The 11 th Panzers in the Defense, 1944by A. Harding Ganz

Even if Gennany were ultimately de­feated, the lith PD would generallyaccomplish the difficult missionsgiven it, improvising methods and op­erations, and contribute a valuablechapter in the history of annored war­fare.

Panzer would wage a fighting with­drawal up the Rhone valley of south­ern France against the advancingAmerican Seventh Army, and in Sep­tember and again in November playasignificant role in thwarting Patton'sThird Anny drive toward the Rhine.

fu~e~! ~si~ ~fl;;~I;~ii~~:~~~~~~~~:i~~F~~~~~~~I;1frauleins, of the ma'm'sellesof sunny southern France, tan­talized the weary Landsers ­troopers - of the 11 th PanzerDivision. The rumors weretrue: it was the spring of 1944,and the battered division wasto be redeployed from theRussian Front to southernFrance for recuperation and re­building. On the Ostfront, thebrutal struggle continued un­abated.· The Gennan defenseof the Dnieper had beencostly, as massive Russian of­fensives resulted in huge en­circlement battles at Korsun­Cherkassy and Kamenets-Po­dolsky. Fierce winter blizzardshad alternated with the raspu­titsa, the sudden spring thaws,that sank vehicles into theUkrainian mud, and then frozethem in solid again, as in con­crete.

The elated troopers boardedtheir trains near Kishinev,bound for Bordeaux. The restof the division followed inMay, by road and rail, via Bu­dapest and Vienna. But even ifthe home of the 11 th was inSilesia, safely beyond thefighting fronts, Allied bomb­ing of the homeland and talkof the expected invasion of ~,.~Festung Europa by the Britishand Americans was sobering.Long gone were the dramaticdays of the blitzkrieg throughthe Balkans and the drives onKiev and Moscow. These hadmade the reputation of the GespensterDivision - the "Ghost" Division, itsemblem an eerie sword-wielding spec­tre on a halftrack. Now its missionwould be mobile defense, against theoverwhelming power of the Allied ar­mies in the West. In August, the 11th

26 ARMOR - March-April 1994

Rebuilding in Southern France

Under its popular commander, Gen­eralleutnant (Major General) Wendvon Wietersheim, the 11 th PD wasbrought up to strength according tothe 1944 T/O&E. At full strength, itwould have 13,726 officers and menin 15 battalions and detachments anddivisional trains. It thus approximatedthe American armored division of1944 which, with the routinely at­tached tank destroyer and antiaircraftbattalions, had an aggregate of 12,774personnel, also in 15 battalions andtrains. But unlike the U.S. division,which interchanged battalions underthree combat command headquarters,the Gennans retained the regimentalstructure with a panzer regiment oftwo battalions, two panzer grenadierregiments of two battalions each, anda panzer artillery regiment of threebattalions. For operations, however,the Germans mixed panzer and ar­mored infantry companies in impro­vised Kampjgruppen (battle groups),and the Americans cross-reinforcedcompanies in battalion-sized taskforces and exchanged platoons toform mixed company teams. Germanarmored doctrine was based on the"combined arms team" concept withbattalions of the three combat arms ­tanks, infantry, artillery - all syn­chronized to work together; and theiropponents had now adopted that con­cept as well.

The American armored division hadthree tank battalions, but these hadlight M5 tanks with 37-mm guns andmedium M4 Sherman tanks with ashort 75-mm gun. The German panzerregiment had two battalions of medi­ums, one of the older Panzer IV, nowmounting a high-velocity 75-mm gun,the other with the newer Panther, withan even more powerful 75-mm gun.The 1st Battalion of Panzer Regiment15 had received its Panthers at theGrafenwohr training area in 1943,shortly before the battle of Kursk. Thenew tanks had numerous mechanicalproblems, especially with hydrostaticlock and the final drives, according toWalter Rahn, then battalion adjutant,and Martin Lange, a corporal in the

ARMOR - March-Apri/1994

maintenance section. But these hadnow been worked out, and with itswide tracks, thick angled armor, andpowerful gun, the Panther was argu­ably the best tank of World War II.

While all three of the American ar­mored infantry battalions weremounted in armored halftracks, pro­duction shortages allowed only thefirst of the four panzer grenadier bat­talions to be so equipped by 1944.The Sd.Kfz. 25 I-series halftrackswere very versatile, and some variantsmounted mortars, flamethrowers, andsearcWights, comprising at least 22different models. They were techni­cally sophisticated, according to GuyFranz Arend of Belgium, who has ex­amples of all models in the VictoryMemorial and Bastogne HistoricalCenter museums, but were rather un­derpowered. The American M3 wasmechanically more reliable, but itsrubber tracks gave poorer cross-coun­try mobility in muddy terrain than theGerman steel track, and both had opentroop compartments, exposed to over­head artillery fire. To Major KarlThieme, who commanded the 11 thPanzer's halftrack-equipped battalion,Gennan unit leaders and vehicle driv­ers, veterans of the Russian campaign,could determine trafficability with amore experienced eye than could theirAmerican counterparts, and employedtheir halftracks accordingly. The otherpanzer grenadier battalions weretransported by truck. The Opel-Blitzwas preferred, but most lacked thefront wheel drive of the sturdy Ameri­can GMC 6x6 "deuce-and-a-half. Inany case, equipment shortfalls had tobe made up with civilian and Frenchvehicles, even including wood-gas fu­eled trucks, and Captain FranzThelen, adjutant of Pz.Gren.Rgt. 111,found himself going up to Paris torequisition whatever he could.

Likewise, only one of the three pan­zer artillery battalions was self-pro­pelled, the others being halftrack­towed, while all three American ar­mored artillery battalions were self­propelled, on the tracked M7 carriage.But all the American howitzers were105mm, with a range of 12,000 yards( 11 ,000 meters), whereas the Germandivision included 150-mm pieces with

a longer range of 15,000 meters, someof which were self-propelled as thetracked Hummel ("Bumble Bee").(The Americans acknowledged theirrange limitation, and a l55-mm battal­ion was routinely attached or in sup­port from corps assets.) The 105s ofthe SP battalion were carried on thePanzer II chassis as the Wespe("Wasp"), though captured chassiswere also utilized.

In France, the towed battalions ofPanzer Artillery Regiment 119 furthertraded batteries so each had 105-mmand 150-mm batteries. Experience haddemonstrated that the division usuallyoperated in three Kampjgruppen, eachsupported by an artillery battalion,and this mixed artillery support wasmore versatile. The 3rd Battalion,which Captain Walter Schaefer­Kehnert commanded by September,also incorporated a battery of Russian120-mm mortars, and a battery oflong-range 105-mm guns, the battal­ion thus providing supporting firesfrom 6,000 meters to 20,000 meters(11 miles). But because of the varietyof fire missions required, and disper­sal because of Allied air control, notesLieutenant Rolf Wandhoff, regimentaladjutant, battalion fifes were seldommassed, and individual batteries oftenfifed independent fire missions.

Replacements were brought in to re­build the units. One of the strengths ofthe Wehrmacht was the concept ofeach field division maintaining a re­placement battalion (Ersatzbataillon)in its home military district (Silesia,for the 11 th PD). Not only did the re­cruits share a common regional back­ground, but also were immediatelytrained for and thus associated withthe unit they would be joining in com­bat. The training cadre were membersof the division, and could imbue thenew recruits with their combat experi­ence and their unit procedures and es­prit. This ensured unit cohesion andmorale, generally considered the mostimportant ingredients in the motiva­tion of soldiers to fight. (Many whohave analyzed the capabilities of theGerman Army have unfavorably con­trasted the American "scientific man­agement" method of processing indi­vidual replacements through replace-

27

ment depots, the hated "repple dep­pIes," and allocating them to units asneeded.)

But maintaining this regional rela­tionship proved ever more difficultgiven wartime demands, and by 1944replacements were usually allocatedby Anny and Anny Group headquar­ters as needed. It was the nucleus ofveterans and the unit commanders,who now provided the cohesion andcontinuity that kept the II th Panzeran effective combat organization. Theunit commanders came from withinthe division, and the battalion com­manders of 1944 had been lieutenantsin 1940. Karl Thieme, for example,was a platoon leader and then a com­pany commander in Pz.Gren.Rgt. 110.In May 1944, he was promoted com­mander of its 1st Battalion (half­tracked) as major, and in November,promoted to lieutenant colonel, wouldbecome the regimental commander ­"For me a dream come to fulfillment,"he said. Wounded six times, Thiemehad received the Knight's Cross forthe Kursk fighting, and subsequentlywas awarded the Oak Leaves andSwords.

Tactical Realities in the West

With the long-awaited Allied inva­sion at Nonnandy in June 1944, Gen­eral Wietersheim dispatched a numberof the division's officers north to ob­serve how battle conditions differedfrom the Eastern Front. Their reportswere analyzed and discussed in com­manders' conferences, and tactical re­sponses were improvised: Allied air­power was all-pervasive, as alreadydemonstrated in North Africa and It­aly. What Luftwaffe remained wascommitted to defense of the Reich it­self. Therefore, standard vehicle road­march procedures (a panzer battalionmoving by day at 20 kmph and 50meter intervals had a time length ofabout 30 minutes and a road space ofsome 8,000 meters) were now unreal­istic. Vehicles, well-camouflaged withnets and branches, with constant airlookouts, would have to "spring" fromcover to cover in Einzelgruppensingle groups of 3-5 vehicles. If at-

28

tacked by the Jabos - Jagdbombers,or fighter-bombers, troops would pileout of the vehicles while crews wouldput up a barrage of fire.

Allied artillery had plentiful ammu­nition, and its effectiveness was en­hanced by accurate observation andcorrections from spotter planes aloft.Panzer artillery fire control exercisesemphasized coordination of artillery,rocket, and mortar fue on concentra­tion points, and rapid displacement toavoid counter-battery fire. Wire com­munication would be destroyed byshell fire and by bombing; radiowould be the primary means of com­munication, recognizing transmissionrange limitations imposed by a topog­raphy of wooded hills.

American ground advances were,however, methodical and cautious,halting at any resistance, and as a ruleending at nightfall. The Amis lackedthe grim stubbornness of the Tommysor the Ivans, preferring to call for ar­tillery support. Training by Major He­inz BOdicker's Pioneer (Engineer)Battalion 209 was emphasized for allunits, as delaying tactics with minesand obstacles would further slow anenemy advance. Aggressive recon­naissance by all units would be im­portant, not only for security, but alsoto take advantage of the occasionalnegligence of the more powerful en­emy and launch surprise attacks.

Other techniques employed on theEastern Front were still consideredvalid, if modified:

Clear, concise Sattelbejehle ("saddleorders" or frag(mentary) orders) wereimperative, given the pace of panzerwarfare, rather than detailed ordersand control measures. This exempli­fied the original concept of Auftrags­taktik - mission tactics, upon whichGerman mobile warfare doctrine wasbased. The Kampjgruppe concept ofmixed battle groups, the mix of pan­zer and panzer grenadier units tailoredto the situation, would be even moreappropriate, but for small-unit engage­ments because of Allied air power ­not mass maneuvers as on the steppesof southern Russia. This further re­quired that company-grade officers

take the initiative and act decisivelyand independently.

As in Russia, the policy for the com­bat companies (panzer, panzer grena­dier, and recon) was that a third of theunit be rotated back to the field re­placement detachment. They wouldget a rest, would be available as a re­serve, and would provide an experi­enced cadre in case of extensive casu­alties in the company, given the tre­mendous enemy fuepower. In thecourse of the coming campaigns, oneis struck by the heavy casualties suf­fered, especially among unit com­manders - in the next eight monthsthe two panzer battalions would haveeight different commanders, the twobattalions of Pz.Gren.Rgt. 110 wouldhave at least six, and the veterans ofPz.Gren.Rgt. III cannot recall alltheir battalion commanders; even Cap­tain Franz Thelen, regimental adjutant,can list and date the last five regimen­tal com.manders but, 'The battalioncommanders changed too frequently,one after another." The casualties re­flect aggressive leadership up front ­the adjutant himself often took tempo­rary command - and it is notable howunit cohesion was yet maintained, andthe division remained combat-capable,the result of this rotation policy.

To engage the Allied beachhead inNormandy, German panzer units con­verged on that front. Soon, only the11 th PO was left as the mobile strikeforce for all of Anny Group G southof the Loire, and even it lost some ofits tanks and annored cars. GeneralWietersheim had to prepare for threepossible scenarios if the Allies alsoinvaded southern France: an Alliedlanding on the Riviera, a landing nearthe Rhone River delta, or simultane­ous landings near Narbonne and onthe Biscay coast, to cut off FascistSpain. The theater of possible opera­tions was thus over 600 kilometers inextent (400 miles), and response timecould be 4-6 days, given probable Al­lied air attacks. Only a mobilecounter-attack strategy after any land­ing was feasible. Training intensifiedwith a new seriousness, while officersdid endless map exercises and routereconnaissances to identify secondaryroutes and river fording sites, aSSUffi-

ARMOR - March-April 1994

In reconnaissance battalions, eight-wheeled annored cars - pakwagens - mounted anti­tank guns and carried a second "reverse driver" who doubled as the radio operator or loader.

ing the major bridges and communi­cation routes would be bombed.

On 13 August 1944, with intelli­gence identifying the Rhone delta asthe probable landing area, the divi­sional units began to move toward theRhone valley. Two days later camethe Allied invasion, east of Toulon,against the weak coast defense divi­sions. Allied air activity was not asall-pervasive as in Normandy, thoughthe task of getting tanks across theRhone, including using a 60-ton ferryat Avignon, was a tedious one.

Delaying Operations

As the Allied armies in the northhad by now broken out of Normandyand were racing across France, driv­ing toward the German border, 11thPanzer had the unenviable task ofcovering the retreat of 19th Anny upthe Rhone, slowing the AJljed south­ern advance, yet avoiding being cutoff in the north. Delaying tactics werenow employed, engaging by day, fall­ing back at night, discouraging rapidAmerican advances with hasty mine­fields of antitank Teller (plate) minesand antipersonnel S (Schuh) mines.The lines of resistance were plannedso the next positions were beyond105mm artillery range (12,000 yardsor II kilometers) of the last positions,forcing the Amis to displace their bat­teries forward each time.

Major Karl Bode's ReconnaissanceBattalion II was especially suited fordelaying actions, as well as for themissions of scouting, route reconnais­sance, and flank protection. The unitwas equipped with armored cars andlight halftracked 250s. But surpriseengagements had invariably generateda demand for more firepower, and theeight-wheeled armored cars nowmounted 50- and 75-mm antitankguns, Pakwagens. Lieutenant WernerStrietzel, commanding 2nd Companyuntil wounded in November, feels theability of the 8-wheelers to drivebackwards as fast as forwards, theloader or radio operator being the "re­verse driver," was "of enormous im­portance." Motorcycles had long been

ARMOR - March-Apri/1994

discarded as too vulnerable to hostilefire, though Volkswagen's amphibiousSchwimmwagens were handy. But theversatility and firepower of the reconbattalion made it tempting to use inbattle itself. That consequent battlelosses reduce the ability of recon unitsto carry out their primary missionshas generated an ongoing controversyabout the role and weaponry of suchunits.

As the 19th Anny columns of men,wagons, and vehicles retreated up theRhone valley, they were savaged bymedium bombers and harassed by theFrench Maquis partisans who rose,sensing liberation. The partisans tar­geted service and staff elements, as at­tested by Sergeant Albrecht Englert, aradio operator at army headquarters;but they avoided II th Panzer combatunits, and did not affect combat op­erations.

Several times the more mobile U.S.Seventh Anny attempted to cut off19th Anny, but was stymied by the11 th Panzer. Annored Task ForceButler and the U.S. 36th Infantry Di­vision, advancing parallel to the east,swung in toward the Rhone defile atMontelimar on 21 August. Wieters­heim divided his units into fourKampjgruppen, under LieutenantColonel Heinrich-Georg Hax ofPz.Gren.Rgt. 110, Major Thieme ofthe halftrack battalion, Colonel Wildeof Pz.Gren.Rgt. 111, and Bode's Re­con Battalion II, and attacked. Whena roadblock was established on thehighway north on the 25th, Wieters­heim himself led a midnight chargethat scattered it. Several days of fight­ing in the tangle of hills and valleysdiscouraged the Americans and they

drew back. Close air support playedno role, as XII TAC (Tactical AirCommand) bases were too distant.The retreat continued, though thehighway traffic was lashed by long­range artillery fire.

Another attempt came when the U.S.45th Infantry Division cut a highwaynortheast of Lyon on 31 August atMeximieux. The next day, a ll1thKampjgruppe charged through a road­block of the 179th Infantry and intothe regimental headquarters in thetown. When F Company was sur­rounded in an old chateau it was sur­rendered by its CO. "He was a Dum­kopf, snorted one of the disgusted GIs,Bob Slingerland, in a recent letter toLieutenant Jtirgen von Pflug, 1st Bat­talion adjutant - and he spent therest of the war as a POW in Stalagmc on the Oder. The 117th CavalryRecon Squadron maneuvered to Mon­trevel to the north, but Bode's ReconBattalion II rolled up from Bourg on3 September. Troops A and B weremauled, and the survivors surren­dered. To GIs who ran afoul of the"Ghost Division," it was no "Cham­pagne Campaign."

A last attempt was made by theFrench I Corps, racing along theSwiss border toward the Belfort Gap,but the II th PO counterattacked the3rd Algerian Division at Baume-Ies­Dames on the 5th and ambushed itsM4 tanks near Montbeliard on the 8th.

The II th PO had been sufferingshortages and losses, yet would some­how gamer new equipment and lashout anew. By 27 August, near Lyon,Antiaircraft Battalion 277 had finallyacquired four of its authorized "Acht-

29

~Medift:rranean Sea

Sept-Dec 19<W" Count....ttkks .ndmobile det..... thl.wrt Plltton'aThird Army drive 10 the W.,to,nlf

21 August 1944: 1Hh FJa~prevel"llS U.S Jel:h 10.ndTask Forc4l Butler fromcutting off 19th Asmy rett"Nt

31 August 1944: l11hPSrT:nrstymiMlItt.mptbytt'oeU.S.4.5thICloclJlrosd north"M cI Lyon.

~'){-~,on

3 s.,nember 1944: 11thPara., A«:on Bn. malisU.S. lllth CII.... Ren. Sqn.neat Morb9v..

Map 1

11th Panzer Divisionin the West, 1944

Major General Wend vonWietersheim, who commanded the11th PO during operations in 1944.

11th PO Panther command tank now exhibited atthe Pan~ermuseumat Munster Lager, Germany.

30 ARMOR - March-April 1994

acht" (8,8cm) dual-purpose guns,equally deadly against aircraft or ar­mor, known to the American GI asthe dreaded "eighty-eight" (nun).They were "procured" from a supplydepot by the battalion commander,Major Joachim Menzel, who effec­tively bluffed the depot paymaster,though the guns were intended for adifferent unit. This gun had a velocityof over 800 meters per second (2,600fps) and a flat, accurate trajectory.The best range to engage the short­barreled M4 Shennan tank, says Jo­chen Menzel, was between 800-2,000meters. The guns also operated mosteffectively in pairs.

When French M4s came up theAudincourt road on 8 September theywere ambushed by Menzel's 88s. Onone side of the road, where it entereda narrow valley, Captain Giesebrechthad two guns tracking the leadingtanks. Menzel himself was with thesecond pair on the other side, sited toknock out the tanks at the rear, to trapthe column. The guns were well­camouflaged with branches, and theofficers did not use their binocularslest light glint off the lenses. WhenMenzel shouted "Feuer!" all gunsfired simultaneously, turning the col­umn into a burning shambles.

By mid-September 1944 the Germanannies had successfully rejoined inLorraine in eastern France. But theAllies had exacted heavy losses, andeven the 11 th Panzer had lost half itspersonnel and most of its tanks andassault guns in the continuous fight­ing. The remaining men were ex­hausted, and their vehicles worn out.The Panther tanks required majormaintenance after 800 kilometers; yetmany had now over 1,500 km on theirodometers. But there was to be norespite for rehabilitation.

Armored Counterattack

American General Patton's ThirdArmy had slashed into Lorraine, andin early September Major GeneralJohn Wood's 4th Armored Divisionbroke out of the Moselle Riverbridgeheads and drove spearheads be-

ARMOR - March-Apri/1994

yond Nancy. Hitler ordered a counter­attack and converged panzer units torestore the situation. Two panzer bri­gades, the lilth and I 13th, werehurled against Colonel Bruce Clarke'sbrigade-sized Combat Command Anear Arracourt, but the panzers werehandled roughly by the veteranAmerican tankers in the days that fol­lowed. These were new-type forma­tions that had no artillery, and organicmaintenance and flak assets wereweak; they were not balanced com­bined arms teams. Then, when the sunburned off the early morning fog, P­47 fighter-bombers swept the battle­field with a vengeance. The two bri­gades were wrecked; one commanderwas killed by American artillery, theother by the aircraft.

The new German commanders,Lieutenant General Hasso von Man­teuffel at 5th Panzer Army and Gen­eral Hermann Balck at Army GroupG, were fresh from the Russian Frontand had to learn the bitter lesson that,as Balck's Chief of Staff ColonelFriedrich von Mellenthin said, "it wasclear that American air power put ourpanzers at a hopeless disadvantage,and that the nonnal principles of ar­mored warfare did not apply in thistheater" - something the Westernveterans had tried to tell them.

But now the experienced 11th Pan­zer Division had arrived, and on arainy 25 September Kampfgruppen ofLieutenant Colonel Stenkhoffs Pan­zer Regiment IS and Colonel Hax'sPanzer Grenadier Regiment 110 drovedown the valley of the Seille againstthe CCA perimeter. This "certainlyput us on notice that some real proswere joining the opposition:' saidCaptain Jimmy Leach, CO of B Com­pany of Lieutenant Colonel CreightonAbrams' 37th Tank Battalion. The 4thArmored's Reserve Command hadcome up from fighting at Luneville,and Wood now pulled back west ofthe Moyenvic-Bourdonnay highwayand brought his CCB down fromChateau Salins, where it had clashedwith Panzer Brigade 106, consolidat­ing his division for some of the mostdramatic armor combat of the Euro­pean theater.

Yet Wietersheim's 11th Panzer wasbadly understrength. It had assembledin the Sarrebourg area after being re­deployed from the Belfort Gap, buthad to detach a Kampfgruppe underthe artillery commander, LieutenantColonel Erich Hammon, which in­cluded the self-propelled artillery bat­talion. In addition, Recon Battalion IIhad not yet arrived and Major ArnoldKessler's Tank Destroyer Battalion 61was back at Saveme, retraining withnew Jagdpanzer IV assault guns. Inredeploying in the face of Americanair power, the wheeled vehicle marchserials had moved rapidly, covered bythe mists of the Rhine River valley,but the tracked vehicles, moving byrail, had been delayed by bomb dam­age. The trains had moved at nightand held in tunnels by day, though2nd Company of Panthers lost heavilyto medium bombers as its train left atunnel near Colmar too soon beforedusk. Pz.Rgt. IS, even incorporatingthe remnants of Pz.Brig. III, mayonly have had 16 panzers fully opera­tional, and only two artillery batterieswere at hand. Nonetheless the twopanzergrenadier regiments were atabout 70-80 percent strength, and withits veteran tankers, the "Ghost Divi­sion" was a dangerous foe.

As they attacked, experienced Ger­man tankers instinctively sought defi­lade in the rolling farmland, and usedtheir longer-ranged 75-mm high-ve­locity guns to advantage. LieutenantKarl Zindler commanded his platoonof Panthers, and also fought his owntank: "Driver, stop! Gunner! Maingun, armor-piercing, two o'clock, sixhundred, Ami tank, on the slope-"The loader and gunner shouted simul­taneously: "Ready!" "Identified!" Zin­dler finished his fire command:"Shoot!"

Some sources say the M4 Sherman'selectric-power turret traverse gave theAmerican tank an advantage over the"manual traverse" of the Panzer IVand Panther. But both Gennan tanksalso had power traverse. The PanzerIV had electric power, generated by asmall two-stroke gasoline engine. Andthe Panther, like the heavy Tiger, hadhydraulic power, the gunner travers­ing by foot pedal. The disadvantage of

31

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hydraulic power was that the enginehad to be running since the pumpswere driven by the engine transmis­sion shaft. But 1st (panther) Battalioncommander Major Jiirgen Reichardtand Sergeants Lange and Filla saidthat in battle the engines were runninganyway, according to the maxim "fireand movement." In defense, said Zin­dler, a tank would be in hull defllade,with its gun tube oriented toward themost likely armor approach, and finalgun-laying manually was no problem.

The apprehension Americans hadabout fighting the German Pantherwas reflected in XII Corps operationsnotes to units, advising flank engage­ments, and warning that head-on at1,000 yards, 75mm rounds mightpenetrate "only when hitting the lowerhalf of the mantiet, when they are de­flected down, penetrating thin hulltop-plate," but that the "Hull is invul­nerable to all calibers." The Panzer

IVs of Captain Rodenhauser's 2ndBattalion were less fonnidable, butdid have a lower silhouette. The Ger­man disadvantage in the Arracourtfighting was that they were attacking,under cover of morning mist, thus ne­gating their long-range gunnery ad­vantage. And they met their match inthe skilled tankers of Wood's 4th Ar­mored, who maneuvered their moreagile M4s and M18 "Hellcat" tank de­stroyers around the undulating coun­tryside in close-quarter engagements.

Pz.Gren.Rgt. Ill, under the tempo­rary command of Major Karl Thieme,came up on the right of the 110th asCCA fell back from Juvelize to Hill265. The panzer grenadiers, riding thepanzers or following in their tracks,came in against the armored doughsin their foxholes along the perimeter.Captain Thelen confmns that, atstrength, the eight-man panzer grena­dier squad had more firepower than

the II-man American rifle squad,with two belt-fed MGs (Machine Gun42s) and the automatic MPi (MachinePistol 40) and selective-fire Sturm­gewehr (Assault Rifle 44), to the U.S.box magazine BAR and semi-auto­matic M 1 Garand rifle. Both sideswere perennially short of infantry, andthe Germans were now mass-produc­ing fully automatic weapons, compen­sating for personnel shortages withfirepower. But GIs traded MIs for"Tommy Guns" and platoons weresupported with mortars and heavy ma­chineguns, and both sides were sel­dom at full strength anyway.

Concealed from American air powerin the patches of woods east of theBourdonnay road were the few artil­lery pieces available. Menzel's 88swere sited near Gelucourt and tied into division artillery, adding flat-trajec­tory fire support across the openfields. But alert 4th Armored ob-

32 ARMOR - March-April 1994

cattle, and l'tat his command postlooked like a stock yard.

The tanks were topped off with fuel,though the crews often had to carryfuel cans up to the forward positions.Panzer crews slept in their tanks, withtwo of the five-man crew on watch intwo or three hour shifts, manning theturret MG and radio. Accompanyingpanzer grenadiers often slept in ashallow pit, over which the tankdrove, straddling it, giving protectionfrom artillery fire and the elements,and wannth in cold weather. This hadbeen learned in Russia, and was agood precaution. Major Ray Mason,S3 (Operations) of the 4th Armored's22d Armored Field Artillery, for ex­ample, said the battalion would fireconcentrations 50 yards in from awood line, for deadly tree bursts.

Sergeant Martin Lange of the Pan­ther Battalion maintenance group didmost of his work at night. Mainte­nance sections were established inpatches of woods, all signs of tread­marks leading into the area carefullyswept away, hidden from spotterplanes and fighter bombers. Canvastarpaulins were strung for conceal­ment, so lights and welding equip­ment could be used at night.

If some of the llth PO veteranspondered Germany's unfavorable situ­ation at this stage of the war, mostwere too preoccupied with battle,work, and survival to muse for long.Political changes could always occur,new weapons - jet planes, V I BuzzBombs, and V2 rockets - were com­ing into evidence, and defending thehomeland, and discipline, routine, and

Captain Johannes Schneiderhad assumed command of the2nd Battalion of the 110thnear Bezange la Petite. Fortwo nights engine sounds andvehicle movement in the Similar to a halftrack. the German Kettenrad motorcycleAmerican lines caused his had a track-laying system instead of a rear wheel.men to be on the alert, butwhen two young Gis wandered intothe front lines, with messkits and ap­parently lost, it was learned that thenew 26th "Yankee" Infantry Divisionwas relieving the hard-fought 4th Ar­mored Division. Stiff local actionsfollowed, and when 5th Company wasdriven off Hill 265 (by the l04th in­fantry Regiment), Lieutenant Rudolph'splatoon of three Panzer IVs helped thegrenadiers recapture some of the lostground. Meanwhile Pz.Gren.Rgt. IIIreturned, having attacked and stoppedthe 45th Division in the MortagneForest, 6-7 October.

men a kilometer! Two or threepanzers provided local sup­port in each battalion sector,their squealing tracks at nightenough to deter inquisitiveAmerican probes.

During this position defense, theeagerly awaited company mess truckscame up at dusk, towing the Cu­laschkanone, the field kitchen trailerwith its distinctive stovepipe, to de­liver hot meals. The company Ketten­rad, a half-tracked motorcycle, couldalso bring up hot rations in a smalltrailer along narrow trails not subjectto harassing and interdiction (H&I)fire. Officers ate with their men, shar­ing the discomfort of the front, uncon­sciously manifesting that indefinableblend of quiet authority, competence,and camaraderie that is true leader­ship. The mess teams would distributerations for the next day, and departbefore dawn. Hot Wurst and Kaffeewere always morale-boosters, offset­ting the Sclwkakola energy bars andchunks of Kommissbrot hard tack, thatwas only softened by suspending incoffee containers. Army rations weresupplemented by local produce, andCaptain Schaefer-Kehnert of the 3rdArtillery Battalion wrote his wife thathe found himself the "divisionagriculturalist," rounding up hogs and

servers in L-4 Cub spotter planescalled in counter-battery concentra­tions from the three annored artillerybattalions, and called in fire missionsthat smashed the German attacks withHE. By mid-day the fighter bombersof XIX TAC would swoop in, strafingwith rockets and machinegun fire,adding the decisive factor.

Yet the higher commanders persistedin massing panzers for attacks, overWietersheim's objections. On 27 Sep­tember, 25 panzers from all armorunits launched attacks on the southflank of the 4th Armored's Arracourtsalient, beginning a three-day battle.By now, Recon Battalion II had ar­rived, fleshed out with Luftwaffetrainees, young but poorly trained.The American annored doughs heldfirm, especially in the bitter fightingfor Hill 318, and tanks, artillery, andfighter-bombers lashed the attackersback. On the 29th many of the survi­vors broke and ran, rallied only by thedivision commander himself. None­theless, the stubborn German assaultsseemed to restore the German front,and by the end of the month bothsides had gone over to the defensive.

Linear Defense

During the October pause the 11thPanzer held a concave HKL (Haupt­kampjlinie, or MLR, Main Line ofResistance) 18 kilometers long fromMoyenvic on the Seille River to Par­roy on the Marne-Rhine Canal. Bydoctrine and equipment annored unitswere ill-suited for position defense; inaddition, one of the two panzer grena­dier regiments, the 111 th now underLieutenant ColOllel Werner von Ruep­precht, was detached toward St. Die.Thus the HKL could only be held as aseries of scattered strongpoints, utiliz­ing the stone fann buildings of Lor­raine. In addition, constant artilleryfire mandated thinning out the for­ward positions, and the strongpointswere only linked by patrols at night,giving a semblance of a defense indepth. Pz.Gren.Rgt. 110, holding asector of some 10 km, had an effec­tive strength of only 600 men. Withonly a third forward, that averaged 20

ARMOR - March-Apri/1994 33

unit morale kept the men fighting.Nazi ideology was no longer a factor.Most combat troops held the civilianleadership in contempt, and Schaefer­Kehnert often heard the division com­mander refer to Hitler: "Once againthe idiot has ordered.... ;" but not inthe presence of the artillery com­mander, who was a convinced Nazi,and who was therefore often detachedwith a Kampfgruppe on missionsaway from the division.

The 11th PD veterans also resentedthe preference and publicity accordedthe Nazi Waffen-SS (Combat SS),who alone were credited with the cap­ture of Belgrade and of Kharkov ear­lier. By 1944, NSFOs - National So­cialist Leadership Officers, were man­dated to give "political instruction" tothe troops. But the Nasojiis were noteager to go up to front-line units, andin the 11 th Panzer members who hada record of leadership in the HJ(Hitler Youth) or SA (Storm Troop­ers) were authorized to give troop in­formation classes. These were not re­ally taken seriously by cynical combatveterans anyway.

Finally the 11 th PD was pulled backinto reserve, with the 361st VoIksgre­nadier Division taking over the sectorby the end of October. CaptainSchneider collapsed from exhaustion,but awoke to find his concerned divi­sion commander sitting by his side.Schneider insisted he not be evacu­ated, as the battalion was now in re­serve. The general agreed, but orderedthe adjutant to report on how muchsleep the captain was getting. "Yes,General von Wietersheim was 'like afather' with his soldiers!" he recalled.Tn addition, even Army Group com­mander Balck, who had commandedthe division in Russia, came down tovisit with some of the veterans. Mo­rale of any military unit is highly de­pendent on sensing the concern com­manders have for the welfare of theirmen. A few of the division receivedleave, and others received additionaltraining. Major Karl Thieme wentback for regimental command school­ing, and would return as a LieutenantColonel, to command his cherishedPanzer Grenadier Regiment I 10.

34

Elastic Defense

The division received replacementswhile in bivouacs east of Met'z, andtank strength was brought up to 40Panthers, 20 Panzer IVs, and 10Jagdpanzer IV turretless assault guns.But 5th Panzer Army headquartershad gone north (to prepare for the Ar­dennes offensive), and the 11th PDwas the sole reserve for Army GroupG. During the eight-day rest, Wieters­heim met with his unit commanders todiscuss tactics against the next Ameri­can offensive, expected in November,toward the Saar industrial basin.American artillery and airpower, evenwith the anticipated poorer weather,made large-scale armored operationsimpractical, and enemy numerical su­periority made the OKW (WehrmachtHigh Command) order to hold everymeter of ground unrealistic.

In a defense in depth, the infantrydivisions would hold positions two orthree kilometers forward of the HKLwith a minimum of forces only, to"absorb" the initial bombardment andattack. The HKL itself consisted ofextensive field works and was cov­ered by minefields. The 11 th PD washeld back as an operational reserve.As the Delme Ridge and the NiedRiver were designated the first andsecond positions of the HKL, sharplocal counterattacks would bemounted to slow the American ad­vance. "Speed, movement, and sur­prise," recorded Major Thieme,"should offset the numerical and ma­terial superiority of the enemy."Mixed companies, Panzerkampjtruppsor "tank battle teams" of a tank pla­toon and two panzer grenadier pla­toons each, would fight these actions.Small sections of one tank, onehalftrack, and an artillery forward ob­server, if possible, would link thefront. Their sudden presence and firewould hopefully magnify their smallnumbers, encourage their own infan­try, and make the advancing Ameri­cans more cautious. While these tac­tics did not conform to the principlesof mass and concentration, theyseemed the only practical way to slowa powerful American advance along avery broad front.

On 7 November, the 11 th Panzerwent on alert, and that night elementsmoved into position north of Morchin­gen (Morhange) in a steady rain. Onthe 8th, Patton's Third Army jumpedoff with six infantry divisions andthree armored divisions, supported by38 field artillery battalions and thefighter bombers of XIX TAC. By the9th, the armor was committed, thelong armored columns passingthrough the infantry. But the Ameri­can armor was road-bound, restrictedby the minefields and mud; and sharpGerman counterattacks resulted in asuccession of bloody engagements.

The 88s of the 9th Flak Divisionstopped one American column at Fon­teny, and a Kampjgruppe of Pz.Gren.Rgt. 11 I occupied Viviers during thenight, cutting off another columnwhich had reached Hannocourt.(These were Task Forces Maybachand Churchill of the 4th Armored'sCombat Command B.) The Americansfinally cleared Viviers but couldn'tclear the flanking fue from the for­ests. The bitter fighting for Fontenyflared up again on the 11th before theGermans pulled back. Two Americanbattalion commanders, one of themColonel Alfred Maybach, were amongthe killed in action. The village costthe "Ghosts" as well. The 2nd Battal­ion of the I 10th had come in the nightbefore; Lieutenant Klele's platoon of8th Company was wiped out in thehouse-to-house fighting against thestubborn GIs, and the battalion com­mander, Captain Schneider, was badlywounded by shell fragments and hos­pitalized until the end of the war.

Also on II November, LieutenantWalter Rahn, adjutant of the PantherBattalion of Pz.Rgt. 15 (and later bat­talion commander), was at his com­mand post in the Foret de ChateauSalins when an excited infantry ser­geant of the 559th Volksgrenadier Di­vision burst in reporting that a hun­dred Ami tanks were advancing upthe valley. Rahn immediately alertedthe crews of five tanks that werenearby awaiting maintenance, andmounted a Kettenrad to reconnoiter.The American column was road­bound, moving up the valley of the

ARMOR - March-Apri/1994

flooded Petite Seille. Though the Pan­thers were technically deadlined, andaveraged only six rounds of ammoeach, Rahn found them a reverse­slope position near Dalhain fromwhere they could engage the Ameri­can column at 1,500 meters from hulldefilade, only the turrets being ex­posed. Several American tanks andvehicles were knocked out; othersdrove ahead, while the rest of the col­umn backed up, turned around, anddetoured on a secondary road. (Thiswas Task Force Bill Hunter's 37thTank Battalion of Creighton Abrams'CCA.) Contrary to the perception ofGerman regimentation, the initiativeshown by, and encouraged in, juniorofficers and NCOs, was a major rea­son for the success of Gennan panzerforces.

The 11th Panzer battle teams werethe "fire brigades," trying to interceptthe American thrusts. The pattern offighting was of the American infantryadvancing through the dripping for­ested hills against the Gennan infan­try, and the armor advancing alongthe valleys, thwarted by the mud,mines, and 11th Panzer counterat­tacks. The cold rain and cloud coverkept off the fighter-bombers, thoughseldom the ubiquitous L-4 observationCubs that droned aloft and called inthe deadly artillery fire. Casualtiesmounted on both sides in this struggleof attrition.

The 26th Infantry Division reachedRodalbe, but at dusk on the 13th aKampjgruppe of liith Panzer Grena­diers riding ten Panthers charged in,and most of the 3rd Battalionll04thInfantry were captured. Captain Ferdi­nand Biedermann, the panzer com­mander (of 3rd Company), then re­ceived orders from Wietersheim tomake a night road march south tomount a spoiling attack on the 26thDivision's right flank, near Guebling.His Kampjgruppe included 17 tanks,and panzer grenadiers in halftracksunder Captain Heinz Wolff, com­manding 1st Battalion of the 110th.

Biedermann was just about to launchhis attack on the 14th when it collided

ARMOR - March-Apri/1994

with the 4th Armored's own attack(Task Force Oden) in the early morn­ing fog. Biedermann's command tankNo. 301 was hit and the ammunitionexploded. He was thrown out of histurret hatch with a severe leg woundand his crew members were killed.Delk Oden's 35th Tank Battalion M4sand Major Art West's 10th ArmoredInfantry Battalion then shot their wayacross Dordal Creek and into Gue­bling. But the 110th Panzer Grena­diers concentrated that night and deci­mated the American defenders, andColonel Abrams agreed they shouldbe pulled out the next day. Oden com­plimented the 11 th Panzer trooperswhen he said, "those Goddarnn Ger­mans were the hardest fighting thingswe had ever tangled with." The 26th"Yankee" Division finally crossed thecreek again on the 18th, but tookheavy casualties from Pz.Gren.Rgt.110, now commanded by KarlThieme, back as a lieutenant colonel.

Though badly outnumbered, the 11 thPanzer was constantly thwarting eachAmerican thrust by a skillful shiftingof available forces. American air didnot fly at night, and this is when theGermans moved. H&I fire at roadjunctions was fairly predictable, andtracked vehicles in particular couldutilize country lanes. German vehiclesroad-marched, led by a guide on footor in a VW Kiibelwagen ("bucketcar") with hooded lights. Tank driversfollowed the marker light of the tankahead, the four slits blurring into twocat-eye images at the correct vehicleinterval of 25 meters. During the con­stant fighting and moving, the crews"just cat-napped when we could," rue­fully said Martin Lange, tank driverand mechanic. Frequently, the driversdozed off whenever the columnhalted, and then someone would haveto go back on foot or on the companyKettenrad and bang on the fender towake them up again. It was importantfor crewmen to rotate positions, spell­ing the driver, the others slumped inthe seats or curled on the turret basketfloor alongside the ammo.

On the night of 18 November theII th Panzer was ordered to redeployback near St. Avoid, for meanwhilethe 48th Division had disintegrated

under the blows of the American 6thArmored and 80th Divisions, and theremnants of the 559th VGD evacuatedMorhange. In the days that followed,Pz.Gren.Rgt. III lost its regimentalcommander, Lieutenant Colonel vonRuepprecht, mortally wounded at Hil­sprich on 23 November. When Alliedforces suddenly broke through theZabern (Saveme) Gap, Hitler releasedthe Panzer Lehr Division to close it.But the PLD's attack ran head-on intoa swing by the 4th Armored east ofthe Saar and it was pulled out again aweek later, leaving 11th Panzer ele­ments to cover east to the VosgesMountains, a 50-kilometer front.

The three artillery battalions weremore dispersed than ever. To super­vise his scattered batteries CaptainSchaefer-Kehnert, whose 3rd Battal­ion usually supported Pz.Gren.Rgt.111 (now under Colonel Graf vonKielmansegg), divided his headquar­ters into a rear command post admin­istered by his adjutant, and a fOlWardcommand post from which he himselfoperated. The battalion commanderpreferred a captured American jeepnicknamed Kleinen Willy ("Little Wil­lyZ) from the Willys Overlandbuilder's plate, because it was light,maneuverable, easy to cover with acamouflage net, and with its four­wheel drive more powerful than theVW Kiibel.

Panzers in DefensiveFortifications

The bitter fighting in the cold mud,rain, and sleet continued around SarreUnion and Domfessel as the Germansdelayed back to their border. The op­posing 4th Armored lost two battalioncommanders wounded and then, afterclashing with his corps commanderover the frustrating, exhausting strug­gle, the able General Wood himselfwas relieved by General Patton. TheI Ith Panzer was falling back throughthe old French Maginot Line fortifica­tions, its works of little use since theyonly faced eastward. Nonethelesssome of the bunkers afforded shelterfrom artillery fire, though unit com-

35

manders had to enJOIn their mennot to become trapped in them.

At Singling on 6 December, asmall unit action typical of thecampaign was fought when Cap­tain Engelmann's 1st Battalion ofPz.Gren.Rgt. III met the advanceof the 4th Armored's Task ForceAbrams. A tank-infantry team un­der Captain Jimmie Leach of the37th Tank Battalion attacked thetown, the armored doughs ridingthe tanks because the halftrackscouldn't negotiate the mud. ButLeacb found the position domi­nated by the high velocity Germantank guns on the Welschoff Farmridge, 1,200 yards to the north,and four of his 14 tanks wereknocked out. Lieutenant Karl Zin­dler's platoon of Major Reichardt'sPanther Battalion launched acounterattack supported by artil­lery fire, but lost two panzers inturn. One was Zindler's, with twoof his crew wounded when theybailed out. Leach recently wroteZindler that it was probably Ser­geant Bob Fitzgerald's B-13, mount­ing a new 76mm gun, that hadknocked him out.

The German advantage was theirlonger-ranged tank guns. They lostthat advantage in an attack that closedthe range with the M4, and were moresuccessful when they returned todominating the position by fire. AsLieutenant Bill Marshall's C Com­pany of Major Albin Irzyk's 8th TankBattalion came up to relieve Leach'sTeam B, one of its tanks was also de­stroyed, and the Americans aban­doned the town as not worth the cost.

These sharp, sudden clashes were tobuy time, slowing the relentlessAmerican advance until the Germanborder Westwall defenses themselves("Siegfried Line" to the Allies) couldbe occupied. But the 11th Panzer wasstretched thin, aI!l along the Saar Riverline, its battle tearns buttressing thedepleted infantry units. Elements ofThieme's Pz.Gren.Rgt. 110 counterat­tacked the 35th Division at Obergail­bach; and ten of Captain Roden­hauser's Panzer IVs were dispatchedeven further to the right to help con-

36

test the 90th Division's bridgehead atDillingen.

The Westwall could be a formidabledefensive line. Though the bunker ap­ertures were too small for the antitankguns of 1944, the concrete pillboxeswith machineguns were sited for enfi­lading fire to cover the minefields and"dragon's teeth" anti-tank traps, andthey could be held by a minimum oftroops. Major Arnold Kessler's assaultguns covered the bunkers near Zwei­brticken, and the role of the panzerKampfgruppen was to counterattackany breakthrougb. The Westwallcould have been even more formida­ble, but the combat troops had beendenied familiarization with the systembecause the Supreme Commandwanted to discourage a "defeatist" at­titude.

Patton's divisions which had bornethe brunt of the November offensivein Lorraine were relieved by freshunits to recuperate; and on 16 Decem­ber some 19 German divisions to thenorth launched a massive counter-of­fensive against the American lines inthe Ardennes. The II th Panzer badplayed its part in slowing the Allied

Karl Heinz Loschke, now secretary ofthe 11 th Panzer Division Association,at right, with the author on a researchvisit to Braunschweig in 1989. Loschkeserved as an artillery officer with the11th PO in Russia.

advance, enabling the Wehrmacht toregain the initiative. General Wieters­heim felt his "cavalry tactics" carriedout by even the smallest battlegroups, were justified by the results.The "Gespenster" could take pride inreading a captured document inwhich the American x:n Corps com­mander complimented the 26th Infan­try Division, confronted by "some ofthe best German fighting forces," spe­cifically the "tough and experienced11th Panzer Division."

Conclusion

The II th Panzer Division wellrepresents the tremendous fightingability of the German Wehrmacht,even as defeat loomed by 1944. Stud­ies have been done to explain Germanfighting power, yet none are reallysatisfactory. An interesting attempt tomeasure fighting power throughmathematical models rests on ques­tionable data and methodology, and aconclusion in terms of Nazi ideologydoes not explain German combat ef­fectivenes/' in 1870 or 1914-1918,well before Nazism. Leadership, train­ing, weaponry, national character, andtraditions all seem to be part of acomplex formula. In the II th PO anucleus of capable and experiencedunit commanders and NCOs, and a di­vision commander of ability and dedi­cation, used resourcefulness andimagination to continually assimilateill-trained replacements, adapt tacticsto adverse circumstances, and credit­ably carry out tbe missions giventhem.

The "Gespensterdivision" was reha­bilitated in the Eifel while in OKWreserve, receiving new drafts and newequipment. In 1945 it would continueto fight, to tbe end, at the Orscholz

ARMOR - March-April 1994

barrier, in the Rhineland, back acrossGermany, into Czechoslovakia. Astough a foe as it was, it could alsoabide by the recognized rules of war­fare, and earn the respect of its ene­mies. In May of 1945, as the RedArmy closed in from the east, GeneralWietersheim met with his command­ers who agreed that a delegation ap­proach the Americans to negotiate asurrender to avoid Russian captivity.On 4 May Wietersheim himself metwith Brigadier General Herbert Ear­nest, who had commanded CCA ofthe 4th Armored Division and wasnow commanding the 90th InfantryDivision. Earnest contacted GeneralPatton, who responded that the II thPanzer was the "fairest and bravest"German division against which he hadfought, and that it be allowed backacross the border. Colonel Hank Reedof the 2d Cavalry Group, who had ar­ranged occasional truces with the II thin Lorraine, stalled negotiations with aSoviet military mission while the col­mnns of the 11 th Panzer, depleted butintact, rolled into honorable, un­guarded captivity at Kotzting, Bavaria.In subsequent years the American 2dCav and German veterans wouldshare joint reunions, with the motto:Aus Feinden werden Freunde - "Ene­mies become friends.

Source Materials

Essential for this study was corre­spondence and discussions with mostof the veterans mentioned in the text.Karl Heinz Loschke, an officer inPz.Art.Rgt. 119 on the Russian Frontand Secretary of the II th Panzer Divi­sion veterans' association, has beenexceedingly gracious and helpful infacilitating contact between the authorand the "Gespenster." The author metwith Herr Loschke in Braunschweigin 1989, and was invited to the divi­sion reunion in Kotzting, Bavaria inMay 1992. Attendance was supportedby a research grant from the Profes­sional Standards Committee of theOhio State University, Newark Cam­pus. Most valuable has been the mate­rials and insights provided by Briga­dier General (Ret.) William W. Molla,

ARMOR - March-Apri/1994

a Captain in S-3 (Operations) of theIOlst Infantry, 26th Division, whoknows many of his former opponents.He generously shared work of hisown on the 11 th PD, some of whichhas been published in the divisionnewsletter, "Yankee Doings." LouisT. Holz, Chairman of the 2d CavalryRegiment Association, was instrumen­tal in enabling the author to benefitsignificantly from the 11 th PD reun­ion activities; and Martin Lange es­corted the author through the Panzer­museum Munster Lager, and westarted up Panther tank no1.

The II th PD KTBs (Kriegstage­bucker - war diaries) and reports arein NARS (National Archives and Re­cords Service) Microfilm T-315, butthe 1944 records for the West arelacking. Related reports and KTBs ofLVIII Pz. Korps, Pz. AOK. 5, andH.Gr. G are on Microcopy T-314 Roll1497, T-313 Roll 420, and T-31l Roll141. Some monthly status reports(Zustandsberichte) in the Bundesar­chivlMilitiirarchiv in Freiburg, in RH10/49, RH 101217, and RH 27-11/135are useful.

U.S. unit records are in NARS, Suit­land, Maryland (e.g. 4th Armored Di­vision in collection 604). Panzer Divi­sion 44 K.St.N.s are calculated fromNARS Microcopy T-78 Rolls 393,397, and 410, and U.S. T/O&Es of 12February 1944 (T/O&E 17s) with bat­talion table changes, copies at theCMH (Center of Military History),Washington, DC, and the USAMHI(U.S. Army Military History Insti­tute), Carlisle, Pa. The USAMHI,where John Slonaker has been quitehelpful, also has oral history manu­scripts, and the post-war accountswritten by General Wietersheim him­self, MSS #B-364, B-416, and B-417.

Published sources on the II th Pan­zer Division include the division his­tory, Obstlt. Anton 1. Donnhauser andGeneralmajor Werner Drews, Der Wegder 11. Panzer-Division (Bad Woris­hofen, 1982), Gustav W. Schrodek,Die 11. Panzerdivision: Bilddokumente1940-1945 (Friedburg, 1984), copyprovided by Major General (ret.) Ray­mond Mason (22d AFA/4th AD), andSchrodek's Pz.Rgt. 15 history, Ihr

Glllube galt dem Vaterlllnd (Munchen,1976). Donnhauser commanded Pz.Gren.Rgt. III in Russia and Drewswas division operations chief, Ia, andSchrodek was an officer in Pz.Rgt. 15.Jochen Menzel provided a copy of hisDer LOwe von Lyon (Berg am See,1988), Walter Schaefer-Kehnert hisprivately published Kriegstagebuch inFeldpostbriejen 1940-1945, andO'Gefr. Albrecht Englert his manu­script (with Oberst i.G. Brandsllidter),Kurze Geschichte und Zusammenstel­lung der Kampje der 19. Armee.

Other studies are Jorg Staiger,Riickzug durchs RhOnetal (Neckar­gemund, 1965) and Erich Spiwoksund Hans StOber, Endkampj zwischenMosel und Inn: Xlll. SS-Armeekorps(Osnabrtick, 1976). American opera­tional accounts include the U.S. Armyofficial histories Jeffrey J. Clarke andRobert Ross Smith, Riviera to theRhine (Washington, DC, 1993) andHugh M. Cole, The Lorraine Cam­paign (Washingon, DC, 1950), andspecial U.S. Army Armor Schoolstudies like The Nancy Bridgehead(Fort Knox, Kentucky, 1946) and Ar­mor vs Mud and Mines (Fort Knox,Kentucky, 1949-50).

Dr. A. Harding Ganz gradu­ated from Wittenberg Univer­sity in 1961 with a SA de­gree, and was awarded anMA degree from ColumbiaUniversity in 1963. Commis­sioned from OCS, he servedas a tank platoon leader with3/37th Armor, 4th ArmoredDivision, in Germany 1964-'66. He received his Ph.D.from Ohio State University in1972, and is now an Associ­ate Professor at the OSUNewark, Ohio campus. Hisfields of specialization areModern Europe and militaryhistory. He is a prior contribu­tor to ARMOR.

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