Thank you for collaborating with your local hackers

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© Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés Thank you for collaborating Thank you for collaborating Thank you for collaborating Thank you for collaborating with your local h4 with your local h4 with your local h4 with your local h4¢ ¢ ¢k3r$ ! k3r$ ! k3r$ ! k3r$ ! Christian “Check your Wifi” Frenette Michel “You’ve been H4x0r3d!” Cusin CSE Conference – Mont-Tremblant October 16, 2009 _ _ _ C: C: C: C:\ \ \>format C:Y/N >format C:Y/N >format C:Y/N >format C:Y/N

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Transcript of Thank you for collaborating with your local hackers

Page 1: Thank you for collaborating with your local hackers

© Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés

Thank you for collaborating Thank you for collaborating Thank you for collaborating Thank you for collaborating

with your local h4with your local h4with your local h4with your local h4¢¢¢¢k3r$ !k3r$ !k3r$ !k3r$ !

Christian “Check your Wifi” Frenette

Michel “You’ve been H4x0r3d!” Cusin

CSE Conference – Mont-Tremblant

October 16, 2009

____C:C:C:C:\\\\>format C:Y/N>format C:Y/N>format C:Y/N>format C:Y/N

Page 2: Thank you for collaborating with your local hackers

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Start to think out of the box…

… and realize what hackers know that you don't… !

Because they WILL use it to their advantage, against you or your customers !

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Let’s try to think out of the box…

• How can we make 4 triangles, with 6 matches… ?

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?

?

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You have to think out of the box, just like the hackers do…

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You know we’re getting at… Right ?

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Overview of the presentation

• Public information gathering

• The WiFi Landscape

• Social Networks / Social hacking / Engineering

• Spamming, phishing & Cross-site Scripting

• The infamous Botnets

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Public information gathering

• Whois, nslookup / dig, ARIN, RF monitoring, etc…

• Google (Maps / Earth, Groups, Blogs, Images, etc…)

• Wigle.net, Wireless Geographic Loggin Engine

• Enterprise Register

• Specialized tools (Maltego, Lazy Champ, Kismet, etc…)

• Social Networking Sites

• Did you know you were leaking that much..?Did you know you were leaking that much..?Did you know you were leaking that much..?Did you know you were leaking that much..?

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The WiFi Landscape

• Use Radio frequencies

• Electromagnetic shared medium, think hub !

• Physical environment dependencies

• Users can move, Phy environment can change

• CSMA/CA instead CSMA/CD, or transmit and pray

• Indoor / outdoor

• Antenna pattern

• New security considerations

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New vector to protect from….

• Protect network from unauthorized users

• Rogue AP, session hijacking, eavesdropping

• Protect users from unauthorized networks– Fake AP

NetworkNetworkNetworkNetwork UsersUsersUsersUsers

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Don’t

• Disclose personal information in the SSID name of your network

• Relying on masking your SSID is useless:– Provide a false sense of security

– User don’t know and reach for other

– The stations are broadcasting the SSID they’re trying to reach anyway (Probe requests)

• Filtering MAC addresses is useless– Always transmit in clear text

– Easy to spoof

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© Bell Canada, 2009. Tous droits réservés

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Page 14: Thank you for collaborating with your local hackers

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DOS attack require expensive equipements

• Micro-wave fork attack

• WiFi jammer

UsuallyUsuallyUsuallyUsually 2.450 2.450 2.450 2.450 GighzGighzGighzGighz, , , ,

justjustjustjust betweenbetweenbetweenbetween ChChChCh 8888----9, in 9, in 9, in 9, in

the ISM band and 500the ISM band and 500the ISM band and 500the ISM band and 500----

1000 watts !!! Vs AP 4 1000 watts !!! Vs AP 4 1000 watts !!! Vs AP 4 1000 watts !!! Vs AP 4

wattswattswattswatts

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We are protected…

• We have firewall

– Facing Internet ! (dude!!!)

– We provide a corporate Lan access jack

• in the parking lot (WiFi)

• We don’t have any wireless… neither policies !

– Neither wireless detection, ;-(

– Laptop with WiFi card (ad-hoc mode)

Internet

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Authentication & encryption

• We use encryption– WEP-RC4 or TKIP-RC4, AES-CCMP

• We use authentication– PSK or Enterprise (Eg: Radius)

– SSID, 802.1x, EAP-TLS, PEAP, etc, (PWD, Certificat)

– EAP, Sitting on WEP/TKIP, AES ?

– Always use strong password policy (LEAP—ASLEAP)

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Working @ home

• I use WEP, WPA-PSK

– you are acting like a rogue AP, if your home network is not protect

• Anayway, I use VPN to connect to the office

– Your lucky, if it never drop when your not in front of your PC

– Enforce layer 2 security even if you use VPN

• All PCs at home are safe

– Kids PCs, Playstation, lots of treath from the inside

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Rogue threats

• Good guys friendly/unaware

– Implement by users to facilitate network

access, always against organization policy

(when they exist…)

• Malicious

– To provide network backdoor

• Unintended

– Authorized but misconfigured equipment

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Ad-Hoc mode

• Ad-hoc mode are insecure– All stations control the communication no APs

– Unencrypted or WEP• Look the same or very close

• With aircrack-ng you get the WEP key and import it in Wiresharkto decrypt on the fly.

– User may use windows bridging utility to give access to wire Lan from the ad-hoc segment

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Free WiFi accesWonderfull Hot spot

• Hot spot controller only identifies authorized user by MAC+IP add

• At login, a popup logoff window is opened, normally block by popup-bloker

• Sessions stay active until inactivity timeout

• Excellent receipt for session Hijacking

– Script to monitor inactivity

– Spoof MAC and IP address (Pickupline)

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Hot spot cont….

• Hotspot are identified only by SSID

• Station reach for the highest signal

• High power soft-AP may be use to capture clients

HotspotHotspotHotspotHotspot APAPAPAP

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Hot spot…Sidejacking.

• Common for popular sites to do authentication

over HTTPS (Gmail)

– and reverts to HTTP after authentication

• Raison they can support HTTPS for all users

– HTTPS is an option you have to select

• The attack consist to retrieve the session cookie,

no need of your credentials

– Attacker can impersonate the user

– Doesn’t affect the active session

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Hot spot injections Airpw

• begin page_html• match ^(GET|POST)• ignore ^GET [^ ?]+\.(jpg|jpeg|gif|png|tif|tiff)• response content/page_html• -----------------------------------------------------------------

• HTTP/1.1 200 OK• Connection: close• Content-Type: text/html

• <html><head><title>HELLO CSE!</title>• </head><body>• <blink><font size=+5 color=red>• Hello CSE! I'm watching you !• </font>• </blink>• <p>

Internet

HTTP HTTP HTTP HTTP reqreqreqreq

sniffsniffsniffsniff

HTTP req

HTTPHTTPHTTPHTTP

responseresponseresponseresponse

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Hot spot recommendations

• Lack of layer 2 security require stronger upper-layer defences

• Personal firewall, HIPS, AV is a must and

– Patch, patch, patch

• Restrict permitted SSID

• Use VPN tunnelled traffic at hotspots

• Security awareness for Hot spot utilisation

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Black Berry

• They are secure, but users are not always

• Social engineering vulnerability

– Malware download, turn de BB into a remote

cam or microphone or redirect mail

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6 things to consider

• Security policy

• Strong authentication

• Strong encryption

• Monitoring

• Auditing

• Security awareness

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Social Engineering

What is social engineering?

Is there any social engineers in the room ?

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Social Networks and Social Engineering

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Social Engineering + Social Networks =

• Some people post their life – (Kids, vacations, etc..)

• Security relies on a username/password– Could be easy to get in

• ID spoofing – Could ask money to the victim’s known contacts

• Koobface– Worm – Infected 2.9M machines just in the US (Soc. Eng.)

• Install a Web Server and fake antivirus, send fake messages,

• Foils CAPTCHA, Steal Data,

• Hijack Web sessions, Change Domain Name System (DNS)

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Social Networks and Social Engineering

• Microblog (Max 140 characters -> SMS)

• Security relies on a username/password– Could be easy to get in

• ID spoofing – Could ask money to the victim’s known contacts

• New way of spamming• Are used to control Botnets• All kind of information could be posted on it (same as forums, BB)

– Corporate

– Sensitive

– Etc..

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Spam

• What is it ?

Did you know that 86.4% of all e-mail in Sep 09 was spam ?

• Who ?

• Why ?

• When ?

• How ?

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Phishing

• What is it ?Did you know that 1 in 437 e-mails comprised a phishing attack?

• Who ?

• Why ?

• When ?

• How ?

• Here’s some examples…

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Example of Phishing

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Example of Phishing

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Web Site (very popular)

Web Site (vulnerable to XSS)

User

XSS example

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XSS example Web Site (very popular)

UserWeb Site

(vulnerable to XSS)

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Another Example <Metasploit>

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Spamming + phishing = Lo$$ & Profit$

Phishing

Spam

min

g

Lo$$ & Profit$

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The infamous botnet

IRC client

Cuba

IRC Servers (Internet Relay Chat)

Relay

Japan

Relay

Russia

Relay

China

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Methodes of propagation

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X OK

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Peer to peer botnet

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Fast flux botnet

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Botnet controled via Twitter

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Botnet controled via Google Groups

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FirewallAntivirus

Intrusion Detection

Security in surface…

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FirewallAntivirus

Intrusion Detection

Security PolicySecurity Policy

Organizational SecurityOrganizational Security

Information ClassificationInformation Classification

Personnel SecurityPersonnel Security

Physical and EnvironmentalSecurity

Physical and EnvironmentalSecurity

Communications and Operations Management

Communications and Operations Management

Access ControlAccess Control

Systems Development and Maintenance

Systems Development and Maintenance

Business ContinuityManagement

Business ContinuityManagement

ComplianceCompliance

* 10 domains of security - ISO 17799

Security in depth

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Information security sometimes

require solutions, that may not be in

“a box”…

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Questions ?Questions ?