utilize proxy’s throughout the region.22
The July War complicated Israel’s domestic and regional status. Its military showed
areas of vulnerability, and it underestimated Hezbollah’s military capacity. Israel’s inability
to determine a military conflict sent shockwaves across the Middle East. While it remains
the most powerful state in the region, it certainly appeared susceptible.
20 Hany T. Nakhleh, "The 2006 Israeli War on Lebanon: Analysis and Strategic Implications," 13‐15. 21 Ibid, 17. 22 Ibid, 17‐18.
Chapter III
The Impact of the War on Lebanon
For Lebanon, the 2006 July War left tremendous burdens upon an already fragile
nation. The country experienced numerous political, economic, and social consequences.
Before the war, Lebanon was in political deadlock. The government, led by Prime Minister
Fouad Siniora, included membership from the anti‐Syrian, pro Western March 14 coalition,
and members of Hezbollah and Amal, another Shi’a political party. At the time, important
economic reforms remained frozen, and Hezbollah threatened to destabilize the state.23
When the war began, the Lebanese government quickly condemned Hezbollah for
“arrogating the power to make war.”24 Members within the March 14 coalition suspected
that Hezbollah initiated the war in order to destabilize the country, destroy the March 14
coalition, and establish control of the nation. The government, looking to maintain order,
focused is efforts on establishing a cease‐fire. It developed a seven‐point framework for a
permanent cease‐fire, and eventually supported the U.N. Security Resolution 1701 peace
imitative.25
As the war progressed, the public’s perception towards the conflict changed. At first,
increased tensions between Shiite and Sunni Muslims in Lebanon split public opinion
regarding Hezbollah’s aggression towards Israel. However, Israel’s all‐out war against
Hezbollah altered the public view. Despite Hezbollah’s irresponsible policies,
23 Paul Salem, "The Future of Lebanon," Foreign Affairs , 2006: 16. 24 Paul Salem, "The Future of Lebanon," 16. 25 Ibid, 17.
condemnation shifted towards Israel and its closest ally, the United States. As civilian
deaths increased, hatred spread to both global superpowers.26
The war produced enormous implications for the Lebanese people. A total of 1,200
deaths and 400 injuries occurred throughout the war. Economically, infrastructural
damage reached $3.9 billion. Eighty bridges, 15,000 homes, and sectors of tourism,
industry, and service were destroyed. Overall, economic losses exceeded seven billion
dollars, roughly thirty percent of overall GDP. It was the costliest Arab‐Israeli war in
Lebanon’s history, exceeding Israel’s 1982 invasion.2728
The issue of displaced persons throughout Lebanon created havoc for the Lebanese
government. Corruption hampered the government’s ability to evacuate the displaced and
provide them with adequate aid supplies. Unfortunately, many party officials used this
situation to promote suffering in Shi’a populated areas in the south to create backlash
against Hezbollah.29
The war also caused political consequences for Lebanon. Initially, the government
claimed that U.N. Resolution 1701 complied with both Lebanese and Hezbollah interests.
However, Hezbollah made several remarks undermining the peace agreement. It claimed
the March 15 coalition sought to convince Israel and the United States to use Resolution
1701 to disarm their network. Further tensions between Hezbollah and the government
involved details pertaining to the establishment of an international tribunal to adjudicate
the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. 30
26 Ibid. 27 Hany T. Nakhleh, "The 2006 Israeli War on Lebanon: Analysis and Strategic Implications," 12. 28 Paul Salem, "The Future of Lebanon," 18. 29 Hany T. Nakhleh, "The 2006 Israeli War on Lebanon: Analysis and Strategic Implications," 12. 30 Paul Salem, "The After‐effects of the 2006 Israel‐Hezbollah War ," Contemporary Arab Affairs , 2010: 16.
Lebanon suffered immense political, economic, and social consequences throughout
the “July War.” The government failed to control Hezbollah’s military policies, resulting in
tremendous misery for the Lebanese people. Despite international efforts to heal its scares,
Lebanon remains a fractured state with little hope moving forward.
Chapter IV
Victims of Violence: Palestinian Refugee’s in Lebanon
Through the July 2006 War, Israel’s bombardment of infrastructure and homes
displaced hundreds of thousands of Lebanese civilians. In the south, entire communities
became inaccessible, hampering relief efforts and costing hundreds of lives. While the war
presented numerous challenges for Lebanese civilians, it also affected thousands of
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. Southern Lebanon occupied nearly 100,000 Palestinian
refugees.31 Therefore, the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah became entrenched
within the Palestinian‐Israeli conflict.
When the State of Israel was established in 1948, 100,000 Palestinians who fled or
were expelled from their homes arrived in Lebanon. A year later, the U.N. established the
United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), an organization that provides welfare
to Palestinian refugees. Since then, Palestinian refugees in Lebanon have encountered
political instability, civil war, repeated Israeli intervention. Currently, UNRWA estimates
state that the Palestinian refugee population in Lebanon exceeds 425,000 people. Clearly,
this presents challenges for the Lebanese government and international community as a
whole.32
As bombs exploded throughout Beirut and southern Lebanon, some 16,000
Palestinian refugees fled to safe havens in an effort to escape violence and avoid death.
31 Adam Ramadan, "The Guests’ Guests: Palestinian Refugees, Lebanese Civilians, and the War of 2006," School of Geography, University of Oxford, 2008: 662. 32 Refugee Studies Centre , "No refuge: Palestinians in Lebanon ," Oxford Department of International Development , 2010: 3‐4
Leaving personal possessions behind, these men, women, and children sought refuge in
civilian homes, shelters, and other safe accommodations. Humanitarian organizations, such
as the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), provided services for thousands
of displaced refugees.33
As the war progressed, concerns arose regarding the outbreak of disease among the
refugee population.34 The UNRWA successfully distributed medicine to conflict zones and
collective centers to prevent a health crisis. However, refugees with common diseases, such
as diabetes, cancer, and influenza, suffered due to poor access to hospitals and other
medical treatment centers.35
For Palestinian refuges, the long‐term influence of Israel’s military assault on
Lebanon proved costly. Israel destroyed 181 shelters throughout the Tyre area, in Ein el‐
Hilweh camp, and the Beqa’a Valley. In Beirut, hundreds of homes were destroyed or
damaged. From the start, thousands of Palestinian refugees lost their jobs, and living
conditions diminished 36
An ironic aspect of the war focuses on Lebanese civilians who sought refuge in
Palestinian camps. During the war, “…Palestinian guests became hosts to their own hosts, and
this temporary reversal of the usual relations of refuge set the scene for the rebuilding and
renegotiation of relations between Palestinian refugees and their host country and its citizens.”37
While many camps in the south came under Israeli attack, some remained untouched throughout
the conflict. This presented an opportunity for “inverted power relations, ” where Palestinian
33 United Nations Relief and Works Agency, Final Report 2006 UNRWA Flash Appeal Lebanon, (Gaza: Department of External Relations and Public Information , 2006) 2. 34United Nations Relief and Works Agency, Final Report 2006 UNRWA Flash Appeal Lebanon, 2. 35 Ibid, 3. 36 Ibid. 37 Adam Ramadan, "The Guests’ Guests: Palestinian Refugees, Lebanese Civilians, and the War of 2006," 658.
“guests” could provide hospitality for Lebanese civilians.38
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon continue to suffer from years of displacement and
lack of necessities. A constructive Palestinian‐Israeli peace treaty is imperative to the lives
of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. The population continues to recover from the
devastations of the 2006 war. This conflict represented a repeated history of victimization
for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and throughout the world.
38 Ibid, 663.
Chapter V
The 2006 July War and Hamas
During the 2006 July War, the international community focused its attention on
Lebanon and away from the Palestinian territories. In March 2006, the Palestinian’s
democratically elected Hamas to control the Palestinian government “…based on its
majority in the Palestinian legislature.”39 The war presented Hamas with the opportunity to
conduct policies against Israel while relying on Hezbollah for physical and moral support.
However, Hamas used the war not as a motive for aggression, but as a model for future
military escalations against Israel.
In the early summer of 2006, Hamas attacked numrous Israeli military targets. On
June 25, members of the Hamas political wing ( Izz ad-Din al- Qassam Brigades) assaulted an
Israeli convoy, killing two Israel soldiers and kidnapping one. Hamas demanded the release of a
Palestinian woman from an Israeli prison. For the next month, similar escalations of violence
continued. By July 12, Hamas had fueled Israel’s militaristic psyche, therefore increasing the
likelihood of an Israel-Hezbollah war.40
Hamas’s direct role in the July War proved minimal. However, prior conflicts
between Israeli and Hamas forces in Gaza presented a wartime environment for Hezbollah.
Speculation persists whether Hezbollah used these clashes between Hamas and Israel to
justify operation “True Promise.” While Hezbollah and Hamas chose not to pursue a joint
39 Shai Feldman, "The Hezbollah‐Israeli War: A Preliminary Assessment," 6. 40 Jeremy M. Sharp, Lebanon: The IsraelHamasHezbollah Conflict , Unclassified (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2006).
military assault against Israel, Hezbollah supported Hamas through funding, arms, and
propaganda.41
While indirectly related, the 2006 War crippled Hamas is several ways.
International attention on Lebanon allowed Israel to imprison Hamas officials without
media coverage. Therefore, any retaliatory action by Hamas appeared to be an offensive
exercise. Further, previous Israeli withdrawals from Lebanon and Gaza led to increased
radicalism amongst Islamic groups. Since Israel suffered physical and emotional military
setbacks during the war, it chose to abandon previous desires to unilaterally withdrawal
from the West Bank. For Hamas, this meant that Israel would continue to occupy
Palestinian land now under control of Hamas’ leadership.42
Hezbollah’s ability to resist Israel’s military forces inspired other Islamic resistance
networks. Hamas, along with other Sunni Islamic groups, looked to counter the successful
Shi’a military campaign. According to Israel Elad Altman, the “fact that the Shi’a of the small
Hezbollah organization managed to afflict upon Israel what the Sunni Arab armies have
failed to do could be seen as a proof that true Islam is the one practiced by the Shi’a.”43
Hamas also increased its recruitment efforts throughout Palestine. Hezbollah’s ability to
market its resistance efforts motivated Hamas’ militant wing, and undermined Palestinian
moderates.44
In December 2008, Israel and Hamas fought a three‐week war in Gaza. Hamas’
military approach toward Israel resembled that of Hezbollah during the 2006 July War.
41 Jeremy M. Sharp, Lebanon: The IsraelHamasHezbollah Conflict , Unclassified (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2006) 30‐34. 42 Hany T. Nakhleh, "The 2006 Israeli War on Lebanon: Analysis and Strategic Implications," 17. 43 Israel Elad Altman, "Some Regional Implications of the Hizbullah‐Israel War," PRISM, 2006: 1. 44 Shai Feldman, "The Hezbollah‐Israeli War: A Preliminary Assessment," 6.
Clearly, Hezbollah’s success in 2006 defined Hamas’ perception of Israel’s military
capabilities. Unfortunately for Hamas, Israel unleashed a successful military operation that
devastated the Gaza strip, and weakened Hamas’ credibility.
Summary
The legacy of 2006 Israel‐Hezbollah War had enormous implications for numerous
state and non‐state participants. The war altered regional assumptions regarding balances
of power, and illustrated various militaristic aptitudes throughout the region. The war
caused extreme anguish for Israeli and Lebanese civilians, and Palestinian refugees. For
Hezbollah and Hamas, the war legitimized Islamic resistance efforts, and Islamic radicalism
throughout the region.
For Hezbollah, the war enhanced it military credibility, and weakened its diplomatic
status within Lebanon. While the group successfully combated Israeli forces, it unleashed
political fragmentation within Lebanon and destabilized the country. Within the Middle
East, Hezbollah’s status as a military power and social servant for the Lebanese people
increased.
The 2006 War left Israel in a weaker military and diplomatic state. Hezbollah’s
success showed areas of military vulnerability and poor government leadership. Israel
undermined Hezbollah’s resilience, and enforced reckless military policies. Its citizens
demanded government accountability for its failure to determine its own military success.
Regionally, neighboring states altered its perception of Israel as a clear determinate of its
policies. The war presented Israel as susceptible to its regional enemies.
Lebanon suffered immense political, economic, and social defeats. The government,
already in political deadlock, unraveled due to Hezbollah’s incompetence. The March 14
coalition and Shi’s parties became politically fragmented. Israel’s military bombardment
destroyed infrastructure, homes, and other industry and service sectors. The civilian death
toll and number of displaced people led to corruption and social unrest. The government’s
relationship with Hezbollah weakened because of its inability to define and agree upon U.N.
Resolution 1701 specifics.
Along with the Lebanese civilian population, Palestinian refugees in Lebanon also
suffered throughout the war. The refugees were forced to abandon their camps and seek
shelter in safer areas throughout the country. Disease, unemployment, and decreased living
standards produced physical and emotional trauma for the victims. Ironically, many
Palestinian refugees hosted displaced Lebanese civilians. The war represented a continued
history of victimization for Palestinian refugees.
Hamas used the 2006 War to adjust its military polices towards Israel. Some experts
claim that Hamas’ prior military conflicts with Israel helped Hezbollah justify operation
“True Promise.” Hezbollah’s success motivated Hamas’ military wing and awakened Sunni
desires to combat Israel. Hamas’ ability to recruit young, proud Palestinian militants
increased due to Hezbollah’s successful military campaign against Israel. Hamas used the
war to implement its strategic military assault against Israel in 2008‐2009.
Finally, the 2006 Israel‐Hezbollah War represented the regions inability to remain
stagnant. The Middle East is complex region of state and non‐state actors that perceive the
world based on interconnected political, religious, and cultural terms. The war showed that
narrow, outdated policies based on inaccurate perceptions of power lead to regional and
global violence.
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