Thayer Vietnam People's Army: Corporate Interests and Military Professionalism

8/2/2019 Thayer Vietnam People's Army: Corporate Interests and Military Professionalism

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ThePoliticalRoleoftheVietnamPeoplesArmy:

CorporateInterestsandMilitaryProfessionalism

CarlyleA.Thayer

PapertoPanelon

UnderstandingVietnamesePolitics:

NewApproachesandIssuesfromtheField

AssociationofAsianStudiesAnnualConference

SheratonCentreTorontoHotel,Toronto,Canada

March1518,2012


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ThePoliticalRoleoftheVietnamPeoplesArmy:

CorporateInterestsandMilitaryProfessionalism

CarlyleA.Thayer

Abstract

The role of the military in a Leninist politicalsystem represents a distinct subset of civil

militaryrelations.Themilitaryisrequiredtoplayadomesticpoliticalroleinsupportofthe

onepartyregime inadditionto itsroleasdefenderofthestatefromexternalattack.This

paper presents a case study of the political role of the Vietnam Peoples Army (VPA) in

contemporaryVietnam.

Vietnamslongyearsofrevolutionandwarhaveresultedinthemilitarysengagementwith

society

in

a

number

of

state

building

activities

such

as

economic

defence

zones,

national

defence industry, commercial enterprise, and socialization of the general public through

universalconscriptionandcompulsorydefenceeducationforstudents.

Since1991theVPAhascomeunderpressuretoreformandthendivestitselfofcommercial

enterprisesnotdirectlyrelatedtonationalsecurity.Themilitaryspolitical influenceatthe

national levelhasdecreased in linewithanoticeabletrend inmilitaryprofessionalismand

institutionalautonomy.

ThesedevelopmentsdonotmeanthattheVietnamesemilitarywillwithdrawentirelytothe

barracks.AsaresultofhistoricallegaciestheVietnamPeoplesArmywillcontinuetoplaya

major

role

in

society

through

national

conscription;

the

maintenance

of

large

reserves,

militia and selfdefence forces; defence education, and socioeconomic development in

economicdefencezones.Thenewlyemergingthreattosovereignty inVietnamsEastSea

willintensifythetrendtowardsmilitaryprofessionalismandinstitutionalautonomy.

INTRODUCTION

WiththecollapseofsocialisminEasternEuropein1989,andthedisintegrationoftheSoviet

Union in 1991, arguably there are only five socialist states remaining: China, Cuba, Laos,

North Korea, and Vietnam. The Vietnam Peoples Army (VPA) and it role in Vietnamese

society

has

always

been

subject

to

the

special

dynamics

inherent

in

the

relationship

between communist parties and their armed forces. On the one hand, the Vietnam

CommunistParty(VCP)exercisesstrictpoliticalcontroloverthemilitary,asitdoesoverall

otheragenciesofthestate.Militaryofficersarepartof,butalsosubordinateto,theofficial

partyhierarchythatdominatesthevarious levelsofstateandsociety.Ontheotherhand,

thecommuniststategrants thearmed forcesaprivilegedplace insociety:historically the

VPA has been viewed as the indispensable tool of the workerpeasant class to fight


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imperialistenemiesbothwithinandoutsidethestate.Consequently,thearmedforcesare

integratedpermanentlyintotheinfrastructureofthestate,andtheirpoliticalinfluencehas

beenrelativelystableovertime.Nevertheless,fluctuations inthepolitical influenceofthe

VPA have occurred, and they have often been indicators not only for change within the

armedforces,alsoforshiftsinVietnamesepoliticsasawhole.

Oneof

these

fluctuations

was

visible

in

the

1990s.

For

Vietnam,

the

decade

of

the

1990swasframedbytwocrises:thecollapseofthesocialistsystem inEasternEuropeand

theSovietUnionandtheAsianFinancialCrisisof199798.Bothoftheseeventsexacerbated

cleavagesamongtheVietnamese leadership,whichwasdividedaboutthescopeandpace

ofeconomicreformsandthedegreetowhichVietnamshouldpursue integrationwiththe

globalmarket.Fearfulthatthecollapseofthesocialistsystemcouldmake itvulnerableto

externalsecuritythreats,andconcernedthatitwouldnotbeabletostemthechallengeof

major economic reform without the help of the military, the Vietnam Communist Party

decided to increase the role of the armed forces in political affairs. As a result, the VPA

becameamajor participant inVietnams thirdwaveof statebuilding (Vasavakul 1997b).

Subsequently, retired senior military officers were selected state president and party

secretarygeneral,andmilitaryrepresentationontheVCPsCentralCommitteeincreasedat

boththeseventh(1991)andeighth(1996)nationalpartycongresses.

Thisperiodofmilitaryascendancywasshortlived.In2001,theninthpartycongress

declined to reappoint the incumbent secretary general (a retired military officer) to a full

fiveyear termandelectedacivilian instead.Military representationon thePolitburowas

reducedbyhalf,leaving itwithonlyoneVPAmember.ItappearedthatafterVietnamhad

overcomethedualthreatofthebreakdownofthecommunistblocandtheAsianfinancial

crisis,theVCPwasconfidentenoughofitspositiontoreturnthestrengthofthemilitaryin

thepartys

key

bodies

to

pre

crisis

levels.

A

major

study

of

this

period

concluded

that

these

developmentsrepresentednotonlyaprocessofdefiningpowersharingbutalsocontinued

partycontrolofthearmy(Vasavakul2001:338).Vasavakul(2001:255356)alsomadetwo

predictions regarding the future role of the military in Vietnam. First, the VPA would

continuetoberunbypoliticalgeneralswhowerenotlikelytobecomespokespersonsfor

professional officers even though the military was given increased autonomy over

professionalmatters.Second,theVPAwouldcontinuetoplayanimportantroleinshaping

the newpolitical,economic, andsocialorderbecause themilitary hadbecomeboth red

and entrepreneur, i.e they had linked their communist identity with both national

economicdevelopmentingeneralandmilitaryownedbusinessesinparticular.

Thispaper

reviews

the

militarys

role

in

politics

from

2001,

Vasavakuls

account

was

published, to the present. The paper argues that while the militarys role has undergone

somesignificantadjustments,itsoverallinfluenceonpoliticsandsocietyhasremainedata

steady state. Three factors explain this stasis. First, there is consensus among the party

leadershipthatthemilitaryshouldcontinuetoplayaroleinstatebuildingthroughnational

conscriptionandwhat isbroadlytermed socialistconstruction.Second,the leadershipof

VCPcontinuestoacceptMarxistLeninist ideologicalstricturesthat legitimisesthepolitical


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roleofthemilitary inVietnamsonepartystate.Third,economicdevelopmentandglobal

integration have replaced the more traditional security concerns of the 1990s as the key

drivers of Vietnamese politics. Despite the general level of stability in militaryparty

relations at society level, Vietnams membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO)

and integration into the global economy has generated external pressures on the VPA to

relinquish

ownership

of

its

commercial

enterprises.

This

is

a

potentially

significant

developmentthatwilllikelyresultingreaterpoliticalautonomyfortheVPAinnationallevel

politicsasitgivesprioritytomilitaryprofessionalism.

This paper also highlights other crucial changes in militaryparty relations as

economicdevelopmentandnationalsecurityconcernshavebecome intertwined.Thishas

become particularly apparent as Vietnams plans to develop its maritime territory in the

SouthChinaSeahavebeenchallengedbyChina(Thayer2008b:3741).Thishasgenerated

pressuresontheVPAtomodernise itsforces,raise itsprofessionalstandards,andstepup

internationaldefencecooperationwithregionalstatesinordertobetterdefendVietnams

nationalsovereignty.Inthefuture,theVPAislikelytobelessredandentrepreneur,thatis

lessideologicallyandcommerciallyorientated,andmorekhakiandprofessionalasmilitary

expertise and corporate interests dominate. The following discussion reviews these

developments in three parts. Part one presents an historical overview of the military

involvement inpoliticsfrom1946to2001.Parttwoanalysesthecontemporaryroleofthe

militaryinpolitics,nationaldefence,securityaffairs,theeconomy,andsocietyfrom2001to

the present. Subsequently, part three discusses the factors that account for altered

influence of the military in national politics and its persistence at societal level. The

conclusionprovidesasummaryofcontemporarycivilmilitaryrelations inVietnamandthe

factorsthathaveshapedthem.

THEMILITARYSINVOLVEMENTINPOLITICS,19462001

TheVietnamPeoplesArmywasfoundedin1946.Initially,itcomprisedaplatoonofthirty

four members led byVo Nguyen Giap, a political general, communist revolutionary and a

seniormemberoftheIndochineseCommunistParty.Since1946,theVPAhasbeenengaged

inarmedconflictforatotalofthirtysixyears,includingthewarsagainsttheFrench(1946

54),theUnitedStates(195975)andtheKhmerRouge inCambodia(197789).Duringand

aftertheKoreanWarintheearly1950s,ChinaassistedtheVPAtotransformitselffroman

antiFrench guerrilla force into a conventional army. Subsequently, the VPA continued its

transformationinto

amodern

regular

force

during

the

Vietnam

War,

this

time

with

Soviet

assistance. By 1987, the VPA had 1.26 million troops and was the worlds fifth largest

standingarmy.

Despite the VPAs transformation into a formidable military force, it has always

remainedunderfirmpartycontrol(Thayer1985:245248).Thepartyexercisescontrolover

theVPAthroughthemechanismofdualroleelites.Inotherwords,seniorpartymembers

simultaneouslyoccupythehighestranks inthemilitary.Fromitsveryorigins,theVPAwas


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commanded by socalled political generals, i.e. communist revolutionaries who had no

prior military experience (Turley 1977). At the same time, party control was reinforced

through a parallel structure of political commissars and political officers within the VPA

itself,1directedbyapartymilitarycommitteecomposedofmembersofthePolitburoand

CentralCommittee.Since1985,partycontroloverthearmedforceshasbeenexercisedby

theCentral

Military

Party

Committee

(Dang

Uy

Quan

Su

Truong

Uong).

With the establishment of a communist oneparty state, first known as the

DemocraticRepublicofVietnam(DRV,195475)andsubsequentlytheSocialistRepublicof

Vietnam (SRV, 1976present), the VPA has been assigned multiple roles, not the least of

which is responsibility for defence of the homeland. The VPA has also been assigned

political,internalsecurity,andeconomicproductionroles(Thayer1985:250254andThayer

2001).Intheviewofpartyleaders,themilitarycannotplayapoliticallyneutralrolebecause

itmustcarryoutitshistoricmandateasaninstrumentofmaintainingthesupremacyofthe

workerpeasant alliance against its class enemies. However, the multiple roles of the

military inVietnamesesocietymaybeaccountedfornotonlybyMarxistLeninist ideology

but also by its guerrilla heritage and protracted periods of armed conflict and external

threatstonationalsecurity.

Table1:MilitaryRepresentationonVCPExecutive

Year/Position Politburo* CentralCommittee*

Year(Congress) Military

Representation

Percent Military

Representation

Percent

1986(6th) 2of13 15.4 9of124 7.3

1991(7th

) 2of13 15.4 13of146 8.9

1996(8

th

)

2of

19

10.5 17

of

170 10.0

2001(9th

) 1of15 6.7 14of150 9.3

2006(10th) 1of14 7.1 17of160 10.6

2011(11th

) 1of14 7.1 19of175 10.9

Average _ 10.4 _ 9.25

*fullmembers

Source: The authors personal FileMaker Pro 9 database on all members of the VCP Central

Committee,1951present.Alternatemembersarenotincluded.

In other words, the VPA has been continually engaged in statebuilding, economic

production and internal security. In order to fulfil these roles, the VPA has always been

accordedblocrepresentationonthepartysCentralCommittee(seeTable1).Between1960

and 1982, for example, military representation on the Central Committee averaged 14.6

percent of full members. With the adoption of economic reforms (doi moi) in 1986,

however,militaryrepresentationdeclinedtosevenpercentof fullmembers.Similarly,the

1Partycontrolistheresponsibiliby oftheGeneralPoliticalDepartment.Politicalcommissarsandofficersare

trainedinaseparatePoliticalAcademy(QuanDoiNhanDan,18February2011.


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VPAs representation on the Politburo has fallen from an average of 20.7 percent in the

1970sandearly1980stoonlyonemember(or7.1percent)in2011.Since2001,thissingle

memberhasbeentheVPAsmostseniorgeneralwhosimultaneouslyholdsthepositionof

MinisterofNationalDefence.

In addition to its representation on the partys Central Committee and Politburo,

uniformed

military

officers

stand

for

election

to

and

serve

as

deputies

in

the

National

Assembly and on its various committees. The Minister of National Defence is ex officio a

member of Cabinet and the National Defence and Security Council. The VPA also plays a

political role through the socialisation of conscripts into the values of Vietnams socialist

regime.Inotherwords,theVPAactsasoneofthemaintransmissionbeltsforrecruitment

into the party. Finally, the VPA also played an important role historically in socialist

construction through involvement in building infrastructure, economic production and

naturaldisasterrelief.

WhileVPAengagementinthecommunistregimehasbeenaconstantinVietnamese

politics since the 1940s, its intensity has seen significant fluctuations. For instance, the

collapseofsocialisminEasternEuropeinthelate1980ssetthestageforaperiodofmilitary

ascendancy inthe1990s.Vietnamesepartyconservativesandmilitary leadersarguedthat

VietnamwasthreatenedbyaWesternplotofpeacefulevolution.In1992, intheshadow

ofthecollapseoftheSovietUnion,Vietnampromulgatedanewstateconstitution.Forthe

firsttime,thearmedforceswerechargedwithdefenceofthesocialistregimeinaddition

todefenceofthefatherland.GeneralLeDucAnh,theformerMinisterofNationalDefence

andseniormemberofthePolitburo,wasselectedpresidentandexofficiocommanderin

chiefofthearmedforces.2

In1996,attheeighthnationalpartycongress,militaryrepresentationontheCentral

Committee

temporarily

rose

to

ten

per

cent,

the

highest

figure

since

the

fourth

nationalparty congress in 1976. The following year, Vietnam was struck by three typhoons: the

AsianFinancialCrisis,amajornaturaldisastercausedbyarealtyphoonandmassivepeasant

protestsinThaiBinhprovince.ItwasinthiscontextthatinDecember1997,Lt.GeneralLe

KhaPhieu(retired),formerheadofthearmysGeneralPoliticalDepartment(GPD),replaced

Do Muoi as VCP secretarygeneral. This marked the first occasion that a retired career

militaryofficerwasappointedparty leader.Significantly,this leadershipchangetookplace

ataplenarysessionoftheCentralCommitteeandnotatanationalpartycongress.

Butbytheearly2000s,Vietnamhadlargelyrecoveredfromthemultiplecrisesofthe

late 1990s. Vietnams economy grew at an unprecedented rate averaging 7.63 percent

between2000

and

2007.

Further,

Vietnam

stepped

up

the

pace

of

economic

integration

by

signing a major bilateral trade agreement with theUnited States that came into effect in

2ThePresidenthasresponsibilityforseniorpromotions.Forexample,followingtheeleventhpartycongress,

PresidentNguyenMinhTrietappointedLt.GeneralNgoXuanLichdirectoroftheGeneralPoliticalDepartment

replacingGeneralLeVanDung(VietNamNetBridge,2March2011).Subsequently,inDecember2011,

VietnamscurrentPresident,TruongTanSang,promotedninegeneralstoseniorrankincludingeighttothe

rankofSeniorLt.General(VietNamNews,7December2011).


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late 2001. As a result, economic development and global integration replaced traditional

security concerns as the key drivers of domestic politics. These developments coincided

with growing disenchantment within the VCP over the lacklustre leadership of Secretary

GeneralPhieuand the increasing roleofthemilitary indomesticpolitics.Phieusposition

wasseverelyunderminedwhenCentralCommitteemembers learnedthathehaddirected

the

military

intelligence

service

to

conduct

wire

taps

on

Politburo

colleagues

(Thayer

2003a).Thus inApril2001,theCentralCommittee issuedanunprecedentedrebuketothe

MinisterofNationalDefence,GeneralPhamVanTra,andtheChiefoftheGeneralStaff,Le

VanDung.SecretaryGeneralPhieufellvictimtothisbacklash.Althoughhewasendorsedby

thePolitburoforanothertermaspartyleader,thisrecommendationwasoverturnedbythe

Central Committee. Phieu was replaced asVCP secretarygeneral at the ninth congress in

2001. As Vietnam weathered the aftershocks of the collapse of socialism and the Asian

Financial Crisis, the militarys political role has gradually receded. It was now the partys

managerial elite that took centre stage to manage Vietnams integration with the global

economy.

MILITARYENGAGEMENT INPOLITICS, SECURITYAFFAIRS,THEECONOMYAND SOCIETY:

20012010

While Phieus replacement, Nong DucManh, signalled a lessening of military influence at

the highest echelons of the party, the continuing interference of General Department II

(military intelligence) in party affairs provided evidence of the VPAs autonomy within

Vietnams political system. This was also highlighted by the fact that the military as an

institution suffered only a minor blowback from Phieus misuse of the VPAs intelligence

service.

For

example,

VPA

representation

on

the

Central

Committee

was

reduced

onlymarginallyattheninthnationalpartycongressin2001fromtheprevioustenpercentto9.3

percent. Similarly, General Pham Van Tra emerged relatively unscathed. While he was

dropped two places in the protocol rankings, he retained his portfolio as Minister of

NationalDefenceandseatonthePolitburo.Iftherewasamainvictiminthemilitary,itwas

GeneralPhamThanhNgan,headoftheGeneralPoliticalDepartment.Hewasdroppedfrom

thePolitburo.GeneralLeVanDung,Chiefof theGeneralStaff (CGS), retainedhisseaton

the Central Committee and was elected to the partys Secretariat. Five months after the

tenthcongress,DungreplacedThanhasheadoftheGPD.

DespitePhieusfall,complaintsaboutthemilitarysinterferenceinpoliticscontinued

after2001.

In

2004,

two

of

Vietnams

most

respected

retired

military

generals

wrote

private

letters to the partys senior leadership charging that the military intelligence service was

abusingitspowerbyinterferingininternalpartyaffairs(Thayer2008a).Nolessafigurethan

General Vo Nguyen Giap demanded an investigation into the extralegal activities of

General Department II because of the failureof the VCPs key bodies to take appropriate

action. General Giap specifically charged that General Directorate II had attempted to

manipulatefactionalisminthepartybysmearingthepoliticalreputationsofleadingfigures


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includinghimself (Thayer2008).GeneralGiapwassupported inhisaccusationsby retired

Major General Nguyen Nam Khanh. Khanh, a pillar of the establishment, was the former

head of the Central Committees Propaganda and Training Department, former Political

Officer for Military Region 5, and former deputy head of the VPAs General Political

Department. He accused General Department II of slandering, intimidation, torture,

political

assassination

as

well

as

manipulation

of

internal

party

factionalism

for

its

own

partisanpurposes.Khanhdocumentedhisallegationsbyquoting fromtheclassifiedNews

BulletinproducedbyGeneralDirectorateII(Thayer2008a).

Ifthere isanysubstancetotheallegationsraisedbygeneralsGiapandKhanh,they

demonstrate that key military leaders were actively involved in internal factional politics

withintheVCPitself.Significantly,itwasonlyinthelate1990sthatthefirstattemptswere

undertakentobringnationalsecurityandintelligenceagenciesunderlegislativecontrol.For

example, the first Ordinance on Intelligence was issued by the chairman of the National

Assembly Standing Committee in December 1996. In September the following year, the

Prime Minister issued Decree 96/CP on defence intelligence. These documents placed

controloverthemilitaryintelligenceserviceinthehandsofthestatepresidentandunified

directionofthegovernment.However,bothdocumentsweredraftedbytheVPAandleftit

withsuchextensivepowersthat itwasstillabletooperateoutsideofeffectivepartyand

government control. Even the Law on National Security, passed in November 2004 in an

efforttorestorepartyandstateoversightofthemilitary,didnotseverelyerodetheVPAs

powerofpoliticalintervention.OneindicationthatGeneralDirectorateIIhadcomethrough

thisreviewprocessunscathedandwasviewedasavaluablecontributortonationalsecurity

came in March 2008 when the VCP secretarygeneral, Nong Duc Manh, awarded it the

designationthePeoplesArmedForcesHeroforitsremarkablecontributionsoverthepast

decades(Quan

Doi

Nhan

Dan,

25

March,

2008).

The militarys ability to maintain its political influence was also reflected in its

representationontheVCPsmainbodiesafterthetenthcongressin2006.Forinstance,VPA

representation on the Central Committee rose slightly from fourteen members or 9.3

percent (ninth congress) to seventeen members or 10.6 percent. Moreover, the

composition of the VPA bloc on the Central Committee highlighted the importance that

boththepartyandthemilitaryassignedtotheVCPVPArelationship.TheVPAsseventeen

membersincluded:chiefofthegeneralstaff,headanddeputyheadoftheGeneralPolitical

Department, head of the Technical General Department, three deputy ministers, the

commander of the navy, the political commissar of the AirDefence Air Force political

commissarsfor

Military

Regions

1,

3,

4,

7and

9,

the

commander

of

Military

Region

5,

the

deputy commander/chief of staff for Military Region 2, and the head of the National

Defence Academy. This pattern of VPA representation on the partys Central Committee

continuedaftertheeleventhnationalpartycongressin2011.

Inthesamevein,theVPAhasretaineditssingleseatonthePolitburo,withDefence

Minister General Pham Van Tra replaced at the tenth congress by General Phung Quang

Thanh,ChiefoftheGeneralStaff.Shortlyafterwards,GeneralThanhalsobecameDefence


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Minister. Both Generals Tra and Thanh are career regular army officers and represent a

break from the political generals who were traditionally appointed in the past. General

ThanhwasreappointedtothePolitburoatthe2011eleventhpartycongress.

The analysis of the VPAs involvement in political institutions has pointed to

fluctuating, but overall significant levels of military participation in Vietnamese elite

politics.3However,

assessing

military

involvement

in

the

political

apparatus

is

only

one

way

of measuring the quality of civilmilitary relations. Comparative analysts have broadened

theirperspectiveon civilmilitary interactionsbydiscussing the involvementof the armed

forces inothermainareasofstateaffairs:nationaldefence,securityaffairs, theeconomy

andsociety.Accordingly,thefollowingsubsectionsreviewtheVPAsengagement inthese

keyarenasofsociopoliticalandsecurityrelationships.

VPAsRoleinNationalDefence

Intermsof itsnationaldefencerole,theVPAunderwentamassivestrategicreadjustment

throughoutthe1990s.In1987,theVPAsmainforcestoodatamassive1.26milliontroops.

Withinayearof itswithdrawalfromCambodia in1989,600,000soldiersweredischarged.

Bytheendofthe1990s,furthermanpowerreductionslefttheVPAwith484,000mainforce

troops (Thayer 1995 and Thayer 2000a). First and foremost, this drastic drop in troop

numbers reflected Vietnams changed strategic priorities after the end of the Cold War.

Revisingitspriorfocusonpossibleaggressionbyimperialism,Vietnambegantotakenoteof

other,more regionalthreats. In1998,Vietnams firstDefenceWhitePaper identified hot

spots intheSouthChinaSeaasthemainexternalthreattoVietnam(SocialistRepublicof

Vietnam1998:18). However, two majorstrategicmissions assigned to theVPA national

defenceand

economic

production

remained

the

same.

Vietnam's

second

Defence

White

Paper issued in2004declared,forexample,thatthemaintasksofthearmed forceswere

to maintain combat readiness for safeguarding the socialist homeland and making a

contributiontothecauseofnationalconstruction(SocialistRepublicofVietnam2004:37).

By 2004, the altered strategic environment had dramatically changed Vietnams

placeintheworld.Vietnamhadnotonlynormalizeddiplomaticrelationswithallitsformer

enemies,buthadavidlysoughtregionalandglobal integrationthroughmembership inthe

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Regional Forum, Asia Pacific

Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and membership in the WTO. Consequently, the

Vietnam Peoples Army was charged with responsibility not only for traditional security

threatssuch

as

territorial

conflict

in

the

South

China

Sea

and

peaceful

evolution

but

non

traditional threats as well. In this regard, the 2004 White Paper mentioned illegal drug

traffickingandtransportationofweapons,piracy,transnationalorganizedcrimes,terrorism,

illegal immigration and migration, and degeneration of ecological environment (Socialist

RepublicofVietnam2004:12).

3ForananalysisoftheroleofseniormilitaryofficersininternalpartypoliticsseeVuving2011.


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Table2VietnamsDefenceBudgetaspercentofGDP,199909

(inbillionUSdollars)

Year VPASize* Defence Budget

(DB)**

GDP** DB as % of

GDP**

1999 484,000 2.1 34.5 6.0

2000 484,000 2.6 36.8 7.2

2001 484,000 3.1 39.4 7.9

2002 484,000 2.6 42.2 6.2

2003 484,000 2.6 45.3 5.8

2004 484,000 3.0 48.8 6.1

2005 455,000 3.2 52.9 6.0

2006 455,000 3.2 57.3 5.6

2007 455,000 3.7 62.1 5.2

2008 455.000 2.1 66.0 3.2

2009 455,000 2.1 69.0 3.0

Sources:

*InternationalInstituteofStrategicStudies,TheMilitaryBalance(19992000to2010)

**DefenceIntelligenceOrganisation,DefenceEconomicTrendsintheAsiaPacific(2009:27).

Nevertheless, Vietnamese leaders remained concerned with external ideological

enemies. These fears were directed mainly at the network of anticommunist overseas

Vietnamese living in America, France, Australia and other Western countries. The 2004

Defence White Paper stated that Vietnam is facing the threat of schemes and ploys by

external hostile elements in collusion with internal reactionaries to interfere in Vietnams

internalaffairsandtocausesociopoliticalunstability[sic]inVietnam(SocialistRepublicof

Vietnam 2004: 1112). While Vietnam regularly expressed concerns about these Diaspora

groups,by2009Vietnamsdomesticsecuritysituationhadbecomestabilizedeventhough

hostileforces[continued]toinciteviolenceandseparatismissomeareasofthecountry

(Socialist Republic of Vietnam 2009: 16 and 18). The improved internal security situation

enabled further troop reductions throughout the 2000s. Between 2001 and 2005, for

example,29,000soldiersweredischarged,bringingmanpowerstrengthdownto455,000a

force level that has been maintained up to the present. According to official Vietnamese


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11

figures,thedefencebudgetasaproportionofGDPfluctuatedbetween1.8and2.5percent

ofGDPbetween2004and2008(SocialistRepublicofVietnam2004:35and2009:38),but

thesefigureshavebeendiscountedastoolowbyoutsideanalysts(seeTable2).

Despite thedownsizingof themilitaryand thedecline in theoverallproportionof

the

defence

budget,

expenditure

on

the

armed

forces

nevertheless

increased

in

absolute

terms between 2002 and 2007. This was due to the VPAs efforts to meet its defence

responsibilities by embarking on a selective program of upgrading existing stocks of

serviceableweapons,forcemodernization,increasingmilitaryprofessionalism,andstepping

up international defence cooperation. As a result, Vietnams spending on defence rose in

absolute terms from US$ 2.6 billion in 2001 to 3.3 billion in 2007, with significant funds

allocatedtotheVPAsmodernizationprogram.Defencespendingfellprecipitously in2008

and2009whentheglobalfinancialcrisisimpactedonVietnam(seeChart1).

Chart1VietnamsDefenceBudget,19992009

(inbillion

US

dollars)

Source:DefenceIntelligenceOrganisation,DefenceEconomicTrendsintheAsiaPacific,(2009:27).

TheonsetofVietnamscurrent forcemodernization programcanbe traced to the

mid1990s(Thayer1997).Sincethattime,Vietnamhasbeenseekingtodevelopadeterrent

capability in the South China Sea through the acquisition of modern Svetlyakclass fast

attackcraftandGephardclassfrigatesarmedwithsurfacetosurfacemissiles,sixKiloclass

conventional submarines, Bastion landbased antiship cruise missiles, Extended Range

Artillery Munitions and possibly the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile. Vietnam has also


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modestly modernized its air force through upgrade programs for its MiG21s and Su22s,

andtheacquisitionofahandfulofSu27andtwentySu30jetfightersarmedwithadvanced

airtoairandairtosurfacemissiles.Theairdefenceforcehasacquiredanewgenerationof

surfacetoairmissilessuchastheS300PMU.Vietnamsforcemodernizationprogramhas

also stressed the development of selfreliant capabilities in its national defence industry

throughco

production

(eg.

the

Dutch

manufactured

SIGMA

class

corvette)

and

technology

transfers at the lower end of the technology scale (Thayer 2009b). In 2011, Vietnam

producedandlauncheditsfirstPatrolBoat(modelledontheSvetlyakoffshorepatrolvessel)

andatripledecktroopship (TuoiTre,3October2011andFragrantHarbour [HongKong]

No.263,NovemberDecember2011,38).

TheVPAsmodernizationprogram,coupledwithregionalintegrationwithVietnams

Southeast Asian neighbours, have produced pressures to step up the pace of military

professionalismtoensurethattheofficercorps iscapableofabsorbingnewtechnologies,

meetingthewiderangeofresponsibilities ithasbeenassigned,andengagingwithASEAN

partners.InordertoensurethatVPAofficerskeepabreastofandassimilatetointernational

standards of military professionalism Vietnam has begun introducing wideranging

educational reforms since the late 1990s. Similarly, Vietnams program of professional

militaryeducation(PME)andtraininghasbeenenhancedinordertoimprovetheskillsand

qualifications of the officer corps. In addition, VPA officers are being sent abroad in

increasing numbers to attend professional development courses in countries such as

Australia, India, Malaysia and the United States. In 2008, Vietnam hosted its first PME

course for foreignmilitaryofficers.Finally,Vietnamhasmarkedly intensified international

defencecooperationthroughtheexchangeofhighleveldelegations,negotiationofdefence

cooperation and arms and technology procurement agreements, sending observers to

foreignmilitary

exercises,

and,

most

recently,

joint

patrols

and

joint

exercises

with

regional

navies(Thayer2008b).

TheMilitaryandDomesticSecurity

As notedabove, the 2004 Defence WhitePaper assigned the VPAa role role in domestic

securityaffairs,primarilythroughcounteringthethreatofpeacefulevolution.TheVPAhas

been very circumspect, however, about involving itself in direct confrontation with the

public,preferringtoseetheMinistryofPublicSecuritysarmedpolicetaketheleadrolein

dealing with public protests, riots and violent demonstrations. Nevertheless, in February

andMarch

2001

the

VPA

was

deployed

to

the

Central

Highlands

to

deal

with

an

outbreak

of

unrest by several thousand members of mostly Christian ethnic minorities (known as the

DegarpeoplesortheMontagnards) inthreeprovinces.Thesedisturbancesreceivedmuch

attentionbecausetheytookplaceontheeveoftheninthnationalpartycongress.National

securityauthoritieswerequicktoblameoutsidehostileforces.Inparticular,theypointed

toFULRO(FrontUnifieLiberationDesRacesOpprimes,UnitedFrontfortheLiberationofthe

Oppressed Races). The FULRO was an ethnonationalist separatist movement of highland


13/26

13

ethnicminoritiesthatdatedtothe1960sbuthadpersisted in itsstruggleafterunification

wellintothe1990s.

Whenunrestbrokeoutin2001,atleastthirteenVPAregimentswerepostedtothe

CentralHighlandstoprovidesecuritybymanningcheckpointsandsecuringtheborderwith

Cambodia(AgenceFrancePresse,27April2001).Soldierswerebilletedwith localfamilies,

while

political

cadres

directed

a

campaign

of

political

education

designed

to

calm

the

situationandpreventillegaldeparturestoCambodia.Butrenewedunresteruptedin2004,

which Vietnamese security authorities blamed on alleged instigation by the Montagnard

FoundationintheUnitedStates.TheMontagnardFoundationisanorganizationcomprised

ofhighlandethnicminoritieswhoworkedwithU.S.SpecialForcesduringtheVietnamWar.

Evidently,thislinkagebetweendomesticethnicminoritiesandtheMontagnardFoundation

isanexampleofwhattheVietnamesegovernmentconsiderstobethe threatofpeaceful

evolution.

Although the security situation has been brought largely under control, ethnic

minorityunrestcontinuestoconcerncentralauthorities.InFebruary2007,forexample,the

National Defence and Security Council discussed plans to boost national defence and

security in strategic areas including the Central Highlands, border regions and the

Northwest(VietnamNewsService,27February2007).Inthiscontext,theVPABorderGuard

has been given responsibility for combating illegal drug trafficking and transportation of

weapons,illegalimmigrationandmigrationaswellasothertransnationalcriminalactivities,

whichareparticularlyprevalentintheborderareasinhabitedbyethnicminorities.

Accordingtothe2010FreedomHousereportonVietnam(Gainsborough2010:10),

the situation in the Central Highlands has remained volatile, and unrest has recently

increased over land disputes resulting from confiscations to develop large stateowned

coffeeplantations.

The

Central

Highlands,

it

appears,

will

continue

to

figure

prominently

on

theVPAsdomesticsecurityagendafortheforeseeablefuture.VPAforceswerereportedly

involved in security operations in May 2011 when unrest broke out among the Hmong

ethnicminorityinDienBienprovincealongtheborderwithLaos(AgenceFrancePresse,16

April2011).

ButsecurityoperationsarenottheonlyVPAinstrumenttoaddresstheunrestinthe

Central Highlands. The armed forces have also long been involved in developing

infrastructureandprovidingsocialwelfareservices inremoteborderregions.Accordingto

VietnamsmostrecentDefenceWhitePapertheVPAcurrentlyrunstwentytwoeconomic

defence zones (khu kinh tequan su) from the Central Highlands to the China border

(SocialistRepublic

of

Vietnam

2009:

118).

An

estimated

20,000

households

belonging

to

the

familiesofsoldiersandmilitiahavebeensettledinDakLakandBinhPhuocprovincesalone

(ThayerandHervouet2004:373374andThayerforthcoming:466467).ArmyCorporation

15, the 15th Army Corps and the Dak To Army Corps have been involved in land

reclamation, infrastructureandhousingconstruction, irrigationandwatersupply,forestry,

education and public health. According to Freedom House, however, such programs are

often implemented within governmentcontrolled parameters and perceived by minority


14/26

14

populations as aimed at weakening their unique cultural and linguistic identity.

(Gainsborough2010:10).

Moreover, the VPA has assisted lowland Vietnamese resettle in the Central

Highlandswhereclearedlandhasbeenturnedoverforthecultivationofcashcropssuchas

coffee,rubber,cashewnuts,cotton,pepper,maizeandgreenbeans.Notsurprisingly,these

resettlementprograms

have

been

controversial

in

some

areas

because

of

their

impact

on

residentethnicminoritycommunities.WhenethnictensionserupttheVPAifoftenaskedto

assistotherelementsofthePeoplesArmedForcesinmaintaininglawandorder.

TheVPAsEconomicActivities

Inadditionto itsnationaldefenceand internalsecurityroles,theVPA isalsochargedwith

makingacontributiontothecauseofnationalconstruction.Therearemanyaspectstothis

role, includingassistingwithsocioeconomicdevelopment,poverty reduction,andnatural

disasterresponseandmitigation.However,themostprominentroleoftheVPAinnational

construction takes the form of direct ownership of national defence industries and

commercialenterprises.

TheVPAsinvolvementincommercialactivitiesbeganinthe1980swiththeadoption

ofdoimoi (Thayer 2003a). In March 1989, nine major army economic construction units

wereconverted into legalentities (corporationsorgeneralcorporations)underDecree46

issuedbytheCouncilofMinisters.Thesenewcorporationswerepermittedtooperateon

thesamelegalbasisasstateownedenterprises,includingobtainingcreditfromstatebanks

and formingjoint ventures with foreign partners. In a short period of time, there was a

marked rise in thenumber of militaryowned corporationsanda rapidexpansion of their

economic

and

commercial

activities.

These

corporations

became

important

generators

ofrevenue, and by the early 1990s, they had massively broadened their production of

consumergoods(VietnamNewsAgency,21February1993).In1993,thearmysetupitsfirst

joint stock commercial bank. In the following year, there were over 330 armyrun

commercialbusinesses,includingsixtymilitaryownedenterprisesoperatedbyregularunits.

Thenumberofjointventureswithforeignpartnersjumpedfromfortyninein1995tosixty

seven in 2003. The scope of the armys commercial activities embraced consumer goods,

garmentsandtextiles,automobilemanufacturing,constructionwork,shipandplanerepair,

hotels and real estate, mechanical engineering, as well as telephone, fax and internet

services.4

Inline

with

national

policy

to

reform

the

state

owned

enterprise

sector,

however,

militaryownedenterpriseswerealsorequiredtorestructurefromthemid1990sonwards.

Thereweretwomajorwavesofenterprisereforms(Thayerforthcoming:463468).Thefirst

lasted from 1995 to 1997 and resulted in the reduction of the number of militaryrun

4MilitaryrunenterprisesreportedlyhavebeenimplicatedinsmugglingtimberfromLaos(VoiceofAmerica

News,29July2011).


15/26

15

corporations from 335 to 193, mainly through mergers. Nonetheless, a number of these

mergerstookplaceonlyonpaperandthereformsofthefirstwavedidlittletogeneratethe

capitalnecessarytoupdateoldequipmentandoutmodedtechnology.

Table3ListofMajorDefenceDepartmentGeneralCorporations

MilitaryTelecommunicationsGeneralCorporation(Viettel)

TruongSonConstructionGeneralCorporation

NortheastGeneralCorporation

FlightServicesGeneralCorporation

General

Corporation

No.

15

MilitaryPetrolGeneralCorporation

GeneralCorporationNo.28

ThanhAnGeneralCorporation

TanCangGeneralCorporation

MilitaryBank

Source:SocialistRepublicofVietnam2009:119.

A second wave of reforms was initiated in May 1998 in a directive issued by the

Central Military Party Committee. The main aim of these reforms was to improve the

efficiencyofmilitarycorporationsand increasetheircapacitytoundertakemajorprojects.

At that time, thenumberofmilitaryenterpriseswas reduced to164, following theCMPC

directivethatcalledforunprofitablefirmtobedissolved.Thedirectivefurtherdecreedthat

army divisions, provincial units and specialized departments within the defence ministry

werebarred

from

operating

commercial

enterprises.

In

late

1999,

Prime

Minister

Phan

Van

Khai directed that military corporations rationalize their commercial activities (Thayer

forthcoming:465). Inordertooverseethisprocess,theEconomicsDivisionoftheGeneral

DepartmentofNationalDefenceIndustryandEconomicswasupgradedtothestatusofan

independentEconomicsDepartmentwithinthedefenceministry.

Itwouldappearthatthesecondwaveofreformofarmyenterprisesdidnothavea

major impact. The VPA defended its corporate interests and business continued more or


16/26

16

lessasusual. Infact, itwasestimated in2001thatthenumberofcompaniesoperatedby

theVPAhadrisenagaintotwohundred,atleastfortyofwhichwerejointventures,withan

annual turnover estimated at US $320 million (Janes World Armies electronic edition,

accessed10October2001). In2001,theMilitaryTelecommunicationGeneralCorporation

or Viettel, entered the lucrative internet5 and mobile phone markets to directly compete

withstate

enterprises.

By

2003,

the

revenues

generated

by

military

owned

enterprises

had

shotuptoU.S.$653.6million(QuanDoiNhanDan,7January2003).Moreover,theMilitary

Commercial Joint Stock Bank raised its chartered capital in 2003 to enable it to provide

credittolargeprojects.

Butthemilitarysgrowingeconomicandcommercial interestsdirectlyclashedwith

the imperatives of global economic integration when Vietnam became a member of the

WTO. In2007, it was estimated that thearmystillownedabout140 companiesandheld

shares inmorethantwentyadditionalfirms inalmosteverysectoroftheeconomy.These

enterprisesreportedlygeneratedUS$2billion inrevenue in2006(ThanhNien,31January

2007). Trying to address both the internal and international pressures in this field, the

Central Committee passed a resolution in January 2007 requiring that all business

enterprisesoperatedbythearmy,publicsecurity,partyandmassorganizationsbeplaced

under state management. The decision specified, however, that the VPA would retain

ownershipandcontrolovercompaniesthatweredirectlyrelatedtonationaldefenceand

security.While theprocessofhandingoverownershipofallothercompanieswas due to

beginbeforetheendof2007,itsoonbecameevidentthatthisdeadlinewasunrealistic.In

December 2007, Defence Minister General Phung Quang Thanh stated that his ministry

wouldhandoveraround140militaryownedcommercialenterprisesto thestateby2012

and focus on training and building up a regular modern army (QuanDoiNhanDan, 19

December2007).

In 2008, the National Assembly adopted the Ordinance on Defence Industry that

providedthelegalbasisforthetransferofmilitaryrunbusinessesandsetouttheprinciples

and legal framework for national defence industries to be retained by the Ministry of

NationalDefence.PlanstodivesttheDefenceMinistryofitsbusinessenterprisesappeared

togathersteaminApril2008whenthePrimeMinisterissuedinstructionsforthedivestiture

of one hundred and thirteen militaryowned enterprises (VietNamNews, 4 April 2008).

While the initiative led to the divestment, restructuring or disbandment of small military

businesses, itallowedtheVPAandtheDefenceMinistrytoholdontotheirmostprecious

asset,Viettel,andnineothermajorgeneralcorporations(seeTable3).

InJanuary

2010,

Viettel

was

officially

acknowledged

as

one

of

Vietnams

eight

largest

economic groups, and the first to be run by the Defence Ministry. In addition to its core

telecommunication business, Viettel was allowed to branch out into the field of military

information technology meeting the criteria set out in the 2007 decree that made it

5ViettelbecamethefirstnetworkoperatorinVietnamtoofferitscustomers4G(fourthgeneration)

broadbandtechnology(VietnamNewsAgency,12May2011).


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17

possiblefortheVPAtomaintaincontroloverenterprisesdirectlyrelatedtonationalsecurity

interests. Accordingly, Viettel remains an important source of income for the military,

despite the governments overall strategy to reduce VPA involvement in commercial

activities. Viettel has increased its revenues 1,500 times within 10 years, from US$2.1

million in 1999 to $3.2 billion in 2009 (Viet Nam News, 13 January 2010). Viettel has

emergedas

one

of

Southeast

Asias

most

profitable

military

businesses

with

investments

in

Cambodia,LaosandHaiti.

TheArmedForcesandSociety

The fourtharea ofmilitarypolitics relates to the way theVPAengageswithsociety, both

directlyandindirectly.TheVPAsdirectinfluenceonsocietyisexercisednotonlythroughits

455,000soldiersandtheirfamilies,butalsothroughnearlyfivemillionreserves,militiaand

otherparamilitaryforces.Inaddition,thereareoveroneandahalfmillionmembersofthe

VietnamVeteransAssociation,not includingtheirdependenthouseholds. Inaddition,the

VPA interacts with society through two major mechanisms: national conscription and

compulsorydefenceeducation.

Vietnam has maintained a system of national conscription since the late 1950s.

Currently,allmalesagedbetween17and45andwomenagedbetween18and40whohold

professionalskillsarerequiredtoregisterwiththeofficesofthemilitarycommandatthe

commune, ward or district where they reside. New recruits are given six months basic

training and then assigned to units that engage in road building, planting trees or other

infrastructure projects. At present, nearly one million men reach military age each year.

Legally all medically qualified males are eligible for service, but there is a long list of

exemptions,including

deferments

for

students.

Military

service

is

generally

sought

after

by

youthsfromruralareas,whilethereisapalpableaversiontomilitaryservicebytheirurban

counterparts, especially those from welloff families who either pay bribes or enrol their

sons in parttime classes and university preparatory courses to avoid the draft.

Nevertheless,asaresultofthemassivereduction inthesizeoftheregulararmy,Vietnam

haslittledifficultyinmeetingitsmanpowerrequirements.1Duetothecompetingdemands

of the countrys market economy, however, the VPA has found it difficult to attract

educationallyqualifiedindividuals.

The VPA has also long provided vocational training for soldiers slated for

demobilization.Priortotheadoptionofdoimoi,demobilizedsoldierswerereturnedtotheir

former

employers

who

were

required

to

provide

them

with

ajob.

During

the

difficult

transition from a centrally planned to a market economy, however, the VPA became

involvedinvocationaltraininginordertoreducetheburdenonbusinesses.Duringthefive

year period from 1996 to 2001, the Ministry of National Defence set up three technical

collegesandeighteenjobpromotioncentrescapableofhandling35,000traineesayearfor

both long and shortterm courses. In the fiveyear period ending in 2001, 80,000

demobilized soldiersweregivenvocational trainingand 45,000demobilized soldiers were


18/26

18

assistedbyjobpromotioncentres in findingemployment (VietnamNewsAgency,30May

2001). In 2011Vocational TrainingSchool22beganavocational course for1,150soldiers

demobilised from military service. The course included training in pharmacy, information

technology, electronics, automobile technology, and driving (Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 29

September2011).

The

second

mechanism

through

which

the

VPA

exercises

influence

in

society

is

throughanextensiveprogramofdefenceeducationforhighschoolanduniversitystudents,

government officials, community leaders and religious dignitaries. In May 2001, Prime

MinisterPhanVanKhaisignedDirectiveNo.15/2001OnDefenceEducation inallcolleges,

universities, and schools belonging to administrative agencies, political and social

organizations. Both the Ministry of National Defence and the Ministry of Education and

Trainingweregivenresponsibilityforcarryingoutthedirective.

In August 2001, the Prime Minister established the Central Council for Military

Education,which includedmanyseniorgovernmentofficials.TheCounciloversaw,among

other things, the redrafting of the curriculum for national defence education. Defence

educationand itscurriculumweremadecompulsory forallstudents inseniorhighschool

and above. During the 2006 school year, for example, over three million students from

2,866schoolsanduniversitiesattendednationaldefenceeducationcourses.Textbooksand

study documents were jointly prepared by the Ministry of National Defence, the VCP

Organisation and Personnel Commission and the Ministry of Education and Training. In

addition, the VPA General Political Department and the VCP Ideology and Culture

Commission organized training courses on national defence for more than one hundred

leaders,editorsandjournalistsfromcentralpressagencies.

Defenceeducationcourseswerealsorunbymilitaryregionalcommands. InMarch

2007,for

example,

Military

Region

5reported

that

it

had

conducted

courses

for

over

half

amillion persons in the previous year. At the same time, Military Region 4 High Command

conducted its twentyfirstcourseondefenceeducation fordirectorsand vicedirectorsof

colleges,universities,highschoolsandstateownedenterprises.MilitaryRegion3provided

defenceeducationto8,700teachersfromschools,collegesanduniversitiesbetween2001

and2010(QuanDoiNhanDan,19February2011).Thefollowingmonth,theHighCommand

of Military Region 9 concluded its twentythird defence education course for eightysix

provincialofficialsfromtheMekongDelta.

Vietnams defence education program is significant because it brings Vietnams

educatedyouthandothermembersofsociety intocontactwith thearmed forcesand its

officers.Most

importantly,

they

are

introduced

to

if

not

indoctrinated

with

the

militarys

conservative views on national security. Furthermore, the series of defence education

courses provides important legitimation for the political role of the armed forces in

Vietnamsonepartystateandforthemilitarysrolesindomesticaffairs.

Likemanyothermilitaries inSoutheastAsia,theVPAalsotriesto influencesociety

throughthemassmedia.Onewayofachievingthisaimisthoughthepublicationofitsmass

daily,QuanDoiNhanDan(PeoplesArmyofVietnam),withaweekdaycirculationofseveral


19/26

19

hundred thousand copies. The VPA alsopublishes the ArmyLiterature and ArtsMagazine

(VanNgheQuanDoi) a popular literature magazine. In addition, the military has its own

publishinghouse,NhaXuatBanQuanDoiNhanDan(PeoplesArmyPublishingHouse)that

producesbooksonmilitaryhistoryandbiographiesofmilitaryheroes.Althoughthemilitary

doesnotownradioortelevisionstations,itdoesproduceavarietyofpopularprogramsfor

thestate

run

network.

Through

efforts

like

these,

which

complement

its

deep

involvement

indefenceeducation,theVPAremainsafixtureinthedailylivesofordinaryVietnamese.

EXPLAININGTHELEVELOFMILITARYINVOLVEMENTINPOLITICS

Samuel Huntington (1991) coined the term third wave to describe the global process of

democratization that took place in the fifteenyear period following the military coup in

Portugal in April 1974. Huntington estimated that during this period thirty countries

underwentatransitionfromauthoritariantodemocraticrule.SinceHuntingtonsstudywas

published, a further eight countries arguably made a similar transition in the AsiaPacific

region. The list includes: Cambodia, Indonesia, Thailand, Mongolia, Taiwan, South Korea,

East Timor, and Pakistan. Several of these countries have suffered reversals, such as

Pakistan and Thailand, but have since experienced fresh democratic transitions (however

thesituation inThailandremainshighlyvolatile).Processesofdemocratictransitionshave

almost invariablyresulted inattemptsbypoliticalelitestoplacethemilitaryundercivilian

control;butciviliancontrolhasnotnecessarilyendedthemilitarysengagementindomestic

politics.

In his study of civilmilitary relations in the AsiaPacific, Muthiah Alagappa (2001)

noted that since the mid1980s there has been a clear trend in reduction in the political

powerof

militaries

across

the

region.

In

the

same

vein,

Vasavakul

(2001:

356)

concluded

her

study of the military in Vietnam by arguing that the Vietnam Peoples Army in 2001 was

likely [to continue] toplayan important role inshaping thenewpolitical,economic,and

social order in the future because the VPA had successfully altered its role from

revolutionaryheroestoredentrepreneursandpoliticalgeneralswouldcontinuetodefend

the armys commercial interests. In other words, Vietnam appeared unlikely to be

influencedbyregionaltrendsidentifiedbyAlagappa.

ThecasestudypresentedinthispapersuggeststhatVasavakulsassessmentsmade

in2001havebeenovertakenbyevents.First,heruseofthetermpoliticalgenerals(taken

fromTurley1977)nolongeraccuratelydescribestheindividualswhohavetakencommand

of

the

VPA

after

2001.

General

Phung

Quang

Thanh,

for

example,

is

a

product

of

professionalmilitaryeducationinVietnamandtheSovietUnion. Second,Vasavakulsuseof

thetermredissomewhatmisleadingbecauseitresonateswiththetermredandexpert

used to describe tensions in Chinese civilmilitary relations in the 1960s. While Vietnam

justifiespartydominanceoverthemilitaryonideologicalgrounds,ithasnevergonetosuch

extremesasChinaduring theCulturalRevolution.Third, Vietnamsmilitaryentrepreneurs

have lost influence within the VPAs institutional hierarchy, with much of the militarys


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20

economicpowernowalmostexclusivelyconcentrated inViettelacompanyrunnotonly

by generals, but by professional managers as well and nine other general corporations

controlledbyregionalmilitarycommands.

Inotherwords,itappearsthatsince2001theVPAhasaspiredtoachievethelevels

ofmilitaryprofessionalismand forcemodernisationnecessaryfor itsmissionofdefending

Vietnamsterritorial

sovereignty

particularly

in

the

South

China

Sea.

In

this

context,

the

VPA

has relinquished some of its influence over the party, state and the economy, while it

increaseditsauthorityoveritsinternalmilitaryaffairs.Nevertheless,theVPAhasremained

politically influential after 2001, confirming Vasavakuls overall prediction of stable civil

military relations in Vietnam. To begin with, the interests of Vietnams military

establishment continue tobe representedby itsmemberson theVCP CentralCommittee

andbytheVPAsmostseniorgeneralonthePolitburo.Similarly,theVPAcontinuetoplay

aninfluentialroleinsocietythroughoversightofmilitia,selfdefenceandreserveforces,a

largeveteransnetwork,conscription,anddefenceeducationcourses.Hence,thenotionof

decliningmilitaryinfluencethatAlagappapostulatedforotherSoutheastAsianstatesdoes

notaccuratelycapturethedynamicsunderway inVietnam.The followingsectionanalyses

thereasonsforthisphenomenon.

VPAInvolvementinPolitics:KeyFactors

Inthescholarlyliteratureoncivilmilitaryrelations,manyauthorshavepointedtofourmain

variablesthatcanexplainthetrajectoryofmilitaryengagementinthepoliticsofparticular

nationstates:historical legacies,qualityofciviliangovernance, international influenceand

internalmilitaryculture. Thissectiondiscusses the relevanceof these four factors for the

caseof

Vietnam,

beginning

with

historical

legacies.

Todays

VPA

still

carries

many

features

that date back to its foundation amidst Vietnams struggle against French colonial rule.

Significantly,thepoliticalroleoftheVPAwasdeterminedattheoutsetbyMarxistLeninist

ideology,accordingtowhichtheVPAwasan instrumentoftheworkerpeasantallianceto

seize power from the capitalist class. The subsequent prolonged wars against the French

and the United States seemed to confirm this MarxistLeninist premise of historical

determinism,providingthefoundationfortheVPAsnationaldefence,internalsecurityand

politicalroles.

The independencestruggleand thewaragainst theUnitedStatesalsoaccount for

theVPAswiderangingengagementwithsociety.TheVPAswarethos,enshrinedincurrent

doctrine

of

allpeoples

national

defence,

stresses

the

importance

of

maintaining

large

reserve, militia and selfdefence forces, and calls for the active involvement of the main

forcesineconomicproduction,socialistconstructionandotherstatebuildingactivities.But

while thewarshada formativeand lasting influenceon theVPAandVietnamesesociety,

the grounds for the militarys institutional involvement in politics were laid in periods of

relativepeace.Mostimportantly,theVPAscurrentroleasoneofthemaincomponentsof

thecommunistsystemhas itsroots inVietnamsperiodsofpoliticalconsolidation,suchas


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21

theestablishmentoftheDRVin1954andtheSRVin1976.Consequently,theVPAbecame

oneofthefourmainpillarsoftheregime,alongsidetheparty,thestateandtheVietnam

FatherlandFront(anumbrellagroupformassorganizations).TheVPAsblocrepresentation

on the partys Central Committee and in the National Assembly is a product of these

periods.Asaresult,politicalandmilitaryrolesbecamefused,andtheyremainsotoday.

Another

factor

in

explaining

the

levels

of

military

participation

in

politics

is

the

qualityofciviliangovernance.Militariesfinditdifficulttointerfereinorassumedominance

over political affairs if civilian groups run effective and stable governments. This link

between the effectiveness of civilian governance and military participation in politics has

alsobeenobvious inVietnam.Militaryengagement inpolitics increased inthe late1990s,

when the Asian Financial Crisis threatened Vietnams economic growth, but it decreased

soon after the economic problems had been resolved. Since 2006, civilian Prime Minister

NguyenTanDungandhiscabinethavetakentheleadinmanagingtheeconomy,delivering

highlevelsofeconomicgrowth,improvedpublicservicesandpoliticalstability.Whilethere

havebeensomedivisions intherulingelite,particularly inresponsetotheglobalfinancial

crisisof2008,thesedidnotunderminetheeffectivenessofthegovernmentasawhole.In

2006, for example, Vietnam witnessed the emergence of a network of prodemocracy

dissidentsknownasBloc8406(fromthedateoftheirfounding)andotherpoliticalactivists

whochallengedonepartyrule.However,thisgrouphassofarnotposedaseriouschallenge

to the legitimacy,power anddurabilityof Vietnamsoneparty regime (Thayer2009aand

2010).

Onvitalelementintheincreasingthestrengthofcivilianrulehasbeentheenhanced

prominenceofthelegislatureandcabinetingovernance.Significantly,PrimeMinisterDung

has used legislation and executive decisions to regulate and control military affairs. For

example,

Vietnams

2009

Defence

White

Paper

noted

that

the

National

Assembly

haspassedanumberoflawsconcerningnationaldefence,suchastheLawonAmendmentsand

Supplements to several articles of the Law on the VPA Officers, the Law on National

Defence, the Law on Amendments and Supplements to several articles of the Law on

MilitaryService,theLawonNationalSecurity,theLawonthePeoplesPublicSecurity,and

theLawonNationalBorder.TheStandingCommitteeoftheNationalAssemblyhasissueda

series of national defence decrees:Decree on Maritime Police, Decree on the Militia and

SelfDefenceForce,DecreeonIntelligence,DecreeontheBorderGuard,DecreeonNational

Defence Mobilization and the Decree on Defence Industry (Socialist Republic of Vietam

2009:5152).

Vietnams

legislative

effort

has

updated

and

amended

outmoded

ordinances

and

filled in legalgapstokeepupwithVietnamstransitiontoamarketeconomy.In2009,for

example, the National Assembly passed the Law on Militia and SelfDefence Forces, inter

alia,torequireprivatizedstateownedenterprisestoraiseandtrainselfdefenceforces.The

importance of Vietnams growing package of defence legislation is that it provides a

regulatoryframeworkforstatecontroloverthearmedforcesandalegalbasisforthemany

domestic roles of the armed forces. But despite this increasing empowerment of civilian


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22

government,theexperienceofthelate1990shasalsoshownthatVCPleaderscontinueto

rely on the VPA whenever they feel that domestic stability could be undermined by

economiccrisisorexternalsecuritythreats.

The third factor highlightedbyscholarsas paying acrucial role indetermining the

levelofmilitaryparticipationinpoliticsisrelatedtointernationalinfluences.Sincethemid

1980s,however,

Vietnams

regime

has

largely

insulated

itself

from

external

influences

that

could undermine oneparty rule or alter existing civilmilitary relations. For instance,

Vietnam successfully weathered the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe and the

disintegration of the Soviet Union by implementing economic reforms that made it

independentfromMoscowsfinancialsupport(ThayerandHervouet2004:363366).

Similarly,Vietnamsmembership inASEANandtheASEANRegionalForum (ARF) in

the mid1990s, have not impacted significantly on the internal dynamics of Vietnams

regime. Neither ASEAN nor the ARF require its members to meet certain benchmarks in

terms of their democratic quality or civilmilitary relations. Nonetheless, Vietnams

increasingintegrationintotheSoutheastAsianregionhasledVPAgeneralstointensifytheir

defence cooperation activities with external states. This has taken the form of reciprocal

highlevel visits, naval port calls, and defence education exchanges. The net result of this

process has been to socialize Vietnams military leaders into new values and norms

governing thedomestic and external roles of the armed forces. These external influences

have combined with domestic pressures (such as the divestiture of most militaryrun

commercialenterprises)torefocusthemilitarysroleinnationalpoliticstothepromotionof

greater military professionalism. However, none of this has reduced the militarys long

standingroleinstatebuildingwithsocietyatlarge.

Fourth and finally, scholars of civilmilitary relations tend to emphasize the

importanceof

internal

military

factors.

In

recent

years,

the

most

important

development

in

this field has been the push for increased military professionalism in the VPA. Since the

1980s, there is some evidence that a debate has taken place within the VPA over the

relativeinfluenceofpoliticalcommissarsonprofessionalmatters.Overtimeandaftersome

experimentation,theroleofpoliticalofficershasbeensupplantedbytheonecommander

system (FitzGerald1989).Today,thebalancehasshifted in favourofcareerprofessionals

whomustpreparetheVPAformodernwars.Inthisregard,Vietnamhasdrawnlessonsfrom

both Iraq wars as well as the modernization of Chinas Peoples Liberation Army. The

increased stress on professionalism notwithstanding, the system of political commissars

remainsinplace.6ThemilitaryscurrentblocrepresentationonthepartyCentralCommittee

is

likely

to

remain

stable,

reflecting

the

VPAs

corporate

interests.

In

the

same

vein,

the

planneddivestmentofthemajorityofmilitarybusinesseshassupportedthetrendtowards

themilitarysprofessionalizationtosomeextent,buttheVPAcontinues toholdontoten

majorgeneralcorporationsascashcowsandsourcesofemploymentformilitarypersonnel.

6PolitburoResolutionNo.51NQ/TU,VetieptuchoanthiencochelanhdaoduaDang,thuchienchedomot

nguoichihuyganvoithuchienchedochinhhuy,chinhtrivientrongQuandoinhandanVietNam,(QuanDoi

NhanDan,14January2011).


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23

CONCLUSION

Theroleofthemilitaryinacommunistpoliticalsystemrepresentsadistinctsubsetofcivil

military relations. Classical civilmilitary relations theory argues that the military should

eschewapoliticalroleinordertoenhanceitsprofessionalmilitarycompetence inexternal

defence.

But

in

Leninist

political

systems

the

military

almost

invariably

plays

a

domestic

political role inorder toensurethesurvivalofthesocialistregime.Vietnam, forexample,

amended its state constitution after the collapseof the Soviet Union to explicitly identify

defenceofthesocialistregimeasoneofthemilitaryscoremissions.Accordingly,theVPA

continuestobeheavily involved inVietnamspolitical institutions.Mostseniorofficersare

members of the VCP, and the military selects its own delegates to attend national party

congresses. The VPA is given bloc representation on the party Central Committee and

representation inthePolitburo.Similarly,activedutymilitaryofficersstandforelectionto

andserveasdeputiesintheNationalAssembly,andthemostseniormilitaryofficerserves

asMinisterofNationalDefenceandhasaseatinCabinet.

While the involvement of the VPA in politics and society has experienced

fluctuationsovertime,theoveralltrendofcivilmilitaryrelationsinVietnamsincetheearly

2000s has been marked by stasis. Regional and global advances towards democratization

and depoliticization of the military have not impacted on Vietnam in similar fashion as

elsewhere in the AsiaPacific. Vietnam reduced the role of military officers in the upper

echelonsof theVCP tosomeextent (thepostofVCPsecretarygeneralwas returned into

civilian hands in 2001 after being held by a retired general for four years), but VPA

representation instateandpartybodieshas remained relativelystable. In thesamevein,

the VCPs CentralCommitteehas ordered themilitary (and otherstatebodies aswell) to

relinquish

ownership

of

their

commercial

enterprises

by

2012,

but

the

VPAs

continuedcontroloverViettelandninemajorgeneralcorporationswillallowthemilitarytoretaina

soundeconomicpowerbase.Inaddition,theVPAiscertaintocontinuetoplayamajorrole

insocietyatlargethroughnationalconscription;themaintenanceoflargereserves,militia

andselfdefenceforces;defenceeducation,andsocioeconomicdevelopmentineconomic

defencezones.

DespitetheVPAscontinuedentrenchment inpolitical,socialandeconomicaffairs,

however, there have been signs of increasing professionalism within the military as a

defenceforce.Thishastakentheformofenhancedmilitaryeducationandtraining,bothat

home and abroad, in order to better manage the process of force modernization now

underway.At

the

same

time,

Vietnam

is

widening

its

military

engagement

with

the

region

and the world. The VPA has taken the first tentative steps towards creating a cadres of

specialists that can be committed to peacekeeping operations under the United Nations.

Thus, while Vietnams socialist regime and its armed forces have so far successfully

withstood domestic and international pressures for democratization and less politicised

civilmilitaryrelations,thegeneralsseemtohavedevelopedagreaterinterestintraditional

areasofdefenceaffairs.


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1 In order to address potential oversupply of conscripts, in July 2005 Vietnam reduced the length of

compulsoryservicefromtwoyearstoeighteenmonths,and loweredtheageofeligibilityformilitaryservice

fromthe1827yearrangeto1825years.Individualsaged26and27wereshuntedintothereserves.Theterm

ofservice forpersonsholdingtechnicalqualifications orserving in the navywasreduced from three to two

years.Fortheannualrecruitmentdrivein2011see:QuanDoiNhanDan,19February2011.

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