Thayer China's Rise and the Passing of U.S. Primacy: Australia Debates its Future

8/6/2019 Thayer China's Rise and the Passing of U.S. Primacy: Australia Debates its Future

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ROUNDTABLEU.S. Re-engagement in Asia

S.R. Joey LongSimon Tay

Kumar RamakrishnaCarlyle A. Thayer

Zheng Wang

The National Bureau of Asian Research, Seattle, Washing ton


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China's Rise and the Passing of u.s. Primacy:Australia Debates Its Future

Carlyle A. Thayer

W hen China surpassed the United States in 2007 as Australia's largesttrading partner, Australian strategic planners were confronted witha strategic dilemma unique in the country's history. In the past, Australia'skey ally was also its major trading partner. Canberra now must fashion astrategic policy to take into account that this is no longer the case and thatits major ally and economic partner are great-power rivals.

Australia Debates China's RiseAustralia has engaged in two debates about how to respond to China'srise. The first took place within government circles in 2009 during the

drafting of the defense white paper released in May that year. 1 Both theOffice of National Assessments and the Defence Intelligence Organisationreportedly offered the view that China's military transformation wasprimarily defensive, being largely in response to U.S. naval power in thePacific, and was also comn1ensurate with China's status as an emerging greatpower. 2 But this view was countered by senior officials in the Departmentof Defence who saw China's military modernization as posing a potentialchallenge to Australia's security interests. The latter view prevailed. It is nowknown, thanks to WikiLeaks, that then prime minister Kevin Rudd alsoshared such reservations about China's rise. Five weeks prior to the release ofthe white paper, Rudd reportedly told Secretary of State Hillary Clinton thatintegrating China into the international community should be pursued bymultilateral engagement, while also preparing to deploy force if everythinggoes wrong."3 Rudd also foreshadowed the report's focus on naval capability

CARLYLE A. THAYER is an Emeritus Professor at the University of New South Wales at the AustralianDefence Force Academy in Canberra. He can be reached at .

1 Australian Government, Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030 (Canberra, 2009).2 Cameron Stewart, Deaf Ear on Agency Advice;' Australian, December 7,2010.3 "U.S. Embassy Cables: Hillary Clinton Ponders U.S. Relationship with Its Chinese Banker;'

Guardian, March 28, 2008 http://www.guardian.co.uklworld/us-embassy-cablesdocuments/199393. For commentary, see Paul Maley "Rudd's Plan to Contain Beijing;' Australian,December 6, 2010; Laura Tingle, What Rudd Really Thinks about China;' Australian FinancialReview, December 6 ,2010; and David McLenan, "Secret Cable Shows Rudd Warned U.S. on'Paranoid' China;' Canberra Times, December 6, 2010.

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of power theory in his analysis to explain China's rise and the responseby the United States and regional states. Instead, he argues that economicpower is the prime component of national power:

In the long run, economics is what counts in power politics.National power has many manifestations-military, political,cultural-but only one ultimate source. No country in historyhas exercised great power without great wealth, and the countrywith the most wealth always ends up with the most power. Thewealth that matters is the aggregate wealth of the state, ratherthan that of individuals. 9

According to this reasoning, China will become more powerful than theUnited States around 2030, when its economy is predicted to surpass the u.Seconomy. China's growing economic power will allow the country to bulkup its military muscle and successfully challenge U.S. military dominancein the Western Pacific. In White's words:

If China grows fast enough to keep our [Australia's] economybuoyant, it will overtake America to become the richest countryin the world sometime around 2030. That will make it too strongto live under American leadership in Asia. It will look to lead inits own right, and challenge America's position. Lo

White argues that the current international order in the Asia-Pacific wasfashioned by Sino-U.S. accommodation in 1972. For the four decades sincethen, American primacy has been uncontested. The United States shapeda benign regional and international order that created the conditions formany states to develop and prosper. Yet in recent years China's phenomenaleconomic rise has also benefitted many Asian states, including Australia.White contends that most states in the Asia-Pacific both want the UnitedStates to renlain engaged and want to trade with Cllina. They do not wantto choose between the two great powers. According to White, a Chinesechallenge to American power in Asia is no longer a future possibility but acurrent reality."11

The most controversial part o[White's treatise is his evaluatioll of optionsfacil1g the United States and his recommended policy prescriptions forAustralia. He asserts that America has three options for responding to China'srise. It can withdraw from Asia, share power with China, or compete with itfor primacy."12 White favors the second option as most conducive to regional

9 White, "Power Shift: Australia's Future:' 19.1a Ibid., l.11 Ibid" 2.12 Ibid., 36.

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stability: the United States must share power with China "as an equal" while"surrendering primacy and all that goes with it."13 He concludes that a concertof Asian powers is the best mechanism for managing China's rise. 14

Australians Debate Hugh White's Power Shift ThesisWhite's "Power Shift" essay provoked an immediate response in the

pages of the Australian, Australia's leading national daily. Four op-edpieces were published in quick succession. Greg Sheridan, the foreign affairscorrespondent for the Australian, characterized White's article as "thesingle, stupidest strategic document ever prepared in Australian history byson1eone who once held a position of some responsibility in our system."15Sheridan takes issue with two main points. First, he argues that Sino-u.S.power-sharing would not guarantee that China will not bully regional statesor continue to develop its nuclear arsenal. Second, Sheridan challenges whathe terms White's patronizing depiction of Washington's China policy. Whiteargues, in effect, that it is not in the American psyche for the United States tosee itself as treating China as an equal. According to White, "Exceptionalismis fundamental to Americans' image of their country.. . Americans simply donot accept that theirs is just one country among others."16 Sheridan arguesthat the United States has been "treating China as a fellow great power formany decades"-for example, by supporting China's membership in theUnited Nations Security Council.

The second op-ed response to White's "Power Shift" was written byMichael Danby (a federal member of Parliament and former chairman ofthe Foreign Affairs Subcommittee), Carl Ungerer (director of the NationalSecurity Program at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute), and PeterKhalil (an associate of the Centre for International Security Studies at theUniversity of Sydney). This trio argues that White's policy prescriptions forAustralia amount to a modern-day form of appeasement to the challenge oftotalitarianism, inasmuch as "China.. . is a totalitarian power that seeks to

13 White, "Power Shift: Australia's Future;' 37, 39.14 Ibid., 23-24, 37-39, 51, and 55. For a discussion of the concert of Asian powers as one possiblefuture mechanism to manage great-power relations, see Malcolm Cook, Raoul Heinrichs, RoryMedcalf, and Andrew Shearer, Power and Choice: Asian Security Futures (Sydney: Lowy Institutefor Inte rnational Policy, 2010), 38-50.15 Greg Sheridan, "Paper Projects Distorted Vision of Future U.S. -China Relations;' Australian,September 11-12,2010.16 White, "Power Shift: Australia's Future;' 40.


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extend hegemony over its neighbourhood as a means of protecting itself."17Danby, Ungerer, and Khalil reject outright White's suggestion that strategiccircumstances might dictate that Austral ia disengage from the United Statesand accommodate China. Although they do not directly confront White'sargument that, irrespective of Australia's preferences, power relativities arechanging in China's favor, they do argue that "the maintenance of the U.S.alliance system in Asia is vital for the continuance of Australia's security."

The third piece to comment on White's "Power Shift" was written byGeoffrey Garrett, the head of the U.S. Studies Centre at the University ofSydney. Garrett begins by taking issue with the emerging view that selfdefense is needed now because "Australia can no longer rely on the U.S. for itssecurity and it cannot trust China to remain peaceful." Thus, Australia facesthree options: "side more with the U.S., sidle up to China, or go it alone."18

Garret dismisses the assumption that it is no longer possible forAustralia to become closer to both China and the United States at the sametime: "Australia does no t have to and should not want to choose betweenits alliance with the U.S. and its economic ties with China. The mostimportant foreign policy move the government can make is to ensure thatit stays that way."19 Garret further argues that Washington does not view itsrelations with Beijing as a zero-sum game. He notes that the United Stateshas been pursuing economic engagement with China for two decades andthat "America seeks to maximise the economic benefits of China's rise andminimise the chances that it will have malign political consequences."20 TheU.S. agenda for the Asia-Pacific century, Garret concludes, "seeks to engageand socialise China rather than isolate and chastise it." What of Australia'srole? According to Garret, Australia not only shares a similar approach toChina as the United States but also Japan and South Korea. Australia shouldassist the United States in becoming more involved in the East Asia Summitand transforming "its hub-and-spokes alliances with Australia, Japan andSouth Korea into a more integrated system."21

Finally, the fourth op-ed essay to comment on White's "Power Shift"was written by Josh Frydenberg, a member of Parliament and a former

17 Michael Danby, Carl Ungerer, and Peter Khalil, "No Winners by Appeasing China," Australian,September 16,2010.18 Geoffrey Garret t, "A New Pacific Triangle Looms:' Australian, September 18,2010.19 Ibid.20 Ibid.21 Ibid.

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Liberal government ministerial adviser. 22 Frydenberg takes issue withWhite's proposal that the United States should relinquish primacy in Asia.In Frydenberg's view, Australia shares liberal and democratic values with theUnited States, whereas China does not. He further notes that U.s. leadershipis required to deal constructively with China to address key security issuesin the Asia-Pacific. Frydenberg concludes by arguing that "Australia'snational interest is best served by continuing to engage and encourage ourlongstanding ally, the U.S., to retain its primacy in the region."23

The editors of the Australian Journal of International Affairscommissioned Hugh White to write a summary of his power shift thesis andinvited two academics to comment on it. The first comment was prepared byAndrew Phillips, a fellow in the Department of International Relations atthe Australian National University. Phillips argues that White's assertionthat U.s. primacy was responsible for 40 years of peace and security in theAsia-Pacific overlooked the important role that East Asian states played inpursuing economic integration and adopting self-strengthening policies. 24Phillips concludes:

White rightly acknowledges the unsustainability of regionalorder if it is exclusively predicated on a waning Americanprimacy. Bllt I believe he understates the role that great andmiddle powers' self-strengthening choices played in the firstinstance in radically broadening the political support base forthe open, commercially integrated and predominately rulegoverned order over which America has presided since 1972.Consequently, I believe that he exaggerates the contemporaryfragility of that order, and overstates the degree to which thesecurity architecture will need to be radically overhauled ifpeace is to be maintained. 25

The second academic commentary on White was written by Nick Bisley,a professor of international relations at La Trobe University.26 Bisley cutsopen White's China billiard ball to expose its inner composition. Bisley findsthat there are economic and social constraints at play that deserve greaterprominence in any analysis of China's future rise. According to Bisley:

China remains a poor country, and there are numerous factors thatpresent significant challenges to China's long-term growth. These

22 Josh Frydenberg Washington Is Integral to Ou r Region;) Australian, September 21, 2010.23 Ibid.24 Andrew Phillips, From the Age of Asymmetry to the Great Reconvergence: Securing Order in the

Asian Century;' Australian Journal of International Affairs 65, no. 1 (February 2011): 94-101.25 Ibid., 99-100.26 Nick Bisley, "Asia's Transformation, International Relations and Public Policy;) Australian Journal ofInternational Affairs 65, no. 1 (February 2011): 102-8.


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include the environmental costs of development, managing largescale and high-tempo social transformation on a massive scale,social inequality and perhaps the hardest of all, moving to morecon1plex capital- and knowledge-intensive economic systems.27

ConclusionHugh White's essay "Power Shift" has provoked a range of responses

from various quarters of the Australian strategic policy community. Yet fewof these analyses engage directly with his central assumptions regarding therelationship between aggregate economic wealth and military power andhow to define and operationalize the concept of primacy as a dependentvariable. White's concept of primacy appears flat and static. Are theredifferent dime11sions of primacy? Is primacy a relative term? Exactly what ismeant by the binary terms "contested" and "uncontested" primacy?White is strongest in his a11alysis of the growing basis of China's power,but he leaves the issues of Chinese weaknesses and what u.S. national powerwill look like in 2030 largely unexplored. 28 Even though power relativitiesmay be changing, White's argument is deficient without an analysis of therole u.S. scientific and technological innovation will play. For example,White argues that China's developn1ent of anti-access and area-denialcapabilities is currently challenging u.S. primacy in the Western Pacific. Yethe does not take into account how the United States will respond to thischallenge over the next several decades.

Finally, White's essay is devoid of any serious consideration of the rolethat multilateral institutions are likely to play now and in the future inmitigating great-power rivalry. Last year the United States, China, Japan,South Korea, India, Australia, Russia, and New Zealand joined the ASEANDefence Ministers Meeting to i11augurate a new security mechanism. Thisyear Russia and the United States will participate in the East Asia Summitfor the first time. The membership of both bodies is congruent. Americanand other regional analysts need to engage in a discussion, if not a debate,about how to shape these fledgling institutions to underpin regional securityby effectively incorporating Cl1ina into the decisionmaking process.

27 Bisley, "Asia's Transformation:' 105.28 For alternate views, see John Lee, "Why America Will Lead the 'Asian Century:" Centre for

Independent Studies (CIS), Foreign Policy Analysis, August 19,2009; John Lee, "The Fantasy ofTaming China's Rise:' CIS, Foreign Policy Analysis, May 6,2010; and Ross Babbage, Australia'sStrategic Edge in 2030, Kokoda Paper, no. 15 (Kingston: Kokoda Fo undation, 2011).[ 26 j

Thayer China's Rise and the Passing of U.S. Primacy: Australia Debates its Future

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